COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, PATNAversusM/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.

                 [2023] 15 S.C.R. 421 : 2023 INSC 910



                           CASE DETAILS

     COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND
                SERVICE TAX, PATNA
                                    v.
        M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT.
                       LTD. & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 3991 of 2023 Etc.)
                          OCTOBER 13, 2023
      [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
                             HEADNOTES
      Issue for consideration: Whether the educational institutions-Indian
Institute of Technology, Patna and the National Institute of Technology,
Rourkela are covered by the definition of “governmental authority” in
Mega Service Tax Exemption Notification inter alia exempting various
services from the tax network rendered to government, governmental, or
local authorities.
     Tax/Taxation – Service tax – Exemption from – Eligibility –
Educational institutions-IIT Patna and NIT Rourkela if covered by the
definition of ‘Government authority’ in Mega Service Tax Exemption
Notification No. 25/2012, G.S.R 467(E) dated 20th June, 2012, exempting
various service from service tax:
      Held: Educational institutions-IIT Patna and NIT Rourkela fall under
the amended definition of ‘Government authority’ under clause 2(s) and
are eligible for the benefit in the Exemption Notification to the educational
institutions and exempted from service tax – Amended definition of
‘government authority’ in clause 2(s) by way of Clarification Notification,
has widened the exemption base for service tax to be provided even to an
authority or a board or any other body, set up by an Act of Parliament or a
State Legislature without the condition of having been established with 90%
or more participation by way of equity or control by Government to carry
out any function entrusted to a municipality u/Art. 243W – Clarification
Notification introduced an amended version of clause 2(s), which re-defined
                                   421
422          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


“governmental authority” with a purpose to make the clause workable in
contra-distinction to the earlier definition – Decisions of the Patna High
Court and the Orissa High Court rightly extending the benefit of the
Exemption Notification to the educational institutions, and a fortiori, to
SPCL, is upheld – Thus, the impugned judgments and orders are upheld –
Constitution of India – Art. 243W. [Paras 30, 34]
      Circular/Government order/Notification – Mega Service Tax
Exemption Notification – Clause 2(s)(as amended by clarification
Notification), defining ‘Government Authority’ – Interpretation of word
‘or’ employed in clause 2(s):
      Held: Word “or” employed in clause 2(s) manifests the legislative intent
of prescribing an alternative – Going by the golden rule of interpretation that
words should be read in their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meaning,
the word “or” in clause 2(s) clearly appears to have been used to reflect the
ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative, giving a choice;
and, a different meaning cannot be assigned unless it leads to vagueness or
makes clause 2(s) absolutely unworkable – Word “or” between sub-clauses
(i) and (ii) indicates the independent and disjunctive nature of sub-clause
(i), meaning thereby that “or” used after sub-clause (i) cannot be interpreted
as “and” so as to tie it with the condition enumerated in the long line of
clause 2(s) which is applicable only to sub-clause (ii) – Literally read, the
conjunction ‘or’ between sub-clauses (i) and (ii) clearly divides the two
clauses in two parts with the first part completely independent of the second
part – First part is by itself complete and capable of operating independently
– While the Clarification Notification introduced an amended version of
clause 2(s), “governmental authority” was re-defined with a purpose to
make the clause workable in contra-distinction to the earlier definition –
Thus, this Court cannot overstep and interpret “or” as “and” so as to allow
the alternative outlined in clause 2(s) to vanish – There exists no ambiguity
insofar as the interpretation of clause 2(s) is concerned – Notification No.
25/2012, G.S.R 467(E) dated 20th June, 2012. [Paras 23, 24, 28].
     Circular/Government order/Notification – Mega Service Tax
Exemption Notification – Clause 2(s)(as amended by clarification
Notification) – Punctuation in clause 2(s) of the Clarification Notification
defining ‘Government Authority’ – Interpretation of:
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 423
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.


       Held: Punctuation, though a minor element, may be resorted to for
the purpose of construction – Use of a semicolon is not a trivial matter but a
deliberate inclusion with a clear intention to differentiate it from sub-clause
(ii) – Upon a plain and literal reading of clause 2(s) that while there is a
semicolon after sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) closes with a comma, this
essentially supports the only possible construction that the use of a comma
after sub-clause (ii) relates it with the long line provided after that and, by
no stretch of imagination, the application of the long line can be extended
to sub-clause (i), the scope of which ends with the semicolon – Thus, the
long line of clause 2(s) governs only sub-clause (ii) and not sub-clause (i)
because the introduction of semicolon after sub- clause (i), followed by the
word “or”, has established it as an independent category, thereby making
it distinct from sub-clause (ii) – If the author wanted both these parts to be
read together, there is no plausible reason as to why it did not use the word
“and” and without the punctuation semicolon – Clarification Notification
amended clause 2(s), and redefined “governmental authority” with a purpose
to make the clause workable in contra-distinction to the earlier definition
– Interpretation of statutes – Notification No. 25/2012, G.S.R 467(E) dt
20.06.2012. [Paras 26, 27]
     Interpretation of statutes – Interpretation of the relevant provision
– Rules of interpretation:
      Held: Plain and ambiguous provision must be interpreted in the same
way as it has been stipulated and not in a way that it presumes deficiency and
radically changes the meaning and context of the provision – Interpretation
of the relevant provision resulting in the expanded scope of its operation
cannot in itself be sufficient to attribute ambiguity to the provision – To make
a statute workable by employing interpretative tools and to venture into a
kind of judicial legislation are two different things – Merely because the
statute does not yield intended or desired results, that cannot be reason to
overstep and cross the line by employing tools of interpretation to interpret
a provision keeping in mind its outcome – Interpretative tools should
be employed to make a statute workable and not to reach to a particular
outcome. [Paras 20, 32, 33]
     Maxims - Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio
contra verba expressa fienda est – Meaning of:
424           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


     Held: When there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition
contrary to the words is to be made. [Para 30]

       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar and
Company & Ors. (2018) 9 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 1191 – held inapplicable.
      Barun Kumar & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (2022) SCC OnLine
SC 1093; Bihar State Electricity Board v. Pulak Enterprises & Ors. (2009) 5
SCC 641; ONGC Ltd v. Afcons Gunanusa JV (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1122;
Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1 : [2016] 10 SCR
1; Akshaibar Lal (Dr.) v. Vice-Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University (1961)
3 SCR 386; ITC Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata (2019)
17 SCC 46 : [2019] 13 SCR 357; Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer,
State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta (1967) 2 SCR 170; Union
of India & Ors. v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 635 : [2011] 2
SCR 1087; Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd (1961)
2 SCR 189; Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1987) 3
SCC 279 : [1987] 3 SCR 317; Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co (1928)
1 K.B. 561, page 56; Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen
(2010) 2 SCC 513 : [2010] 1 SCR 1127; Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young
Lawyers Association & Ors. (2020) 9 SCC 121; Girdhari Lal & Sons v.
Balbir Nath Mathur (1986) 2 SCC 237 : [1986] 1 SCR 383 – referred to.
      Green vs. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co (1928) 1 K.B. 561 - referred to.
      Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice GP Singh's - referred to.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3991 of 2023.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 03.03.2016 of the High Court of
Patna in CWJC No.16965 of 2015.
      With
      Civil Appeal No. 3992 of 2023.
      Appearances:
   Balbir Singh, A.S.G., Gopal Sankar Narayanan, Sr. Adv., Mukesh
Kumar Maroria, Ms. Nisha Bagchi, Rupesh Kumar, Veer Vikrant Singh,
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 425
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.


Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Vikrant Singh, Rakesh Karela, Jaiyesh Bakhshi, Ravi
Tyagi, Gaurav Mishra, Chirag Sharma, Daman Popli, Ms. Ria Chanda, Ms.
Neetu Devrani, Ms. Sakshi Tibrewal, Ms. Saksha Jha, Ms. Aditi Gupta, P.
V. Yogeswaran, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Mrs. Alka Agarwal, Prashant Singh II,
Shantnu Sharma, Ms. Vibhooti Malhotra, Bhuvnesh Satija, Udit Sharma,
Advs. for the appearing parties.

       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                 JUDGMENT
     DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
     PREFACE
      1. We are tasked to decide two civil appeals that centre around a
common question: whether the educational institutions in question, viz. (i)
the Indian Institute of Technology, Patna (“IIT Patna”, hereafter) and (ii)
the National Institute of Technology, Rourkela (“NIT Rourkela”, hereafter),
are covered by the definition of “governmental authority” in Mega Service
Tax Exemption Notification1 (“Exemption Notification”, hereafter) inter alia
exempting various services from the tax network rendered to government,
governmental, or local authorities. If “governmental authority” as defined
in the Exemption Notification takes within its embrace IIT Patna and NIT
Rourkela, they would be eligible for an exemption from the service tax that
otherwise applies to construction services provided by service providers or
subcontractors within their premises.
     THE APPEALS
      2. In Civil Appeal No. 3991 of 2023 (“CA-I”, hereafter), the appellant
assails the judgment and order dated 03rd March, 2016 of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna (“Patna High Court”, hereafter) whereby a writ petition2
preferred by the first respondent, i.e., M/s Shapoorji Pallonji & Company
Pvt Ltd (“SPCL”, hereafter) was allowed and the service tax collected by
the appellant was directed to be refunded.



1   No. 25/2012, G.S.R 467(E) dated 20th June, 2012
2   CWJC No. 16965 of 2015
426              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      3. Civil Appeal No. 3992 of 2023 (“CA-II” hereafter) challenges the
judgment and order dated 05th February, 2018 of the High Court of Orissa
at Cuttack (“Orissa High Court”, hereafter). The Orissa High Court while
relying on the aforesaid decision of the Patna High Court in favour of SPCL,
on a similar question of law, allowed a writ petition3 preferred by SPCL for
refund of service tax.
       THE RELEVANT NOTIFICATIONS
     4. The Exemption Notification, under consideration, was issued by the
Department of Revenue under section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994 (“the
1994 Act”, hereafter) inter alia exempting various taxable services from the
levy of whole of the service tax under section 66B thereof. Clause 12(c) of
the Exemption Notification, which is relevant for the purpose of the present
adjudication, reads as follows:
       “12. Services provided to the Government, a local authority
       or a governmental authority by way of construction, erection,
       commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair,
       maintenance, renovation, or alteration of –
       (a) ***
       (b) ***
       (c) a structure meant predominantly for use as (i) an educational, (ii)
       a clinical, or (iii) an art or cultural establishment;
       (d) ***
       (e) ***
       (f) ***”
     5. Since we are concerned with the interpretation of “governmental
authority”, clause 2(s) of the Exemption Notification defining “governmental
authority” is reproduced hereunder:
       “(s) “governmental authority” means a board, or an authority or any
       other body established with 90% or more participation by way of equity



3     W.P. (C) No. 17188 of 2015
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 427
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

     or control by Government and set up by an Act of the Parliament or a
     State Legislature to carry out any function entrusted to a municipality
     under article 243W of the Constitution.”
       6. It may also be noticed that section 66D of the 1994 Act, inserted by
the Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 1st July, 2012, specifies the negative
list of services, i.e., the services on which service tax is not leviable.
      7. Clause 2(s) of the Exemption Notification underwent an amendment
vide a Notification dated 30th January, 2014 (“Clarification Notification”,
hereafter). This amendment, re-defining “governmental authority”, sought
to broaden the scope of the exemption. The amended definition is set out
hereinbelow:
     “(s) “governmental authority” means an authority or a board or any
     other body;
     (i) set up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature; or
     (ii) established by Government,
           with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control, to
     carry out any function entrusted to a municipality under article 243W
     of the Constitution.”
      8. Having outlined the relevant legal framework under consideration,
we consider it proper to delve into the facts that formed the genesis of the
writ petitions before the Patna High Court and the Orissa High Court.
     FACTS
     9. The material facts, leading to the presentation of CA-I, are as
follows:
     a) IIT Patna, the fourth respondent, appointed NBCC India
        Limited (“NBCC”, hereafter), the third respondent, as a Project
        Management Consultant to oversee the construction of building/
        facilities/services for its academic complex. Vide Letter of
        Award dated 20th December, 2012, NBCC awarded the contract
        for construction works to SPCL at a total contract price of
        Rs.167,70,09,043.00 (Rupees One hundred Sixty-Seven Crore
        Seventy Lakh Nine Thousand Forty-Three only). Clause 4.2.4 of
428          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


          the Letter of Award specified that the aforementioned rates did not
          include service tax and that SPCL would be reimbursed for this
          tax by IIT Patna upon providing receipts.
      b) SPCL, in accordance with the Letter of Award, duly registered
         itself with the Central Excise and Service Tax (“CEST”,
         hereafter) and discharged its service tax obligations amounting
         to Rs.9,73,25,398.23 (Rupees Nine Crore Seventy-Three Lakh
         Twenty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Eight and Twenty-
         Three paisa) for the period spanning from March 2013 to April
         2015. It is important to note that these service tax amounts were
         integrated into the monthly running bills for the aforementioned
         months, which were submitted by SPCL and subsequently
         approved and paid by IIT Patna. This meant that IIT Patna was
         ultimately responsible for settling the service tax dues.
      c) The Indian Audit and Account Department raised an audit objection
         on 30th June, 2015 to the effect that service providers engaged
         in construction activities for educational institutions meeting
         the criteria of a “government, local authority, or governmental
         authority” according to clause 12(c) of the Exemption Notification
         were not obligated to remit service tax. Consequently, because IIT
         Patna was classified as a governmental authority, the payment of
         service tax by them was objected as such payment contravened
         the exemption provision specified in the Exemption Notification.
         Additionally, IIT Patna was directed to immediately undertake
         actions for the recovery or adjustment of the service tax previously
         paid to SPCL.
      d) Following receipt of the audit objection, IIT Patna notified NBCC
         vide a letter dated 27th August, 2015 and conveyed that the Joint
         Secretary (Tax Research Unit) at the Government of India’s
         Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, had clarified the
         definition of auxiliary educational services. This clarification
         included an enumeration of various services eligible educational
         institutions could receive and which would be exempted from
         service tax. Notably, this clarification did not specifically mention
         construction activity. Additionally, IIT Patna expressed its
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 429
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

        intention to establish a methodology for the recovery of service
        tax reimbursement.
    e) Apprehensive of the initiation of recovery proceedings for the
       service tax already paid, SPCL approached the Patna High Court
       seeking the following relief:
         “(i) the instructions of the respondent no.2 dated 30.06.2015
         (as contained in Annexure-6) directing immediate recovery
         adjustment of service tax reimbursed by the respondent no.4 be
         quashed.
         (ii) for a declaration that [IIT Patna] is obliged to reimburse
         service tax paid by the [SPCL] on the service of construction of
         its building premises.
         (iii) alternatively for a direction to the [Commissioner, Customs
         Central Excise and Service Tax] to refund the amount of service
         tax paid by [SPCL] on the service of construction of building
         premises of [IIT Patna] in pursuance of the contract.”
    f) Vide the impugned judgment, the Patna High Court allowed the
       writ petition of SPCL and held that IIT Patna would indeed be
       covered within the definition of a “governmental authority” under
       clause 2(s). In its interpretation of clause 2(s), the Court observed
       that provisions contained in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 2(s)
       are independent disjunctive provisions and the expression “90%
       or more participation by way of equity or control to carry out any
       function entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W of the
       Constitution” is related to sub-clause (ii) alone because sub-clause
       (i) is followed by the punctuation “;” and then by the conjunction
       “or”. According to the Court, any authority set up by an Act of
       Parliament or by an Act of the State Legislature as envisaged in
       sub-clause (i), therefore, cannot be made subject to the condition
       of “90% or more participation by way of equity or control” and it
       is only an authority or a board or any other body established by the
       Government as envisaged under sub-clause (ii) of clause 2(s) that
       has to meet the requirement of governmental participation of 90%
       or more by way of equity or control. It was, accordingly, ruled that
430          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2023] 15 S.C.R.


         the construction activity undertaken by SPCL is exempt from
         payment of service tax in terms of the Exemption Notification
         read with the Clarification Notification, followed by a direction
         that the service tax collected by the Revenue shall be refunded
         to SPCL or IIT Patna, as the case may be.
     10. The relevant facts, leading to the presentation of CA-II, are as
follows:
      a) SPCL was awarded a works contract vide Work Order dated
         22nd February, 2013 by NIT Rourkela to carry out construction
         projects at its campus. The total value of the contract was
         Rs.302,82,39,866.00 (Rupees Three Hundred Two Crore
         Eighty-Two Lakh Thirty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-
         Six only). Clause 12 of the Work Order stated that the aforesaid
         price shall be inclusive of all taxes except service tax which
         may be reimbursed as applicable.
      b) SPCL sought clarifications from the Service Tax Commissionerate
         regarding the applicability of service tax on services rendered
         to NIT, Rourkela.
      c) SPCL, however, discharged its service tax liability amounting
         to Rs 5,79,17,168.00 (Rupees Five Crore Seventy-Nine Lakh
         Seventeen Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Eight only) to the
         Service Tax Department and raised all the bills to NIT, Rourkela
         charging service tax. However, no service tax was paid by NIT,
         Rourkela claiming that the work executed is exempt from the
         payment of service tax.
      d) Aggrieved, SPCL approached the Orissa High Court for
         reimbursement of such service tax payment.
      e) The Orissa High Court, vide the impugned judgment, allowed
         the writ petition of SPCL by relying upon the judgment and
         order of the Patna High Court, as aforesaid. The Deputy
         Commissioner of Service Tax was directed to dispose of
         SPCL’s pending application for refund of service tax within
         two months.
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 431
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

     SUBMISSIONS
      11. Ms. Bagchi, learned counsel representing the appellants in both
the appeals, contended that IIT Patna and NIT Rourkela were not eligible
for the benefits outlined in the Exemption Notification due to its exclusion
from the definition of “governmental authority”. In contesting the impugned
judgment and order of the Patna High Court, she advanced the following
submissions:
     a) The Amendment to the Exemption Notification carried out vide the
        Clarification Notification aimed to broaden its applicability beyond
        statutory bodies, extending its benefits to government-established
        entities as well. The Clarification Notification further clarified
        this expansion by encompassing government-established bodies
        within the definition of “governmental authorities”. However, it is
        important to note that the requirement of 90% or more government
        equity or control still applies to both types of governmental bodies,
        whether they are statutory or non-statutory.
     b) The High Court’s error lay in its interpretation of the sub-clauses
        as independent and disjunctive. The deliberate separation of the
        condition of “90% or more participation” from sub-clause (ii)
        serves the specific intent of making it applicable to both sub-
        clauses.
     c) It is firmly established that punctuation marks alone should not
        dictate the interpretation of a statute, especially when meaning
        of the statute is clear without them. The general principle is that
        punctuation marks carry less weight in the interpretation of statutes,
        especially when dealing with subordinate legislation. Furthermore,
        punctuation marks may convey different impressions, and their
        interpretation should not be isolated but considered in conjunction
        with other clauses to discern legislative intent. To support this
        argument, reference was made to the decisions of this Court in
        Barun Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.4, Bihar State




4   (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1093
432            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


            Electricity Board vs. Pulak Enterprises & Ors.5, and ONGC Ltd
            vs. Afcons Gunanusa JV6.
       d) The terms ‘or’ and ‘and’ can be interchangeably interpreted to
          fulfil the legislative intent. In this context, reference was made
          to the rulings of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of
          Haryana7, Barun Kumar (supra) and Akshaibar Lal (Dr.) v.
          Vice-Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University8.
       e) The impugned judgment of the Patna High Court carries the risk
          of unconditionally broadening the coverage and scope of the
          exemption to include various public bodies, such as Telecom
          Regulatory Authority of India, Airports Authority of India,
          and public sector banks. These entities could potentially claim
          exemptions under different clauses of the Exemption Notification,
          covering various services provided by a “governmental authority”.
          A lenient interpretation of the term “governmental authority”
          could unfairly burden the exchequer. Reliance was placed on the
          decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Commissioner
          of Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar and Company &
          Ors.9 wherein it was held that any notification or a clause granting
          an exemption must be interpreted strictly and literally, with any
          ambiguity resolved in favour of the revenue.
       f)   IIT Patna and NIT Rourkela are institutions incorporated under
            central statutes, i.e., the Indian Institute of Technology Act,
            1961 (“the 1961 Act”, hereafter) and the National Institutes of
            Technology Act, 2007 (“the 2007 Act”, hereafter), respectively,
            and they do not carry out any duties or responsibilities akin to
            Schedule XII of the Constitution; the two educational institutions,
            therefore, do not fall under the classification of “governmental
            authority” nor are exempted under the negative list.



5     (2009) 5 SCC 641
6     (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1122
7     (2017) 12 SCC 1
8     (1961) 3 SCR 386
9     (2018) 9 SCC 1
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 433
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

      g) SPCL has paid service tax through self-assessment. Reliance was
         placed on ITC Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,
         Kolkata10 in support of the contention that the order of self-
         assessment being an assessment order under the Customs Act,
         1962 is appealable and a refund claim is not sustainable unless
         the assessment itself is set aside.
      h) Classification of IIT Patna as a “governmental authority” has
         no bearing on the applicability of service tax to the transaction
         between SPCL and NBCC. The crux of the argument lies in the
         specific nature of this case: SPCL has delivered its services to
         NBCC, not directly to IIT Patna. IIT Patna has engaged NBCC
         as a Project Management Consultant, making SPCL the service
         provider and NBCC the service recipient in this particular
         transaction. Consequently, it cannot be contended that SPCL
         provided services directly to IIT Patna. NBCC lacks the status of
         a “government, local authority, or governmental authority” under
         the Exemption Notification, and it has not asserted such a claim.
         Therefore, the activities and transactions between SPCL and
         NBCC are subject to service tax and do not qualify for exemption
         under the Exemption Notification.
      12. Learned counsel representing SPCL, supported the impugned
judgment and order of the Patna High Court and contended that while
construction services are classified as taxable under section 65 of the
1994 Act, the Exemption Notification provides an exemption for services
rendered to the Government, local authorities, or governmental authorities.
IIT Patna, as an institution of national importance, was established by the
Parliament under Article 248 of the Constitution, through the 1961 Act.
Similarly, NIT Rourkela was established under the 2007 Act. Consequently,
IIT Patna and NIT Rourkela should be considered governmental authorities
in accordance with clause 2(s)(i) of the Exemption Notification, read in
conjunction with the Clarification Notification. In reply to the submission
of the appellants that the classification of IIT Patna as a “governmental
authority” would not have any bearing on the applicability of service tax to


10   (2019) 17 SCC 46
434           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2023] 15 S.C.R.


the transaction between SPCL and NBCC as service provider and service
recipient respectively, learned counsel drew support from clause 29(h) of the
Exemption Notification which exempts services provided by sub-contractors
by way of works contract to another contractor providing works contract
services which are already exempted under the Exemption Notification.
Accordingly, it was submitted that there was no merit in the appeals and
the same deserved outright dismissal.
      13. Learned counsel appearing for IIT Patna supported the impugned
judgment and order of the Patna High Court. According to him, IIT Patna
qualifies as a “governmental authority” under the Exemption Notification
as amended by the Clarification Notification. It was further submitted that
the provisions contained in sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (ii) of clause 2(s)
are independent disjunctive provisions and the expression ”90% or more
participation by way of equity or control” is related to sub-clause (ii) alone,
meaning thereby that an authority established by Government should have
90% or more participation in order to be exempted from service tax. The
authority set up by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature is not subject
to this condition. No case for interference having been set up, the counsel
prayed for dismissal of CA-I.
      ANALYSIS
      14. Before we commence our analysis, it would be apt to juxtapose
the relevant clauses from the Exemption Notification and the Clarification
Notification for facility of appreciation:
 EXEMPTION NOTIFICATION                      CLARIFICATION NOTIFICATION
 2(s) “governmental authority’’ means        2(s) “governmental authority” means an
 a board, or an authority or any other       authority or a board or any other body;
 body established with 90% or more
                                                   (i) Set up by an Act of Parliament
 participation by way of equity or
                                                   or a State Legislature; or
 control by Government and set up by
 an Act of the Parliament or a State               (ii) established by Government,
 Legislature to carry out any function
                                             with 90% or more participation by way
 entrusted to a municipality under article   of equity or control, to carry out any
 243W of the Constitution;
                                             function entrusted to a municipality
                                             under article 243W of the Constitution;
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 435
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

      15. Having read the two definitions, first and foremost, it is necessary
to ascertain the objective behind the Clarification Notification which
amended the Exemption Notification and re-defined “governmental
authority”. A bare perusal of the Exemption Notification reveals that
the exemption therein was only extended to those entities, viz. board or
authority or body, which fulfilled the three requisite conditions, i.e. : a)
having been established with 90% or more participation by way of equity
or control by Government, b) set up by an Act of the Parliament or a State
Legislature, and c) carrying out any function entrusted to a municipality
under Article 243W of the Constitution. It is evident that the scope of
the exemption was severely restricted to only a few entities. Although
the reason for re-defining “governmental authority” has not been made
available by the appellants, we presume that unworkability of the scheme
for grant of exemption because of the restricted definition of “governmental
authority” was the trigger therefor and hence, the scope of the exemption
was expanded to cover a larger section of entities answering the definition
of “governmental authority”. An amendment by way of the Clarification
Notification was, therefore, introduced which expanded the definition of
“governmental authority” and widened the exemption base for service
tax to be provided even to an authority or a board or any other body, set
up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature without the condition
of having been established with 90% or more participation by way of
equity or control by Government to carry out any function entrusted to a
municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution.
      16. While the aforesaid interpretation of amended clause 2(s) has been
upheld by the Patna High Court, the appellants have countered the same by
submitting that the amended definition of “governmental authority” as in
clause 2(s) should be interpreted in a manner so as to make the long line
under clause 2(s) applicable to both sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (ii). In
other words, as per the appellants, to qualify as a “governmental authority”
under clause 2(s)(i), such authority, board or body must not only be a
statutory authority set up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature
but must also have 90% or more participation of the Government by way
of equity or control to carry out any like function that a municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution is entrusted to discharge.
436            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.


    17. We have no hesitation to disagree with the latter interpretation
sought to be placed by the appellants, for the reasons that follow.
      18. In Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal
vs. Corporation of Calcutta11, a nine-judge Bench of this Court, relying
upon Craies’ On Statute Law (6th edn), stated that where the language of
a statute is clear, the words are in themselves precise and unambiguous,
and a literal reading does not lead to absurd construction, the necessity
for employing rules of interpretation disappears and reaches its vanishing
point.
      19. This Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories
Ltd.12, held that harmonious construction is required to be given to a
provision only when it is shrouded in ambiguity and lacks clarity, rather
than when it is unequivocally clear and unambiguous.
      20. What is plain and ambiguous from a bare reading of a provision
under consideration must be interpreted in the same way as it has been
stipulated and not in a way that it presumes deficiency and radically changes
the meaning and context of the provision. This is the view expressed in
the decision of a five-judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales
Tax, U.P. vs. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.13. The relevant passage therefrom
reads as under:
       “10. […] In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations
       are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on
       any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at
       the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing
       statute in the light of what is clearly expressed : it cannot imply
       anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the
       statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency.”
      21. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation
that any authority, entrusted with the function of legislating, legislates
for a purpose; it can, thus, safely be assumed that it will not indulge in



11    (1967) 2 SCR 170
12    (2011) 4 SCC 635
13    (1961) 2 SCR 189
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 437
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

unnecessary or pointless legislation. This Court, in Utkal Contractors &
Joinery (P) Ltd. vs State of Orissa14, lucidly explained thus:
      “9. […] It is again important to remember that Parliament does not
      waste its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use
      unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express
      itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without
      meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation
      is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake
      of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation.
      Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is
      unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament
      may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily.”
      22. Having noticed some of the precedents in the field of interpretation
of statutes, we now move on to a little bit of English grammar. The word
“or” as well as the word “and” is a conjunction; and it is well known
that a conjunction is used to join words, phrases, or clauses. On how the
conjunctions “or” and “and” are to be read, guidance could be drawn
from authoritative texts and judicial decisions. As per Justice GP Singh’s
Principles of Statutory Interpretation, the word “or” is normally disjunctive
while the word “and” is normally conjunctive. In English law, the position
is clear as crystal, as explained by Lord Scrutton in Green vs. Premier
Glynrhonwy Slate Co.15, that one does not read “or” as “and” in a statute
unless one is obliged, because “or” does not generally mean “and” and “and”
does not generally mean “or”.
      23. When the meaning of the provision in question is clear and
unambiguous by the usage of “or” in clause 2(s), there remains no force in
the submission of Ms. Bagchi that “or” should be interpreted as “and”. In
our opinion, the word “or” employed in clause 2(s) manifests the legislative
intent of prescribing an alternative. Going by the golden rule of interpretation
that words should be read in their ordinary, natural, and grammatical
meaning, the word “or” in clause 2(s) clearly appears to us to have been
used to reflect the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative,


14   (1987) 3 SCC 279
15   (1928) 1 K.B. 561, page 569
438            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


giving a choice; and, we cannot assign it a different meaning unless it leads
to vagueness or makes clause 2(s) absolutely unworkable. We are fortified
in our view by the decision of this Court in Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust
vs. A.G. Syed Mohideen16, where it was held thus:
       “11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to
       be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding,
       substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in
       the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary
       or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or
       ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading,
       leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were
       not obviously intended by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court
       should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of
       construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the
       provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should
       remember that it is not the author of the statute who is empowered to
       amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents.
       A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only
       interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to
       achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or
       absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision
       what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature
       intended it to be.”
      24. In the present case, the word “or” between sub-clauses (i) and (ii)
indicates the independent and disjunctive nature of sub-clause (i), meaning
thereby that “or” used after sub-clause (i) cannot be interpreted as “and”
so as to tie it with the condition enumerated in the long line of clause 2(s)
which is applicable only to sub-clause (ii).
      25. Applying a different lens, let us test the worth of Ms. Bagchi’s
submission in the light of the punctuations in clause 2(s). It has been held
by a bench of nine Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Kantaru Rajeevaru
vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors.17 that when a provision is


16    (2010) 2 SCC 513
17    (2020) 9 SCC 121, para 18.
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 439
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should
undoubtedly be given to the punctuation; however, though a punctuation
may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a
controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning.
While so observing, this Court considered several decisions as well as the
punctuation comma in the relevant provision of the Supreme Court Rules,
2013.
      26. What follows is that punctuation, though a minor element, may be
resorted to for the purpose of construction.
      27. In the present case, the use of a semicolon is not a trivial matter
but a deliberate inclusion with a clear intention to differentiate it from sub-
clause (ii). Further, it can be observed upon a plain and literal reading of
clause 2(s) that while there is a semicolon after sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii)
closes with a comma. This essentially supports the only possible construction
that the use of a comma after sub-clause (ii) relates it with the long line
provided after that and, by no stretch of imagination, the application of the
long line can be extended to sub-clause (i), the scope of which ends with
the semicolon. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the long line of clause
2(s) governs only sub-clause (ii) and not sub-clause (i) because of the simple
reason that the introduction of semicolon after sub-clause (i), followed by the
word “or”, has established it as an independent category, thereby making it
distinct from sub-clause (ii). If the author wanted both these parts to be read
together, there is no plausible reason as to why it did not use the word “and”
and without the punctuation semicolon. While the Clarification Notification
introduced an amended version of clause 2(s), the whole canvas was open
for the author to define “governmental authority” whichever way it wished;
however, “governmental authority” was re-defined with a purpose to make
the clause workable in contra-distinction to the earlier definition. Therefore,
we cannot overstep and interpret “or” as “and” so as to allow the alternative
outlined in clause 2(s) to vanish.
     28. Let us consider the problem from a different angle. The revised
definition of “governmental authority” and the few punctuations in the
definition (two semicolons and two commas) and the conjunction ‘or’
have been noticed above. Literally read, the conjunction ‘or’ between sub-
clauses (i) and (ii) clearly divides the two clauses in two parts with the first
440          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


part completely independent of the second part. The first part is by itself
complete and capable of operating independently. A construction leading
to an anomalous result has to be avoided and to so avoid, it has to be held
that the long line of clause 2(s) starting with “with 90%” and ending with
“Constitution” qualifies sub-clause (ii); and, if the conjunction ‘or’ is to be
read as ‘and’, meaning thereby that the portion “with 90% … Constitution”
has to be read as qualifying both sub-clauses (i) and (ii), then the intention
of re-defining “governmental authority” would certainly be defeated. As
discussed earlier, the purpose for which “governmental authority” was re-
defined must have been to make it workable. We cannot, therefore, resort
to a construction that would allow subsistence of the unworkability factor.
Assuming what Ms. Bagchi contended is right, it was incumbent for the
appellants to bring to our notice, if not by way of pleading, but at least
with reference to the relevant statutes, which of the particular authorities/
boards/bodies are created by legislation - Central or State – “with 90% or
more participation by way of equity or control by Government”. Each word
in the definition clause has to be given some meaning and merely because
promoting educational aspects is one of the functions of a municipality in
terms of Article 243W of the Constitution read with Schedule XII appended
thereto is no valid argument unless equity or control by the Government,
to the extent of 90%, is shown to exist qua the relevant authority/board/
body. Incidentally, neither is there any indication in the petition nor has
Ms. Bagchi been able to disclose the identity of any such authority/board/
other body which is covered by her argument. No such identified authority/
board/body covered by the aforesaid construction of the definition of
“governmental authority” in clause 2(s) of the Clarification Notification,
which the appellants appeal to us to accept, having been brought to our
notice, we are unable to find any fault in the decisions of the Patna High
Court and the Orissa High Court extending the benefit of the Exemption
Notification to the educational institutions, and a fortiori, to SPCL.
      29. We need not draw guidance from any of the decisions cited by Ms.
Bagchi, except one, on the question of construction of the relevant clause
because none of those decisions had the occasion to deal with the issue
emanating from the Exemption Notification and the Clarification Notification
that we are tasked to consider.
 COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX, 441
PATNA v. M/S SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

      30. Ms. Bagchi heavily relied on the decision of a five-judge Bench
of this Court in Dilip Kumar (supra) to urge that in case of any ambiguity
in interpreting an exemption notification, the interpretation that favours the
revenue must be adopted; also, the burden of proving applicability of the
exemption notification would be on the assessee to show that his case comes
within the parameters of the exemption clause or exemption notification. At
the outset, we record that there is absolutely no quarrel with the proposition
laid down therein. We, however, reject the contention of Ms. Bagchi based
on Dilip Kumar (supra) because the ratio is not applicable to the facts and
circumstances of this case. This, for the simple reason, that there exists
no ambiguity insofar as the interpretation of clause 2(s) is concerned. We
are endorsed in our opinion by the Latin maxim quoties in verbis nulla est
ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba expressa fienda est, which means
that when there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition contrary
to the words is to be made. It is, therefore, clear as a sunny day that there
arises only one plausible construction of clause 2(s) which is the one the
Patna High Court adopted, and which we are inclined to uphold.
      31. Ms. Bagchi had submitted that the impugned judgment broadens
the scope of the exemption to include vast number of statutory bodies;
therefore, unfairly burdening the exchequer. We observe that the authority
having the competence to issue a notification completed its job by re-
defining “governmental authority” and now it is a task entrusted to the
courts to interpret the law. It is, at this juncture, important to notice the law
laid down by this Court, speaking through Hon’ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.
in Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur18. The position of law was
affirmed in the following terms:
      “6. Where different interpretations are likely to be put on words and
      a question arises what an individual meant when he used certain
      words, he may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say
      that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the legislature
      that has expressed itself by making the laws and difficulties arise in
      interpreting what the legislature has said, a legislature cannot be asked
      to sit to resolve those difficulties. The legislatures, unlike individuals,


18   (1986) 2 SCC 237
442            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      cannot come forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties of
      interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws by finding out
      what the legislature meant is allotted to the courts. Of course, where
      words are clear and unambiguous no question of construction may
      arise. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words
      must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely
      presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. This
      is the real basis of the so-called golden rule of construction that where
      the words of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect must be given
      to them. A court should give effect to plain words, not because there
      is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because
      plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the
      legislature to others as well as judges.”
      32. Keeping the above-said ratio in mind, an interpretation of the
relevant provision resulting in the expanded scope of its operation cannot
in itself be sufficient to attribute ambiguity to the provision.
      33. To make a statute workable by employing interpretative tools and
to venture into a kind of judicial legislation are two different things. Merely
because the statute does not yield intended or desired results, that cannot
be reason for us to overstep and cross the Lakshman Rekha by employing
tools of interpretation to interpret a provision keeping in mind its outcome.
Interpretative tools should be employed to make a statute workable and not
to reach to a particular outcome.
      CONCLUSION
     34. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in these appeals. The
impugned judgments and orders are upheld and the appeals are dismissed,
without any order for costs.




Headnotes prepared by:                                         Appeals dismissed.
Nidhi Jain