BHAVESHBHAI CHAMPAKLAL MEHTAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/CR.MA/26244/2017                         JUDGMENT DATED: 14/08/2026




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD


R/CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET
         ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 26244 of 2017


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
================================================

              Approved for Reporting             Yes             No
                                                                  √
================================================
      BHAVESHBHAI CHAMPAKLAL MEHTA & ANR.
                        Versus
              STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
================================================
Appearance:
MR. SURAJ A SHUKLA(7185) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
MR NK MAJMUDAR(430) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL

                            Date : 14/08/2026

                          ORAL JUDGMENT


1.        Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the Code) by this application, the
applicants have prayed to quash the FIR being C.R. No. I-247 of
2017, dated 05.10.2017, lodged before Kamrej Police Station, Dist.:



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Surat (Rural) for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420,
465, 468, 471, 120B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).


2.        The gravamen of the FIR is that de facto complainant had
rented a Block No. 52 of Survey Nos. 65 and 66, admeasuring 3700
sq. mtr., situated at Village: Dhoran Pardi for a period of 30 years
at the rate of Rs.18,000/- per month to the applicants herein with a
condition to increase 10% annually by an Agreement, which,
allegedly, the complainant did not even read out of trust upon the
applicants. That, initially, the applicants used to pay Rs.10,000/-
without any written note, however, when the Petrol-pump,
constructed thereon, became functional, they paid Rs.18,000/- per
month till 2013 and receipts were also collected through Manager.
It is further alleged that despite de facto complainant having made
repeated demands to the applicants, he was not provided with the
copy of Rent Agreement and hence, the complainant procured a
copy of the same from the office of Sub-registrar and found that
the same was not according to the terms they agreed upon. It is
further alleged that the applicant No. 1 committed fraud upon the
complainant and deposited Rs.20,000/- in the account of the
complainant, however, the complainant returned the said amount.
Thereafter, Rs.5,000/- was also sent by the applicant No. 1 through
post, however, the same also was returned by the complainant.


2.1       The FIR further alleges that on 16.03.2011, the applicants, by
forging signature of the de facto complainant, applied for NA of the


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said land, and such fact of forged signature is confirmed by a
private handwriting expert.            It is further the case of the
prosecution that applicant No. 2 carried out Rent Agreement with
the signature of the de facto complainant for renting the premises
for 97 years and therefore, the brother of the de facto complainant
asked one Ranjitbhai Chaudhary about the same, who, in turn,
replied that said Agreement was executed on 01.06.2020 and 5-7
stamp papers of Rs.5,000/- were also bought from one Kiritbhai.


2.2       It is further alleged that provisions of Section 63 of the
Bombay Tenancy Act have not been followed before granting NA
Permission and it is the complainant who is paying Rs.5,420/- to
the Revenue Department. It is further alleged that the applicants
also got done a mutation entry in the revenue record being Entry
No. 3440 on 15.05.2015 in their names for the purpose of illegally
obtaining the property, however, the said Entry came to be
cancelled by the Mamlatdar and in appeal, the applicants failed.


2.3       Thus, the applicants - accused, in collusion with each other,
presenting false facts and forged documents, committed fraud and
criminal breach of trust, for which, FIR in question came to be
registered.


3.        Heard, learned advocate Mr. Suraj A. Shukla for the
applicants, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Rohan Shah
for the respondent No. 1 – State and learned advocate Mr. Rohan


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Majmudar for learned advocate Mr. N. K. Majmudar for the
respondent No. 2 - de facto complainant, at length.


3.1    The bone contention of the learned advocate for the
applicants is that the ingredients of the offence alleged against the
present applicants are not at all satisfied.


3.2    The learned advocate for the applicants would submit that
on the contrary, the applicants are the victims of the act of the de
facto complainant as the complainant wants to illegally evict and
vacate the tenants for the purpose of selling the land in question.


3.3    The learned advocate for the applicants submitted that only
because the applicants are the family members of other accused,
they have been roped in the crime in question. It is submitted that
otherwise, the de facto complainant was very much present before
the office of the Sub-registrar while executing the Rent Agreement
and thus, was fully aware of the facts. It is submitted that the Rent
Agreement was handed over to the de facto complainant at the time
of execution and thereafter, to the present applicants, which can be
substantiated from the Possession Receipt produced on record.
Further, it is submitted that the applicants have not committed any
wrong but in fact, initially Survey No. 67 was given on rent,
which, later on, was converted to Survey No. 52 and as the
Collector asked for the copy of Agreement qua Survey No. 52 for
granting permission, the de facto complainant himself executed the


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new Rent Agreement.
3.4    It is submitted that from the statements of the complainant
before the Kamrej Police dated 27.12.2010 and before the Circle
Officer dated 29.01.2011 regarding giving no objection for using
the land for the purpose of petrol-pump, respectively, are perused
it would clear that the complainant admits that the lands in
question came to be given for 30 years and 97 years, respectively,
and rent amount was fixed to Rs.5,000/- each.


3.5    The learned advocate for the applicants would submit that
even NA Permission was also applied for by the de facto
complainant himself, which fact can be crystallized from the Reply
dated 06.01.2011 to the Circle Inspector and from the fact that NA
order dated 18.04.2011 was received by the de facto complainant
himself and thus, in the submission of the learned advocate for the
applicants, the de facto complainant was fully aware of all facts.


3.6    It is further submitted that so far as application dated
16.03.2011 is concerned, it is only with a view to reopen the
application dated 24.12.2010 seeking NA Permission as the said
application was not decided within 60 days by the concerned
authority.


3.7    The learned advocate for the applicants would submit that
an application for Plan Sanction before the Town Planning
Authority and before Gram Panchayat was also filed by the de facto


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complainant himself and the complainant was also present at the
time of inauguration of the petrol-pump.


3.8    It is submitted that it is only with a view to remove the
present applicants from the land in question from the legal
tenancy, with ill intention, present proceedings are initiated and as
a part thereof, the de facto complainant also sold the land in
question to one Vinubhai Savaliya by way of a registered Sale
Deed No. 3335/16 dated 15.02.2016.


3.9    The learned advocate for the applicants submitted that in
fact, for vacating the land in question, the de facto complainant was
threatening the applicants for which, a police complaint was also
filed by the applicants and by a communication dated 11.03.2014,
IGP, Surat Division, Surat, requested the SP, Surat (Rural) to take
preventive measures against the complainant and others.               The
applicant No. 2 herein also made an application before the Kamrej
Police Station on 06.04.2015 against the de facto complainant and
others. Further, the applicant No. 2 has also filed a Civil Suit
before the competent Court being Regular Civil Suit No. 40 of 2015
seeking direction to injunct the complainant from dispossessing
the applicants their legal tenancy rights.


3.10 The learned advocate for the applicants would submit that
so-called mutation entry was cancelled in view of the fact of the
fact that civil suit is pending and it was not decided on merits.


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3.11 It is submitted that the dispute, even otherwise, is of civil in
nature which is being given a criminal colour.


3.12 Making such submissions, it is urged that present FIR and
the consequential proceedings qua the applicants may be quashed
and set aside as no prima facie case is made out against the present
applicants.


4.        Conversely, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would,
while opposing this application would submit that FSL Report
reveals the signature of the de facto complainant is forged one and
in the circumstances, it cannot be said this is a civil wrong and
matter requires further investigation and accordingly, it is urged
that this Court may not entertain this application at this stage.


5.        The learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 - de facto
complainant would submit that the applicants, by forging
signature of the de facto complainant, preferred the NA application
for the land in question and in the application dated 16.03.2011, as
confirmed by the private handwriting expert, the signature of the
complainant is forged one.


5.1       It is submitted that the fact of forged signature itself proves
mala fide intention and ulterior motive of the applicants and in the
circumstances, it cannot be said that this is a civil dispute being


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given a criminal colour and thorough investigation is required to
be done in the matter so as to churn out the truth.


5.2       The learned advocate for the de facto complainant would
submit that the applicants have not approached the Court with
clean hands and have suppressed the material facts and thereby,
misguided the Court.


6.        The learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the
learned advocate for the de facto complainant would further submit
that as per the settled law of the land, inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code should be used sparingly and with a view
to curb the abuse of process of law. He submitted that in the case
on hand, a prima facie case is made out against the applicants and
hence, they requested that it is ultimately a matter of trial after
which, the truth could be churned out and hence, these
applications may not be entertained and they urged to be
dismissed.


7.        Heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned
advocates for the parties and carefully gone through the material
placed on record as well as the papers of investigation.


8.        Prior to assessing the factual matrix on the touchstone of
criminal jurisprudence, it is apposite to reinforce the settled legal
position governing the scope, ambit, and limits of the inherent


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jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the Code. The
jurisprudential        parameters    regulating    the   exercise      of    this
extraordinary power have been authoritatively catalogued by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a long line of precedents, chief among
them being the authoritative in the case of State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604]. Therein, Hon’ble Supreme Court
crystallized seven distinct, illustrative categories of cases where
judicial intervention under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226
of the Constitution is necessitated to secure the ends of justice and
clip any abuse of the process of Court. The relevant portion of
Paragraph 102 of the said judgment is extracted below:


       “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
       provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
       law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
       exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
       inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
       extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following
       categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
       be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
       otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
       possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
       channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give
       an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
       should be exercised.

               (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
               report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
               value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
               constitute any offence or make out a case against the
               accused.

               (2)     Where the allegations in the first information report

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               and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
               disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
               police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
               an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
               155(2) of the Code.

               (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
               or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
               same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
               out a case against the accused.

               (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
               cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
               offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
               without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
               Section 155(2) of the Code.

               (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
               are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
               which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
               that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
               accused.

               (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
               the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
               a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
               continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
               specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
               providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
               aggrieved party.

               (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
               with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
               instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
               the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
               personal grudge.”


8.1    Evaluating the present applications on the anvil of the


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principles enunciated in Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court has to
determine whether the allegations in the FIR, even when accepted
at face value, satisfy the essential statutory ingredients of Sections
406, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B and 114 of the IPC. This Court must
ensure that criminal machinery is not permitted to degenerate into
an engine of harassment where liability under criminal law is
completely absent.


8.2    The FIR reveals that the accused created forged and
fabricated documents relating to the property owned by the de
facto complainant and thereby, though the de facto complainant had
given the land for the purpose of petrol-pump only on lease of 30
years with monthly rent of Rs.18,000/- with 10% increase per
annum, got NA Permission for the lands in question belonged to
the de facto complainant wherein, in the application for NA, forged
signature of the de facto complainant was made and that, mobile
number that was of the applicant No. 1 was also shown.


8.3    Evaluating      the   rival   contentions   and     analyzing       the
evidentiary record, the following facts emerge on record:


       a)      the issue involved in the matter is with regard to a land
       stated to have been property of the de facto complainant of
       which, land was given to the applicants herein on a lease of
       30 years for the purpose of petrol-pump with monthly rent
       of Rs.18,000/- with 10% increase per annum;


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     b)      indisputably, the Rent Agreement was entered into
     between the parties in the year 2010;


     c)      it is also an undisputed fact that the applicants were
     paying Rs.10,000/- monthly to the de facto complainant till
     the construction of the petrol-pump was underway and the
     de facto complainant also received the same;


     d)      it is also not in dispute that thereafter, that is after the
     petrol-pump       became     functional,   the   applicants       paid
     Rs.18,000/- to the de facto complainant till December 2013;


     e)      further, it is also not in dispute that in the year 2014,
     the applicant No. 1 had deposited Rs.20,000/- in the account
     of the de facto complainant and thereafter Rs.10,000/- (rupees
     five thousand each, twice), however, the de facto complainant
     returned the said amount;


     f)      copies of photographs produced on record vide
     Annexure R/4 by the applicants with Additional Affidavit
     reveal clear presence of the de facto complainant during
     inauguration of the petrol-pump;


     g)      the FIR in question is of 2017, to be precise dated
     05.10.2017, whereas, the present applicant No. 2 had


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     preferred a complaint before the concerned police against the
     de facto complainant in the year 06.04.2015 i.e. prior to more
     than two years before the present FIR came to be lodged
     against the applicants;


     h)      admittedly, civil suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 40 of
     2015 is filed by the present applicant No. 2 before the
     competent civil Court, which is also prior to the present FIR,
     which is of 2017;


     i)      to understand when these Sections of the IPC are
     legally "attracted," the prosecution must satisfy specific,
     distinct components known as essential ingredients. Here is
     the structured breakdown of the necessary ingredients for
     each section as mentioned in the FIR:


     i.a)    Section 406: Criminal Breach of Trust:


             This section provides the punishment for "Criminal Breach
             of Trust" (which is defined under Section 405).


             Ingredient 1: The accused must be entrusted with property
             or with dominion (control) over that property.


             Ingredient 2: The accused must dishonestly misappropriate,
             convert it to their own use, or use/dispose of that property.


             Ingredient 3: Such disposal must be in violation of a
             direction of law prescribing how the trust is to be discharged,

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             or any legal contract (express or implied) touching the
             discharge of the trust.


             When it is attracted: When someone lawfully gives
             something to hold or manage, and one dishonestly pockets it
             or violates the agreement to use it for oneself/one’s own
             benefit.


     i.b)    Section 420: Cheating and Dishonestly Inducing
             Delivery of Property:


             Cheating is defined in Section 415; Section 420 is the
             aggravated form where property is delivered as a result.


             Ingredient 1: Deception of a person by the accused.


             Ingredient 2: Fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that
             person to deliver any property to someone, or to consent to
             retain property.


             Ingredient 3: Mens Rea at Inception: The intention to
             deceive must exist at the very inception of the transaction. A
             mere breach of a promise later on does not equal cheating
             unless the bad intent was there on Day one.


     i.c)    Section 465: Punishment for Forgery:


             This is the basic offense of making a false document (defined
             under Sections 463 and 464).


             Ingredient 1: The creation of a false document or false
             electronic record (or part of one).


             Ingredient 2: The intent must be to cause damage/injury to

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             the public or any person, support a false claim/title, cause
             anyone to part with property, or commit fraud.


     i.d)    Section 467: Forgery of Valuable Security, Will, etc.:


             This is a severe, highly punishable form of forgery due to the
             nature of the document involved.


             Ingredient 1: The elements of basic forgery (Section 465)
             must be present.


             Ingredient 2: The forged document must explicitly purports
             to be a valuable security, a will, an authority to adopt, or a
             document giving authority to receive money, principal,
             interest, or goods. (e.g., forging a land Sale Deed or a bank
             cheque).


     i.e)    Section 468: Forgery for Purpose of Cheating:


             Ingredient 1: The accused committed forgery.


             Ingredient 2: The accused did so with the specific intent
             that the forged document would be used to cheat someone.


             Note: The actual cheating does not need to be completed; the
             mere act of creating the fake document with the intent to
             cheat attracts this section.


     i.f)    Section 471: Using as Genuine a Forged Document:


             This section punishes the use of the fake document rather
             than its creation.




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             Ingredient 1: Fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as
             genuine.


             Ingredient 2: The accused must have knowledge or a
             definitive reason to believe that the document was actually
             forged.


             When it is attracted: If one knowingly hands a fake land
             entry or certificate to a government officer to claim an
             advantage, it triggers Section 471.


     j)      so far as offence of criminal breach of trust is
     concerned, the accused must be entrusted with property or
     with dominion over that property, who must dishonestly
     misappropriate, convert it to their own use, or use/dispose
     of that property and that, such disposal must be in violation
     of a direction of law prescribing how the trust is to be
     discharged, or any legal contract (express or implied)
     touching the discharge of the trust. In the case on hand,
     there is nothing on record to suggest any such sort of act
     committed by the applicants inasmuch as, it is the case of the
     de    facto     complainant   only        that   he   had     given      the
     property/land in question on rent by executing a Rent
     Agreement upon monthly rent and the period prescribed for
     in the Rent Agreement.            Further, the complainant has
     accepted that he was being given rent amount too. Thus,
     there is no question of breach of trust and thereby,
     invocation of provisions of such offence;



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     k)      so far as offence of cheating is concerned, in Vesa
     Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of Kerala and
     others, (2015) 8 SCC 293 in Paragraph 12, the Apex Court
     held that every breach of contract would not give rise to an
     offence of cheating. Only in those cases breach of contract
     would amount to cheating where there was any deception
     played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has
     developed later, the same cannot amount to cheating. In
     other words, for the purpose of constituting an offence of
     cheating, the complaint is required to show that the accused
     had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making
     promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations
     are made about failure on part of the accused to keep his
     promise, in absence of a dishonest intention at the time of
     making the initial promise, no offence under Section 420 of
     IPC is made out. In the instant case, nothing such a sort
     prima facie appears on record to substantiate such a fact.
     Also, as noted earlier, the de facto complainant himself
     entered into a Rent Agreement and such fact is not denied by
     him. Further, FIR itself reveals that the de facto complainant
     received the rent amount from the applicants;


     l)      it is also not in dispute that the applicants and the de
     facto complainant are known to each other and merely,
     because the expert opinion denotes signature of the de facto
     complainant to be forged in the application for NA, the same


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     straightway does not amount to forgery by the applicants
     inasmuch as, mere signature on the application for NA, it
     does not create any right, title or interest of the applicants
     over the property/land in question. Further, a perusal of the
     said application dated 16.03.2011 reveals that it bears a
     stamp “ReOpen” and that, it appears that it is an application
     to reopen earlier application dated 24.02.2010, as the same
     was not decided in a time-frame;


     m)      further, it may be that signature on the application for
     NA is forged, however, it is not the case that it is forged by
     the present applicants nor is there any evidence therefor;


     n)      it is well settled that a person does not commit forgery
     merely by executing a document asserting ownership or a
     right over a property, even if such claim is legally incorrect,
     disputed or ultimately found to be unsustainable. What is
     required is that the execution of the document itself must be
     fraudulent or dishonest. To constitute forgery, a person must
     dishonestly or fraudulently make, sign or execute a false
     document with the intention of causing it to be believed that
     the document was made, signed or executed by another
     person or under the authority of another person. A person
     signing a document in his own name, even while asserting
     an incorrect claim, does not thereby create a false document
     so as to attract the offence of forgery;


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     o)      in the case of Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj and
     Another etc., (2018) 7 SCC 581, more particularly, in
     paragraph 26 the Court held:


             “26. The definition of “false document” is a part of the
             definition of “forgery”. Both must be read together. ‘Forgery’
             and ‘Fraud’ are essentially matters of evidence which could
             be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn
             from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is no finding
             recorded by the trial Court that the respondents have made
             any false document or part of the document/record to execute
             mortgage deedn under the guise of that ‘false document’.
             Hence, neither respondent No.1 nor respondent No.2 can be
             held as makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter
             who can be said to have made the false document by
             committing forgery. In such an event the trial Court as well
             as appellate Court misguided themselves by convicting the
             accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the
             accused based on the settled legal position and we find no
             reason to interfere with the same.”


     p)      In Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, reported in (2009) 8
     SCC 751, the Court held that, where a person executes a
     document claiming a property as his own, though such claim
     may ultimately be found to be incorrect, he is neither
     claiming to be someone else nor claiming to be authorized by
     another person. Therefore, execution of such a document,
     purporting to convey a property of which he is not the
     owner, does not amount to execution of a false document
     within the meaning of Section 464 IPC. If what is executed is
     not a false document, there is no forgery.             If there is no



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     forgery, the provisions of Sections 467 and 471 of the IPC
     would also not be attracted;


     q)      in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and Others v. State of
     Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 73929 : 2024
     (10 SCC 690, the Court held that both offences viz. offence of
     cheating        viz-a-viz   the   criminal    breach     of     trust   are
     independent and distinct. Two offences cannot coexist
     simultaneously in the same set of facts. They are antithetical
     to each other. The two provisions of the IPC (now BNS, 2023)
     are not twins that they cannot survive without each other;


     r)      it is settled principle of law that when financial terms
     like rent or the lease amount are explicitly written, any
     promise         or   subsequent       oral   testimony        are   legally
     impermissible in the Court because a valid lease falls under
     Section 107 of the Transfer of property Act and Section 17 of
     the Registration Act. As per Section 17 of the Registration
     Act must be in written and registered and hence, in the case
     on hand when valid agreement falls into this category, no
     direction or subsequent variation of the rent / lease amount
     can be approved or recognized by law.                          Under the
     circumstances, the contention of the learned advocate for the
     de facto complainant that one of the employees of the
     applicants is supporting that there was an Agreement of
     Rs.18,000/- per month to be paid for the entire leased


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     property and therefore, execution of a lease deed for
     Rs.10,000/- per months for the entire leased property cannot
     be a valid ground. To buttress the argument of the learned
     advocate for the de facto complainant that the applicants had
     cheated by orally submitting more amount however, by
     executing the document granting lesser amount of lease per
     month.          This aspect otherwise goes against the de facto
     complainant inasmuch as he accepted the amount paid by
     the applicants and even it is admitted by him in the FIR itself
     that he stopped taking amount of lease from the applicants
     and returned the amount deposited by the applicants in 2014
     and thus, thus has not disputed the execution of the Rent
     Agreement, but has raised the dispute by lodging the present
     FIR only on 05.10.2017;


     s)      from a perusal of the FIR, it appears that the period of
     occurrence of offence is from 2010 till date i.e. the date of FIR.
     Thus, despite the de facto complainant having knowledge of
     such a position, he preferred to file the FIR in question only
     in 2017, precisely on 05.10.2017 and for such an exorbitant
     delay, there is no plausible explanation forthcoming on
     record. Though, the aspect of delay can be gone in to during
     trial however, considering other attended circumstances
     delay also hits to the root of the case as held in the case of
     Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs v. Gurpal Singh and
     Others, (2010) 8 SCC 775, the filing of belated FIR without


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     any plausible explanation would amount to abuse of process
     of law. The Apex Court has, in no uncertain terms, observed
     that:


             “In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court
             has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In
             absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The
             reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that
             the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured
             version of events. In such cases the court should carefully
             examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated
             litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may
             initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side
             with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking
             vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated
             litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
             frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the
             criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be
             permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and
             persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly
             with a view to spite the other party because of a private and
             personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and
             arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view
             that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts
             and circumstances of the case.” (Para 22)


     t)      there is an absolute lack of material demonstrating any
     criminality involved in the case on hand as only bare
     allegations without any proof therefor, are made in the FIR
     and that, the dispute appears to be solely of civil nature to
     which, criminal colour is tried to be given;


     u)      the record is completely barren of any evidence



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       suggesting any forgery and/or false representation by the
       applicants or claiming the right over the property and thus,
       it cannot be said to attracting provisions of 406, 420, 465, 468,
       471, 120B and 114 of IPC.


8.4    Tested on the aforesaid, none of the ingredients of the
offences alleged are attracted in as much as it is not the case of the
de facto complainant that he has not executed the Rent Agreement
nor has he denied his signature thereon. The mere assertion that
he did not go through the contents of the said agreement does not
amount to any fraud, forgery or cheating that too after execution
of the same, more particularly, despite he having received the rent
amount initially.      Further, so far as he having not signed the
application for NA dated 16.03.2011 and FSL Report denoting his
forged signature is concerned, at the same time, it is also not the
case of the prosecution that the said signature is made by the
applicants. Besides, out of total 10940 sq. mtr. of land, the de facto
complainant has already sold 7204 sq. mtr. of land to some one
else by way of registered Sale Deed dated 03.02.2016, where,
admittedly, there is no averment with regard to ongoing litigation
and/or dispute regarding the Rent Agreement. Thus, it is trite
that, where a controversy is predominantly civil, criminal
machinery cannot be allowed to degenerate into an engine of
harassment. The impugned FIR is a classic case of malicious
prosecution and a manifest abuse of the process of law,
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive to give a


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predominantly civil dispute a criminal cloak.


8.5    Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [AIROnline 2025 SC 956] recently
synthesized the jurisprudence governing Section 482 of the Code
and formulated a strict four-step analytical framework to evaluate
petitions seeking the quashing of criminal trials at their inception.
The framework dictates:


       “20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity
       of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the
       power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC:

               (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused
               is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of
               sterling and impeccable quality?

               (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
               accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the
               charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is
               sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions
               contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
               would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn
               the factual basis of the accusations as false.

               (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the
               accused,     has     not      been   refuted      by     the
               prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it
               cannot       be     justifiably    refuted       by      the
               prosecution/complainant?

               (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would
               result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not
               serve the ends of justice?


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       If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial
       conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such
       criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
       Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing
       justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which
       would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial...”


8.6    Applying the aforementioned four-step test to the facts on
hand, the case put up by the applicants is of unimpeachable
quality rulling out the factual assertions contained in the FIR and
the material, as such, cannot be justifiably refuted by respondents.
The same cannot be lightly brushed aside by a Court of law, even
at the preliminary stage of quashing.


8.7    If the decision in Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs, (supra),
is revisited,


8.8    If the case on hand is adverted to, as noted herein above,
there is a huge delay in lodging the FIR for which, no plausible
reason is forthcoming on record.


8.9    Further, in the decision in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia &
Another etc. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others Others,
AIR 1988 SC 709, the Court held as under:


       “The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution
       at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be
       applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted
       allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is


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          also for the court to take into consideration any special
          features which appear in a particular case to consider
          whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to
          permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis
          that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and
          where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate
          conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely
          to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,
          the court may while taking into consideration the special
          facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may
          be at a preliminary stage. A case of breach of trust may be
          both a civil wrong and criminal offence. But there would be
          certain situations where it would predominantly be a civil
          wrong and may or may not amount to criminal offence. The
          instant case is one of that type where, if at all, the facts may
          constitute a civil wrong and the ingredients of the criminal
          offence are wanting”. (Para 7)
                                                     (emphasis supplied)


9.        In view of the distinct absence of the essential ingredients
required to attract Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B and 114 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860, forcing the parties to endure a full-
fledged criminal trial, would be an exercise in futility, more
particularly, the facts on hand constitute civil wrong lacking
ingredients of afore-stated offences.


10.       As a necessary corollary, this application succeeds and is
hereby allowed. FIR being C.R. No. I-247 of 2017, dated 05.10.2017,
lodged before Kamrej Police Station, Dist.: Surat (Rural) for the
offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B
and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 with all consequential
criminal proceedings flowing therefrom, stands quashed and set

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aside qua the present applicants only.


10.1 Rule is made absolute in the aforementioned terms.


10.2 It goes without saying that above observations are made for
deciding the present application only, which shall have no bearing
on any other litigation between the parties and the same shall be
decided on its own merits.


10.3 Direct service is permitted.



                                                                                          [ P. M. Raval, J. ]
hiren/41tss14826+




 Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
 Digitally signed by: HIREN VIRENDRABHAI MER(HC00351), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 14/08/2026 11:27:37



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