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High Court of Gujarat

ABHESING RUMALBHAI PARGHIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

Disposal
26-DISMISSED @ ADM.STAGE
Bench
C DOSHI

Holding

The Court held that the petitioner cannot disown his advocate and that the 173‑day delay cannot be condoned, thereby dismissing the application for restoration.

Summary

The petitioner, Abhesing Rumalbhai Parghi, filed a criminal miscellaneous application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of a 173‑day delay in filing a restoration application for a Special Criminal Application that had been dismissed multiple times for non‑prosecution. The petitioner repeatedly failed to appear before the court, blaming his advocate for the omissions, and argued that the delay was beyond his control. The court examined precedents that a litigant cannot disown his advocate and that negligence of counsel does not justify condoning inordinate delay. Citing Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., and Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. ESIC, the court held that the petitioner’s conduct did not merit discretion to condone the delay. Consequently, the application for restoration was dismissed and the request for condonation refused.

Issues considered

  • Whether a delay of 173 days in filing a restoration application can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • Whether the petitioner can attribute the delay solely to the advocate and seek condonation.
  • Whether the court should exercise its discretion to restore the Special Criminal Application despite repeated non‑appearance and interim relief.
  • Whether the existence of interim relief under Articles 226/227 and IPC Section 409 influences the condonation of delay.

Legislation cited

Subjects

condonation of delayLimitation ActSpecial Criminal Applicationinterim reliefnon‑appearanceadvocate negligencerestoration of criminal proceedingsIPC 409constitutional jurisdictioncriminal procedure

Judgment

     R/CR.MA/3477/2026                             ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




            IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO.
                        3477 of 2026

                In F/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION/5396/2026
              In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION/3455/2016

==========================================================
                         ABHESING RUMALBHAI PARGHI
                                   Versus
                          STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MS. DIPA B ZALA(6937) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR CHINTAN DAVE, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s)
No. 1
==========================================================

 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

                               Date : 10/03/2026

                                ORAL ORDER


1.     By way of         ling present Criminal Misc. Application u/s 5
of the Limitation Act, the applicant prays to condone the delay
of 173 days in           ling the restoration application to restore
captioned Special Criminal Application.


2.     Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned APP
Mr. Chintan Dave for the respondent State.


3.     For condonation of delay, learned advocate for the
petitioner has averred following reasons:-

            “5. That, however, on 14.07.2025, when the matter
            was listed before this Hon'ble Court, due to


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     R/CR.MA/3477/2026                           ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




            unavoidable circumstances, the learned advocate for
            the applicant could not remain present despite the
            matter being called out twice. Consequently, the
            captioned Special Criminal Application once again
            came to be dismissed for default.

            6. That, the absence of the advocate on 14.07.2025
            was neither deliberate nor intentional, but purely due
            to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant.
            The applicant has always been diligently pursuing the
            matter and has no intention whatsoever to abandon
            the proceedings.”


4.     Ordinarily, this Court would condone the delay of 173
days caused in preferring restoration application. However,
the peculiar facts of the present case are required to be
noticed.


5.     The captioned Special Criminal Application u/s 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India was          led to quash and set
aside FIR being I – C.R. No.12 of 16 registered with Virpur
Police Station, Dist: Mahisagar on 28.4.2016. On 17.6.2016,
the Coordinate Bench of this Court passed an order directing
the investigating o8icer not to       le charge sheet in the present
case without prior permission of this Court.                 Since, the
petitioner was enjoying interim relief and did not appear in
the Court, the matter continued to hover on the board. Thus,
the intention of the petitioner was to linger the matter, as
interim relief is granted in his favour.           In the aforesaid
circumstances, the Coordinate Bench of this Court on
3.4.2024 granted last chance despite learned advocate for the
petitioner did not remain present in both the calls.                 Same
story continued to operate. Ultimately, the Coordinate Bench



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     R/CR.MA/3477/2026                                 ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




of this Court vide order dated 2.12.2024 dismissed the Special
Criminal Application for non-prosecution.                  Thereafter, the
matter was restored and in restoration application, again
learned advocate for the petitioner did not remain present and
therefore, vide order dated 24.1.2025, again the Coordinate
Bench       of    this    Court   dismissed      the   petition      for    non-
prosecution. Again the matter was restored on the request of
the petitioner.          Yet the petitioner continued his act of not
remaining present and enjoyed the interim relief.                    Thus, on
14.7.2025, this Court has passed following order:-

            “On previous two times, learned advocate for the
            applicant did not remain present, which constrained
            the Court to dismiss the matter and thereafter, it was
            restored.

            Today when the matter is taken up for hearing,
            learned advocate for the petitioner did not remain
            present.

            Hence, the petition is dismissed for non prosecution.”


6.     Thus,       the    petitioner    approached       this      Court         for
restoration of the matter fourth time after 173 days pleading
aforesaid reasons for condonation of delay.


7.     Perusal of the aforesaid reasons, it appears that the
entire blame has been thrown upon the head of the advocate,
who was appearing for the petitioner in the matter.


8.     The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Rajneesh Kumar &
Anr v. Ved Prakash, reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406,
noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the


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   R/CR.MA/3477/2026                                  ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




litigants    to        blame   their   lawyers   of     negligence          and
carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court.
The observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court reads as under:-

      “[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown
      on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the
      petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a
      period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to
      blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in
      attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we
      assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was
      careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground
      to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes
      a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to
      be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings
      pending in the court initiated at his instance. The
      litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the
      entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby
      disown him at any time and seek relief.”

      [11]. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision
      of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C.
      Private Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185 , wherein
      this Court observed as under:-

      8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
      statements, made within the limits of authority given to
      him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the
      party who engage him. It is true that in certain
      situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set
      aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree
      notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of
      the advocate where it 6nds that the client was an
      innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a
      party can disown its advocate at any time and seek
      relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized.
      Such an absolute rule would make the working of the
      system extremely di9icult. The observations made in
      Ra6q [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an
      absolute     proposition.   As    we    have    mentioned
      hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for 6nal


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R/CR.MA/3477/2026                         ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




  hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It
  was not a second appeal 6led by a villager residing away
  from the city, where the court is located. The defendant
  is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited
  company with its head o9ice at Calcutta itself and
  managed by educated businessmen who know where
  their interest lies. It is evident that when their
  applications were not deposed of before taking up the
  suit for 6nal hearing they felt piqued and refused to
  appear before the court. May be, it was part of their
  delaying tactics as alleged by the plainti9. May be not.
  But one thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate with
  the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the
  court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence.
  Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to
  make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature
  or signi6cance of the proceedings is a theory which
  cannot be accepted and ought not to have been
  accepted. (Emphasis supplied)

  [12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to
  the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG
  Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation,
  reported in 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as
  under:-

  ‘The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to
  ensure that actions are commenced within a particular
  period, 6rstly to assure the availability of evidence
  documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to
  contest the claim against him; secondly to give e9ect to
  the principle that law does not assist a person who is
  inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them
  when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without
  asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which
  forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum
  vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws
  give help to those who are watchful and not to those who
  sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations
  is to compel a person to exercise his right of action
  within a reasonable time as also to discourage and
  suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.’ (emphasis
  supplied).”


                         Page 5 of 6
          R/CR.MA/3477/2026                                                            ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




    9.        In view of above, present Criminal Misc. Application,
    whereby the petitioner has thrown the entire blame on the
    head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and
    seek relief is not permissible.                                  Rather, it appears that the
    petitioner is enjoying the interim relief since 2016 in the form
    of direction to the investigating o8icer not to                                            le charge sheet
    without prior permission of the Court. The o8ence against the
    petitioner is u/s 409 of the IPC. The petitioner accused is a
    police constable and he has kept the papers with him despite
    he has been transferred from one station to another station.
    Looking to these aspects, according to this Court, the
    petitioner has failed to establish his germane conduct and
    thus, this Court is not inclined to exercise discretion and to
    condone the delay.


    10.       Accordingly, present Criminal Misc. Application stands
    dismissed.                  Consequently, registration of Criminal Misc.
    Application for restoration is refused.



                                                                                                    (J. C. DOSHI,J)
    SHEKHAR P. BARVE




Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SHEKHAR PRAFULBHAI BARVE(HC00200), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 10/03/2026 17:14:09




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