Supreme Court of India
DALJIT SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA & ANR.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 21
- Decided
- 1 January 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- C T RAVIKUMAR
Holding
Section 174A IPC is a standalone substantive offence that can continue even after a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is extinguished, and proclaimed offender status does not survive an acquittal.
Summary
The appellant, Daljit Singh, was declared a proclaimed offender under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. for failing to appear after summons in a cheque‑related criminal case filed in 2010. He was later acquitted of the underlying offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, and an FIR under Section 174A IPC was filed for his non‑appearance. The appellant sought quashing of the complaint, the summoning order and the proclamation, but the High Court refused. The Supreme Court examined whether a proclamation under Section 82 can continue after acquittal and whether Section 174A IPC can be prosecuted independently of a standing proclamation. It held that proclamation status ceases upon acquittal and that Section 174A creates a stand‑alone offence that remains enforceable even if the proclamation is extinguished. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside, the proclamation was quashed, and all criminal proceedings, including the FIR under Section 174A, were closed.
Issues considered
- Whether the proclaimed offender status under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. can subsist when the accused is acquitted of the same offence.
- Whether the subsistence of a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is necessary for authorities to proceed against the accused under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 41, s. 82
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 174A
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138
Subjects
Proclaimed offenderProclaimed offender statusSection 82 Cr.P.C.Section 174A IPCNon‑appearanceSummoning orderCriminal ProcedureAcquittalStand‑alone offence
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 117 : 2025 INSC 21
Daljit Singh
v.
State of Haryana & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 4359 of 2024)
02 January 2025
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the order passed by the High Court refusing
to quash the complaint, summoning order and order declaring
the appellant a proclaimed offender passed by the Magistrate;
whether the proclaimed offender status, under the provisions of the
Cr.P.C., of an accused can subsist if such accused stands acquitted
during trial in connection to the very same offence; and whether
the subsistence of the proclamation u/s.82 Cr.P.C. necessary for
the authorities to proceed against accused against whom such
proclamation issued, u/s.174A IPC.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.82 – Proclamation
for person absconding – Penal Code, 1860 – s.174A –
Penal consequences for intentionally evading the process
u/s.82 Cr.P.C. – Appellant declared proclaimed offender for
failing to appear in the court despite summons and written
proclamation u/s.82 – High Court dismissed the appellant’s
petition seeking quashing of the complaint, summoning
order, and proceedings – Subsistence of the proclamation
u/s.82 Cr.P.C., if necessary for the authorities to proceed
against accused against whom such proclamation stands
issued u/s.174A IPC:
Held: If the status u/s.82 Cr.P.C. is nullified, the person subjected
to such proclamation, by virtue of subsequent developments is
no longer required to be presented before a Court of law, the
prosecution can still proceed against such a person for having not
appeared before a Court during the time that the process was in
effect – s.174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence, that can
* Author
118 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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continue even if the proclamation u/s.82 Cr.P.C. is extinguished – It
is a stand-alone offence – On facts, the appellant stands acquitted
of the main offence which means that there is no case for which
his presence is required to be secured – FIR u/s. 174A IPC was
registered against the appellant, in connection with which, he was
released on bail – Original offence pertains to the year 2010, the
money subject matter of dispute stands paid, the judgment of the
High Court is quashed and set aside – All criminal proceedings,
inclusive of the FIR u/s.174A IPC closed – Appellant’s status, as
‘proclaimed person’ quashed. [Paras 7.3, 8, 9, 11]
Case Law Cited
Mukesh Bhatia v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023;
Divya Verma v. State 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619; Sameena & Anr.
v. State GNCT of Delhi & Anr. Crl. M.C No, 1470 of 2021, Dated
17th May, 2022 – approved.
Kartarey v. State of U.P (1976) 1 SCC 172; Jayendra Vishnu
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 8 SCR 591 : (2009) 7
SCC 104; Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel
[2008] 4 SCR 1077 : (2008) 4 SCC 649; Raghubir Singh v. State
of U.P. (1972) 3 SCC 79; Rahman v. State of U.P AIR 1972 SC
110; Matru v. State of U.P [1971] 3 SCR 914 : (1971) 2 SCC
75; State v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 212 :
(2000) 10 SCC 438; Sureshchandra Ramanlal v. State of Gujarat
(2008) 7 SCC 591; State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma [2013] 12
SCR 772 : (2014) 2 SCC 171: ; Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of
Bihar [2021] 6 SCR 1176 : (2022) 14 SCC 516; Srikant Upadhyay
v. State of Bihar [2024] 3 SCR 421 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
282 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881
List of Keywords
Proclaimed offender; Proclaimed offender status; Subsistence
of the proclamation u/s.82 Cr.P.C.; Failing to appear in the
court despite summons and written proclamation u/s.82 CrPC;
Summoning order.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 119
Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4359 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.06.2023 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 5784 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Ms. Sugandh Rathor, Mayank Dahiya, Ajay Pal, Ms. Bhupinder,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Raj Singh Rana, A.A.G., Samar Vijay Singh, Makrand Pratap Singh,
Fateh Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
1. The questions arising in this appeal that assails the judgment and
order dated 2nd June, 2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana at Chandigarh in Case No.CRM-M-5784 of 2023 (O&M),
whereby under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731 the
Court refused to quash Complaint Case No.151 of 2010 dated 8th
June, 2010; summoning order dated 17th August, 2010; and order
dated 28th November, 2016 declaring the appellant a proclaimed
offender passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bhiwani; are that
whether the proclaimed offender status, under the provisions of the
Cr.P.C., of an accused can subsist if such accused stands acquitted
during trial in connection to the very same offence; and whether
the subsistence of the proclamation under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. is
necessary for the authorities to proceed against an accused against
whom such a proclamation stands issued, under Section 174A of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860.2
2. The facts which gave rise to the question as above, in brief, are:
1 Hereinafter, “Cr.P.C.”
2 Hereinafter, “IPC”
120 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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2.1 The Appellant ran a business concern which was awarded a
contract for ‘8-Laning’ of a National Highway (NH-1) within Delhi,
by the National Highways Authority of India3.
2.2 In furtherance of such a contract, Respondent No. 24 approached
a company by the name of M/s Bhola Singh Jaiprakash
Construction Ltd. for stone crushing. On mutually agreed
specifications, it is also part of the agreement that the same
would be supplied to the construction site. In connection thereto,
cheques by way of security, were also issued. The work under
the agreement was also executed but allegedly did not meet
the specifications, hence resulting in a dispute.
2.3 The NHAI terminated the Appellant’s contract on 13th January,
2009 and accordingly cashed the bank guarantee furnished.
It is alleged that the cheques issued by way of security to
Respondent No. 2 were misplaced and the new cheque worth
₹10 Lacs given as the payment was duly encashed on 16th
October, 2009.5 Subsequently on 30th November, 2009 cheque
issued from the bank guarantee account as security was also
encashed despite having encashed the subsequent cheque
issued as final payment.
2.4 The Complaint case, in connection with the unclaimed cheque,
was filed on 8th June, 2010, in which summons were issued on
17th August, 2010. Thereafter, the case was allegedly transferred
out of Bhiwani, and eventually back to its jurisdictional Court.
Notice upon non-appearance of the Appellant, direction to issue
written proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. with a further
direction to the Appellant to appear before the Court on 28th
November, 2016 was issued on 15th October, 2016. On 28th
November, 2016, the order declaring the Appellant and another
director of the company as proclaimed offenders, was issued.6
All such proceedings and orders are subject matter of challenge
in this Appeal.
3 Hereafter, “NHAI”
4 Hereinafter referred to as the complainant
5 Cheque No. 72107, Bank of Baroda.
6 Hereafter referred to as the ‘PO Order’
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 121
Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr.
2.5 This other Director, RP Singh preferred quashing petitions
before the High Court which came to be eventually dismissed.
2.6 The Appellant was arrested under the PO Order on
19th December, 2022 and released on bail the same day, by
the competent Court. He was raided by the police again, in
connection with an FIR7 of similar nature.
2.7 The Quashing Petition in which the impugned order came to be
passed was filed on 31st January, 2023. The same was dismissed
on 2nd June, 2023 by the impugned order and judgment.
3. The impugned order dismissed the Appellant’s petition under
Section 482, Cr.P.C., with reference to an earlier judgment of the
Court wherein it had been held that if a person had been declared a
proclaimed offender, such a petition by him would not be maintainable.
It was observed that the validity of such a proclamation is also to be
raised before the Court which issued the proclamation.
4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is
the admitted position at the Bar that in subsequent developments
after the filing of the special leave petition, the Appellant stands
exonerated in the germane proceedings under section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It is against this backdrop that
the questions identified in paragraph 1 of this judgment, arise for
consideration.
5. Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. runs thus:
“82. Proclamation for person absconding.—(1) If any Court
has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or
not) that any person against whom a warrant has been
issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so
that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may
publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at
a specified place and at a specified time not less than
thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation.
(2) The proclamation shall be published as follows:—
(i) (a) it shall be publicly read in some conspicuous place of
the town or village in which such person ordinarily resides;
7 FIR No. 200 dated 17th December 2023 u/s 174A, IPC.
122 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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(b) it shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the house
or homestead in which such person ordinarily resides or
to some conspicuous place of such town or village;
(c) a copy thereof shall be affixed to some conspicuous
part of the Court-house;
(ii) the Court may also, if it thinks fit, direct a copy of
the proclamation to be published in a daily newspaper
circulating in the place in which such person ordinarily
resides.
(3) A statement in writing by the Court issuing the
proclamation to the effect that the proclamation was duly
published on a specified day, in the manner specified in
clause (i) of sub-section (2), shall be conclusive evidence
that the requirements of this section have been complied
with, and that the proclamation was published on such day.
[(4) Where a proclamation published under sub-section (1)
is in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable
under section 302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394,
395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459 or 460
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and such person
fails to appear at the specified place and time required by
the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry
as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and
make a declaration to that effect.”
6. Let us now consider some of the pronouncements of this Court to
appreciate its import.
6.1 In Kartarey v. State of U.P. 8 the meaning of the word ‘absconder’
was recorded as follows:-
“43. …To be an “absconder” in the eye of law, it is not
necessary that a person should have run away from his
home, it is sufficient if he hides himself to evade the process
of law, even if the hiding place be his own home…”
8 (1976) 1 SCC 172
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 123
Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr.
Further, in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra,9
it was observed:-
“40. The term “absconding” has been defined in several
dictionaries. We may refer to some of them:
Black’s Law Dictionary — To depart secretly or suddenly,
especially to avoid arrest, prosecution or service of process.
P. Ramanatha Aiyar — primary meaning of word is “to hide”.
Oxford English Dictionary — “To bide or sow away”.
Words and Phrases — “clandestine manner/intent to avoid
legal process”.
6.2 The object and purpose of Section 82, Cr.P.C. was taken note
of in Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashok bhai Patel.10
S.B Sinha J., writing for the Court held as under:-
“32. The provisions contained in Section 82 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure were put on the statute book for
certain purpose. It was enacted to secure the presence
of the accused. Once the said purpose is achieved, the
attachment shall be withdrawn. Even the property which
was attached, should be restored. The provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure do not warrant sale of the
property despite the fact that the absconding accused
had surrendered and obtained bail. Once he surrenders
before the court and the standing warrants are cancelled,
he is no longer an absconder. The purpose of attaching
the property comes to an end. It is to be released subject
to the provisions of the Code. Securing the attendance
of an absconding accused, is a matter between the State
and the accused. The complainant should not ordinarily
derive any benefit therefrom. If the property is to be sold,
it vests with the State subject to any order passed under
Section 85 of the Code. It cannot be a subject-matter of
execution of a decree, far less for executing the decree
of a third party, who had no right, title or interest thereon.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9 [2009] 8 SCR 591 : (2009) 7 SCC 104
10 [2008] 4 SCR 1077 : (2008) 4 SCC 649
124 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
6.3 The evidentiary value of a person absconding has been
discussed in Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P.,11 in the following
terms:
“11. …the act of absconding, even if proved, is normally
considered a somewhat weak link in the chain of
circumstances utilised for establishing the guilt of an
accused person. If the evidence of eye-witnesses is held
trustworthy then the act of absconding even if established
would serve only to further fortify the satisfaction of the
court with respect to the guilt of the accused concerned,
for, even an innocent person may well try to keep out of
the way if he learns of his false implication in a serious
crime reported to the police. ...”
(Emphasis Supplied)
6.4 In Rahman v. State of U.P.,12 it was held that absconding by
itself is not conclusive either of guilt or of a guilty conscience.
For, a person may abscond on account of fear of being involved
in the offence or for any other allied reason. The observations
in Matru v. State of U.P.,13 are instructive.
“19. … Even an innocent man may feel panicky and
try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave
crime such is the instinct of self-preservation. The act
of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to
be considered along with other evidence but its value
would always depend on the circumstances of each
case. Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much
importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very
small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can
scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the
chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no
other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the
accused.…”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11 (1972) 3 SCC 79
12 AIR 1972 SC 110
13 [1971] 3 SCR 914 : (1971) 2 SCC 75
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 125
Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr.
6.5 The notice under Section 41 Cr.P.C., must have necessarily
been issued prior to the notice and declaration under Section
82, and attachment under its subsequent sections. In State v.
Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar,14 it was held:-
“22. … Now, the power of issuing a proclamation under
Section 82 (quoted earlier) can be exercised by a Court
only in respect of a person “against whom a warrant
has been issued by it”. In other words, unless the Court
issues a warrant the provisions of Section 82, and the
other sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked
in a situation where in spite of its best efforts the police
cannot arrest a person under Section 41.”
6.6 Numerous judgments of this Court which concern this Section,
have been about bail. Illustratively, Sureshchandra Ramanlal v.
State of Gujarat,15 State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma,16 Prem
Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar17 and Srikant Upadhyay
v. State of Bihar.18 However, we are not concerned with bail
in the present matter, so it is not necessary to go into them.
7. Having considered the law as laid down in the judgments above in
respect of Section 82, at this stage we must also consider Section 174A
IPC which lays down penal consequences for intentionally evading
the process under Section 82 Cr.P.C. It reads as under :-
“174A. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation
under section 82 of Act 2 of 1974.—
Whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the
specified time as required by a proclamation published
under sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with
both, and where a declaration has been made under sub
14 [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 212 : (2000) 10 SCC 438
15 (2008) 7 SCC 591
16 [2013] 12 SCR 772 : (2014) 2 SCC 171
17 [2021] 6 SCR 1176 : (2022) 14 SCC 516
18 [2024] 3 SCR 421 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282
126 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
section (4) of that section pronouncing him as a proclaimed
offender, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine.”
Now, let us consider the second question arising in this appeal,
in reference to this provision is, whether the subsistence of the
proclamation u/s 82 Cr.PC is necessary for the authorities to proceed
against the accused person u/s 174A IPC. In other words, whether
Section 174A IPC can stand independent of the proclamation
u/s 82 Cr.P.C. or not?
7.1 The purpose of Section 82 Cr.P.C., as can be understood from
a bare reading of the statutory text is to ensure that a person
who is called to appear before a Court, does so. This Section
appears as part of Chapter VI which is titled ‘Process to Compel
Appearance’. Section 83 to 90 provide for the additional method
of attachment of property to the end of securing appearance.
Necessarily then some or the other proceeding has to be
ongoing for which the presence of such person is necessary.
The words of the Section dictate that it can be only issued in
respect of a person against whom a warrant has been issued.
Neither a warrant nor proclamation subsequent can be conjured
up out of thin air.
7.2 Section 174A IPC, inserted by the 2005 Amendment to the
Indian Penal Code inserts a substantive offence, prescribing
punishment of three years or fine or both when such
proclamation is issued under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. and, seven
years and fine if the said proclamation is under Sub-section (4)
thereof. The object and purpose of this Section is to ensure
penal consequences for defiance of a Court order requiring a
person’s presence.
7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is
nullified i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation, by
virtue of subsequent developments is no longer required to be
presented before a Court of law. Then, can the prosecution
still proceed against such a person for having not appeared
before a Court during the time that the process was in effect.
The answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following
reasons:-
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 127
Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr.
(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says “whoever fails
to appear at the specified place and the specified time
as required by proclamation…”. This implies that the very
instance at which a person is directed to appear, and he
does not do so, this Section comes into play;
(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the
instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the
Section, and therefore, prosecution therefore would be
independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C. being in effect;
(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot
be initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can
only be started post the issuance of proclamation, they
can continue if the said proclamation is no longer in effect.
(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e.,
that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in Mukesh
Bhatia v. State (NCT of Delhi);19 Divya Verma v. State;20
Sameena & Anr. v. State GNCT of Delhi &Anr.21 For the
reasons afore-stated, we agree with the findings made in
these judgments/orders. At the same time, it stands clarified
that we have not commented on the merits of the cases.
(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A
IPC is indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an
original offence in connection with which proceedings
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is initiated and in the said offence
the accused stands, subsequently, acquitted, it would be
permissible in law for the Court seized of the trial under
such offence, to take note of such a development and treat
the same as a ground to draw the proceedings to a close,
should such a prayer be made and the circumstances of
the case so warrant.
8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent,
substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under
Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence. That
19 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023
20 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619
21 Crl. M.C No, 1470 of 2021, Dated 17th May, 2022
128 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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being the position of law, let us now turn to the present facts. As
we have already noted supra, the Appellant stands acquitted of the
main offence.
9. The record speaks to the fact that an FIR under Section 174A IPC
was registered against the Appellant, in connection with which, he
was released on bail by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhiwani,
vide order dated 19th December, 2022. It reads:-
“Dinesh Kumar Vs. R.P. Singh etc.
BA-3034-2022
COMA-1664-2013
Present: Complainant in person with Sh. Raj kumar
Gugnani, Advocate.
Sh. Devender Singh Tanwar, counsel for the accused
Daljeet Singh.
Reply to the bail application not filed. Brief arguments on
the bail application heard. At this juncture a compromise
has been effected wherein the matter has been settled
for 9.5 lakh out of which Rs. 1 lakh have been paid to the
complainant and another Rs. 1 lakh shall Be transferred
in his bank account today. The nephew and son of the
accused have further suffered a statement that the
remaining 7.5 lakh shall be paid to the complainant on
or before the adjourned date of hearing. The complainant
have suffered a statement and agrees with the said
arrangement. In the given circumstances when the
matter has been settled and even otherwise also the
proceedings had been stayed by Hon’ble High court way
back on 07.02.2017 and which have only been dismissed
on 15.11.2022 after which, the accused was arrested on
17.12.2022. he is admitted to bail subject to the following
conditions.
1. He shall furnish personal and surety bonds in the sum of
Rs.50,000/- along with an FDR In the sum of Rs. 50,000/-.
2. The present place of residence as well as office of the
accused be furnished by way of affidavit through next of kin.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 129
Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr.
3. That he shall come present in Court in person on all
dates of hearing, failing which his bail shall be cancelled,
subject to just exceptions.
Requisite bonds, affidavit and FDR furnished. Accepted
and atlested. Additional affidavit also filed by surety that
he shall not en cash the FDR without the permission of
the Court and that the R.C. submitted is original which he
shall not sell without the permission of The Court Release
Warrant be issued forth with.
Adjourned to 21.01.2023 for payment else for further
proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. None has disputed the above or brought to the attention of this Court
such a fact that the said arrangement has not been complied with.
11. The Appellant has been acquitted which means that there is no
case for which his presence is required to be secured. Resultantly,
the appeal is allowed. In the attending facts and circumstances of
the case, i.e. that the original offence pertains to the year 2010; the
money subject matter of dispute stands paid, the judgment of the
High Court with the particulars as mentioned in paragraph 1 of this
judgment, stands quashed and set aside. All criminal proceedings,
inclusive of the FIR under Section 174A IPC, shall stand closed.
The Appellant’s status, as a ‘proclaimed person’ stands quashed.
Pending Application(s) if any, stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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