DEEPAK KUMAR SAHUversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 929
- Decided
- 4 August 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SUDHANSHU DHULIA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the conviction and sentence are upheld because the victim's testimony was credible, consistent, and sufficient even in the absence of corroborative medical evidence.
Summary
The appellant was convicted under IPC sections 450 and 376(2) and POCSO Act section 4 for raping a 15‑year‑old girl after forcing her onto a cot in the porch of her house. The prosecution's case rested primarily on the victim's detailed testimony, corroborated by her brother, parents, and neighbours, while medical evidence showed no external injuries but a ruptured hymen. The appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: the victim's minority, the lack of emphatic medical proof, and alleged inconsistencies between the victim's and her brother's statements. The Supreme Court held that the victim's testimony was credible, consistent, and sufficient to sustain conviction despite the absence of injury marks. It reiterated that corroboration, especially medical, is not mandatory where the victim's evidence inspires confidence. Consequently, the High Court's decision to uphold the conviction was affirmed and the appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the conviction under IPC sections 450, 376(2) and POCSO Act section 4 is justified on the basis of the victim's testimony despite lack of medical injury evidence.
- Whether the absence of external injury marks or emphatic medical evidence undermines the credibility of the prosecutrix.
- Whether the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offence, thereby attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376(2), s. 450
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 4
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The appellant came to be convicted and sentenced for the offences punishable u/ss.450 and 376(2) of the IPC and s.4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [POCSO Act]. Whether the High Court was justified in upholding and confirming the conviction and by the trial court. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 450, 376(2) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.4 – Allegation that appellant- accused entered the house of victim aged about 15 years and sent her brother aged about 11
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 395 : 2025 INSC 929
Deepak Kumar Sahu
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 3352 of 2025)
05 August 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and N.V. Anjaria,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The appellant came to be convicted and sentenced for the offences
punishable u/ss.450 and 376(2) of the IPC and s.4 of the Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [POCSO Act]. Whether
the High Court was justified in upholding and confirming the
conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant-convict, by the
trial court.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 450, 376(2) – Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.4 – Allegation that appellant-
accused entered the house of victim aged about 15 years
and sent her brother aged about 11 years to bring a pack
of chewing tobacco – Once the brother left the house, the
accused forced the victim to lie on the cot lying in the porch
of the house, gagged her mouth and then committed sexual
intercourse – Trial Court convicted accused u/ss.450, 376(2)
of IPC and s.4 of the POCSO Act – The High Court upheld
and confirm the conviction – Correctness:
Held: 1. The High Court was wholly justified in upholding and
confirming the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant-
convict, by the trial court. [Para 6.3]
2. Evaluating the total evidence in light of the principles of law,
evidentiary appreciation and application, with the evidence of the
victim at the forefront, it has to be stated that victim’s evidence
was entirely probable, natural and trustworthy who with lucidity
narrated the whole incident about commission of offence against
her by the accused – There exists no reason, much less compelling
reasons, to disbelieve and discard her testimony – Her brother’s
testimony as a child witness was rationally and logically supportive
* Author
396 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of what the prosecutrix narrated – The factum that the cot was in
the porch and the victim was forced to lay there by the accused
could also be called out from the evidence. [Para 6]
3. There was a consistency lent – The conduct of the victim, soon
after the incident was quite natural, as she went to cousin sister’s
neighbouring house and through her, informed cousin brother and
her parents who were away. [Para 6.1]
4. The crux of the incident, of accused overpowering the victim
and committing forcible act by forcing her to the bed, could be
clearly established from the totality of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. [Para 6.2]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.450, 376(2) – Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.4 – Appellant-accused
convicted by the trial Court u/ss.450, 376(2) of IPC and s.4 of
the POCSO Act – It was contended by the accused that non-
availability of emphatic medical evidence about occurrence
of physical intercourse and absence of external injury marks
make it imperative to doubt and disregard the evidence of
the prosecutrix:
Held: 1. The contention that non-availability of emphatic medical
evidence about occurrence of physical intercourse and absence
of external injury marks make it imperative to doubt and disregard
the evidence of the prosecutrix, could hardly be countenanced.
[Para 5.4.1]
2. The crux of the incident, of accused overpowering the victim
and committing forcible act by forcing her to the bed, could be
clearly established from the totality of evidence adduced by the
prosecution – Merely because the medical evidence was less
corroborative and less supportive or absent in details or indictive
of no external injuries – It in no way weakened the prosecution
case – Sole testimony of the victim was a strong evidence to rely
on along with available attendant evidence. [Para 6.2]
Case Law Cited
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [1996] 1 SCR 532 : (1996) 2 SCC
384; Lok Mal alias Loku v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 4 SCC
470; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh [2018] 14 SCR
904 : (2019) 16 SCC 759 – relied on.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 397
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2009] 15 SCR 1207 :
(2010) 2 SCC 9; Raju alias Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 997; State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain [1990] 1 SCR 115 : (1990) 1 SCC 550; Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat [1983] 3 SCR 280 : (1983)
3 SCC 217; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj [1999] Supp.
4 SCR 286 : (2001) 1 SCC 247; Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala
(1974) 3 SCC 767; Jagdish v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1981)
SCC (Crl.) 676; State of Rajasthan v. N.K. The Accused [2000] 2
SCR 818 : (2000) 5 SCC 30 – referred to.
List of Acts
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal
Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Sexual intercourse; Absence of external injury marks; Evidence
of the prosecutrix; Sole testimony of the victim.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3352 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.09.2023 of the High Court
of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 34 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Manish Kumar Saran, Ms. Ananya Tyagi, Sidhant Sharma.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
N.V. Anjaria, J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. Preferred by the appellant-accused, the present appeal addresses
the challenge to judgment and order 22nd September, 2023 passed
by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, at Bilaspur, in CRA No. 34 of
398 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
2020 whereby the High Court continued the judgement and order
of the Special Judge (SC/ST Court), Rajnandgaon, (CG) in Special
Criminal (T) Case No. 10 of 2018, convicting and sentencing the
appellant.
2.1 The appellant came to be convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine of ₹5,00/-. He
was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 4
of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
[POCSO Act] and further came to be convicted for the offence
under Section 376 (2), IPC to be sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for ten years and with a fine of ₹1,000/-. The
punishment for the offence under Section 376 (2), IPC, which
was more severe to one provided for the offence under the
POCSO Act therefore the same came to be awarded.
3. As per the prosecution case, the incident occurred on 03.04.2018 at
about 12:00 Noon. On the fateful day, the victim aged about 15 years
and her younger brother named Mayank, aged about 11 years were
inside their house. The parents had gone to village Karate to attend
the funeral as there was a death in their family. Finding the victim
alone in the house, the appellant-accused entered the house. He
thereafter sent the brother of the victim to bring a pack of chewing
tobacco. Once the brother of the victim left the house, the accused
forced the victim to lie on the cot lying in the porch of the house,
gagged her mouth and then committed sexual intercourse. When the
brother of the victim came back, seeing him, the appellant-accused
fled away from the house, threatening the victim not to tell anything
to anyone.
3.1 Soon after the incident the victim went to her cousin sister-
Dushyantin’s house in the neighbourhood and told about the
incident. The brother of the Dushyantin named Khomendra,
who had gone to village Kareti with the parents of the victim,
was also informed through mobile phone about the incident.
The parents of the victim rushed back to home. When they
reached the home, the victim narrated the entire story of the
incident to her parents. A police complaint was lodged, and FIR
(Ex. P-08) was registered.
3.2 The victim was subjected to medical examination, statement
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1978 was
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 399
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
recorded and a criminal case was registered for the offences as
above, which was tried before the Special Court culminating into
conviction and sentence of the appellant upheld by the High Court.
3.3 Amongst the witnesses examined by the prosecution in course
of the trial, included the prosecutrix herself (PW-2), mother
Alka (PW-1), father Mayaram (PW-3), brother Mayank (PW-9),
Dushyantin (PW-14), Medical Officer, Dr. R.K. Pashi (PW-11),
Dr. Kiran, Block Medical Officer (PW-17), Investigating Officer
(PW-18).
4. Learned advocate Mr. Manish Kumar Saran, AOR appearing for the
appellant assailed the judgment of the High Court primarily and mainly
on three grounds, as highlighted from the memorandum of appeal
and elaborated in course of submissions. It was contended that the
prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond the reasonable
doubt and that it was not possible to rule out the theory of innocence
of the appellant. In this regard, it was submitted that the evidence
of the prosecutrix could not be relied on and needed to be analysed
with caution when the medical report was not categorical to confirm
the offence of sexual assault and rape on the victim. Secondly, it
was contended that there were contradiction between the evidence
of the victim (PW-2) and her younger brother (PW-9). Lastly it was
sought to be contended that the prosecution could not establish that
the victim was minor on the date of commission of offence so as to
attract the provisions of POCSO Act, 2012.
5. Dealing with the last contended aspect at the outset, that the
prosecutrix was not shown to be minor, this contention is stated to
be rejected. There was a cogent and reliable evidence in the nature
of 8th standard marksheet of the victim which showed her date of
birth to be 09.10.2002. The said marksheet was obtained by the
investigating officer (PW-18) from the mother of the victim and he
had testified about it in his evidence. The birth date of 09.10.2002
was also corroborated by the evidence of the mother of the victim
(PW-1) and father of the victim (PW-3) who stated that her daughter
was less than 16 years of age. The trial court rightly recorded that
on the date of the incidence which was 03.04.2018, the age of the
victim was 15 years 5 months 24 days.
5.1 Before proceeding further, the evidence brought on record and
appreciated by the court of the first instance and considered
400 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the High Court may be briefly visited with. The prosecutrix
herself deposed as PW-2. Her testimony weighed pivotal by
the courts below, along with the other evidence, in establishing
the commission of the offence.
5.2 Looking at the evidence of the Prosecutrix with some elaboration,
she stated that on that particular day, she and her younger
brother Mayank were at home and that she had been serving
lunch to her brother, at which time the accused whom she could
recognized, came inside the house, sent away her brother to buy
some chewing tobacco. She stated that thereafter the accused
forced her to lay down on the cot which was in the porch of the
house and gagged her mouth. She stated that after disrobing
her, the accused committed a misdeed and raped her.
5.2.1. The victim further stated that when her brother returned,
seeing him, the accused ran away. After the incident, it
was stated, she went to the house of her uncle in the
neighbourhood and asked her sister named Dushyantin to
give her mobile, using which she contacted cousin brother
Khomendra who had gone with her parents at Kareti
village, and informed him about what has happened. She
stated that after her parents came back, she informed
the all about the incident. They went to the police station
to get the complaint registered. The report to the police
was made her own signature.
5.2.2. In her cross-examination, the victim stated that her brother
when questioned by her parents, told the parents that he
saw both of them namely herself and the accused on the
cot. She further stated that her father phoned his friend
named Sudarshan Manikpuri, who also had come to the
police station. She stated that at the police station, she
was questioned orally.
5.3 Noticing the other evidence would not be out of place. The
brother-Mayank (PW-09) who was aged about 11 years and
a child witness, came to be examined. He was put to certain
questions to ensure that he was capable of giving evidence. He
stated that when he came back from the school on the day of
happening, except her sister nobody was at home. He stated
that accused-Deepak who saw him coming inside their house
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 401
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
sent him to buy chewing tobacco and when he came back with
the tobacco he saw the accused gagging his sister’s mouth
with his hand and had laid her down on the cot. It was stated
that his sister at that time was seen without clothes and that
the accused was also noticed in a similar state, off the trouser.
5.3.1. The evidence of Dusyantin (PW-10) as well as that
of Khomendra (PW-14) corroborated with what was
testified by the victim that after the incident she has
gone to the house of Dushyantin from where she using
the mobile phone of Dushyantin, contacted and informed
Khomendra, who in turn informed the parents of the victim
about the incident and that knowing about the incident
they had returned back.
5.3.2. The mother of the victim, Alka Barsagarhe, (PW-1) and
the father Myaram Barsagarhe (PW-3) were consistent
in deposing, inter alia, that the accused-Deepak Kumar
lived in their neighbour and they knew him, that on the
date of incident they had gone to village Kareti to attend
a funeral and that son of the brother-in-law Khomendra
had also accompanied them along with other relatives.
PW-1 stated that her husband informed her about the
incident, upon being informed by Khomendra who had
received the phone call from her daughter. Both in their
depositions narrated the incident which was told to them
by the victim-daughter, that the accused came inside
the house and gagged her to lay her down on the bed
in the porch of the house and raped her. PW-1 stated
in terms in her cross examination that her daughter told
her that the accused had committed misdeed with her
after removing her inner clothes.
5.3.3. The record of the medical examination obtained by the
police post-complaint showed that there where no injury
marks on the private parts of the victim. It was however,
mentioned that the hymen was ruptured and healing
up was indicated. The accused was found to be fully
capable physically, mentally and medically of having
sexual intercourse as was stated by PW – 11. He in his
cross-examination have stated that if the bath is taken
402 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and clean, the semen can be absent. PW-17, who was
the Block Medical Officer has also stated that there where
no external signs of injury marks or scratch marks on
the genitals of the victim.
5.4 The evidence of the prosecutrix is highlighted in Para 5.2 to
5.2.2 above is not is only clear and consistent in the narration
of the incident, and natural as well. The sequence of events
including her approaching the house of Dushyantin and through
her mobile contacting her parents by talking to Khomendra etc.
which facts were duly corroborated from the evidence of PW-1
and PW-3 as well as PW -10 and PW-14. The facts relating to
the actual commission of offence and attendant circumstances
thereof matched in the testimony of prosecutrix (PW-2) and her
brother, Mayank (PW-9).
5.4.1. An attentive look at the evidence of the prosecutrix
(PW-2) would reveal that her testimony in narrating the
incident and to describe what happened with her, is
natural. Even when read independently, excepting the
oral testimonies of others highlighted above, it inspires
confidence and veracity for its clarity and consistency.
The contention that non-availability of emphatic medical
evidence about occurrence of physical intercourse and
absence of external injury marks make it imperative to
doubt and disregard the evidence of the prosecutrix,
could hardly be countenanced.
5.5 In cases of offences committed under Section 376, IPC, when
the story of the victim girl as told in the evidence is found credit-
worthy, the apparent insufficiency of medical evidence pitted
against acceptable testimony of the victim, the latter would
prevail. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC
384] it was observed:
In the absence of injury on the private part of the
prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the incident
had not taken place or the sexual intercourse was
committed with the consent of the prosecutrix. The
prosecutrix being a small child of about nine years
of age, there could be no question of her giving
consent to sexual intercourse. The absence of injuries
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 403
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
on the private part of the prosecutrix can be of no
consequence in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
(Para 16)
5.5.1. In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh,
[(2019) 16 SCC 759], which was also a case in relation
to the offence committed under Section 376, IPC where
the prosecutrix was minor girl aged 9 years, she was
staying in her aunt’s house pursuing her studies. When
the offence of rape was committed against her, she
narrated the story to her teacher. The High Court gave
the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground, inter
alia, that the medical evidence of the doctor was not
conclusive to hold that the prosecutrix was subjected to
sexual intercourse.
5.5.2. This Court observed that if the evidence of the victim
does not suffer from any basic infirmities and the factor
of probability does not render it unworthy evidence,
the conviction could base solely on the evidence of the
prosecutrix. It was further observed that as a general rule
there is no reason to insist on the corroboration accept
in certain cases, it was stated.
5.5.3. The medical evidence may not be available in which
circumstance, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix could
be sufficient to base the conviction.
“The conviction can be sustained on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires
confidence. The conviction can be based solely
on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix
and no corroboration be required unless there
are compelling reasons which necessitate
the courts to insist for corroboration of her
statement. Corroboration of the testimony of
the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law;
but a guidance of prudence under the given
facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or
404 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
small discrepancies should not be a ground for
throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.”
(Para 11)
5.5.4. It may be true that in the present case the evidence
of the medical officer (PW-17) spoke about absence
of external injury marks on the genitals of the victim.
However, the proposition that the corroboration from the
medical evidence is not sine qua non when the cogent
evidence of the victim is available, was reiterated in a
recent judgement of this Court in Lok Mal alias Loku vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh, [(2025) 4 SCC 470], observed:
“Merely because in the medical evidence, there
are no major injury marks, this merely cannot
a be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable
evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not necessary
that in each and every case where rape is
alleged there has to be an injury to the private
parts of the victim and it depends on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case. We
reiterate that absence of injuries on the private
parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case
of the prosecution.
(Para 4)
5.5.5. Akin to the facts of the present case, it was stated in
Lok Mal (supra), according to the version of the
prosecutrix, that the accused overpowered her and
pushed her to bed in spite of her resistance and gagged
her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus, considering
this very aspect, it is possible that there were no major
injury marks. The appellant made an attempt to raise the
defence of false implication, however, he was unable to
support his defence by any cogent evidence.
5.5.6. The credible and reliable evidence of prosecutrix could
not be jettisoned for want of corroboration including the
corroboration by medical report or evidence. The Court
observed in Manga Singh (supra) that “in absence of
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 405
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
injury on the private part of the prosecutrix, it cannot be
concluded that the incident had not taken place or the
sexual intercourse was committed with the consent of
the prosecutrix”. It was stated that it is well settled that in
the cases of rape it is not always necessary that external
injury is to be found on the body of the victim.
5.5.7. In Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2010) 2
SCC 9], this Court repelled the contention of the appellant
that since the hymen of the prosecutrix was found to be
intact, it cannot be said that an offence of rape has been
committed. The Court refuse to accept such contention in
light of the definition of offence of rape in Section 375 of
the Indian Penal Code. It was further observed that it is
the consistent view of this Court that even the slightest
penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape.
5.6 It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in cases of rape, the
testimony of the prosecutrix alone may be sufficient and sole
evidence of the victim, when cogent and consistent, could be
properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In the State of
Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759,
this Court in terms stated that conviction can be rested on the
testimony of the prosecutrix alone.
The conviction can be sustained on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence.
The conviction can be based solely on the solitary
evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be
required unless there are compelling reasons which
necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of
her statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the
prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance
of prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contractions or small discrepancies should
not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the
prosecutrix.”
(Para 10)
5.6.1. It was further asserted that corroboration is not an
essential requirement for conviction in the cases of rape.
406 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the
Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine
qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the
evidence of the victim does not suffer from any
basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does
not render it unworthy of credence. As a general
rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration
except from medical evidence. However, having
regard to the circumstances of the case, medical
evidence may not be available. In such cases,
solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be
sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the
confidence of the court.
(Para 11)
5.6.2. In Gurmit Singh (supra) it was observed to reiterate that
in all cases, the corroboration to the statements made
by the victim in her evidence could not be insisted upon
as a rule of thumb:
In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed
considerations which have no material effect
on the veracity of the prosecution case or
even discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies
are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed
to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case. The inherent bashfulness of the females
and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual
aggression are factors which the courts should
not overlook.
(Para 8)
5.6.3. It was asserted that only compelling reasons would justify
rejection of testimony of a rape victim, and not otherwise:
“….the courts should find no difficulty to act
on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault
alone to convict an accused where her testimony
inspires confidence and is found to be reliable.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 407
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
Seeking corroboration of her statement before
relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases
amounts to adding insult to injury…..”
(Para 8)
5.6.4. From a recent decision in Raju alias Umakant vs. State
of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC OnLine SC 997),
following observations could be noticed:
“…….a woman or a girl subjected to sexual
assault is not an accomplice but a victim of
another person’s lust and it will be improper and
undesirable to test her evidence with suspicion.
All that the law mandates is that the Court should
be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is
dealing with the evidence of a person who is
interested in the outcome of charge levelled by
her and if after keeping that aspect in mind if the
Court is thereafter satisfied that the evidence is
trustworthy, there is nothing that can stop the
Court from acting on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K.
the Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v.
State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State
of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal
Chand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384]”
(Para 18)
5.6.5. As early as in State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain, [(1990) 1 SCC 550], this court
observed that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be
put on a par with the accomplice, it was further observed
that she is a victim of crime. The Evidence Act nowhere
says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it
is corroborated in material particulars. It was further
observed that evidence of a rape victim must receive
the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. It was stated that there is no rule of
408 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which
may require it to look for corroboration.
5.7 The last submission on behalf of the appellant that there were
discrepancies in the evidences of victim (PW-2) and her brother
(PW-11) has no room to stand, for, no material discrepancy
could be noticed by the Court on comparison of the evidence of
the two witnesses. Even otherwise, discrepancies in evidence
which are of minor nature not going to the root have to be
ignored. This Court observed in Lok Mal alias Loku (supra)
that in criminal jurisprudence the principle is that the evidence
of prosecutrix in case of rape is of the same value as that of
an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis
of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, while reiterating this.
5.7.1. The sensitive approach and greater inclination to rely
on the creditworthy evidence of the victim is guided
by the aspect as observed in Bharwada Bhoginbhai
Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, [(1983) 3 SCC 217] it
was observed thus:
In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the
testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the
absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding
insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the
girl or the woman who complains of rape or
sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of
spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt,
disbelief or suspicion?”
(Para 9)
5.7.2. Insignificance of minor discrepancies was pointed out by
this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Lekh Raj,
[(2001) 1 SCC 247]. By referring to earlier judgment in
Ousu Varghese vs. State of Kerala, [(1974) 3 SCC 767],
it was observed that minor variation in the accounts of
the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their
testimony and the discrepancies are found to be of minor
character not going to the root of the prosecution story,
they need not be given undue importance.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 409
Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh
5.7.3. It was observed in Jagdish vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, [(1981) SCC (Crl.) 676], that mere congruity
or consistency is not the sole test of truth of depositions.
The discrepancies have to be such which could be
characterized as material, which are not normal and of
the nature not expected from the normal person.
5.8 There is no gainsaying that the Court should remain sensitive
while dealing with the charges of sexual assault on the helpless
woman. In State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. The Accused, [(2000)
5 SCC 30], this Court observed that “an unmerited acquittal
encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for easy
prey, more so when the victim of crime are helpless females.”
Similar was expressed in Gurmit Singh (supra) that the rapist
not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical
harm in the process. It was stated that the rape is not merely
a physical assault and subsequently destructs the whole
personality of the victim.
6. Evaluating the total evidence in light of the principles of law,
evidentiary appreciation and application, with the evidence of the
victim at the forefront, it has to be stated that victim’s evidence was
entirely probable, natural and trustworthy who with lucidity narrated
the whole incident about commission of offence against her by the
accused. There exists no reason, much less compelling reasons, to
disbelieve and discard her testimony. Her brother Mayank’s testimony
as a child witness was rationally and logically supportive of what
the prosecutrix narrated. The factum that the cot was in the porch
and the victim was forced to lay there by the accused could also be
called out from the evidence.
6.1 There was a consistency lent. The conduct of the victim, soon
after the incident was quite natural, as she went to cousin
sister’s neighbouring house and through her, informed cousin
brother and her parents who were away.
6.2 The crux of the incident, of accused overpowering the victim
and committing forcible act by forcing her to the bed, could be
clearly established from the totality of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. Merely because the medical evidence was less
corroborative and less supportive or absent in details or indictive
410 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of no external injuries. It in no way weakened the prosecution
case. Sole testimony of the victim was a strong evidence to
rely on along with available attendant evidence.
6.3 The High Court was wholly justified in upholding and confirming
the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant-convict,
by the trial court.
7. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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