DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIAversusBIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI & ANR.

                          [2022] 12 S.C.R. 635                            635


                  DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA                                 A
                                  v.
              BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI & ANR.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 2912 of 2022)
                           APRIL 12, 2022                                 B
        [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
       Dentists Act, 1948 – ss. 10A & 20 – Dental Council of India
(Establishment of New Dental Colleges, Opening of New or Higher
Course of Study or Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in
                                                                          C
Dental Colleges) Regulations, 2006 – r. 6(2)(h) – Power to make
regulations – Permission for establishment of dental college was
denied to the respondent no.1 – Respondent no. 1 submitted fresh
application which was returned by the respondent no. 2 on the
grounds that the application was not in compliance with the amended
Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations – Single Bench of the High          D
Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 1
challenging the rejection order of its application – However, Division
Bench of High Court allowed the writ petition by striking down the
impugned notification dated 21 May, 2012 amending regulation
6(2)(h) and directed the respondent no. 2 to reconsider the
                                                                          E
application of respondent no. 1 – The impugned notification was,
inter-alia, quashed on the ground that it is beyond the scope of the
powers of the Council to make delegated legislation as provided
under sub-section (7) of section 10A of the Act – Held: It is settled
that subordinate legislation may be questioned on the ground of
unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense        F
of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is
manifestly arbitrary – In the instant case, the Division Bench of the
High Court has failed to take into consideration clause (g) of
subsection (7) of s. 10A of the Act – Whereas clauses (a) to (f) of
subsection (7) of s. 10A of the said Act deal with various factors,
                                                                          G
clause (g) thereof, which can be said to be a residual clause, enables
the Council to take into consideration also any other factor as may
be prescribed – Conjoint reading of ss. 10A(7)(g) and 20(2)(fb) of
the Act would reveal that it is within the competence of the Council
to make Regulations prescribing any other conditions, which are
otherwise not found in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (7) of Section   H
                                 635
636            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     10A of the said Act – Challenge to the same would be permissible
      only on the ground of manifest arbitrariness – Respondent no.1
      failed to discharge burden that impugned notification suffered from
      manifest arbitrariness – Subordinate legislation.
             Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Dental Council of India
B     (Establishment of New Dental Colleges, Opening of New or Higher
      Course of Study or Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in
      Dental Colleges) Regulations, 2006 – r. 6(2)(h) – Whether the
      impugned Notification dated 21 May, 2012 amending r. 6(2) (h)
      was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? – Held: Tests of
      arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily
C     apply to delegated legislation – In order that delegated legislation
      can be struck down, such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary;
      a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an
      authority delegated with the lawmaking power – Colleges established
      prior to the impugned Notification and the Colleges established/to
D     be established after the impugned Notification would form two
      separate classes – The differential treatment for different classes
      would not be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Factors
      taken into consideration by the Council, while amending Regulation
      6(2)(h) of the Regulations are relevant factors – The factors have a
      nexus with the object sought to be achieved which is to provide
E     adequate teaching and training facilities to the students – Amended
      Regulation 6(2)(h) has a direct nexus with the object to be achieved,
      i.e., providing adequate teaching and training facilities to the
      students and it is not violative of art. 14 of the Constitution.
            Constitution of India – Art. 19 (1)(g) – Dental Council of
F     India (Establishment of New Dental Colleges, Opening of New or
      Higher Course of Study or Training and Increase of Admission
      Capacity in Dental Colleges) Regulations, 2006 – r. 6(2)(h) – Whether
      the impugned Notification dated 21 May, 2012 amending r. 6(2) (h)
      was violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution? – Right to establish
G     an educational institution can be regulated – Such regulatory
      measures must, in general, be to ensure the maintenance of proper
      academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and the
      prevention of maladministration – Impugned Notification is made
      in order to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards
      and infrastructure – Impugned notification is not violative of art.
H     19(1) (g).
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                       637
                     & ANR.

      Court practice and procedures – Judicial Propriety – Prayer        A
for reconsideration of the proposal submitted by the respondent
No.1, which was already rejected by the single judge of the High
Court, was renewed in the fresh writ petition filed and granted by
the Division Bench of the High Court – On the ground of judicial
propriety also the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to
                                                                         B
have entertained the writ petition for a prayer, which already stood
rejected.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD:
        1. This Court finds that the Division Bench has failed to        C
take into consideration clause (g) of sub-section (7) of Section
10A of the said Act. It is to be noted that whereas clauses (a) to
(f) of subsection (7) of Section 10A of the said Act deal with various
factors, clause (g) thereof, which can be said to be a residual
clause, enables the Council to take into consideration also any          D
other factor as may be prescribed. [Para 29][653-B-C]
       2. This Court further finds that the Division Bench of the
High Court has also failed to take into consideration clause (fb)
of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the said Act. A conjoint reading
of these provisions would reveal that the Council is also                E
empowered to take into consideration any other factor as may be
prescribed and also to make a Regulation with regard to any other
factor under clause (g) of sub-section (7) of Section 10A of the
said Act. It could thus be seen that it is within the competence of
the Council to make Regulations prescribing any other conditions,
which are otherwise not found in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section       F
(7) of Section 10A of the said Act. Challenge to the same would
be permissible only on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. It is
also equally settled that the presumption is always with regard to
the validity of a provision. The burden is on the party who
challenges the validity of such provision. This Court finds that         G
the respondent No.1 has failed to discharge the burden to show
that the impugned Notification suffers from manifest arbitrariness.
[Para 30][653-C-F]
      3. Secondly, the Division Bench of the High Court found
the impugned Notification dated 21st May, 2012 to be violative
                                                                         H
638            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     of Article 14 of the Constitution, on the ground that the Dental
      Colleges established prior to impugned Notification would not
      be required to be attached with the Medical Colleges, whereas,
      the Dental Colleges, established after the impugned Notification,
      will be compelled to be attached to such Medical Colleges. We
      are of the considered view that the Colleges established prior to
B
      the impugned Notification and the Colleges established/to be
      established after the impugned Notification would form two
      separate classes. The differential treatment for different classes
      would not be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The
      only requirement would be, as to whether such a classification
C     has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. For
      the reasons given hereinafter, we find that the factors taken into
      consideration by the Council, while amending Regulation 6(2)(h)
      of the Regulations are relevant factors. The factors have a nexus
      with the object sought to be achieved. It has been submitted on
      behalf of the Council that the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the
D
      Regulations was brought into effect so that it would facilitate
      training to the students of the proposed Dental Colleges as per
      the syllabus/course curriculum prescribed. It, therefore, cannot
      be said that the Council has taken into consideration the factors,
      which are not relevant or germane for the purpose to be achieved.
E     The object to be achieved is to provide adequate teaching and
      training facilities to the students. If in the wisdom of the expert
      body, this can be done by attaching a Dental College to the already
      existing Medical College, it cannot be faulted with. [Para 31][653-
      F-H; A-E]
F           4. The amended Regulation cannot be said to be one, which
      is manifestly arbitrary, so as to permit the Court to interfere with
      it. On the contrary, this Court finds that the amended Regulation
      6(2)(h) has a direct nexus with the object to be achieved, i.e.,
      providing adequate teaching and training facilities to the students.
      [Para 33][654-G-H; 655-A]
G
            5. That leaves with the finding of the Division Bench of the
      High Court that the amended Regulation is violative of Article
      19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench itself has
      held that the right to establish an educational institution can be
      regulated. However, such regulatory measures must, in general,
H
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                    639
                     & ANR.

be to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards,            A
atmosphere and infrastructure and the prevention of
maladministration. [Paras 40 and 41][657-C, F-G]
       6. Impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High
Court is also not sustainable on the ground of judicial propriety.
In writ petition filed before division bench, the prayer was for      B
challenging the validity of the impugned Notification and for a
direction to reconsider the proposal of the respondent No.1. The
impugned Notification could have very well been challenged in
the earlier writ petition, which was filed in the year 2016 before
the learned single judge of the High Court. However, having failed
in that writ petition before the learned single judge, the            C
respondent No.1 filed another writ petition before the Division
Bench of the High Court. Though one of the prayers challenges
the validity of the impugned Notification, another prayer claims
for reconsideration of its proposal. It could thus be seen that the
prayer for reconsideration of the proposal submitted by the           D
respondent No.1, which was already rejected by the learned single
judge of the High Court has been renewed in the fresh writ
petition filed in the year 2017 and granted by the Division Bench
of the High Court. Therefore, on the ground of judicial propriety
also the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have
entertained the writ petition for a prayer, which already stood       E
rejected. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment and
order dated 24th April, 2018 passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court is not sustainable. [ Paras 43 and 44][658-A-B; D-H]
      Dental Council of India vs. Subharti K.K.B. Charitable
      Trust and Another (2001) 5 SCC 486 : [2001] 3 SCR               F
      149; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and
      Higher Secondary Education and another vs. Paritosh
      Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others (1984) 4 SCC 27 :
      [1985] 1 SCR 29; India Council for Technical Education
      vs. Surinder Kumar Dhawan and others (2009) 11 SCC              G
      726 : [2009] 3 SCR 859; Indian Express Newspapers
      Bombay) Private Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and
      others (1985) 1 SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287 Khoday
      Distilleries Ltd. and others vs. State of Karnataka and
      others (1996) 10 SCC 304 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 759;
                                                                      H
640          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A          State of T.N. and another vs. P. Krishnamurthy and
           others (2006) 4 SCC 517 : [2006] 3 SCR 396; Supreme
           Court Employees’ Welfare Association. vs. Union of
           India and another (1989) 4 SCC 187 : [1989] 3 SCR
           488; Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another
           vs. Union of India and others (1990) 3 SCC 223 : [1990]
B
           1 SCR 909; St. Johns Teachers Training Institute vs.
           Regional Director, National Council for Teacher
           Education and another (2003) 3 SCC 321 : [2003] 1
           SCR 975; Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal and
           others vs. State of Maharashtra and other (1981) 2 SCC
C          722 : [1981] 2 SCR 866 ; Union of India and another
           vs. Cynamide India Ltd. and another (1987) 2 SCC 720
           : [1987] 2 SCR 841 ; State of Haryana vs. Ram Kishan
           and others (1988) 3 SCC 416; T.M.A. Pai Foundation
           and others vs. State of Karnataka and others (2002) 8
           SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587 – referred to.
D
                           Case Law Reference
      [2001] 3 SCR 149             referred to             Para 11
      [1985] 2 SCR 287             referred to             Para 22

E     [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 759      referred to             Para 25
      [2006] 3 SCR 396             referred to             Para 26
      [1989] 3 SCR 488             referred to             Para 26
      [1990] 1 SCR 909             referred to             Para 26
F     [2003] 1 SCR 975             referred to             Para 26
      [1981] 2 SCR 866             referred to             Para 26
      [1987] 2 SCR 841             referred to             Para 26
      (1988) 3 SCC 416             referred to             Para 26
G     [1985] 1 SCR 29              referred to             Para 35
      [2009] 3 SCR 859             referred to             Para 38
      [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587      referred to             Para 40
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2912
H     of 2022.
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                           641
                     & ANR.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 24.04.2018 of the High Court        A
of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Civil Writs No.3260
of 2017.
      Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv., Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek
Bhatia, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Ms. Shobha Gupta, Rajendra Kumar            B
Panigrahi, Ms. Jessy Kurien, Nishant Bahuguna, Vidit Agarwal, Shubham
Jalan, Ms. Prachi Sharma, Ms. Sakshi Tiwari, Gurmeet Singh Makker,
Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Shailesh Madiyal, Digvijay Dam, Bhuvan Kapoor,
Himanshu Satija, Ms. Shristi Misra, Ms. Poornima Singh, Advs. for the
Respondents.                                                                 C
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      B. R. GAVAI, J.
      1. Leave granted.
       2. The present appeal challenges the judgment and order of the        D
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at
Jaipur, dated 24th April, 2018, passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
3260 of 2017, thereby allowing the writ petition filed on behalf of the
respondent No.1-Biyani Shikshan Samiti (hereinafter referred to as “the
respondent No.1”) and striking down the Notification dated 21 st May,
                                                                             E
2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned Notification”), vide which
the appellant-Dental Council of India (hereinafter referred to as “the
Council”), had substituted Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Dental Council of
India (Establishment of New Dental Colleges, Opening of New or Higher
Course of Studies or Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in
Dental Colleges) Regulations, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the          F
Regulations”), on the ground of the same being inconsistent with the
provisions of the Dentists Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the said
Act”) and also being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of India.
      3. The facts in the present case are not in dispute.                   G
       4. The respondent No. 1 had submitted an application to the
Government of India for grant of permission for establishment of dental
college from academic year 2012-2013 on 24th September, 2011. This
was after the Letter of Intent was issued by the State Government on
23rd September, 2011. The respondent No. 2 – Union of India, through         H
642             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Dental Education
      Section) [hereinafter referred to as “the respondent No.2”), noticed
      certain deficiencies in the proposal of the respondent No.1 and vide its
      letter dated 7th October, 2011, required the respondent No.1 to cure the
      said deficiencies.
B            5. After exchange of certain communications, on 6th January, 2012,
      the respondent No.2, returned the application of the respondent No.1
      along with demand draft of Rs.6 lakh, on the ground that deficiencies
      pointed out were not cured prior to 31st December, 2011, i.e., the last
      date for curing the deficiencies.
C            6. In the meantime, the Government of Rajasthan issued
      Essentiality Certificate to the respondent No.1 on 11th January, 2012.
      However, on 17th February, 2012, the respondent No.2 declined to
      reconsider the application/request of the respondent No.1, on the grounds
      stated in its earlier letter, dated 6th January, 2012. As such, the request
      of the respondent No.1 for reconsideration of its proposal came to be
D     rejected by the respondent No.2, vide its communication dated 17th
      February, 2012.
              7. In the meantime, vide the impugned Notification, existing
      Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations was substituted by amended
      Regulation 6(2)(h) on 21st May, 2012. Respondent No.1 again submitted
E     its fresh application on 28th September, 2012 for academic year 2013-
      2014. The same was returned by the respondent No.2 vide its order
      dated 31st December, 2012, on the ground that the proposal/application
      was not in compliance with the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the
      Regulations. On 23rd January, 2013, the respondent No.1 thereafter wrote
F     a letter to the respondent No.2, stating therein that since Essentiality
      Certificate was issued to it on 11th January, 2012, the impugned
      Notification was not applicable to it and requested for reconsideration of
      its application under the unamended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations.
      The respondent No.2 rejected the application of the respondent No.1
      vide its order dated 5th March, 2013.
G
             8. The respondent No.1 challenged the order passed by the
      respondent No.2 rejecting the request for reconsideration of its application
      before the learned single judge of the High Court of Judicature for
      Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15090
      of 2016. The respondent No.1 further sought a direction to reconsider
H     the application submitted by it on 24th September, 2011 for establishment
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                            643
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

of a new dental college for academic session 2017-2018. The learned           A
single judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 3rd
November, 2016, finding no merit in the writ petition, dismissed the same.
The respondent No.1 thereafter filed a writ petition before the Division
Bench being D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3260 of 2017, challenging the
impugned Notification amending Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations.
                                                                              B
The respondent No.1 also sought a prayer for direction to the respondent
No.2, for reconsidering its application, dated 28th September, 2012, for
establishment of a new Dental College for academic session 2018-2019
and for subsequent academic sessions. By the impugned judgment and
order dated 24th April, 2018, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed
the said writ petition by striking down the impugned Notification and         C
directed the respondent No. 2 to reconsider the case of the respondent
No.1 in the light of the observations made in the impugned judgment and
order. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been preferred
by the Council.
      9. We have heard Shri Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel appearing          D
on behalf of the Council, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor
General (“ASG” for short) appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2
and Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent No.1.
       10. Shri Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel, would submit that the         E
Division Bench of the High Court has grossly erred in allowing the writ
petition. He submits that the Council is an expert statutory body duly
constituted under the said Act. He submits that the said Act empowers
the Council to make Regulations for various aspects concerned with
Dental Education, including prescribing requirement of minimum
standards. He submits that the Council, after examining various aspects,      F
had found it necessary to amend Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations.
He submits that this was done for providing better teaching facilities to
the students and for improving the standards of education. He submits
that the Division Bench has grossly erred in holding that it was beyond
the powers of the Council to make delegated legislation. He submits           G
that, in any case, the finding of the High Court that the impugned
Notification was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
of India, is totally erroneous.
     11. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned ASG also supports the
submission made on behalf of the Council. Relying on the judgment of          H
644                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     this Court in the case of Dental Council of India vs. Subharti K.K.B.
      Charitable Trust and Another1,she submits that the High Court ought
      not to have interfered with the impugned Notification, since the
      Regulations were made by the expert body in accordance with the
      provisions of the said Act.
B            12. Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
      the respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the High Court
      has rightly quashed the impugned Notification. She submits that the
      impugned Notification has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
      She submits that there is a huge shortage of Dentists in the country and
      therefore, the object of the legislation should be to encourage establishment
C     of more Dental Colleges rather than providing a requirement which will
      restrict the number of new Dental Colleges. On facts, she submits that
      there is no medical college within the vicinity of 100 kms. from the place
      at which the respondent No.1 proposes to start a new Dental College.
      She submits that the impugned Notification, therefore, violates the
D     fundamental rights of the students to take dental education as well as
      the fundamental right of the respondent No.1 to establish an educational
      institution under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
             13. For considering the rival submissions, it will be appropriate to
      refer to certain provisions of the said Act. Section 3 of the said Act
E     requires the Central Government to constitute a Council consisting of
      members named therein. Section 10 of the said Act deals with recognition
      of dental qualifications. Section 10A of the said Act deals with permission
      for establishment of new dental college, new courses of study, etc. Sub-
      section (1) of Section 10A of the said Act puts restriction on the
      establishment of an authority or institution for a course of study or training
F     which would enable a student of such course or training to qualify himself
      for the grant of recognized dental qualification; it also imposes a restriction
      on opening a new or higher course of study or training, or increase the
      admission capacity in any course of study or training, including a post-
      graduate course of study or training. It is provided that no person can
G     establish an authority or institution for dental education and that no
      authority or institution can open a new or higher course of study or
      training, including a post-graduate course of study or training, or increase
      its admission capacity without the prior permission of the Central
      Government. Sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 10A of the said Act deal
      1
H         (2001) 5 SCC 486
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                              645
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

with the procedure to be followed for making an application for permission      A
to start a new or higher course of study or training or increase of intake
capacity in any course of study or training. Sub-section (5) of Section
10A of the said Act is a deeming provision, which provides that if the
Central Government fails to pass an order on the scheme/application
submitted by the applicant within a period of one year from the date of
                                                                                B
submitting the scheme/application, such scheme/application shall be
deemed to have been approved by the Central Government in the form
in which it was submitted. It also provides that the permission of the
Central Government required under sub-section (1) shall also be deemed
to have been granted. Sub-section (6) of Section 10A of the said Act
provides for extension of the period provided in sub-section (5) by entitling   C
an applicant for the extension of the period for furnishing the particulars
called for by the Council or by the Central Government.
       14. It will be apposite to reproduce sub-section (7) of Section 10A
of the said Act, since the same fell for consideration before the Division
Bench of the High Court while allowing the writ petition. It reads thus:        D
       “10A. Permission for establishment of new dental
      college, new courses of study, etc.—(1)
      …………………………
      (2)………………………………………………
                                                                                E
                                        xxx
      (7) The Council, while making its recommendations under clause
      (b) of sub-section (3) and the Central Government, while passing
      an order either approving or disapproving the scheme under sub-
      section (4), shall have due regard to the following factors,              F
      namely:—
          (a)     whether the proposed authority or institution for grant
                  of recognised dental qualification or the existing
                  authority or institution seeking to open a new or higher
                  course of study or training, would be in a position to
                                                                                G
                  offer the minimum standards of dental education in
                  conformity with the requirements referred to in Section
                  16-A and the regulations made under sub-section (1) of
                  Section 20;

                                                                                H
646            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A               (b)    whether the person seeking to establish an authority or
                       institution or the existing authority or institution seeking
                       to open a new or higher course of study or training or
                       to increase its admission capacity has adequate
                       resources;
B               (c)    whether necessary facilities in respect of staff,
                       equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities
                       to ensure proper functioning of the authority or institution
                       or conducting the new course of study or training or
                       accommodating the increased admission capacity have
                       been provided or would be provided within the time-
C                      limit specified in the scheme;
                (d)    whether adequate hospital facilities, having regard to
                       the number of students likely to attend such authority
                       or institution or course of study or training or as a result
                       of the increased admission capacity have been provided
D                      or would be provided within the time-limit specified in
                       the scheme;
                (e)    whether any arrangement has been made or
                       programme drawn to impart proper training to students
                       likely to attend such authority or institution or course of
E                      study or training by persons having the recognised dental
                       qualifications;
                (f)    the requirement of manpower in the field of practice of
                       dentistry; and

F               (g)    any other factors as may be prescribed.”
             15. It could thus be seen that the Council, while making its
      recommendations and the Central Government, while passing an order,
      are required to take into consideration various factors as are enumerated
      in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act.
G            16. Section 20 of the said Act empowers the Council, with the
      approval of the Central Government, to make Regulations. It will be
      apposite to refer to the relevant part of Section 20 of the said Act, which
      reads thus:
            “20. Power to make regulations.-(1) The Council may, with
H           the approval of the Central Government, by notification in the
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                            647
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

      Official Gazette, make regulations not inconsistent with the            A
      provisions of this Act to carry out the purposes of this Chapter.
      (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
      foregoing power such regulations may-
      (a)    ……………………………………………
                                                                              B
      (b)    ……………………………………………
                         xxx      xxx         xxx
      (fb)   prescribe any other factors under clause (g) of sub-section
             (7) of section 10A”
                                                                              C
       17. It could thus be seen from the conjoint reading of clause (g) of
sub-section (7) of Section 10A and clause (fb) of sub-section (2) of
Section 20 of the said Act that the Council is also empowered to take
into consideration any other factors as may be prescribed and also entitled
to make Regulations for prescribing any other factor under clause (g) of
sub-section (7) of Section 10A.                                               D
      18. It will also be relevant to refer to the provision of Regulation
6(2)(h) as it existed prior to the impugned Notification and the amended
provision after the impugned Notification was given effect to. They read
thus:
      “Regulation 6(2)(h) prior to impugned Notification dated                E
      21st May, 2012
      6. Eligibility and qualifying criteria.-
      (1) …………………………………………..
      (2) The organizations under sub-regulation (1) shall qualify to apply   F
      for permission to establish a dental college if the following
      conditions are fulfilled:-
      (a)        …………………………………………..
      (b)        …………………………………………..
                                                                              G
                                        xxx
      (h) the applicant owns and manages a General Hospital of not
      less than 100 beds as per Annexure I with necessary infrastructure
      facilities including teaching pre-clinical, para-clinical and allied
      medical sciences in the campus of the proposed dental college,          H
648         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A                                       or
      the proposed dental college is located in the proximity of a
      Government Medical College or a Medical College recognised by
      the Medical Council of India and an undertaking of the said Medical
      College to the effect that it would facilitate training to the students
B     of the proposed dental college in the subjects of Medicine, Surgery
      and Allied Medical Sciences has been obtained,
                                        or
      where no Medical College is available in the proximity of the
      proposed dental college, the proposed dental college gets itself
C     tied up at least for 5 years with a Government General Hospital
      having a provision of at least 100 beds and located within a radius
      of 10 K.M. of the proposed dental college and the tie-up is
      extendable till it has its own 100 bedded hospital in the same
      premises. In such cases, the applicant shall produce evidence that
D     necessary infrastructure facilities including teaching pre-clinical,
      para-clinical and allied medical sciences are owned by the proposed
      dental college itself;
      Regulation 6(2)(h) after the impugned Notification dated
      21st May, 2012
E     6. Eligibility and qualifying criteria.-
      (1) …………………………………………..
      (2) The organizations under sub-regulation (1) shall qualify to apply
      for permission to establish a dental college if the following
      conditions are fulfilled:-
F
      (a)       …………………………………………..
      (b)       …………………………………………..
                                       xxx

G     (h) the applicant shall attach its proposed dental college with a
      Government/Private Medical College approved/recognised by the
      Medical Council of India which is located at the distance of 10
      kms. by road from the proposed dental college and produce
      evidence of the said Medical College to the effect that it would
      facilitate training to the students of the proposed dental college as
H
    DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                               649
                 & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

         per syllabus/course curriculum prescribed in respective                    A
         undergraduate and post graduate dental course regulations as
         amended from time to time:-
         Provided that not more than one dental college shall be attached
         with the medical college.”
        19. It could thus be seen that the change that has been brought by          B
the impugned Notification is that, though under the unamended Regulation
6(2)(h), an applicant was entitled to apply if he/she/it owned and managed
a General Hospital of not less than 100 beds; by the impugned Notification,
it has been made mandatory that the applicant has to attach its proposed
Dental College with the Government/Private Medical College, approved/               C
recognized by the Medical Council of India, which is located at a distance
of 10 kilometers by road from the proposed Dental College. The distance
of 10 kilometers has now been increased to 30 kilometers, vide
amendment dated 5th July, 2017.
      20. The Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned                    D
judgment and order dated 24th April, 2018, has allowed the writ petition
and quashed the impugned Notification on three grounds, viz.,
         (i)     that it is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of
                 India;
         (ii)    that it is beyond the scope of the powers of the Council to        E
                 make delegated legislation as provided under sub-section
                 (7) of Section 10A of the said Act; and
         (iii)   that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,
                 inasmuch as the Dental Colleges established prior to
                 impugned Notification would be permitted to run without            F
                 attachment with Medical Colleges, whereas, the Dental
                 Colleges established after the impugned Notification will
                 be compelled to have such an attachment with the Medical
                 Colleges.
       21. We find that the learned judges of the Division Bench have               G
erred on all counts.
      22. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this
Court in the case of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private
Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and others2.
2
    (1985) 1 SCC 641                                                                H
650               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A              “75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same
               degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a
               competent Legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned
               on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned.
               In addition it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not
               conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be
B
               questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute.
               That is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary
               legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is
               unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable,
               but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.”
C
             23. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the
      subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which
      plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned
      on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is
      made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to
D     some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of
      unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of
      not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly
      arbitrary.
             24. It has further been held by this Court in the said case that for
E     challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of arbitrariness, it
      can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the
      statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It has further
      been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not
      reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances
      which the Court considers relevant.
F
             25. The judgment of this Court in the case of Indian Express
      Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. (supra) has been followed by a
      three-judge Bench of this Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd.
      and others vs. State of Karnataka and others3. It will be apposite to
      refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case:
G
               “13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules are
               arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue hardship and, therefore,
               violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Although the protection of
               Article 19(1)(g) may not be available to the appellants, the rules
      3
          (1996) 10 SCC 304
H
    DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                            651
                 & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       must, undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14, which is a guarantee   A
       against arbitrary action. However, one must bear in mind that
       what is being challenged here under Article 14 is not executive
       action but delegated legislation. The tests of arbitrary action which
       apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated
       legislation. In order that delegated legislation can be struck down,
                                                                                 B
       such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary; a law which could
       not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated
       with the law-making power. In the case of Indian Express
       Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC
       641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 : (1985) 2 SCR 287] (SCR at p. 243)
       this Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation does not          C
       carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute
       passed by a competent legislature. A subordinate legislation may
       be questioned under Article 14 on the ground that it is unreasonable;
       “unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the
       sense that it is manifestly arbitrary”. Drawing a comparison
                                                                                 D
       between the law in England and in India, the Court further observed
       that in England the Judges would say, “Parliament never intended
       the authority to make such Rules; they are unreasonable and ultra
       vires”. In India, arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will
       come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. But
       subordinate legislation must be so arbitrary that it could not be         E
       said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article
       14 of the Constitution.”
      26. In the case of State of T.N. and another vs. P. Krishnamurthy
and others4 after considering the law laid down by this Court earlier in
the cases of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd.                     F
(supra), Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association. vs. Union
of India and another5, Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and
another vs. Union of India and others6, St. Johns Teachers Training
Institute vs. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher
Education and another7, Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal and
others vs. State of Maharashtra and others8, Union of India and                  G

4
  (2006) 4 SCC 517
5
  (1989) 4 SCC 187
6
  (1990) 3 SCC 223
7
  (2003) 3 SCC 321
8
  (1981) 2 SCC 722                                                               H
652                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     another vs. Cynamide India Ltd. and another9 and State of Haryana
      vs. Ram Kishan and others10, this Court has laid down certain grounds,
      on which the subordinate legislation can be challenged, which are as
      under:
                   “Whether the rule is valid in its entirety?
B                  15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or
               validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him
               who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised
               that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the
               following grounds:
C                  (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate
               legislation.
                 (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the
               Constitution of India.

D                  (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India.
                  (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or
               exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act.
                   (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment.
                   (f) Manifest arbitrariness/ unreasonableness (to an extent
E              where the court might well say that the legislature never intended
               to give authority to make such rules).”
            27. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to examine
      the correctness of the findings of the learned judges of the Division
      Bench in the impugned judgment and order.
F
              28. One of the grounds on which the impugned Notification has
      been struck down is that it is beyond the scope of powers of the Council
      under Section 10A(7)(d) of the said Act. The Division Bench of the
      High Court has relied on clause (d) of sub-section (7) of Section 10A of
      the said Act to come to a conclusion that clause (d) refers to adequate
G     hospital facilities, having regard to the number of students likely to attend
      the institution. It has held that a requirement of hospital was already
      fulfilled in the pre-amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations. It has
      further held that clause (d) does not refer to Medical College. It was
      9
          (1987) 2 SCC 720
      10
H          (1988) 3 SCC 416
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                              653
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

therefore held that the impugned Notification requiring the Dental Colleges     A
to be attached with the Government/Private Medical College was beyond
the scope of sub-section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act and, therefore,
inconsistent with the said Act.
       29. We find that the Division Bench has failed to take into
consideration clause (g) of sub-section (7) of Section 10A of the said          B
Act. It is to be noted that whereas clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (7) of
Section 10A of the said Act deal with various factors, clause (g) thereof,
which can be said to be a residual clause, enables the Council to take
into consideration also any other factor as may be prescribed.
       30. We further find that the Division Bench of the High Court has        C
also failed to take into consideration clause (fb) of sub-section (2) of
Section 20 of the said Act. A conjoint reading of these provisions would
reveal that the Council is also empowered to take into consideration any
other factor as may be prescribed and also to make a Regulation with
regard to any other factor under clause (g) of sub-section (7) of Section
10A of the said Act. It could thus be seen that it is within the competence     D
of the Council to make Regulations prescribing any other conditions,
which are otherwise not found in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (7) of
Section 10A of the said Act. Challenge to the same would be permissible
only on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. It is also equally settled that
the presumption is always with regard to the validity of a provision. The       E
burden is on the party who challenges the validity of such provision. We
find that the respondent No.1 has failed to discharge the burden to show
that the impugned Notification suffers from manifest arbitrariness.
        31. Secondly, the Division Bench of the High Court found the
impugned Notification dated 21st May, 2012 to be violative of Article 14        F
of the Constitution, on the ground that the Dental Colleges established
prior to impugned Notification would not be required to be attached with
the Medical Colleges, whereas, the Dental Colleges, established after
the impugned Notification, will be compelled to be attached to such
Medical Colleges. We are of the considered view that the Colleges
established prior to the impugned Notification and the Colleges established/    G
to be established after the impugned Notification would form two separate
classes. The differential treatment for different classes would not be hit
by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The only requirement would
be, as to whether such a classification has a nexus with the object sought
to be achieved by the Act. For the reasons given hereinafter, we find           H
654             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     that the factors taken into consideration by the Council, while amending
      Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations are relevant factors. The factors
      have a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It has been submitted
      on behalf of the Council that the existing recognized Medical College
      already has a facility to impart education to about 500-700 students.
      Such Medical Colleges have a full-fledged teaching faculty. Such a faculty
B
      would enable providing a proper education to the students of the Dental
      colleges on various aspects of pre-clinical, para-clinical and allied
      medicine, etc. The Council has also taken into consideration the fact
      that the General Hospitals having bed-capacity of 100 beds or more do
      not have experts on full-time basis. They usually engage the services of
C     consultant doctors, who visit the Hospital for a very limited period. The
      Council has also taken into consideration the fact that the private hospitals
      do not have adequate clinical facilities and/or clinical material and
      therefore, it is unlikely that they will be able to impart education and
      training to students. It has been submitted on behalf of the Council that
      the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the Regulations was brought into
D
      effect so that it would facilitate training to the students of the proposed
      Dental Colleges as per the syllabus/course curriculum prescribed. It,
      therefore, cannot be said that the Council has taken into consideration
      the factors, which are not relevant or germane for the purpose to be
      achieved. The object to be achieved is to provide adequate teaching and
E     training facilities to the students. If in the wisdom of the expert body, this
      can be done by attaching a Dental College to the already existing Medical
      College, it cannot be faulted with.
             32. The reason given for not permitting more than one Dental
      College to be attached to the existing recognized Medical College is that
F     if one Dental College is permitted to be attached to a recognized Medical
      College, which is already having 500-750 students in different semesters
      of their 5-year MBBS course, the additional students of the Dental College
      may very well be absorbed in the facilities that are already available in
      the recognized Medical College. However, if more than one Dental
G     College is permitted to be attached, it will lead to overcrowding of students
      in the Medical College.
            33. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the amended
      Regulation cannot be said to be one, which is manifestly arbitrary, so as
      to permit the Court to interfere with it. On the contrary, we find that the
H     amended Regulation 6(2)(h) has a direct nexus with the object to be
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                                  655
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

achieved, i.e., providing adequate teaching and training facilities to the          A
students.
      34. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of the
Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment:
          “We fail to understand as to how the earlier provisions, in any           B
          manner, were not sufficient for the object sought to be achieved.
          A careful reading of the unamended Regulation 6(2)(h) shows
          requirement of attachment with General Hospital owned and
          managed by the applicant in the campus of the proposed Dental
          College. It was with infrastructure facilities including teaching
          pre-clinical, para-clinical and allied medical sciences.                  C

                If we talk about practical training, it would be more in the
          hospital, therefore, the unamended provision of Regulation 6(2)(h)
          provided both i.e. attachment with General Hospital or with a
          Medical College with required facilities of teaching.”
                                                                                    D
      35. In this respect, we would gainfully refer to the following
observations of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of
Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another vs.
Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others11:
          “14. ….. whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory          E
          instrument — is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation
          conferred on the delegate has to be determined with reference
          only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute
          conferring the power to make the rule, regulation, etc. and also
          the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the             F
          various provisions of the enactment. It would be wholly wrong
          for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature
          or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the
          objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the
          wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by
          the regulation-making body and declare a regulation to be ultra           G
          vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the
          impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose
          of the Act. So long as the body entrusted with the task of framing
          the rules or regulations acts within the scope of the authority
11
     (1984) 4 SCC 27                                                                H
656                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A               conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by
                it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the statute,
                the court should not concern itself with the wisdom or
                efficaciousness of such rules or regulations.”

             36. This Court in unequivocal terms has held that it would be
B     wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the
      Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve
      the objects and purposes of the Act. It has been held that it is not
      permissible for the Court to sit in judgment over the wisdom and
      effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation-
C     making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the
      ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not
      help to serve the object and purpose of the Act.

            37. We find that the observations quoted herein above of the
      Division Bench of the High Court are totally contrary to the view
D     expressed by this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of
      Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another (supra).

             38. The Division Bench of the High Court has erred in substituting
      its wisdom with that of the rule-making body, which is an expert body. In
      this respect, it will also be apposite to refer to the observations of this
E
      Court in the case of All India Council for Technical Education vs.
      Surinder Kumar Dhawan and others12. After considering various
      judgments on the issue, this Court observed thus:

                “16. The courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or
F               technical background to substitute themselves in place of statutory
                professional technical bodies and take decisions in academic
                matters involving standards and quality of technical education. If
                the courts start entertaining petitions from individual institutions
                or students to permit courses of their choice, either for their
                convenience or to alleviate hardship or to provide better
G
                opportunities, or because they think that one course is equal to
                another, without realising the repercussions on the field of technical
                education in general, it will lead to chaos in education and
                deterioration in standards of education.
      12
           (2009) 11 SCC 726
H
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                               657
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

          17. The role of statutory expert bodies on education and the role      A
          of courts are well defined by a simple rule. If it is a question of
          educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the courts
          keep their hands off.”
      39. We are, therefore, of the considered view that it was not
permissible for the Division Bench of the High Court to enter into an            B
area of experts and hold that the unamended provisions ought to have
been preferred over the amended provisions.
       40. That leaves us with the finding of the Division Bench of the
High Court that the amended Regulation is violative of Article 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution. Reliance in this respect is placed on the Eleven-           C
Judge Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of T.M.A.
Pai Foundation and others vs. State of Karnataka and others 13. In
this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of
the Eleven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the said case:
          “54. The right to establish an educational institution can be          D
          regulated; but such regulatory measures must, in general, be to
          ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards,
          atmosphere and infrastructure (including qualified staff) and the
          prevention of maladministration by those in charge of management.
          The fixing of a rigid fee structure, dictating the formation and       E
          composition of a governing body, compulsory nomination of
          teachers and staff for appointment or nominating students for
          admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.”
       41. It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench itself
has held that the right to establish an educational institution can be           F
regulated. However, such regulatory measures must, in general, be to
ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and
infrastructure and the prevention of maladministration.
      42. The impugned Notification, undoubtedly, is made in order to
ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards and infrastructure           G
and as such, the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others (supra), rather than
supporting the case of the respondent No.1, would support the case of
the Council.
13
     (2002) 8 SCC 481                                                            H
658             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A            43. We further find that the impugned judgment of the Division
      Bench of the High Court is also not sustainable on the ground of judicial
      propriety. The respondent No.1 had already filed a writ petition being
      S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15090 of 2016, challenging the action of the
      Council and the respondent No.2 in returning the application of the
B     respondent No.1 for grant of recognition to new Dental College and for
      a direction to reconsider its application submitted on 24th September,
      2011. The said writ petition was filed in the year 2016. The said writ
      petition was dismissed by the learned single judge of the High Court by
      the judgment and order dated 3rd November, 2016. After the said writ
      petition was rejected on 3rd November, 2016, the respondent No.1 filed
C     the present writ petition being D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017
      before the Division Bench of the High Court on 1st March, 2017. In the
      said writ petition, the prayer was for challenging the validity of the
      impugned Notification and for a direction to reconsider the proposal of
      the respondent No.1. The impugned Notification could have very well
D     been challenged in the earlier writ petition, which was filed in the year
      2016 before the learned single judge of the High Court. However, having
      failed in that writ petition before the learned single judge, the respondent
      No.1 filed another writ petition before the Division Bench of the High
      Court. Though one of the prayers challenges the validity of the impugned
      Notification, another prayer claims for reconsideration of its proposal.
E
      The said prayer has been granted by the Division Bench of the High
      Court by its impugned judgment and order dated 24th April, 2018. It
      could thus be seen that the prayer for reconsideration of the proposal
      submitted by the respondent No.1, which was already rejected by the
      learned single judge of the High Court vide order dated 3rd November,
F     2016 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15090 of 2016, has been renewed in
      the fresh writ petition filed in the year 2017 and granted by the Division
      Bench of the High Court.
             44. We, therefore, find that on the ground of judicial propriety also
      the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have entertained the
G     writ petition for a prayer, which already stood rejected. In that view of
      the matter, the impugned judgment and order dated 24th April, 2018 passed
      by the Division Bench of the High Court is not sustainable.
            45. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
      and order dated 24th April, 2018 passed by the Division Bench of the
H
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI                             659
              & ANR. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

High Court is quashed and set aside. The D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3260      A
of 2017 filed by the respondent No.1 before the Division Bench of the
High Court stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
       46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

                                                                               B
Ankit Gyan                                                   Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)




                                                                               C




                                                                               D




                                                                               E




                                                                               F




                                                                               G




                                                                               H