Holding

An arbitral award expressed in foreign currency is deemed enforceable, and the conversion rate is fixed, on the date when objections under Section 48 are finally decided; any deposit made by the debtor that the award holder could withdraw is converted at the rate on the date of deposit.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered an appeal by DLF Ltd. and another Indian company against a Croatian generator firm concerning the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award expressed in euros. The key issues were the appropriate date for fixing the foreign exchange rate to convert the award into rupees and the treatment of amounts deposited by the award debtor during the pendency of objections under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court held that the award becomes enforceable – and thus the conversion rate is fixed – on the date when all objections are finally decided, i.e., when the award attains finality as a decree under Section 49. Deposits made by the debtor that the award holder could withdraw are to be converted at the rate prevailing on the date of deposit, while the balance of the award is converted on the enforceability date. Applying these principles, the Court ordered the first deposit of Rs. 7.5 crore to be converted at the 22‑Oct‑2010 rate and the second deposit of Rs. 50 lakh together with the remaining award to be converted at the 1‑Jul‑2014 rate. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed and the High Court’s finding that the entire award should be converted at the 2014 rate was set aside.

Issues considered

The correct date for determining the foreign exchange rate to convert a foreign‑currency arbitral award into Indian rupees.
The appropriate conversion date for amounts deposited by the award debtor before the court during the pendency of objections under Section 48.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 17
Arbitration Act, 1950 (UK)
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 48, s. 49, s. 50, s. 51, s. 52
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973

Subjects

ArbitrationArbitral awardForeign arbitral awardEnforcement of foreign awardForeign currency conversionSection 48Section 49Exchange rate determinationDeposit during pendencyIndian courts

Judgment

[2024] 8 S.C.R. 291 : 2024 INSC 593

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr.
v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No. 7702 of 2019)
08 August 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The issue arising in the present appeal relates to enforcement of
an arbitral award expressed in foreign currency. In this context,
two questions arise for consideration. First, what is the correct
and appropriate date to determine the foreign exchange rate for
converting the award amount expressed in foreign currency to Indian
rupees. Second, what would be the date of such conversion, when
the award debtor deposits some amount before the court during
the pendency of proceedings challenging the award.

Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Arbitral Award –
Enforcement of an arbitral award expressed in foreign
currency – What is the correct and appropriate date to
determine the foreign exchange rate for converting the award
amount expressed in foreign currency to Indian rupees:
Held: The statutory scheme of the Act makes a foreign arbitral
award enforceable when the objections against it are finally
decided – Therefore, as per the Act and the principle in Forasol
case, the relevant date for determining the conversion rate of
foreign award expressed in foreign currency is the date when the
award becomes enforceable. [Para 20(i)]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Arbitral Award –
Enforcement of an arbitral award expressed in foreign
currency – What would be the date of such conversion,
when the award debtor deposits some amount before the
court during the pendency of proceedings challenging the
award:
Held: When the award debtor deposits an amount before the
court during the pendency of objections and the award holder is
permitted to withdraw the same, even if against the requirement of
* Author
292 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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security, this deposited amount must be converted as on the date
of the deposit – After the conversion of the deposited amount, the
same must be adjusted against the remaining amount of principal
and interest pending under the arbitral award – This remaining
amount must be converted on the date when the arbitral award
becomes enforceable, i.e., when the objections against it are finally
decided. [Para 20(ii)(iii)]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Appellants are Indian
companies and the respondent is a Croatian company –
Dispute arose between the parties – Matter referred to
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce –
Arbitral tribunal passed its award dated 12.05.2004 in favour
of the respondent-claimant – Appellants then filed objections
against the award u/s. 48 – The appellants deposited Rs. 7.5
crores with the Executing Court on 22.10.2010 – Trial Court
dismissed the objections filed u/s. 48 – Appellants filed
a revision, which the High Court admitted by order dated
03.06.2011 – The High Court stayed the operation of the Trial
Court order dismissing objections, subject to the appellants
depositing a further amount of Rs. 50 lakhs, in addition to
Rs. 7.5 crores, with the Executing Court – The revision came
to be dismissed by the High Court on 01.07.2014, by which
the award attained finality as this order was not challenged
any further – What would be relevant conversion date of the
amount:
Held: The deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores was permitted for withdrawal by
furnishing a bank guarantee – So, the first deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores
must be converted as on the date of deposit being 22.10.2010 –
The second deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs pursuant to the High Court
order dated 03.06.2011 stands on a different footing from the first
deposit – This order did not permit the respondent to withdraw this
amount till the completion of the proceedings – Hence, the amount
cannot be converted as on the date of deposit as the respondent
could not have benefitted from the same – Here, the revision
proceedings were complete on 01.07.2014 – Thus, the second
deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs as well as the remaining amount due under
the award must be converted when the objections proceedings
attained finality on 01.07.2014 – The Executing Court, being the
Additional District Judge cum Commercial Court, must determine
the amount payable by taking into account the exchange rate as
on 01.07.2014. [Paras 11.2, 18, 19, 21]
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 293

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

Case Law Cited
Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 422 : (2006)
8 SCC 457 – followed.
Forasol v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission [1984] 1 SCR 526 :
(1984) Supp SCC 263 – relied on.
Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric Co [1993] Supp. 3
SCR 22 : (1994) Supp 1 SCC 644; P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar
v. O.R.M.P.R.M [1968] 3 SCR 367; Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal
Exports Limited [2001] 3 SCR 479 : (2001) 6 SCC 356; United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kantika Colour Lab [2010] 6 SCR 204 :
(2010) 6 SCC 449; Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Limited [2018] 5
SCR 421 : (2018) 7 SCC 479; United India Insurance Co. Ltd v.
Patricia Jean Mahajan [2002] 3 SCR 1176 : (2002) 6 SCC 281;
Jiju Kuruvila v. Kunjujamma Mohan [2013] 7 SCR 276 : (2013)
9 SCC 166; Triveny Kodkany v. Air India Limited (2021) 19 SCC
214; KL Suneja v. Dr Manjeet Kaur Monga [2023] 1 SCR 1079 :
(2023) 6 SCC 722; Nepa Limited v. Manoj Kumar Agrawal [2022]
14 SCR 446 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1736; Delhi Development
Authority v. Bhai Sardar Singh and Sons (C.A. 3867 of 2010) –
referred to.
Progetto Grano S.P.A. v. Shri Lal Mahal Limited (2014) SCC
OnLine Del 3348; Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports Ltd (2012)
SCC OnLine Del 5647; Trammo AG v. MMTC Limited (2019)
SCC OnLine Del 7337; Voith Hydro v. NTPC Limited (2021) SCC
OnLine Del 1325; Karamchand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd.
v. MMTC Ltd. (2022) SCC OnLine Del 949 – referred to.
Jugoslavenska Oseanska Plovidba v. Castle Investment Co. Inc.
[1973] 3 All E.R. 498; In re United Railways of the Havana and
Regia Warehouses, Ltd. [1959] 1 All E.R. 214 (CA); Schorsch
Meier GmbH v. Hennin [1975] 1 All E.R. 152; Miliangos v. George
Prank (Textiles) Ltd. 1976 AC 443 – referred to.

List of Acts
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Arbitration Act, 1940;
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973; Arbitration Act, 1950
(UK); Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961;
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
Arbitration; Arbitral award; Foreign arbitral award; Enforcement of
an arbitral award expressed in foreign currency; Foreign Exchange;
294 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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Foreign exchange rate for converting award; Date to determine the
foreign exchange rate for converting the award; Enforcement of an
arbitral award expressed in foreign currency; Relevant conversion
date of amount; Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7702 of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.02.2018 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No.1827 of 2017
Appearances for Parties
Pinaki Misra, Sr. Adv., Pravin Bahadur, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Ms.
Kritika Gomber, Ms. Akanksha Thapa, Vishnu Kant, Ms. Uzma Sheikh,
M/s. Karanjawala & Co., Advs. for the Appellants.
Abhay Mahajan, Shivam Malhotra, Manoranjan Kumar, Advs. for
the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
1. The issue arising in the present appeal relates to enforcement of
an arbitral award expressed in foreign currency. In this context,
two questions arise for consideration. First, what is the correct and
appropriate date to determine the foreign exchange rate for converting
the award amount expressed in foreign currency to Indian rupees.
Second, what would be the date of such conversion, when the award
debtor deposits some amount before the court during the pendency
of proceedings challenging the award. Two uncertainties have a direct
bearing on the question to be answered, the time lapse between
the date of the award and its enforceability- a local factor, and the
ever-fluctuating exchange rates- a global factor.
1.1 Taking into account these two factors and the statutory
provisions, coupled with the decisions of this Court, we have
formulated twin principles: First, following the principle in Forasol
v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission,1 the date when the arbitral

1 [1984] 1 SCR 526 : 1984 Supp SCC 263
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 295

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

award becomes enforceable shall be the date for conversion.
Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19962 this date is
when the objections against the award are dismissed, and award
attains finality. Second, in the event that the award amount or
part of it is deposited in court pending objections, enabling
withdrawal by the decree holder, that date of such deposit
shall be the relevant date for conversion as per the principle
in Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric Co.3 Before
we consider the submissions of the counsels representing the
parties, followed by our reasons and decision, we will refer to
the relevant facts of the case.
2. Facts: The relevant facts are that the appellants are Indian companies
and the respondent is a Croatian company. The parties entered a
contract for the design, engineering, manufacturing, and supply of
two generators by the respondent. Certain disputes arose between
them that were referred to arbitration before the International Chamber
of Commerce,4 Paris. The three-member arbitral tribunal passed its
award dated 12.05.2004 in favour of the respondent-claimant and
held the appellants to be jointly and severally liable to pay Euros
10,93,989, along with interest, as follows:
i. Euros 9,60,308.41 with interest of 5% p.a. starting on
31.10.1999 until final repayment;
ii. Euros 18,411.40 for the storage and maintenance of the
goods with interest of 5% p.a. starting from the date of
the award;
iii. Euros 5,545.40 relating to lawyer expenses of the claimant,
euros 99,482.70 relating to arbitration fees paid to the
ICC, euros 3,389.57 as guaranty expenses relating to the
repayment of the appellants’ arbitration fee to the ICC,
euros 6,852 relating to the arbitration costs in Paris, all
these amounts with interest of 5% p.a. from the date of
the award.

2 Hereinafter ‘the Act’.
3 [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 22 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644
4 Hereinafter “ICC”.
296 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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2.1 The respondent filed for execution of the award in 2004, while
the appellants filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act,
which was dismissed on 28.04.2010. In 2010, the appellants
then filed objections against the award under Section 48 of the
Act and also filed a Section 37 appeal against the Section 34
order. The High Court dismissed the appeal by its order dated
15.10.2010, the terms of which are important for our purpose
and are hence extracted:
“After arguing for some time learned counsel have
reached a consensus on the present appeal. It has
been agreed by learned counsel for the appellants
that the appeal as well as the application under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 would be dismissed as withdrawn. It has been
further agreed that the appellants would deposit an
amount of Rs.7.5 Crores before the Executing Court
on or before 08.11.2010.
It has been agreed by learned counsel for the
respondent that the application under Section 48
which has been filed by the appellants would be
decided on its own merits without being influenced
by any findings or observations in the order on the
application under Section 34 dated 28.04.2010. It
has further been agreed by learned counsel for the
respondent that the amount of Rs. 7.5 Crores which
would be deposited by the appellants would be
released to it only consequent to furnishing a bank
guarantee of a scheduled bank of India in the amount
of Rs. 7.5 Crores in favour of the Executing Court and
the said bank guarantee would be kept alive during
the proceedings under Section 48 and for a period
of 60 days thereafter. The final order thereon would
obviously be passed by the Executing Court after
the conclusion of the proceedings under Section 48.”
2.2 In accordance with the above, the appellants deposited
Rs. 7.5 crores with the Executing Court on 22.10.2010.
2.3 The Trial Court dismissed the objections filed under
Section 48 by order dated 02.04.2011. The appellants filed
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 297

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

a revision, which the High Court admitted by order dated
03.06.2011. By this order, the High Court also stayed the
operation of the Trial Court order dismissing objections, subject
to the appellants depositing a further amount of Rs. 50 lakhs, in
addition to Rs. 7.5 crores, with the Executing Court. The Court
directed that the amount shall be disbursed to the successful
party on the final adjudication of this lis. It also rejected
the respondent’s prayer for deposit of the amount in euros.
Pursuant to this order, the appellants deposited Rs. 50 lakhs on
15.07.2011. Subsequently, the revision came to be dismissed
by the High Court on 01.07.2014, by which the award attained
finality as this order was not challenged any further.
2.4 In the execution proceedings, the Trial Court by order dated
24.08.2016 permitted the respondent to withdraw the entire
deposit of Rs. 8 crores as per the direction of the High Court.
On 10.10.2016, the respondent received Rs. 11,60,12,100,
including the interest that had accrued on the deposited amount.
2.5 The execution petition was allowed by the Trial Court by its
order dated 03.02.2017, wherein it was held that the relevant
date to convert the award amount expressed in euros to Indian
rupees (the foreign exchange rate) is 01.07.2014, i.e., the
date on which all the objections against the award were finally
decided as it is only on such date that the award is deemed
to be a decree. The Trial Court accepted the calculation as
submitted by the respondent.
2.6 The appellants filed a revision petition against this order, which
was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 26.02.2018,5
which is impugned herein. The High Court rejected the
appellant’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Forasol (supra) to
submit that the date of decree shall be deemed as the relevant
date for conversion and since the award dated 12.05.2004 is
a deemed decree under the Act, the exchange rate as on the
date of the award should be applied. The Court reasoned that
this Court’s judgment in Forasol (supra) was passed under the
Arbitration Act, 1940 and hence, does not apply in the present
case. Instead, the High Court referred to the Delhi High Court’s

5 In CR No. 1827 of 2017 (O&M), Punjab and Haryana High Court (hereinafter “impugned judgment”).
298 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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decision in Progetto Grano S.P.A. v. Shri Lal Mahal Limited,6
against which this Court dismissed the SLP,7 where it was held
that the relevant date for conversion is when the objections filed
under Section 48 are finally decided. Further, the Court referred
to Section 49 of the Act8 that provides that the foreign arbitral
award shall be deemed to be a decree of the court when it is
satisfied that it is enforceable under Part II, Chapter I of the
Act. It reasoned that such satisfaction required under Section
49 is complete only when the objections filed under Section
48 are finally decided, which was on 01.07.2014 in the present
case (when the High Court dismissed the revision). It also
observed that the appellants delayed execution of the award
by initially filing under Section 34, despite such application
not being maintainable and then filing an appeal against this
order and subsequently withdrawing it. The appellants cannot
be permitted to benefit from the fluctuation in exchange rates
when the delay is attributable to them. Therefore, the relevant
date for conversion is 01.07.2014.
2.7 While issuing notice on the special leave petition filed by the
appellant on 10.09.2018,9 this Court confined the issue to
determining whether the foreign exchange rate as on 15.10.2010
would apply to the deposit of Rs. 8 crores.
3. Submissions: Learned senior counsel Mr. Pinaki Mishra appeared
on behalf of the appellants. Initially, he submitted that 01.07.2014
would not be the relevant date for conversion for the entire amount
and argued for using the exchange rate on 02.04.2011, when the
Trial Court dismissed objections under Section 48. However, he
later restricted his submissions to the exchange rate that applies
when the amount of Rs. 8 crores was deposited by the appellants
on 22.10.2010 as per the order dated 15.10.2010. The crux of his
argument is that the deposited amount stands converted as on the

6 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3348
7 SLP No. 27041/2014, order dated 21.11.2014.
8 Section 49 of the Act reads:
“49. Enforcement of foreign awards.—Where the Court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable
under this Chapter, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that Court.”
9 By order 10.09.2018, this Court ordered: “Issue notice, returnable within four weeks, limited to the
conversion rate that would be applicable on 15.10.2010 insofar as the deposit of Rs. 7.5 Crores is
concerned. The same will apply to the further deposit of Rs. 50,00,000/-.”
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 299

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

date of its deposit, and this amount then cannot be converted again
as per the exchange rate prevailing on 01.07.2014. He has submitted
that the High Court passed an order dated 15.10.2010 directing the
appellants to deposit Rs. 7.5 crores on the consent of both parties, and
also permitted the respondent to withdraw this amount on furnishing
a bank guarantee in Indian rupee for the entire amount, to which
the respondent had agreed at the time. He further submitted that
the appellants cannot be faulted for the respondent not withdrawing
the amount when it was deposited. In response to the respondent’s
contention regarding their inability to furnish a bank guarantee of a
scheduled Indian bank, he submitted that the respondent had agreed
to this condition when the order was passed, and in any case, it
could have applied for a modification but did not do so. Since the
respondent consented to the deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores and it was
also permitted to withdraw the same, the amount stood converted
as on the date of its deposit on 22.10.2010. The exchange rate on
this date was 1 euro = Rs. 59.17. While the arbitral award along
with interest was euros 16,73,469.07, the deposited amount of Rs.
7.5 crores gets converted to euros 12,67,534.22 at that exchange
rate, and the balance of the award would be euros 4,05,934.85 that
remained pending as on this date. Subsequently, pursuant to the
High Court’s interim order dated 03.06.2011 in revision against the
Trial Court dismissing the objections petition, the appellant deposited
an additional amount of Rs. 50 lakhs on 15.07.2011. As on this date,
the amount of arbitral award including interest pending payment was
euros 4,17,278.78, i.e., after converting and adjusting the earlier
deposit against the award. Using the prevailing exchange rate of 1
euro = Rs. 62.89 as on 15.07.2011, the appellant’s deposit amounts
to euros 79,503.90. Therefore, a balance of euros 3,37,774.88, along
with interest, remains pending for which the exchange rate as on
01.07.2014 would apply.
3.1 Mr. Mishra concluded by submitting that the appellants would
be required to pay only Rs. 3.19 crores if their calculation is
accepted. On the other hand, if the impugned judgment is
upheld, they would be required to be pay more than double
the amount, i.e., Rs. 6.48 crores.
3.2 Mr. Abhay Mahajan, learned counsel, appearing for the
respondent submitted that the exchange rate on 01.07.2014
would apply to the entire award amount. He submitted that
the respondent had not consented to the deposit of Rs. 7.5
300 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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crores and that the High Court did not convert the amount but
only directed deposit of a lump sum amount. He relied on this
Court’s decision in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. O.R.M.P.R.M.
Ramanathan Chettiar10 where it was held that the judgment
debtor depositing a sum in court during the pendency of the
appeal does not pass the title and vest the money with the
decree-holder. The decree-holder may withdraw the amount
only on furnishing security, which means that the payment is
not in satisfaction of the decree. Further, the judgment debtor
can proceed against the security in case he succeeds in the
appeal. Rather, the purpose of the deposit is to obtain a stay
of execution and to put the money beyond the reach of the
parties pending the disposal of the appeal. On this basis, Mr.
Mahajan submitted that the deposit of Rs. 8 crores during the
pendency of the objections under Section 48 does not pass the
title of this amount to the respondent and such deposit was not
under the arbitral award as the award can be deemed to be a
decree only on 01.07.2014 when all the objections to the award
stood dismissed. Hence, this is the relevant date for conversion.
3.3 As per the calculation sheet submitted by the respondent,
the exchange rate as on this date is 1 euro = Rs. 82.21 and
this rate must be used for converting the entire arbitral award
and interest. The amount of Rs. 11.6 crores withdrawn by the
respondent on 10.10.2016 must first be appropriated towards
interest and then towards the principal sum. After adjusting
this amount and after accounting for interest, the respondent
submits that it is entitled to Rs. 6,57,62,057 from the appellants.
4. Analysis – Statutory Scheme: It is important to first set out the
statutory scheme for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
India. Under the Act, Part II deals with the enforcement of certain
foreign arbitral awards. Chapter I deals with awards under the New
York Convention. Section 45 provides for the power of a court to
refer parties to arbitration.11 Section 46 provides that a foreign award

10 [1968] 3 SCR 367
11 Section 45 reads:
“45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration.—Notwithstanding anything contained
in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an action
in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in section 44, shall, at the
request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration,
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 301

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

which is enforceable under this Chapter shall be treated as binding
for all purposes on the persons between whom it is made.12 Section
47 provides for the evidentiary requirements for enforcement of a
foreign award.13 Section 48 sets out various grounds on which the
court may refuse the enforcement of a foreign award.14 Section 49

[unless it prima facie finds] that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”
12 Section 46 reads:
“46. When foreign award binding.—Any foreign award which would be enforceable under this Chapter
shall be treated as binding for all purposes on the persons as between whom it was made, and may
accordingly be relied on by any of those persons by way of defence, set off or otherwise in any legal
proceedings in India and any references in this Chapter to enforcing a foreign award shall be construed
as including references to relying on an award.”
13 Section 47 reads:
“47. Evidence.—(1) The party applying for the enforcement of a foreign award shall, at the time of the
application, produce before the court—
(a) the original award or a copy thereof, duly authenticated in the manner required by the law of the
country in which it was made;
(b) the original agreement for arbitration or a duly certified copy thereof; and
(c) such evidence as may be necessary to prove that the award is a foreign award.
(2) If the award or agreement to be produced under sub-section (1) is in a foreign language, the party
seeking to enforce the award shall produce a translation into English certified as correct by a diplomatic
or consular agent of the country to which that party belongs or certified as correct in such other manner
as may be sufficient according to the law in force in India.
[Explanation.—In this section and in the sections following in this Chapter, “Court” means the High Court
having original jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitral award if the
same had been the subject-matter of a suit on its original civil jurisdiction and in other cases, in the High
Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to such High Court.]”
14 Section 48 reads:
“48. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards.—(1) Enforcement of a foreign award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the court
proof that—
(a) the parties to the agreement referred to in section 44 were, under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
enforced; or
(d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
(2) Enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the Court finds that—
(a) the subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of India;
or
(b) the enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of India.
[Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public
policy of India, only if,—
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section
75 or section 81; or
302 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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provides that where the court is satisfied that a foreign award is
enforceable under this Chapter, it shall be deemed to be a decree
of that court. Section 50 provides for appeal against certain orders,
i.e., orders refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 45
and orders refusing to enforce a foreign award under Section 48.15
Finally, Section 5116 is a savings clause and Section 5217 provides
that Chapter II of Part II shall not apply to awards governed under
this Chapter.
4.1 From the statutory scheme, it is clear that a foreign arbitral award
is binding between the parties when it is enforceable under
Part II, Chapter I of the Act (Section 46). The enforceability of
the award can be challenged under Section 48, and the order
passed on such an application can be appealed under Section
50 only if it is allowed and the court refuses enforcement of
the award. Therefore, a foreign award can be enforced when
the objections against it are finally decided and dismissed. At
this point, the award is deemed to be a decree of the court as
per Section 49.18 Unlike under the Arbitration Act, 1940, there
is no requirement for a separate decree by a court for making
the award a rule of the court.19

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. ]
[Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.]
(3) If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent
authority referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) the Court may, if it considers it proper, adjourn
the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of the party claiming
enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.”
15 Section 50 reads:
“50. Appealable orders.—(1) [Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, an appeal] shall lie from the order refusing to—
(a) refer the parties to arbitration under section 45;
(b) enforce a foreign award under section 48, to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from such
order.
(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this
section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”
16 Section 51 reads:
“51. Saving.—Nothing in this Chapter shall prejudice any rights which any person would have had of
enforcing in India of any award or of availing himself in India of any award if this Chapter had not been
enacted.”
17 Section 52 reads:
“52. Chapter II not to apply.—Chapter II of this Part shall not apply in relation to foreign awards to which
this Chapter applies.”
18 See Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports Limited (2001) 6 SCC 356, paras 30 and 31.
19 ibid.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 303

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

5. Case-law on Relevant Date for Conversion: Now, we will discuss
the case-law on the relevant date of conversion, both in the context
of arbitral awards and judgments where the decretal amount is
expressed in a foreign currency. The seminal case that first decided
this question was Forasol v. ONGC (supra). Forasol was a French
company that was awarded a tender for structural drilling of oil
for exploration by ONGC. Pursuant to certain disputes that arose
between the parties, the matter was referred to arbitration and on
21.12.1974, an arbitral award was passed in Forasol’s favour where
the amount was expressed in French francs. This award was made
under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Court held that the award can be
enforced either in foreign currency or in Indian rupee. The principles
for determining conversion to Indian rupee are as follows:
5.1 Where the contract provides for a rate of exchange, the same
must be used to convert the amount in accordance with the
wording of the contractual clause. In this case, article IX-3.1
of the contract provided for the exchange rate of FF 1.033 =
Re. 1.000, which the Court held as applying to only 20% of
the fees and charges computed in French francs based on
contractual interpretation.20 Further, the arbitral award provided
for an enhanced rate of conversion of FF 1.000 = Rs. 1.5178 as
applicable to payments in Indian rupee on or after 30.11.1966
as the Indian rupee was depreciated at this time. The Court
interpreted the arbitral award and held this exchange rate to
apply in place of what was provided in article IX-3.1 to the extent
of payments made in Indian rupee on and after 30.11.1966.21
5.2 For the remaining amount that still required to be converted to
Indian rupee for which no exchange rate was provided in the
contract or the arbitral award, the Court considered six possible
dates as the proper date for fixing the rate of exchange22:
i. the date when the amount became due and payable;
ii. the date of the commencement of the action;
iii. the date of the decree;

20 Forasol (supra), para 16.
21 ibid, paras 17-22.
22 ibid, paras 24-2 5.
304 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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iv. the date when the court orders execution to issue;
v. the date when the decretal amount is paid or realised;
vi. and in cases where a decree is passed by the court in
terms of an arbitral award in foreign currency, the date
of the award.
5.3 After an extensive discussion of English jurisprudence on the
point, the Court noted the position of law in England at the
time.23 Briefly stated, the position is as follows: Both courts
and arbitrators in England have the jurisdiction to make a
judgment/ award in foreign currency in certain circumstances.
In the Jugoslavenska case,24 the Court of Appeal held that in
cases of arbitral awards, the date of award is the relevant date
for determining the exchange rate. This was a departure from
the ‘breach date rule’, i.e., the conversion must be as per the
exchange rate on the date when the debt was payable, which
principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the Havana
case.25 Subsequently, in the Schorsch Meier case26 (this was
not a case of arbitration but a claim for payment of price of
goods in a foreign currency filed before English courts), the
Court of Appeal held that the date of conversion should be the
date of payment, i.e., the date on which the court authorises
enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling. Finally, in the
Miliangos case,27 the House of Lords also held that the date
of conversion should be the date when the court authorises
enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling pound. While
Jugoslavenska (supra) was not expressly overruled by the
House of Lords, its correctness was doubted.
5.4 The Court held that there is no bar on courts in India to pass
a decree for a sum expressed in foreign currency. However,
for the purpose of payment of such amount, the limitations and
restrictions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973
(that was in force at the time) must be considered. If permission

23 ibid, para 39.
24 Jugoslavenska Oseanska Plovidba v. Castle Investment Co. Inc., [1973] 3 All E.R. 498.
25 In re United Railways of the Havana and Regia Warehouses, Ltd.,[1959] 1 All E.R. 214 (CA).
26 Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin, [1975] 1 All E.R. 152
27 Miliangos v. George Prank (Textiles) Ltd., 1976 AC 443.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 305

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

is not granted by the authorities to pay the decretal amount in
foreign currency, the amount would have to be converted to
Indian rupees for payment of an equivalent amount. The date
of conversion becomes relevant here, as the “court must select
a date which puts the plaintiff in the same position in which he
would have been had the defendant discharged his obligation
when he ought to have done, bearing in mind that the rate of
exchange is not a constant factor but fluctuates, and very often
violently fluctuates, from time to time.”28 These are the guiding
principles and considerations for the Court to determine the
relevant date, which are apposite even today.
5.5 The Court then undertook a detailed examination of each of
the 6 dates that it set out earlier and held that the date of the
decree (the third option) is the most appropriate amongst them.
The Court adopted the approach of eliminating other possible
dates, on the following grounds:
i. The date when the amount becomes due and payable
does not have the same effect of putting the plaintiff in the
same position that he would have been in if the defendant
had discharged his obligation. Due to the fluctuations in
exchange rate, using this date could result in the decree-
holder only receiving a fraction of or a lot more than what
he is entitled to.29
ii. The second date – when the action or suit commenced –
was rejected for the same reason as above, considering
that there is usually a large period of time between the
filing of the suit, the decree by the Trial Court, subsequent
appeals, revisions, and reviews, and the final decision.30
iii. The Court favourably discussed the third option, i.e., the
date of the decree or judgment. It held that the decree
crystallises the amount payable to the decree-holder. To
account for appeals and revisions, the date when the action
is finally disposed of and when the decree becomes final

28 Forasol (supra), para 40.
29 ibid, para 41.
30 ibid, para 42.
306 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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and binding on both parties, after exhausting all remedies,
can be used. However, it observed that the only objection to
be considered against this date is that there is a significant
lapse of time between the decree and its execution.31
iv. The Court rejected the fourth date, i.e., the date of court
order for execution, despite the same being used in English
law as per the decision in Miliangos (supra). It noted that
the process of execution in India is a lengthy one that may
require attachment of property, deciding third party claims
to such property, proclamation with particulars, and auction
sale. Moreover, multiple applications for execution may be
required if the initial attachment and sale does not cover
the decretal amount. Hence, it may lead to a situation
where there are multiple execution orders, meaning multiple
exchange rates would have to be considered. Another
difficulty is that the execution application itself requires
the amount to be expressed in Indian currency.32
v. The date of payment was also rejected as the proper date
due to practical and procedural difficulties of having to pay
court fees on a determined amount in Indian rupee; the
pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of courts would depend
on the amount claimed, which must again be in Indian
rupee; and execution is for a specific sum expressed in
Indian rupee. For these reasons, the Court held that the
conversion of the amount to the domestic currency cannot
be left to the date of payment as the legal procedures in
India require the amount to be determined in domestic
currency before that.33
vi. Among the remaining dates, the Court was of the
opinion that the date of the judgment/decree is the most
appropriate.34 It rejected the date of the arbitral award as
the proper date while observing that the Jugoslavenska
case (supra), where this date was used, was doubted even

31 ibid, para 43.
32 ibid, paras 44-46.
33 ibid, paras 47-52.
34 ibid, para 53.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 307

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

by the House of Lords in Miliangos (supra). If the law laid
down in Miliangos (supra) were to be applied to arbitral
awards, the date of conversion would be when the court
grants leave under Section 26(1) of the Arbitration Act,
1950 (UK) to enforce such award in the same manner
as a judgment or to the same effect.35 Further, noting the
differences between the statutory scheme for enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards in the UK and in India, it held
that the Jugoslavenska case (supra) will not apply in the
Indian context considering the procedure under Section 17
is different from the procedure under English law.36 Section
17 of the Arbitration Act, 194037 required a judgment and
decree to give an award the status of a decree, i.e., making
it a rule of court, for the award to become enforceable. On
the other hand, English law38 did not require a judgment to
be passed in all cases and it was sufficient for the court
to grant leave to enforce the award in the same manner
as a judgment. In Indian law, it was not the arbitral award
but only the decree of the court that could be enforced
by an application for execution.39 Hence, the Court found
that rather than the date of the arbitral award, the date
of the judgment and decree under Section 17 is the most
appropriate one to determine the conversion rate as it
was only then that the arbitral award became enforceable.
6. The above extensive discussion on Forasol (supra) is necessary
to understand the principles set out by this Court to determine the
relevant date for conversion. The law laid down in this case was

35 ibid, paras 61-62.
36 ibid, paras 63-65.
37 Section 17 reads:
“17. Judgment in terms of award.—Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the
matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time
for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made,
after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so
pronounced a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it
is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award.”
38 See Section 26(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1950, which provides:
“26. Enforcement of award.—(1) An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of the High Court
or a Judge thereof, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect, and
where leave is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award…”
39 Forasol (supra), paras 65-66.
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subsequently affirmed by a 3-judge bench of this Court in Renusagar
Power Co. Ltd v. General Electric Co40 in the context of the Foreign
Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. A foreign arbitral
award in favour of the respondent-claimant, which is an American
company, was passed where the amount was expressed in US dollars.
The respondent then filed for enforcement of this award before the
Bombay High Court under the Foreign Awards (Recognition and
Enforcement) Act, 1961 as the appellant was an Indian company.
Both the single judge and division bench of the High Court allowed
the enforcement of the award and dismissed Renusagar’s objections
under Section 7 of this Act. The matter was then appealed to this Court,
which dealt with several issues on objections to the enforceability of
foreign awards, including the scope of inquiry under Section 7 and
the meaning of ‘public policy’. The most relevant issues framed by
the Court, for our purpose, are which law would govern the rate of
exchange for conversion in proceedings for enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award and whether Forasol (supra) required reconsideration.
The Court held that the applicable law to determine the proper date
for conversion is the lex fori,41 which would be Indian law. After
extensively discussing the principles under English law as well as
the reasoning in Forasol (supra), the Court rejected the contention
that Forasol (supra) required reconsideration.42
7. The law laid down in Forasol (supra) has also been used in other
cases though they do not pertain to arbitration but involved an issue
of a debt expressed in foreign currency that required to be converted
to Indian rupee. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kantika Colour
Lab43 involved a consumer complaint for payment of an insurance
claim due to the damage of a printer in transit. This Court did not
cite Forasol (supra) but used the date of its judgment as the proper
date for conversion of the cost of the printer that was expressed in
Singaporean dollars. In Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Limited,44
again was a consumer complaint for payment under an insurance
contract for loss suffered during export of goods, the Court noted

40 Renusagar (supra), see paras 131-133.
41 ibid, paras 107-108.
42 [2010] 6 SCR 204 : ibid, para 133.
43 [2010] 6 SCR 204 : (2010) 6 SCC 449
44 [2018] 5 SCR 421 : (2018) 7 SCC 479
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 309

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

that the contract provided for a date on which the exchange rate
must be determined and followed Forasol (supra) to hold that this
is the proper date.
7.1 In certain other cases, the principle in Forasol (supra) has been
considered but not applied due to the peculiar facts of those
cases. For example, in cases of motor accident deaths where
the deceased was earning in foreign currency, the Court has
refused to use the date of the judgment as the proper date and
has instead used the date of filing the claim as the claims in
these cases were filed in Indian rupee and the Tribunal also
decided the cases in Indian rupee. Hence, it was held that the
amount already stood converted in the claim itself.45 Similarly,
in Triveny Kodkany v. Air India Limited 46 involving claim for
compensation due to the death of an airline passenger, the
Court considered Forasol (supra) and Renusagar (supra) but
did not apply them. It differentiated the facts in those cases as
in both of them, the award holders were foreign companies.
However, in this case, the claimants seeking compensation
were residing in India. Further, like in motor accident cases,
it found that the claim for payment was itself in Indian rupees
and interest was also provided on such amount. Hence, it
found that the date of filing the complaint is the proper date
for conversion.
8. It is therefore clear from the above-referred analysis of judicial
determinations that the principle and law laid down in Forasol (supra)
has been widely considered and followed by this Court in various
types of matters. There is no impediment for us to apply this decision
to cases under the 1996 Act, even though it was decided under the
Arbitration Act, 1940. We therefore disagree with the High Court
that Forasol (supra) does not apply to cases under the 1996 Act.
9. The Delhi High Court has also relied on Forasol (supra) in several
cases on the enforcement of domestic and foreign arbitral awards
where the amount is expressed in foreign currency:

45 See United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Patricia Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281; Jiju Kuruvila v.
Kunjujamma Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 166.
46 (2021) 19 SCC 214
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9.1 In Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports Ltd,47 the High Court
relied on Forasol (supra) and analogised that the date on which
the objections to the enforcement of the award are finally rejected
and the foreign award becomes enforceable would be the date
that it is deemed to be a decree under Section 49. Hence, this
would be the relevant conversion date.
9.2 This case was followed in Progetto (supra), where the relevant
date was held to be when this Court dismissed the SLP in the
objections petition. The award debtor herein had deposited
the entire amount only after the dismissal of the SLP by using
the exchange rate as on the date of deposit, which was higher
than the rate as on date of dismissal of SLP. Hence, the High
Court while deciding the execution petition directed refund of
the excess amount by using the date of this Court’s order as
the relevant date. In so far as the present appeal is concerned,
we have already mentioned that the respondent was permitted
to withdraw 7.5 crores during the pendency of the proceedings.
9.3 Similarly, in Trammo AG v. MMTC Limited,48 the date of
dismissal of review by this Court in the proceedings to set aside
the award was held to be the relevant date.
9.4 In Voith Hydro v. NTPC Limited,49 the award debtor had paid
some part of the arbitral award amount during the pendency of
proceedings to set aside the award. It paid 75% of the amount
on 06.11.2018, against bank guarantees by the award holder,
in accordance with a Niti Aayog Circular. Subsequently, this
Court dismissed the SLP in the 22.09.2020. The High Court
held that the exchange rate as on 06.11.2018 would apply
insofar as 75% of the deposit is concerned as the claimant
had received this part-payment and the exchange rate on
22.09.2020 was higher than on 06.11.2018. Relying on Forasol
(supra), Renusagar (supra), and Fuerst Day Lawson (supra),
it held that the exchange rate on 22.09.2020 would apply to
the remaining amount.

47 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5647
48 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7337
49 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1325
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 311

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

9.5 In Karamchand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. v. MMTC
Ltd.,50 the date on which the arbitral award attained finality (when
the SLP in the Sections 34 and 37 proceedings was dismissed)
was determined as the relevant date for the exchange rate.
Here, the award debtor had deposited an amount subsequent
to the dismissal of the SLP at the exchange rate as on date
of deposit, which was higher than the exchange rate when the
SLP was dismissed. The High Court therefore also directed the
award holder to refund the excess amount paid by the award
debtor. This case does not involve deposit during the pendency
of the objections.
10. Applying the Principle in Forasol under the 1996 Act: The reason
that this Court in Forasol (supra) determined the date of the decree
under Section 17 of the 1940 Act as the proper date is that it is only
then that the arbitral award becomes enforceable. However, as set
out earlier, the statutory scheme under the 1996 Act does not require
such a judgment or decree to be passed for a foreign award to be
enforceable. Rather, the enforceability of a foreign award is automatic
and deemed under Section 49 after the objections against such an
award under Section 48 are finally decided and disposed of. At this
point, the award is enforceable as a decree of a court (Section 49).
Hence, the date on which the objections are finally decided and
dismissed would be the proper date for determining the exchange
rate to convert an amount expressed in foreign currency.
10 .1 In the present case, this date is 01.07.2014 – when the High
Court dismissed the revision petition against the Trial Court
order dismissing the appellants’ objections. No further appeal
was preferred from this order and hence, it attained finality.
While the learned counsels have not contested this issue, it
was necessary for us to delve into the reason and principle
behind selecting this date and to settle the position of law on
the applicability of Forasol (supra) under the 1996 Act.
11. Conversion of Deposited Amounts: The primary contention by the
learned counsels was regarding the proper date to determine the
exchange rate to the extent of Rs. 8 crores that was deposited in
the court pursuant to certain orders. The learned counsels have

50 2022 SCC OnLine Del 949
312 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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both referred to decisions by the Delhi High Court on this point.
Mr. Mishra heavily relied on Voith Hydro (supra), where the arbitral
award was partly paid against bank guarantees under a Niti Ayog
circular, before the objections were finally decided. The High Court
here held that the paid amount stood converted as on the date of
payment as it was received by the award-holder and the exchange
rate increased by the time the objections were finally decided. On the
other hand, Mr. Mahajan has relied on Karam Chand Thapar (supra),
where again a deposit of some part of the amount was made, albeit
after the final decision on objections. Here the High Court held that
the date on which the SLP in the objections was dismissed would
be the proper date.
11.1 In the present case, it is important to note the terms on which
the two deposits of Rs. 7.5 crores and Rs. 50 lakhs were
made. From the order of the High Court dated 15.10.2010, it
is clear that such order for deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores and for
furnishing a bank guarantee of an Indian bank for the release
of the deposit was made in accordance with the consent of
the parties. Mr. Mahajan’s submission that the respondent
did not consent to the deposit hence cannot be accepted.
The further deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs was made pursuant to
an interim order of the High Court dated 03.06.2011, which
stayed the Trial Court order dated 02.04.2011 and directed the
deposit. However, unlike the previous order, neither was this
order passed on the consent of the parties nor did it permit
the respondent to withdraw the money during the pendency of
the proceedings. Rather, it directed that the amount shall be
deposited in a fixed deposit receipt and shall be disbursed to
the successful party on the final adjudication of the objections.
11.2 We will first deal with the deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores. Despite
being permitted to withdraw this amount by furnishing a bank
guarantee, the respondent did not do so until 2016. Mr. Mahajan
contended that being a foreign company, it was unable to
obtain a bank guarantee from an Indian bank. However, the
order of 15.10.2010 clearly records the respondent’s consent
to this condition. Further, when it was unable to comply with
the same, it also did not apply for a modification or removal
of the condition. Hence, the respondent, in its own discretion,
did not withdraw Rs. 7.5 crores when it was deposited in 2010.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 313

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

11.3 A similar situation arose in this Court’s decision in Renusagar
(supra) as well. This Court was deciding an appeal against
the dismissal of Renusagar’s objections under Section 7 of the
Foreign Awards Act, 1961. During the pendency of the appeal,
by order dated 21.02.1990, this Court stayed the operation
of the High Court order subject to deposit of one-half of the
decretal amount calculated as on date. General Electric was
permitted to withdraw the deposited amount by furnishing
security by way of bank guarantee for the sum to be withdrawn
in excess of Rs. 4 crores. It also directed that 10% interest
p.a. would be payable by Renusagar on the balance of the
decretal amount in case the appeal is dismissed, and the same
interest would be payable by General Electric on the amount
withdrawn by it if the appeal is allowed. Pursuant to this order,
Renusagar deposited Rs. 9.69 crores on 20.03.1990, which
was withdrawn by the respondent on furnishing necessary
bank guarantee. In a subsequent order, this Court directed a
further deposit of Rs. 1 crore and bank guarantee of Rs. 1.92
crores to be furnished by Renusagar. The deposit was made
on 03.12.1990, which was also withdrawn.51 However, General
Electric contended that it was unable to use a large part of this
amount as it had not received permission from the Reserve
Bank of India to convert the same into US dollars due to the
pendency of the appeals.
11.4 After rejecting various submissions by the appellant regarding
the enforceability of the award, this Court decided the question
of the amount in Indian rupee that was to be paid. The relevant
portion on this point is extracted:
“141. As indicated earlier, in pursuance to the orders
of this Court dated February 21, 1990, Renusagar
deposited a sum of Rs 9,69,26,590 on March 20,
1990 and a further amount of Rs 1,00,00,000 was
deposited by Renusagar in pursuance to the order
dated November 6, 1990 on December 3, 1990.
These amounts have been withdrawn by General
Electric. The question is how and at what rate the

51 Renusagar (supra), para 18.
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said amount should be adjusted against the decretal
amount. It is not disputed that on the date when the
said deposits were made by Renusagar and were
withdrawn by General Electric, rupee-dollar exchange
rate was Rs 17 per dollar. Shri Shanti Bhushan has,
however, submitted that although General Electric
had withdrawn the amount deposited by Renusagar,
it was not able to use the same because the Reserve
Bank of India did not grant the permission to General
Electric to remit the amount by converting the same
into U.S. dollars on account of the pendency of these
appeals in this Court… Shri Shanti Bhushan has,
therefore, submitted that the amounts deposited by
Renusagar should be converted from Indian rupees
into U.S. dollars at the exchange rate prevalent on
the date of the judgment of this Court and not on the
basis of the rate of exchange prevalent at the time
of the said payments by Renusagar. We are unable
to agree with this submission. The convertibility into
U.S. dollars of money paid by Renusagar in Indian
rupees is not the condition for discharge of the decree
and as laid down in Forasol case the decree can be
discharged by payment in Indian rupees and it is for
General Electric to obtain the necessary permission
from the Reserve Bank of India for such conversion of
Indian rupees to U.S. dollars and the transfer thereof
to the United States. If General Electric were finding a
difficulty in such transfer on account of the pendency
of these appeals in this Court they could have moved
this Court and obtained necessary clarification in
this regard. They did not choose to do so. In these
circumstances, the amount of Rs 10,69,26,590 which
has been paid by Renusagar in pursuance to the
orders dated February 21, 1990 and November 6,
1990 has to be converted into U.S. dollars on the
basis of the rupee-dollar exchange rate of Rs 17.00
per dollar prevalent at the time of such payment and
calculated on that basis the said amount comes to
US $ 6,289,800.00.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 315

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

142. The judgment of the High Court passing a decree
in terms of the award is, therefore, affirmed… The
amount paid by Renusagar during the pendency
of these appeals will have to be adjusted against
the said decretal amount and the present liability of
Renusagar under this decision has to be determined
accordingly. Calculating on this basis the amount
payable by Renusagar under the decree in terms of
U.S. dollars is:

Amount awarded by the Arbitral : 12,215,622.14
Tribunal
Interest on US $ 2,716,914.72 : 117,733.00
(the total amount awarded under
item Nos. 1, 3 and 5) @ 8% per
annum from 1-4-1986 to 15-10-
1986 in terms of the award
12,333,355.14
Less: Amount paid by Renusagar 6,289,800.00
in pursuance of the orders dated
21-2-1990 and 6-11-1990 during
the pendency of the appeals in
this Court
6,043,555.14
143. In accordance with the decision in Forasol case
the said amount has to be converted into Indian
rupees on the basis of the rupee-dollar exchange
rate prevailing at the time of this judgment. As per
information supplied by the Reserve Bank of India,
the Rupee-Dollar Exchange (Selling) Rate as on
October 6, 1993 was Rs 31.53 per dollar.”
11.5 From the above, it is clear that the Court adjusted the amounts
deposited during the pendency of the proceedings and against
security by converting them to US dollars as on the date of
their deposit. It applied the date of its own judgment only for
converting the remaining portion of the award in accordance
with Forasol’s (supra) ruling that the date of decree or judgment,
after exhausting all remedies, is the proper date. It rejected
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the respondent’s argument regarding its inability to convert
the amount on the grounds that a decree in foreign currency
can be validly satisfied by payment in Indian rupee and the
respondent did not move the Court for necessary clarification.
12. The facts in this case are similar to Renusagar (supra) for an analogy
to be drawn. Here as well, the deposit was made during the pendency
of the proceedings under the objections petition. It was permitted
to be withdrawn against a bank guarantee of an Indian bank. Here
the respondent was entirely unable to withdraw the amount, while
the issue there was that it was only unable to convert the amount to
US dollars. However, in both cases, the respondent failed to move
the Court for necessary orders to be able to receive and utilise the
amount. In this case, there is the added fact that the respondent
consented to the deposit and the condition requiring security. In
light of these similarities, it is appropriate for us to adopt the Court’s
approach in Renusagar (supra).
13. We therefore hold that the deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores stands converted
as on the date of deposit (22.10.2010), when the rate of exchange
as submitted by the appellants is 1 euro = Rs. 59.17. We also reject
the submission by Mr. Mahajan that the respondent was unable to
furnish a bank guarantee of an Indian bank. This argument is only to
serve its own interest to be able to benefit from a higher exchange
rate but does not address the principle that operates while enforcing
a sum expressed in foreign currency.
14. It is important to appreciate the consequence and effect of deposit
during the pendency of proceedings to understand the need to convert
this amount on that date. Through a deposit, the award debtor parts
with the money on that date and provides the benefit of that amount
to the award holder. Provided that the award holder is permitted to
withdraw this amount, it can convert, utilise, and benefit from the
same at that point in time. Considering that the deposited amount
inures to the benefit of the award holder, it would be inequitable
and unjust to hold that the amount does not stand converted on the
date of its deposit.
15. A similar logic underscores the statutory provisions in Order 21, Rule
1 and Order 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190852 to determine

52 Hereinafter “CPC”.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 317

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

whether interest will continue to operate on an amount deposited
before a court. It would be relevant for us to briefly discuss the law
on this point:
15.1 A constitution bench of this Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Union
of India53 extensively discussed the rules governing interest
calculation when the defendant/ judgment-debtor deposits
some part of the amount. Order 24 governs deposits at the
pre-decretal stage and Order 21, Rule 1 at the post-decretal
stage.54 The essence of these provisions is that on any amount
deposited into the court, interest shall cease to run from the
date when the depositor serves a notice to the plaintiff/decree-
holder. Similarly, when payment is tendered to the decree-holder
outside the court, interest ceases on such amount even if the
payment is refused.55
15.2 Order 21, Rule 1 embodies a rule of prudence that once the
amount is tendered to the decree-holder by the judgment-
debtor, whether in the form of a court deposit or other forms of
payment such as demand draft or cheque, the judgment-debtor
cannot be made liable to then pay interest on such amount.56
15.3 The rationale for this rule has been explained in Nepa Limited
v. Manoj Kumar Agrawal 57 through a similar logic of the decree-
holder being able to benefit from the deposited amount. In this
case, the award-debtor deposited 50% of the awarded amount
before the executing court to obtain a stay on the execution
proceedings of the arbitral award during the pendency of
appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. This amount was
withdrawn by the award holder, and the issue before this Court
was whether interest is payable on the deposited amount even
after the date of deposit. The Court held as follows:
“21. In the present case, the appellate court, on the
appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Act did
grant stay, subject to the condition that the appellant

53 [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 422 : (2006) 8 SCC 457
54 ibid, para 14.
55 ibid, paras 15, 25 and 26.
56 KL Suneja v. Dr Manjeet Kaur Monga (2023) 6 SCC 722, para 36.
57 [2022] 14 SCR 446 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1736
318 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

would deposit 50% of the amount. Rs. 7,78.280/- was
deposited by the appellant on 05.11.2001. The stay,
therefore, only operated for the balance amount. On
the balance amount, certainly, the appellant would be
liable to pay interest @ the rate of 18% per annum till
the date of actual payment. However, on Rs. 7,78,280/-
paid, after adjusting/appropriating payment due on
the interest accrued, on the balance principal amount
paid to the respondent, interest would not be payable.
24. The respondent submits that the payment of
Rs. 7,78,280/- being conditional, the respondent
would have been under an obligation to refund the
said amount in case the appellant had succeeded
in the appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996.
This argument does not impress, as in the event
the appellant had succeeded in their appeal, the
entire amount paid would have been refundable. The
undertaking was not onerous, and was to operate only
if the amount of Rs. 7,78,280/- was not refunded by
the respondent. The respondent had obviously used
and utilized the money. The appellant did not have
any right on the money paid to the respondent, who
could use it in a manner and way he wanted. There
was no charge. Money is fungible and would have
gotten mixed up with the other amounts available
with the respondent. Right to restitution would not
make the payment conditional. Interest has been
jurisprudentially defined as the price paid for money
borrowed, or retained, or not paid to the person to
whom it is due, generally expressed as a percentage
of amount in one year. It is in the nature of the
compensation allowed by law or fixed by parties,
for use or forbearance or damage for its detention.
In the context of the present case, interest would be
the compensation payable by the appellant to the
respondent, for the retention or deprivation of use of
money. Therefore, once the money was paid to the
respondent, interest as compensation for deprivation
of use of money will not arise.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 319

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

15.4 Therefore, the ability of the decree-holder to access and use
the money in a manner he deems fit was considered by this
Court while deciding the issue.
15.5 Here, the Court also differentiated P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar
(supra), which has also been relied on by the respondent in
the present matter, and another decision by this Court in Delhi
Development Authority v. Bhai Sardar Singh and Sons58. P.S.L.
Ramanathan Chettiar (supra) holds that a deposit is only a way
to obtain a stay on execution and does not pass title to the
decree-holder, and hence, is not in satisfaction of a decree.
The decree-holder in Delhi Development Authority (supra) was
not permitted to withdraw the deposited amount and hence,
interest was calculated on the same. The Court in Nepa Limited
(supra) however held that these cases do not apply in its facts
as the respondent here was permitted to withdraw the deposited
sum and did so. Hence, the Court instead relied on the ability
of the respondent to use the deposited money as it deems fit.
16. These cases demonstrate that once there is a deposit by the award
debtor and the award holder is permitted to withdraw the same, even
if such withdrawal is conditional and subject to the final decision
in the matter, the court must consider that the award holder could
access and benefit from such deposit. It is then the burden of the
award holder to furnish security, as required by the court’s orders,
to utilise the amount or to make an application for modification of
the condition if it is unable to fulfil the same.
17. In furtherance of the above, we therefore reiterate that the deposit
of Rs. 7.5 crores must be converted as on the date of such deposit,
i.e., 22.10.2010, when the rate of exchange as submitted by the
appellants was 1 euro = Rs. 59.17.
18. The second deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs pursuant to the High Court order
dated 03.06.2011 stands on a different footing from the first deposit.
This order did not permit the respondent to withdraw this amount
till the completion of the proceedings. Hence, the amount cannot
be converted as on the date of deposit as the respondent could not
have benefitted from the same. This amount could be withdrawn only

58 C.A. 3867 of 2010.
320 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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in 2016, pursuant to the Executing Court’s order dated 24.08.2016.
The respondent withdrew the entire deposit of Rs. 8 crores, along
with the interest that accrued on this amount, on 10.10.2016.
19. From the above discussion on the first deposit, it is clear that the
exchange rate on 22.10.2010 would apply to that extent and non-
withdrawal by the respondent of Rs. 7.5 crores was in its own
discretion and inaction. However, since the order of 03.06.2011
permits withdrawal of Rs. 50 lakhs on the completion of the
proceedings, that would be the appropriate date for determining the
exchange rate. Here, the revision proceedings were complete on
01.07.2014. Hence, it would be appropriate to apply the exchange
rate as on this date to convert the deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs.
20. Our conclusions from this judgment can be summarised as follows:
i. The statutory scheme of the Act makes a foreign arbitral award
enforceable when the objections against it are finally decided.
Therefore, as per the Act and the principle in Forasol (supra),
the relevant date for determining the conversion rate of foreign
award expressed in foreign currency is the date when the award
becomes enforceable.
ii. When the award debtor deposits an amount before the court
during the pendency of objections and the award holder is
permitted to withdraw the same, even if against the requirement
of security, this deposited amount must be converted as on the
date of the deposit.
iii. After the conversion of the deposited amount, the same must
be adjusted against the remaining amount of principal and
interest pending under the arbitral award. This remaining
amount must be converted on the date when the arbitral award
becomes enforceable, i.e., when the objections against it are
finally decided.
21. As per these conclusions, the first deposit of Rs. 7.5 crores must be
converted as on the date of deposit being 22.10.2010. The second
deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs as well as the remaining amount due under the
award must be converted when the objections proceedings attained
finality on 01.07.2014. The Executing Court, being the Additional
District Judge cum Commercial Court, must determine the amount
payable by taking into account the exchange rate as on 01.07.2014.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 321

DLF Ltd. (Formerly Known as DLF Universal Ltd) and Anr. v.
Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd.

22. In light of the above, we partly allow the appeal, and set aside the
findings of the High Court in the impugned judgment to the extent
that Forasol (supra) does not apply under the 1996 Act and that the
exchange rate on 01.07.2014 must be used for converting the entire
arbitral award and interest.
23. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
24. No order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan