Holding

Having given an unconditional undertaking to vacate, the petitioners were barred from contesting the judgment and their subsequent applications were an abuse of process, justifying dismissal and exemplary costs.

Summary

The petitioners were tenants of a commercial premises under a conducting agreement and were ordered by the High Court to vacate within a year, later receiving a four‑month extension. They filed an unconditional undertaking to vacate, but subsequently sought a review and a further five‑year extension, claiming the High Court’s order was erroneous. The Supreme Court held that having taken the benefit of the time granted and furnished an unconditional undertaking, the petitioners could not now challenge the judgment on its merits; their actions constituted an abuse of process and frivolous litigation. The Court emphasized the need to deter such conduct through exemplary costs and ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises by a specified date and to pay Rs 5 lakhs as costs. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The effect of filing an unconditional undertaking to vacate on a party's right to challenge the underlying judgment.
Whether the petitioners' applications for further extensions amount to abuse of process and frivolous litigation.
The appropriateness of imposing exemplary costs for abuse of process.
The characterization of the tenancy under a conducting agreement and its impact on the parties' rights.

Legislation cited

Bombay Shops and Establishment Act
Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Payment of Wages Act
Presidency Small Causes Courts' Acts. 41

Subjects

abuse of processundertakingexemplary costsfrivolous litigationpossession suitconducting agreementtenantlicencecivil procedurearticle 136court jurisdiction

Judgment

(2017] 2 S.C.R. 95

DNYANDEO SABAJ! NAIK AND ANR. A
v.
MRS. PRADNYA PRAKASH KHADEKAR AND ORS.
(SLP (C) Nos. 25331-25333 of2015)
MARCH 01, 2017 B
jJAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD ·
AND SANJi\Y Kl SHAN KAUL, JJ.j
Administration <!f Justice:
Suit for recovery of possession of premises given under c
Conducting Agreement - Decreed - Appellate Court granting time
of one year to vacate the premises on the basis of the undertaking
given by the defendant-petitioner - Time further extended/or 4
months - Thereafter defendant filing Review Petition and also
seeking extension of time for further 5 years - Dismissal of - On
D
appeal, held: The petitioners having sought and obtained the benefit
of order granting them time to vacate the premises and having
furnished unconditional undertaking to vacate the premises, it would
be an abuse of the process for the petitioners to seek recourse to
their remedies on the merits of the issues - The Court must view with
disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process - Frivolous E
and groundless filing constitute a serious menace to the
administration of justice - Liberal access to justice does not mean
access to chaos and indiscipline - It is duty of every court to firmly
deal with such situation - The imposition of exemplary costs is a
necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well
F
as to prevent the filing of frivolous cases - The defendants are
directed to vacate the pre111/ses - Defendants are to pay costs
quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs - Costs.
Respondent granted the premises in question to the petitioner under
a conducting agreement for carrying on the business oflaundry. Suit for
recovery of possession was filed by landlord. Trial Court decreed the G
suit. In First Appeal, Single Judge of High Court directed the tenant to
vacate the premises and on the basis of undertaking given by the tenant,
granted one year time to vacate the premises. Further extension of time
was granted for 4 months. Thereafter tenant filed Review Petition and
· application for extension of time to vacate the premises for further period H
95
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 2 S.C.R.

A of five years. The petition was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the
present petitions.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. It is not correct to say that the filing of an
undertaking does not disentitle a litigant to question the legality
B of the judgment dismissing the First Appe.al. The petitioners
sought and obtained the benefit of an order granting them a period
of one year to vacate the premises. The matter did not rest there.
The petitioners moved the High Court again for extension of
time which was allowed to them by an order dated 5 December
c 2014. This sequence of events leaves no manner of doubt that
the undertaking was not called for by the High Court to secure
the occupation of the premises during the period that the
petitioner would have required to further assail the order of the
High Court in this Court. The petitioners, on the contrary, clearly
indicated that they would rest content with a time of one year to
D vacate the premises and in fact obtained a further extension of
time of four months even after the expiry of the initial term of
one year. Having furnished an unconditional undertaking to vacate
the premises, it would be manifestly an abuse of the process for
the petitioners to seek recourse to their remedies on the merits
E of the issues which arose in the First Appeal. [Paras 8, 9, 11)
[102-:F-G; 103-C-D, E-F; 104-C-D)
P R Deshpande v. Maruti Ba/aram Haibatti (1998) 6
SCC 507 : (1996) 2 Suppl. SCR 863 - distinguished.
2. The present case indicates a blatant abuse of the process
F of the Court. The petitioners uot only took the benefit of an
order of the High Court granting them one year's time to vacate
the premises bnt obtained a further extension of a period of four
months to vacate. The petitioners then filed a Review Petition
before the High Court and moved another application, this time
seeking an extension of five years to vacate the premises. The
G
time of the High Court and of this Court as well had to be devoted
to a thoroughly frivolous proceeding. [Para 12) (104-D-F)
3, This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a
litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process
will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with Grmly.
1-l A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures
DNYANDEO SABAJ! NAIK v. PRADNYA PRAKASH 97
KHADEKAR

of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences A
to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the
hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency.
Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to
ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our
country, there is no premium on the truth. [Para 13] [105-B-C]
B
4. Courts across the legal system - this Court not being
an exception - are choked with litigation. Frivolous and
groundless filings constitute a serious menace to the
administration of justice. They consume time and clog the
infrastructure. Productive resources which should be deployed
in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to c
cases filed only to benefit from delay, by prolonging dead issues
and pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested
interest in. aetay. In the present case, the process of dispensing
justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the
legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a simple D
issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive
applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable. The person
in whose favour the balance of justice lies has in the process
been left in the lurch by repeated attempts to revive a stale issue.
This tendency can be curbed only if courts across the system
adopt an institutional approach which penalizes such behavior. E
Liberal access to justice does not mean access to chaos and
indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed that courts of
justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies
designed to profit from the delays of the law. Unless remedial
action is taken by all courts here and now our society will breed F
a legal culture based on evasion instead of abidance. It is the
duty of every court to firmly deal with such situations. [Para 14]
[105-C-G]
5. The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary
instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well as to G
prevent the filing of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts
can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the
concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real
time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is
available to citizens with genuine grievances. Otherwise, the
doors would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A undeserving cases which flood the system. Such a situation cannot
be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of
discretion but a duty and obligation cast upo_n all courts to ensure
that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms
of the law to defeat or delay justice. This Court commends all
courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner. The
B
petitioners are directed to pay costs quantified at Rs 5 lakhs
(Rupees five lakhs) to the respondents within two months. [Paras
14, 15] [105-G-H; 106-A-B, D-E]
Case Law Reference
c [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 863 distinguished Para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 25331-25333of2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.06.2015 in RPST No ..
7761 of2015 and order dated 22.11.2013 in CA No. 2135 of2012 and
D final order dated 02.12.2013 in FA No. 1051 of2012 (corrected vide
order dated 11.12.2013) of the High Court of Bombay
Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Yatin K., S. K. Pandey, A. Kumar,
Bankey Bihari, Advs. for the Appellants.
R.Anand Padmanabhan, Kaustubh Bhardwaj, Ajay Sejwal, Shashi
E Bhushan Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. I. The Special Leave
Petitions in the present case arise from three orders of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in a First Appeal:
F
(i) an order dated 22 November 2013 by which a year's time was granted
to the petitioners (in terms as prayed) to vacate the premises which
formed the subject matter of a decree for eviction, until 30 November
2014;

G (ii) an order dated 2 December 2013 by which the High Court disposed
of the First Appeal in terms of the undertaking filed by the petitioners;
and
(iii) an order dated 16 June 2015 by which the petition for review has
been dismissed. There is a delay of503 and 522 days respectively in the
Special Leave Petitions filed against the orders dated 2 December 2013
H
DNYANDEO SABAJ! NAIK v. PRADNYA PRAKASH 99
KHADEKAR [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

and 22 November 2013. Since the petitioners moved the High Court in A
a petition for review, we condone the delay and having heard counsel,
proceed to dispose of the Special Leave Petitions by this judgment.
2. The subject matter of the dispute comprises of commercial
premises bearing Shop No.8 A, Bhatia Bhuvan Ground Floor, D S
Babrekar Marg, Off Gokhale Road (North), Dadar, Mumbai 400 028. B
The finding of fact (as will be elucidated hereafter) is that the premises
were granted under a conducting agreement to the petitioners for carrying
on the business ofa laundry. The case of the original plaintiff who sued
for possession was that the premises were granted on the basis of a
conducting agreement on 31 July 1968 on a royalty ofRs.260 per month.
The suit for eviction was filed against the petitioners in the Court of
c
Small Causes on 26 April 1984. Initially, the suit was decreed on 15
September l 999. In an appeal filed by the petitioners, the appellate Bench
of the Small Causes Court by ajudgme1\t dated 10 January 2002 held
that since the petitioners were in occupation of the premises under a
conducting agreement, there was no relationship of licensor and licensee. D
As a result, the Court of Small Causes was held to have no jurisdicfion
under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts' Act. The
appeal against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was hence
allowed. The judgment of the appellate Bench was questioned in a Writ
Petition filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The
petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on E
24 June 2002.
3. The respondents thereupon instituted a suit in the City Civil
Court for recovering possession of the premises. The suit was decreed
by a judgment dated 5 May 2012. The trial judge entered a finding of
fact that the premises had been given on a conducting basis. In support F
of this finding, the trial Judge adverted to the admission of the first
defendant in certain proceedings which were instituted before the Labour
Court under the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the laundry
had been taken over on a conducting basis from the original Plaintiff.
The finding recorded by the trial judge was in the following terms: G
"The question to be considered in this case is as to whether the
business of the laundry was given to the defendant no.1 on
conducting basis or not. It is pertinent to note that the workers
of the Kismet Laundry had filed case in the Labour Court under
the Payment of Wages Act bearing Case nos.530 of 1974 and
H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A 531 of 1974 against the defendant no.I and the plaintiff. In that
case defendant no. I had given evidence. He has admitted that
he has taken laundry business "Kismat Laundry" for conducting
the laundry business on 0I10811968 on payment of royalty of
Rs.260/- from the plaintiff. In his cross-examination DW-1
DnyandeoSabaj i Naik in this suit admitted about giving deposition
B
in the labour Court. Thus, from the admissions of the defendant
no. I it is established that the original plaintiff had given laundry
business on conducting basis to the defendant no. I. In his cross-
examination defendant no. I has also further admitted that stock-
in-trade, furniture relating to the business were given to him and
c the royalty of Rs.260/- per month was fixed. He has also not
disputed the receipts which were issued by the plaintiff accepting
of payment of royalty of Rs.260/- from the defendant no. I
towards conducting his business. Moreover the copy of license
issued under the Bombay Shops and Est ab Iishment Act produced
in the Small Causes Court relating to the business run from the
D
suit premises has been admitted by the defendant no. I in his
evidence. It is admitted that in the licence the name of business
. ofKismat Laundry managed by B!uestar Art Dyers and Cleaners
has been mentioned. In the licence Narayan Narvakar was
shown as the owner and Naik was shown as conductor of
E business. Thus, on the basis of the documentary evidence and
on the admissions of the defendant no.I it has been established
by the plaintiffs that the suit premises and business therein was
given on conducting basis to the defendant no. I."
4. Against the Judgment and order of the Trial Court, decreeing
F the suit for possession, the petitioners filed a First Appeal. On 22
November 2013, the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed the
following order in the First Appeal:
"In this Appeal, after hearing the learned counsel for the
Appellants fully, I disclose that there is no merit in the Appeal.
G However, as the Appellants have been conducting the business
at the suit premises since more than 40 years, it was suggested
that some time can be given to Appellants to vacate the suit
premises. The learned counsel for the Appellants sought
instructions and makes statement that the Appellants are ready
to give undertaking that they will vacate the suit premises on or
H
DNYANDEO SABAJ! NAIK v. PRADNYA PRAKASH 101
KHADEKAR [DR: D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

before 30•h November, 2014. The learned counsel for the A
Respondent Nos. I and 3 submits that Appellants to disclose the
names of all the occupants of the suit premises.
2. The learned counsel for the Respondents submits that ifthe
Royalty of Rs.5,000/- per month as directed by this Court is
continued to be paid till 30"' November, 2014 and undertaking be B
given that Appellants will not alienate the property or create any
_ third party right in any manner in the suit property or part with
the possession of the property, then the Respondents are ready
and willing to accept the said undertaking and ready to
accommodate the Appellants by giving time to Appellants to
vacate the suit premises.
c
3. In view of this development and submissions made by the
learned counsel of both the sides, Appellants to give their
undertaking. Stand over to 29'h November, 2013 at 3 .00 p.m."
5. In pursuance ofthe above order, the petitioners filed undertakings D
to vacate the premises on or before 30 November 2014. The petitioners
took the benefit of the order of the High Court by which they were
granted a year's time to vacate the premises. The undertakings formed
the basis of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December
2013 when the First Appeal was disposed of. The matter did not rest
there. An application for extension of time to vacate the premises was E
filed before the High Court which was allowed by the learned Single
Judge in the following terms, by an order dated 5 December 2014:
"Application is moved for extension oftinie till 31" May, 2015
and also seeking leave to deposit the rent from September, 2014
onwards. This Court by order dated 2"' December, 2013, has F
granted time to the applicant to vacate the suit premises till 30'h
November, 2014. Now the applicant seeks extension of time.
The learned counsel for the applicant submits that his daughter
is doing her post graduation and the applicant wants some time
to find out other premises for their laundry business. The learned G
counsel for the respondent submits that the applicants have put
up partition in the suit premises and abused respondent when
they went to take possession 30'h November, 2014 at 7.00 p.m.
In view of the submissions, Civil Application is disposed of by
passing the following order.
H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A Order
i) Applicant shall vacate the premises and hand over possession
of suit premises to respondent at 7.00 p.m. on'3 I" March,
2015.
ii) This is the last extension and hereafter no extension will be
B given.
iii) Applicant to remove any construction i.e. partition if put up at
the time of handing over possession.
iv) The applicant shall give undertaking to that effect on or before
9'h December, 2014. ·
C v) The applicant is directed to deposit the arrears of rent from
September, 2014 onwards till 3 l" March, 2015, on or before
17'h December, 2014."
6. By and as a result of the above order, the petitioners obtained •
an extension of time until 31 March 2015 to vacate the premises. The
D petitioners then filed a Review Petition before the High Court on 17
March 2015. Together with the Review Petition, the petitioners filed
another application for extension of time to vacate the premises by a
further period of five years. The learned Single Judge dismissed the
Review Petition on 16 June 2015.
·E 7. The petitioners moved this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. On 28 August 2015, notice was issued in the application for
condonation of delay as well as on the Special Leave Petitions and a
stay of dispossession was granted conditional on the petitioners depositing
an amount of Rs 15,000 towards compensation for using the premises
with effect from I December2013.
F
8. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioners
is that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was manifestly in
error in rejecting the First Appeal without reasons. It was urged that the
petitioners would be entitled to assail the judgment and order dated 22
November 2013 on merits notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners
G had filed an undertaking to vacate the premises by 30 November 2014.
Jn support of the submission reliance was placed on a judgment of this
Court in PR Deshpande v. Maruti BalaramHaibatti 1 to advance the
submission that the filing of an undertaking does not disentitle a litigant
to question the legality of the judgment dismissing the First Appeal.
H 1
r< J 998) 6 sec 507]
DNYANDEO SABAJ! NAIK v. PRADNYA PRAKASH 103
KHADEKAR [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.)

9. We are unable to accept the contention which has been A
advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The order of the High Court
dated 22 November 2013 indicates that at the hearing of the First Appeal,
the learned Single Judge indicated to the petitioners that she found no
substance in the First Appeal. At this stage, counsel for the petitioners,
upon seeking instructions, stated that the petitioners would be willing to
B
furnish an undertaking to vacate the premises by 30 November 2014.
The respondents acceded to this request subject to the compensation
being determined at Rs 5000 per month as was directed by the High
Court previously. The order ofthe High Court indicates that the petitioners
were granted a period of ten days even thereafter to reflect upon the
undertaking which they were to file and it was only on 2 December c
2013 that the First Appeal was eventually disposed of in terms of the
undertaking. The petitioners sought and obtained the benefit of an order
. granting them a period of one year to vacate the premises. The matter
did not rest there. The petitioners moved the High Court again for
extension of time which was allowed to them by an order dated 5
D
December 2014. The order of the High Court indicates thatthe extension
·was sought on the ground that the daughter of the applicant was pursing
her post graduate studies and in order to enable the petitioners "to find
out other premises for their laundry business". This sequence of events
leaves no manner of doubt that the undertaking was not cal led for by the
High Court to secure the occupation of the premises during the period E
that the petitioner would have required to further assail the order of the
High Court in this Court. The petitioners, on the contrary, clearly indicated
that they would rest content with a time of one year to vacate the premises
and in fact obtained a further extension of time of four months even
afte!_the expiry of the initial term ofone year.
F
10. The judgment of this Court in PR Deshpande (supra) lays
down the following principle:
"11. A party to a lis can be asked to give an undertaking to the
court ifhe requires stay ofoperation of the judgment. It is done
on the supposition that the order would remain unchanged. By G
directing the party to give such an undertaking, no court can
scuttle or foreclose a statutory remedy of appeal or revision,
much less a constitutional remedy. If the order is reversed or
modified by the superior court or even the same court on a review,
the undertaking given by the party will automatically cease to
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 2 S.C.R.

A operate. Merely because a party has complied with the directions
to given an undertaking as a condition for obtaining stay, he cannot
be presumed to communicate to the other party that he is thereby
giving up his statutory remedies to challenge the order."
11. The above principle applies in a situation where an undertaking
B is filed by a litigant, as a part of a condition for stay of operation of the
judgment of the High Court. The filing of such an undertaking does not
deprive the litigant of the remedy to question the judgment of the High
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Such a situation must,
however, be distinguished from a case (such as the present) where a
litigant rests content with seeking time to vacate the premises an,c),the
c circumstances of the case indicate thatthe litigant did not intend to pursue
any further remedy before this Court to assail the judgment of the High
Court. Having furnished an unconditional undertaking to vacate the
premises, it would be manifestly an abuse of the process forthe petitioners
to seek recourse to their remedies on the merits of the issues which
D arose in the First Appeal.
12. This case indicates a blatant abuse of the process of the Court.
The petitioners not only took the benefit of an order of the High Court .
granting them one year's time to vacate the premises but obtained a
further extension of a period of four months to vacate. The petitioners
E then filed a Review Petition before the High Court and moved another
application, this time seeking an extension of five years to vacate the
premises. The time of the High Court and, unfortunately, of this Court as
well had to be devoted to a thoroughly frivolous proceeding. Learned
counsel for the petitioners in fact sought to urge that as a result of the
judgment of the City Civil Court, the petitioners have been deprived of
F establishing that their status as licensees fructified into a tenancy with
effect from 1 February 1973. Quite apart from the fact that such a plea
would not be open to the petitioners in the background of what has been
observed earlier, we find even on merits that the submission requires
only be stated to be rejected. We have extracted in the earlier part of
G this judgment the specific finding of the Trial Court based on the
admissions of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners that the
premises were granted to them on the basis of a conducting agreement.
Besides this, in the earlier proceeding that was instituted in the Small
Causes CQurt, it was found that the premises have been granted under a
conducting agreement and there was no relationship of licensor and
H
DNYANDEO SABAJ! NAIK v. PRADNYA PRAKASH 105
KHADEKAR [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.)

licensee.That being the position, the petitioners would not acquire status A
as tenants with effect from I February 1973, there being no licence in
their favour.
13. This Court must view with disfavourany attempt by a litigant
to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process wil I be seriously
eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly.A litigant who takes B
liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left
in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture
along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation ofjudicial
leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order
to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country,
there is no premium on the truth.
c
14. Courts across the legal system - this Court not being an
exception - are choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless filings
constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice. They
consume time and clog the infrastructure. Productive resources which
should be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in D
attending to cases filed only to benefit from delay, by prolonging dead
issues and pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested
interest in delay. Unfortunately, as the present case exemplifies, the
process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the
detriment of the legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a E
simple issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive
applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable. The person in whose
favour the balance ofjustice lies has in the process been left in the lurch
by repeated attempts to revive a stale issue. This tendency can be curbed
only if courts across the system adopt an institutional approach which
penalizes such behavior. Liberal access to justice does not mean access F
to chaos and indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed that courts
of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies
designed to profit from the delays of the law. Unless remedial action is
taken by all courts here and-now our society will breed a legal culture
based on evasion instead of abidance.' It is the duty of every court to G
firmly deal with such situations. The imposition of exemplary costs is a
necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well as
to preventthe filing of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts can
set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the concerns of
those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also
H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A necessary to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with
genuine grievances. Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate
causes simply by the weight of undeserving cases which flood the system.
Such a situation cannot be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not
merely a matter of discretion but a duty and obligation cast upon all
courts to ensure that the legal system is not exploited by those who use
B
the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all courts
to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner.
15. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions but while
doing so, direct that:
c (i) the petitioners shall vacate the premises on or before 7 March 2017;
· (ii) In case the petitioners fail to vacate the premises by the date indicated
in (i) above, they shall expose themselves to civil and criminal
consequences under the law;
(iii) the petitioners shall pay all arrears for use of the premises computed
D at the rate fixed in the order of this Court dated 28 August 2015 within
four weeks; and
(iv) the petitioners shall pay costs quantified at Rs 5 lakhs (Rupees five
lakhs) to the respondents within two months.
16. We also clarify that this judgment shall not affect the contempt
E
proceedings which have been initiated against the petitioners.
17. There shall be an order in these terms.

Kalpana K. Tripathy SLPs dismissed.