Supreme Court of India

DR. D.C. SAXENAversusHONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

Citation: 1996 INSC 753
Decided: 19 July 1996
Disposal: Disposed off
Bench: K RAMASWAMY

Holding

Imputations of bias, motive and misconduct against a sitting Chief Justice, made in scurrilous language without factual basis, constitute scandalising the court and amount to criminal contempt, not protected by the right to free speech.

Summary

Dr. D.C. Saxena filed a public‑interest writ petition seeking recovery of funds from the Prime Minister, which was dismissed by a bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. He then filed a second writ petition directly against the Chief Justice, alleging bias, procedural improprieties, misuse of official facilities and seeking his removal, stripping of citizenship and prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the allegations were scandalous, reckless and intended to lower the authority of the Court, constituting criminal contempt under Article 129 and the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on freedom of speech and Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, stating that such defenses do not apply to scurrilous attacks on a judge. Consequently, the petitioner was convicted of contempt and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and a fine.

Issues considered

Whether the statements made in the second writ petition amount to criminal contempt (scandalising the court) under Article 129 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether the petitioner is protected by the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the fair‑criticism provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Contempt Act.
Whether the Chief Justice can be deemed a judge in his own cause for hearing the first petition and assigning the bench for the second.
Whether the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is constitutionally valid.
Whether the lack of mens rea is relevant in criminal contempt proceedings.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 121, s. Article 124(4), s. Article 129, s. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(2)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 12, s. 2(c), s. 4, s. 5

Subjects

contempt of courtscandalising the courtfreedom of speechArticle 19Article 129Chief Justice of Indiajudicial immunityContempt of Courts Actpublic interest litigation

Judgment

DR. D.C. SAXENA A
v.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

JULY 19, 1996
B
[K. RAMASWAMY, N.P. SINGH AND S.P. BHARUCHA, .TJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 :

A1tic/e 121}-Contempt of Cowt-Wiit petition filed before Supreme
Corat-Disn1isscd sununalily by the Bench co1nprising Chief Justice of India c
as one of the Judges~Pctitimzcrfiling a second w1it petition against the Chief
Justice of India levelling allegations against and imputing motives to the CJI
for disn1issing his fiJ:r;t 1vn·t petition-Mi/it petition containing inten1perate
language and scunilous accusations against the CJI---c.rl allocating the peti-
tion to a Bench for hearin5fl'rit petition disn1issed--Conten1pt proceedings D
initiated against the petitiollo~Held, allegatiolls made ill respect of the CJ/
in pofonna!lce of his judicial fu!lctioll intc!lded to lower the authmity of a!ld
respect for the Cowt a!ld office of the Judge--The allegations sca!ldalise the
C'o1ut-Sca11dalising judge or corut tends to b1ing autho1ity and adn1i11istra-
tion of justice into disrespect and disregard and tantan1ounts to con-
tenzpt-Scrurilous abuse of a judge or cou1t, or attacks on personal chqracter E
of a Judge are acts of contempt-It is duty of the Chief Justice of a Cowt to
assign judicial work to his brother Judges-By assigning the second w1it
petition to a Bench, CJ! ~vould not beconie a judge in his own caus~
Petitioner conunitted contenipt of Co1at-Sentenced to sbnple ilnprisonnient
for three n1onths.
F
A11icles 19(1) a!ld 19(2), 129 and 2I~Freedom of speech and expres-
sion-Held, is subject to A1tic/es 19(2), 129 and 215, in relation to contempt
of Court, defan1ation or incitelnent to an offenc~Any citizen is entitled to
express his opinion about the co1rectness of the judg111ent, order or sentence
within dignified alld moderate language, but motives to Judges should not be G
attJibuted; it b1ings the adn1inistration of justice into disrespect.

Article 32-Writ petitio11-Summa1y disposal of-Heid, it is not
obligato1J' to give reasons for disniissing a vv1it petition.

Contempt of Cowts Act, 1971 : H
677
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A S. 2(c)-<_'rimi11a/ comempt-W1it petitin11 filed before S11preme
Cowt-Co11fai11ini; allq,11tio11s against the Chief Justice nf India for dismissillf?
petitioner's earlier ivrit petition-Held, the allegations scandalise the
Colu1-Scanda/ising the Court 1-vould n1ea11 hostile c1iticisn1 of jlldf.tCS or
co1u1-Tendency to scandalise the co1ut or tendency to loiver the autho1ity or
to obstruct the adnzinistration of justice in any 1nan11er or tc11de11cy to
B challenge the authmity or majesty of j11stice, wo11/d be a uiminal contempt.

Me11s rea-He/d i11 comempt proceedings proof of mens rea is 11ot
relevant-ft is not necessa1y to establish actual intention on the pa1t of
contenuzer to inte1fere ivith adn1inistration ofjustice-lf'lzat is relevant is that
the offending act produces interference ~vith or tendency to i11te1fere ~vith the
C course of justice.

Ss. 4 and 5-Repo11 of judicial proceedings and oiticism of judicial
act-Held, a citizen is entitled to b1ing to the notice of puhlic at !arie
infi1111itics fro111 1vhich any institution including judicia1y suffers jl·o111, but
D personal attack upon a judge in connection 1vith the office he holds is not
protected by la1v-171c allegations n1ade by the co11te111ner in the second YPit
petition are neither a fair and accurate rcpo11 of the proceedings in the earlier
ivrit petition nor a fair criticisn1 thereof-bnputation of i111proper 111otives or
bias cannot be justified on the 1uinciple of fair conunent.

E Contenipt of Court-Punislunent-Held, contenzpt jraisdiction is in-
tended to uphold the aulh01ity and digniO' of coll!1s of law and protect public
confidence reJJosed in then1-Punis/11nent is inflicted not for p1uposes of
protecting either the coll!t or an individual judge b11t for the lJli!pose of
protecting the p11blic.

Practice and Procedure :
F
Pleadings-Held, a pa1tly-in-person or an Ad1 ocate has lihe1ty of ex-
1

pression-But they equally oa:e counte1vailing duty to nzaintain dignity,
deconan and order in the cou1t proceedings and judicial process-T71ey
should not indulge in 1t·1iting in the pleadings scunilous accusations against
G a judge or cowt.
The contemner, a Professor of English, tiled before this Court a "Tit
petition seeking: a direction to the Union of India to recover fron1 the then
Prime J\.linister of India and President of Congress Party, the expenditure
incurred for the private use of Indian Air Force Aircrafts and Helicoptt>rs.
H The writ petition ca1ne to he listed for admission before a Bench comprising:
D.CSAXENAv. HON'BLEC.J.J. 679

the Chief Justice of India and another Judge. The contemner appeared A
in-person. The Bench sent for the Solicitor General of India and asked him
to verify the contents of the \lTit petition. On the next date, i.e. 7th August,
1995, the \\'rit petition ca1ne to he listed before a Bench con1prisi11g the Chief
Justice of India and m·o other Judges; the Solicitor c;eneral of India placed
the record before the Court; and the Court, after perusing the record and
hearing the conte1nner, sum1narily dismissed the writ petition.
B

The conten1ner tiled a second \\Tit petition before this Court arraign-
ing the Chief Justice of India as a party respondent thereto. lie alleged,
inter alia, in the said petition that it was improper for the respondent (the
Chief Justice of India) to have heard the earlier nTit petition; the respon- c
dent by disn1issing the earlier \Vrit petition, ll'ilfully and advertently vi.:,Iated
the fundamental rights not only of the petitioner but also of the people of
the India; the respondent caused fabrication of court proceedings of
7.8.1995 in the earlier YtTit petition as the said proceedings did not indicate
the presence of the Solicitor General of India; the respondent deliberately
and wilfully failed to perform hmdamental duties and stultified their per- D
for1nance by the petitioner; dis1nissal of the earlier \\'rit petition Yt'ithout
recording: reasons \\'as against the rn'in princi11Ies of transparency and
accountability; the respondent had attempted but failed to bro\\'heat the
petitioner; the respondent by allowing his son, a law:yer practising in the
Supreme Court, to stay \\.ith him in his official residence presumably to E
n1isuse the official facilities and prestige of oflice of Chief Justice of India;
during pendency of the "Tit petition the respondent "be advised to proceed
on leave; so that he may not directly or indirectly influence any of the judges
hearing the matter"; the respondent was Hable to reimburse from his pocket
not only the cost incurred by the petitioner in the two writ petitions, but
also the entire loss caused to the State as a consequence of non-payment of F
dues by the Prime Minister. The petitioner, inter alia, prayed: (a) that it be
declared that the respondent was unlit to hold the ollke of Chief Justice of
India; (b) that the respondent be stripped of his citizenship; (c) that an FIR
he registered against the respondent for con1mitting forgery and fraud; and
(d) that prosecution of the respondent under the Prevention of Corruption
Act be directed.
G

This Court pointed out to the conten1ner the scandalous nature of
accusations 1nade in the second '"''rit petition 1 but he persisted for con-
sideration of the said accusation and reiterated that he would stand by the
sarne. The Court disrnissed the second \Vrit petition and, considering the H
680 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A allegations n1acle therein by the conteJnner against the Chief Justice of
India and the Court to be scandalous and scurrilous, directed the issue of
notice to the contemner "'h)' proceedings to punish him for conten1pt of the
Court be not initiated against him. The conternner \Vas sen'ed \\'ith a
conte1npt notice enlisting 14 instante!'i of allegations niade in the second
B \\Tit petition, which "'ould 1nin1a facie constitute contu1nacious conduct of
the conten1ner to scandalise the Court.

The contemner filed \\Titten sub1nissions stating that the Bench
which dismissed the second writ petition had been constituted by the
respondent, \Vho had thereby becon1e a Judge in his 0"11 cause; that the
C second \Vrit petition therefore, \.'t'as not listed before a court con1petent to
decide it; that the order of its dismissal \.\.'as therefort~, non-est and it \.\.'as
still deemed to be pending; that the petition should be listed before a Bench
of not less than 5 .Judges; that no conten1pt proceedings could be initiated
against hiln and the notice \.'t'as, therefore, premature. Later, the conte1nner
filed a statement of arnendments n1odit)'ing only a fe\\' of the itenis enlisted
D in the contempt notice and stating that prayers (b) and (c) in the writ
petition be treated as deleted.

It \\.'as submitted by the Solicitor General of India, ap11earing as
anzicus c1uiae, that the averments made in the second "'rit petition
E re•nained on the record; theyn·ereex-facie contumacious and the contemner
expressed no regret for \.\'hat he had stated therein; and even the niodified
averments '"'ere contumacious.

It \\.'as mainly contended by the conte1nner that he did not seek any
gain for himself and he made the avrrments for the public good; he had no
F intention to scandalise the court; that the certified copy of the order
dt.7.8.95 in the lirst writ petition did not indicate that the Solicitor General
appeared as a111icus curiae; the aver1nents n1acle in the \.\Tit petition being:
truthful and factual and n1ade \'t'ithout rancour or n1alicc should not he
construed scandalous; the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the Contempt
G of Courts Act were applicable; and,. therefore, he did not commit any
conten1pt of the Court. The conten1ncr also challenged the constitutionality
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Disposing of the Contempt Petition, this Court

H HELD : By the Cowt :
D.C. SAXEN1\ v. HON°BLE C.J.I. 681

The contcn1ncr has con1n1itted the contempt o!' this Court under A
Article 129 of the Constitution. He ~s convicted and sentenced to undergo
sin1ple imprisonrnent for a period of three n1onths and to pay a line in the
sum of Rs. 2,000.

Per K. Ramaswamy, J
B
1.1. Scandalising the Judges or Courts tends lo bring the authority
and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamounts
to contempt. Tendency to scandalise the Court or tendency to lower the
authority of the Court or tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct
the adminstration of justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the
authority nr majesty or justice, would be a criminal contem1it. All acts which
c
bring the Court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its
majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt C(nnmitted in respect
of single Judge or single Court or in certain circun1stances comn1itted in
respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial system. [713-H, 714-A]
D
E.M.S. Namboodi1ipad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, [1971] I S.C.R. 697,
relied on.

1.2. A libel upon a court is a reflection upon the sovereign people
themselves. Scandalising the court is a convenient expression of scurrilous
attack on the majesty of justice calculated to undermjne its authority and E
public confidence in the administration of justice. The malicious or
slenderous publication inculcates in the mind of the people a general dis-
affection and dissatisfaction on the judicial determination and indisposes
their mind to obey them. If the people's allegiance to the law is so fun-
damentally shaken it is the n1ost vital and most dangerous obstruction of F
justice calling for urgent action. [714-F, 715-E]

C. Raviclwndran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattachmjee & Ors., [1995] 5
sec 457, referred to.
Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.) Vol. 9 para 27, page 21, G
referred to.

13. Scandalising the Court would mean hostile criticism of Judges
as Judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection \\.'ith
office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. Yet defamatory
publication concerning the Judge as a Judge brings the court or judges into H
6S2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A l'ontcn1pt~ a serious i1n1>edin1cnl tojuslire and an inroad on the n1ajesty of
ju!'ltite. Any raricature of a judge calculated to IO\\'er the dignity of the court
l\'ouh.I destroy, undcr1nine or lend to u11dern1ine public confidL•nl'C in the
adrninistration of justice or rnajesty of justice. It \Vould, therefore, be scan-
dalising the Judge as a .Judge~ in other \\'ords, irnputing partiality, corrup-
tion, bias, i1nporpcr n1otives to a judge is scandalisation of the court and
B \\'ould be conte1npt of the court. Even irnputation of lack of ilnpartiatity or
fairness to a .iucl~e in the discharge of his otlicial dutit-s amounts to con-
tetn pt. The gravan1en of the offence is that of lowering: his dignity or
authority or an affront to majesty of justice. [716-B-D]

c the Court
1.4. Punishment is inflicted not for !he purpose of protecting either
as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition
of the attack, but of protecting the public and especially those who either
voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdicti'on of the Court,
from the mischief' they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is under-
mined or in1paired. In consel)uence, the Court has regarded with particular
D seriousness the allegations of partiality or bias on the part of a Judge or a
Court. [714-H, 715-A]

2.1. Freedom of' speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a)
brings within its ambit the corresponding duty and responsibility and puts
E limitations on the exercise of that liberty. If a speech of expression was
untrue and so reckless as to its truth, the speaker or the author does not
get protection of the constitutional right. Freedom of speech and expres-
sion, therefore, would be subject to Articles 19(2), 129 and 215 of the
Constitution, in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to
an offence etc. 1711-H·E]
F
2.2. A citizen is entitled to bring to the notice of' the public at large
the infirmities from which any institution including judiciary suffers from.
Courts, the instrumentalities of the State are subject to the Constitution
and the laws and are not above criticism. Section 5 of' the Contempt of
G Courts Act accords protection to fair criticism and saves from contempt of
Co1n1. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the
correctness of the judgment, order or sentence with dignified and moderate
language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order
or sentence. But motives to the Judges need not be attributed. It brings the
adrninistration of justice into disrepute. Any criticism about judicial sys-
H tc1n or the judges \Vhich hampers the udministration of justice or "'hich
D.C. SAXENA 1•. HON'IJl.E CJ.I. 683

erodes the faith in the ol~jective approach of the Judges and brings ad- A
ministration of justice to ridicule 1nust be prevented.
1712-A-C; 718-F; 712-F-G]

Slui Baradaka11ta Mishra Etc. v, The Registrar of 01issa High Cow1 &
Anr. Etc., [1974] 1SCC374; followed.
B
P.N. Duda v. F. Shiv Slumkar, AIR (1968) 1208, referred to.

Ambard v. Attomey-General for Tli11idad a11d Tobago, 1935 AC 322,
referred to.

2.3. An advocate or a party appearing in person is given liberty of C
expression. But, they equally O\\'e countervailing duty to maintain dignity,
decoru1n and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. Liberty of
free expression is not to be confounded or confused vdth licence to n1ake
unfounde1I allegations against any institution much less the judiciary.
When an advocate or a party appearing before the Court requires to con- D
duct himself in a manner helitting the dignity and decorum of the Court,
he cannot have a free licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the
scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the judge or the Court. If
the reputation or dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to
be prescribed in the pleadings, it would atli:ct the respect for the Court and
independence of the judiciary. [713-E-F; 720-C-D] E

Slui Baradaka11ta Mishra Etc. v. The Registrar of Olissa High Cmm &
Anr. Etc., [1974] 1 SCC 374, followed.

Re: Roslwn La/Ahuja, [1993] Suppl. 4 SCC 446; L.D. Jaikwal v, State
of U.F., [1984] 3 SCC 405; Re : Slui S. Mulgaokar, [1978] 3 SCC 497; K.A. F
Mohammed Ali '" C.N. Frasannan, [1994] Supp. 3 SCC 509; Sambu Nath
Iha v. Kedar Prasad Si11ha, [1992] l SCC 573 and Charan Lal Sahu v. Union
of India &Anr., [1988] 3 SCC 255, relied on,

E.M.S. Namboodi1ipad v. T. Naraya11an Nambiar, [1971] I SCR 697, G
referred to.

Ambard v, Attomcy-Genera/ for T!inidad and Tobago, 1936 AC 322,
referred to.

Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965] 1 SCR 413, referred to. H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "Reg11ialion of Lmvyers - Problems of Law und Ethics", (Thrid Edition
- 1922) page 747, referred to.

3.1. The conte1nner made allegations in the second 'vrit petition in the
language as "it was improper" for the Chief Justice "to hear it (the first writ
petition)", "the course of action" by the Chief Justice "in dealing with the
B grouse of the petitioner and dismissing his petition, is totally unjust, un-
fair, arbitrary and unlawful. It is flagrant violation of mandate of Article
14"; " violation of the oath of ollice by" the Chief Justice; the Chief Justice
"responded that he (Solicitor General) was there to assist the Court, con-
trary to evidence of the Court proceedings"; "declare the respondent unfit
C to hold the office of Chief Justice of India", When these imputations were
pointed out to the contemner by three-Judge Bench while dismissing the
second "'rit petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he stated that he "stood
by" these allegations. He repeated the same with justification in his prelimi-
nary submissions. He has stated that the accusations made ''"'ere truthful
and "carefully worded". These imputations are obviously reckless apart
D from scandalising this Court, in particular, the Chief Justice of India, and
\\'ere intended to foul the process of the Court or lcnver or at any rate tend
to lower the authority of the Court in the estimate of the public and tend to
undermine the eflicacy of the judicial process. The accusations are gross
contempt. (722-F-H; 723-A]

E
3.2. It is the duty of the Court to hear and decide any matter posted
for adn1ission. Therefore, there is nothing improper for the Court presided
over by the Chief Justice of India to hear and decide the matter (the first
\\Tit petition). (721-G-H]

F 3.3. When the first writ petition came up for admission, the Court
sent for the Solicitor General to obtain information from the Government
as to the correctness of the allegations. Accordingly the Solicitor General
placed the record before the Court, and on perusal thereof the Court
declined to exercise the power under Article 32 of the Constitution. In the
G proceedings of the Court, recorded by the Staff, it was recorded that the
Solicitor General appeared in the Court in his official capacity. The counsel
as Solicitor General of India or in personal capacity obviously acted as
amicus on behalf of the Court. [721-H; 722-A-B; E-F]

3.4. The contemner stated that since the first writ petition was not .
H disposed of by a Bench of not less than five Judges, the writ petition was
D.C. SAXENA v. J-!ON'BLE C.J.L 685

not dismissed in the eye of law and the order of dis1nissal "is non-est" and A
it is 11not decided and disposed of constitutionally". This assertion flies in
the face of the judicial finality of the order of this Court and tends to
question the authority of the Court. It creates tendency to obstruct the
administration of justice and, therefore, it,vould he an outrageous criminal
contempt. [723-B]
B
3.5. The conhnner in regard to the tjueStion posed by hin1 in the \\Tit
petition, nan1ely, "what are the legal consequences of the violation of oath
of oflice by11 the Chief Justice, states in his 11reliminary sub1nissions that it
is a constitutional question re(fUired to be decided by a Constitution Bench.
The oath of office taken by a Judge of this Court is not that he should allow c
every case or dismiss every case but only to uphold the Constitution and
the laws and to administer justice in accordance therewith in tune with the
oath of his office. The protection of Articles 124(4), 121, 211, the Judicial
Officer Protection Act and the Judges (Protection) Act is to ensure inde-
pendence to the judiciary. Threat to judicial process is a challenge to the
authority of the Court or majesty of justice. It would be cx-facie contuma- D
cious conduct. [726-A-C]

3.6. The contemner alleged that omission to record reasons was viola-
tive of the principles of natureal justice and the Chief Justice of Jodi&
committed impropriety in deciding the matter. It is not obligatory for this E
Court to give reasons .for dismissing the writ petition. Besides, the decision
is that of the Bench on behalf of the Court, and the Chief Justice, being the
seniormost among the members constituting the Bench, had spoken on
behalf of the Bench. Therefore, the attribution of improper motives scan-
dalise the efficacy of judicial adjudication and per se contumaciously lowers
or at any rate tends to lower the dignity or authority of the Court. [723-C-D] F

3.7. The prayers (a) to (d) seeking a declaration that the respondent
is unlit to hold the office of Chief Justice of India, that the Chief Justice be
stripped of the citizenship and seeking prosecution of the Chief' Justice,
though sought to be withdrawn, which would be of no conset1uence, are G
unbelievably outrageous contempt. [723-E]

4. The contemner by stating iu his writ petition that Chief Justice's
utmost reluctance to perform his fundamental duties and constitutional
obligations was apparent, which after failing to browbeat the 11etitioner... n,
imputed motives to the Chief Justice in the discharge of his constitutional H
686 Sll l'REME CO\Jlff REPORTS [1996] SU PP. 3 S.C.R.

A duty of deciding a case and that by not ad1nitting the \\Tit petition or by
dismissing it, the CJI \\'as reluctant to perform his constitutional duty.
Even in the 1nodified staten1ent, he attributed motives to CJJ in the perfr)r-
rnance of his constitutional duty \\'hile the Bench that dis1nissed the first
\\Tit petition consisted of' three Judges. By infereru.:e, he suggested the other
Judges to be mere non-entity. lfis revised imputation con1pounds the con1-
B nlission of flagrant conte1npt by substituting: the '''ord 11 bro\\'beat" \Vith the
\rords 11 discerned reluctance". The conten1ner contnn1aciously attributed
motives to the Court, in particular to the presiding ofticer of the court, the
Chief Justice of India, and !hereby he scandalised the Court in the estimate
of the general public. [700-G; 701-B-0; 724-E]
c 5.l. The conten1ner, referring: to dismissal of his earlier \Vrit petition,
imputed to CJI, "and \Vithout recording the reasons for dismissing the
petition. So much for the vaunted adherence to the tnin principles of
transparancy and accountability". He imputed to the CJI to have facilitated
the Congress President to avoid payment of public dues. In his preliminary
D submission he had given justification for his attributing motives to CJI
stating that the Solicitor General handed over some documents to the
Bench, without supplying copies thereof to him and the Chief Justice asked
him to argue on the supposition that nothing has been given to the Bench.
In vie\\' of this, reference has been made to the "t,vin principles of
E transparancy and accountaliility". The insinuation tends to bring the Court
into contempt in the estimate of the general public and that the Court
lacked fairness, objectivity and dismissed the writ petition for known
reasons. It also tends to interfere with the administration of justice and
that the Court should give reasons lest the order be believed to be shrouded
with suspicion. Therefore, it is ex-facie contumacious. [724-A-B]
F
6. The contemner stated in the nrit petition, thus : can the Chief
Justice "be allowed to take shelter behind the cloak of judicial immunity,
particularly when unlike the President of India, who cannot be impleaded
in civil or criminal proceedings during his tenure of otlice, he enjoys no
G such constitutional protection? 11 This bravado not only in1pinges upon the
protection given by Article 124(4) of the Constitution and under relevant
provisions of the Protecti"n of Officials Act. Ex-facie it is an outrageous
tendency to lower the authority of the Court and interference nith judicial
administration. The assertion of the contemner that this is a constitution
conundrum rei1uired to be decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court
H highlights contumacious conduct of"the contemner. [725-C·D]
D.C. SAXENA v. IJON'IJLE C..1.1. 687

7. The contemncr further stated that "for "ilrully and advertently A
,·iolating the fundan1ental rights of not only the petitioner as an individual,
but that of the people of India, \Vho are ulthnately sovereign, has not "the
Lhief Justice "forfeited any legal protection, even if it \rere available to him".
The words "advertently" and "wilfully" do emphasise the emphatic tone of
the language and the n1otive of the conte1nner, and attribute rnotives to this
11
Court that the relief sought for in the first \\Tit pt'tition "advertently \\'as
B
not granted and was "wilfully" declined and thereby the Chier Justice lost
constitutional protection of not being prosecuted. This accusation is a
culnlination of the contumacious conduct of wanton scandalisation of the
Court and reckless denigration. In his an1ended petition, he further ag-
gravates the conte1npt stating that the disn1issal of the first petition sent C
\\Tong signals to the entire judiciary of,vhich the respondent is the head as
Chief Justice of India. The scurrilous attack, therefore, is not only on the
respondent as a Judge but also as the Chief Justice of lnida and also as
head of the institution of the whole country. Thereby he designedly aud
deliberately allowed himself being brought within ex-facie criminal con-
tempt. [725-E-H] D

8. The contemner stated that uFor deliberate and \\'ilful failure to
perform his fundamental duties and stultifying their performance by the
petitioner "the Chief Justice should "be stripped of his citizenship". The
contemner attributed that the respondent as Chief Justice of India and as E
a Judge of this Court deliberately and wilfully failed to perform his fun-
damental duties by dismissing the "Tit petition and stultified the perfor-
mance of fundamental duties by the petitioner. Thereby, he seeks stripping
of citizenship of the Chief Justice. It is an unbelievable outrageous affront
to the majesty of justice on the part of the contemner and scandalisation
of this Court. It tends to lower the dignity and authority of the Court and F
also so"'S seed for persons \\'ith similar propensity to undern1ine the
authority of the Court or the judiciary as a \\'hole. The contemner crossed
all boundaries of recklessness and indulged in 'vild accusations. He sought
justification in his preliminary submissions that it being a question of la\\',
it does not amount to personal hnputation or insinuation. This \\'ould G
further compound the contempt. [726-D-F]

9.1. The contemner alleged in the writ petition: "For allrming his son
who is practising: in the Supreme Court, to stay 'vith him in his oflicial
residence, and presurnably 1nisusing official facilities and prestige of office
of Chief Justice of India, is not" respondent "liable to be prosecuted under H
6R8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11990] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Prevention of Corruption Act". The contemner sought justification to the
.said in1putation from reports said to have been published in a news
1nag:azine and a daily newspaper. But he has not placed on record the said
material. He also admitted that he did not make any independent enquiry
in this regard. For the said imputation he said that the Chief Justice of
India is liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
B The conten1ner in his preliminary subnlissions reiterated that this is a
ttuestion of la\\' based on infor1nation received. He stood by the in1putation
and reiterated with further justification in that behalf made in his prelimi-
nary submission. The persona! allegation against the Chief.Justice of India
of allowing his son to practise in the Supreme Court is false. His permitting
C his son to reside in his otlicial residence has no rele\'ance to the first \\-'rit
petition relating to the recovery of alleged dues frorn the Congress Presi~
dent. Irrelevancy of the accusations apart, the prayer for prosecution of the
Chief Justice oflndia under The Prevention of Corruption Act is an assault
on majesty of justice, affront to authority of law, the gravest conturnacious
conduct and scurrilous scandalisation of the Court. [704-G, 705-C-F]
D
K. Veeraswami v. Union of India & 01:1-., [1991] 3 SCR 189 and C.
Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhaltachmjee & Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 457,
cited.

E 9.2. Article 124(4) of the Constitution read with the Judges (Inquiry)
Act prescribes the procedure to take action against a Judge of the Su1ireme
Court or of the High Court for proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Articles
121 and 211 of the Constitution prohibit discussion, in the Parliament or
in the Ligislature of a State, of the conduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court
or High Court respectively. Therefore, when the Constitution prohibits the
F discussion of the conduct of a Judge, by implication, no one has power to
accuse a Judge of his misbehaviour or incapacity except and in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution and the Judges (Inquiry)
Act or as per the procedure laid down in Bhattachmjee's case. [727-C-F]

G Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Blzallac/1a1jee & Ors .• [1995] 5 SCC
457, relied on.

Ill. The contemner posed, is the respondent "not liable to pay from
his pocket not only legitimate cost incurred hy the petitioner but also the
foss caused to the public exchequer by non-payment of dues" by the Con-
H gress President'? This was reiterated in the preliminary submission. The
D.C. SAXENA v. HON.BLE CJ.I. 689

implication is that by judicial act, if a presiding judge dismisses a petition, A
he is liable to bear personally not only the costs incurred by the litigant hut
also the resultant loss to the State nith interest payable thereon. This
in1putation is a deliberate interference 'rith the judicial process and tends
to lower the authority of the Court spreading rippling effect on inde-
pendence of the judiary, authority of the Court and \Vanton interference
B
\\'ith judicial process. It must be held to be a depraved contumacious
conduct. [728-A-C]

ll.l. The contemner stated in the writ petition that the seniormost
Judge of the court should be permitted to constitute a Constitution Bench
of judges "excluding any Judg:e \Vho O\\'es his elevation to the apex Court to C
the respondent, and during its pcndcncy the respondent " may be advised
to proceed on leave, so that he niay not directly or indirecly influence any
of the Judges hearing the matter". In his prelin1inary objections he
reiterated the assertion. This relates to interference \'t'ith the judicial
management of the Court and the duty a Judge, and is a deliberate inter-
ference in the judicial 1nanagen1cnt tending to disaflcction in the cflicacy of D
<lispeusation ofjustit:e. [728-J)]

11.2. The contcmner further made an accusation that the Chief Jus-
tice of India should not constitute a Bench of the Judges appointed during
his tenure so that he (Chief Justice of India) may not directly or indirectly E
influence any of the Judges hearing the matter. It would thus be in une-
quivocal loud expression that the contemner attributed motives to the CJJ
that the Judges appointed during his tenure as Chief Justice are amenable
to his influence in judicial adjudication and \\'ould decide the causes by
1iressure or influence directly or indirectly brought by the Chief Justice of
India. Equally it is a corollary that these Judges are amenable to influence F
and thereby they do not decide the cases before them legally and objectively.
The Court is subject to presume and decided cases under inlluence. These
allegations are flagrantly outrageous to scandalise the Court. Though the
contemner sought leave to n1odify this statement, ultimately, in his
an1ended statement, he did not touch upon this aspect and thus stood by G
his avern1ents calculatedly n1ade. Thus the conte1nner has cornmitted con-
tempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. [728-F-GJ

S.P. Gupta v. U11io11 of !11diu, AIR (1982) SC 149, cited.

12.1. In a criminal contempt proceedings of sumn1ary nature, the H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119961SUPP.3 S.C.R.

A proor of n1ens rea is absolutely unnecessary. For~ criminal cont.empt as
defined in Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 any
enunu:rated or any other act apart, to create disaffection, disbelief in the
efficacy of judicial dispensation or tendency to obstruct administration of
justice or tendency to lower the authority or majesty oflaw by any act of the
parties, constitutes criminal contempt. Thereby it excludes the proof of
B n1ens rea. What is relevant i~ that the offending or affront act produces
interference with or tendency to interfere with the course ofjustice. [717-A-B]

12.2. Absence of personal gain to seek in the list except said to have
been fired by public duty and has professed respect for the Court, are
C ileither relevant nor a defence for the offence of contempt. \Vhat is 1natt!rial
is the effect orthe offending act and not the act per se. [717-C]

12.3. It is, therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention on the
part of the contc1nner to interfere \\'ith the ad1ninistration of justice.
I\·faking rcckles:, allegations or vilification of the conduct of the Court or the
D judge \rould he contempt. Imputation of corrupt or itnproper motive in
judicial conduct would impair the etlicacy of judicial di.spensation and due
protection of the liberties of the citizen or due ad1ninistration of justice.
[717-~'-E]

13. The Court does not sit to try the conduct of a judge to whom the
E imputations are n1ade. It \\'01Ild not be open to the conte1nner to bring
fornard evidence or circumstances to justify or to show \\ hether and lunv
1

fairly imputation were justified because the judge is not before the Court.
The defence justification to an imputation \rould not, therefore, be available
to the conten1ner. The imputation of improper motives or bias cannot be
justified on the principle of fair comment. [718-B]
F
14. When this Court pointed out the scandalous nature of accusa-
tions which found place in his petition, the contemner persisted for con-
sideration of the ~aid accusations to lay proceeding against the Chief
Justice of India for prosecution and other reliefs. He stated that he \Vould
G stand by those accusations. He reiterated them in his preliminary subniis-
sions \\ith further justification. He admitted that many of them are strin-
gent and pungent. He rnodified some but by compounding further
contempt. In spite of the Solicitor General pointing out the seriousness of
the accusation and the conte1nner having consultation \rith son1e Advocates
at the Bar, he did not retract his steps. He did not tender any unconditional
H apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an unconditional
D.C. SA,XENA v. HON'BLE C.J.I. 691

apology. [729-F-H, 730-A-C] A
15. Considered fro1n the totality of the facts and circun1stances, the
gravest nu•gnitude of the contu1nacio11s conduct of the cnntcmner, he has
to he convicted. [7 30-C]

Per Bila111cl!a, J. (Concuning) : B
1.1 A.ny act done or \\Titing published \\'hich is calculated to bring a
Court or a Judge into contenipt or to lower his authority or to intt:rfere \Vith
the due course of justice is a conten1pt of the court; scurrilous abuse of a
Judge or Court, or attacks on the personal character of a judge are acts of
contempt. [738-D] c
R. v. Grey, [19110] 2 Q.ll., 36; He/more v. Smith, (1886) 35 Ch. D. 449;
Ambard v. A.G. for T1inided and To/Jago, (1936) A.C. 322; Re. A.G. of
Canada and Alexander ct al, (1976) 65 D.L.R. (3rd) 608 and Re. Wiseman,
(1969) NZLR 55, referred to.
D
1.2. The contempt jurisdiction is intended to uphold the authority
and dignity of the Courts of law \Vhichi on behalf of the State, deliver justice
and protect the public confidence that is reposed in them. [739-B]

2. The contempt notice to the alleged contemner pursuant to the E
order of dismissal of his second \\Tit petition \\'as issued in exercise of the
power of this Court, recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution, to punish
for contempt of itself. The issue of the constitutionality of the Contempt of
Courts Act is, therefore, not germane. 1739-C]

3. The contemner in the second \\Tit petition stated that the respon- F
dent (the Chief .Justice of India) had 11 caused fabrication of court proceed-
ings on 7th August, 1995 and \\as, therefore, liable to prosecution under the
relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code". The relevant prayer of the
\\Tit petition \\'as that an F.I.R. be registered against the respondent under
the Indian Penal Code for con1mitting "forgery and fraud". The 1noditit:a- G
tion 1nade by the contemner of the averments in this regard is that the
respondent \\'as responsible for 11 inaccurate recording of the proceedings of
7th August 1995", and the prayer is sought to be deleted. 111e rnodilication
does not speak of inadvertant or inaccurate recording or express and regret
for the allegations of fabrication, forgery and fraud. The ·allegation of
inaccurate recording, as 1nade, suggests that such recording \\'as delibt!rate H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS j1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and there is, therefore, no 1nore than some moderation of language. The
allegations of fabrication, forgery, fraud and inaccurate recording of
proceedings are n1ade in respect of a Judge in the perfortnance of his
judicial function. They are of a 1nost serious character. l'hey are intended
to lon,er the authority of and respect for the Court and the otlice of the
Judge. [739-G-H, 740-A-C]
B
4. There are allegations in the second writ petition that the respon-
dent violated his oath of office and failed to perform his fundamental
duties. The summary dismissal of a writ petition by a judge is not a
violation of his oath or fundamental duties; at \\'orst, it might be a judicial
C error. The dis1nissal of a \Vrit petition cannot \\'arrant the charge of viola~
tion of his oath by a Judge; and no n1ore serious charge against a judge can
be rnade. \Vhat the conten1ner conveniently does not mention is that the
three .Judges (including the respondent) '''ho constituted the Bench found
no n1erit in the earlier writ petition and disrnissed it. The averment made
in the second writ petition that the earlier \Vrit petition ,,·as disrnissed by
D the respondent suggests that the other hro Judges counted for nothing.
This is also conten1pt. The allegations are scurrilous and scandalise the
Court. [740-D-E]

5. It is the duty of the Chief Justice of a Court lo assign judicial work
E to his brother judges. It was, therefore, the duty of the respondent to assign
the second \\Tit petition to a Bench to hear it. By doing so he did not, as is
alleged, become a Judge in his own cause. It is contempt to imply, as the
conten1ner does, that the respondent would assign it to a Bench \\ hich 1

\Vould not 11ass an order adverse to hhn. It is also contempt to iinply that
Judges would be so amenable. To plead that that Bench that heard the
F second writ petition could not h'-'.ard it and, therefore, could not have
dismissed it and that it is deemed to be still pending is to add to the
conte1npt. These allegations are also aimed at bringing the administration
of justice into disreput~. [740-1<~-G]

G 6. The second writ petition alleged that the respondent had allowed
''his son, \rho is practising in the Su1>reme Court, to stay "ith him in his
official residence ;;ind presun1ably mis-using ollicial facilities and prestige
of olTice of Chief Justice of India", and sought his prosecution under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, the allegation and prayer are not sought to
be n1odied. The allegation is not in any way connected \\'ith the dismissal of
H the earlier \\'rit petition. It is brought in for no reason other than to vilifY
D.C. SAXENA I'. HON'BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY,].] 693

the respondent in connection with his otlicial duties and position. How A
irresponsible the allegation is, is slunvn by the fhct that according to the
c~1ntemner hin1self, it is based only upon \l'hat he read in articles in a
newspaper and a news magazine. [740-H, 741-A·B]

C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattachwjee & Ors., [1995] 5
sec 457, cited. B
7. The contemner has sought the protection of Sections 4 and 5 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. What he has written in the second writ
petition is neither a fair and accurate report of the proceedings of the
earlier \\'rit petition nor a fair criticism thereof. The principle underl}ing
these provisions is, therefore, not applicable. [741-D]
c
8. Having regard to the gravity of the contun1acious statemt'nts, the
recklessness \\-'ith n·hich they are n1ade, the intemperateness of their lan-
guag:t', the mode of their publication in am-it petition in this Court and the
conten1ner's influential position in society, punishn1ent only in the nature D
of a tine \\''ould not be adequate. A contemner such as the present 1nust also
undergo itnprisonment. [741-E]

Per N.P. Singh, J. (Concuning) :

The conclusions arrived at and the sentence imposed against the E
contemner as found in thejudgn1ents of K. Ramas\\'amy and S.P. Bharucha,
JJ. are concurred with. [730-E]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition No. 38 of 1996.

Jn Re : Dr. D .C. Saxena F
Jn The Matter Of: Writ Petition (C) No. D. 17209 of 1995.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

Jn-!ler.son for Contcmnor.
G
D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General (AC.) and P. Parmeshwaran for the
Respondent.

The Judgments/Order of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Jn a clash of competing interests in constitu· H
694 SUPREME COURT REPO~TS [ 1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A tional contours, this case calls to strike a balance between the freedom of
speech and expression, a salutary right in a liberal democratic society and
paramount countervailing duty lo maintain public confidence in the ad-
ministration of justice. The petitioner had initiated public interest litigation
under Article 32 of the Constitution to direct Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, the
President of India National Congress and the former Prime Minister of the
B country to pay a sum of Rs. 8.29 Lakhs and odd said to be due to the Union
of India for use of Indian Air Force aircraft or helicopters from October
1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. When Writ Petition No. 432/95 was posted
for hearing on July 17, 1995 before the learned Chief Justice of India and
brother Justice S.C. Sen the Solicitor General for India, Shri Dipankar P.
Gupta was sent for and the Court dirL.:cted him to have the avcrmcnts
C verified to be correct and directed the petition to be listed after two weeks.
On August 7, 1995, the wril petition came before the Bench comprising the
learned C.JI, Justice S.C. Sen and Justice K.S. Paripoornan. It is not in
displllc that the Solicitor General had placed the record before the Court
and upon perusal thereof and <.tfter hearing the petitioner-in-person, the
D Bench sun1n1arily "disn1isscd" the \Vrit petition \vhich ha<l triggered the
petitioner to file yet another \Vrit petition, this tin1c against the learned
Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. The Registry raised objec-
tions for its n1aintainability but, at the insistence of the petitioner) it \Vas
poste<l 1 \vith officer objections, Jor hearing, as unregistered Writ Petition
(C) No. D- 17209/95 on January 13, 1996 before a Bench of three learned
E Judges, viz., Justice J.S. Verma and two of us (Justice N.P. Singh and
Justice S.P. Bharucha). The petitioner) again appearing in person, persisted
to justify the averments made against the learned C.11, Justice A.M. Ahmadi
in the writ petition. In spite of the Court having pointed out that the
averments \Vere scandalous, the proceedings of the Court did indicate that
the petitioner reiterated that he ''stood by the avermcnts ma<lc thercin 1' and
F sought fur declaration (1) that .Justice A.M. Ahnwdi is unfit to hold the
office as Chief Justice of India; (2) that he should be stripped of his
citizenship; (3) to direct registration of an FIR against him under various
provisions of In<lian Penal Code for comn1itting forgery and fraud and
under the Prevention of Corruption Acl; (4) to direct prosecution of him
under the Prevention of Corruption Act; (5) tc direct him lo defray from
G his personal pocket lhe expenses incurred by the petitioner in filing the two
writ petitions, i.e., W.P. No. 432/95 an the second writ petition; (6) to direct
Justice A.M. Ahmadi to reimburse from his pocket to the public exchequer
the entire los~ caused to the State, as a consequence of non-pay1ncnt of
the dues by Sri P.V. Narasin1ha Rao \Vith interest at 1six per annun1 and
H (7) other consequential directions.
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY,J.] 695

After hearing the petitioner, the Bench dismissed the second writ A
petition with the order as under :

"The several avennents in the \Vrit petition are scandalous and it
is surprising that the petitioner, who is, said to be a Professor in
a University, has chosen to draft and file such a writ petition. His
understanding of the meaning of Article 32 of the Constitution, is B
to say the least, preposterous. The allegations made are reckless
and disclose irresponsibility on the part of the petitioner. This writ
petition is wholly misconceived and is an abuse of the process of
the Court. The writ petition has no merit.

The \Vrit petition is, therefore, dismissed. c
In vie\v of the attitude of the petitioner even at the hearing, \vhen
he persisted in this stand and, on our asking hin1, reiterated that
he stood by the scandalous avern1ent n1a<le therein, \Ve consider it
our duty to issue to the petitioner a notice to sho\v cause \vhy
proceedings to punish him for contempt of this Court should not D
bt: initiated against hitn. The Registry to take the necessary steps
for registering the n1attcr as a contempt petition. The petitioner
\Vhn is present-in-person is given notice of the contempt petition.
He is required to file his reply within four weeks to show cause
why proceedings for contempt should not be initiated against him. E
We request the learned Solicitor General to assist the Court in this
contempt matter.

List the matter after notice of the date fixed by Registry is given
to Dr. D.C. Saxena and the Solicitor General."
F
While dismissing the petition, this Court observed in the later part
of the order the petitioner's conduct in his persistence to stand by the
scandalous avcrments n1a<le against the learned Chief Justice of lndia. This
Court \Vas constrained to initiate contempt proceedings and enlisted 14
instances which would plin1a facie constitute contumacious conduct of the
petitioner to scandalise the Court. In the meanwhile, the petitioner wrote G
in a ne\vspaper criticising Justice J.S. Verma. Resultantly, Justice J.S.
Verma rcclused himself from the Bench. Thus the matter was posted
hefore this Bench.

On April 12, 1996, the petitioner filed his reply to the show cause
notice styling the .same as 11 prcliminary .submissions'' and reiterated his H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A avermcnts, which, as pointed by this Court, would constitute scandalisation
of the Court and yet he had given his Justification for accusing the Chief
Justice of India. However, at the end, as a foot-note, he has wriqen in his
own hand- writing as under :

"N.B. If some passages seem strindent or pungent, the defendant
B is willing to suitably modily them."

On April 14, 1996, this Court passed the order as under :

"Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court the Contemnor Dr.
D.C. Saxena is present today in person. He has stated that he would
c modii)r the offending portions noted in the sho\v cause notice in
Item (ii), (iv), (vi), (vii), (viii), (x), (xii), (xiii) and wishes lo
withdraw unconditionally item (xiv), paras B and C.

The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that even if the
Contemnor withdraws or files statement in the modified form what
D the Court required to do is whether his statements made in the
writ petition originally filed constitute contempt or the Court or
not and his modification of the above statements would not be of
material relevance for consideration. Since the conternnor seeks
time to submit the show cause in the modified language which he
wishes to place before the Court, at his request the matter is
E
adjourned to May 2, 1996 at 2.00 p.m. The registry is directed to
supply complete set of papers to learned Solicitor General."

When the case up for hearing on ,May 2, 1996, the petitioner filed
amended portions to substitute the averments made, at proper places, in
F the second unnumbered writ :ietition. We have heard learned Solicitor
General as cnnicus curiae and the petitioner-in- person. Before opening the
case. the Solicitor General, in view of the seriousness of the averments
made by the petitioner in the petition filed against the Chief Justice of
India, and in view of his stand in both the preliminary submissions to the
contempt notice an<l the revised avcrments 1nade in the \Vrit petition)
G suggested that it would be advantageous for the petitioner to have consult-
ation and legal assistance of any counsel of his choice and to revise his
stand, but the petitioner remained silent and got along with the case.

The Learned Solicitor General stated that on July, 17, 1995, the
Court had sent for and called upon him to have the allegations made in
H the first writ petition, verified and lo place the factual position before tlie
D.C.SAXENAv. HON'IlLEC..1.1.[RAMASWAMY,.l.J 697

Court. Pursuant thereto, on August 7, 1995, he hacl placed the record A
before the Court which arc confidential in nature. After their perusal and
hearing the petitioner, the Court <li<l nllt think it necessary to issue Jirec-
tions as sought for. Al this stage, we would point oul that when Sri P.V.
Narasin1ha Rao, as President of Indian National Congress or as the former
Prin1e tvfinistcr, \Vas alleged to have used the defence aircrafts, this Court
obviously was of the vie\v that ~the relationship bet\vccn the t \VO \Vin gs of B
the Ciovcrnrncnt or the political party, i.e., the Indian National Congress is
of debtor and creditor and that, therefore, prerogative writ under Article 32
of the Constitution would not lie to enforce contractual dues adjustable as
per their practice. The exercise of the power under Article 32 was, there-
fore, obviously thought to be uncalled for. Supreme Court being the highest
judicial forum, the need to record reasons is ohviatc<l since there is no c
further appeal against the order of this Court. Recording reasons is not,
therefore, necessary nor is called for.

The learned Solicitor General, therefore, contended that when the
Court dismissed the writ petition, the petitioner, being a professor of D
English in Chandigarh University, should have exercised restraint and felt
duty-bound not to proceed further in the matter. Instead, he filed the
second writ petition with allegations which are ex-facie contumacious. The
petitioner reiterated the same in his preliminary submission to the notice
of the contempt. His modified statement filed on April 24, 1996 itself is
not relevant. What would be material and relevant for consideration is E
whether the allegations made against the learned Chief justice of India in
the second writ petition do constitute contempt of the Court. The modified
stand, therefore, is not relevant to adjudge whether the petitioner has
committed of this Court. The Court, therefore, has to consider the totality
of the averments and their effect on the judicial process to adjudge the
conduct of the petitioner to be contumacious. The petitioner contended F
that he did not seek any personal gain for himself. As a duty-bound citizen,
he was actuated to see that the public dues are recovered from any person
how-so-high he may be. To the best of his understanding, the petitioner
made the averments for public good and he has no intention to scandalise
the Court. He had approached this Court earlier more than 12 times to
vindicate public justice. As a human being, he is fallible but he has no G
intention to denigrate the Court to which he has highest respect. His
modified language in the statement filed on April 24, 1996 does indicate
his intention.

In the proceedings of the Court dated July 17 1995, it was recorded H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that the Solicitor General lrnd appeared for Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao who
\Vas in1plea<led in his personal capacity. It is the petitioner's contention that
the Solicitor General cannot appear for him. He \Vas not assisting the Court
as amicus. When the Chief Justice called for the records from the Govern-
ment through Solicitor General, it is Court's duty lo give him copies of
those documents bt•t the s<lme were denied to him. It is his further
B contention that even though the petitioner had pointed out the same,
Justice AM. Ahmadi was stated lo have observed that the pelitionei· could
argue the case as if no records had been produced before the Court. If the
petition \Vas to be disn1isscd, he has a right to have the reasons given for
dismissal of his writ petition. He further argued that whatever comments
he has made in the second writ petition, they are plain comments based on
C the Court proceedings and as per the law and were for public good. He
stands lo gain no personal benefit in the litigation. To the best of his
understanding, the petitioner made only relevant allegations based on
record and of law with no bad intention. They arc valid defences to him.
The Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is
D the legacy of the colonial rule and is ultra vires Article J9(1)(a). All the
contentions raised by him need to be decided by a Constitution Bench since
they pose questions of consi<lcrablc constitutional importance. The
petitioner, therefore, has not committed any contempt of the Court.

With a view to appreciate the respective contentions and to adjudge
E whether the petitioner has committed contempt of this Court, it is neces-
sary to extract the relevant portions supplied to him by show cause and his
reply thereto and of preliminary submissions and his modified statement
as a substitution to the averments made in the second writ petition and the
effect thereof. In respect of the averments made in the offending portions
of item 1, 3, 5, 9, 13 and 14(a) and (d), the petitioner stood by them. He
F submitted his modified statement on April 24, 1996 only for the rest of the
statements. Let us first consider the un1nodified averments before cxan1in-
ing the original and the 1nodified avcnnent:s.

The first averment made at page 4 in paragraph 9 is that "it is
G improper for Justice Ahmadi lo hear it". Item 3 at page 6 in paragraph 14
is; "To this Justice Ahmadi responded that he (the Solicitor General) was
there to assist the Court, contrary to the evidence of the court proceed-
ings''. Item 5 relating lo the averments made in page 6 in paragraph 17 is
: "the subsequent course of action by Justice Ahmadi, in dealing with the
grouse of the petitioner and dismissing his petition is tota1ly unjust, unfair,
H arbitrary and unlawful. It is in flagrant violation of the mandates of Article
D.C. S,\XFNA v. HON"IJLECJ.l. [RAMASWAMY.J.j 699

14 of the Constitution, which "runs like a golden thread" through it and is A
11
the foundation of ,iusticc and fair play ltcn1 9 relating to the aver1nents
•

made at page ~ in parngraph IS(f) is : "What arc the legal consequences
of the violation of the sacred oath of office by Justice Ahmadi?" llem 14(a)
relating to the prayer portion is : "declare the respondent (Justice A.M.
Ahmadi) unfit to hold office as Chief Justice of India" and item 14( d) is :
' Direct the respondent's (Justice .1\.M. Ahmadi's) prosecution under the
1 B
Prevention of Corruption Act." The petitioner in his affidavit filed in
support of the second writ petition has stated in para 2 thereof thus : "!
am actuated purely by national interests and no personal gains and have
t111thfully and carefully stated the facts (emphasis supplied), in pursuance of
my fundamental duties, which can be effectively performed only through
the fundamental rights enjoyed as a citizen of India." In his preliminary
c
submissions, he has slated that the writ petition under Article 32 shall be
heard by a Division Court of not less than 5 Judges. Emphasis was added
by the petitioner himself. Since the writ petition was not listed before a
Court competent to dispose of the same, it makes the order of dismissal
non est and it should be deemed to be pending and is "not yet decided and D
disposed of constitutionally". No contempt proceedings can, therefore, be
initiated. The notice is, therefore, pre-n1ature. Constitution of the Bench
by the Chief Justice is in violation of the principles of natural justice as no
one can be a Judge of his own cause. Justice "should not only be done but
should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be <lone ........ Nothing is to be
done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper E
interference of the course of justice.", he quoted the above statement of
Lord Heward, C.J. Regarding Item 1 referred to hereinbefore; he justified
the imputation stating that no person can be a Judge in his own cause
directly or indirectly. Jn spite of his objection, the respondent (CJ!) chose
to constitute the bench himself as a presiding Judge. According to the
F
petitioner the word 11 improper' 1, therefore \Vas used in that perspective.
With regard to the averments made in Item 3, his reply was that the Court
proceedings dated July 17, 1995 recording that the Solicitor General, Shri
Dipankar Gupta appeared in his official capacity to Sri P.V. Narasimha
Rao, a private Party, He had stated that even assuming, though not
conceding, that he (Solicitor General) was acting as mnicus curiae also was G
not recorded in the Court proceedings. Therefore, his comment that CJJ
had fabricated false record is fair and an accurate report of the Court
proceedings protected under Section 4 of the Act.

With regard to Item 5, he states thus : "This is a reaffirmation of an
unimpeachable legal proposition in the most widely-prevalent legal H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS j l<J%] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A phraseology, lo which no umbrage can be taken, for by this logic all
petitions containing this phrase \Voul<l be deemed contemptuous. Even the
part of the quotation is from the leading decision of this Hon'ble Court in
1
Maneka Ga11dhi s casc.'
1

With regard to avcrmcnts made in item CJ, he justified it stating that
B "this again is an unresolved question of great legal significance and he cited
as analogy of Mr. Facdul Huq, then Chief Minister of Bengal and quoted
a passage from a Special Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in R.C.
Pollard v. Satya Gopal Majunulm; A.l.R. (1943) Cal. 594 (605). He added
special emphasis to the words "the clear violation of it brands a man as
unfit for public office" and stated that it is a legal question of substantial
C importance relating to the violation of oath of office, contained in the Third
Schedule of the Constitution and it cannot be disposed of by a three .Judge
Bench. It cannot be considered as personal imputation against the .I udge.
With regard to imputation and prayer (a) in item 14, he says that the
analogy he had taken from the Calcutta High Court decision. It was a
D natural corollary to the legal proposition considered by a Constitution
Bench. With regard to prayer (d) in Item 1.4, he states that this is only a
prayer for relief sought. The defence taken in relation to (xiv)(b) and (c)
would equally be applicable and so he has reaffirmed them to be correct.
The allegations, therefore, are neither "reckless" nor do they "disclose
irresponsibilitjl' (put within inverted comma by a petitioner himself) and is
E not "an abuse of the process of the court."

He reiterated that 11 Several averments in the writ petition 11 being
truthful, factual, and made without rancour or malice and for no personal
gain, should not be construed "scandalous" (inverted commas were put by
the petitioner himself).
F
Let us now consider other imputations, in the language of petitioner
himself with regard to the "truthfully and carefully" stated facts. Act page 5 in
para JO, the petitioner has stated that "Justice Ahmadi's utmost reluctance to
pe1fonn his fundanzental duties and constitutional obligations was UJJJJarent,
when aftcrfaililig to browbeat the petitioner, he stated that it would be taken up
G at the end of the cause list". In his preliminary submissions he has stated that
11
this is a fair and accurate submission of the Court proceedings on matter
which had already been "heard and finally decided". (inverted commas were
put by the petitioner himself). He sought protection to it, as a fair comment,
under Section 4 of the Act. He further justified it stating that even the use of
H the word '1bro\vbeatn by the petitioner is a 11 fair criticism of judicial act 11 (in-
D.C. SJ\XENA 1•. llON'BLF CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY.J.[ 701

v~rtc<l con1111a was put by the pct itioncr him~clf) to in1ply that proper hearing A
was not being granted lo the petitioner who had approached the highest Court
of the land to "protect and safeguard public property". He justified them as a
"statement of truthful facts", for public good should not be construed as dis-
respect to the Hon'hle Court. After offcringjustification in his 111odificd state-
ment1 be reiterates thus: '1The petitioner discerned reluct;~nce on the part of
B
the presiding judge lo allow the relief claimed, which was in public interest,
and actuated hy the desire to 1'preserve and protest public property," \Vithout
any personal 1nalice 11 • It \vould, thus, indicate that the petitioner in1puteJ mo-
tives to Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Chief Justice India, in the discharge of his con-
stitutional duty and that by not admitting the writ petition or dismiesing the
petition, the CJI \Vas reluctant to pcrfonn his constitutional duty. He kne\v C
that the \Vord '1bro\vbcat 11 is a strindent in1putatio11 to the Court and, therefore,
in his modified avcrment, he substituted by the works "discerned reluctance".
Even in the n1odified statement, he attributed n1otivcs to CJJ in the ptrfur-
1nance ·Jf his constitutional duty \Vhile the Bench that disn1issed the first \Vrit
petition consisted of three Judges. By inference, he suggested the other D
brother Judges to be mere nun-entity.

With regard to item 4 at page Gin para 15, he imputed to the CJl that
11
an<l \vithout recording the reasons for dismissing the petition. So n1uch for
the vaunted adherence to the t\vin principles of transparency and account-
ability.'' In his pr~li1ninary submissions, he has given justification for his at- E
tributing motives to CJ! stating that the Solicitor General handed over some
documents to the bench, without suppl)ong the copy thereof to the petitioner.
When he had objected to it in his own language, he avers that ''Justice Ahmadi
asked him to argue on the supposition that nothing had been given to the
bench. In view of this, reference has been made to the "twin principles of F
transparency and accountability \vhich1', according to the petitioner, 1'is a fair
and accurate report of court proceedings, which is also for the "public good."
(inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). In the modified state-
ment he stated thus : "That J usticc Ahmadi ultimate! y dismissed the petition,
observing that the Government of India was capable to realise the dues from G
Shri Rao (which it had not done in two years) and without recording the
reasons for dismissing the petition, for which lapse it has often berated High
Courts, in pursuance of the twin principles of tran~arency and account-
ability". It would, thus, be seen that as regards this imputation, the petitioner
givesjuslification that there \Vas omission lo record reasons for dismissal of
the writ petition;he imputed to CJ! that the CJ! facilitated Sri NarasimhaRao H
7112 SUPRl·ME COURT REPORTS [ l'J%J SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A avoid pay1nent of public <lue~. The act of the Court \Vas not transparent. Ac-
cording to the petitioner) it is a lapse on the part of the Court for \vhich the
(~ourt conduct) by in1plic<Jtion, \Vas not transparent and the Court n1ust he ac-
countable.

1
Hcn1 6 at page 7 in p<iragraph LS( c) reads thu:;: 'For causing fabrication
B nf courts proceedings of 7th August, 1995, and nol mentioning the fact of ap-
pearance of the Solicitor Cicncral, would Justice Ahmadi not he liable to
prosecution under the rclcYant provisions of the Indian Penal Code in con-
sonance with the time- honoured 1naxin1, "Be you ever ::;o high, the hnv is above
you ?" (inverted commas \Vere put by the petitioner hin1sclf). In his prelin1i-
C nary subn1ission~, he stated that '1Although some\vhat unhappily\vordetl, it is
one of the substantial questions of law, which needed lo be determined by the
Constitution Bench of the apex court''. According to him, above maxim is one
lo which this Court has repeatedly staled to have avowed allegiance. In his
n1odified version, he stated thus: '1For inaccurate recording of the court
D proceedings of7 August, 1995 and not mentioning even the fact of appearance
of the Solicitor General for the respondent, what responsibility would ensue
on the presiding judge, wbo dictated them ?"It \VOuld, therefore, in the lan-
guage of the petitioner, be "discernible" difference of the imputation as
originaJly n1ade in the \Vrit petition and reiterated in his preliminary submis-
sions and its impact was understood bylhe petitioner. Therefore, he made the
E amended version imputing responsibility to Justice Ahmadi personally for the
so-called inaccurate recording of the Court proceedings and stated that the ·
CJ! should be prosecuted for the recorded said to he falsely recorded by CTI
after fabrication and it is a fraud and CJI is liable for prosecution for fraud etc.

F Item 7 al page 6 in paragraph 18( d) reads thus : "Can Justice Ahmadi
be allowed to lake shelter behind the cloak of the judicial immunity, in the
facts and circumstances of the instance case, particularly when unlike the
President of India, \vho cannot be impleadcd in civil or crintinal proceedings
11
<luring his term of office,' 1 CJI enjoys no such constitutional protection ? 11 In
G his prelirninary submissions, he stated that this is yet another constitutional
conundrum which needed to be resolved by a Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Court under Article 145(3) read with Supreme Court Rules.Accord-
...
ing to the petitioner "Crucial to it are "the facts and circumstances" (inverted '
commas were put by the petitioner himself) spelled out earlier", implicitly
conferring imn1unity on the Congress President, Sri P.V. Narasirnha Rao,
H from paying lh" heavy dues that he owed to the national exchequer and thus
D.C. SAXENA v. IION"IJLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY,.!.] 703

the Court treated him as a class to which the laws of the land do not apply. ls A
this not a negation of all that the Constitution holds sacred?" In the modified
version, he st<~tcd thus 11 When under the Constitution .I udges of superior
courts do not, unlike the President of India, enjoy total immunity, during their
term of office, can the presiding judge, be allowed lo make such a claim for
wrong-doing'" (Emphasis supplied). He, thus, imputed to the Chief J ustiee of
B
India, Justice Ahmadi motives that CJ! allowed Sri Narasimha Rao, Congress
President, to avoid payment of dues causing loss to the national exchequer
treating him as a class by himself and the CJ! neglected to perform the con-
stitutional duty which he holds sacred which is a wrong-doing. Therefore,
Chief Justice of India should not be allowed to take judicial immunity and is
liable to crin1inal prosecution even during his term of office as CJI. c
ltemS of the imputation al page 7 in para 18(e) reads thus: "For willfully
and adve11cntly violating (emphasis supplied) the fundamental rights of not
only the petitioner as an individual, but that of the people of India, who arc
ultimately sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, has not D
Justice Ahmadi forfeited any legal protection, even if it were available to him
?11 In his preliminary submissions, he ha.s stated that 11That first part of the sen-
tence is based on the implicit constitutional provisions and in fact shows that
the petitioner/defendant looks upon the apex court as the guardian of his fun-
damental rights and those of the voiceless millions. The second part raises a
constitutional question, which needed determination by an appropriate E
bench. 11 Jn the amended version, he reiterated that 11 for violating the fun-
damental rights of not only the petitioner, as an individual, but also that of the
people of India, who are the ultimate sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to
the Constitution, has not Justicc Ahmadi sent wrong signals to the entire
judiciary of which he is the head". In this paragraph, it is clear that the F
petitioner knew the distinction between the imputation as originally at-
tributed to the Chief Justice oflndia as H cad of the Institution, i.e., Judiciary
and reiterated in his preliminary submissions that CJ! "willfully" and "adver-
tently" violated the petitioner's and people's fundamental right to redressal by
w~ongful dismissal of the writ petition. He knew its indelible effect on the
public confidence in the efficacy of judicial dispensation and propriety of the G
judicial process. When they read the imputation, he attributed to the Chief
Justice that CJ! willfully and adve1tently violated the fundamental rights of the.
petitioner and other people in dismissing the writ petition. Thereby, Justice
Ahmadi forfeited legal protection of law, if it were available to him and he
slated in his modified version that the action of Chief Justice of India sent H
704 SUPREME COURT REPOR1S !1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A \Vrong signals to the entire judiciary of \vhich he is the head. In other \Vords, it
would imply that CJJ as Judge and as head of the institution committed mis-
conduct.

Imputation 10 made at page 8 in paragraph 18(g) reads thus: "For
<lclibF.ratc an<l \villful failure to pcrform his fun<larncntal duties and stultifying
B their performance by the petitioner, should not Justice Ahmadi be stripped
of his citizenship, because duties alone can confer the corresponding legal
and constitutional rights?" fn his preliminary submissions, he has slated that
this is also a constitutional question needed to be interpreted on the ambit and
enforceability of fundamental duties in Article 51-A; it should not be con-
C siclcrc<l by a Division Bench. 11 Morcovcr, this is a logical corollary of the
forl..!going que!-.tion of la\v. It i~ respectfully reiterated that a question of law is
not a personal irnputation or insinuation.'' In his modified version, he has
stated thus: "For failure lo perform his fundamental duties and impeding
their performance hy the petitioner, 'hould not .Justice Ahmadi be regarded
D as accountable to the people of India, because duties alone can confer the cor~
responding legal and constitutional rights ?11 In this behalf, it is clear that the
petitioner is \Veil conversant \Vith the effect of 11 a person<Jl imputation and the
negation". He attributed that .I us lice Ahmadi, Chief .I ustice of India deliberate-
ly and willfully failed lo perform his fundamental duties by dismissing the first
writ petition and stultified the performance of the duty by the petitioner.
E Thereby Justice Ahmadi "be stripped of his citizenship''. He also knew that for
exercise of legal or constitutional rights one owes corresponding duties. The
person who fails lo perform the duty is accountable to the people. 0 l willfully,
in other words, deliberately with supine indifference dismissed the writ peti-
tion. OI does not get legal protection but also forfeits his citizenship.
F
Imputation 11 at page 8 in paragraph 18(h) reads thus : "For allowing
his son who is a practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official
residence, and presumably misusing official facilities and prestige of office of
ChiefJustice oflndia, is not Justice Ahmadi liable to be prosecuted under the
G Prevention of Corruption Act, in viev.' of the ratio decidendi of Veeraswa111i 's
case ?11 In his preliminary submissions, he reiterated that this is a question of
law based on informati.on he had received from "public documents" (inverted
commas were put by the petitioner himself) from an article which was said to
have appeared in "India Today", with Justice Ahmadi's photograph and yet
another one said to have been published in "The Times oflndia'', authored by
H a woman Senior Advocate of this Court. He states that "It is widely talked in
0.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMYJ.] 705

legal circles that apart from being favoured in appointment on local commis- A
sions (by the Delhi High Court) JusticeAhmadi's son (and daughter also) are
very often assigned government bricfs 11 • Jn support of his imputation, he seeks
justification from the observation made by this Court in C. Ravichandran Iver
v. Justice A.M. Bhattachmjee & 01:<., [1995] 5 SCC 457 of transparency of the
conduct of the Judge on and off the Bench. He further added that "the
B
criminal contempt application of one M.P. Shorewala against the
petitioner/defendant was got filed and in gross violation o[ statutory
provisions (mentioned in the office report) was got listed next to the
petitioner's ci\~l \Vrit petition on the same day, Le., 30th January, 1996 for
reasons which need no dilation". The petitioner had not modified in his
modified version, though he undertook to do so. He stood by the above im- C
putati~1 as reiteration \Vith further justification in that.behalf n1ad~ in his
preliminary subn1issions. We n1ay obscrYe here itself that tlie personal in1-
putation against the Chief J usticc of India, Justice Alunadi of alJo,ving his son
to pr<Jctise in t.hc Suprcn1e Court is false. His pcnnitting his son to reside in
hi~ official residence said to be in abuse of his official position has no D
relevance to the first \Vrit petition rchiting to lhc recovery of the alleged ar-
rCars said to be due fron1 Sri P.V. Narasin1ha Rao. During the course of hear-
ing, \Vhen it \Vas pointed out to the petitioner that as a fact the son of J usticc
.A.hn1adi is not practising in the Supreme Court and that the above in1putation
has no rational connection to the first \Vrit petition and of the necessity to al-
lege them in the second one, no ans\ver \Vas given by the petitioner. He sought E
to justify it on the basis of the reports said lo have been published in the
newspapers. When we further inquired from him whether he made any inde-
pendent inquiry in the matter or_ on the accuracy of the nc\vspaper publica-
tions, he stated that he relied upon the above staten1ents as an accurate
statement of fact reported therein. We may mention that this imputation has F
no relevance to the first proceedings. As a fact, the son of Justice Ah1nadi is
not practising in the Supreme Court. The alleged facility of permitting his son
to stay in his official residence bears no relevance to the proceedings. Theim-
putations were obviously off the cup.

Imputation 12 made at page 8 in paragraph 18(i) reads thus: "Is Justice
G
Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the legitimate costs incurred
by the petitioner in C.W.P. No. 432of1995 and the present petition, but also
the loss caused to the public exchequer by non-payment of dues with 18% in-
terest by Shri P.V.N. Rao ?11 In his preliminary submissions he reiterated it
giving further justification thus : "This is the law laid down by this Hon'ble H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Court in relation to public servants. Whether it is also applicable to holders
of constitutional office or not is a substantial question of law, which should
have been answered by a Constitution bench." In his modified version he has
stated thus : "who would be liable to reimburse the legitimate costs incurred
by the petitioner by filing C.W.P. No. 432of 1995, and the present petition and
the huge loss caused to the public exchequer because of the persistent default
B
in paying them by P.Y. Narasimha Rao, with 18% interest?" It would, thus, be
apparent that for dismissal of the writ petition filed by a party, by a judicial
act, the presiding Judge of the Court is liable to pay costs to the litigant and
also the resultant loss to the public exchequer for non-payment of the dues by
the defaulter with interest. He justified it stating that when a public servant
C causes loss to the State and the same is sought to be recovered from him, why
not the constitutional functionary for Judicial act is also liable to pay "er the
same. In other words, if the Court dismisses a petition filed by a litigant, the
resultant costs must be borne by the presiding officer of the Court. Equally,
the loss caused to the State should also be recoverable from the presiding
D Judge from his personal pocket.

Regarding imputation 13, though he stated that he wished to make
n1odification to it, in his an1cnded version, he did not touch upon the sa1nc.
In1putation 13 at page 8 reads thus: "Since no person can be a judge in his O\Vn
cause, the senior-n1ost judge of the Hon'b]e Court 1nay be permitted to con-
E stilute a constitution bench, for expeditious hearing of the petition excluding
any Judge \vho O\Ves his elevation to the apex court to Justice Ahmadi. Further
during its pendency, .Justice Ahmadi may be advised to proceed on leave, so
that he may not directly or indirectly inlluence any of the judges hearing the
1 11
matter.' In his preliminary subn1ission, he reiterates that The prayer is in
F strict conformity with the maxim cited earlier in the words of Lord Heward,
C..J.'' He justified it on the basis ofJustice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was), the
senior-n1ost Judge's presiding over P.S. Gupta's case, i.e., First Judges case
\Vhen Justice (:11andrachud \Vas imputed \Vith some allegations. He also jus-
tified his quoting the a<lvicc given to .Justice V. Ran1as\vami to proceed on
leave when enquiry was pending against him under the Judges (Inquiry) Act.
G It would be seen that in this imputation, he categorically asserts and relics that
.I us ti cc Ahmadi, Chief.I ustice oflndia would bring about inlluence directly or
indirectly upon his colleagues when the matter was to be heard. While he is in
the office, he also should not function as Chief Justice pending his second writ
pctitiqn. C.TI also should not constitute any benches. That should done by the
H senior-most puisne Judge. Any .Judge appointed lo this Court during his
D.C. SAXENA v. llON'BLECJ.J.[RAMASWAMYJ.] 707

tenure as CJ! should not hear the case as CJ! directly or indirectly would in- A
llucnce them when Lhe case relating to hin1 \Vas dealt \Vi th. fn other\vords, his
iinputation is that J udgcs appointed to the Suprcn1c Court during the tenure
of Justice A.M. Ahn1adi as CJl, are a1nenable to influence in deciding the
cases al the behest ur the CJ! as they owe their appointments to him. In other
\Vords, as soon as a \Vrit petition under Article 32 or petition under Article ]36
B
was filed attributing motives or bias to the CJI (it would equally apply to any
Judge) he should desist to perform judicial and administrative work. He
should proceed on leave till that case is decided. The senior-most puisnc
Judge should assume the work of the CJ!.

Imputations in Prayer (b) and (c) read as under: c
"(h) strip the respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) of his citizen-
ship"; and (c) Direct the registration of an FIR against the respon-
dent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) under the Indian Penal Code for
con1n1itting forgery and fraud."
D
In his prclin1inary subn1issions, he has staled \Vi th regard to stripping ol
--itizcnship of CJ I that "this n1ay have been the consequence of the constitution
hench affirn1ing the vie\V taken by the Calcutta High Court cited earlier.
Morem·cr, this is only a prayer for relief sought, which does not fall within the
mischief of the Contempt of Courts Act." With regard lo prayer ( c) he states
E
thus: "the plea taken in relation to (xiv)(b) (supra) is affirmed." In other
words, he is affirming his stand with regard to the iinputation l4(b). Now, in
the modified statement, he seeks to withdraw them and states "May kindly be
treated as deleted". It would, thus, be clear that his asking for stripping of the
or
citizenship of the Chief Justice India is for dismissing his \Vrit petition and
prosecution is the consequence of a decision of this Court \Vhich had affirmed F
the judgment of a special Bench judgment to the Calcutta High Court in
Fazalul Haq's, Chief Ministc1; BenJial's case.

At this stage, it may he relevant to mention that the petitioner) either in
his prelin1inary submissions or modified version filed on April 24, 1996)
during the Course of hearing, did not tender any unconditional apology for G
the imputations made against CJJ. On the other hand, it is clear that being a
professor of English, he knc\vthe consequences of the language used, its pur-
pose and effect and pressed for consideration. At the time of Uisn1issing the
second writ petition to a pointed reference of the allegations to be scandalous,
it \Vas recorded in the order and there \Vas no demur from the petition to the H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A contra, that the petitioner stood by them. In other words, he would bear the
consequences that would flow therefrom. According to the petitioner, many
an imputation bearing constitutional contour require interpretation by a
bench of five Judges under Article 145(3). We need not refer the case to the
Constitution Bench merely because the petitioner has raised that contention
in the petition; nor same requires decision unless the Court finds that the peti-
B
tion cannot be disposed of without the questions being decided by the Con.-
stitution Bench.

When imputations were made against the Chief Justice, the petitioner
assumed, in our vic\v, '\vrongly" that CJI cannot constitute benches nor he
C should discharge the functions of Chief Justice until the Matter is decided. On
appointn1cnt by the President by a \Varrant an<l on his taking oath of office,
the C.ll becomes entitled to discharge the functions and duties of that office
including constitution of benches and assignn1ent of judicial \Vork to judges as
per procedure. This responsibility flows from the office and none including a
D litigant hc1.s right to denian<l for contra position. As regards his personal dis-
position to hear a case by a bench of \vhich he is a member, it is his O\Vn per-
:;,onal volition. The Chief Justice's pr~rogativc to constitute benches and
assignn1ent of judicial business \vould not hin!!c at th8 \vhim of a litigant.

The decisioos of different benches arc the decisions of the Court. For
E the convenient transaction of business, the senior Judge among the 1nembers
composing the Bench gets the privilege to preside over the Bench but the
decision is that of the Court. The members composing the Bench collectively
speak for the Court and would bear collective responsibility for the decision
unless separate opinions are expressed by individual members composing the
F Bench. Majority opinion is the law as envisaged uoder Article 145(5) of the
Constitution. Their opinion or orderthus is the opinion or order of the Court.
The minority opinion also would form part of the judgment or order but
remains the minority view. The Chief Justice is first among the colleagues.

The question, thercforc, arises: \Vhether the afore-enumerated imputa-
G tions constitute contempt of this Court'/ Though the petitioner contended
that the provisions of the Act are ultra vires Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitu-
tion, it is not necessary for the purpose of this case lo dwelve upon that con-
tention. This Court has taken sou motu cognizance of contempt of this Court
under Article 129 of the Constitution of India which reiterates as a court of
H record, its power to punish for contempt of itself. As pointed out in the
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY,J.] 709

proceedings of this Court dated January 13, 1996, in spite of the fact that this A
Court brought to his attention the gravity of the imputations, the petitioner
insisted and reiterated that he stood by the scandalous averments made there-
in. This Court being duty bound. \Vas, therefore) constrained to issued notice
of contetnpt. The question, therefore, is: \vhether the aforesaid imputations
arc scurrilous attack intended to scandalise the Court and do they not impede
B
due administration of Justice? Words are the skin of the language. Language
in \vhich the \Vor<ls are couched is media to convey the thoughts of the author.
Its effect would be discernible from the language couched prop1io vigore. The
petitioner, a professor of English language in clear and unequivocal language
e1nphasised and rcaffirn1ed that the averments \Vere 11 truthfully and carefullyrr
worded. The question is : to what extent the petitioner is entitled to the c
freedom of those expressions guaranteed under Article J9(1 )(a) of the Con-
stitution ? If they arc found scandalous, whether he would get absolved by
operation of Article 19(l)(a) ?. As this Court has taken suo motu action
under Article 129 of the Constitution and the word 'contempt' has not been
defined by making rules, it would be enough to fall back upon the definition
D
of "criminal contempt" defined under Section 2( c)of the Act which reads thus:

"ncrin1inal contcrnpC' n1cans the pubhcation. (\vhcthcr by words,
spoken or ivritten, or by signs, or by visible representations, or
otherwise) of any matter of the doing of any other act whatsoever
1vhich - E
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to !oiver the
autholity of any cou1t; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tend~ to interfere \\'ith, the due
course of any judicial proceedings; or F

(iii) i11te1feres or tends to inte1fere with, or obslnlcts or tends to
1

obst11tct1 the ad111inistration of justice in any other n1anncr. 11

(Emphasis supplied)
G
It is doubtless that freedom of speech and of expression guaranteed by
Article 19(1 )(a) is one of the most predous liberties in our secular, socialist
republic, freedom of expression is a prized privilege to speak one's open mind
although not always in prefect good taste of all institutions. Since it opens up
channels of open discussion, the opportunity of speech and expression should H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A be afforded for vigorous advocacy, no less than abstract discussion. This liber-
ty may be regardsd as an autonomous and fundamental good and its value gets
support from the need to develop our evolving society from unequal past to a
vigorous homogeneous egalitarian order in \vhich each gets equality of status
and of status and of opportunity; social, economic (:Ind political justice \vith
dignity of person so as to build an integrated and united Bharat. T'ransfonna-
B
tion for that strong social restructure \Voukl be secured \Vhen channels for free
discussion arc \vide open and secular mores are not frozen. AI1 truths are rela-
tive and they can be judged only in the competition of market. Liberty is not
to be equated with certainty. Freedom of expression equally generates and
disseminates ideas and opinions, information of political and social i1npor-
C lance in a free niarket place for peaceful social transformation under rule of
hnv. The doctrine of discovery of truth docs require free exchange of ideas
and use of appropriate language. Words are the skin of the language \Vhich
manifests the intention of its maker or the speaker. The right to free speach
is, therefore, an integral aspect of right to self-development and fulfilment of
D person's duties some of which are proselytised in Part IVA of the Constitution
a-s Funda1ncntl:1l Duties. The end of the State is to secure the the citizen~
freedom to develop his faculties, freedom to think as he will, to speak as he
thinks and read as indispensable tools to the discovery of truth and realisation
of human knowledge and human rights. Public discussion is political liberty.
The purpose of freedom of speech is to understand political issues so as to
E protect the citizens and to enable them to participate effectively in the work-
ing of the den1ocracy in a representative forn1 of Government. Freedon1 of ex~
pression \vould play crucial role in the formation of public opinion on social,
political and econon1ic questions. Therefore, political speeches are greater
degree of protection and special and higher status than other types of
F speeches. and exprec.sions. The importance of speaker's potential develop-
ment on political and social questions is also relevant to encourage human
development for cilectivc functioning of democratic institutions.

Equally, debate on public issues would be uninhibited, robust and wide
open. It may \vell include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant
G sharp criticism of Govern111ent and public officials. Absence of restraint in
this area encourages a well informed and politically sophisticated electoral
debate to confor111 the Govern1nent in tune with the constitutional mandates
to return a political party to power. Prohibition of freedom of speech and ex-
pression on public issues prevents and stifles the debate on social, political
H and economic questions which in long term endangers the stability of the com-
D.C.SAXENAv. HON'llLECJ.1.[RAMASWAMY,J.] 711

munity and maximises the source and breeds for more likely revolu•.ion. A

If maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech) society
equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech or expression by democratic
action. The reason is obvious, viz., that society accepts free speech and cxpn.::s-
sion and also puts limits on the right of the majority. Interest of the people B
involved in the acts of expression should be looked al not only from the
perspective of the speaker but also the place at which he speaks, the scenario,
the audience, the reaction of the publication, the purpose of the speech and
the place and the forum in which the citizen exercises his freedom of speech
and expression. The State has lcgiti1nate interest, therefore, to regulate the
freedom of speech and expression which liberty represents the limits of the c
duty of restraint on speech or expression not to utter defamatory or libelous
speech or expression. There is a co-relative duty not to interfere with the liber-
ty of others. Each is entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody
has a right to denigrate others' right to person or reputation. Therefore,
frccdon1 of speech and expression is tolerated so long as it is not malicious or D
libelous so that all attempts to foster and ensue orderly and peaceful puhlic
discussion or public good should result fron1 free speech in the market place.
If such speech or expression \Vas untrue and so reckless as to its truth, the
speaker or the author does not get protection of the constitutional right.

E
Freedom of speech and expression, therefore, would be subject to Ar-
ticle 19(2), 129 and 215 of the Constitution, in relation to contempt of court,
dcfan1ation or incitement to an offence etc. Article 3 read with Article 19 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants to everyone liberty a.1d
right to freedom of opinion and expression. Article 19 of the International F
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to which India is a signatory and
had ratified, provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expres-
sion, tu receive an<l impart information and ideas of all kinds but clause (3)
thereof imposes corresponding duty on the exercise of the right and respon-
sibilities. lt may, therefore, be subject to certain restrictions but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and arc necessary for the respect of life G
and reputations of others for the protection of national security or public
order or of public health or moral. It would thus be seen that liberty of speech
and expre_ssion guaranteed by Article 19(1)( a) brings within its ambit, the cor-
responding <luty and responsibility and puts limitation:-; on the exercise of that
liberty. H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A A citizen is entitled to bring to the notice of the public al large the inlir-
n1ities fron1 which any institution includingjudiciary suffers from. Indeed) the
right to offer healthy and constructive criticism \Vhich is fair in spirit n1ust be
left uni111paired in the interest of the institution itself. Critics are instrun1cnts
of reform but not those actuated by matice but those who are inspired by
public weal.Bona fide criticism of any system or inslitutionincludingjudiciary
B
is aimed at inducing the a<lministration of the system or institution to look_in-
ward and improve its public image. Courts. the instrumentalities of the Stale
are subject to the Constitution and the laws and arc not above criticism. Heal-
thy and constructive criticism arc tools lo augment its forensic tool!-> for in1-
proving its functions. A harmonious blend and balanced existence of free
C speech and fearless justice counsel that la\v ought tn be astutL: to critici:-1n1.
Constructive public criticisn1 even if it slightly oversteps its limits thus ha~
fruitful play in preserving democratic health of public institutions. Section 5
of the Act accord~ protection to such fair criticisn1 and saves fron1 conten1pt
of court. The best way to sustain I he dignity and respect for the office ofjudgc
D is to deserve respect from the public at large by fearlessness and objectivity· of
the approach to the issues arising for decision, quality of the judgn1cnt,
restraint, dignity and decorun1 a judge observes in judicial conduct off and on
the bench and rectitude.

InP.N. Duda v.P. Shiv Sha11ke1; AIR (1988) SC 1208 this Court has held
E that administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and
public scrutiny . .I udgcs have their accouotability to the society and their ac-
countability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e., to
defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour.
Thus the judges n1ust do, in the light given to them tO detern1inc, \vhal is right.
F Any criticism about judicial system or the judges which hampers the ad-
ministration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of
the .iu<lges and brings adn1inistration of justice to ridicule nlust he preventL:d.
The conten1pt of court proceedings arise out of that atten1pt. J udgn1cnts can
be criticised. Motives to the judges neeJ not be attributed. It brings the ad-
ministration of justice into disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice is
G one of the pillars on \vhich den1ocratic institution functions and sustains. In
the free market place of ideas criticism about the judicial system or judges
should be welcome so long as such criticism does not in1pair or ha1npcr the
a<ln1inistration of justice. This is ho\V the courts should exercise the po\vcrs
vested in them and judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt by
H taking notice of the contempt sou motu or al the behest of the litigant or a
D.C. SAXENA 1•. HON'BLECJ.L [RAMi\SWAMYJ.] 713

la\\yer. ln that case the speech oft he La\v Miqistcr in a Se1ninar organised by A
the Bar Council an<l the offending portions therein were held not con-
tcn1ptuous and punishable under the Act. In a den1ocracy judges and courts
alike are, therefore, subject to criticisn1 and if reasonable argument or
criticistn in respectful language and t.cmpcrcd \Vith moderation is off~red
against any judicial act as contrary to la\v or public good no court \vould treat
B
criticis1n as a contempt nf court.

Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of exprcs-
si0n. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech which
holds so <lcar in a democracy of ability to express freely. Freedom of expres-
sion produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the C
niistakes or bias or at times even corruption. It assists stability by tempered
articulation of gr.ievanccs and by pro1noting peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Frccdon1 of expression in arbrumcnts encourages the development of judicial
dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity,
equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection of D
other fun<la1nental hun1an rights. Legal procedure illuminates ho\V free
speech of expression constitutes one of the n1ost essential foundations of
<lc1nocratic society. Frccdon1 of expression, therefore, is one of the basic con-
ditions for the progress of a<lvocacy and for the devclopn1ent of every tnan
including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expres-
sion, therefore, is vital to the n1aintenance of free society. lt is essential to the E
rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in
person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. As stated hereinbefore, they
equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the
Court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to
be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations F
against any institution, much less the judiciary.

In E.M.S. Namboo<lilipad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, f1971J l SCR 697
a Bench of three Judge had held that the law of contempt stems from the right
of a court to punish, by imprisonn1ent or fine, persons gui1ty of words or acts
which obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is G
exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie cwiae by
the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to
them, even if committed outside the courts.

Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and ad- H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ministration of ht\V into disrespect and disregard and tantainounts to co11-
tcmpl. All acts which bring lhe court into disrepute or disrespect or which of-
fend its dignity or.its majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contcn1pt
con1111ittcd in respect ofsingl~ juJge or single court or in certain circu1nstan-
ces committed in respect of the whole of the judiciary or Judicial system.
Therein the criticisra by the Chief Minister \Vho described judiciary as an in-
B
strument of oppression and the judges as guided and dominated by class
haired, class interest and class prejudices etc. was held to be an attack upon
judges calculated to give rise to a sense of disrespect and distrust of all Judicial
decisions. II was held that such criticism of authority of the law and law courts
constituted contempt of the court and lhe Chief Minister was found guilty
C thereof.

The contempt of court evolved in common la\V jurisprudence \Vas
codified in the form of the Act. Section 2(c) defines "criminal contempt"
which has been extracted earlier. In A.M. Bhattacjarkee's case (supra) relied
D on by the petitioner himself, a Bench of two Judges considered the said defini-
tion and held that scandalising the court would mean any act done or writing
published which is calculated lo bringthe court or judges into contempt or the
lower its authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the legal
process of the courl. In para 30, it was stated that scandalising the court is a
convenient way of describing a publication which, although it docs not relate
E to any specific case either past or pending or any specificJudge, is a scurrilous
attack on the judiciary as a whole, which is calculated to undermine the
authority of the courts and public confidence in the administration of justice.
Contempt of court is to keep the blaze of glory around the .iudiciary and to
deter people from attempting to render justice contemptible in the eyes of the
· F public. A libel upon a court is a reflection upon the sovereign people thems~],
ves. The contemn or conveys lo the people that the administration of justice is
weak or in corrupt hands. The fountain of justice is tainted. Secondly, the
judgments that stream out of that foul fountain is impure and contaminated.
In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 9 para 27 at page 21 on the
topic "Scandalising the Court 11 it is stated that scurrilous abuse of a judge or
G court, or attacks on the personal character of a judge, are punishable con-
tempt. The punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting either
the court as a whole or the individual judges of the court from a repetition of
the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either volun-
tarily or by compulsion are subject tu the jurisdiction of the court, from the
H mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is undermined or im-
o_c_ SAXENA v. llON'BLECJ_[_ [RAMASWAMYJ.] 715

paired. In consequence, the court has regarded \Vith particular seriousness al- ,A,
legations of partiality or bias on the part of a judge or a court On the other
hand, criticisn1 of a judge's conduct or of the conduct of a court, even if strong-
ly \vor<le<l, is not a contempt provided that the criticism is fair, tc1nperate and
n1adc in good faith, and is not directed lo the personal character of a judge or
the impartiality of a judge or court. B

Therefore, it is of necessity to regulate the judicial process free from
fouling the fountain of justice to ward off the people from undermining the
confidence of the public in the purity of fountain of justice and due ad-
1ninistration. Justice thereby remains pure, untainted and unimpeded. The
punishment for contempt, therefore, is not for the purpose of protecting or c
vindicating either the dignity of the court as a whole or an individual judge of
the court from attack on his personal reputation but it was intended to protect
the public who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court and to prevent undue
interference with the administration of justice_ If the authority of the court
remains undermined or impeded the fountain of justice gets sullied creating D
distrust and disbelief in the mind of the litigant public or the right-thinking
public at largefor the benefit of the people. Independence of the.judiciary for
due course of administration of justice must be protected and remain unin1-
paired. Scandalising the court, therefore, is a convenient expression of scur-
rilous attack on the n1ajesty of justice calculated to undermine its authority
and public confidence in the administration of justice. The malicious or E
slcndcrous publication inculcates in the mind of the people a general disaf-
fection and dissatisfaction on the judicial determination and indisposes in
their mind to obey them. If the people's allegiance to the law is so fundamen-
tally shaken it is the most vital and most dangerous obstruction of justice call-
ing for urgent action. Action for contempt is not for the protection of the F
Judge as private individual but because they arc the channels by which justice
is administered to the people without fear or favour. As per the Third
Schedule to the Constitution oath or affirmation is taken by the Judge that he
will duly and faith[ully perform the duties of the office to the best of his ability,
knowledge and _judgment without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and will G
so uphold the Constitution and the laws. In accordance therewith, judges
must always remain impartial and should be known by all people to be impar-
tial. Should they be imputed with improper motives, bias, corruption or par-
tiality, people will lose faith in them. The judge requires a degree of
detachment and objectivity which cannot be obtained, if judges constantly are
required to look over their shoulders for fear of harassment and abuse and H
716 SUPHFME COURT REPORTS 11990] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A irresponsible demands for prc1:-.ecution or n;signation. The \Vhoic adn1inistra-
lion ofjuslicc would suffer due lo ils rippling effect. It is for this reason lhal
scandalising the judge~ \Vas considered by the Parliament to he conten1pt of a
court punishable with in1prisonmcnt of line.

B Scandalising the court, therefore. \Vould ini.::an hustnc cnuc1srn of
judges as judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in conncc-
lion with office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. Yet
defan1atory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or
judges into conten1pt, a serious i1npcdi111ent to justice and an inroad on
majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to lo\ver the dignity
c of the COUrl \VOUld destory, undern1inc Or fend to undermine public Con-
fidence in th adn1inistration of justice or majesty of justice. It \voulcl,
therefore, be scandalising the judge as a judge, in other \Vords, i1nputing
partiality, corruption, bias, i1nproper niotives to a Judge is scanJalisation
or the court \Vould be contempt of the c.ourt. Event i1nputation of lack of
D i1npartiality or fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties
a1nounts to cnntcm~t. The grava1nen of the offence is that of lo\vering his
dignity or authurity or an affront to niajcsty of justice. When the contemnor
challenges the authority of the Court, he interferes with the performance
of duties of Judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice
or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary
E into conten1pf. SecUon 2 (c) of the Act, therefore, defines crin1inal con·
templ in wider articulation lhal any publication, whether by words, spoken
or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or othcr\vise of any
matter or the doing of any other acl whatsoever which scandalises or tends
to scandalise, or Jo,vers or tends to Jo\ver the authority of any court; or
F prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any
judicial proceeding; or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or
tends to obstruct, the administration of .iusticc in any other manner, is a
crin1inal contc1npt. ·rhereforc, a tendency to scandalise the Court or ten-
dency to lower the authority of lhe coun or tendencr"to interfere with or
tendency to obstruct the administration of justice in ai{y manner or tendcn~
G cy to challenge the authority or majesty of justice, would be a criminal
conlempt. The offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to or lends
to lower the authority of the court is a criminal contempt. Any conduct of
the contemnor which has the tendency or produces a tendency lo bring the
judge or court into contempt or tends to lower the authority of the court
H would also be contempt of the court.
D.C. SAXENA v. HON"BLE CJ.I. [RAM/\SWAMY..1.J 717

It is true that in an in<lict<Jble offence generally n1ens rea is an essential A
ingredient and requires to be proved for convicting the offender but for a
criminal conten1pt as defined in Section 2f c) any cnun1cratcd or any other act
apart, to create disaffection, disbelief in the efficacy of judicial dispensation
or tendency to obstruct adn1inistration of _justice or tendency to lo\ver the
authority or majesty of law by any act of the parties, constitutcs criminal con- B
tempt. Thereby it excludes the proof of mens rea. What is relevant is that the
offending or affornt act produces interference \Vith or tendency to interfere
with the course of justice. At this stage~ we \Voul<l dispose of one of the serious
contentions repeatedly emphasised by the petitioner that he had no personal
gain to seek in the !is except said to have been fired by public duty and has
professed respect for the Court. Those are neither relevant nor a defence for C
the offence of contempt. What is material is the effect of the offending act and
not the actperse. lnE.M.S. Namboodilipad's case this Court had held in para-
graph 33 that a law punishes not only acts which had in fact interfered with the
courts and administration of justice but also those \vhich have that tendency,
that is to say, are likely to produce a particular result. It was held that the likely D
effect of the words must be seen and they clearly have effect of lowering the
prestige of the judges and courts in the eyes of people. San1c view was
reiterated in Sambu Nath Jha V. Kedar Prasad Sinha, [19'12] 1sec573 at 577.
As stated earlier, i1nputation of corrupt or improper motives in judicial con-
duct would impair the efficacy ofjudicial dispensation and due protection of
the liberties of the citizen or due administration of justice. This paramount E
public interest is protected by the definition in Section 2( c) of the Act. It is,
therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention on the part of the con-
temnor to interfere with the administration of justice. Making reckless allega-
tions or vilification of the conduct of the court or the jucl~e would be
contempt. F

The question, therefore, to be considered is: whether the imputations
referred to hereinbefore have necessary tendency to impinge or tendency to
impede the public confidence in the administration of justice or would create
disbelief in the efficacy of judicial administration or lower the authority or in- G
terferes with majesty of Court ? The court, therefore, is required to consider
whether the imputations made by a contemnor are calculated to bring or have
the effect of bringing the court into contempt or casting aspersions on the ad-
ministration of justice tends to impede justice etc. The court has to consider
the nature of the i1nputations, the occasion of making the imputations and
whether the contemnor foresees the possibility of his act and whether he was H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SlJPP. 3 S.C.R.

A reckless as to either the result or had foresight like any other fact in issue to
be inferred forn1 the facts and circun1stances emerging in the case. The
reason is obvious that lhc court does not sit to try the conduct of a judge to
\Vho1n the imputations are made. It \vould not be open to the contcmnor to
bring for\vard evidence or circun1stanccs to justify or to sho\v \Vhethcr and
how fairly imputations were justified because the .Judge is not before the
B
Court. The defence justification to an in1putation \Vould nol, therefore, be
available to the contcmnor. The in1putation of improper motives or bias can-
not be justified on the principle of fair contempt. lnAmbard v. Attomey-
General for T1inidad and Tobago, (1936) AC 322 at 335 Lord Atkin in his
oft-quoted judgment held that justice is not a cloistered virtue and must be
C allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectfully, have been, though outspoken
comments of ordinary man 11 • But in the sa1ne judg1nent it \Vas further pointed
out that provided that members of the public should abstain from imputing
in1propcr motives to tho~c taking part in the adn1inistration of.iustice Jnd are
genuinely exercising a right of criticisn1 and not acting in n1alice or attc1npting
D to impair the administration of justice. That \Vas a case of criticisn1 of the
Court proceedings as is saved by Section 5 of the Act.

Lav.' is not in any doubt that in a free democracy everybody is entitled
to express his honest opinion about the correctness or lcgalit y of a judgment
or sentence or an order of a court but he should not overstep the bounds.
E Though he is entitled to express that criticism objectively and with detach-
ment in a language dignified and respectful tone \Vith moderation the liberty
of expression should not be a licence to violently make personal attack on a
judge. Subject to that, r.in honest criticisn1 of the administration of justice is

F
\Velcon1e since justice is not a cloistered virtue and is entitled to respectful
scrutiny. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the cor-
rectness of the judgment, order or sentence with dignified and moderate lan-
guage pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order or
-
sentence. That is after the event as post-n1orten1.

In Siui Baradakanta Mishra Etc. v. The Registrar of 01issa High Cowt &
G A111: Etc., [1974] 1 SCC374, the appellant, a District Judge was suspended and
a spate of litigation in that behalf had ensued. When an order of suspension
was set aside by the Government, in exercise of his power under Article 235,
the High Court further ordered suspension of him pending enquiry of the al-
legations made against Judges in a men1orandum and letters sent to the
H Governor in a vilificatory criticism of the judges in their function on the ad-
'
D.C. SAXENA v. HON"BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY,].] 719

ministration side. When contempt action was initiated, he challer.gc<l the A
jurisdiction of the court and the competency to initiate action for contcn1pt
on the specious plea that the acts done by the High Court were on the ad-
ministration side and were not judicial actions. A three-Judge Bench had
negatived the plea and convicted the appellant under section 12 of the Act.
When the matter had come up hcfore this Court, a Constitution Bench con-
B
sidered the gravamen of the imputotions and had held that the allegations
made against the court in the memo submitted to the Government constituted
scurrilous allegations against the High Court. Again some of the allegations
made in the 1nemo of appeal and various con1munications lo the Supren1e
Court were held to constitute contempt of the court and the conviction was
confirmed though sentence was reduced. This Court held that imputation of c
improper moqves, bias and prejudice constitutes contc1npt under Section
2(c) of the Act.

In Special Reference No. 1of1964, popularly known as U.P.
Legislature's Warrant of Arrest of the Judges of the Allahabad High Court D
and Keshav Singh Reference, a Bench of seven .T udges of this Court observed
that the power to punish for contempt alleged must always be exercised
cautiously, \Visely and \Vith circumspection. The best way to sustain the dig-
nity and status of their (judges) office is to deserve respect from the public "t
large by the quality of their judgments, fearlessness and objectivity of their ap-
proach and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their E
judicial conduct. It would equally apply to the legislature. Keeping the above
perspective in view, the question emerges: whether the imputations iten1ised
hereinbefore constitute contempt of the court. At the cost of repetition, we
may reiterate that in a democracy though every one is entitled to express his
honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or an order or F
sentence, judges do require degree of detachment and objectivity in judicial
dispensation, they being duty bound with the oath of office taken by them in
adjudicating the disputes brought before the court. The objectivity or detach-
ment cannot be obtained if the judges have constantly to look over their
shoulders for fear of harassment and abuse and irresponsible demands for
prosecution, resignation or to refrain from discharging their duties pending G
further action. Cognisant to this tendency, the founding fathers of the Con-
stitution engrafted Article s121and211 of the Constitution and prohibited the
Parliament and the Legislatures to discuss on the floor of the House the con-
duct of any judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court in the discharge of
his duties except upon a motion for presenting address to the President pray- H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996J SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ing for the removal of a judge under Article 124(4) of the Constitution in ac-
cordance with the procedure prescribed under the.I udges (Inquiry) Act, J%8
and the Rules made thereunder. ln ..4.111. Bhuttaclu!ijee's case on \vhich grc·n
reliance \Vas placed by the petitioner cn1pl~asising the rectitude on the part of
a .iudgc1 thi~ Court Ja;:J rule for the advocates to adhere to a code of conduct
B in seeking rcJres~al nn the perceived abcrr~tion or the conduct or a _judge
other\visc than in accord<1ncc \Vi th the procedure prescribed in Article I.24( 4)
of the Constitution. The respect for and the dignity of the court thereby was
protected from scurrilous attack on the judge or the court. If the forum of the
judicial process is allo\vcd to 1nount scurrilous attack on a judge, the question
arises \Vhethcr the forum of lhc judicial process of vilificalion of the judges of
C impulations to the judges in the pleadings presented lo lhe court would give
liberty of freedom of exprc,;ion lo an advocale or a litigant. In the light of the
above discussion, \Ve have little doubt to conclude that \Vhcn an advocate or a
party appearing before the court rcq uircs to conduct hin1self in a 1natt er hcfit-
ting to the dignity and decoru1n of the court, he cannot have a free licence to
D indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation
against the judge or lhe court. Ir the reputalion and dignity of the judge, who
decides the case arc allowed to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for
the court would quickly disappear and independence of the judiciary would
be a thing of lhe past.

E In Re: Roshan Lal Ahuja (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446 when the contem-
nor-petitioncr's countless unsuccessful attempts against his order of
removal fron1 service became abortive and in spite of this Court granting
at one stage compensation of a sum of Rs. 30,000 he had indulged in the
pleadings with scnrrilous accusalions on judges who granted compensation
F and not reinstatement. It was held by a three-Judge Bench that the con-
temnor had permitted himself the liberty of using language in the docu-
ments .and pleadings which nol only had the effect of scandalising and
lowering the authority of the court in relation to judicial matters but also
had the effect of substantial interference with and obstructing the ad-
ministration of justice. The unfounded and unwarranted aspersions on the
G judges of this Court had the tendency to undermine the authority of the
court and would create distrusl in the public mind as to the capacity of the
judges of this Court to mel out fearless justice. Accordingly, he was
convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of four
months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default, to undergo sentence
H for a further period of 15 days.
D.C.SAXENAv. llON.BLECJ.J JRAMASWAMY,J.] 721

In L.D. jaikwalv. State of U.P., J 1984J 3 SCC 405, the conduct of an ad- A
vocate in using abusive language in pleadings had vilification of a judge \Vas
held to constitute contempt under Section 2( c)(i) of the Act and his sentence
under Section 12 of the Act was upheld. Jn Re: Slui S. Mulgaokw; [1978] 3
sec 497 lhe conduct of a senior advocate in publishing a pamphlet imputing
in1proper motives to the Magistrate \Vho decided his case was held to con-
B
stitute substantial interference \vith the due administration of justice. His con-
viction was accordingly upheld though sentence was reduced. In KA.
Mohammed Ali v. C.N. Prasannan, [1994] Supp. 3 SCC 509 while arguing the
case, the counsel raised his voice unusually high to the annoyance of the
Magistrate and used derogatory language against the Magistrale before
whon1 he conducted the trial of an accused. His conviction and sentcnl'.C for c
contempt was accordingly upheld.

In Gillers "Regulation of Lawyers - Problems of Law and Ethics" (Third
Edition - 1992) al page 747 it was pointed out lhal in spite of First Amendment
protection offrec speech, la\vyers \Vho con1mittcd contempt of the court \Vere D
punished by American court even if they \Vere advocating th(:ir client's inter-
est al that time. The lawyer's behaviour threatens the dignity and authority of
the courts was held to constitute contempt of the Court.

Jn Charan Lal Sahu v. Union oj1ndia &Anr., [1988] 3 SCC 255, in a peti-
tion under Article 32 of the Constitution the advocate indulged in mud-sling- E
ing against advocates and this Court. It was held that those allegations were
likely to lower the prestige of this Court. This Court accordingly held that he
committed contempt in drawing up the petition and directed to initiate
proceedings against him for overstepping the limits in particular of self-
restraint. F

It would, thus, be seen that when the first writ petition was dismissed by
this Court, as a responsible citizen, the petitioner would have kept quite.
Wh_en the result animated by the petitioner was not achieved, he embittered
to foul at the process of this Court and emboldened to file the second writ peti-
tion with imputation made against this Courts, in particular targctting the G
Chief J usticc of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. As stated hereinbefore and need
not be reiterated once that it is the duty of the Court to hear and decide any
matter posted for admission. Therefore, there is nothing improper for the first
Court presided over by the Chief .I ustice of India to hear and decide the mat-
ter. When it came up for admission, the Court appears to have been per- H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A suaded to ascertain the correctness of the allegations made in the writ peti-
tion. This Court obviously before issuing notice had sent for and directed the
Solicitor General to obtain the information from the Government as to the
correctness of the allegations made before deciding whether the Court wonld
exercise its prerogative power under Article 32 to issue directions as sought
B for. In furtherance thereof, the Solicitor General admittedly placed before the
Court the record. On perusal thereof, the first Court had declined to exercise
the power as enumerated and obviously stated by the petitioner that the exer-
cise of the power under Article 32 was not appropriate since the Government
in the Defence Department could recover from the Prime Minister's
C Secretariat or from the Congress party, as the case may be, all the arrears, if
any, due and payable by the respective entities. It is not obligatory for this
Court to give reasons for dismissing the writ petition. Day in and day out in
countless cases, \vhile refusing to interfere \vith the orders this Court dismis-
ses the petitions be it filed under Article 32 or 136 of the Constitution in
limine. It is also seen that though the case adjourned for two weeks, no doubt,
D it was not posted on that day but it was listed some time thereafter. In the
proceedings of the Court recorded by the staff, it was recorded that the
Solicitor General for India appeared in the Court in his official capacity. Shri
Dipankar Gupta as Solicitor General or in personal capacity obviously acted
as amicus on behalf of the court. Being the Solicitor General for India, he was
E directed to have consultation with Government Departments and to obtain
needed information. Jn appropriate cases this procedure is usually adopted
by the Court. Recording of the proceedings by the court generally is not noted
by the Court. Is it improper for the Chief Justice to hear the case? Was the
dismissal totally unjust and unfair for not recording the reasons ? The
petitioner obviously with half-baked knowledge in law mixed up the language
F
as improper for Chief Justice of India lo hear it Di'imissa] of the grouse' of
11 1 11
•
11 1

the petitioner was totally unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful, flagrant viola-
tion of mandate of Article 14 "Violation of the sacred oath of office" and to
"declare Justice A.M. Ahmadi unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India".
When these imputations were pointed out to the petitioner by three-Judge
G Bench presided over by brother Verma, J. while dismissing the second writ
petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he had stated that he "stood by" those
allegations. He reiterated the same\vithjustificationin his preliminary submis-
sions. He has stated that the accusations made were truthful and "carefully"
worded. In this backdrop scenario, the effect of these imputations is obviously
H reckless apart from scandalising this Court, in particular the Chief Justice of
D.C.SAXENAv. HON'IlLECJ.I.[RAMA~WAMY,J.] 723

India and was intended to foul the process of the Court or lower or at any rate A
tends to lower the authority of the Court in lhe estimate of the public and
tends to undermine the efficacy of the judicial process. ll would, therefore, be
clear that the accusations are gross contempt. At the height of it, he stated that
since the first writ petition was not disposed of by a bench of not less than five
Judges, the writ petition was not dismissed in the eye of law and the order of B
dismissal is 11011 est and il is "not decided and disposed of constitutionally".
This assertion of the petitioner flies in the face of the judicial finality of lhe
order of this Court and the assertion lends lo question the authority of the
court. It creates tendency to obstruct the administration of just.ice and, thcre-
forei it would be outrageous criminal contempt.
c
()mission to record reasons, according to the petitioner, is violative of
the principles of natural Jusicc. The Chief Justice oflndia has committed im-
propriety in deciding the matter. As slated earlier, the decision is that of the
Bench on behalf of the Court and the Chief Justice, being the senior-most
among the members constituting the bench, had spoken on behalf of the D
Bench. Therefore, the attribution of in1propcr 111otives scandalises the ef-
ficacy ofj udicia1 adj u<lication andjJer se contumaciously lo\vers or at any rate
lends lo lower the dignity or authority of the Court. The prayer for prosecu-
tion oflhe Chief.Justice, though sought in Item 14(a) and ( <l) lo be withdrawn,
which would be of no consequence, is, therefore, unbelievably outrageous
contempt. E

These findings dispose of Items 1, 3, 5, 9 and J.4(a) which remain not
even amended by the contemnor.

As regards other imputations, it may be stated at this stage, as rightly F
pointed out by the learned Solicitor General, that what we are required to
consider is the effect of the imputations made by the contcmnor in the second
writ petition and not what he sought to amend some of the averments attribut-
ing imputations to this Court and the effect thereof. By his own admission,
they are 11 strindent 11 an<l 11pungent 11 • They arc "truthful1 1 and \Vere ncarefully 11
stated by him. Even the amended avennents did not advance the conten1nor's G
stand. On the other hand, they compounded perpetration of contumacious
conduct recklessly made by the contemnor in the second writ petition. In item
4, the contemnor attributed that Justice Ahmadi 11 ultin1atcly" dismissed the
petition observing that the Government of India was capable of realising dues
from Shri Rao (which it had not done in two years) and without recording H
.
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A reasons for dismissing the petition. So much for the vaunted adherence to the
twin principles of the "trampare11cy and accountability". It would be seen that
insinuations that emerge from these words in writ petitions together with the
phrase that CJI browbeated him ex facie scandalise the Court and tend to
lower the authority of the Court. As seen, the insinuations tend to bring the
B couri- into conten1pt in the estimate of the general public and that the court
lacked fairness, objectivity and dismissed the writ petition for known reasons.
It also tends lo interfere with the administration of justice and that the court
should give reasons lest the order be believed to be shrouded with suspicion.
Therefore, it isexjacic contumacious. The contemnor seeks to justify his aver-
ments under Section 4 of the Act as fair and accurate report of the judicial
C proceedings and that, therefore, they are not contempt. Even in his modified
statement, for his statement that the Chief Justice of! ndia browbeated him in
disn1issing the \Vrit pctition 1 he· stated the 11 discerned rcluctancen on the part
of the presiding.fudge. In other words, his revised imputation compounds the
con1n1ission of flagrant contempt by substituting the word "browbeat 11 with the
D words "discerned reluctance". Jn other words, he attributed motives to the
Court for dismissal of the first writ petition. It would, thus, be clear that the
contemnor animated to impute motives to the ChiefJustice of India in the dis-
charge of his constitutional duly of.deciding a case. When his grouse (stated
by the petitioner - emphasis supplied) against Shri P.Y. Narasimha Rao was
E not redressed exercising the power under Article 32 a result which he wanted,
the petitioner contumaciously attributed motives to the Court, in particular to
the presiding officer of the Court, the Chief J us lice of India and thereby he
scandalised the Court in the estimate of the general public. We fail to ap-
preciate the stand of the petitioner that Section 4 bails him out and purges
F from contempt. It would be applicable only to publication of the report of a
judicial proceedings fairly and with accuracy to outside the world. There is a
distinction between expression in pleading and publication of the report of
judicial proceedings or an order without malice as fair and constructive
criticism to the readers. As stated earlier, fair criticism of the judicial
proceedings outside the pleadings of the Court is a democratic feature so as
G to enable the court to look inward into the correctness of the proceedings and
the legality of the orders of the Court by the Court itself for introspection. But
a party has duty and responsibility lo plead as a part of the averments or the
prayer in the relevant portion with language befitting with the dignity of the
Court and the judicial process and not in self- abuse of the freedom of exprcs-
H sion given under Article 19(l)(a). Abuse of the process of the court is a self-
D.C. SAXENA v. HON"BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 725

evidence. AB such Article 19(2) creates an embargo on the freedom of exp:es- A
sion and excludes from its operation the power of contempt of Court of under
the Act. This Court being court of record, power of this Court under Article
129 is independent and is not subject to Article 19(1)(a). Et abundanti
cautela, Article 19(2) excludes the operation of Article 19(1) when speech or
expression is trapped in contempt of court or tends to trench into it. When
B
. the contempt of court is committed by a litigant, the freedom of expression
being contemptuous become punishable under Article 129 of the Constitu-
tion de horse the power under Section 12 of the Act.

Item 7 relates to the imputation that the Chief .I ustice of India gets no
judicial protection unlike the President of India for being prosecuted even c
while Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi holds office as Chief .Justice of India and is
accordingly liable to prosecution. This bravado not only impinges upon the
protection given by Article 124(4) of the Constitution and under relevant
provisions of the Protection of Official Act ex facic it is an outrageous tenden-
cy to lower the authority of the Court and interference with judicial ad- D
ministration. The assertion of the petitioner that this is a constitution(ll
conundrum required to be decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court
highlights contumacious conduct of the contemnor.

In item 8 he attributes that this Court "willji1lly" and "advertently" (em- E
phasis supplied) violated fundamental rights of contemnor and of other
people in not granting relief of direction to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao to pay the
alleged dues. The word "advertentlywas carefully used by lhe petitioner and
the word "willfully" was employed for refusal of the relief. They do emphasise
the emphatic tone of the language and the n1otive of the contcmnor and at-
tribute motives to this Court that the relief sought for in the first writ petition
"advertently" was not granted and was "willfully" declined and thereby the
Chief Justice Ahmadi lost constiutional protection of not being prosecuted.
This accusation is a culmination of the contumacious conduct of \Vant on scan-
dalisation of the Court and reckless denigration. In his amended petition, he G
further aggravates the contempt stating that the dismissal of the petition by
the first court sent wrong signals to the entire judiciary of which Justice Ah-
madi is the head as Chief Justice of India. The scurrilous attack, therefore, is
not only on Justice Ahmadi as a Judge but also as the Chief Justice of India
and also as head of the institution of the whole country. Thereby he designedly
and deliberately allowed himself brought within ex facie criminal contempt. H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Item 9 relates to the accusation "what are the legal consequences of the
violation of cnth of office by Justice Ahmadi". He states in his preliminary sub-
missions that it a constitutional question required to be decided by a Constitu-
tion Bench. As stated earlier, every qeestion raised need not necessarily be
decided unless the case cannot be disposed of without the question for grant-
ing or refusing to grant the relief. The oath of office taken by a Judge of this
B
Court is not that he should allow every case or dismiss every case but only to
uphold the Constitution and the laws and to administer justice in accordance
therewith in tune with the oath of his office. The protection of Article 124(4),
121,211, the Judicial Officers Protection Act and the J udgcs (Protection) Act
is to ensure independence to the judiciary. Threat to.Judicial process is a chal-
C lenge to the authority of the court or majesty of justice. It would be ex-facie
contun1acious conduct.

In item 10 again, the petitioner attributes that Justice Ahmadi as Chief
Justice oflndia and as a Judge of this Court deliberately and willfully failed lo
D perform his duties and stultified the performance of fundamental duties by
the petitioner. This imputation is the consequence of the dismissal of the first
writ petition. Thereby, he seeks stripping of citizenship of Justice Ahmadi, It
is an unbelievable outrageous affront to the majesty of justice on the part of
the contemnor and scandalisation of this Court. It tends to lower the dignity
and authority of the Court and also sows seeds for persons with similar
E propensity to undermine the authority of the Court or the judiciary as a whole;
he crossed all boundaries of recklessness and indulged in wild accusations.
He sought justification in his preliminary submissions that it being a question
of la\v, it docs not amount to personal imputation or insinuation. In spite of
this Court pointing it out to be. scandalous, when the second writ pelition was
p dismissed and his persistence that he stood by those allegations, it does not lie
in his mouth to contend either in his preliminary submissions or his modified
form that the dismissal of the first writ petition amounts lo failure lo perform
fundamental duties by the CJI ancl, therefore, it would further compound the
contempt.

G In imputation 11, the petitioner attributed to the Chief Jusice of India
that he had allowed his son lo practise in the Supreme Court and to stay with
him in his official residence etc. The petitioner sought justification to the said
imputation from reports said to have been published in the "India Today" and
"The Times oflndia" by a lady senior advocate of this Court. But the petitioner
H has not placed on record the said material. Therefore, we do not have the ad-
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY,.!.] 727

vantage to verify their contents or correctness or otherwise of the statements A
said lo have been published therein. When we pointed out to the petitioner
whether he had made any independent enquiry, he had reiterated that he
relied upon those slalements. ln other words, by implication, he admitted that
he did not make any independent enquiry into the alleged misuse of official
facility by the Chief Justice of India in permitting his son to practise in this B
Court or to reside in his residence along with him. For the said imputation he
said that Justice Ahmadi, the Chief Justice of India is liable to be prosecuted
under the Prevention of Corruption Act and he seeks as a justification the
ratio decidendi of Veeraswanii's case. It is seen that Veeraswa111i's case has no
application whatsoever. As stated earlier, Article 124(4) of the Constitution
read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act prescribes the procedure to take action C
against a .Judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court for proved mis-
behaviour or incapacity. As laid down in Bhattacha1jee's case, Bar Associa-
tion of the concerned Court was given liberty to place any material of the
aberration of the conduct ofJudge before the CJ! for redressal as per the ''in-
house" procedure laid down therein. For proved misbehaviour, the address D
by each House of Parliament to the President for removal of a Judge pursuant
lo a finding of proved misbehaviour or incapacity under the Judges (Inquiry)
Act by a resolution of not less than two-third of the members of the House and
voling by two-third of the House present and an order or removal therein by
the President of India is culmination. In Blwttacharjee's case, this Court also
laid down that no other authority or person has power to conduct any enquiry E
against the conduct of a Judge. Article 121and211 prohibit discussion, in the
Parliament or in the Legislature of the State, of the conduct of Judge of the
Supreme Court or High Court respectively. Therefore, when the Constitution
prohibits the discussion of the conduct of a Judge, by implication, no one has
power to accuse a judge of his misbehaviour or incapacity except and in ac· p
core.lance with the procedure prescribed in lhe Constitution and the Judges
(Inquiry) Act or as per the procedure laid down in Blzattachmjee's case. Ir-
relevancy of the accusations apart, the prayer for prosecution of the Chief Jus-
tice of India under the Prevention of Corruplio_n Act is an assault on majesty
of justice, affront to authority of law, the gravest contumacious conduct and
scurrilous scandalisation of the court. G

Item 12 of the accusation relates to the payment of litigation cost in-
curred by the contemnor in both the writ petitions and the Joss said to have
been caused to the public exchequer by non- payment by Sri P.V. Narasimha
Rao, from personal pocket of Justice Ahmadi as a Chief Justice for dismissal H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A of the writ petition. He stated in his preliminary submission that when loss was
caused by a public servant in his official capacity to the public exchequer due
to his dereliction of duty and under thr. law it was recoverable from pay or
pension of the public servant, on the same analogy Chief Justice of India
should be liable to make good the loss incurred by him and by the State due

B to non-payment by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao. The implication is that byjudieial
act, if a Presiding Judge dismisses a petition, he is liable to bear personally not
only the costs incurred by the litigant but also the resultant loss to the State
with interest payable thereon. This imputation is a deliberate interference
with the judicial process and tends to lower the authority of the Court spread-
ing the virus to repeat by <lrum beats of similar reckless ilnputations against
C the judiciary at every forum down to the lower rank of the judiciary spreading
rippling effect on independence of the judiciary, authority of the court and
wanton interference with judicial process. It must be held to be a depraved
contun1acious conduct.

D Item 13 relates to the interference with the judicial management of the
Court and the duty of a.Judge. When an accusation is n1adc against the Presid-
ing Judge, by implication, until the matter is decided, the Presiding Officer
has to desist from discharging the judicial duties by his proceeding on lca\'C
and the senior-most puisne Judge would assume the office of the Chief Jus-
tice. This is a deliberate interference in the judicial n1anagcmcnt tending to
E sow disaffection in the efficacy of dispensation of justice. The further accusa-
tion that the ChiefJustice of India should not constitute a Bench of the Judges
appointed during his tenure so that "he (CJ!)" "may not directly or indirectly
iniluence any of the Judges hearing the matter 11 • lt\vou!<l, thus, be in uncquivo~
cal loud expression that the contemnor attributed motives to the CJ l that the
F Judges appointed during his tenure as Chief Justice are amenable to his in-
fluence in judicial adjudication and would decide the causes by pressure or
influence directly or indirectly brought by the Chief Justice of India. Equally,
it is a corollary that these .T udges are amenable to influence and thereby they
do not decide the cases posted before them legally and objectively. The Court
is subject to pressures and decides cases under iniluence. These accusation~
G and decides cases under influence. These accusations are flagrantly out-
rageous to scandalise the Court. Though the contemnor has sought lca\'e to
modify this statement, ultimately, in his amended statement, he did not touch
upon this aspect of the matter. In other words, as stated earlier, he stood by
his avcrments calculatedly made. His justification thatJ ustice P .N. Bhagwati
H (as he then was) decided first S.P. Gupta's case when allegations against
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [RAMASWAMY!.] 729.

CBI Chandrachud were made has no application. In a judicial proceedings A
taken by this Court, the office of the Chief Justice of India was directly in-
volved in appointment of additional Judges or exlension of their tenure as ad-
ditional Judges or their transfer' The Chief Justice of India recluscd himself
from the Bench; resultantly, the senior-most puisne Judge came to preside
over that Bench. Thus, the conlemnor has committed the contempt of this
B
Court under Article 129 of the Constitution.

The question then is: what punishment is to be awarded to the conlem-
nor '!As pointed out earlier, the repealed assertions of the petitioner that he
has no personal gain in the litigation and was actuated by the public duty and
laid the petitions, bear no relevance or a defence. ll is already held that in a C
conten1pt proceedings, the n1otive, in other \Vords, the 111ens rea is not
relevant. What would be the effect of the act or conduct or imputation is the
relevant question for decision? It is true that in an indictable offence under
penal law generally 1nens rea is an essential ingredient and the burden lies on
the prosecution to prove it affirmatively. In a contempt proceedings of sum- D
n1ary nature, the proof of nzens rca is absolutely unnecessary. What is material
is the effector the tendency of the act, conduct or the publication of the words,
\Vrittcn, spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise an<l
\vhcther it scandalises or tends to scandalise or lo\vers or tends to lo\ver the
authority of the Court or prejudices or tends to prejudice or interfere or tends
to interfere \vith the due course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or E
tends to interfere v.,rith or obstruct the administration of justice in any other
manner. The tendency due to the publication, whether by words - written or
spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise, of any matter or
the doing of any other act whatsoever is relevant and material.
F
It is already noted that while dismissing the second writ petition, this
Court has pointed out the scandalous nature of accusations which found
place in the second writ petition and when the petitioner persisted for con-
sideration of scandalous accusations to lay proceedings against the Chief Jus-
tice of India for prosecutiOn and other reliefs referred to hereinbefore, he G
reiterated that he would stand by those accusations. Resultantly, this Court
was constrained to go into merits and dismissed the petition and initiated suo
motu contempt proceedings and got the notice issued to him pointing out
specifically 14 items which constituted scandalous and reckless litigations
pleaded with irresponsibility. He reiterated them in his preliminary submis-
sions with further justifications. He admitted that may of them are strident H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and pungent. He modified some but, as has been pointed out, by compound-
ing further contempt. [n spite of the Solicitor General pointing out the
seriousness of the accusations and lhc need for the petitioner to have further
consultation with a counsel of his choice the cuntemnor remained unmoved.
On April 15, 1996, when the matter came up before with Bench for the first
B time after the service of no! ice of the cont cm pt and his Jiling the preliminary
submissions, the petitioner had orally stated that some legal counsels in the
Bar suggested to him that he should modify the offending portions noted in
the contempt notice. It would, thus, be seen that he appears lo have had con-
sultation with some advocates at the Bar and that he did not retract his steps.
He did not tender any unconditional apology, though this Court is not bound
C to accept such an unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from
the totality of the facts and circumstances, the gravest magnitude of the con-
tumacious conduct of the contemnur, we are left with no option but to con-
viclh and sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three
months with a fine of Rs. 2,000 payable in a period of 3 months and in case of
D default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month.

The contempt petition is accordingly disposed of.

N.P. SINGH, J l have the privilege of perusing the judgments of my
learned brothers K. Ramaswamy and S.P. Bharucha, J.I. I agree to the con-
E clusions arrived al by them and the sentence imposed against the contcmner.

BHARUCHA, J. I have had the advanhge of reading the judgment and
order proposed by my learned Brother, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ramas-
wamy. I agree with the order but, very respectfully, now set out my reasons
therefor.
F
The alleged contemnor, Dr. D. C. Saxena, had filed a writ petition
(C.W.P. No. 432/95) in this Court in the public interest seeking to recover
from the then Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasirnha Rao, expenditure incurred
for the private use of Indian Air Force aircraft and helicopters and conse-
quential reliefs. The alleged contemnor appeared in person when the writ
G petition was called out on 17th July, 1995, for admission before a Bench com-
prised or the Chief Justice of India, the Hon,ble Mr. Justice A.M. Ahmadi,
and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Sen. The Bench sent for the Solicitor
General for India and directed him to verify the contents of the writ petition,
which was ordered to be listed after two weeks. On 7th August, 1995, the writ
H petition was listed before a Bench comprised of the Chief Justice oflndia and
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLEC.T.I. [BHARUCHA,J.] 731

S.C. Sen and K.S. Paripoornan, .I.I. The Solicitor General placed the original A
record before the Court and, after perusing the same and hearing the alleged
contemnor, the writ petition \Vas sun1marily dismissed.

The alleged contemnor filed a second writ petition (No 017209/95)
making the Chief Justice oflndia the respondent thereto. He prnycd that it be
declared that the respondent was unfit to hold the office of Chief J us ti cc of B
India; that the respondent be stripped of his citizenship; that an F.I.R. be
registered against the respondent for committing forgery and fraud; for a
direction that tile respondent be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corrup-
tion Act, and for other reliefs. The alleged contemnor submitted that it was
improper for the respondent to have heard the earlier writ petition and that c
the respondent had attempted but failed to browbeat the alleged contemnor;
the dismissal of the earlier writ petition without recording the reasons there
for invited the comment, "So much for the vaunted adherence to the twin prin-
ciples of transparency and accountability''. The grounds for the relief which
the alleged contemnor sought, inter alia, \Vere :
D
- "for causing fabrication of court proceedings of 7th
August, 1995 .......... ".

- "for wilfully and advertently violating the fundamental
rights of not only the petitioner as an individual, but that E
of the people of India ........ "

- "for violation of the sacred oath of office by the respon-
dent11;

- "for deliberate and wilful failure to perform fundamental F
duties and stultifying their performance by the petitioner";
and

11
- for allo\ving his son \Vho is practising in the Supreme Court
to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably G
misusing official facilities and prestige of oftice of Chief
Justice of India."

The alleged contemnor added that during the pendency of the writ petition,
the respondent "may be advised to proceed on leave, so that he may not
directly or indirectly influence any of the judges hearing the matter". H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The second writ petition came up for admission before a Bench com-
prised of Verma, .I. ,rnd lwo·of us (N.P. Singh and S.P. Bharucha, .T.J). After
hearing the alleged contemnor, the second writ petition \vas dismissed, the
following order being passed:

"The several avermcnts in the \\Tit petition are scandalous and it
B is surprising that the petitioner, \vho is, said to he a Professor in
a University, has chosen lo draft and file such a writ petition. His
understanding of the meaning of Article 32 of the Constitution, is
·to say the least, preposterous. The allegations 1nadc an.; reckless
and disclose irresponsibility on the part of the petitioner. This writ
petition is wholly n1isconcciv~d and is an abuse of the process of
c 1he Court. The \Vrit petition has no 1nerit.

The \Vrit petition is, therefore, dismissed

Jn view of the attitude of the petitioner even at the hearing, when
D he persisted in this stand and, on our asking him, reiterated that
he stood by the scandalous avcrment made therein, we consider it
our duty to issue to the petitioner a notice to show cause \vhy
proceedings to punish him for contempt of this Court should not
he initiated against him. The Registry to take the necessary steps
for registering the n1atter as a contempt petition. The petitioner
E \vho is present in person is given notice of the contempt petition.
He is required lo file his reply within four weeks to show cause
why proceedings for contempt should not be initiated against him.
We request the learned Solicitor General to assist the Court in this
contempt matter.

F List the matter after notice of the dated fixed by Registry is given
to Dr. D.C. Saxena and the Solicitor General."

Pursuant to the order the alleged contemnor was served with a
contcmt notice, which drew his attentioi1 to the following contents of the
G second writ petition :

"(i) "Page 4 Para-9

"..... it was improper of Justice Ahmadi to hear it."

H (ii) Page 5 Para-10
0.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE C.T.f. [BHARUCHA, J.] 733

"That Justice Ahmadi's utmost reluctance to perform his fun- A
damental duties and constitutional obligations was apparent, when
dtcr failing to browbeat the petitioner, ............"

(iii) Page 6 Para-14

"....... To this Justice A hmadi respondent that he (th~ Solicitor B
General) was there to assist the Court, contrary to the evidence ol'
the Court proceedings."

(iv) Page 6 Para - ] 5.

"........... and without recording reasons for dismissing the petition. C
So mtich for the vaunted adh erence lo the twin principles of
tran:;parency and accountability."

(v) Page 6 Para-17

"........ The Course of action by Justice Ahmadi, in dealing with the D
grouse of the petitioner and dismissing his petition, is totally unjust,
unfair, arbitrary and unlawful. IL is in flagrant violation of th e
mandates of A rticle 14 of the Constitution, which "runs like a
golden thread" through it and is the fountliltion of justice and fair
play......"
E
(vi) Page 7 Para-l8(c)

"For causing fabrication of court proceedings of 7 August, 1995,
anc.J not mentioning the fact of appearance of the Solicitor General,
would justice Ahmadi not be liable to prosecuti on under the
relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, in consonance with F
the time-honoured maxim, "Be you ever so high, the law is above
you?"

(vii) page 7 Para-18(d)

"Can Justice Ahmadi be allowed to take shelter behind the cloak G
of judicial immunity, in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, particularly when unlike the President of Jfidia, who cannot
·be impleaded in civil or criminal proceedings" during his terms of
office" he enjoys no such constitutional protection ?

(viii) Page 7 Para 18(e) H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "For wilfully and adverlenlly violating the fundamental right of not
only the petitioner as an individual, bul that of the people of India,
\Vho are ultimately sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to lhe
Constitution, has nol Justice Anmadi forefcired any legal protec-
tion, even it if \Vere available to him ?11

B
(ix) Page 8 Para-l8(f)

11
What are the legal consequences of the violation of the sacred
oath of office by J us lice Ahmadi ?"

c (x) Page 8 Para-18(g)

"For deliberate and wilrul failure lo perform his fundamental duties
and stultifying their performance by lhc petitioner, should not
Justice Ahmadi be stripped of his citizenship, because duties alone
can confer the corresponding legal an<l constitutional rights ?' 1
D
(xi) Page 8 Para-18(h)

11
For allo\ving his son \Vho is practising in the Supren1c Court, to
stay \Vith him in his official residence, <in<l presumably misusing
official facilities and prestige of office of Chief Justice of India, is
E not .J usticc Ahmadi liahlc to be prosl'.cutc<l under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, in view of the ratio decidendi of Vecraswa1ni's
case ?"

(xii) Page 8 Para-18(i)

F "ls Justice Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the
legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner in C.W.P. No. 432 of
1995 and the present petition, but also the loss caused to the public
exchequer by non-payment oi dues with 18% interest by Shri
P.V.N. Rao'!"
G
(xiii) Page 8, 7th line from the bottom

"........ excluding any Judge who owes his elevation to the apex Court
to Justice Ahmadi, Further, during its pendency. Justice Ahmadi
may be advised to proceed on leavei so that he may not directly
H or indirectly influence any of the Judges hearing the matter."
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLECJ.l. [BHARUCHA, J.J 735

(xiv) Page 9 Prayer A

(d) Declare the respondent unfit to hold office as Chief J us ti cc of
India;

(b) Strip the respondent of his citizenship;
B
(c) Direct the registration of an F.l.R. against the respondent
under the Indian Penal Code for committing forgery and fraud;

(cl) Direct the respondent's prosecution under the Prevention of
Corruption Act. C

The alleged contemnor filed written submissions in reply to the con-
tempt notice. His first submission was that the Bench which had heard and
dismissed the second writ petition had been constituted by the respondent,
who had thereby become a judge in his own cause. The second writ petition
was, accordingly, not listed before a court competent to dispose it of, so that D
the order of its dismissal was non est, and it was still deemed to be pending.
The contempt notice \Vas, therefore, premature. The \vritten submission then
dealt with the portions of the second writ petition which had been indicated
in the contempt notice and reiterated the same, except only that it was sub-
mitted that the allegation about fabrication of the court proceedings of 7th E
August, 1995, was ''somewhat unhappily worded". It was submitted thereafter
that the Contempt of Courts Act was a legacy ofBritish imperialism and, while
appropriate to a 11 banana republic\ \Vas incompatible with a democratic,
people's polity; it was a law-less law because it fused the offices of the
prosecutor and the judge and "belongs with the infamous Spanish Inquisi-
tion". After his signature at the foot of the written submissions, the alleged F
contemnor added in hand, "N.B. If some passages seem strident or pungent,
the defendant is willing to suitably modify them."

The contempt notice came up before this Bench on 15th April, 1996.
The following order was then passed : G

"Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court the Contemnor Dr.
D .C. Saxena is present today in person. He has stated that he would
modify the offending portions noted show case notice in Item (ii),
(vi), (vii), (viii), (x), (xii), (xiii) and wishes to withdraw uncondi-
tionally item xiv, paras B and C. H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that even if the
Contemnor withdraws or files statement in the modified form what
the Court required to do is whether hi$ statements made in •he
writ petition originally filed constitute contempt of the Court or
not and his modification of the above statements would not be of
material reliance for consideration. Since the contemnor seeks
B time to submit the show cause in the modified language which he
wishes no place before the Court, at his request the matter is
adjourned to May 2, 1996 at 2.00 p.m. The Registry is directed to
supply complete set of papers to learned Solicitor General."

C Pursuant to this order the alleged contemnor submitted a statement of
modifications. In regard to Item (ii) of the Contempt notice, the amended ver-
sion read:

"The petitioner discerned reluctance on the part of the presiding
judge to allow the relief claimed, which was in public interest, and
D actuated by the desire to "preserve and protect public property,"
without any personal malice."

In respect of Item (iv), it read :

"That Justice Ahmadi ultimately dismissed the petition, observing
that the Government of India was capable of realising the dues
E
from
. Shri Rao (which
. it had not done in two years) and without
recording the reasons for dismissing the petition, for which lapse
it has often berated High Courts, in pursuance of the twin prin-
ciples of transparency and accountability."

F In respect of item (vi), it read :

nFor inaccurate recording of the court proceedings of 7 August,
1995 and not mc11tioning even the fact to appearance of the
Solicitor General for the respondents, what responsibility would
ensue on the presiding judge, who dictated them ?"
G
In respect of item (vii), it read :

"When under the Constitution, judges of superior courts do not,
unlike the President of India, enjoy total immunity during their
term of office, can the presiding judge be allowed to make such. a
H Claim for wrong-doing? 11
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [BHARUCHA, J.] 737

In respect of item (viii), it read : A

"For violating the fundamental rights of not only the petitioner, as
an individual, but also that of the people of India, who are ultimate-
ly sovereign, as staled in the preamble to the Constitution, has not
Justice Ahmadi sent wrong signals to the entire judiciary, of which
he is the head ?" B
In respect of item (x), it read :

"For failure lo perform his fundamental duties and impeding their
performance by the petitioner, should not Justice Ahmadi be
regarded as accountable to the people of India, because duties C
alone can confer the corresponding legal and constitutional
11
rights?

In respect of item (xii), it read :

"Who would be liable lo reimburse the legitimate costs incurred D
by the petitioner in C.W.P. No. 432 of 1995, and the present
petition, and the huge loss caused lo the public exchequer, because
of persistent default in paying them, by Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao,
\vith 18% intercst'! 11

In respect of item (xiv), it read : E

"(Prayers) (b) and ( c) may kindly be treated as deleted"

The malterwas heard on 2nd May, 1996. The Solicitor General, appear-
ing amicus cwiae, suggested al the outset that the alleged contemnor would
be advised to take legal counsel before proceeding further, but the suggestion F
was not heeded. The Solicitor General drew our attention to what has been
set out above. He submitted that the averments in the second \Vrit petition
were rna<le and remained on the record; they \Vere ex-facie contumacious.
The alleged contemnor had sought to delete some of these averments and
modify some others but had expressed no regret for what he had already said. G
Even the modified averments \Vere contumacious.

The alleged contemnor submitted that he had the greatest respect for
this Court and that he had expressed the same in his reply to the contempt
notice. The modifications that he had made indicated his own fallibility, for
he had used exaggerated language in the second writ petition. He submitted H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that the certified copy of the first order in the earlier writ petitions did not
indicate that the Solicitor General had appeared amicus curiae. He drew at-
tention lo the judgment of this Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M.
Bhattuchmjee & Ors., jl995] 5 S.C.C. 457, in support of his submission that the
respondent to the second writ petition was liable to be prosecuted under the
Prevention of Corruption Act for allowing his son "who is practising in the
B
Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably
misusing official facilities and prestige of office of Chief Justice of India". He
said that the factual basis for this submission were articles in a newspaper and
a news magazine. He submitted that he had acted for the public good and that
Sections 4 & 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act applied. He also contended that
c the Contempt of Courts Act was violative of the Constitution, but did nol en-
large upon the contention.

Article 129 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court
D including the power to commit for contempt of itself. Any act done or writing
published \Vhich is calculated In hring a courl or a judge into contempt or to
lo\vcr his authority or to interfere \Vi th the due course of justice is a conten1pt
of the Court: scurrilous abuse of a judge or court, or attacks on the personal
character of a judge arc acts of contempt. See R. v. Grey, (1900) 2 Q.B. 36.
"The object of the discipline enforced by the court in the case of contempt of
E court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or person of the judge, but to
prevent undue interference \Vith the adn1inistratio~ of justice". (He/Jnore v.
Smith, (1886) 35 Ch. D. 449). This is not to say that judicial decisions may not
be subjected to criticis1n; they can, but not the judges who took thcn1. Lord
Atkin inAmbardv.A.G. For Tiinidad and Tobago, (1936) AC. 322, said: "The
F path of criticism is a public way: the wrongheaded arc permitted to err there-
in: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper mo-
tives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely
exercising a right of criticisn1, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair
the ad1ninistration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not cloistered virtue
: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though out-
G spoken, comments of ordinary mcn. In Re. A.G. of Canada and Alexander al,
11

(1976) 65 D.L.R. (3rd) 608, a newspaper was held by tho Supreme Court of
the Northwest Territories of Canada to have committed contempt for alleging
a "cover-up 11 by court officials, participated in by a Supren1e Court judge, to
shield a public figure from adverse publicity. In New Zealand solicitor was
H held by the Court of Appeal to have committed contempt for alleging that in
D.C. SAXENA v. HON"BLECJ.l. [BIIARUCHA, J.] 739

a previous case judges had been guilty of forgery, fabrication of evidence an<l A
partiality; in the court's opinion, "there could not be a· clearer case of a serious
contempt of court... .. " (Re. Wiseman, (1969) NZLR 55). The contempt juris-
diction is not, thercfore, to be found in "banana republics 11 but in <le111ocracies
that abide by the rule of law. ll is intended to uphold the authority and dignity
oft he courts of law which, on behalf of the State, deliver justice and protect
B
the public confidence that is reposed in them.

The contempt notice lo the alleged contemnor pursuantto the order of
disn1issal of the second \Vrit petition \Vas issued in exercise of the pO\VCr of this
Court, recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution, to punish for contempt
of itself. The issue of the constitutionality of the Contempt of Courts Act is, C
therefore, not gern1anc.

The earlier writ petition came up for admission on 17th July, 1995. The
Solicitor General was, admittedly, called by the Bench and asked to look into
the papers. The n1inutes shO\V the Solicitor General as having appeared for ti D
the respondent'". Since the Solicitor General appeared on being called by the
Bench, plainly, he coukl not have appeared 11 for the respondent." His ap-
pearance \Vas wrongly recorded.

The matter was listed again on 7th August, 1995. On that occasion the
appearance of the Solicitor General was not shown in the minutes, but, admit- E
tedly, he appeared and showed to the Bench the original record. After seeing
it and hearing the alleged contc1nnor, the earlier \vrit petition was dismissed.
According to the second writ petition, the alleged contemnor asked the Bench
'\vho1n the Solicitor General \Vas representing, since he could not appear for
a priYate party, namely, the President of the Congress Party. To this Ju.stice f
Ahmadi responded that he was there to assist the Court contrary to the
evidence of the court proceedings." Upon this basis the alleged contemnor
slated in the second writ petition that the respondent (the Chief Justice of
India) had caused "fabrication of court proceedings on 7th August, 1995 and
\Vas, therefore, liable to prosecution under the relevant provisions of the Jn- G
dian Penal Code" The relevant prayer of the second writ petition was that an
F.l.R. be registered against the respondent under the Indian Penal Code for
committing 11 forgery and fraud''. The alleged conte1nnor who i,c.;, [understand,
a Professor of English, could have had no doubt of the grave import of the
v..:ords 'fabrication', 'forg~ry' and 'fraud'. He also knew lhem to be offences
under the Indian Penal Code". The modification made by the alleged contem- H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A nor of the averments in this regard is that the respondent was responsible for
"inaccurate recording of the proceedings of 7th August, 1995," and the prayer
is sought to be deleted. The modification does not speak of inadvertant inac-
curate recording or express any regret for the allegations of fabrication,
forgery and fraud. The allegation of inaccurate recording, as made, suggests
that such recording was deliberate and there is, therefore, no more than some
B
moderation of language. The allegations of fabrication, forgery fraud and in-
accurate recording of proceedings are made in respect of a judge in the per-
formance of his judicial function. They are of a most serious character. They
arc intended to lower the authority of and respect for the courl and the office
of the judge.
c
Upon the same facts there are aHegations in the second \Vrit petition
that the respondent violated his oath of oflice and failed to perform his fun-
damental duties. The summary dismissal of a writ petition by a judge is not a
violation of his oath or fundan1ental duties; at \Vorst, it might be a judicial
D error. The disn1issaJ of a \Vrit petition cannot \varrant the charge of violation
of his oath by a judge; and, in my book, no more serious charge against a judge
can be n1ade. What the alleged conte1nnor conveniently does not mention is
thal the three learned judges (includir.g the respondent) who constituted the
Bench found no merit in the earlier writ petition and dismissed it. The sugges-
tion of the alleged contemn or in paragraph 15 of the second writ petition that
E the earlier writ petition was dismissed by the respondent suggests that the
other lwo learned judges counted for nothing, and this is also contempt. The
allegations are scurrilous and scandalise the court.

It is lhe duly of the ChiefJ ustice of a court to assign judicial work to his
F brother judges. It was, therefore, the duty of the respondent to assign the
second writ petition to a bench to hear it. By doing so he did not, as is alleged,
become, a judge in his own cause. It is contempt to imply, as the alleged con-
temnor does, that the respondent would assign it lo a bench which would not
pass an order adverse to him. It is also contempt to imply that judges would
be so amenable. To plead that the Bench that heard the second writ petition
G could not have heard it and, therefore, could not have dismissed it and that it
is deemed to be still pending is to at!t! to the contempt. These allegations are
also aimed at bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

The second writ petition alleged that the respondent had allowed "his
H son, who is practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official
D.C. SAXENA v. HON'BLE CJ.I. [BIIARUCHA, J.] 741

residence and presumably mis-using official facilities and prestige of office of A
Chief Justice of India" and sought his prosecution under the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The allegation and prayer are not sought to be modified. The
allegation is not in any way connected with the dismissal of the earlier writ
petition. It is brought in for no reason other than to vilify the respondent in
connection with his official duties and position. How irresponsible the allega-
B
tion is is shown by the fact that, according lo the alleged contemnor himself,
it is based only upon what he read in articles in a newspaper and a news
magazine.

I have dealt with what seem to me to be the principal contempts; I agree
broadly with the discussion by brother Ramaswamy, J. of the other allegations C
made by the alleged conlemnor.

The alleged conlemnor has sought the protection of Sections 4 and 5 of
the Contempt of Courts Act. Whal he has written in the second writ petition
is neither a fair and accurate report of the proceedings of the earlier writ peti-
tion nor a fair criticistn thereof. The principle underlying these provisions is, D
therefore, not applicable.

For the reasons aforesaid, I find the alleged contemnor to be in con-
tempt.

Having regard to the gravity of the contumacious statements, the reek- E
lessness with which they arc made, the intemperateness of their language, the
mode of their publication in a writ petition in this court and the alleged
contemnor's influential position in society, I do not think that punishment only
in the nature of a fine would be adequate. A contemnor such as the present
must also undergo imprisonment. p

Accordingly, the alleged contemnor is convicted for contempt and sen-
tenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to
pay a fine in the sum of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees two thousand). In default of such
payment within three months, the alleged contemnor shall undergo further
simple imprisonment for period of one month. G
In view of the conviction and sentence, the Court Marshal of the Court
is directed to take the Contemnor into custody and confine him to Tihar Jail
for his undergoing the sentence as imposed in the case.

R.P. Petition disposed of.

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