Holding

Rule 1 is constitutionally valid and falls within the rule‑making authority of the State Bar Council under the Advocates Act.

Summary

Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani, a practising surgeon, applied for enrollment as an advocate but was rejected by the Maharashtra and Goa State Bar Council under Rule 1, which bars persons engaged in any other profession from being enrolled. He challenged the rule on grounds of excessive delegation of legislative power and violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) (and not saved by 19(6)) and 21 of the Constitution, and alleged that it went beyond the scope of Section 24A of the Advocates Act. The Supreme Court held that the rule was made within the authority conferred by Sections 24(1)(e) and 28(2)(d) of the Advocates Act, that sufficient legislative guidelines exist, and that the restriction is a reasonable one aimed at ensuring full‑time dedication of advocates to the legal profession. Consequently, the rule does not suffer from excessive delegation, is not unconstitutional, and is within the permissible scope of the Bar Council’s rule‑making power. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Rule 1 of the Maharashtra & Goa State Bar Council Rules suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and is void.
Whether Rule 1 violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and is not saved by Article 19(6).
Whether Rule 1 violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Whether Rule 1 imposes a disqualification beyond the scope of Section 24A of the Advocates Act.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 24(1)(e), s. 24A, s. 28(2)(d), s. 49(1)(ag), s. 49(1)(c)
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 19(1)(g), s. Article 19(6), s. Article 21

Subjects

Advocates ActBar CouncilEnrollmentDual professionExcessive delegationConstitutional lawArticle 19Article 14Article 21Professional ethicsRule‑making power

Judgment

DR. HANIRAJ L. CHULANI A
v.
BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA AND GOA

APRIL 8, 1996

[AM. AHMADI, CJ, S.B. MAIMUDAR AND SU.TATA V.
B
MANOHAR, JJ.]

Advocates Act, 1961: Section 24(1)(e) read with Section
28(2)(d)-Rule 1 of Maharashtra & Goa State Bar Council Rules, jimned
thereunde1; baning other professionals from enrolment-Whether suffers from c
vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and hence void and inoperative
at law-Held, no.

Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 14, 19(J)(g) & 21 : Rule 1 of
Maharashtra & Goa State Bar Council Rules baning other professionals from D
enro/Jnent-lVhether ultra vires-Held, no.

Section 24(1) (e) of the Advocates Act, 1961 requires persons seeking
admission as advocates on a State roll to fulfil such other conditions as
may be specified in the rules made by the State Bar Council. Section 24A
bars a person from being admitted as an advocate on a State roll if he is E
convicted of an offence involving m.oral turpitude etc. Section 28(2)(d)
empowers the State Bar Council to make rules as may provide for the
conditions subject to which a person may be admitted as an advocate on
its rolls. Section 49(1)(ag) requires the Bar Council of India to indicate
the class or category of persons who may be enrolled as advocates. f

Rule 1 of the Rules framed by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra
and Goa in exercise of its powers under section 28(2)(d) read with section
24(1)(e) ofthe Act bars a person, who is otherwise qualilied to be admitted
as an advocate but is either in full or part time service or employment or
is engaged in any trade, business or profession, from being admitted as an G
advocate.

The Enrolment Committee of the Respondent State Bar Council
refused enrolment to :he appellant, qualified to be admitted as an advo-
cate, on his insistance on simultaneously carrying on his medical practice H
51
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. i S.C.R.

A as a surgeon. A Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed
his writ petition. Hence this appeal.

It was contended for the appellant that rule 1 of the rules framed by
the respondent Bar Council suffers from the vice of excessive delegation
of legislative power and hence is void and inoperative at law, that the said
B rule is violative of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and is not saved by
sub-article (6) thereof, and that the aforesaid rule is violative of Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution, that in the guise of imposing conditions for t

enrolment the impugned rule has laid down a disqualification for enrol-
ment which is beyond the scope of section 24A of the Act.
c
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. Rule 1 of the Maharashtra and Goa State Bar Council
Rules does not suffer from vice of any excessive delegation of legislative
D power. [72-C]

1.2. Rule 1 has been framed by the respondent State Bar Council in
exercise of its rule-making power under section 24(1)(e) read with section
28(2)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961. Sufficient guidelines are laid down by
the legislature itself while conferring the said power on the State Bar
E Councils. These guidelines flow from the nature of the profession to which
admissions are to be given, the selection of the chosen representatives of
the profession to be the recipients of such power and the requirements of
the Statute and the rules framed by the Bar Couucil of India for the
guidance of all the State Bar Councils. [70-F-G]
F 1.3. Tite Act has been enacted with a view to regulate the right of
advocates to practise law. It provides standards for identification and
meaSurement of professional deviance. It sets up disciplinary authorities
to chastise and if necessary, punish members of the profession for n1iscon-
dnct. The punishment may include suspension from practice as well as
G removal of the name from the roll of advocates. Section 49(1) of the Act
confers power on the Bar Council of India to make rules, inter alia, for
discharging its functions under the Act. Section 49(1)(ag) r-ead with section
24 of the Act confers wide powers on the Bar Council of India to indicate
the class or category of persons who may be enrolled as advocates, which
H power wonld include the power to refuse enrolment in certain circumstan-
H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA 53

ces. The rules framed by the Bar Council of India, especially relating to A
standards of professional conduct clearly aim at securing high standards
of competence in legal services. The Act has also entrusted the Bar Council
of India the function to promote legal education and to lay down standards
of such education in consolation with the Universities in India and the
State Bar Councils. It is also entrusted with the function to recognize" B
Universities whose degrees in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as
an advocate. Further, the Act has entrusted the power and the duty to the
elected representatives of the profession constituting the State Bar Coun-
cils to lay down the high standards of professional etiquette as expected
of the advocates enrolled by it. [67-B; D-F; 68-B-C; 67-G-H]
c
1.4. The role of an advocate is essentially different from the role of'-
any other profession. He is an officer of justice and friend of the Court.
His status as an officer of justice does not mean the he is subordinate to
the Judge. If' only means that he is an integral part of the administration
of-justice. The legal profession inheres certain high traditions which its D
members are expected to upkeep and uphold. [69-E-F]

1.5. The rule-making power conferred on the State Bar Councils by
sections 24(1)(e) read with section 28(2)(d) of the Act is thus inherently
hedged in with the obligation to frame only such rules regarding enrolment
which would fructify the purpose of having efficient members of the Bar E
who can stand up to the expectation of the profession to which they are to
be given entry. Any rule which effectuates this purpose will be within the
permissible field. The rule makirig power therefore cannot be said to be an
unfettered power or that it exhibits effacement of legislative power. Con-
sequently, rule 1 cannot be said to be void and inoperative at law. [72-A-C] F

• A.N. Parasurama11 & 01~. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1989] 4 SCC 683;
Ajoy Kumar Banerjee & Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 3 SCC
127 and Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice & Ors. v. Bar Council of India
& Anr., [1995] 1 SCC 732 referred to.
G
2.1. It cannot be said that the respondent State Bar Council has, by
enacting rule 1 of its Rules, imposed any unreasonable restriction on the
fundamental right of the prospective practitioner who wants to enter the
legal profession. Rule 1 restricts entry of a professional who is otherwise
qualified for being enrolled as an advocate if he is already carrying on any H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A other profession. Legal profession rei111ires full time attention and would
not countenance an advocate practising two prdf'essions or n1ore at a time.
He has to be a full time advocate or not at all. [72-G-H; 73-A-B)

2.2. An advocate faces examination every day. It is not as if he has
not to put in hurd work on his study table in his chamber with or without
8" the presence of his clients. To put forward his best performance as an
advocate he is required to give whole-hearted a.,d full time attention to his
profession. Any llinching from such unstinted attention to his legal profes·
sion would certainly have an impact on his professional ability and exper·
tise. [74; B-C]
c 2.3. In the instant case, the appellant insists that he will be a
practising doctor as well as a practising advocate simultaneously. Such an
insistence on his part itself would create an awkward situation not only
for him but for his own clients as well as patients. As a practising advocate
if he gives attention to his clients in his chamber after court hours and if
D he is also required to attend an emergency operation at that very time, it
will be very difficult for him to choose whether to leave his clients and go
to attend his patient in the operation theatre or to refuse to his patient. If
he selects to cater to his patient his clients would clamour, his preparation
as advocate would suffer and naturally it would reflect on his performance
E in the court next day. If on the other hand he chooses to cater to the needs
of his clients and his legal work, his patients may suffer and may in given
contingency even stand to lose their lives without the aid of his expert hand
as a surgeon. [73-C, F-H)

2.4. Litigants are also members of gen~ral public and if in their
F interest any rule imposes a restriction on the entry to the legal profession,
it cannot be said to be unreasonable. Article 19(6) permits such a restric·
ti on, in the interest of general public, on tht: exercise of the right conferred
by Article 19(l)(g). Rule 1 cannot therefore be said to be violative of
appellant's right under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. [72; E·F)
G 3. Rule 1 of the respondent's Rules cannot be said to be arbitrary or
unreasonable. The rule carves out a well defined class of professionals
carrying on other professions and denies to members of this well defined
class entry to the legal profession so long as they insist on carrying on any
other profession simultaneously with the legal profession. The said clas·
H silication has a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved,
J•
ll.L. CHU LANI "· BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MA.TMUDAR• .T.J 55

namely, the efficiency of advocates and the better administration of justice A
for which the legal profession is a partner with the judiciary. Rule I cannot
therefore be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
[75; G-H, 76; A]
4. Rule 1 framed by the respondent does not deny the appellant his
right to livelihood. He is already a professional carrying on the profession B
of medical practitioner. He wants simultaneously to be permitted to prac-
tise law "ith a view to earn additional or more livelihood. The rule requires
that unless he gives up that other practice and joins wholeheartedly the
legal profession he cannot be permitted to enter the legal profession. That
rule cannot be said to be laying down a procedure not established by law.
The procedure has been found well sustained under Article 19(l)(g) read
c
mth Article 19(6). Consequently, rule 1 cannot be said to be violative of
Article 21 the Constitution. [76; B-E)

5. Once it is found that rule 1 falls mthin the parameters of rule
making power as entrusted by the legislature to the State Bar Councils as D
per section 24(1)(e) read mth section 28(2)(d), it cannot be said that the
State Bar Council has laid down a dfsqualification for enrolment which is
,.. beyond the scope of Section 24A of the Act. [76; G, F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6876 of
1996. E
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.92 of the Bombay High
Court in W.P. No. 2584 of 1992.

Ms. Indira jaising, V.K. Garg, Rajeev Kr. Singh and Sanjay Parikh,
for the Appellant. F
V.B. Joshi and Alok Singh for the Respondents .

• Maninder Singh for Medical Council of India.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
S.B. MAJ.MUDAR, J. Leave granted.

A short but an interesting question falls for determination in the
present case. It runs as under :

"Whether the respondent-State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
i

A was justified in refusing enrolment of the appellant as an advocate
under the Advocates Act, 1961 as he is a medical practitioner who
does not want to give up his medical practice but wants simul-
taneously to practice law. 11

In order to appreciate the contours of controversy centering round this
B question, a few relevant facts leading to these proceedings arc required to
be noted at the outset.

The appellant is a permanent resident of Bombay. He is a medical
practitioner (coloreetal surgeon) since 1970. During the continuance of his
said profession as a medical practitioner, the appellant joined LL.B. De-
c gree Course and obtained Degree of Bachelor of Law on 4th March 1991.
Thereafter the appellant applied to the respondent State Bar Council of
Maharashtra & Goa for being enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates
Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). This application was moved
by the appellant on 26th July 1991. The appellant insisted that even though
D he is a medical practitioner he is entitled to siml!ltaneously carry on the
profession as an advocate. The Enrolment Committee of the respondent-
State Bar Council rejected his request for being enrolled as an advocate
simultaneously with his carrying on his medical practice as a surgeon. The ..
appellant was ultimately informed on 16th November 1992 that his applica-
E tion for enrolment as an advocate was rejected. He was also supplied a
copy of the reasons for 'refusal for grant of a sanad'. The appellant feeling
aggrieved by the said refusal filed writ petition No. 2584 of 1992 in the High
Court of Bombay. After hearing the petitioner '\ Division Bench of the
High Court summarily dismissed his writ petition on 14th December 1992.
It is thereafter that the appellant moved the present proceedings by way
F of special leave petition. By an order dated 30th November 1993 delay in
filing the special leave petition was condoned and notice was ordered to
be issued to the Bar Council of Maharashtra & Gpa with a direction that
the notice \viii state that the matter will be disposed of at the notice stage
itself. Subsequently after hearing the learned senior counsel for the appel-
G !ant by an order dated 21st September 1995 notice was ordered to be issued
to Bar Council of India as well as the Medical Council of India.

Rival Co11te11tio11s

We have heard the learned senior advocate for the appellant as well
H as the learned advocates for the respondents in support of their respective
H.L.CHUlANI v. BARCOUNCILOFMAHARASHTRA[MAJMUDARJ.] 57

stands. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that Ruic (1) A
framed by the respondent-Bar Council of Maharashtra under Sections
28(2) and 24(1)(e) of the Act was ultra vires and illegal. In this connection
she submitted that in so far as the said rule prohibits a person who is
otherwise qualified to be admitted as an advocate from being enrolled as
an advocate if he is carrying on any other profession like medical profes- B
sion in the present case, it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of
legislative power and even otherwise the said rule is unconstitutional being
violative of Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution and is not saved by sub-ar-
ticle (6) thereof as it imposes unreasonable restriction on the right of a
citizen to pursue any profession of his choice and that the rule is equally
violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as it seeks to C
deprive right of livelihood to the appellant in a most unreasonable manner.
It was contended that there was nothing obnoxious or illegal in a practising
doctor insisting on being enrolled as an advocate and in carrying en
practice both as a medical practitioner as well as an advocate. As the
medical profession cannot be said to be in any way less dignified profession D
and once the appellant is found to be qualified to be enrolled as an
advocate as per the Act, the State Bar Council by framing such a rule could
not have restricted his entry to the profession of advocates especially when
the appellant was ready to give an undertaking that during court hours he
would not carry on his medical profession. Learned counsel appearing for
the State Bar Council on the other hand supported the decision of the High E
Court and contended that the rule framed by the State Bar Council does
not suffer from any vice nor was it violative of any of the fundamental rights
invoked by t.he appellant for getting it voided on that score. It may be stated
ihat the Medical Council of India to whom notice was issueed has referred
this matter to its Executive Committee which was of the view that Medical F
Council of India has no objection to llhy medical practitioner holding
registerable recognised medical certificate who is also qualified in law,
•. practising medicine and law simultaneously.

In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions the following points G
arise for our determination. ·

1. Whether impugned Rule (1) framed by the State Bar Council of
Maharashtra & Goa suffers from the vice of excessive delegation
of legislative power and hence is void and inoperative at law. H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORT~ \ 1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A 2. Whether the said rule is violative of Article 19)(l)(g) and is not
saved by sub-article (6) thereof.

3. Whether the aforesaid rule is violative 9f Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution.

B We shall deal with the aforesaid points in the same sequence in which
they are noted. However, before dealing with them it is necessary to have
a glance at the relevant statutory settings in the light of which the aforesaid
points will have to be considered.

C Statutmy Provisions
The genesis of the advocates Act, 1961 is found in the felt need for
providing a uniform and well-knit structure of lega) profession which plays
pivotal role in strengthening the system of administrative justice in the
country. It is axiomatic that a properly equipped and efficient Bar can play
D a pre-eminent role not only in the system of justice but also in the
constitutional government and rule of law. Realising the importance of an
independent/integrated Bar, the India Bar Committee appointed by
Government of India in 1951 recommended, inter alia, the constitution of
an All India Bar Council, State Bar Councils, a common roll of advocates
and complete autonomy to the Bar in matters relating to qualification,
E administration, discipline, etc. of members of the profession. In 1958 the
Law Commission in its fourteenth report on the Reform of Judicial Ad-
ministration endorsed the recommendation of the All India Bar Committee
and urged the Government to implement the sa;me. In 1959, the Legal
Practitioners1 Bill incorporating the recommendations was introduced in
F Parliament which was later adopted with the changed name of Indian
Advocates Act. 1961.

Though the demand for a unified All India Bar initially emerged
mainly, if not wholly, as a protest against the monopoly of the British
Barristers on the 'Original Side' of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts
G and the invidious distinctions between the barristers and non-barristers,
after independence it assumed the status of a professional claim and a
national necessity in the search for better delivery of justice to the people.
It was as,,umed that a unified Bar for the whole country with monopoly in
legal practice and autonomy in matters of professional management would
H advance the cause of justice in society. The role of the profession in the
H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMLIDAR, J.J 59

national movement for Independence and the professional standards dis- A
played by native lawyers including Vakils, Pleaders and Mukhtars, con-
vinced Parliament to adopt the Advocates Act giving a unique status and
structure to the Indian Bar.

The Advocates Act amended and codified the law relating to legal
practitioners and provided for the constitution of an All India Bar. The
B
complete control and jurisdiction regarding enrolment of advocates and
their discipline, which had all along been with the High Courts, stood
., transferred to the Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils. The Bar
Councils have become complete autonomous bodies with elected repre-
sentatives of advocates. C

Every State Bar Council has (a) one or more Disciplinary Commit-
tees; (b) an Executive Committee consisting of live members; (c) an
Enrolment Committee consisting of three members; and such other com-
mittees as may be found necessary. D

.. The Act came into force with effect from 19.5.1961. The dictionary
of the Act is to be found in Section 2, clause (a) whereof defines an
advocate as a person entered in any roll under the provisions of the Act
as such and the term 'roll' according to clause (k) means a roll of advocates
prepared and maintained under the Act. Section 3 provides that there shall E
be a Bar Council for each of the States to be known as the Bar Council of
that State. Section 4 next provides for a Bar Council for the territories to
which the Act extends to be known as the Bar Council of India. The
functions of the Slate Bar Council and the Bar Council of India have been
set out in Sections 6 and 7 respectively. The functions of the State Bar F
Council include admission of persons as advocates on its roll, preparation
and maintenance of such roll, safeguarding the rights, privileges and inter-
ests of advocates on its roll and to do all things necessary for discharging
the above functions. The functions of the Bar Council of India include the
laying down of standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advo- G
cates and for safeguarding their rights, privileges and interests. Chapter Ill
which deals with "Admission and Enrolment of Advocates" comprises of
Sections 16 to 28. Section 16 provides that there shall be two classes of
advocates, senior advocates and other advocates; Section 17 sets out how
every State Bar Col'Ileil shall prepare and maintain a roll of advocates;
Section 18 deals with the transfer of name of an advocate from one State H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A to another; Section 19 enjoins upon every State Bar Council to send a copy
of the roll of advocates to the Bar Council of India; Section 20 makes
special provision for enrolment of every advo<;ate who was entitled to
practise in the Supreme Court immediately before the appointed day and
whose name is not entered in the roll of the State Bar Council; Section 21
relates to the fixation of seniority; Section 22, provides for issuance of
B
certificate of enrolment and Section 23 confers the right of pre-audience
on the Attorney General of India, the Solicitor General of India, the
Additional Solicitor General of India, etc. Section 24 to the extent it is
relevant for our purpose provides as under : r

c "24. Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State 'roll. -

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made
thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an
advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the following conditions,
namely:
D
(a) he is a citizen of India;

(b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years; and .
(c) he has obtained a degree in law -
E

(d) ...

(e) he fulfils such other conditions as may be specified in the rules
F made by the State Bar Council under this Chapter;

(f) ...

Section 24-A provides that no person shall be admitted as an advocate on
'
G a State roll, for the period indicated in the proviso, if he is convicted of an
offence involving moral turpitude, or if he is convicted of an offence under
the provisions of Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 or if he is dismissed
or removed from employment or office under the State on any charge
involving moral turpitude; Section 25 indicates the authority to whom
applications for enor!ment may be made; Section 26 provides for the
H disposal of such applications; Section 26-A confers power on the State Bar
11.L. CHU LANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJ MUD AR, J.) 61

Council to remove any name from its roll; Section 27 provides that where A
a State Bar Council has refused application of any person for admission as
an advocate, no other State Bar Council shall entertain his/her application
for admission on roll except with the previous consent of the former and
of the Bar Council of India. Section 28 confers power on a State Bar
Council lo make rules to carry out the purposes of the Chapter which may
B
in particular, inter <;1lia, provide fort.he conditions subject to which a person
may be admitted as an advocate on its roll. Chapter IV deals with the
"Right to Practise". Section 29 says that subject to the provisions of the Act
and any rule made thereunder there shall, as from the appointed day, be
only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law, namely,
advocates. According to Section 30 every advocate whose name is entered c
in the Stale roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the
territories to which the Act extends in all courts including the Supreme
Court of India, before any Tribunal or person legally authorised lo take
evidence and before any authority or person before whom such advocate
is, by or under any law for the time being in force, entitled to practise.
D
Section 33 further provides that no person shall, on or after the appointed
day, be entitled to practise in any court or before any authority or person
>• unless he is enrolled as an advocate under the Act. Chapter V deals with
11
Conduct of Advocates11 • Under Section 35 where on receipt of a complaint
or otherwise a Stale Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate
on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer E
the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. Section 37 provides for
an appeal to the Bar Council of India against an order made by the
disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council. Section 36 provides that
where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise, the Bar Council of India has
reason to believe that any advocate whose name is not entered on any State F
roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the
case to the disciplinary committee. Any person aggrieved by an order made
..- by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under Section 36
or 37 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Section
38 of the Act. The powers of the disciplinary committee have been
enumerated in Section 42. Chapter VI deals with 'Miscellaneous' matters. G

Having noted the relevant provisions of the Act it will be apposite to
consider the scheme underlying the Act. This Court has an occasion to
consider this very scheme in the case of Indian Council of Legal Aid &
Advice & Ors v. Bar Council of India & Anr., [1995] 1 SCC 732. A three H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A member Bench of this Court presided over by one of us A.M. Ahmadi, C.J.
had ·to consider whether Rule (9) framed by the Bar Council of India
barring enrolment to persons who had completed 45 years of age was
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India being discriminatory,
unreasonable and arbitrary. While considering the said question the fol-
lowing pertinent observations were made on ti\e scheme of the Act in para
B 6 of the Report :

"We have briefly noticed the relevant provision of the Act in the
earlier part of this judgment. We may now briefly indicate the
scheme. Before we do so it may not be out of place to mention
c that the profession of law is one of the oldest professions and was
practised in one form or the other in the hoary past. After the
advent of the British in India, certain rules in regard to the practise
of law were introduced. Before independence there were Mukhtars
and Vakils who were permitted to practise law in moffusil courts
D even though not all of them were Law graduates. However, slowly
and gradually they were allowed to .wither away and their place
was taken by pleaders who were, after securing a degree in Law,
permitted to practise at the district level. Those who were enrolled
as advocates could practise in any court subordinate to the High
Court including the High Court. The difference between a Pleader
E and an Advocate was merely on account of the fee charged for
enrolment. After independence, came the Act which was enacted
"to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners
and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an all-India
Bar". The Act creates an all-India Bar with only one class of legal
F practitioners, namely, advocates, who of course arc classified as
senior advocates and other advoca\es (Section 16). The general
superintendence of ethics and etiquette of the profession is the
responsibility of the Bar Councils created under the Act and they ...
have been charged with the duty to punish their members for
misconduct. The Act envisages the existence of a Bar Council for
G every State. The function of admission of persons as advocates is
entrusted to every State Bar Council which is required to prepare
and maintain a roll for that purpose. While disciplinary jurisdiction
is conferred on the State Bar Councils to punish its members for
misconduct, it is at the same time charged with the duty to
H safeguard their rights, privileges and interests. They must perform
H.L. CHULA I "· BAR COU CIL OF MAHARASHTRA (MA.TMUDAR J.] 63

all the functions conferred on them by or under the Act and do A
everything that is necessary to discharge the functions set out in
Section 6. So far as the Bar Council of India is concerned, its
functions arc of a more general nature, e.g., to lay c.lo\vn standards
of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, to safeguard
their rights, privileges and interests, to supervise and control the
B
working of the State Bar Council, to promote legal education, to
recognise universities, to organise legal aid to the poor and to
perform all other functions conferred by or under the Act and do
everything that may be necessary to discharge the functions
enumerated in Section 7. Besides the above it too is required to
exercise discipline and control over the members of the profession. c
Thus the functions are divided between the State Bar CounCils and
the Bar Council of India, although for obvious reasons overlaps
are unavoidable. The rule-making power has been conferred on
the State Bar Councils under Sections 15 and 28 and on the Bar
Council of India under Section 49 of the Act." D
While considering the relevant roles of the State Bar Councils and the Bar
Council of India as envisaged by the Act following pertinent observations
were made in paragraph 11 of the Report :

11
lt seems Parliament while enacting the Act created agencies at E
the State level as well as at the Central level in the form of State
Bar Councils and Bar Council of India and invested them with
rule-making powers on diverse matters touching the legal profes-
sion, presumably because it must have realised that matters per-
taining to the profession are best left to informed bodies F
comprising of members of the said profession. However, while
doing so it provided for basic substantive matters, e.g., eligibility
for entry into the .profession (Section 24), disqualification for
enrolment (Section 24-A), authority entitled to grant admission
(Sections 25 and 26), the authority which can remove any name G
from the roll (Section 26-A), etc., and placed them within the
domain of a State Bar Council. Thus it is the State Bar Council
which alone must decide the question of enrolment of an applicant
on its roll. Under Section 24 a person who is citizen of India and
p-Ossesses a degree in Law becomes qualified to be admitted as an
advocate if he has completed twenty-one years of age, subject of H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A course to the other provisions of the Act. No doubt he must fulfil
the other conditions specified in the ru 1es made by the State Bar
1

Council [Section 24(l)(e)]. Every person whose name is entered
in the list of advocates has a right to practise in all courts including
the Supreme Court, before any tribunal or other authority. It is,
therefore, within the exclusive domain of the State Bar Councils
B lo admit persons as advocates on thei,r rolls or to remove their
names from the rolls. 11

In the light of the aforesaid statutory settings i\, therefore, becomes clear
that it is for the concerned State Bar Councils by promulgating appropriate
C rules to regulate the entry of persons seeking to join legal profession. The
respondent-Stale Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa in exercise of its
powers under Section 28(2)(d) read with Section 24(1)(e) of the Act has
framed rules in this connection. Rule (1) with which we are concerned
reads as under :

D ''1. A person \Vho is otherwise qualified to be admitted as an
Advocate but is either in full or part time service or employment
or is engaged in any trade, business or profession shall not be ••
admitted as an Advocate.

E Provided however that this rule ~hall not apply lo :

(i) Any person who is a Law Officer of the Central Gover-
ment or the Government of a State or of any Public corpora-
tion or body constituted by Statute.

F For the purpose of this clause a "Law officer" shall mean a person
who is so designated by the terms of his appointment and who by
the said terms is required to act and/or plead in Court on behalf
of his employer.

(ii) Any person who is an Articled Clerk of an Attorney;
G
(iii) Any person who is an assistant to an Advocate or to an
Attorney who is an Advocate;

(iv) Any person who is in part-time service as a Professor, Lecturer
H or Teacher-in-law;
H.L. CHULAN! "· BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 65

(v) Any person who by virtue of being a member of a Joint Hindu A
Family has an interest in a joint Hindu Family business, provided
he does not take part in the management thei;cof; and

(vi) Any person who is not personally engaged in any business
but is a sleeping partner in a firm doing business, provided
that in the opinion of the Bar Council of Maharashtra the B
nature of the business is not inconsistent with the dignity of
1 the profession.

(vii) Any person who is a Director or Chairman of the Board
of Directors of a company with or without any ordinary sitting
fees, provided none of his duties are of an executive character
c
and he is not a Managing Director or a Secretary of the said
company, or of any other company.

(viii) Any person who has inherited or succeeded by survivor-
ship to a family business but who is not personally participat- D
ing in the management thereof.

(ix) Any person who either prior to or after his application
for enrolment under Section 24 holds or continues to hold a
share with others in any business which descended to him by
survivorship or inheritance or by Will provided he does not E
personally participate in the management thereof.

(x) Any person who reviews Parliamentary Bills for a
remuneration, edits legal text-books at a salary, does !!press
vetting11 for ne\vs-papers, sets and examines question papers
or is a part-time teacher or lecturer or and assistant to an
F
editor of a La\v journal provided his hours or \Vork and/or
> engagement <lo not conflict with the hours of court, and
subject to the rules ag<iinst advertising and full-time employ-
ment to which an Advocate after enrolment is subject to, is
engaged in broadcasting, journalism, lecturing and teaching G
subjects, both legal and non-legal.

(xi) Any other person or class of persons as the Bar Council
may from time to time exempt. 11

The said rule which is impugned in the present proceedings clearly bars H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A an otherwise qualified person from being enrolle\! as an advocate if he is
engaged in any other profession. It is based qn the premise that an
advocate must devote his full time and attention to the legal profession. It
is because of the aforesaid provision in the rule that appellant's entry to
the legal profession is denied by the respondent-State Bar Council as the
appellant is already an active medical practitioner carrying on his profes-
B sion as a surgeon and which professional activity he insists on continuing
simultaneously with being an advocate though as submitted by his learned
senior counsel the appellant is willing to stagger the time during which he
would carry on either of the two professions in the course of the day. At
this stage also it is necessary to note that the Bar Council of India has also
c framed rules called Bar Council of India Rules in exercise of its powers
under Section 49 of the Act. In Chapter III of Pa~t VI of the Rules dealing
with the 'Conditions for right to practice', are found rules framed under
Section 49(l)(ah) of the Act which deals with 'the conditions subject to
which an advocate shall have the right to practise and the circumstances
D under which a person shall be deemed to practice as an advocate in a
court'. The relevant rule is Rule 2 which states that an Advocate shall not
enter into a partnership or any other arrangement for sharing remuneration
with any person or legal practitioner who is not an Advocate. Our attention
was also invited to Rule 47 found in Section VII of Chapter II part VI of
the said Rules dealing with 'Standards of Professional Conduct and
E Etiquette' which contains rules framed by the B~r Council of India under
Section 49(1)(c) of the Act read with the provi~o thereto. The aforesaid
rule-making power pertains to Standards of professional conduct and
etiquette to be observed by the advocates. This rule states that an advocate
shall not personally engage in any business; but he may be a sleeping
F partner in a firm doing business provided that, in the opinion of the
appropriate State Bar Council, the nature of the business is not inconsistent
with the dignity of the profession. This rule framed by the Bar Council of
India was sought to be contrasted with the impugned rule framed by the
respondent-State Bar Council. It was submitted that as per Rule 47 framed
by the Bar Council of India an advocate is not all,,wed to personally engage
G in any business. The said rule does not prohibit him from carrying on any
other profession while the impugned rule bars the entry of even a profes-
sional carrying on any other profession which is equally dignified from
being enrolled as an advocate.

H It is in the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions and the
~-

H.L CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 67

relevant rules that we now proceed to deal with the points for determina- A
tion that have fallen for our consideration.

Point No. 1

So far as the question of excessive delegation of legislative power is B
concerned we must note at the outset that the Act has been enacted, as
seen earlier, with a view to regulate the right of advocates to practise law.
The rules framed by the Bar Council of India especially relating to stand-
ards of professional conduct and etiquette clearly aim at securing high
standards of competence in legal services and seek to strengthen profes-
sional relationship among its members and promote the welfare of the c
society as a whole. Specific norms have been laid down in respect of
conduct of the persons practising the profession vis-a-vis the public, the
court, the client, the opposite lawyer and professional brethren. Lawyer's
duty to train juniors and impart free legal aid to poor is part of the ethics.
The code thus provides standards for identification and measurement of D

.. professional deviance. As noted earlier the Act besides highlighting the
essential functions of Bar Council of India provides for enforcement of the
same and sets up disciplinary authorities to chastise and, if necessary,
punish members of the profession for misconduct. The punishment may
include suspension from practice as well as removal of the name from the
roll of advocates. Section 49(1) confers power on the Bar Council of India E
to make rules, inter alia, for discharging its functions under the Act. Section
49(1)(ag) when read with section 24 of the Act confers wide powers on the
Bar Council of India to indicate the class or category of person who may
be enrolled as advocates which power would include the power to refuse
enrolment in certain circumstances. The obligation to maintain the dignity F
and purity of the profession and to punish erring members carries with it
the power to regulate into the profession with a view to ensuring that only
profession-oriented and service-oriented people join the Bar and those not
so oriented are kept· out. The role of an advocate is essentially different
from the role of any other profession. An advocate is said to belong to a
noble profession. That Act itself envisages the State Bar Councils who are G
the elected peers of advocates themselves to lay down the standards for
the professional conduct and etiquette. That would naturally bring in its
wake the power to regulate entry to such a noble profession. It is said that
law is a jealous mistress that calls for undivided loyalty and unflinching
attention from her devotees. Dry drudgery of desks' dead wood is the H
)
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A essential requirement of an advocate aspiring to Win laurels in the profes-
sion. The attack on the impugned rule on the ground of excessive delega-
tion of legislative power will have to be examined 1n the light of scheme of
the Act which has entrusted the power and th<; duty to elected repre-
sentatives of the profession constituting the State Bar Councils to lay down
the high standards of professional etiquette as expected of the advocates
B enrolled by it. It is pertinent to note that the Act has entrusted to the Bar
Council of India, amongst others, the functions to1 promote legal education
and to lay down standards of such education in consultation with the
Universities in India imparting such education and the State Bar Councils.
The Bar Council of India is entrusted with the function to reCO!,'llise
c Universities whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolments as
an advocate and for that purpose to visit and inspect Universities or cause
the State Bar Councils to visit and inspect Universities with such directions
as it may give in this behalf. It conducts seminars and organise talks on
legal topics by eminent jurists and publishes journals and papers of legal
D interest. In this connection, it also exercises general supervision and control
over the State Bar Councils. It is also entrusted with the task of promoting
and supporting law reform. All these provisions ,as laid down by Section 7
of the Act leave no room for doubt that even prior to the enrolment as
advocate the teaching of law and laying down pf the curriculum for law
courses are also the tasks entrusted to the Bar Council of India, which is
E the apex body of professionals monitoring these rµatters in conjunction with
the State Bar Councils. Thus even at pre-entry stage of an advocate to the
profession his equipments as a student of law and the requirement of basic
legal education with which he should be armed before he can aspire to be
enrolled as an advocate are also looked after by the Bar Council of India
F and the concerned State Bar Council which works under the general
supervision and control of the apex body, namely, the Bar Council of India.
Thus the Bar Council of India is cast with the duty to take all such steps
as it considers necessary to filter students at the entry stage to the law
course e.g. by providing an entrance test, as well as al the entry point to
the profession, e.g. by providing an examination 'Of a training course before
G enrolment as an advocate. The Act also deals with the topic of regulation
of professional conduct of advocates from the entry point itself.

The concerned State Bar Councils have to monitor the role of
advocates so long as they continue to practise law after initial entry. As the
H enrolment by the State Bar Council entitles an advocate after entry to the
H.L. CHULM1 v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 69

profession; to practise the noble profession of law and who becomes, by A
such enrolment, an officer of the court, the said entrant can be validly
subjected by the concerned Bar Council to the strict requirements of the
profession for enabling such an aspirant to effectively cater to the needs of
the legal profession. The power and the duty entrusted to the State Bar
Councils to monitor such entry, in the light of the nature of the profession
B
to which such entry is given would themselves supply the necessary
yardstick and guidelines for the exercise of such power by the elected body
of advocates constituting the concerned Bar Councils. The scheme of the
Act thus lay down a complete code for regulating the l,egal education and
professional equipments of an aspirant seeking entry to legal profession
from the grassroot level where he is student of law till he equips himself c
with essential legal knowledge and seeks enrolment and even thereafter till
he practices law and completes his professional career as advocate. Thus,
from the pre-entry point to legal profession till the exit point from the legal
profession, the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Council monitor the
career of the legal practioner. It is the entire scheme of the Act when D
considered in the light of the nature of the legal profession to which such
entry is given which has to be kept in view while considering the submission
• of learned senior counsel for the appellant that the power given to the State
Bar Counci1' to regulate such entries by framing. rules is a piece of
excessive delegation of legislative power. It cannot be gainsaid that law is
universally deseribed as an honourable profession. An advocate is an E
officer of justice and friend of the court. A conduct, therefore, which is
unworthy of him as an officer of justice cannot be justified by stating that
he did it as the agent of his client. His status as an officer of justice does
not mean that he is subordinate to the judge. It only means that he is an
integral part for the admini,tration of justice. Legal profession is monop- F
olistic in character and this monopoly itself inheres certain high traditions
which its members are expected to upkeep and uphold. Members of the
profession claimed that they are the leaders of thought and society. The
central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than
the administration of justice.
G
The aforesaid well established connotations and contours of the
requirements of legal profession themselves supply the necessary guideline
for the concerned Bar Councils to frame rules for regulating the entries of
persons to the profession. As noted earlier, the impugned rule has been
framed by the Maharashtra State Bar Council in the exercise of its rule- H
·r

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS, [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A making power under Section 24(1)(e) read with Section 28(2) of the Act
Section 24 deals with 'Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State
roll'. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that subject to the provisions of this
Act, and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be
admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the conditions laid
down in the Section. Amongst other conditions are found conditions which

~
B the entrant has to fulfil as may be specified by the Rules made by the State
Bar Council under Chapter III dealing with 'Admission and Enrolment of
Advocates'. Section 28 sub-section (2) similarly gives power to the State I
Bar Council to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and in •
particular such rules may provide the conditions subject to which a person
c may be admitted as an advocate. Such rule-making power flows from
Section 28(2)( d). Even though the aforesaid rule making power is couched
in wide terms the said power entrusted to the Stat~ Bar Council cannot be
said to be unfettered or unhedged. The said rule-making power draws its
sustinence from the guidelines laid down by the Act itself which entrusts
the duty to the concerned State Bar Council to rcgu.late entry to the legal
D profession which has the aforesaid well established connotations and at-
tributes. The concerned Bar Councils are entrusted by the legislature itself
with the aforesaid rule-making power enabling them to determine the
requirements of the concerned State Courts where the new entrants have
to practise and to lay down appropriate conditions regulating such entries.
As the power to make rules is entrusted by legislature to the chosen
E representatives of legal practitioners themselves who would be alive to the
requirements of the concerned State where the Council functions and the
needs of the litigating public residing in the State in the J;ght of the set-up
courts in the State concerned, it cannot be said that the the power is in any
way unfettered or uncanalised so as to amount' to total effagement of
legislative control. Sufficient guidelines are laid down by the legislature
F
itself while conferring such powers on the State Bar Councils. The
guidelines flow from the nature of the profession to which admissions are
to be given, the selection of the chosen representatives of the profession
lo be the recipients of such power and the requirements of the Statute itself
laying down the conditions for regulating the professional conduct of
G advocates as discernible from various provisions of the Act and the rules
framed by a Central Bar Council itself for the guidance of all the State Bar
Councils functioning in the country which are entrusted with the task of
regulating the conduct of legal-profei;sion throughout the country under
the supervision and guidance of Central Bar Council. The entire edifice of
the Act in this connection has to.be kept in view for finding out the relevant
H
j
H.L CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MATMUDAR. J.J 71

guidelines for enlightening the path of State Bar Councils entrusted with A
the task of framing rules regulating entries of new aspirants who are to be
permitted to enter the fold legal profession.

In this connection the learned senior counsel for the appellant invited
our attention to the decision of this Court in A .N. Parasuran1an & Ors. v.
B
State of Tamil Nadu, [1989] 4 SCC 683 and Ajay Kumar Baiwjee & 01:<.
Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & 01:<., [1984] 3 SCC 127 for buttressing her
submission that legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions to
its delegate. There cannot be any dispute about the settled legal position
on this aspect. However, as discussed by us earlier, in the set-up of the
entire scheme of the Act and the rules framed by the Central Bar Council C
and in the light of the nature of the power entrusted to the elected body
of advocates themeselves it cannot be said that while regulating the entry
to the legal profession the Bar Councils would find themselves without any
yardstick or guideline and would be trading an unchartered sea and
consequently the rules of enrolment framed by them would fall foul on the D
alter of permissible delegation of legislative power. It is, therefore, not
possible to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the
'. appellant that the impugned rule suffers from the vice of excessive delega-
tion of legislative power or by providing rule- making power to the State
Bar Councils for regulating entries of new advocates seeking to join the
profession the legislature has effaced itself. The power conferred on the E
State Bar Councils to lay down further conditions for controlling the entries
to the legal profession cannot be said to be an unguided power conferred
on them. The conditions which the State Bar Councils can lay down by
rules rimst be conditions which would be germane to the high and exacting
standards of advocacy expected of the new entrants to the fold of the F
profession. Implicit in the conferment of such rule-making power is the
guideline laid down by the legislature itself that the conditions must be
commensurate with the fructification of the very purpose of the Act of
putting the profession of advocates on a sound footing so that the con-
cerned new entrant can well justify his role as an officer of the Court
admitted to the fold of the noble ptofession to which he seeks his admis- G
sion. Any conditions laid down by the State Bar Councils for fructifying
· this laudable object of legislature would remain germane to the exercise of
this power and can well be said to be logically flowing from it. It cannot,
therefore, be said that any unguided and unchartered power is handed over
on a platter by the legislature to the concerned Bar Councils for regulating H
•
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS! [1996] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A entry to the legal profession. Rule-making power conferred on the State
Bar Councils is inherently hedged in with the obligation to frame only such
rules regarding enrolment which would fructify the purpose of having
efficient members of the Bar who can stand up to the expection of the
noble and learned profession to which they are to Ile given entry. Any rule
which effectuates this purpose will be within ti1e p~rmissihle field and will
B
not fall foul on the altar of Article 14 and Article 19(l)(g) read with Article
19(6). Any rule framed for enrolment which does not meet this yardstick
will be a taboo. Hence it cannot be said that the rule making power
entrusted to the State Bar Councils suffers from absence of any guidelines
or exhibits effacement of legislative power. The fits! point for determina-
c tion, therefore, is answered in the negative by holding that the impugned
rule docs not suffer from vice of any excessive delegation of legislative
power. That takes us to the consideration of Point No. 2.

Point No. 2

D
It is no doubt true that under Article 19; sub-Article (l)(g) all
citizens have a right to practise any profession, or to carry on the occupa-
tion, trade or business and any profession may include even plurality of
professions. However, this is not an absolute right. It is subject to sub-Ar-
ticle (6) of Article 19 which lays down that nothing in sub-clause (g) of the
E said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the
interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the right conferred by the said-clause. It cannot lle gainsaid that litigants
are also members of general public and if in their interest any rule imposes
F a restriction on the entry to the legal profession ~nd if such restriction is
found to be reasonable Article 19(1)(g) would not get stultified. It is true
that the appellant as a citi?.cn of India having obtained the qualification
required for being enrolled as an advocate can legitimately aspire to be
enrolled as an advocate but his aforesaid right is fettered by the impugned
rule framed by the State Bar Council. We have to consider whether the
G said restriction imposed by the rule is in any way unreasonable. We have
to keep in view the fact that the impugned rule restricts entry of a person
who is otherwise qualified for being enrolled as an advocate if he is already
carrying on any other profession. Question is whether such a person
carrying on other profession can be validly told off the gates by the State
H Bar Council by resorting to the impugned rule. In our view looking to the

1
H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA (MAJMLJDAR. J.] 73

nature of the legal profession to which we have made detailed reference A
earlier the State Bar Council would be justified in framing such a rule
prohibiting the entry of a professional who insists on carrying on other
profession simultaneously with the legal profession. As we have seen earlier
legal profession requires full time attention and would not countenance an
advocate riding two horses or more at a time. He has to be full time B
advocate or not at all. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted
that even though the appellant is a practising surgeon he undertakes, if
given entry to the legal profession, not to practise medicine during the
court hours. This is neither here nor there. It is obvious that even though
medical profession also may be a dignified profession a person cannot
insist that he will be a practising doctor as well as a practising advocate c
simultaneously. Such an insistence on his part itself would create an
awkward situation not only for him but for his own clients as well as
patients. It is easy to visualise that a practicing surgeon like appellant may
be required to attend emergency operation even beyond court h•.;urs either
in the morning or in the evening. On the other hand the dictates of his legal D
profession may require him to study the cases for being argued the next
day in the court. Under these circumstances his attention would be divided.
He would naturally be in a dilemma as to whether to attend to his patient
on the operation table in the evening or to attend to his legal profession
and work for preparing cases for the next day and to take instructions from E
his clients for efficient conduct of the cases next day in the court. If he is
an original side advocate he may be required to spend his evenings and
even late nights for making witnesses ready for examination in the court
next day. Under these circumstances as a practising advocate if he gives
attention to his clients in his chamber after court hours and if he is also
required to attend an emergency operation at that very time, it would be
F
very difficult for him to choose whether to leave his clients and go to attend
his patient in the operation theatre or to refuse to attend to his patients.
If he selects the first alternative his clients would clamour, his preparation
as advocate would suffer and naturally it would reflect upon his perfor-
mance in the court next day. If on the other hand he chooses to cater to G
the needs of his clients and his legal work, his patients may suffer and may
in given contingency even stand to lose their lives without the aid of his
expert hand as a surgeon. Thus he would be torn between two conflicting
loyalties, loyalty to his clients on the one hand and loyalty to his patients
on the other. In a way he will instead of having the best of both the worlds, H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A have worst of both the worlds. Such a person aspiring to have simultaneous
enrolment both as a lawyer and as a medical practioner will thus be like
'trishanku' of yore who will neither be in heaven nor on earth. It is
axiomatic that an advocate has lo burn midnight pi! for preparing his cases
for being argued in the court next day. Advocate face examination every
B day when they appear in courts. It is not as ~f that after court hours
advocate has not to put in hard work on his stud~ table in his chamber with
or without the presence of his clients who may be .available for consultation.
To put forward his best performance as an advocate he is required to give
whole-hearted and full time attention to his profession. Any flinching from •
such unstinted attention lo his legal profession would certainly have an
c impact on his professional ability and expertise. If he is permitted to
simultaneously practise as a doctor then the requirement of his full time
attention to the legal profession is bound to be adversely affected. Conse-
quently however equally dignified may be the profession of a doctor he
cannot simultaneously be permitted to practise law which is a full time
D occupation. It is for ensuring the full time attention of legal practitioners
towards their profession and with a view to bringing out their best so that
they can fulfil their role as an officer of the court and can give their best
in the administration of justice, that the impugned rule has been enacted
by the State legislature. It, therefore, cannot be said that it is in any way '
E arbitrary or that it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the new entrant
to the profession who is told not to practise simultaneously any other
profession and if he does so to deny to him entry to the legal profession.
It is true as submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the
rule of Central Bar Council does not countenance an advocate simul-
taneously carrying on any business and it does not expressly frawn upon
F
any simultaneous profession. But these are general rules of professional
conduct. So far as regulating enrolment to the profession is concerned it
is the task entrusted solely to the State Bar Councils by the Legislature as
seen earlier while considering the schen1c of the Act. While carrying on
that task if the entry to the profession is restricted by the State Bar council
G by enacting the impugned rule for not allowing any other professional to
enter the Bar when he does not want to give up the other profession bnt
wants to carry on the same simultaneously with legal practice, it cannot be
said that the Bar Council has by enacting such a rule imposed any un-
reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the prospective prac-
H titioner who wants to enter the legal profession.
H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 75

Learned senior advocate for the appellant vehemently contended A
that such a rule is not found to have been framed by other State Bar
Councils. In our view that would not make any difference. We are called
upon to decide the question whether the impugned rule framed by the
respondent-State Bar Council stands the test of Article 19(1)(g) or not.
While deciding that question whether other State Bar Councils permit by
B
their rules entry of other professional to the legal profession, would be an
aspect which would not be strictly relevant. In our view the impugned rule
does not impose any unreasonable restriction on the right of the profes-
sional carrying on any other avocation and insisting on continuing to carry
on such profession, while it prohibits entry of such a person to the legal
profession. If the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant C
is countenanced and any person professing any other profession is permitted
to join the legal profession having obtained the Degree of law and having
fulfilled the other requirements of Section 24, then even chartered account-
ants, engineers and architects would also legitimately say that during court
hours they will practise law and they will simultaneously carry on their other D
profession beyond court hours. If such simultaneous practices of profes-
sionals who want to carry on more than one profession at a time are
permitted, the unflinching devotion expected by the legal profession from
its members is bound to be adversely affected. If the peers being chosen
representatives of the legal profession constituting the State Bar Council, in
their wisdom, had thought it fit not to permit such entries of dual prac- E
titioners to the legal profession it cannot be said that they have done
anything unreasonable or have framed an arbitrary or unreasonable rule.

Point No. 3
F
So far as the challenge to the impugned rule on the touchstone of
Article 14 is concerned it cannot be said that the rule is unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious from any angle. On the same ground on which the
rule is found not to have fallen foul on the anvil of Article 19(1)(g) as the
impugned rule has to be treated as imposing a reasonable restriction on G
the said fundamental right is also, therefore, has to be held not to be
arbitrary or unreasonable from any viewpoint. The rule carves out a well
defined class of professionals carrying on other professions and denies to
members of this well defined class entry to the legal profession so long as
they insist on carrying on any other profession simultaneously with the legal
profession. The said classification has a reasonable nexus to the object H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. •
A sought to be achieved, namely, the efficiency of advocates belonging to the
legal profession and the better administration of justice for which the legal
profession is a partner with the judiciary. The challenge mounted on the
rule in the light of Article 14, therefore, has to fail.

That leaves out the challenge to the rule in the light of Article 21. It
B is difficult to appreciate this challenge. It is no doubt true that right to live
includes right to livelihood. However the appellant is not denied his right
to livelihood. He is already a professional carrying on the profession of a
medical practitioner. He wants to have a second string to his bow. He wants •
simultaneously to be permitted to practise law with a view to earn addi-
c tional or more livelihood. So far as his aforesaid demand is concerned the
impugned rule requires that unless he gives up that other practice and joins
wholeheartedly the legal profession he cannot be permitted to enter the
legal profession. That rule cannot be said to be laying down a procedure
not established by law. On the contrary that procedure has been found to
D be well sustained under Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6). Once that
conclusion is reached the absolute requirement of Artcle 21 would be out
of the way. Appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his right to
livelihood by pursuing two professions, contrary to any established proce-
dure of law. Consequently the impugned rule cannot be faulted on the
touchstone of Article 21. The third point for determination also, therefore,
E is decided against the appellant.

Before parting we may mention one submission highlighted by
learned senior counsel for the appellant. She submitted that under rule-
making power of the State Bar Council conditions of enrolment can be
F imposed. But in the guise of imposing such conditions, the impugned rule
has travelled further and has laid down a disqualification for enrolment
which is beyond the scope of Section 24-A. It is true as submitted by
learned senior counsel for the appellant that in a way the enactment of this
rule imposes a disqualification for enrolment, However once it is found
that the rule falls within the parameters of rule•making power as entrusted
G by the legislature to the State Bar Councils as per Section 24(1)(e) read
with Section 28(2)(d) it cannot be said that such disqualification could not
be legitimately imposed by the State Bar Council. She next submitted that
the Medical Council of India has no objection to the appellant's simul-
taneously practising law along with his practising as a surgeon. She also
H submitted that in foreign countries in some of the States such simultaneous
H.L. CH ULAN! v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJ MUD AR. J.] 77

practice is permitted. In our view all this is besides the point. Whether the A
Medical Council of India has no objection to their members' practising law
or whe.thcr in foreign countries under certain circu1nstances other profes-
sionals are permitted to simultaneously practise law would not be strictly
relevant in deciding the short question with which we are concerned,
namely, whether ihe State Bar Council had undertaken an impermissible
B
exercise in enacting the impugned ru1e restricting entries of other profes-
sionals to the legal profession while they are not prepared to give up their
other professions and on the contrary insist on simultaneously practising
more than one professions. While deciding this question the wider question
whether there can be a better rule than one framed by the State Bar
Council would be besides the point and cannot be of any assistance. Such c
a contention, therefore, cannot be of any avail to the learned senior councel
for the appellant.

The aforesaid were the only contentions canvassed on behalf of the
appellant and as they fail the appeal also fails and will stand dismissed. In
the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. D

P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

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