Holding

The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservation) Act, 2000 is ultra vires the Constitution as it exceeds State legislative competence and violates Article 14 by impermissibly sub‑classifying the homogeneous class of Scheduled Castes.

Summary

The Andhra Pradesh government, after a commission report, enacted the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservation) Act, 2000, which divided the 59 castes listed under Article 341 into four groups and allocated separate reservation percentages to each. The petitioners challenged the Act on the grounds that it violated Article 341(2), exceeded the State's legislative competence, and created an impermissible sub‑classification of Scheduled Castes in breach of Article 14. The Supreme Court examined the pith and substance of the Act, held that the Constitution treats all castes in the Presidential List as a single homogeneous class and that any further division amounts to "tinkering" with the List. It found that the State could not rely on entries 41 of List II or 25 of List III to justify the legislation, as the true object was re‑distribution of an already granted reservation quota. Consequently, the Court declared the Act ultra vires the Constitution for both lack of competence and violation of the equality clause. The appeals were allowed and the Act was struck down.

Issues considered

Whether the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservation) Act, 2000 violates Article 341(2) of the Constitution.
Whether the Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature.
Whether the Act creates a sub‑classification or micro‑classification of Scheduled Castes that contravenes Article 14.

Legislation cited

Subjects

ReservationScheduled CastesArticle 341Legislative competenceSub‑classificationEquality clausePith and substanceAffirmative action

Judgment

A E. V. CHINN AI AH
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 5, 2004

B [N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIA VA, B.P. SINGH, H.K. SEMA
AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservation) Act,
c 2000:
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 14, 341 and Schedule VII List II
Entry 41, List III, Entry 25:

Scheduled Castes enumerated in Presidential List-Sub-Classification
D of-For the purpose of admission to professional colleges and appointment in
services of the State-By State legislation-Constitutional validity of-Held:
The sub-classification is ultra vires the Constitution-It would amount to
tinkering with the Presidential List-It is violative of Scheme of Article 341
and Article 14, against doctrine of reasonableness and lacks legislative
competence-Jn pith and substance legislation not being a law governing the
E field of education or field of State Public Services, legislative competence
cannot be traced to Entry 41 of List 11 or Entry 25 of List III of VII Schedule.

Doctrines:

Doctrine of Pith and substance-Applicability of
F
Doctrine of reasonableness.

State of Andhra Pradesh appointed a Commission to identify the
groups amongst the Scheduled Castes, found in the List prepared under
Article 341 of the Constitution of India by the President, but had failed
G to secure the benefit of reservations provided for Scheduled Castes in the
State in respect of admission to professional Colleges and appointment to
services in the State. Accepting the Report of the Commission, the State
by an Ordinance divided the 59 castes enumerated in the Presidential List
into 4 groups based on inter se backwardness and apportioned 15% .quota

H 972
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 973
of reservation among the 4 groups. A

The Ordinance was challenged before High Court as violative of
Articles 15(4), 16(4), 162, 246, 341(1), 338 (7), 46, 335 and 213 of the
Constitution as also the Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950
notified by the President of India and· Scheduled Castes and Scheduled B
Tribes Amendment Act, 1976. During pendency of the Writ Petitions,
Ordinance having been replaced by the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes
(Rationalisation of Reservation) Act, 2000, the Act was also challenged.
High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions. Hence the present appeals.

The questions for consideration before this Court were: c
1. Whether the Act was violative of Article 341(2) of the Constitution
of India?

2. Whether the enactment is constitutionally invalid for lack of
legislative competence? D

3. Whether the enactment created sub-classification or micro
classification of scheduled Castes so as to violate Article 14 of the
Constitution?

Allowing the appeals, the Court E

HELD: Per Santosh Hegde (For himself, S. N. Variava and B. P. Singh,
JJ)

1.1. Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of F
Reservation) Act, 2000 apart from being beyond the legislative competence
of the State is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence is
liable to declared as ultra vires the Constitution. (998-A)

1.2. Article 341 of the Constitution indicates that there can be only

- one List of Scheduled Caste in regard to a State and that List should
include all specified castes, races or tribes or part or groups notified in
that Presidential List. Any inclusion or exclusion from the said list can
G

only be done by the Parliament under Article 341(2) of the Constitution
of India. Except for a limited power of making an exclusion or inclusion
in the list by an Act of Parliament there is no provision either to suo-divide, H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
,.
A sub-classify or sub-group these castes which are found in the Presidential
List of Scheduled Castes. Therefore, it is clear that the Constitution
intended all the castes including the sub-castes, races and tribes mentioned
in the list to be members of one group for the purpose of the Constitution
and this group could not be sub-divided for any purpose.
(986-G-H; 987-A]
B
1.3. It is also clear from the Articles in part XVI of the Constitution
that the power of the State to deal with the Scheduled Castes list is totally
absent except to bear in mind the required maintenance of efficiency of
administration in making of appointments which is found in Article 335.
c (989-C)

1.4. Any executive action or legisla~ive enactment which interferes,
disturbs, re-arranges, re-groups or re-classifies the various castes found
in the Presidential List will be violative of scheme of the Constitution and
will be violative of Article 341 of the Constitution. (989-D]
D 1.5. It cannot be said that by merely including them in a List by the
President these castes do not become a homogeneous group, therefore, to
fulfil the constitutional obligation of providing an opportunity to these
castes more so to the weaker amongst them, it is permissible to make a
classification within this class. (989-H; 990-AI
E
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., (19921 Supp. 3 SCC 217,
referred to.

1.6. From the scheme of the Constitution and Article 341, it is clear
that the castes once included in the Presidential List, form a class by
themselves. If they are one class under the Constitution, any division of
F
these classes of persons based.on any consideration would amount to
tinkering. with the Presidential List. [991-A]

State of Kera/a and Anr. v. N.M Thomas and Ors., [1976] 2 SCC 310,
relied on.
G 2.1. One of the proven methods of examining the legislative
competence of an enactment is by the application of doctrine of pith and
substance. This doctrine is applied when the legislative competence of a
Legislature with regard to a partkular enactment is challenged with
reference to the Entries in various lists and if there is a challenge to the ~

H legislative competence the courts will try. to ascertain the pith and
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 975
substance of such enactment on a scrutiny of the Act in question. In this A
process, it is necessary for the courts to go into and examine the true
character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect to find out
whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to the field of
legislation allotted to the State under the constitutional scheme.
(991-H; 992-A-B] B
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, referred to.

2.2. State cannot claim legislative power to make a law dividing the
Scheduled Castes List of the State by tracing its legislative competence to
Entry 41 of List II or Entry 25 of List III. In pith and substance the C
enactment is not a law governing the field of education or the field of State
Public Services. The purpose or the true intendment of this Act is only to
,.., first divide the castes in the Presidential List of the Scheduled Castes into
4 groups and then divide 15% of reservation allotted to the Scheduled
Castes as a class amongst these 4 groups. Thus it is clear that the Act
does not for the first time provide for reservation to the Scheduled Castes D
but only intends to re-distribute the reservation already made by sub-
classifying the Scheduled Castes which is otherwise held to be a class by
itself. Part of its constitutional obligation, has already been fulfilled by
the State. Having done so, it is not open to the State to sub-classify a class

- already recognised by the Constitution and allot a portion of the already
reserved quota amongst the State created sub-class within the List of
Scheduled Castes. The primary object of the impugned enactment is to
create groups of sub-castes in the List of Scheduled Castes applicable to
E

the State and, apportionment of the reservation is only secondary and
consequential. (992-G-H; 993-A-C)
F
3.1. If a class within a class of members of the Scheduled Castes is
created, the same would amount to tinkering with the List. Such sub-
classification would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitutinn oflndia.
It may be true that the caste system has got stuck up in the Society but
with a view to do away with the evil effect thereof, a legislation which does G
not answer the constitutional scheme cannot be upheld. It also cannot be
said that for the purpose of identifying backwardness, a further inquiry
can be made by appointing a Commission as to who amongst the members
of the Scheduled Castes is more backward. If benefits of reservation are
not percolating to them equitably, measures should be taken to see that
they are given such adequate or additional training so as to enable them H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
..
A to compete with the others but the same would not mean that in the process ~
;'

of rationalizing the reservation to the Scheduled Castes the constitutional
mandate of Articles 14, 15 and 16 could be violated. [997-B-D)

3.2. Legal constitutional policy adumbrated in a statute must answer
the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Classification wuether
B permissible or not must be judged on the touchstone of the object sought
to be achieved. If the object of reservation is to take affirmative action in
favour of a class which is socially, educationally and economically
backward, the State's jurisdiction while exercising its executive or
legislative function is to decide as to what extent reservation should be
c made for them either in Public Service or for obtaining admission in
educational institutions. Such a class cannot be sub-divided so as to give
more preference to a miniscule proportion of the Scheduled Castes in
preference to other members of the same class. (996-E-F( .;..

3.3. The principles laid down in Indra Sahani 's case for sub-
D classification of other backward classes can not be applied as a precedent
law for sub-classification or sub-grouping Scheduled Castes in the
Presidential List because that very judgment itself has specifically held
that sub-division of other backward classes i~ not applicable to Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Constitution itself has kept the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes List out of interference by the State
E ._---
Governments. (996-C-D)

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217,
distinguished.

F 3.4. The emphasis on efficient administration placed by Article 335
of the Constitution must also ,be considered when the claims of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes to employment in the services of the Union
are to be considered. (996-GI

3.5. The very fact that the members of the Scheduled Castes are most
G backward amongst the backward classes and the impugned legislation
having already proceeded on the basis that they are not adequately
represented both in terms of Article 15 (4) and Article 16 (4) of the
Constitution of India, a further classification by way of micro classification
-
is not permissible. Such classification of the members of different classes
H of people based on their respective castes would also be violative of the ~
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 977
doctrine of reasonableness. Article 341 provides that exclusion even of a A
part or a group of castes from the Presidential List can be done only by
the Parliament. The logical corollary thereof would be that the State
Legislatures are forbidden from doing that. A uniform yardstick must be
adopted for giving benefits to the members of the Scheduled Castes for
the purpose of Constitution. The impugned legislation being contrary to B
the above constitutional scheme cannot, therefore, be sustained.
(997-F-H)

The State ofJammu and Kashmir v. Tri/oki Nath Khosa and Ors., [19741
1 sec 19, followed.

Food Corporation of India and Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma and Ors., C
[199817SCC676 and Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway)
represented by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Asson. Etc. v.
Union of India and Ors., AIR (1981) SC 298, referred to.

Her Majesty the Queen v. Burah (1878) Vol. VII 889, referred to. D
Per Sinha, J (Concurring):

1.1. There is no good reason for classifying the backward classes of
citizens in four categories and furthermore the Scheduled Caste Order and
Scheduled Tribe Order provide for conglomeration of castes and t.ribes E
-.. and, thus, must be treated as a distinct and separate class for the purpose
of the Constitution. There is no such express provision in the Constitution
in respect of"other backward class". (1004-H; 1005-Al

1.2. The approach to construe the impugned legislation should not
be based on subjective intention of legislation but should be given an F
objective meaning. The meaning is declared by the courts after the
application of relevant interpretative principles so as to co.nstrue the
constitutionality of a statute having regard to the object, the Constitution
makers sought to achieve. The Constitution makers inserted Article 341
and 342 with a view to provide benefits to the members of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes as being belonging to a socially, educationally G
and economically backward class of citizens. Any legislation which would
bring them out of the purview thereof or tinker with the order issued by
the President of India would be unconstitutional. f 1006-F, G, HI

Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) 2 H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A AC 532, referred to. /

1.3. As the Constitution itself treats the members of the Scheduled
Castes as a single integrated class of most backward citi:.!ens, it is not
competent for the Legislature of a State to sub-divide them into separate
compartments with a separate percentage o reservation for each resulting
B in discouraging merit as well as the endeavor of individual members to
excel - vide Fundamental Duty under Art.51A(j). The operation of
reservation policy ought to be in a manner consistent with the objective
of promoting fraternity among all citizens, assuring the dignity of the
individual and unity of the Nation. [1007-B-C)
c 1.4. Except, to the extent the Constitution itself makes a sub-
classification, there cannot be grouping of Scheduled Castes into different
categories for differential treatment. Only exclusion of castes, parts or
groups within the castes from the list of Scheduled Castes is contemplated
by law made by Parliament, but not sub-classification of Scheduled Castes
D and that too on the basis of caste. (1007-F)

Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1992) Supp. 3
sec 217, distinguished.
Narayana Rao and Anr. v. State of A.P. and Anr., AIR (1987) AP 57,
E referred to.

1.5. Scheduled Caste, however, is not a caste in terms of its definition
-
as contained in Article· 366(24) of the Constitution of India. They are
brought within the purview of the said category by reason of their abysmal
F backwardness. Scheduled Caste consists of not only the people who belong
to some backward caste but also race or tribe or part of or groups within
castes, races or tribes. They are not merely backward but the backward
most. A person does not cease to be a Scheduled Caste, automatically even
on his conversion to another religion. [1009-G-H)

G Punit Rai v. Di~esh Chaudhary, (2003) 8 SCC 204 and State of Kera/a
and Anr. v. Chandramohanan, AIR (2004) SC 1672, referred to.

2.1. The States though have been granted legislative competence as
regard education (Entry 25, List III) and public employment (Entry 41,
H List II) .but the same is circumscribed by Article 341 of the Constitution ,.
..f
E. V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 979
of India. Whenever such a situation arises in respect of Scheduled Caste, A
it will be the Parlia~ent alone to take the necessary legislative steps in
terms of Clause (2) of Article 341 of the Constitution. The States
concededly do not have the legislative competence therefor. (1008-G]

2.2. State Legislature cannot take away the benefit of reservation in
jobs or in educational institutions on the premise that one or the other B
group amongst the members of the Scheduled Castes has advanced and,
thus, is not entitled to the entire benefit of reservation. The impugned
legislation, thus, must be held to be unconstitutional. [1017-A]

NTR University of Health Sciences, Vijayawada v. G. Babu Rajendra
Prasad and Anr., (2003) 5 SCC 350, distinguished. C
3.1. Constitution permits application of equality clause by grant of
additional protection to the disadvantaged class so as to bring them on
equal platform with other advantaged Class of people. Such a class which
requires the benefit of additional protection, thus, cannot be discriminated
inter se i.e. between one member of the said class and another only on a D
certain presupposition of some advancement by one group over other
although both satisfy the test of abysmal backwardness as also inadequate
representation in public service. In a case of this nature, the burden of
reasonable classification and its nexus with the object of the legislation is
on the State. The. State has not been able to discharge the said burden. E
(1005-E-FJ

3.2. The legislation may not be amenable to challenge on the ground
of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution whence it is intended to giving
effect to principles specified under Article 15 or when the differentiation
is not unreasonable or arbitrary but when a classificatior. is made which F
is per se violative of the constitutional provisions, the same cannot be
upheld. While reasonable classification is permissible what would be
impermissible is micro classification or mini classification. [1011-D-El

3;3. The backward class which may be given the benefit of Clause
(4) of Article 15 or Article 16 must consist of a homogeneous group - the G
element of homogeneity being the backwardness characterizing the class.
The link 'or the thread holding the class together, thus, should be the
backwardness of its members which can never be supplemented by castes.
Classification, thus, may be justified on the ground that it is a backward
class but the same may not stand the scr~tiny or the equality clause when H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A classification is made on the basis of a backward caste or a section of a
backward caste. (1013-H; 1014-A-BI

Triloki Nath and Anr. v. State ofJammu and Kashmir and Ors., (19691
1 SCR 103, followed.

B · State of Uttar Pradesh v. Punit Tandon and Ors., (19751 2 SCR 76;
Kumari K.S. Jayasree and Anr. v. The State of Kera/a and Anr., (1977) l SCR
194; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented by its
Assistant General Secretary on behalf ofthe Asson. Etc. v. Union ofIndia and
Ors., (1981) 2 SCR 185 and Kai/ash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan
C and Ors., (2002) 6 SCC 562, relied on.

3.4. Article 16(4) must be read with Article 335 of the Constitution
which emphasizes the fact that efficiency of administration cannot be
sacrificed which would lead to the conclusion that the same cannot be done
to favour less weaker sections, i.e. some castes out of the homogeneous
D class of Scheduled Castes. (1014-C)

3.5. The Court is required to interpret the provisions of the impugned
Act on the touchstone of Article 15(4) and Article 16 (4) of the Constitution
oflndia. Thus, in this view, the Act is unconstitutional. [1016-B)

E Food Corporation of India and Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma and Ors.,
(19981 7 SCC 676; K.R. Lakshman and Ors. v; Karnataka Electricity Board
and Ors., (2001) l SCC 442; Ku/deep Kumar Gupta and Ors. v. H.P. State
Electricity Board andOrs., (2001) l SCC 475 and Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab
University and Ors., [2003) 8 SCC 440, referred to.
F
Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji. v. Union of India and Ors., (1981 J l
sec 166, referred to.
Shaw v. Reno 509 US 630, 642 (1993); Jennifer Gratz and Patrick
Hamacher v. Lee Bollinger, decided on 23rd June 2003 by U.S. Supreme
G Court, referred to.

The Affirmative Action Debate, I 7 Philosophy and Public Policy 1
(Special Issue Winter Spring, 1997 - United States, referred to.

Per Sema, J. (Supplementing):
H
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 981
HELD: 1. )'he Presidential Notification under Article 341 of the A
Constitution as well as the benefits of reservation of appointments or posts
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
sel'Vices under the State, is afforded to a class of persons specified in
Presidential Notification under Article 341 of the Constitution. The
protection and reservation is afforded to a homogeneous group. Further B
classification and/or regrouping the homogeneous groups by State
Legislature would'tinker with the Presidential Notification issued under
Articl~ 341, which is constitutionally impermissible. [1018-H; 1019-B]

2. By the impugned legislation, the State has sought to re-group the
homogeneous group specified in Presidential Notification for the purposes C
of reservation and appointments. It would tantamount to discrimination
in reverse and would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution.
It is a trite law that justice must be equitable. Just to one group at the
costs of injustice to other group is another way of perpetuating injustice.
[1019-B]
D
3. The definition of "Scheduled Castes" as per Article 366(24) of the
Constitution would go to show that by virtue of the Notification of
President the Scheduled Castes come into being as one class of persons
regardless of members drawn from castes races or tribes etc. They attain
a homogeneous group by virtue of the Presidential Notification. [IOtS:BI E
Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [19921 Supp. 3
sec 217, distinguished.
State of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind and Ors., [200111 SCC 4, referred to.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6758 of
2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.11.2000 of the Andhra Pradsh
High Court in W.P. No. 9421 of 2000.
G
WITH

C.A. Nos. 3442/2001, 6934, 7344 of 2000.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 3442/2. H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A P.P. Rao, C.S. Vaidyanathan, L. Nageshwar Rao, S. Ramachandra Rao-
'
A. Subba rao, Chandra Mohan Anisetty, Mahalakshmi Pavani, H.K. Naik, T.
Raja, Shiv Pujan Singh, Manoj Saxena, S.K. Mitra, Mohanprasad Meharia,
G. Ramakrishna Prasad, Wasay Khan, Jayant Mathuraj, Ms. Elisha, Guntur
Prabhakar, P.S. Narasimha, Nagesh, Ananga Bhattacharya, V.G. Pragasam,
D. Ramakrishna Reddy and Mrs. D. Bharthi Reddy with them for the appearing
B parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered· by

SANTOSH HEGDE, J. The validity of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled
Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act, 2000 (A,P. Act 20 of2000) was
c challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad which
came to be dismissed~by a five Judge Bench on a majority of 4 : I, the court
having certified the case as being fit for appeal to the Supreme Court, these
appeals are now before us after the same was referred to a Constitution
Bench by an order of this Court dated 25th June, 2001. The facts necessary
D for the disposal of these appeals without reference to previous litigations are
as follows :-

The State of Andhra Pradesh (the State) appointed a Commission headed
by Justice Ramachandra Raju (Retd.) to identify the groups amongst th<::
Scheduled Castes found in the List prepared under Article 341 of the
E Constitution of India by the President, who had failed to secure the benefit
of the reservations provided for Scheduled Castes in the 'State in admission
to professional colleges and appointment to services in the State.

The Report submitted by the Commission led to certain litigations and
a reference being made by the State to the National Scheduled Castes
F Commission. We will not dilate on these facts since the same are not necessary
for the disposal of these appeals. Accepting the Report of Justice Ramachandra
Raju Commission (Supra), the State by an Ordinance divided the 57 castes
enumerated in the Presidential List into 4 groups _based on inter-se
backwardness and fixed separate quota in reservation for each of these groups.
G Thus, the castes in the Presidential List came to be grouped as A, B, C, and
D. The 15% reservation for the backward class in the State in the educational
institutions and in the services of the State under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of
the Constitution of India for the Scheduled Castes were apportioned amongst
the 4 groups in the following manner :-
.....
H
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SAN10SH HEGDE, J.] 983

/ I. Group A - 1% A
2. Group B - 7%

3. Group C - 6%

4. Group D - 1% B
The said Ordinance came to be challenged before the High Court by
way of various writ petitions as being violative of Articles 15(4 ), 16(4), 162,
246, 341(1), 338(7), 46, 335 and 213 of the Constitution of India as also the
Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 notified by the President of
India and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Amendment Act, 1976. C
During the pendency of the said writ petitions, the State Government replaced
the Ordinance with the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of
Reservation) Act, 2000 (A.P. Act 20 of 2000) ('the Act') on 2.5.2000. The
.impugned Act was on the same lines as the Ordinance No. 9 of 1999.
Consequently the Act was also challenged and as stated above the petition D
being dismissed these appeals are now before us.

Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel led the argument on behalf of the
appellants, his arguments were supported and supplemented by Mr. P.S.
Mishra, learned senior counsel, Mr. Shiv Pujan Singh and Mr. T. Raja, the
other learned counsel appearing for the appellants. E
The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants are that the State
Legislature has no competence to make any law in regard to bifurution of
the Presidential List of Scheduled Castes prepared under Article 341 ( l) of
the Constitution, therefore the impugned legislation being one solely meant
for sub-dividing or sub-grouping the castes enumerated in the Presidential F
List, the same suffers from lack of legislative competence.

It is further submitted that once the castes are put in the Presidential
List, the said castes become one homogeneous class for all purposes under
the Constitution, therefore, there could be no further division of the said
castes in the Scheduled List by any Act of the State Legislature. His further G
submission was that in the guise of exercising its legislative competence
under Entry 41 in List II or Entry 25 of List III the State Legislature cannot
exercise its legislative power so as to make a law tinkering with the Presidential
List because the said Entries do not permit any law being made in regard to
Scheduled Castes. In the guise of providing opportunity to some of the castes H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A in the list of Scheduled Castes the State can not invoke Entry 41 of List II
and Entry 25 of List III to divide the Scheduled Castes. According to the
learned counsel the impugned. enactment does not really deal with the field
of Legislation contemplated under the said Entries but in reality is targeted
to sub-divide the Scheduled Castes. Alternatively, he submitted the
classification or sub-grouping made by the State Legislature amounting to
B sub-classification or micro classification of the Scheduled Caste is violative
of Article 14 of the Constirutiori of India.

One of the arguments addressed on behalf of the appellant is that allotting
a separate percentage of reservation from amongst the total reservation allotted
C to the Scheduled Castes to different groups amongst the Scheduled Castes
amounted to depriving one class of the benefits of such reservation at least
partly. It is also argued that the impugm:d legislation was bad because the
Report of the National Commission was not placed before the Legislature as
required under Article 338(9) of the Constitution of India.

D On behalf of the respondents Shri K.K. Venugopal, reamed senior
counsel appearing for the State who led the argument on behalf of the
respondents, contended Article 341 only empowers the President to specify
the castes in the Presidential List and the Parliament to include or exclude
from the specified· list any caste or tribe and beyond that no further legislative
or executive power is vested with the Union of India or the Parliament to
E decide to what extent the castes included in the Scheduled Castes List should
be given the benefit of reservation which according to the learned counsel
depended upon their degree of backwardness. His further argument is that the .
authority to decide to provide reservation or not, and if yes, then the quantum
of reservation to be provided is the exclusive privilege of the State. In that
F process the State will have to keep in mind. the extent of backwardness of a
group be it other backward class, Scheduled Caste or Bcheduled Tribe.
Therefore, having found a class of persons within the Scheduled Castes as
having been deprived of such benefits the State has the exclusive legislative
power to make such grouping for reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16 (4)
of the Constitution subject, of course, to Articles 245-246 of the Constitution.
G Since in the instant case there is no allegation that there has been any violation
of Articles 245-246,. the argument of lack of legislative competence advanced
on behalf of the appellant should fail. He further submitted that there is an
obligation on the State under Article 16(4) to identify the group of backward
class ofcitizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented
H in the service under the State and make reservation in their favour for such
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 985

appointments and under Article 15(4) of the Constitution there is an obligation A
on the State to make special provisions for the advancement of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes and what the State has sought to do under the
impugned Act was only to make such a provisions to fulfil the constitutional
obligation after due enquiry, hence, the allegation of violation of Article 14
cannot be sustained. He strongly relied on the findings of fact recorded in B
Justice Raju Commission's report which according to him establish.es that
some particular groups within the Scheduled Castes have cornered all the
benefits at the cost of others in the said List, therefore, with a view to see that
J
the benefit of reservation percolates to the weaker of the weakest it had
become necessary to enact the impugned law. The learned counsel submitted
that by re-grouping the castes in the Scheduled Caste List there is no C
reclassification or micro classification as contended by the appellants.

Some other counsels also argued that neither Article 34 f nor any other
provisions of the Constitution prohibits the State from performing its
obligations under Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 16 (4A) of the Constitution and
categorising the various castes found in t_he Presidential List of Scheduled D
Castes based on inter-se backwardness within them. Reference was also made
to the Constituent Assembly Debates and Reports to point out that it was the
intention of the Constitution makers to confer the power of classification of
Scheduled Castes on· the President or the Parliament as the case may be under
Article 341 of the Constitution. A further classification of the caste within E
the List if became necessary, the same could be done by the State only under
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.

It was also argued that further classification of the backward class is
permissible in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Indra Sawhney
v. Union of India and Ors., [1992] Supp.3 SCC 217, the principles laid down p
therein was applicable even to the Scheduled Castes. It was also argued that
the enactment was in the form of affirmative action to fulfil the constitutional
objects and the courts should not interfere in such efforts of the Legislature.
Reliance was also placed on the recommendations made by the Natic.-nal
Commission for Scheduled Castes and in its Report a further argument
addressed on behalf of the respondents is that even if some castes in the G
Presidential List of Scheduled Castes get excluded from the benefit of
reservation made by the State that by itself would not take the caste out of
the List of Scheduled Castes because they will continue to be entitled to other
benefits that are being provided by the State to the Scheduled Castes.
H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A In regard to manner in which the constitutional provisions should be
interpreted, reliance was placed in the case of Her Majesty the Queen v.
Burah, (1878) Vol. III 889 contending that while interpreting the constitutional
provisions the court should try to give purposive interpretation rather than
restricted meaning.

B From the pleadings on record and arguments addressed before us three
questions arise for our consideration:-

(I) Whether the impugned Act is violative of Article 341 (2) of the
Constitution of India?

c (2) Whether the impugned enactment is constitutionally invalid for
, lack of legislation competence? .

(3) Whether the impugned enactment creates sub-classification or
micro classification of Scheduled Castes so as to violate Article
14 of the Constitution of India?
D We will first consider the effect of Article 341 of the Constitution and
examine whether the State could, in the guise of providing reservation for the
weaker of the weakest, tinker with the Presidential List by sub-dividing the
castes mentioned in the Presidential List into different groups. Article 341
which is found in Part XVI of the Constitution refers to special provisions
E relating to certain classes which includes the Scheduled Castes. This Article
provides that the President may with respect to any State or Union Territory
after consultation with the Governor thereof by Public Notification, specify
the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes
which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled
Castes in relation to that State or Union Territory. This indicates that there
F can be only one List of Scheduled Caste in regard to a State and that List
should include all specified castes, races or tribes or part or groups notified
in that Presidential List. Any inclusion or exclusion from the said list can
only be done by the Parliament under Article 341 (i) of the Constitution of
India. In the entire Constitution wherever reference has been made to
G "Scheduled Castes" it refers only to the list prepared by the President under
Article 341 and there is no reference to any sub-classification or division in
the said list except, may be, for the limited purpose of Article 330, which
refers to reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes in the House of People,
which is not applicable to the facts of this case. It is also clear from the above
Article 341 that except for a limited power of making an exclusion or inclusion
H in the list by an Act of Pariiament there is no provision either to sub-divicfe,
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 987

• sub-classify or sub-group these castes which are found in the Presidential A.,
List of Scheduled Castes. Therefore, it is clear that the Constitution intended
all the castes including the sub-castes, races and tribes mentioned in the list
to be members of one grottp for the purpose of the Constitution and this
group could not be sub-divided for any purpose. A reference to the Constituent
Assembly in this regard may be useful at this stage.
B
In the Draft Constitution, there was no Article similar to Article 341 as
is found in the present Constitution. Noticing the need for creating a list of
Scheduled Castes a Draft Article 300A was introduced in the Draft Constitution
and while introducing the same Dr. Ambedkar stated the object of introducing
the said Article in the following words·: - c
"The object of these two articles, as I stated, was to eliminate the
necessity of burdening the Constitution with _long lists of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is now proposed that the President,
in consultation with the Governor or Ruler of a State should have the
power to issue a general notification in the Gazette specifying all the D
Castes and tribes or groups thereof deemed to be Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of the privileges which have
been defined for them in the Constitution. The only limitation that
has been imposed is this: that once a notification has been issued by
the President, which, undoubtedly , he will be issuing in consultation
with and on the ice of the Govem~ent of each State, thereafter, if E
any elimination was to be made from the List so notified or any
addition was to be made, that must be made by Parliament and not
by the President. The object is to eliminate any kind of political
factors having a play in the matter of the disturbance in the pchedule
so published by the President." (emphasis supplied) (CAD, Vol. 9,
F
Pg. 1637).

A discussion that ensued in regard to the framing of this Article indicates
that there was an attempt on the part of some of the Members of the Constituent
Assembly to empower the States also to interfere with the list prepared by the
President under the said Article. As a matter of fact an amendment to this G
effect was also moved by Shri Kuladhar Chaliha, who while moving the said
amendment stated thus:-

"That in amendment No. 201 of List V (Eighth Week) in clause (2)

- of the proposed new article 3008 after the words 'Parliament may'
the words 'and subject to its decision the State Legislature' be H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A inserted". (CAD, Vol.9, Pg.1638)

Speaking on the amendment Shri Chaliha stated :-

"I have always been fighting that the Governor should have power to
safeguard the rights of the Tribes. I am glad in some measure this has
B been conceded. Yet I find certain amount of suspicion in that the
State Legislature is neglected. The Drafting Committee has not allowed
the State Legislature to have a voice. In order to fill up that lacuna
I have said that Parliament may and subject to its decision the State
Legislature.

c Somehow or other I feel you have neglected it. In these you have
covered a good deal which you had objected to in the past. The
Governor has been given power I am glad to say. The only thing is
provincial assemblies have no voice in this. Whatever Parliament
says they are bound by it; but if there is anything which consistently
with the orders of the Parliament they can do anything, they should
D be allowed to have the power. That is why I have moved this. However,
I am thankful this time that the Drafting Committee has assimilated
good ideas and only provincial assemblies have been neglected.
However, the Governor is there-that is an improvement-Parliament
is there and the President is there. Therefore, I thank the Drafting
E Committee for this". (CAD, Vol.9,Pg.1638)

Opposing this amendment Shri V.I. Muniswami Pillai said among other
things as follows :-

"Sir, I am grateful to the Drafting Committee and also to the Chainnan
of that Committee for making the second portion of it very clear, that
F
in future, after the declaration by the President as to who will be the
Scheduled Castes, and when there is need for including any other
class or to exclude anybody or any community from the list of
Scheduled Castes that must be by the word of Parliament. I feel
grateful to him for bringing in this clause, because I know, as a
G matter of/act, when Harijans behave independently or asserting their
right on some matters, the Ministers in some Provinces not only take
note and action against those members, but they bring the community
to which that particular individual belongs; and thereby not only the

H
individual, but also the community that comes under that category of
Scheduled Castes are harassed. By this provision, I think the danger -
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE.OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 989

f is removed". (Emphasis supplied) (CAD, Vol.9, Pg. 1639) .• A
After the above discussion it is seen that this amendment came to be
defeated and the original draft Article was approved by the Constituent
Assembly which was renumbered as Article 34 l in the present Constitution.

This part of the Constituent Assembly Debate coupled with the fact that B
Article 341 makes it clear that the State Legislattire or its executive has no
power of "disturbing" (term used by Dr. Ambedkar) the Presidential List of
Scheduled Castes for the State.

It is also clear from the Articles in part XVI of the Constitution that the
power of the State to deal with the Scheduled Castes list is totally absent c
except to bear in mind the required maintenance of efficiency of administration
in making of appointments which is found in Article 335.

Therefore any executive action or legislative enactment which interferes,
disturbs, re-arranges, re-groups or re-classifies the various castes found in the
Presidential List will be violative of scheme of the Constitution and will be D
violative of Article 34 l of the Constitution.

We will now consider whether the Scheduled Castes List prepared by
the President under Article 34 l (I) forms one class of homogeneous group
or does it still continue to be a list consisting of different castes, sub-castes,
E
tribes etc. We have earlier noticed the fact that the Constitution has provided
for only one list of Scheduled Castes to be prepared by the President with a
limited power of inclusion and exclusion by the Parliament. The Constitution
intended that all the castes included in the said Schedule would be "deemed
to be" one class of persons but arguments have been addressed to the contrary
stating that in spite of the Presidential List these castes continue to hold their F
birth mark and remain to be separate and individual caste though put in one
List by the President. It is the contention of the respondents that by merely
including them in a List by the President these castes do not become a
homogeneous group, therefore, to fulfil the constitutional obligation of
providing an opportunity to these castes more so to the weaker amongst
them, it is permissible to make a classification within this class, as was made
G
... permissible in regard to other backward classes (OBC) by this Court in Indra
Sawhney's case (supra). We cannot accept this argument for more than one
reason.

It cannot be denied that all the castes included in the Presidential List H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A for a State are deemed to be Scheduled Castes, which means they form a
class by themselves.

In State of Kera/a and Anr. v. NM Thomas and Ors., [1976] 2 SCC
310, para 82 at 348, Mathew, J. discussing the status of the caste found in
the Presidential List observed:
B
"This shows that it is by virtue of the notification of the President that
the Scheduled castes come into being. Though the members of the
scheduled castes are drawn from castes, races or tribes, they attain a
new Status by virtue of the Presidential notification".

c (Emphasis supplied).

Krishna Iyer, J. speaking in the same case with reference to the status
of castes included in the Presidential List had this to say :-

"We may clear the clog of Article 16(2) as it stems from a confusion
D about caste in the terminology of scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes. This latter expression has been defined in Articles 341 and
342. A bare reading brings out the quintessential concept that they
are no castes in the Hindu fold but an amalgam of castes, races,
groups, tribes, communities or parts thereoffound on investigation to
be the lowliest and in need of massive State aid and notified as such
E by the President". (para 135)

(Emphasis supplied)

According to Justice Krishna Iyer, though there are no castes, races,
groups, tribes, communities or parts thereof in Hinduism, the President on
F investigation having found some of the communities within amalgam as being
lowliest and in need of massive State aid included them in one class called
the Scheduled Castes. The sequitor thereof is that Scheduled Castes are one
class for the purposes of the Constitution.

G Justice Fazal Ali in the very same case referring to caste enumerated in
the list of Scheduled Caste stated thus in paragraph 169 :-

"Thus in view of these provisions the members of the scheduled
cast~s and the scheduled tribes have been given a special status in the
-
Constitution and they constitute a class by themselves".
H (Emphasis supplied.)
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 991

Thus from the scheme of the Constitution, Article 341 and above A
opinions of this Court in the case of N.M Thomas, (supra), it is clear that the
castes once included in the Presidential List, form a class by themselves. If
they are one class under the Constitution, any division of these classes of
persons based on any consideration would amount to tinkering with the
Presidential List.
B
The next question for our consideration is : whether the impugned
enactment is within the legislative competence of the State Legislature ?
According to the respondent-State, it is empowered to make reservations for
the backward classes which include the Scheduled Castes as contemplated
under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. Since the impugned C
enactment contemplates reservation in the field of education and in the field
of services under the State, the State Legislature derives its legislative
competence under Entry 41 of List II and Entry 25 of List Ill of the VII
Schedule which are the fields available to the State to make laws in regard
to education and services in the State. Therefore, it has the necessary legislative
competence to enact the impugned legislation which only provides for D
reservation to the Scheduled Castes who are the most backward of the
backward classes.

The appellants have argued that the impugned Act in reality is _not an
enactment providing for reservation for the Scheduled Castes in the educational
institutions and in the services of the State. They further contended that such E
reservation has already been provided when the State took a decision to
exercise its power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and made reservations for
the backward classes in the State. In that process, it had already allotted 15%
of the reserved quota in favour of the Scheduled Castes. Therefore, the State
had already exercised its constitutional power of making reservations under F
Articles 15(4) and 16(4). It is further contended that by the impugned.Act,
the State has only divided the Scheduled Castes in the Presidential List by re-
grouping them into four groups. For making such re-grouping of the Scheduled
Castes List, the State neither can rely upon Articles 15(4) and 16(4) nor on
Entry 41 of List II and Entry 25 of List III of the VII Schedule.
G
One of the proven methods of examining the legislative competence of
an enactment is by the application of doctrine of pith and substance. This
doctrine is applied when the legislativ~ competence of a Legislature with
regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the Entries
in various lists and if there is a challenge to the legislative competence the H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

._ A courts will try to ascertain the pith and substance of such enactment on a
scrutiny of the Act in question. (See: Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994]
3 SCC 569). In this process, it is necessary for the courts to go into and
examine the true character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect
to find out whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to the
B field of legislation allotted to the State under the constitutional scheme.

Bearing in mind the above principle of the doctrine of pith and substance,
if we exam.ine the impugned Act then we notice that the Preamble to the Act
says that it is an Act to provide for rationalisation of reservations to the
Scheduled Castes in the State of Andhra Pradesh to ensure their unified and
C uniform progress in the society and for matters connected therewith and
incidental thereto. The Preamble also shows that the same is being enacted
with a view to give effect to Article 38(2) found in Part IV of the Directive
Principles of the State Policy of the Constitution. If the objects stated in the
enactment were the sole criteria for judging the true nature of the enactment
then the impugned enactment satisfies the requirement on application of the
D doctrine of pith and substance to establish the State's legislative competence,
but that is not the sole criteria. As noted above, the Court will have to
examine not only the object of the Act as stated in the statute but also its
scope and effect to find out whether the enactment in question is genuinely
referable to the field of legislation allotted to the State.

E On a detailed perusal of Act it is seen that Section 3 is the only
substantive provision in the Act, rest of the provisions are only procedural.
Section 3 of the Act provides for the creation of 4 groups out of the castes
enumerated in the Presidential List of the State. After the re-grouping it
provides for the proportionate allotment of the reservation already made in
F favour of the Scheduled Castes amongst these 4 groups. Beyond that the Act
does not provide for anything else. Since the State had already allotted 15%
of the total quota of the reservation available for the backward classes to the
Scheduled Castes the question of allotting any. rese..Vation under this enactment
to the backward classes does not arise. Therefore, it is clear that the purpose
or the true intendment of this Act is only to first divide the castes in the
G Presidential List of the Scheduled Castes into 4 groups and then divide 15%
of reservation allotted to the Scheduled Castes as a class amongst these. 4
groups. Thus it is clear that the Act does not for the first time provide for
reservation to the Scheduled Castes but only intends to re-distribute the
reservation already made by sub-classifying the Scheduled Castes which is
H otherwise held to be a class by itself. It is a well settled principle in law that
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 993

reservation to a backward class is not a constitutional mandate. It is the A
prerogative of the State concerned if they so desire, with an object of providing
opportunity of advancement in the society to certain backward classes which
includes the Scheduled Castes to reserve certain seats in educational institutions
under Article 15(4) and in public services of the State under Article 16(4 ).
That part of its constitutional obligation, as stated above, has already been B
fulfilled by the State. Having done so, it is not open to the State to sub-
classify a class already recognised by the Constitution and allot a portion of
the already reserved quota amongst the State created sub-class within the List
of Scheduled Castes. From the discussion herein above, it is clear that the
primary object of the impugned enactment is to create groups of sub-castes
in the List of Scheduled Castes applicable to the State and, in our opinion, C
apportionment of the reservation is only secondary and consequential.
Whatever may be the object of this sub-classification and apportionment of
the reservation, we think the State cannot claim legislative power to make a
law dividing the Scheduled Castes List of the State by tracing its legislative
competence to Entry 41 of List II or Entry 25 of List III. Therefore, we are
of the opinion that in pith and substance the enactment is no! a law governing D
the field of education or the field of State Public Services.

The last question that comes up for our consideration is : whether the
impugned enactment creates sub-classification or micro classification of the
Scheduled Castes so as to violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
E
We have earlier noticed that by the impugned Act the State has regrouped
the 59 castes found in the Presidential List into 4 separate groups and allotted
them different percentage out of the total reservation made for Scheduled
Castes as a class. We have also noticed from Article 341 and the judgment
of this Court in NM Thomas, (supra) all the castes in the Schedule acquire p
a special status of a class and all the castes in the schedule are deemed to be
a class. Under the States reservation policy the backward class consists of
other backward class, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Therefore,
there is already a classification for the purpose of reservation. In that
background the question that arises is whether further classification amongst
the class of Scheduled Castes for the very same object of providing reservation G
is permissible and if so will it stand the test of Article 14.

In The State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors.,
[1974) l SCC 19 , this Court held :

"29. This argument, as presented, is attractive but it assumes in the H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Court a right of scrutiny somewhat wider than is generally recognised.
Article 16 of the Constitution which ensures to all citizen equality of
opportunity in matters relating to employment is but an instance or
incident of the guarantee of equality contained in Article 14. The
concept of equal opportunity undoubtedly permeates the whole
spectrum of an individual's employment from appointment through
B promotion and termination to the payment of gratuity and pension.
But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation arising from
the very nature of the constitutional guarantee. Equality is for equals.
That is to say that those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled
to an equal treatment.
c 31. Classification, however, is fraught with the danger that it may
produce artificial inequalities and therefore, the right to classify is
hedged in with salient restraints; or else, the guarantee of equality
will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws meant to "
govern well marked classes characterized by. different and distinct
D attainments. Classification, therefore, must be truly founded on
substantial differe'.lces which distinguish .persons grouped together
from those left out of the group and such differential attributes must
bear a just and rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.

51. But we hope that this judgment will not be construed as a charter
E for making minute and microcosmic classifications. Excellence is, or
ought to be, the goal of all good governments and excellence and
equality are not friendly bed-fellows. A pragmatic approach has
therefore to be adopted in order to harmonize the requirements of
public services with the aspirations of public servants. But let us not
evolve, through imperceptible extensions, a theory of classification
F which may subvert, perhaps submerge, the precious guarantee of
equality. The eminent spirit of an ideal society is equality and so we
must not be left to ask in wonderment: what after all is the operational
residue of equality and equal opportunity?

57. Mini~classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our
G
egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward classifications
plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To
overdo classification is tc undo. equality. If in this case Government
had prescribed that only those degree holders who had secured over
70 per cent marks could become Chief Engineers and those with 60
H per cent alone be eligible to be Superi~tending Engineers or that
E.V. CHINNAlAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 995

foreign degrees would be preferred we would have unhesitatingly A
voided it."

Said decision has been followed by this Court in Food Corporation of India
and Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma and Ors., [1998] 7 SCC 676 and other
cases.
B
In Om Prakash Sharma 's case (supra) this Court noticed that the
Constitution Bench in Triloki Nath Khosa (supra) while deciding the case
took care to add that one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances
of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification. Applying the
aforesaid principles the Court is required to interpret the provisions of the
impugned Act on the touchstone of Clause (4) of Article 15 and Clause (4) C
of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Articles 14, 15 and 16 form a
group of provisions guaranteeing equality. Such provisions confer a right of
equality to each individual citizen. Article 15 prohibits discrimination. Article
16 confers a right to equality of opportunity for being considered for public
employment. D
In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented by
its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Asson.Etc. v. Union of India
and Ors., AIR (1981) SC 298 : [1981] l SCC 246, Krishna Iyer, J. stated:

"78 ... Since a contrary view is possible and has been taken by some E
judges a verdict need not be rested on the view that SCs are not
castes, Even assuming they are, classification, if permitted, will validate
to the differential rules for promotion. Moreover, Article 16(4) is an
exception to Article 16(2) also.

22 .... The success of State action under Art.16(4) consists in the speed F
with which result-oriented res~rvation withers away as no longer a
need, not in the everwidening and everlasting operation of an exception
(Art. 16(4) ) as if it were a super-fundamental right to continue
backward all the time ..... .

37 .... The first sub-article speaks of equality and the second sub-article G
amplifies its content by expressly interdicting caste as a ground of
discrimination. Article 16(4) imparts to the seemingly static equality
embedded in Article 16( l) a dynamic quality by importing equalisation
strategies geared to the eventual achievement of equality as permissible
State action, viewed as an amplification of Art. 16(1) or as an exception
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A to it. The same observation will hold good for the sub-articles of
....
Article 15 .."

We have already held that the members of Scheduled Castes fonn a
class by themselves and any further sub-classification would be impennissible
while applying the principle of reservation.
B
On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out that in Indra Sahani 's
case (supra), the court had permitted sub-classification of other backward
communities, as backward and more backward based on their comparative
under development, therefore, the similar classification amongst the class
enumerated in the Presidential List of Scheduled Castes is permissible in law.
C We do not think the principles laid down in Indra Sahani's case for sub-
classification of other backward classes can be applied as a precedent law for
sub-classification or sub-grouping Scheduled Castes in the Presidential List
because that very judgment itself has specifically held that sub-division of
other backward classes is not applicable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
D Tribes. This we think is for the obvious reason, i.e. Constitution itself has
kept the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes List out of interference by
the State Governments.

Legal constitutional policy adumbrated in a statute must answer the test
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Classification whether pennissible
E or not must be judged on the touchstone of the object sought to be achieved.
If the object of reservation is to take affinnative action in favour of a class
which is socially, educationally and economically backward, the State's
jurisdiction while exercising its executive or legislative function is to decide
as to what extent reservation should be made for them either in Public Service
or for obtaining admission in educational institutions. In our opinion, such a
F class cannot be sub-divided so as to give more preference to a miniscule
proportion of the Scheduled Castes in preference to other members of the
same class.

Furthermore, the emphasis on efficient administration placed by Article
G 335 of the Constitution must also be considered when the claims of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes to employment in the services of the Union are
to be considered.

The conglomeration of castes given in the Presidential Order, in our
opinion, should be considered as representing a class as a whole. The contrary
H approach of the High Court, in our opinion, was not correct. The very fact

;.
E.V. CHJNNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 997

that a legal fiction has been created is itself suggestive of the fact that the A
Legislature of a State cannot take any action which would be contrary to or
inconsistent therewith. The very idea of placing different castes or tribes or
group or part thereof in a State a~ a conglomeration by way of a deeming
definition clearly suggests that they are not to be sub-divided or sub-classified
further. If a class within a class of members of the Scheduled Castes is
created, the same would amount to tinkering with the List. Such sub-
B
classification would be violative of Article I 4 of the Constitution of India. It
may be true, as has been observed by the High Court, that the caste system .
has got stuck up in the Society but with a view to do away with the evil effect
thereof, a legislation which does not answer the constitutional scheme cannot
be upheld. It is also difficult to agree with the High Court that for the purpose C
of identifying backwardness, a further inquiry can be made by appointing a
commission as to who amongst the members of the Scheduled Castes is more
backward. If benefits of reservation are not percolating to them equitably,
measures should be taken to see that they are given such adequate or additional
training so as to enable them to compete with the others but the same would
not mean that in the process of rationalizing the reservation to the Scheduled D
Castes the constitutional mandate of Articles I 4, I 5 and 16 could be violated.

Reservation must be considered from the social objective angle, having
regard to the constitutional scheme, and not as a political issue and, thus,
adequate representation must be given to the members· of the Scheduled E
Castes as a group and not to two or more groups of persons or members of
castes.

The very fact that the members of the Scheduled Castes are most
backward amongst the backward classes and the impugned legislation having
already proceeded on the basis that they are not adequately represented both F
in terms of Clause (4) of Article 15 and Clause (4) of Article 16 of the
Constitution of India, a further classification by way of micro classification
is not permissible. Such classification of the members of different classes of
people based on their respective castes would also be violative of the doctrine
of reasonableness. Article 34 l provides that exclusion even of a part or a
group of castes from the Presidential List can be done only by the Parliament. G
The logical corollary thereof would be that the State Legislatures are forbidden
from doing that. A uniform yardstick must be adopted for giving benefits to
the members of the Scheduled Castes for the purpose of Constitution. The
impugned legislation being contrary to the above constitutional scheme cannot,
therefore, be sustained. H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the
impugned legislation apart from being beyond the legislative competence of
the State is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence is liable
to declared as ultra vires the Constitution.

The appeals are allowed, impugned Act is declared as ultra vires the
B Constitution.

S.B. SINHA The vires of a State Legislation of Andhra Pradesh known
as the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations)
Act, 2000 (Act 20 of2000) (for short 'the Act') purported to have been made
in terms of Entry 41, List II and Entries 23 and 25, List III of the Seventh
C Schedule of the Csmstitution of India was questioned before the High Court.
Its validity has been upheld by a Five Judge Bench of the said Court,
correctness whereof is in question before us.

INTRODUCTION:
D The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes occupy a special place in
our Constitution. The President of India is the sole repository of the power
to specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races
or tribes which shall for the purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be
Scheduled Castes.
E
Claus~ (2) of Article 341 of the Constitution confers power only on the
Parliament to include therein or exclude therefrom castes, races or part or
group within any caste etc. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, the
members of the Scheduled Castes specified for the ~tate of Andhra Pradesh
had been divided in four different categories and reservations both in public
F office as also in education had been earmarked in the manner specified
therein.

HJG/j COURT JUDGMENT:

The validity of the said Act has been upheld by the High Court inter
G alia on the· premise that the State has the exclusive jurisdiction to make
reservation in relation to Public Service and Education. It was further held
that by reason of the provisions of ~he said Act, the Presidential Order has
not been tinl\ered with.

H QUESTIONS:
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.) 999

The questions raised before the High Court were: A
"(I) Whether the State's legislative power is curtailed or eclipsed by
any provision of the Constitution;

(2) Whether the impugned act is beyond the legislative competence
of the State and is violative of Article 341 (2); B
(3) Whether the impugned act violates Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the
Constitution;

(4) Whether the impugned legislation is a colourable piece of
legislation;
c
(5) Whether the law declared by the Full Bench operates as res judicata
and the State is debarred from enacting the impugned act; and

(6) Whether the act is invalid for non-compliance with the provisions
of Article 338 of the Constitution.
D
All answ.!rs to the aforementioned questions were rendered in favour of
the State.

HIGH COURT JUDGMENT:

The High Court having regard to Articles 15, 16, 38, 39, 41, 46, 335, E
338 and, legislative powers of the State under Lists II and III of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution opined that no technical meaning should be
given to the expression "a caste" as such and further opined rhat the
conglomeration of castes given in the Presidential Order cannot be considered
as representing a caste as a whole in view of the fact that it is a deeming
definition. F
It was observed that an attempt should be made to do away with the
evil of the caste system which has got struck up in the society. Referring to
Doctrine of Federalism and the necessity of distribution of legislative powers,
it was held that States though are not separate sovereigns; rieither Union nor G
States possess untrammeled sovereignty because the legislative, executive
and judicial powers in India are divided between the Union and the States.
Having regard to the fact that there is no express field of legislation providing
for regulation of reservations, it was opined that the State is empowered to
provide for reservation in the public services and educational institutions. It
was furthermore held that as no citizen has any fundamental right as regard H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A reservation under the constitutional scheme, the State would be well within
its power to identify the extent of backwardness of a class of citizens so as
give preference to those who may be more backward on account of their
social or economic backwardness and, thus, wcmld form a distinct class from
the general body of the civil society.

B Relying on or on the basis of the purported experience that out of 59
castes specified in the Scheduled Castes for the State of Andhra Pradesh in
the Presidential Order, it was held that as the State in discharge of its function
or duty bound to provide for upliftment of the educational and social interests
of the Scheduled Castes who are most backward classes amongst the Scheduled
C Castes, the impugned legislation is valid as thereby it was perceived that the
benefits of reservation had not been percolating to them equitably so as to
rationalize the reservation meant for the Scheduled Castes.

It was further held that the named castes in the Presidential Order
would jointly and severally be a Scheduled Caste and issuance of 0 residential
D Order does not denude the State from its legislative competence to make laws
and to adopt such policy decision so as to confer the benefit of reservation
with regard to admissions to educational institutions and services under the
State subject to Article 335 and other provisions of the Constitution. The
Scheduled Castes enumerated in the Scheduled Castes Order, it was observed,
do not lead to an inference that all of them are equal to each other.
E
SCHEME OF THE ACT:

Section 2 sets out the definitions. Section 3 is_ the charging section
enabling reservation to the extent of l %, 6%, 7% and l % to be provided for
categories A, B, C and D respectively in each of the four categories curved
F out from the Presidential Order. Section 4 provides for primacy to the
provisions of the Act in relation to the matters stated therein. Section 5,
however, carves out an exception from the purview of the provisions of the
said Act the services and educational institutions coming within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Centre. Section 7 provides for rule making power. Section
G 8 declares that nothing therein shall be construed as including or excluding
from or further classification of the list of Scheduled Castes with respect to
the State.

Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said legislation, the roster points for
eligible candidates for public appointments or posts and admission to
H educational institutions were also recast.
E.V. CillNNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] J001

ISSUE: A
The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether by
reason of the impugned legislation the State has exceeded its legislative
power.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT:
B
Equality Clause:

It is true that by reason of Article 341 of the Constitution of India no
benefit other than expressly provided for in the Constitution, as, for example,
Article 320 or Article 322, had been conferred on a member of Scheduled C
Caste. It is also not in doubt or dispute that the State has the legislative
competence to provide for reservations both in the field of public services as
also education. Article 15(4) and Article 335 expressly refer to the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Clause (4) of Article 16 although does not refer
to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, having regard to the expressions
"backward class of citizens" contained therein, it is judicially interpreted that D
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would come within the purview
thereof. ~cheduled Castes indisputably is treated to be more backward than
the backward class people.

By reason of the impugned legislation, the State although had not sought
to alter or amend the Scheduled Castes Order made by the President of India~ E
but, admittedly, it sub-divided the members of Scheduled Castes in four
different categories.

It may not be necessary for us to delve deep into the question as to
whether the factual foundation for enacting the said legislation being based f
on a report of a Court of Inquiry constituted under Section 3 of the Commission
of Inquiry Act, 1952 known as Justice Raju Report is otherwise laudable or
not.

By reason of the said legislation, each category of citizens whether
placed in Category A or Category B or Category C or Category D remains G
members of most backward class. Indisputable, the policy of reservation or
the extent thereof must have a nexus to the broader question as to whether
the members of Scheduled Castes are adequately represented in public services
or not but by reason of the provisions of the said Act, the State accepts that
members of each category are not adequately represented in public services
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A and, therefore, the state policy of reservation should be extended to them.

It is, therefore manifest that the classes of citizens mentioned in the
said Act are not only socially, educationally or economically backward, they
are also entitled to be provided with the benefits of state's reservation policy.

B Equal protection clause mandates that all persons under like
circumstances should be treated alike. Article 14 is in many respects similar
to Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, the relevant portion
whereof reads as follows:

" ... no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
C privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life liberty or property without due
process of Jaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."

The equal protection clause contained in Fourteenth Amendment of the
D American Constitution, however, postulates that it is permissible to distribute
a benefit or a burden on, or partly, on the basis of race - to use race as a
criterion of selection in distributing a benefit or a burden - is not necessarily
to distribute the benefit or the burden on an "invidious" because there might
be a nonracist reason for using race as a criterion of selection. [See Shaw v.
E Reno, 509 US 630, 642 (1993)]

Although in the United States of America, affirmative action based on
race is a deeply divisive issue insofar as whereas the proponents thereof
regard the continuance of affirmative action as a litm}IS test over the nation's
commitment to racial justice; opponents thereof see it as an unacceptable
F violation of the ideal of equality of opportunity and the principle that
government should treat its citizens in a colour-blind fashion. [See The
Affirmative Action Debate, 17 Philosophy & Public Policy I (Special Issue,
Winter/Spring 1997) (quoting Glenn Loury)]. Constitution of-India, on the
contrary, specifically provides for affirmative action. Such affirmative action
G can be based on a nonracist reason for using race as a criterion of selection.

In a recent decision a question came up before the US Supreme Court
in Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher v. lee Bollinger, (decided on 23rd
June, 2003) as regard the validity of guidelines providing for selection method
under which every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority
H groups was to be automatically awarded 20 points out of I 00 points needed
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 1003

to guarantee admission. The said provision was struck down as being violative A
of equality protection clause observing:

"The very nature of a college's permissible practice of awarding value
to racial diversity means that race must be considered in a way that
increases some applicants' chances for admission. Since college
admission is not left entirely to inarticulate intuition, it is hard to see B
what is inappropriate in assigning some stated value to a relevant
characteristic, whether it be reasoning ability, writing style, running
speed, or minority race. Justice Powell's plus factors necessarily are
assigned some values. The college simply does by a numbered scale
what the law school accomplishes in its "holistic review," Grutter, C
post, at 25; the distinction does not imply that applicants to the
undergraduate college are denied individualized consideration or a
fair chance to compete on the basis of all the various merits their
applications may disclose."

Delivering his minority opinion on his own behalf as also on behalf of D
Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, however, held:

"Our jurisprudence ranks race a "suspect" category, "not because
(race) is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is
one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the
purpose of maintaining racial inequality." Norwalk Core v. Norwalk E
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920, 931-932 (CA2 1968) (footnote
omitted). But where race is considered "for the purpose of achieving
equality," id., at 932, no automatic proscription is in order. For as
insightfully explained, "the Constitution is both color blind and color
conscious. To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a
classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden F
must not be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color
blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination
being perpetuat_ed and to undo the effects of past discrimination.
"United States v. Jefferson Country Bd Of Ed., 372 F.2d 836, 876
(CA5 1996)(Wisdom, J.): see Wechsler, The Nationalization of.Civil G
Liberties and Civil Rights Supp. To 12 Tex.Q.10,23(1968) (Brown
may be seen as disallowing racial classifications that "imply an
invidious assessment" while allowing such classifications when "not
invidious in· implication" but advanced to "correct inequalities").
Contemporary human rights documents draw just this line; they
distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed to H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A accelerate de facto equality. See Grutter, post, at 1 (Ginsburg, J.
concurring)(citing the United Nations - initiated ·conventions on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women)."

The minority opinion of Ginsburg, J. appeals to us and is in tune with
B our Constitutional scheme.

Can having regard to the constitutional scheme, the conglomeration of
the members of Scheduled Castes be subjected to further classification is the
question.

C Article 14 of the Constitution of India aims at equality. It prohibits
discrimination in any form. At its worst form, it wiJJ be violative of basic and
essential feature of the Constitution. (See Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji
v. Union of India and Ors., (1981] 1 SCC 166]

Reasonableness of sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes must be
D judged on the touchstone of the equality clause.

Having regard to the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors., (1992] Supp (3) SCC 217, the backward class
citizens can be classified in four different categories - (i) more backward, (ii)
E backward, (iii) Scheduled Caste and (iv) Scheduled Tribe. A contention has
been raised that in Indra Sawhney (supra) the Court permitted a classification
amongst other backward classes and as such there is no reason as to why the
said principle shall ·not be applied to the members of the Scheduled Castes.
In Indra Sawhney (supra) itself this Court categorically stated that it was not
concerned with the question as regard members of Scheduled Castes and
F Scheduled Tribes. (SCC Para 792 at page 725)

It is refovant to note that question No. 5 formulated by Jeevan Reddy,
J. was only in relation to the further division in the backward class into
backward and more backward categories. Advisedly, no question was framed
as regard division of Scheduled Castes into more backward and backward
G Scheduled Castes. -.
There appears to be no good reason for classifying the backward classes
of citizens in four categories; as noticed in the judgment of Broth~r Hegde,
J. and furthermore the Scheduled Caste Order and Scheduled Tribe Order
H provide for conglomeration of castes and tribes and, thus, must be treated as
EV. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] l 005

~. a distinct and separate class for the purpose of the Constitution. We may A
notice that there is no such express provision in the Constitution in respect
of "other backward class".

The preamble to the Constitution proclaims that 'we the people of India'
adopt, enact and give to ourselves the Constitution of India to secure to all
its citizens justice, liberty and equality. There are a few Articles in Part IV B
of the Constitution of India like Articles 38, 39 and 47 which aim at securing
equality of opportunity and social justice. The State in terms of Articles 14,
15(1) and 15(4) of the Constitution had inter a/ia made special provisions
with regard to admissions in educational institutions for advancement of
Scheduled Castes. Article 16(4) likewise enable the State from making any C
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of the backward
classes under the State. Inevitably, its meaning is influenced by the legal
context in which it must operate.

Indisputably, only because the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
and other socially and economically backward class of citizens are not in a D
position to compete with the general category candidates, the equality principle
has been adopted by way of affirmative action by the State Government in
making reservations in their favour both as regard admission in educational
institutions and public employment. The doctrine of equality is the fibre with

- which constitutional scheme is woven.

Our Constitution permits application of equality clause by grant of
additional protection to the disadvantaged class so as to bring them on equal
E

platform with other advantaged class of people. Such a class which requires
the benefit of additional protection, thus, cannot be discriminated inter se i.e.
between one member of the said class and another only on a certain F
presupposition of some advancement by one group over other although both
satisfy the test of abysmal backwardness as also inadequate representation in
public service.

In a case of this nature, the burden of reasonable classification and its
nexus with the object of the legislation is on the State. The State, in my G
opinion, has not been able to discharge the said burden.

Reservation:

The essence of reservations basically can be sub-divided into three
categories: (i) Facilitating access to value posts or resources whereby seats H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A are reserved in the Legislature in Government services and in academic
institutions; (ii) Providing for scholarships, land allotments, grants for health
care, etc. and (iii) Special protections like.prohibiting exploitation of Scheduled
Castes by others with a view to promote the educational and economic interests
of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes
B and Scheduled Tribes who, for centuries, have been deprived of their legitimate
due, so that they may be brought to the same platform so as to enable them
to compete with the others. In relation to the backwardness arguable reservation
in favour of a caste cannot be by itself a ground for grant thereof but may
only by one of the several factors for determining the criteria of backwardness
under Article 16(4) which provides for the following criteria:
c (i) There must be a backward class of citizens.
(ii) The said class in the opinion of the State is not adequately
represented on the services of the State.

Provision for reservation can be made only when both the conditions
D are satisfied.
Constitution oflndia is not caste blind and, thus, ifthe citizens belonging
to a caste as such be rationally assumed bac;kward, the entire caste can be as
such be recognized as Backward Class. Articles 15(2) and 16(2) of the 1 .
Constitution prohibit discrimination based 'only on Caste' and not 'Caste and
E something else'.

Determination:

The approach to construe the impugned legislation should not be based
on su_bjective intention of legislation but sh~uld be given an objective meaning.
F The meaning is declared by the courts after the application of relevant
interpretative principles so as to construe the constitutionality of a statute
having regard to the object, the Constitution makers sought to achieve. The
Constitution makers inserted Articles 341 and 342 with a view to provide
benefits to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as
G being belonging to a socially, educationally and economically backward class
of citizens. Any legislation which would bring them out of the purview
thereof or tinker with the order issued by the President of India would be
unconstitutional. In Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home·
Department, (200 I) 2 AC 532 at 548, Lord Stein observed that in the law
context is everything. Constitutional law is a part of the Indian law and being
H
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 1007

suprema lax its meaning is subject to textual consideration. A
As the Constitution itself treats the members of the Scheduled Castes
as a single integrated class of most backward citizens, it is not competent for
the Legislature of a State to sub-divide them into separate compartments with
a separate percentage of reservation for each resulting in discouraging merit B
as well as the endeavour of individual members to excel - vide Fundamental
Duty under Art. 51A(i). The operation of reservation policy ought to be in
a manner consistent with the objective of promoting fraternity among all
citizens, assuring the dignity of the individual and unity of the Nation.

The aim of the Constitution is to equip each member of the weaker C
sections with the ability to compete with other citizens with dignity on a level
playing field. The pitiable condition of Sch~duled Castes in recognized by
the Constitution as a national problem. Therefore, the responsibility of
improving the lot of Scheduled Castes has been entrusted to the National
Commission and the Parliament.
D
The provisions of Article 330(l)(b)(c) show that the Constitution has
treated Scheduled Tribes in the autonomous districts of Assam as a separate
category distinct from all other Scheduled Tribes. This clearly indicates that
when the Constitution-makers wanted to make a sub-classification of Scheduled
Tribes, they have themselves made it in the text of the Constitution itself and
have not empowered any Legislature or Government to make such a sub- E
classification. Except, to the extent the Constitution itself makes a sub-
classification, there cannot be grouping of Scheduled Castes into different
categories for differential treatment. Only exclusion of castes, parts or groups
within the castes from the list of Scheduled Castes is contemplated by law
made by Parliament, but not sub-classification of Scheduled Castes and that F
too on the basis of caste.

-In Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1992] Supp 3
sec 217 analyzing the caste factor vis-a-vis the. necessity for making
reservation it was observed:
G
.- "Even if one ceases to follow that occupation, still he remains and
continues a member of that group. To repeat, it is a socially and
occupationally homogeneous class. Endogamy is its main
characteristic. Its social status and standing depend upon the nature
of the occupation followed by it.
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Lowlier the occupation, lowlier the social standing of the class in the
graded hierarchy. In rural India, occupation-caste nexus is true even
today. Caste-occupation-poverty' cycle is thus an ever present reality.
In rural India, it is strikingly apparent; in urban centres, there may be
some dilution. But since rural India and rural population is still the
overwhelmingly predominant fact of life in India the reality remains.
B All the decisions since Balaji speak of this 'cast-occupation-poverty'
nexus. The language and emphasis may vary but the theme remains
the same. This is the stark reality notwithstanding all our protestations
and abhorrence and all attempts at weeding out this phenomenon. We
are not saying it ought to be encouraged, It should not be. It must be
c eradicated. That is the ideal- the goal. But any programme towards
betterment of these sections-classes of society and any programme
designed to eradicate this evil must recognise this .ground reality and
attune its programme accordingly. Merely burying our heads in the
sand - Ostrich-like - wouldn't help."

D The validity of the Act must be tested on the touchstone of the
aforementioned tests.

What, in my considered view, is necessary to be kept in mind for
determining the validity of the impugned statute would be: (i) whether a
member of Scheduled Caste is still backward, (ii) whether they require special
E protection so as to invoke equality clause.

In India, States are not separate sovereigns. The respective legislative
competence of the Union and the States have although been delineated under
Article 246 but the same would be subject to other provisions thereof. The
F legislature, executive and ju.dicial powers in India are divided between the
Union and the States. The States indisputably have been granted legislative
competence as regard education (Entry 25, List III) and public employment
(Entry 4-1, List II) but the same is circumscribed by Article 341 of the
Constitution of India.

Jeevan Reddy, J. incidentally who wrote the majority judgment in Indra
G
Sawhney (supra) made a reference to his judgment in Narayana Rao andAnr.
v. State of A.P. and Anr., AIR (1987) AP 57 wherein the learned Judge
opined:

"94 ... Art. 15(4) or Art. 16(4) are not designed to achieve abolition
H of caste-system-much less to remove the meanness or other evils in

•
E.V. CHINNAIAH i·. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] } 009

the society. They are designed to provide opportunities in education, A
services and other fields to raise the educational social and economic
levels of those lagging behind, and once this is achieved, these Articles
must be deemed to have served their purpose. If so, excluding those
who have already attained such economic well-being (inter-linked as
it is with social and educational advancement) from the special benefits B
provided under these clauses cannot be called unreasonable or
discriminatory or arbitrary much less contrary to the intention of the
founding-fathers. It can be reasonably presumed that these people
have ceased to be socially if not educationally backward and hence
do not require the preferential treatment contemplated by Articles
15(4) and 16(4). Moreover, in the face of the repeated pronouncements C
of the Supreme Court referred to above, these arguments cannot be
countenanced. Not only it does not amount to creating a class within
a class, it is a proper delineation of classes ....... "

Those observations were confined to backward classes and not SCs and
STs. The learned Judge in Indra Sawhney (supra) also stuck to the said view. D
The impugned Act as also the judgment of the High Court are premised
on the observations in Indra Sawhney (supra) that there is no constitutional
or legal bar for a State in categorizing the backward classes as backward and
more backward class. This Court, however, while referring to Article 16(4)
of the Constitution stated that it recognized only one class, viz., backward E
class of citizens in the following terms:

"At the outset, we may state that for the purpose of this discussion,
we keep aside the . Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes (since
they are admittedly included within the backward classes), except to F
remark that backward classes contemplated by Art. 16(4) do comprise
some castes - for it cannot be denied that Scheduled Castes include
quite a few castes."

Scheduled Caste, however, is not a caste in terms of its definition as
contained in Article 366(24) of the Constitution of India. They are bought G
within the purview of the said category by reason of their abysmal
backwardness. Scheduled Caste consists of not only the people who belong
to some backward caste but also race or tribe or part of or groups within
castes, races or tribes. They are not merely backward but the backwardmost.
A person even does not cease to be a Scheduled Caste automatically even on
his conversion to another religion. (See Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary, H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R .

.A [2003] 8 SCC 204 and State of Kera/a and Anr. v. Chandramohanan, AIR
(2004) SC 1672)

It is also relevant to note that the two groups, i.e., socially and
educationally backward class and Scheduled Castes were differentiated for
the purpose of Clause (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution as therein Scheduled
B Castes had been recognized, in the nature of things, to be backward but it is
also recognized that besides them, there may be other groups of persons who
are backward and deserve preferential treatment.

In.Indra Sawhney (supra) while applying the 'Means-test' and 'Creamy
layer test', it was observed:
c
"it is not a question of permissibility or desirability of such test but
one of proper and more appropriate identification of a class - a
backward class. The very ·concept of a class denotes a number of
persons having certain common traits which distinguish them from
the others. In a backward class under clause (4) of Article 16, ifthe
D
connecting link is the social backwardness, it should broadly be the
same in a given class. If some of the members are far too advanced
socially (which in the context, necessarily means economically and,
may also mean, educationally) the connecting thread between them
and the remaining class snaps. They would be misfits in the class.
E After .excluding them alone, would the class be a compact class. In
fact, such exclusion benefits the truly backward. Difficulty, however,
really lies in drawing the line - how and where to draw the line? For,
while drawing the line, it should be ensured that it does not result in
taking away with one hand what is given by the other. The basis of
exclusion should not merely be economic, unless, of course, the
F economic advancement is so high that if necessarily means social
advancement. Let us illustrate the point. A member of backward class,
say a member of carpenter caste, goes to Middle East and works there
as a carpenter. If you take his annual income in rupees, it would be
fairly high from the Backward Class? Are his children in India to be
G deprived of the benefit of Article 16(4)? Situation may, however, be
different, ·if he rises so high economically as to become say a factory
. owner himself. In such a situation, his social status also rises. He
himself would be in a position to provide employment to others. In
such a case, his income is merely a measure of his social status."

H But we must state that whenever such a situation arises in respect of
i
]

E. V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 1011

......... Scheduled Caste, it will be the Parliament alone to take the necessary legislative A
steps in terms of Clause (2) of Article 341 of the Constitution. The States
concededly do not have the legislative competence therefor.

The State's argument to justify the legislation on the basis of population
ratio also would not satisfy the test. The population of 'Relli' which is the
most backward category consists of 1.67% only and although hardly any B
person of that community had been getting the benefits of education, they are
placed in Category A wherefor the benefits of reservation being l % whereas
those belonging to Adi-Andhra having 8.96% of population and where the
students belonging to that community have been taking admissions in all
disciplines had been placed in Category D had also been provided reservation
to the extent of l %. We do not know on what basis both the categories have
c
been put in the same class.

The legislation may not be amenable to challenge on the ground of
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution whence it is intended to giving
effect to principles specified under Article 15 or when the differentiation is D
not unreasonable or arbitrary but when a classification is made which is per
se violative of the constitutional provisions, the same cannot be upheld. While
reasonable classification is permissible what would be impermissible is micro
classification or mini classification.

In Triloki Nath and Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors., E
[ 1969] l SCR l 03 it was stated:

" ... The members of an entire caste or community may in the social,
economic and educational scale of values at a given time be backward
and may on that account be treated as a backward class, but that is
not because they are members of a caste or community, but because F
they form a class. In its ordinary connotation the expression "class"
means a homogeneous section of the People grouped together because
of certain likenesses or common traits, and who are identifiable by
some common attributes such as status, rank, occupation, residence
in a locality, race, religion and the like. But for the purpose of Art.
G
16(4) in determining whether a section forms a class, a test solely
based on caste, community, race, religion, sex, des<;ent, place of birth
or residence cannot be adopted, because it would directly offend the
Constitution."

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradip Tandon and Ors., [1975] 2 SCR H
"'
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. '

A 761 it was stated:
"The backwardness contemplated under Article 15(4) is both social
and educational. Article 15(4) speaks of backwardness of classes of
citizens. The accent is on classes of citizens. Article 15(4) also speaks
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, socially and
B educationally backward classes of citizens in Article 15(4) could not
be equated with castes. In MR. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963]
Supp l SCR 439 : and State of A.P. v. P.Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595:
this Court held that classification of backwardness on the basis of
castes would violate both Articles 15(1) and 15(4).

c Broadly stated, neither caste nor race nor religion can be made the
basis of classification for the purposes of determining social and
educational backwardness within the meaning of Article 15(4). When
Article 15(1) forbids discrimination on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, cannot be made one of the criteria for determining social and
educational backwardness. If caste or religion is recognised as a
D
criterion of social and educational backwardness Article· 15(4) will
stultify Article 15(1). It is true that Article.15(1) forbids discrimination
only on the ground of religion, race, caste, but when a classification
taken recourse to caste as one of the criteria in determining socially
and educationally backward classes the expression "classes" in that
E case violates the rule of expression unius est exclusio alterius. The
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens are groups
other than groups based on caste.

In Kumari K.S. Jayasree and Anr. v. The State of Kera/a and Anr.,
[1977] l SCR 194, this Court held:
F
" ... If any classification of backward classes of citizens is based solely
on the caste of the citizen it will perpetuate the vice of caste system.
Again, if the classification is based solely on poverty it will not be
logical. The society is taking steps for uplift of the people. In such a
task groups or classes who are socially and educationally backward
G are helped by the society. That is the philosophy of our Constitution.
It is in this context that social backwardness which results from poverty
is likely to be magnified by caste consideration. Occupations, place
of habitation may also be relevant factors in determining who are
socially and educationally backward dasses. Social and economic
H consideration come into operation in solving the problem and evolving
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] IQ 13

the proper criteria of determining which classes are socially and A
educationally backward. That is why our Constitution provided for
special consideration socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens as also schedule castes and tribes. It is only by directing the
society and the St.ate to offer them all facilities for social and
educational uplift that the problem is solved.
B
_In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented by
its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Asson. Etc. v. Union of India
and Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 185, it was opined:

"The President notifies Scheduled Castes not with reference to any
caste characteristics, but their abysmal backwardness, as is evident C
from the scheme of Part XVI. He appoints, under Article 338, a
Special Officer whose duty is to investigate into all matters relating
to safeguards for the SC & ST. The Constitution provides not merely
for adequate representation of SC & ST to services and posts under
the Union and States, but also provides for reservation of seats for SC D
& ST in the legislatures. The cursory study of the articles relating to
the status and safeguards of SC & ST puts it beyond doubt that the
founding fathers have assigned to them a special place and shown
towards them special concern and charged the State with special
mandates to redeem these handicapped human sectors from their
grossly retarded situation. indeed, they are not merely backward, but E
are the backwardmost and cannot be equated with just any other
caste in the Hindu fold. lt is, therefore, problematic whether Article
16(2) when it refers to equality among castes deals with the Scheduled
Castes which, as shown above, may even be made of a plurality of
castes or groups or races and may vary from State of State. Also, a F
caste, subjected qua caste, to the most humiliating handicaps may be
a backward class although the court will hesitate to equate caste with
class except where the degree of dismalness is dreadful...."

(Emphasis supplied)

This Court in Kai/ash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., G
[2002] 6 SCC 562 following Pradip Tandon (supra) held an affirmative
action as regards employment of rural residents vis-a-vis the residents in the
town is not sustainable under Clause (4) of Article 16.

It is, therefore, manifest that the backward class which may be given H
)
'

A
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

the benefit of Clause (4) of Article 15 or Article 16 must consist of a
I
L"'

homogeneous group - the element of homogeneity being the backwardness
characterizin~ the class. The link or the thread holding the class together,
thus, should be the backwardness of its members which can never be
supplemented by castes. Classification, thus, may be justified on the ground
that it is a backward class but the same may not stand the scrutiny or the
B equality clause when classification is made on the basis of a backward caste
or a section of a backward caste.

Furthermore, Article 16(4) must be read with Article 335 of the
Constitution which emphasizes the fact that efficiency of administration cannot
C be sacrificed which would lead to the conclusion that the same cannot be
done to favour less weak sections, i.e., some castes out of the homogeneous
class of Scheduled Castes.

The decision of this Court in State of J and K v. Triloki Nath Khosa
and Ors. [1974] 1 SCC 19 to which a detailed reference has been made in
D the accompanying judgment of Brother Hegde', J. we may notice that the
ration thereof has distinctly been noticed and factually differentiated in Food
Corporation of India and Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma and Ors., [1998] 7
SCC 676, K.R. Lakshman and Ors. v. Karnataka Electricity Board and Ors.,
[2001] 1 SCC 442; Ku/deep Kumar Gupta and Ors. v. H.P. State Electricity
Board and Ors., [2001] 1 SCC 457.
E
In Om Prakash Sharma (supra), this Court noticed that the Constitution
Bench in Triloki Nath Khosa (supra) while deciding the case took care to
add that one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the
case in order to judge the validity of a classification.
F In Ku/deep Kumar Gupta (supra), Pattanaik, J. (as the learned Chief
Justice then was ) in no uncertain terms observed that in Triloki Nath Khosa
(supra) a word o{ caution has been indicated that the right to classify is
hedged in with salient restraints stating:

"5 ... Classification must be truly founded on substantial differences
G which distinguish persons grouped together from those left out of the
group and such differential attributes must bear a just . and rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved and judicial scrutiny
extends only to the consideration whether the classification rests on
a reasonable basis and whether it bean, a nexus w_i!b- the object in
H
E. V. CHINNAl AH v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SANTO SH HEGDE, J.] } Q15

view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical A
evaluation on the basis of classification."

In K.R. Lakshman (supra), Pattanaik, J. again observed:

"5 ... It is no doubt true that in Tri/oki Nath Chandrachud, J. had
observed that the classification should not be carried too far lest it B
may subvert, perhaps submerge the precious guarantee of equality ... "

In Vijay Lakshmi (supra), M.B. Shah, J. while holding that reservation
for women is permissible in terms of Clause (3) of Article 15 of the
Constitution stated:

"8(a). For the policy decision of classification we would straightaway
c
refer to the decision rendered by this court in State of Jammu
and Kashmir v. Shri Tri/oki Nath Khosa, [1974] 1 SCC 19,
wherein the Court [Chandrachud, J. (as he then was] succinctly
held thus:-
" ........ The challenge, at best, reflects the respondent's opinion on
D
promotional opportunities in public services and one may assume
that if the roles were reversed, respondents would be interested
in implementing their point of view. But we cannot sit in appeal
over the legislative judgment with a view to finding out whether
on a comparative evaluation of rival theories tom;hing the question E
of promotion, the theory advocated by the respondents is not to
be preferred. Classification is primarily for the Legislature or for
the statutory authority charged with the duty of framing ti1e terms
and conditions of service; and if looked at from the standpoint
of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on F
a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld." (p ... 30)

It was also observed that discrimination is the essence of classification
and does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only if
it rests on an unreasonable basis and it was for the respondents to
establish that classification was unreasonable and bears no rational
nexus with its purported object. Further, dealing with the right to G
equality, the Court (in paras 29 & 30 ) held thus:-

29 .......... But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation arising
from the very nature of the constitutional guarantee. Equality is for
equals. That is to say that those who are similarly circumstanced are H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
.
\
).......
A entitled to an equal treatment.

30. Since the constitutional code of equality and equal opportunity is
a charter for equals, equality of opportunity in matters of promotion
means an equal promotional opportunity for persons who fall,
substantially, within the same class." {p.33)
B
Applying the aforementioned principles, the Court is require to interpret
the provisions of the impugned act on the touchstone of Clause (4) of Article
15 and Clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.

The Constitution provides for declaration of certain castes and tribes as
c Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in terms of Articles 341 and 342 of
the Constitution of India. The object of the said provisions is to provide for
grant of protection to the backwards class of citizens who are specified in the
Scheduled Castes Order and Scheduled Tribes Order having regard to the
economic and educationally backwardness wherefrom they suffer. The
President of India alone in terms of Article 341(1) of the Constitution of
.D India is authorized to issue an appropriate notification therefor. The
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 made in terms of Article 341(1)
is exhaustive.

Mr. Venugopal has strongly relied on a decision in NTR University of
Health Sciences, Vijayawada v. G.Babu Rajendra Prasad and Anr;, [2003]
E
5 sec 350 for the proposition that the question as to how and in what
manner the reservation should be made is a matter of policy of the State and
such a policy decision normally would not be open to challenge, but the said
observation must be understood in the context of the Presidential Order made
under Article 371-D application to the State of Andhra Pradesh. Under the
F . Presidential Order, 1974, 85% of the seats were reserved in favour of the
local candidates within the University area only and the remaining 15% were
reserved for candidates of non-local area. In the instant case, it is not the
extent of reservation, but competence of the State Legislature to make a sub-
classification of Scheduled Castes notified initially by the President and
subsequently amended by Parliament by law, is in question.
G
The power of State Legislature to decide as regard grant of benefit of
reservation in jobs or in educational institutions to the backward classes is
not in dispute. It is furthermore not in dispute that if such a decision is made
that State can also lay down a legislative policy as regard extent of reservation
H to be made for different members of the backward classes including Scheduled "
E.V. CHJNNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [H.K. SEMA, J.) 1017

Caste. But it cannot take away the said benefit on the premise that one or the A
other group amongst the members of the Scheduled Castes has advanced and,
thus, is not entitled to the entire benefit of reservation. The impugned
legislation, thus, must be held to be unconstitutional.

WHAT JS THE REMEDY?
B
There is one practical aspect of the matter which may not also be lost
sight of. The chart produced before us clearly shows that the members
belonging to Relli and Adi-Andhra are hardly educated. What was necessary
in the situation was to provide to them scholarships, hostel facilities, special
coaching, etc., so that they may be brought on the same platform with the
member of other Scheduled Tribes, viz., Madiga and Mala, if not with the C
other backward classes. It is not in dispute that members belonging to Relli
. are hardly educated. Only 2% of the members of the said community have
studied in secondary school. No one has ever been admitted in any engineering
discipline or other professional disciplines. The said facts clearly go to show
that providing reservation for them in engineering or medical discipline or in D
public service would not solve their problem. Without such basic education,
the members belonging to the said community would not be getting admission
either in the engineering or medical colleges or other professional courses
and as such the question of their joining public service may not arise at all.
Now, even for the post of Class IV employees, qualification of passing
matriculation examination is provided. Unless children of the said community E
are educated, the provision for both for education as also public service
would be a myth for them and ultimately in view of the impugned Iegisla.ion
for all intent and purport, the benefit thereof would go to other categories.
The State, in our opinion, should take positive steps in this behalf.
F
I entirely agree with the opinion of Brother, N.Santosh Hegde, J. that
the appeals be allowed.

H.K. SEMA, J. I had the privilege of going through the erudite judgment
prepared by my learned Brother Hegde, J and I respectfully agree with him.
However, having regard to the substantial question of law involving as to the G
interpretation of the Constitution, I thought of putting a few lines of my own
in one aspect of the matter.

Article 366(24) defines "Scheduled Castes" means such castes, races or
tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed
H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A under Article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution.
This would go to show that by virtue of the Notification of the President the
Scheduled Castes come into being as one class of persons regardless of
members drawn from castes, races or tribes etc. They attain a homogeneous
group by virtue of the President Notification.

B In Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1992] Supp 3
SCC 217 this Court observed at page 725(SCC) that the discussion of creamy
layer is confined to other backward classes only and has no relevance in the
case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind and Ors., [2001] 1 SCC
C 4, it was pointed out by the Constitution Bench of this Court at page 15
SCC:-

"By virtue of powers vested under Articles 341 and 342 of the
Constitution of India, the President is empowered to issue public
notification for the first time specifying the castes, races or tribes or
D
part of or groups within castes, races, or tribes which shall, for the
purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes in relation to a State or Union Territory, as the case
may be. The language and terms of Articles 341 and 342 are identical.
What is said in relation to Article 341 mutatis mutandis applies to
E Article 342. The laudable object of the said articles is to provide
additional protection to the members of the Scheduled Castes and
Sche"duled Tribes having regard to social and educational backwardness
from which they have been suffering since a considerable length of
time. The words "castes" or "tribes" in the expression "Scheduled
Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes" are not used in the ordinary sense of
F the terms but are used in the sense of the definitions contained in
Articles 366(24) and 366(25)."

Thus, the pious object for issuing the Presidential Notification is to
afford them special protection having regard to social and educational
G backwardness. The Presidential Notification under Article 341 of the
Constitution as well as the benefits of reservation of appointments or posts
which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services
under the State, is afforded to a class of persons specified in Presidential
Notification under Article 341 of the Constitution. The backward class of
citizens enshrined in Article 16(4) of the Constitution includes Scheduled
H
E.V. CHINNAIAH v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [H.K. SEMA, J.) 1019

Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The whole basis ef reservation is to provide A
additional protection to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes as a class of persons who have been suffering since a considerable
length of time due to social and educational backwardness. The protection
and reservation is afforded to a homogeneous group. Further classification
and/or regrouping the homogeneous groups by State Legislature would tinker B
with the Presidential Notification issued under Article 341, which is
constitutionally impermissible. By the impugned legislation, the State has
sought to re-group the homogeneous group specified in Presidential

-· Notification for the purposes of reservation and appointments. It would
tantamount to· discrimination. It is a trite law that justice must be equitable.
Justice to one group at the costs of injustice to other group is another way
of perpetuating injustice.

K.K.T. Appeals allowed.