ESSKEY ROADWAYS (FIRM)versusANANDHAKRISHNAN BUS SERVICE
- Citation
- 1994 INSC 326
- Decided
- 17 August 1994
Holding
The date of consideration is the relevant date for determining eligibility to grant the required marks under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Summary
The appellant and respondent both applied for a stage‑carriage permit. The Regional Transport Authority (RTA) awarded marks based on the date of application, granting the permit to the appellant. The respondent appealed, and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (STAT) set aside the RTA’s order, holding that the date of consideration was the relevant date for assessing eligibility under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a view affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the date of application or the date of consideration should govern the grant of marks. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that the date of consideration is the appropriate reference point for eligibility under Section 46. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the respondent’s permit intact. The Court also noted that the appellant, being ineligible, could not acquire legitimacy for the permit by court order and that any further relief must be sought under the appropriate statutory provisions.
Issues considered
- Whether the date of consideration or the date of application is the relevant date for assessing eligibility for marks under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
ESSKEY ROADWAYS (FIRM) A
v.
ANANDHAKRISHNAN BUS SERVICE
AUGUST 17, 1994
[K. RAMASWAMY AND S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.) B
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-Section 46-Grant of Stage Caniage pei•
mit-Ciaims of candidates for award of marks-Relevant date for considering
respective claims-it is date of co11Siderati011 and not date of application.
c
The appellant along with the contesting respondent had applied for
grant of stage carriage permit. On consideration of the respective the
R.T.A. granted permit to the appellant awarding him 10 marks and 8
marks to the respondent. The R.T.A. held that the date of application was
the relevant date for considering the respective claims of the candidates D
for awarding marks. On appeal, the S.T.A.T. set aside the order of the RTA
and granted the permit to the respondent taking the date of consideration
as the r·levaot date for the purpose of considering the eligibility to grant
the required marks. Io revision, the High Court upheld the order of the
Appellate Authority. This appeal by special leave was filed against the
judgment of the High Court. E
The only question raised in this appeal was whether the RTA should
consider the respective claims as on the date of consideration or as on the
date of the application.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court F
HELD : 1.1 The date of consideration is the relevant date for the
purpose of considering the eligibility to grant the required marks for grant
of permits u/s 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This declaration of law
Is confined to and peculiar of the statutory operation u/s 46 of Act 5 of G
1958. [707-G, H, 708-A]
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Manqrulpir It. Motor
Service (P) Ud. & Ors., [1971] Supp. SCR 561; Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari
& Ors, [1969] 2 SCR 507 and A.S. Ja/a/uddin v. Ba/asubramaniar Bus
Service Pvt. Ltd. & Am: C.A. No. 161 of 1965, decided on 31- 10-1967 H
705
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A (Supreme Court), relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 570 of
1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.3.80 of the Madras High
B Court in C.R.P. No. 88 of 1978.
C.S, Vaidyanathan, K. Vishwanathan and K.V. Venkataraman for the ·
Appellant.
S. Srinivasan and Mrs. N. Annapoorani for the Respondent.
c The following Order of the Court was delivered :
The appellant along with the contesting respondent had applied for
grant of stage carriage permit on the route from Truchirapalli to Jayankon-
dam on or before October 10, 1975. Objections have been called for on
D October 22, 1975 and the last date to file the objection was November 10,
1975. On consideration of the respective claims the R.T.A., Truchirappalli
awarded to the appellant 10 marks and 8 marks to the respondent. On
that premise RTA granted permit to the appellant. The respondent carried
the matter in appeal to the S.T.A.T. Which by its Order dated November
14, 1977 set aside the order of R.T.A. and grated the permit io .the
E
respondent. In C.R.P. No. 88/78 by Order dated March 5, 1980 the learned
Single Judge upheld the Order of S.T.A.T. thus, this appeal by Special
leave.
The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is
F whether the RTA should consider the respective claims as on the date of
the consideration or as on the date of the,application. The RTA held that
the date of application was the relevant date. But the Appellate Authority
and the High Court found that the dat~ of the consideration was the
relevant date. Admittedly, the respondent-partnership firm was
G reconstituted on April 1, 1976 taking one Easwaran as a managing partner
and it was registered on May 21, 1976 under Section 69 of the Partnership
Act. Admittedly, the managing partner had the technical qualification as
on the date of consideration. The managing partner being the technically
qualified man, the respondents are entitled to the award of two more marks
on the ground of qualifications. The Appellate Tribunal taking that fact
H into consideration awarded 10 marks and on comparative evaluation, since
ESSKEY ROADWAYS v. ANANDHAKRJSHNAN BUS SERVICE 707
the respondent by then had three permits, granted the permit to the A
respondent. The question whether the date of consideration is the relevant
date is no longer res imegra. This Court in Maharashtra Staie Road
Transport Corporation v. Mangrulpir ft. Motor Service (P) Ltd. & Ors., (1971)
Suppl. SCR 561 at 571 held that :
"The High Court was in error on the second question in holding B
that the Regional Transport Authority would have to consider the
respective qualifications of the applicants as on the date of their
applications and not as on the date of the actual consideration by
the Regional Transport Authority of the applications for the grant
of permit." C
This Court considered diverse circumstances in support of that conclusion
this' Court said that as on the date of the application if insolvency petition
is pending against one of the applicants, but on the date of consideration
if he is declared to be an insolvent, he becomes disentitled to the grant of D
permit by operation of law. As on the date of the application if there is no
conviction, but as on the date of consideration, if an applicant is convicted,
he also becomes ineligible for consideration.
Another circumstance arose Dhani Devi v. Sant Bahari & Ors, (1969)
2 SCR 507 case was that when one of the applicants before the considera- E
tion died and his L.Rs. were .brought on record. When It was questioned,
this Court held that the L.Rs. are entitled to be considered as inheriting
the estate of the deceased applicant for grant of permit. In A.S. Jalaluddin
v. Ba/asubramaniar Bus Service (P) Ltd. and Anr., C.A. NO. 161 of (1965)
decided on 31.10.1967) the question arose that whether the applicant who F
secured the residential qualification by establishing a branch office at one
of the terminus of the route would be considered eligible as on the date of
the consideration. This Court held that he is entitled to. In view of these
considerations, it must be held that the date of consideration is the relevant
date for the purpose of considering the eligibility to grant the required G
marks under Section 46 of Act IV of 1939. This law being in operation from
1970, we do not think that it requires any reconsideration by this Court by
a larger bench. Accordingly, we hold that the date of consideration is the
relevant date on which the respective claims of the candidate have to be
considered for award of the marks for grant of permit. It is made clear that
this declaration of law is confined to and peculiar of the statutory operation H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A under Section 46 of Act 5 of 1958.
It is then contended that the appellant has been carrying on the
service by orders of stay and that therefore, at the distance of time it
requires interference. We are afraid that we cannot give countenance to
such contention, as a person who was ineligible for grant of permit cannot
get legitimacy to a grant by order of Court. He should have only statutory
B get the right which alone could be protected by judicial review. ·
It is 11ext contended that in the application made by the respondent
in this Court, the respondent-firm admitted that they are not a position to
carry on the stage carriage service to the public and they wanted to dispose
of one of the permits granted to it with the permission of the Court. That
C would show that the respondent is not in a position to carry on the
operation of the service catering to the travelling needs of the public and
that, cherefore, it is a case for interference. We cannot accede to the
contention. Several grounds have been give in support of the permission
for alienation of one of the permits, but the permit in question is not the
one in respect of which the permission was sought for. Under these
D circumstances, we do not find any justification warranting interference with
the order of the High Court and the Appellate Tribunal.
It is then contended that in view of the change in law by operation
of Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 and the Special Law made by the State of
Tamil Nadu .in Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles (Special Provisions) Act, 1992
(Act 41 of 1992) validating the renewals of all the permits granted, since
E the appellant has been carrying on the permit by obtaining the renewals, it
may be permitted to carry on the permit. We cannot given any direction it
ll'ay be open to the appellant to approach the appropriate authority in
accordance with law with would be considered and disposed of.
T:1e appeal is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances,
without costs.
A.G. Appeal dismissed.
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