Holding

The dismissal of Constable Ramvir Singh from service was proper, proportionate, and not subject to interference, and the appellant's raised contentions were barred as they were not earlier presented.

Summary

Constable Ramvir Singh of the Border Security Force was convicted of disobeying orders, withholding official dak and, while in internal custody, refusing meals and pack drill. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven days of rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service. He challenged the dismissal on grounds of disproportionate punishment, denial of the right to counsel under Rule 157, and alleged discrimination vis-\u00e0-vis another constable, but the High Court dismissed his writ petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct, that the doctrine of proportionality could not be invoked, and that the appellant’s contentions were barred because they were not raised before the High Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the dismissal from service upheld.

Issues considered

The propriety and proportionality of dismissal from service for the appellant's misconduct
Whether the doctrine of proportionality under Article 226 can be invoked in service disciplinary matters
Whether the appellant was denied the right to engage counsel under Rule 157 of the BSF Rules, 1969
Whether the claim of discrimination against another constable, not raised before the High Court, is maintainable
Whether the appellant's refusal to take food and pack drill while in custody falls within the ambit of misconduct under Section 22 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968

Legislation cited

Army Act, 1950s. 41
Border Security Force Act, 1968s. 117, s. 22
Border Security Force Rules, 1969s. Rule 157

Subjects

dismissal from serviceproportionality doctrineBorder Security Forceservice lawdisciplinary actionright to counselSection 22Article 226military disciplinemisconduct

Judgment

[2008] 16 S.C.R. 1112

A EX. CONSTABLE RAMVIR SINGH
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...
(Criminal Appeal No. 2061 of 2008)

DECEMBER 18, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

Service Law - Dismissal - Punishment of seven days
imprisonment for disobeying orders of Authority and
\. ~
c'withholding official Dak for three days - During imprisonment
refusing to take food and refusing to do pack drill - Trial -
Accused pleaded guilty - Dismissal from service - Held: In
the fac;ts of the case punishment of dismissal is proper - The
punishment is not· disproportionate to the offence - Border
Security Force Act, 1968 - ss. 22 - Border Security Force
D Rules, 1969 - r. 157.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of proportionality -
Invoking of - Held: The doctrine can be invoked by superior
courts - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226. /'

E Practice and Procedure - Plea - Raising of- For the first
time before Supreme Court - Permissibility - Held: Not
permissible.
Plea - Whether raised before Court - Ascertainment of
....:. Held: To be ascertained from the judgment - If the plea
F raised not dealt with by the Court, the remedy available is to
move that particular court.
Judicial Interference - Interference with quantum of
punishment in service matters - Held: Superior courts
ordinarily not to interfere with quantum of punishment unless
G the punishment is shockingly disproportionate.
Appellant-a 'constable with Border Security Force;
allegedly did not ·report to duty as per direction of his
superior officer, after collecting official Oak. Enquiry was
initiated against him. He was awarded 7 days RI in view
: H 1112
EX. CONSTABLE RAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1113
ORS.

of the fact that such offence was committed by him for · A
the second time. While in custody he refused to take
meals and refused to do pack drill in defiance of authority.
He was put to trial where he pleaded guilty. He was
dismissed from service. His statutory petition was
rejected by the authorities concerned. Writ Petition B
thereagainst was dismissed by High Court negating the
pleas that the appellant ·was not given opportunity of
service of counsel; and that the punishment imposed

... ' was disproportionate.
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended intera\ia c
that as no action was taken against another constable
who had also absented from duties with him, entire '
proceedings were vitiated in law; and that the
misconduct committed in the prison did not come within ,
purview of misconduct.
D
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The plea that the appellant was
discriminated against vis-a-vis the other constable who
had gone alongwith him to collect the official Oak, having
not been raised by him before the High Court, it is not E
possible to consider the contention which has been
raised for the firsftime. Even if such a contention had
been raised in th~ writ p~tition, but it does not appear
from the ,impugned judgment that the same was pressed .
before the High Court. This Cou_rt is bound by the
Judge's record. If the High Court, despite raising a F
contention in that behalf did ,rot dear therewith, the only, ·
remedy available to the appellant was to move the High
Court drawing its attention thereto. Apart from the fact !

'that the said procedure was not adopted by appellant,
even before this Court neither the counsel appearing in G
the High Court nor the appellant, affirmed any affidavit 1

that such a contention, in fact, had been raised before the
High Court. It is, therefore, not possible to accept that the
1

contention as regards the discrimination against the '
H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A appellant vis-a-vis the other constable was raised. [Para
9] (1119-A-D]
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982) "
2 sec 462, Relied on.
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mm (P) Ltd.
8 (2003) 2 SCC 111 and Dhanabhai Khalasi v. State of Gµjarat
(2007) 4 sec 241, referred to.
2. Appellant did not raise any c·ontention before the
Summary Security Force Court that he intended to
consult a lawyer or to select a friend of his choice as
C provided for in Rule 157 of Border Security Force Rules,
1969. The High Court, therefore, has rightly opined that
such a contention cannot be permitted to be raised. (Para
11] (1120-F-G]
3.1. The doctrine of proportionality in a given case
D may be invoked by the Superior Courts in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In the facts of the present case, however, the said
doctrine should not have been invoked. Appellant was in . ,.;

uniform service. BSF is a disciplinary force. Appellant
E pleaded guilty to both the charges. He could not show
any mitigating circumstances. He had committed a similar
offence earlier. He had been asked to report back to duty
as he had been carrying a bank draft, which was
necessary for payment of the electricity bill as it was
F required to be deposited by the due date. He not only
disobeyed the said order but also in fact reported three
days after the date he was asked to arrive. 'Except the
cases where the punishment is shockingly i ·-
,disproportionate, the Superior c·ourts would not
ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment.
G [Paras 12, 13 and 20] [1121-D, G, H; 1122-A-B; 1126-A]
Union of India vs. Narain Singh (2002) 5 SCC 11 and
The Managing Director State Bank .of Hyderabad & Anr. vs.
P. Kata Rao (2008) 6 SCALE 575, relied on.
H 3.2. A punishment of simplicitor dismissal from
EX. CONSTABLE RAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1115
ORS~

service, in a situation as in the instant case, cannot, A
however, be held to be disproportionate to the gravity of
misconduct. The appellant pleaded guilty. It was an
unconditional plea. He might have offered an explanation,
but as it was not found to be correct, he should have
proved the same. No medical record was produced to 8
show that he had been suffering from any kind of ailment.
Evidently, he refused to take meals only as a measure of
protest when he had been imposed a sentence of seven
days R.I. He was. bound to follow the rules. He is

' presumed to know the consequences of violation thereof.
It may or may not be that he committed acts of
insubordination by not taking food but he did not even
C

participate in the pack drilling, which, concededly, is
imperative. It is, therefore, not a case where the High
Court could come to the conclusion that the punishment
imposed is shocking to the conscience. [Paras 12 and 15] o
[1121-A-C; 1123-B]
Union of India and Ors. vs. Datta Unga Toshatwad (2005)
13 sec 709, relied on.
Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India and Ors. (1987) 4 SCC
611, referred to. E
4. Section 22 of the Act is wide in nature. It is neither
in dispute nor doubt that even a person while in custody
would be subject to the Act. The custody of the appellant
was an internal custody ,1 he having been imposed with
punishment. It is not a case where a prisoner is governed F
,. by a separate set of legislation. It is also not a case where
-\
.a prisoner is sent to an independent authority. Even while
he is in custody, he is a member of the force. He,
therefore, in terms of clause (e) of Section 22 of the Act
neglected to obey any general, local or other order. Even G
while in custody a member of the force serving the
sentence would still be an officer of the Force. [Para 19]
[1125-F-H]
Case Law Reference:
(1982) 2 sec 462 Relied on. Para 10 H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
)
.
A (2003) 2 sec 111 Referred to. Para 10
(2001) 4 sec 241 Referred to. Para 10
~
(1987) 4 sec 611 ,Referred to. Para 12 I

c2002) 5 sec 11 Relied on. Para 16
(2005) 13 sec 109 Relied on. Para 17
B (2008) 6 SCALE 575 Relied on. Para 21
:--
CRIMINAL APPELLAflE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2061 of 2008.
From the Judgment & Orderdated 23.5.2006 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Writ
,.
c Petition No. 872 of 2003.
Shiv Prakash Pandey and Ambika Das for the Appellant.
A. Sharan, ASG, Sunita Sharma and Sushma Suri for the
Respondents.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J.1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant is before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied
with the judgment and order dated 23.5.2006 passed by the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing the
E writ petition filed by him questioning an order of the Summary
SecuritY- Force Court dated 8.9.2002 whereby and whereunder
a sentence of dismissal from service was imposed.
3. Appellant, at all mater\al times, was working as a
constable in the Border Security Force. At the relevant time,
F he was posted at 24 Bn. BSF at Jodhpur. His duty, inter alia,
was collection of official, dak from Central Diary, FHQ BSF, New ~
..,..
..,

Delhi through SHQ BSF Amritsar. He was sent to SHQ BSf
Amritsar along with one 'Kalipada Mandal'. He had been given .
an authority letter with an electricity bill. He was directed to I
G .collect bank draft prepared in respect of the said bill by PAD
well in advance, otherwise to report to the Unit immediately. The
Oak was collected from the Central Diary. They reached at their
l
destination on 31.7.2000; collected the Oak from Central Diary, 4 ..1
FHQ BSF New Belbi on 3.8.2000. Appellant informed the
Second-in-Command on phone on 3.8.2000 that some unit
H

'
EX. CONSTABLE RAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1117
ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

drafts were to be collected from PAD. As 5th and 6th August, A
2000 were holidays, appellant was directed to report back
forthwith by boarding the evening train from Amritsar on
3.8.2000 as he had official Oak in his possession. He did not
do so although he had already collected the official Oak.
He reported for duty on 7.8.2000. An enquiry was initiated. B
He could not give a satisfactory reply before the Co.mmandant.
He was awarded 7 days' Rigorous Imprisonment (RI) in the
custody of the force for absence without leave. The said
- J punishment was imposed .as the offence was committed by him
for the second time during service. According to respondents, c
earlier he had committed the following offences.
"1. Disobeyed the lawful command of then 21 C of his
Unit.
2. Kept official Oak with him for 4 days.
3. Absented himself from duty for 4 days." D
While in the custody of the force, he is said to have
committed the following offences:
"a. Refused to take meals w.e.f. 10/08/2000 to 11/08/
2000 in protest of punishment.
E
b. Refused to do the pack drill on all seven days while
undergoing RI, which is total defiance of authority."
He was put to t~ial before a Summary Security Force Court
on the aforementioned two charges in terms of the provisions
of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 (for short, "the Act") and F
the rules framed thereunder.
4. He pleaded guilty to both the charges. He was
dismissed from service. A statutory petition filed by him under
Section 117 of the Act was rejected by the Director General of
Border Security Force by an order dated 28.6.2001. Legality G
and/ or validity of the said order came to be questioned by the
appellant by filing a Writ Petition before the Punjab & Haryana
High Court at Chandigarh which was marked as Criminal Writ
Petition No. 872 of 2003.
5. Before the Hi9h Court. principally two contentions were H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A raised, (1) he had not been giv~n an opportunity to engage the
services of a counsel, and (2) the punishment imposed is
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence charged against.
6. Both the said contentions were rejected by the High
Court by reason of the impugned judgment.
B 7. Mr. Shiv Prakash Pandey, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant apart from the contentions raised
before the High Court, urged:
f

"-
I
i. As 'Kali pad a Mand al', another constable of the
Border Security Force having also absented from
c the duties and no action having been taken against
him, the entire proceeding against appellant is
vitiated in law.
ii. The purpor1ed misconduct having been committed
by appellant while he was in prison, it does not
D come within the purview of 'misconduct' within the
meaning of Section 22 of the Act. ·
"'
\-
8. Mr. A S~aran, learned Additional Solicitor General, on
~ ~
the other hand, submitted:
i. Appellant being in uniform service, where discipline ,
E 'r
is considered to be of utmost importance, and in
view of the indisciplined conduct on the part of the
appellant, it is not a case where he deserves a "·
lesser punishment.
, F ii. The plea that he was not permitted to engage a
counsel has never been raised by appellant and as
admittedly, in terms of Rule 157 of the Border
Security Force Rules, 1969, one Shri Ashim
Biswas, Assistant Commandant was detailed as a
friend of the accused in the trial, the same should
G not be allowed to be raised. ·
iii. Appellant pleaded guilty to both the charges; he did
not adduce any evidence; he purported to have ,J ,__

offered an~explanation that he was suffering fro11t
stomachache and, therefore, he could neither take
H any food nor could participate in the pack drilling.
EX. CONSTABLE RAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1119
ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

which have been found to be incorrect, this Court A
should not interfere with the impugned judgment.
,; 9. The question as to whether he was discriminated
against vis-a-vis the aforementioned Kalipada Manda! having
not been raised by him before the High Court, we are of the
opinion that it is not possible for us to consider the said B
contention which has been raised for the first time. Mr. Pandey
submitted that such a contention had been raised in the Writ
Petition. It might have been raised but it does not appear from
the impugned judgment that the same was pressed before the
High Court. This Court is bound by the Judge's record. If the c
High Court, as contended by Mr. Pandey, despite raising a
contention in that behalf did not deal therewith, the only remedy
available to him was to move the High Court drawing its
attention thereto. Apart from the fact that the said procedure
was not adopted by appellant, even before us, neither the
counsel appearing in the High Court nor the appellant, affirmed D
any affidavit that such a contention, in fact, had been raised
before the High Court. It is, therefore, not possible for us to
....
accept that the contention as regards the discrimination against
the appellant vis-a-vis the said Kalipada Manda! was raised.
10. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak E
[(1982) 2 SCC 462], this Court held:
"4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-
General to the concession made before the High Court._
Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra
before the High Court and led the arguments for the F
respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay
before us intervened and protested that he never made any
such concession and invited us to peruse the written
submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid
that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired G
in the High. Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars
us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record
~
are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges
•
cannot be dragged into the arena. 'Judgments cannot be
treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.' (Per H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
~

A Lord Atkinson in Somasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian
Chetty.) We are bound to accept the statement of the
Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired
in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to "
be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and
B other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that
something was done, said or admitted before theni, that
has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well
settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the

c
hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are
conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict
such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party
' -
thinks- that the happenings in court have been wrongly ,...
recorded in ajudgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while
the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call
the attention of the very Judges who have made the record
....
D to the fact that the statement made with regard to his
conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per
Lord Buckmaster in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v.
Chandrabati Chowdhrain.) That is the only way to have the
record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must I'

E necessarily end there. Of course a party may r-esile and
an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate
cases to resile frorh a concession on the ground that the
concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law ,,,...
and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in
question the very fact of making the concession as
r-
recorded in the judgment."
.'
[See also Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill I'
I
(P) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111 and Dhanabhai KhfJ./asi v. State of
Gujarat, (2007) 4 SCC 241]

G 11. Appellant did not even raise any contention before the
Summary Security Force Court that he intended to consult a
lawyer or to select a friend of his choice as provided for in Rule
157 of the Rules. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, has
). ......
rightly opined that such a contention cannot be permitted to be
~
raised.
H
EX. CONSTABLE RAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1121
ORS. [S.8. SINHA, J.]

12. So far as the question of imposition of disproportionate A
punishment on the appellant is concerned, suffice it to note that
he pleaded guilty. It was an unconditional plea. He might have
offered an explanation, but as it was not found to be correct;
he should have proved the same. No medical record was
produced to show that he had been suffering from any kind of B
ailment. Evidently, he refused to take meals only as a measure
of protest when he had been imposed a sentence of seven
days R.I. He was bound to follow the rules. He is presumed to
know the consequences of violation thereof. It may or may not
be that he committed acts of insubordination by not taking food C
but he did not even participate in the pack drilling, which,
concededly, is imperative. It is, therefore, not a case where the
High Court could come to the conclusion that the punishment
imposed is shocking to the conscience.
The doctrine of proportionality in a given case may be
invoked by the Superior Courts in exercise of its jurisdiction D
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was so held in
Ranjit Thakur vs. Union oflndia & Ors. [(1987) 4 SCC 611],
stating:
"25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed
against a decision, but is directed against the "decision E
making process". The question of the choice and quantum
of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It .
should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to F
shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part
of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even
on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive
province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court G
even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,
then the sentence would not be immune from correction.
Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of
judicial review ... "
13. In the facts of the present case, however, we are of the H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 17 S.C.R.
I'

A opinion that the said doctrine should not have-been invoked.
Appellant was in uniform service. BSF is a disciplinary force.
Appellant pleaded guilty to both the charges. He could riot show >.
'
any mitigating circumstances, He had committed a similar
offence earlier. He !tad been asked to report back to duty as
8 he had-been carrying a bank draft, which was necessary for
payment of the electricity bill as it was required to be deposited
by the due date. He not only disdbeyed the said order but also
in fact reported three days after the date he was asked to arrive
at Amritsar. In any event, we are not concerned with the ...,
'
justification of imposition of the sentence or the quantum thereof
c in the disciplinary proceedings. The order imposing the said
sentence is not in question before us. The purported harsh
~
punishment as submitted by Mr. Pandey is, therefore, not a
matter of which we can take cognizance at this stage.
14. The question as to wmether refusal to take food by itself ..
D would come within the purview of Section 41 ¢>f the Army Act,
1950, this Court in Ranjit Thakur(supra) heldt
"The submission that a disregard of an order to eat food
,
does not by itself amount to a disobedience to a lawful
command for purposes of Section 41 has to be\examined
E in the context of the imperatives of the high and rigorous
discipline to be maintained in the Armed Forces. Every
aspect of life of a soldier is regulated by discipline. ,.,-
Rejection of food might, under circumstantes, amount to
an indirect expression of remonstrance and resentment
F against the higher authority. To say that, a mere refusal to
eat food is an innocent, neutral act might be an over- ,,-
)

simplification of the matter. Mere in-action need not always I

necessarily be neutral. Serious acts of caJutnny could be }
done in silence. A disregard of a direction to accept food
G might assume the complexion of disrespect to, and even
defiance of authority. But an unduly harsh and cruel
reaction to the expression of the injured feelings may be

H
counter-productive and even by itself be sub verse of
discipline. Appellant was perhaps expressing his anguish
at, what he considered, an unjust and disproportionate
)

....
"
EX. CONSTABL!= RAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1123
ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J,)'

punishment for airing his grievances before his superior A
officers."
It was not a case where the quantum of punishment, tor
violating the regulation applicable to the inmates of a prison was
involved. Therein the delinquent employee was sentenced to
one year's R.I. and further dismissed from service with the B
added disqualification of being declared unfit for any future civil
employment. The charge of misconduct that he refused to eat
his food was found to be strikingly disproportionate.
15. A punishment of simplicitor dismissal from service, in
I a situation of this nature, cannot, however, be held to be C
disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct.
16. In Union of India vs. Narain Singh [(2002) 5 SCC 11],
this Court held:
"7. This Court has, in the case of Union of India v. Sardar
Bahadur[(1972) 4 SCC 618], held that there are limits of D
the powers which can be exercised by a Single Judge
under Article 226 of the Constitution and, similarly, there
are limits to the powers of a Division Be,nch while sitting
in appeal over the judgment of a Single Judge. This Court
has held that where there are relevant materials which E
support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the
function of the High Court to arrive at an independent
finding. It has been held that if an enquiry has been properly
held the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence
cannot be canvassed before the High Court. F
8. In the case of Apparel Eyiort Promotion Council v.
A.K. Chopra [(1999) 1 SCC 159], it has been held by this
Court that it is within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority to decide what punishment is to be imposed and
the question of punishment is outside the purview of High G
Court's interference unless it is so disproportionate to the
proved misconduct as to shock the conscious of the Court.
It has been held that reduction of sentence by the High
Court would have a demoralising effect and would be a
retrograde step. It has been held that repentance/
H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A unqualified apology at the last appellate stage does not
call for any sympathy or mercy."
--
17. Yet again in Union of India & ors. vs, Datta Linga
7Toshatwad [(2005) 13 SCC 709], this Col!Jrt opined: "
,,..
"8. The present case is not a case of.a constable merely
B overstaying his leave by 12 days. The respondent took
leave from 16.6.1997 and never reported for duty
thereafter. Instead he filed a writ petition before the High
Court in which the impugned order has bee~ passed.

c
Members of the uniformed forces cannot absent
themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature
of the duties enjoined on these forces. Such indiscipline,
I.;
-
if it goes unpunished, will greatly affect the discipline\ of the
forces. In such forces desertion is a serious matter. Cases """""
of this nature, in whatever manner described, are cases ~

D of desertion particularly when there is apprehension of the
member of the force being called upon to perform onerous
duties in difficult terrains or an order of deputation which
he finds inconvenient, is passed. We' cannot take such
matters lightly, particularly w.hen it relates to uniformed ,
forces of this country. A member of a uniformed force who
E overstays his leave by a few days must be able to give a
satisfactory explanation. However, a member of the force
who goes on leave and never reports for duties thereafter,
cannot be said to be one merely overstaying his leave. He
must be treated as a deserter. He appears on the scene
,....
,

F for the first time when he files a writ petition before the High :.
Court, rather than reporting to his Commanding Officer. We
are satisfied that in cases of this nature, dismissal from ,<

the force is a justified disciplinary action and cannot be
described as disproportionate to the misconduct alleged."
G 1-8. The last contention raised on behalf of the appellant
in regard to construction of Section 22 of the Act may now be
considered.

H
Section 22 of the Act reads as under:
"22 - Insubordination and obstruction - Any person
)

...
EX. CONSTABlERAMVIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA & 1125
ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

subject to this Act who commits any of the following A
offences, thatis 'to say,--

• ,i
(a) being concernedlh any quarrel; affray or disorder,
refuses to obey any officer,-though of inferior rank,
who orders him into arrest, or: use.s criminal force
to or assaults any such officer; or B
(b) uses criminal force to, or assaults any person,
whether subject to this Act or not, in whose custody
he is lawfully placed, and whether he is or is not his
superior officer; or
(c) resists an escort whose duty it is to apprehend him C
or to have him in charge; or
(d) breaks out of barracks, camp or quarters; or
(e) neglects to obey any general, local or other order;
or
D
(f) impedes the Force-Police referred to in section 63
or any person lawfully acting on his behalf, or when
called upon, refuses to assist in the execution of his
duty a Poree Police or any perso~ lawfully acting on
his behalf,
E
shall, on conviction by a Security Force Court, be liable to
suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend, in the
case of the offences specified in claus.es (d) and (e), to
.....' two years, and in the case of the offences specified in the
other clauses, to ten years, or in either ~ase such less
F
punishment as is in this Act mentioned."
19. It is wide in nature. It is neither in dispute nor doubt
that even a person while in custody would be subject to the Act.
The custody of the appellant was an internal custody, he having
been imposed with punishment.
G
It is not a case wher~ a prisoner is governed by a separate
set of legislation. It i~ also not a case where a prisoner is sent
to an independent authority. Even while he is in custody, he is
a member of the force. He, therefore, in terms of clause (e) of
Section 22 of the Act neglected to obey any general, local or
H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (2008] 17 S.C.R.

A other order. Even while in custody a member of the force
serving the sentence would still be an officer of the Force.
20. However, itis well known that except the cases where
the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, the Superior
Courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of
s punishment.
21. In The Managing Director State Bank of Hyderabad
& Anr. vs, P. Kata Rao [2008 (6) SCALE 575], this Court held:
"18. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the
jurisdiction of superior courts in interfering with a finding
c of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is limited. The High
Court, it is trite, would also ordinarily not interfere with the
quantum of punishment..."
22. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the judgment
of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed. However, there
shall be no order a~ to costs.
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.

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