Holding

A complaint filed within three years of the alleged offence is not time‑barred; therefore the magistrate’s taking of cognizance was valid and, having found no prima facie case, the FIR and charge‑sheet were quashed.

Summary

The appellant, Ghanshyam Soni, was accused under sections 498A, 34 and 406 IPC for alleged cruelty and dowry demands by his wife, a police officer, with incidents said to have occurred in 1999. The complainant filed a complaint on 3 July 2002, leading to an FIR on 19 December 2002 and a charge‑sheet in 2004, after which the magistrate took cognizance. The appellant contended that the magistrate’s taking of cognizance in 2004 was beyond the three‑year limitation period prescribed by section 468 of the CrPC and that no prima facie case existed against him or his family. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period is computed from the date of filing the complaint, not from the date the magistrate takes cognizance, and that the complaint was within the statutory period. It further found that the FIR and charge‑sheet lacked specific evidence and did not establish a prima facie case, warranting their quash. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Sessions Court order, and quashed the FIR and charge‑sheet under its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Issues considered

Whether cognizance taken by the magistrate after the limitation period prescribed under section 468 CrPC renders the complaint time‑barred.
Whether a prima facie case under section 498A read with section 34 IPC was made out against the appellant and his family.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 468, s. 473
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 406, s. 498A

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the cognizance on the complaint u/ss.498A rw s.34 IPC was taken beyond the limitation period as mandated u/s.468 CrPC; and whether the prima facie case u/ss.498A rw s.34 IPC was made out against the appellant-husband or his family. Headnotes† 1973 – s.468 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 34 – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation – Allegations of cruelty and dowry demand against the appellant-husband and in-laws, by the respondent no.2-wife – Both parties police officer

Subjects

Cognizance on the complaintLimitation periodAllegations of cruelty and dowry demandsChargesheetInordinate delayDischarging the accusedTime-barred caseSessions CourtDate of commission of offenceDate of filing of complaintDivorce decree

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 331 : 2025 INSC 803

Ghanshyam Soni
v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2894 of 2025)
04 June 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the cognizance on the complaint u/ss.498A
rw s.34 IPC was taken beyond the limitation period as mandated
u/s.468 CrPC; and whether the prima facie case u/ss.498A rw s.34
IPC was made out against the appellant-husband or his family.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.468 – Penal Code, 1860 –
ss.498A, 34 – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the
period of limitation – Allegations of cruelty and dowry demand
against the appellant-husband and in-laws, by the respondent
no.2-wife – Both parties police officer – Filing of complaints
by respondent no.2, and withdrawal of one – Thereafter,
respondent no.2 registered FIR against the appellant and
her in-laws for commission of offences u/ss.498A, 406 and
34 and chargesheet was filed – Magistrate framed charges
only u/ss.498A rw s.34 – Revision Petition by the appellant
that allegations against him and his family were false; that
the complaint was lodged after an inordinate delay of 3
years; and that the cognizance on the complaint was taken
beyond the limitation period – Sessions Court discharged
the appellant and the in-laws for the offences u/ss.498A
and 34 holding that the Magistrate took cognizance of time-
barred case – High Court set aside the order passed by the
Sessions Court – Correctness:
Held: For the computation of the limitation period u/s.468 the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of
institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate
takes cognizance – Magistrate is well within his powers to take
cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from

* Author
332 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the date of the commission of offence as mandated u/s.468 –
Simply because the cognizance is taken at a later stage, but the
complaint was filed within the specified period from the commission
of the offence, the complainant cannot be put to prejudice and the
complaint cannot be discarded as time-barred – High Court was
right in holding that considering the date of commission of offence
and the date of filing of complaint, the complaint was lodged by
the complainant within the period of limitation of three years as per
s.468 – Not a case where the complaint or the issuance of process
is ex-facie barred by limitation – Magistrate rightly took cognizance
of the offence u/s.498A and the question of applicability or exercise
of powers u/s.473 CrPC does not arise – Furthermore, the scrutiny
of the allegations in the FIR and the material on record reveals
that no prima facie made out against the appellant or his family –
Divorce decree of their marriage, has already been passed, and has
attained finality – Upon consideration of the relevant circumstances
and that the alleged incidents pertain to the year 1999 and since
then the parties have moved on with their respective lives, it would
be unjust and unfair if the appellants are forced to go through the
tribulations of a trial – In the interest of justice, and in exercise of
power u/Art.142, the FIR and the chargesheet are quashed and
set aside. [Paras 11-19]

Case Law Cited
Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. [2010] 9 SCR
1168 : [2010] 7 SCC 667; Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh [2003] 8 SCC 559; Kamatchi v. Lakshmi
Narayanan [2022] 15 SCC 50 – relied on.
K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary,
Department of Home & Ors. (2018) 14 SCC 452; Jaydedeepsinh
Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 960 :
[2024] 12 SCR 439; Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025
INSC 671; Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana &
Anr., 2024 INSC 953 : [2024] 12 SCR 559; Sarah Mathew v. Institute
Cardio Vascular Diseases by Its Director Dr. K. M. Cherian & Ors.
[2013] 12 SCR 674 : [2014] 2 SCC 62 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 333

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

List of Keywords
Cognizance on the complaint; Limitation period; Allegations of
cruelty and dowry demands; Chargesheet; Inordinate delay;
Discharging the accused; Time-barred case; Sessions Court; Date
of commission of offence; Date of filing of complaint; Divorce decree.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2894 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.04.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No. 1227 of 2009
With
Criminal Appeal No. 2895 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Appellant:
Yusuf.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Anita
Sahani, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, B K Satija, Kamlendra Mishra,
Udai Khanna, Siddharth Sinha, Tathagat Sharma, Raman Yadav,
Ms. Sunanda Shukla, Jasmeet Singh, Saif Ali, Pushpendra Singh
Bhadoriya, Vijay Sharma, Pranav Menon, Saurav.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The captioned Appeal is filed assailing the Impugned Judgment/Final
Order dt. 01.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl. MC
No. 1227/2009 whereby the Order/Judgment dt. 04.10.2008 passed
by Additional Sessions Judge Delhi (“Sessions Court”) in CR No.
87/2008 discharging the Appellant for the offence u/s 498A Indian
Penal Code, 1860 in FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered
with PS Malviya Nagar, was set aside.
334 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

3. The criminal machinery was set in motion with the Complaint
dt. 03.07.2002 filed by the Complainant wife/Respondent no.2
culminating into the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered
with PS Malviya Nagar, against the Appellant husband and her in-
laws for commission of offences under sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC.
The factual conspectus is briefly stated as under:
3.1 As per the FIR, the marriage between the Appellant husband
and the Complainant wife, Respondent no. 2 herein was
solemnized on 28.02.1998 according to Buddhist rites and
ceremonies. It is averred that the entire cost of the ceremonies
had been arranged by the Complainant, according to the best
of their financial abilities. At the time, both the parties were
serving as Sub-Inspectors with the Delhi Police.
3.2 It is alleged that soon after her marriage, the Complainant learnt
about the greedy and abusive nature of the Appellant and his
family members, who constantly taunted her and ridiculed her
for bringing insufficient dowry. Purportedly, the mother-in-law,
Smt. Bhagwati and five of her sisters-in law, namely Geeta,
Lata, Misiya, Hemlata and Gayatri constantly fueled conflict,
and instigated the Appellant against the Complainant. The
father-in-law hurled abuses at the Complainant and her family,
allegedly saying that their family had adopted Buddhism to
simply evade the traditions of dowry.
3.3 The Appellant and his family consistently raised demands for
more dowry and allegedly made a specific demand for Rs. 1.5
Lakhs in cash, a Car and a separate house for the Appellant
amongst other petty things. The Complainant averred that
despite serious effort, her father was unable to meet the said
demands which led to her being subjected to serious physical &
mental atrocities at the hands of her husband and in-laws.
3.4 It is alleged that on 27.04.1999, the Appellant husband and her
mother-in-law, Smt. Bhagwati had beaten up the Complainant
with fists, blows for not fulfilling their needs. The Complainant
who hurt her wrist in the incident, had to put on a bandage
for a month, and her parents took her to their house, where
she remained on medical rest for twenty days. However, even
after her return from her parental home with Rs. 50,000/- in
cash, her late father-in-law and her sisters in law (except one)
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 335

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

berated her for her inability to fulfill their demands and being
a burden on the family.
3.5 On 04.09.1999, the Appellant allegedly took out a dagger and
threatened the Complainant that he would kill her if she failed
to fulfill the demands, particularly that of his sister. It is alleged
that on 05.09.1999, the sister-in-law, Ms. Lata had allegedly
threatened the Complainant in front of the father-in-law and the
Appellant husband that since she is to return to her house in
Jaipur in 2-3 days, her demand of a “mangalsutra” be fulfilled
within 2 days, or else the 3rd day would be the last day for
the Complainant in that house. Since she was not able to
fulfill the demands, the Complainant was allegedly beaten
up and thrown out of the matrimonial house on 08.09.1999.
The Complainant was not allowed to take with her any of her
belongings including her own motorcycle, jewelery or clothes
and was left to fend for herself. Aggrieved, she reported the
incidents of cruelty and filed a Complaint on the same day
with PS Prasad Nagar, Delhi vide DD No. 31 dt. 08.09.1999.
It is the case of the Complainant that since the incident, she
had been living with her parents.
3.6 It is further alleged that on 06.12.1999, the Complainant while
returning from her shift at the Palam Airport was allegedly
beaten up by the Appellant, who threatened her to withdraw
the earlier Complaint alleging domestic violence against him
and his family. The Complainant, who was pregnant at the
time, had allegedly hit the railing and purportedly sustained
an injury on the right side of the ear. She reported the incident
by filing a Complaint at PS Palam Airport vide DD No. 35
dated 06.12.1999.
3.7 The Complainant gave birth to a daughter on 27.04.2000.
It is alleged that neither the Appellant nor any of his family
members came to visit her or their new-born daughter at the
hospital or at her parents’ house. Even at that stage, when
the Complainant was in dire need, the Appellant or his family
did not return her belongings. The Complainant alleges that
the Appellant, who did not bother to visit her own daughter,
assaulted the Complainant wife during the advanced stage
of pregnancy and did not incur any expenditure towards the
336 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

birth of the child, and yet enjoyed paternity leave for more
than 15 days from the Department.
3.8 On 03.07.2002, the Complainant filed a formal Complaint
with the Deputy Commissioner of Police, CAW Cell, New
Delhi through proper channels, wherein she gave elaborate
details of the alleged incidents and the torture meted out to
her since her marriage on 28.02.1998. Pursuant to the said
Complaint, FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 was registered
at PS Malviya Nagar, under sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC
against the Appellant husband and her in-laws.
3.9 The Charge-sheet in the captioned case was filed on 27.07.2004
under sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC and the Metropolitan
Magistrate, Delhi (“Magistrate”) took cognizance on the very
same day. Vide Order dt. 04.06.2008, the Magistrate framed
charges under section 498A read with Section 34 IPC and
dropped the charge under section 406 IPC.
3.10 Aggrieved by the Order dt. 04.06.2008 passed by the
Magistrate, the Appellant filed Criminal Revision Petition No.
87/2008 before the Sessions Court, Delhi. Apart from the
submissions that the allegations against him and his family
are false, it was the assertion of the Appellant that the alleged
incidents of cruelty pertain to the year 1999, whereas she
lodged a Complaint on 03.07.2002 after an inordinate delay of
3 years. It was averred that the cognizance on the Complaint
was only taken on 27.07.2004, which is beyond the limitation
period as provided under section 468 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”).
3.11 The Sessions Court vide Order dt. 04.10.2008 within its powers
of revision, discharged the Appellant, his mother and her five
sisters for the offences under section 498A & 34 IPC. It was
observed that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of a time-
barred case as cognizance was taken on 27.07.2004 of the
alleged incidents of cruelty pertaining to the year 1999 i.e.
after five (05) years of the commission of the alleged offence,
whereas the limitation period for an offence punishable under
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 337

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

Section 498A is three (03) years.1 The Sessions Court held that
the Magistrate did not have the inherent powers to condone
delay under section 473 CrPC at the time of framing of charges,
and even if it was authorized to condone such delay, it could
not have done so in the present case where the chances of
false implication of the Appellants were apparent.
3.12 The Sessions Court further remarked that the possibility of
false implication cannot be ruled out since the Complainant
wife was a police officer trained to tackle tough and high-
pressure situations and such an offence in question could
not have been committed against her. The said remarks are
reproduced as under:
“In the present case unlike the Ramesh’s case
(supra) relied upon by the learned trial court in the
impugned order the complainant is a police officer and
is supposed to be a tough person used to deal with
hard situations, by virtue of her job which includes her
handling the criminals besides tough and hard job of
police officer. Such a strong-and tough person is not
only almost immune to be pressurized but also can be
harsh and strong in reaction to other persons going
against her-wishes. A woman police officer knowing
the law and rules pertaining to crime detection and
investigation and trial before court, therefore, cannot
be equated to an .oppressed housed wife who is
subjected to cruelty by her husband and in laws and
the aforesaid observation in Arun Vyas’s case seems
to apply to such a wife and not to a strong woman
police officer wife dealing with hardened criminals
daily in discharge of her official duties. However, it
cannot always be a case that a woman wife working
in police is an aggressor and not subject to cruelty.
She can also be subjected to cruelty by her husband
and in laws. But when she being conversant with law
on the subject has roped in the five sisters which
include four married sisters of her husband besides

1 Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
338 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

aged mother in law and father in law (since deceased)
of the complainant, the possibility of false implication
of accused persons cannot be ruled out particularly
when as per the statement u/s 161 CrPC of mother
of complainant, the complainant wife came to her
parents in September 199 due to marriage of her
sister but accused husband did not take her back to
matrimonial home. When the Complainant wife is in
full know of investigation procedure and law and by
living separate from the revisionists since September
1999 has lodged FIR/Complaint in 2002, there
certainly is unexplained delay in lodging the FIR.”
3.13 Aggrieved thereby, the Complainant filed the Petition under
section 482 CrPC assailing the Judgement dt. 04.10.2008
before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court vide Impugned
Judgment and final Order dt. 01.04.2024 allowed the Petition,
and set aside the Order dt. 04.10.2008 passed by the Sessions
Court, observing that the findings of the Sessions Court were
perverse.
3.14 The captioned Appeal is against the Impugned Judgment and
final Order dt. 01.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi.
During the course of the proceedings before this Court, the
Appellant has also filed an Application under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India seeking quashing of the FIR No. 1098/2002
dt. 19.12.2002.
4. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellants that the High Court
had erred in setting aside the Order dt. 04.10.2008 passed by the
Sessions Court, which was well-reasoned and passed after due
consideration of the material on record. It was vehemently argued
that the present case was time-barred and the Magistrate could not
have taken cognizance in light of the bar under Section 468 CrPC.
Also, the Magistrate after taking cognizance on 27.07.2004 could not
have reviewed its own order, subsequently at the stage of framing
of charges.
5. Even otherwise, it was contended that the Magistrate can only
condone the said delay only at the time of taking cognizance and in
terms of section 473 CrPC, only after a proper explanation of delay.
It is borne from the record that the first complaint by the Complainant
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 339

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

was lodged on 08.09.1999 and undisputedly, the Complainant has
been residing separately since then. The second Complaint was
filed on 06.12.1999 which was withdrawn by the Complainant on
12.12.1999, and it was only on a Complaint filed on 03.07.2002 that
the captioned FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 was registered. It
was argued that since all the three Complaints mention the same
incidents of cruelty in the year 1999, there is no explanation with
regard to the inordinate delay in filing the FIR dt. 19.12.2002, more
than three years after the alleged incidents and the delay could not
have been condoned for any reason whatsoever. It has been urged
by the learned counsel that the allegations in the FIR are false, and
no prima facie case can be made out against the Appellant or his
family, even after the perusal of the material on record.
6. Per contra, it is argued by the learned counsel for the Complainant/
Respondent no. 2 that it cannot be assumed at this stage when the
trial is yet to commence that the Complaints filed by her are false,
simply because she is a police officer. Since there were specific
allegations against the Appellant of physically and mentally harassing
the complainant, it was argued that the Sessions Court could not
have discharged him without the Appellant standing the test of trial.
7. It was further argued that the last alleged offence was committed
on 06.12.1999, and complaints were filed both on 06.12.1999 and
03.07.2002 which is well-within the three year limitation period in
terms of section 468 CrPC. The relevant date to compute the limitation
period under the said provision is the date of filing of the Complainant
or date of institution of proceedings, and even otherwise, an offence
under section 498A is a continuing offence, and there are serious
allegations made against the Appellant and his family, even after
September or December 1999.
8. Learned counsel for the State also supports the case of the
prosecution and has prayed for the dismissal of the Appeal.
9. We have heard Learned counsel for the parties and have carefully
perused the material on record.
10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the
complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental
and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient dowry. The
Complainant refers to few instances of such atrocities, however
the allegations are generic, and rather ambiguous. The allegations
340 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped
in, is that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass
the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing
enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment
or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the
five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and
demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but
there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation
has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he being
a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant, and
was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are
merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate
a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason
alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with
the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible
and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State
of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home
& Ors.2, fits perfectly to the present scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against
the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial
disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband
should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations
unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime
are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled
against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and
the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from
the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place,
there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather
produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of
“cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case
of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat3
and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh.4 The Complainant
has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports,
x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We

2 (2018) 14 SCC 452
3 2024 INSC 960
4 2025 INSC 671
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 341

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second
Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is
also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry
allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the investigative
agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.
12. In this respect, the Sessions Court has applied its judicial mind to
the allegations in the FIR & the material on record, and has rightly
discharged the Appellants of the offences under section 498A & 34
IPC. Notwithstanding the said observation by the Sessions Court that
the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out, the discharge
of the Appellant merely because the Complainant is a police officer is
erroneous and reflects poorly on the judicial decision making, which
must be strictly based on application of judicial principles to the merits of
the case. On the other hand, the High Court vide the Impugned Order
has traversed one step further and overtly emphasised that simply
because the Complainant is a police officer, it cannot be assumed that
she could not have been a victim of cruelty at the hands of her husband
and in-laws. We agree with the sensitive approach adopted by the High
Court in adjudicating the present case, however a judicial decision
cannot be blurred to the actual facts and circumstances of a case. In
this debate, it is only reasonable to re-iterate that the Sessions Court
in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction and the High Court in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC, must delve into the
material on record to assess what the Complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted
in toto. In the present case, such scrutiny of the allegations in the FIR
and the material on record reveals that no prima facie is made out
against the Appellant or his family. It is also borne from the record
that the divorce decree of their marriage, has already been passed,
and the same has never been challenged by the Complainant wife,
and hence has attained finality. Upon consideration of the relevant
circumstances and that the alleged incidents pertain to the year 1999
and since then the parties have moved on with their respective lives,
it would be unjust and unfair if the Appellants are forced to go through
the tribulations of a trial.
13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an officer of the
State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner, where the
aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one tailor have been arrayed
342 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

as an accused. Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the
allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse legal provisions
has time and again been condemned by this Court. The observations
in Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.5,
Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.6 aptly captures
this concern.
14. In addition, we are also of the considered view that the Complaint dt.
03.07.2002 filed by the Complainant was not time barred and was
filed within the ascribed period of three years from the date of the
commission of the offence. In arguendo, even if the assertion of the
Appellants is considered to be true that the allegations pertain to the
year 1999, and there is no material change from the first Complaint
dt. 08.09.1999 and the final Complaint dt. 03.07.2002, it cannot be
construed that the same was not within the time frame of limitation
simply because cognizance was taken by the Magistrate two years
later vide Order dt. 27.07.2004.
15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation
period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing
of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the
date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.7 The dicta laid down
in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh8 makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within
his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of
three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated
under section 468 CrPC. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:
“50. The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved
party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the
period provided by law and once he takes such action, it
would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told
that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had
not taken an action within the period of limitation. Such
interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would

5 2024 INSC 953
6 (2010) 7 SCC 667
7 Sarah Mathew Vs Institute Cardio Vascular Diseases by Its Director DR K. M. Cherian & Ors. (2014) 2
SCC 62
8 (2003) 8 SCC 559
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 343

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object
of procedural law.
51. The matter can be looked at from different angle also.
Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it
is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting
agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process
and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or
initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of
initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of
limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay
on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or
taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be
penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on
the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may
have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision
is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled
law that a court of law would interpret a provision which
would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the
doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it
vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera
legis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468
of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance
by the court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution.
52. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must
be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating
criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance
by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a court. We,
therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held
that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation
is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/court and not
of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.
53. In the instant case, the complaint was filed within a
period of three days from the date of alleged offence. The
complaint, therefore, must be held to be filed within the
period of limitation even though cognizance was taken by
344 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the learned Magistrate after a period of one year. Since
the criminal proceedings have been quashed by the High
Court, the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly
set aside by directing the Magistrate to proceed with the
case and pass an appropriate order in accordance with
law, as expeditiously as possible.”
16. The following observation in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan9 also
re-iterates the said position, and further holds that simply because
the cognizance is taken at a later stage, but the Complaint was filed
within the specified period from the commission of the offence, the
Complainant cannot be put to prejudice and her Complaint cannot
be discarded as time-barred.
“It is, thus, clear that though Section 468 of the Code
mandates that ‘cognizance’ ought to be taken within the
specified period from the commission of offence, by invoking
the principles of purposive construction, this Court ruled
that a complainant should not be put to prejudice, if for
reasons beyond the control of the prosecuting agency or
the complainant, the cognizance was taken after the period
of limitation. It was observed by the Constitution Bench that
if the filing of the complaint or initiation of proceedings was
within the prescribed period from the date of commission of
an offence, the Court would be entitled to take cognizance
even after the prescribed period was over.”
17. The observations made by the High Court in respect of computation
of the limitation period is the correct appreciation of facts, and it is
right in holding that “considering the date of commission of offence
as 08.09.1999 and the dale of filing of complaint as 03.07.2002, this
Court finds that the Complaint was lodged by the Petitioner within a
period of two years and ten months from the date of commission
of alleged offence, which is within. the period of limitation of three
years as per Section 468 of CrPC.”
18. Therefore, this is certainly not a case where the Complaint or the
issuance of process is ex-facie barred by limitation, that the question

9 (2022) 15 SCC 50
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 345

Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

of condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore clarified that
the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the offence under
section 498A and the question of applicability or exercise of
powers under section 473 CrPC as erroneously observed by the
Sessions Court, does not even arise and need not be delved into
at this stage.
19. In the interest of justice, and in exercise of our powers under Article
142 of the Constitution of India, we deem it fit and appropriate to
quash and set aside the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered
with PS Malviya Nagar and the Chargesheet dt. 27.07.2004.
20. Both the Criminal Appeals are accordingly allowed.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain