Supreme Court of India
GOVERDHAN & ANR.versusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 47
- Decided
- 9 January 2025
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the two appellants, converting them to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part I of Section 304 IPC, and found the mother’s testimony credible and sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Summary
The trial court convicted two brothers, Goverdhan and Rajendra, and their father Chintaram for the murder of Suraj under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, based primarily on the testimony of Suraj's mother, Lata Bai, who was the sole eye‑witness. The High Court upheld the convictions of the brothers but acquitted the father, leading the brothers to appeal alleging a miscarriage of justice due to the delayed and allegedly unreliable testimony of Lata Bai and the hostility of other witnesses. The Supreme Court examined the credibility of Lata Bai’s statement, the effect of delayed recording under Section 161 CrPC, the relevance of hostile and seizure witnesses, and the non‑recovery of the weapons, concluding that her evidence was trustworthy, corroborated by other material, and that the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the lack of a clear motive justified converting the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part I of Section 304 IPC, and rejected the argument that the father’s acquittal should affect the brothers’ convictions. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, confirming the brothers’ convictions under Section 304 IPC and sentencing them to the period already served with a fine.
Issues considered
- The credibility of the mother (PW‑10) as an eye‑witness despite delayed recording and minor inconsistencies
- Whether the delay in recording a statement under Section 161 CrPC renders it unreliable
- The impact of hostile witnesses and seizure witnesses on the prosecution case
- Whether non‑recovery of the weapon of crime defeats the prosecution’s case
- The effect of the father’s acquittal on the convictions of the two brothers
- The appropriate conviction: Section 302 IPC versus Section 304 IPC Part I
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162, s. 280
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 155, s. 3
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304, s. 34
Subjects
s.304 Part I IPCSection 161 CrPCEvidenceArmed assault with deadly weaponsEye witnessMiscarriage of justiceRustic illiterate womanMotiveBodily injuries likely to cause deathConviction convertedStandard of proof in a criminal caseProof based on preponderance of probabilitiesFIRMedical recordHostile witnessSeizure witnessAssessment of evidenceNon-recovery of weapon of crimeTestimony of neighbourAcquitted accusedDemeanour of witness while under examinationReasonable doubt
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 657 : 2025 INSC 47
Goverdhan & Anr.
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 2011)
09 January 2025
[B.R. Gavai, K.V. Viswanathan and
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The two accused-appellants and their father-the third accused, were
convicted by the trial court u/s.302 r/w s.34 IPC for assaulting a
person with deadly weapons causing his death. High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellants while setting aside the conviction of
their father. The complainant (PW-6) who filed the FIR was initially
projected as the eye witness but later turned hostile during the trial
and it was only PW-10 (mother of the deceased) who claimed to
be the eye witness. The conviction of appellants was challenged
in the instant appeal as being illegal causing grave miscarriage
of justice to them.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.304, Part I – Armed assault leading to
death – Testimony of deceased’s mother (a rustic illiterate
woman) trustworthy and reliable – Corroboration from other
evidence – Prosecution case proved beyond reasonable
doubt – However, motive not clearly established, though
appellants fully knew that the bodily injuries caused by them
were likely to cause death – Conviction accordingly converted
from s.302 (by Courts below) to Part I of s.304:
Held: 1. Merely because statement of PW-10, mother of the
deceased, under Section 161 CrPC was recorded belatedly i.e. after
five days which have been duly considered by the High Court and
there are some inconsistencies and embellishments in her testimony
before the trial court, one is not persuaded to take the view that
PW-10 cannot be an eye-witness and her testimony not credible –
No material contradiction between the statement made by her
before the court and the previous statement recorded under Section
161 CrPC could be shown by the defence under Section 162(1)
* Author
658 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and Explanation thereto as to render her testimony doubtful – A
careful perusal of the testimony of PW-10 shows that her narration
of the incident was natural, and trustworthy – PW-10, the mother
of the deceased, though was related to the victim, cannot by any
stretch of imagination be said to be an interested witness – As also
observed by the High Court, there is no reason why the mother
of the victim should falsely implicate the appellants without any
rhyme or reason more so when apparently there was no previous
animosity of PW-10 with any of the appellants – The trial court
after recording the testimony of the PW-10 and on consideration of
the same found her evidence trustworthy and credible – There is
no reason to question the assessment about the credibility of the
witness by the Trial Court which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing above the witness and all other witnesses – Even if there
are certain embellishments and improvements and contradictions
which are of minor nature, the evidence of PW-10 on the whole
does appear to be consistent and there is no cogent reason to
disbelieve her claim that she had witnessed the incident – Thus,
there appears to be no patent illegality in the view taken by the
trial court and the High Court. [Paras 79, 80, 81, 83, 84]
2.1. The evidence which has emerged is that the father PW-5
came to the scene after the assailants appellants had fled – As
far as the mother PW-10 is concerned, on seeing the assault she
ran inside to wake up her husband and when they came out, the
assailants had fled – It cannot be considered to be highly unnatural
for a woman not rushing to intervene and instead seek the help
of a male member (her husband) when there were two persons
with deadly weapons assaulting her. [Para 86]
2.2. The evidence of PW-10, the sole eye witness, a hapless
rustic illiterate woman visited with the vicissitude and tragedy of
her son being fatally assaulted by co-villagers before her own
eyes, has withstood intensive cross examination and judicial
scrutiny – She has answered the questions put to her during her
cross examination with spontaneity without any jitteriness and her
response was natural and not elusive and prevaricating, which all
are signs of truthfulness of the witness – Therefore, her testimony
is trustworthy and reliable – Her evidence finds corroboration from
the admissible part of the evidence of the complainant (PW-6), and
her husband (PW-5) even though they had turned hostile, and the
medical evidence, evidence of the Investigating Officer and other
official witnesses. [Para 87]
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 659
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
3. The Prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants were responsible for the death of the
deceased, for which they were convicted by the trial court under
Section 302 IPC – There is no glaring illegality or perversity in
the findings arrived at the trial court and the High Court causing
any grave miscarriage of justice to the appellants. [Paras 88, 89]
4. The motive for committing the crime has not been clearly
established and proved – However, it is established beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants had caused the death
of the deceased fully knowing that the bodily injuries caused
by the appellants were likely to cause death as the appellants
were armed with deadly weapons, therefore, the appellants are
convicted under Part I of Section 304 IPC – Appellants have
already undergone 10 years 3 months of incarceration – Under
the facts and circumstances, interest of justice will be served if
the appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by
them. [Paras 90, 91, 93 and 94]
Evidence – Standard of proof in a criminal case is not
proof beyond all doubts but only beyond reasonable
doubt – Contradistinction to requirement of proof based on
preponderance of probabilities as in case of civil proceedings.
[Para 20]
Evidence – FIR – Appreciation of:
Held: Though the FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence,
especially, when the Complainant, i.e., PW-6 did not fully support
the contents of the FIR, yet, it cannot be totally ignored and is to
be treated as a relevant circumstance if the same is proved by
other prosecution witness, in this case by PW-14, the SHO who
recorded the report in the form of FIR as stated to him by the
complainant. [Para 30]
Evidence – Armed assault leading to death – Noting made by
the doctor on the medical record – Appreciation of:
Held: Though the medical report was not made immediately after
the incident, it was made without much time gap and it was made
almost contemporaneously with the incident – Further, the medical
record was in conformity with the FIR filed by the complainant, PW-6,
thus corroborating the contents of the FIR in which the appellants
were named as the assailants – Since the FIR was filed soon after
the incident occurred and the names of the appellants were again
660 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
mentioned in the medical record as the assailants within a very
short span of time, there was hardly any scope for fabrication of
evidence and falsely implicating the appellants in the case, as they
were already named in the FIR. [Para 65]
Evidence – Armed assault leading to death – Hostile witness –
Seizure witnesses turning hostile – Effect:
Held: The seizure witnesses have not denied their signatures on
the seizure memo and admitted putting their signatures – Though
both the witnesses have denied having any knowledge of the
actual recovery of the weapons at the instance of the appellants,
their denials do not appear convincing – However, since the IO of
the case, PW-15 had proved the said seizure memos, there is no
reason to hold that there was no seizure that was affected merely
because the two seizure witnesses had turned hostile. [Paras 68, 71]
Evidence – In a trial, the assessment of evidence cannot be
made in a technical manner – Realities of life must be kept
in mind for arriving at the truth. [Para 66]
Evidence – Non recovery of the weapon of crime – Is not fatal
to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction,
if there are direct reliable witnesses. [Para 70]
Evidence – Testimony of police personnel involved in recovery
of articles – Appreciation of. [Para 71]
Evidence – Armed assault leading to death – Untruthful and
evasive testimony of the neighbours:
Held: The testimonies of some neighbours were highly unnatural and
untruthful and they appear to be reluctant to come up with the truth
in order to protect the appellants – Because of the unnaturalness
of the testimonies of these neighbours before the court, which
defy human behaviour, the reasonable inference one can draw is
that these witnesses have been won over – The fact that all these
witnesses had close association with the acquitted father of the two
appellants on account of consumption of ganja also clearly indicates
the influence the latter may have on these witnesses. [Paras 73, 75]
Evidence – Hostile witness – Merely because the witnesses
turn hostile does not necessarily mean that their evidence
has to be thrown out entirely. [Para 76]
Evidence – Armed assault leading to death – Role of acquitted
accused not coming out clearly – Appellants-convicts cannot
be placed at par with the case of acquitted accused:
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 661
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
Held: Just because the father of the Appellants was acquitted will
not warrant their acquittal as there is sufficient and cogent material
evidence against them to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt
whereas the case against the acquitted father of the appellants is
doubtful. [Para 85]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.280 – Demeanour of
witness while under examination – Assessment by trial court –
Ought not be ignored by the Appellate Court. [Para 82]
Words and Phrases – “reasonable doubt” – Meaning of
reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely
possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. [Paras 21, 22]
Case Law Cited
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12
SCC 395; State of Haryana v. Bhagirath [1999] 3 SCR 529 : (1999)
5 SCC 96; Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [1974]
1 SCR 489 : (1973) 2 SCC 793; Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh
[2012] 6 SCR 517 : (2012) 11 SCC 181; Leela Ram (Dead)
through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana [1999] Supp. 3 SCR
435 : (1999) 9 SCC 525; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat [1983] 3 SCR 280 : (1983) 3 SCC 217; Appabhai v.
State of Gujarat (1988) Supp. SCC 241; Prabhu Dayal v. State
of Rajasthan (2018) 8 SCC 127; State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj [1999]
Supp. 4 SCR 286 : (2000) 1 SCC 247; Rakesh v. State of U.P.
[2021] 6 SCR 874 : (2021) 7 SCC 188; Karamjit Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.) [2003] 3 SCR 25 : (2003) 5 SCC 291; Gangadhar
Behera v. State of Orissa [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 183 : (2002) 8 SCC
381; Raja v. State of Karnataka [2016] 9 SCR 615 : (2016) 10
SCC 506; Mohd. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam (2019) 9 SCC
567; Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi [2008] 6 SCR 1176 : (2008)
10 SCC 497; Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2022]
6 SCR 989 : (2022) 8 SCC 253 – relied on.
State of Orissa v. Brahmananda Nanda (1976) 4 SCC 288; State
of Punjab v. Sucha Singh (2003) 3 SCC 153 – held inapplicable.
State of U.P. v. Satish [2005] 1 SCR 1132 : (2005) 3 SCC 114 –
referred to.
Miller v. Miller of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, 373 – referred to.
662 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
s.304, Part I of IPC; Section 161 CrPC; Evidence; Assault with
deadly weapons; Eye witness; Miscarriage of justice; Rustic illiterate
woman; Motive; Bodily injuries likely to cause death; Conviction
converted; Standard of proof in a criminal case; Proof based on
preponderance of probabilities; FIR; Medical record; Hostile witness;
Seizure witness; Assessment of evidence; Non-recovery of weapon
of crime; Testimony of neighbour; Acquitted accused; Demeanour
of witness while under examination; “Reasonable doubt”.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
116 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2009 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 290 of 2002
Appearances for Parties
Dr. Rajesh Pandey, Sr. Adv., Chandrika Prasad Mishra, Mahesh
Pandey, Rahil Kochar, Ms. Nishi Prabha Singh, Ms. Prashasti
Singh, Mrs. Swati Surbhi, U.N. Mishra, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Advs.
for the Appellants.
Ravi Sharma, D.A.G., Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav, Alok Sahay,
Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred against judgement and order
dated 30.11.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in the Criminal Appeal No. 290/2002
whereby the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence
imposed upon the present two appellants under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 663
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
‘IPC’) while setting aside the conviction of the third accused and
thus, acquitting him.
2. As the two appellants are seeking reversal of the concurrent findings
by two courts, the Sessions Court and the High Court, this Court
has to tread very cautiously as observed by this Court on numerous
occasions including in Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(2022) 8 SCC 253 wherein it has been held that unless the findings
are perverse and rendered in ignorance of material evidence, this
Court should be slow in interfering with concurring findings. Thus it
was, observed in Mekala Sivaiah (supra) as follows:
“15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that Article
136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred under
the said Article are not hedged by any technical hurdles.
This overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be
exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of
justice. Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted
in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension
or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence
then this Court is not only empowered but is well expected
to interfere to promote the cause of justice.
16. It is not the practice of this Court to re-appreciate
the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the
findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court
and the High Court are correct or not. It is only in rare and
exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality
or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of
misreading or ignoring material evidence, that this Court
would interfere with such finding of fact.”
In the above case, this Court, while dealing with a criminal appeal
against an order of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh
upheld the conviction of the accused by the Sessions Court, and
declined to interfere with the conviction.
3. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, this Court would proceed
to decide the appeal at hand to examine whether there is some
manifest error or illegality and if any grave and serious miscarriage
of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence has
occurred in the present case. This invariably would require a proper
664 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
examination of the facts and context of the case, for which we must
revisit the background facts of the case and evidence adduced.
4. It may be noted that since the State has not preferred any appeal
against the acquittal of the third accused, Chintaram, the father
of the two appellants, we may not burden ourselves in detail with
the evidence relating to the initial conviction and the subsequent
acquittal of the third accused Chintaram except those as may have
ramifications for the present two appellants.
5. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 23.09.2001, at about
7.00 am, the complainant, Santosh Kumar Mandle (PW-6), who
was employed by the parents of the deceased, namely Shatrughan
Sharma (PW5) and Lata Bai (PW-10), while washing utensils at
the house of the deceased Suraj, heard a cry for help from Suraj.
Upon hearing, he came out of the house and saw the three accused
Goverdhan, Rajendra and Chintaram assaulting Suraj with an axe
(tangiya) and iron pipe. Chintaram was also hitting the deceased with
fists and kicks and urging his two sons, Goverdhan and Rajendra,
the present appellants to kill Suraj. Santosh (PW-6) immediately
informed Shatrughan Sharma (PW-5) and Smt. Lata Bai (PW-10)
about the incident. Santosh also mentioned about the altercation
between Chintaram and Suraj the previous night about ganja.
6. Soon, thereafter, an FIR was lodged by Santosh which was registered
u/s 307 IPC vide Ex. P/12 at around 7.30 am on the same day i.e.
23.09.2001.
7. The injured Suraj was immediately rushed to the local hospital and
was examined by the doctor, Dr. G.R. Agarwal (PW-1) who found
as many as nine injuries on the deceased, which were as follows :
i) One contusion of 6 cm x 5 cm with active bleeding, and fracture
of under beneath bone over right temporal region
ii) One incised wound of ½ cm x ½ cm x screen deep just above
right ear.
iii) One incised wound over occipital region of 5 cm x 1 cm x skin
deep.
iv) One incised wound over frontal region of 4 cm x 1 cm x skin
deep.
v) One incised wound of 4 cm x 1 cm x skin deep 10 cm from
injury No.3.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 665
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
vi) One lacerated wound over right hand of 7 cm x 3 cm x skin deep.
vii) One incised wound over left hand of 2 cm x ½ cm x skin deep.
viii) One lacerated wound over right hand of 3 cm x 2 cm x skin deep.
ix) One lacerated wound over right elbow of 3 cm x 2 cm x skin
Deep. Active bleeding was present over the injury.
In view of the seriousness of the injuries, the victim was referred to
the Medical College Hospital, Raipur and thereafter, shifted to MMI
Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries on 25.09.2001 at about
9.22 pm. The cause of death was mentioned as coma as a result of
injuries received and death was opined to be homicidal in nature.
Subsequently, charge under Section 302 IPC was added to the FIR.
Necessary investigation was carried out by the Investigating Officer.
8. Based on the disclosure statement made by Goverdhan, Appellant
No. 1 on the same day on 23.9.2001, two blood-stained axes were
recovered at his instance from his father’s room vide Ex.P/6. Appellant
No. 2 Rajendra also made a disclosure statement on 23.9.2001 at
about 3.45 p.m. relating to iron pipe vide Ex.P/4, and the same was
recovered from his father’s room vide Ex.P/5. Blood-stained soil and
plain soil were recovered from the place of incident vide Ex.P/7.
Blood-stained clothes were seized from Shatrughan Sharma (PW-5)
vide Ex.P/10. Spot map was prepared by the Patwari (PW-8) vide
Ex.P/16 as witnessed by Santosh (PW-6), Kanhaiya (PW-11) and
Shailu (PW-2). Goverdhan and Rajendra were arrested on 23.9.2001
vide Exs. P/23 and P/24. Seized articles were examined by Dr.
G.R. Agrawal (PW-1) vide Ex.P/2. The seized articles were sent for
medical analysis. The presence of blood over two axes recovered at
the instance of Goverdhan and iron pipe recovered at the instance of
Rajendra, was confirmed vide Ex.P/30. The Investigating Officer (IO)
recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 CrPC.
9. To prove the guilt of the accused, the Prosecution examined as
many as 15 witnesses. Statements of the accused were also
recorded under Section 313 of the Code, where they denied the
circumstances appearing against them and claimed innocence by
pleading false implication in the crime in question. The accused had
also produced two defence witnesses, Ramlal Yadav (DW-1) and
Lakhan Lal Sahu (DW-2) to prove that the police pressurised the
mother of the deceased Suraj, Lata Bai (PW-10) to give evidence
against the accused persons.
666 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
10. The Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, on
appreciation of the evidence before it and after hearing the parties,
convicted all the three accused persons under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life along with a fine of ₹10,000, and in default
of payment of such fine, each accused was directed to undergo
additional rigorous imprisonment for 3 years in terms of the judgment
dated 06.03.2002.
11. In the statutory appeal preferred by the three accused persons, the
High Court affirmed the conviction of the present two appellants while
acquitting the third accused, Chintaram, by the impugned judgment
dated 30.11.2009.
12. Before the High Court, the appellants had taken various pleas,
including that the convictions were not based on cogent evidence, the
sole eye witness account of Lata Bai (PW-10) was uncorroborated
and wholly unreliable as her initial statement under Section 161
CrPC, was recorded belatedly after 5 days of the incident and that
all the remaining non-official witnesses had turned hostile, including
the Complainant (PW-10) and the father of the deceased (PW-5)
who were cited to be eye-witnesses by the Prosecution, and seizure
witnesses.
13. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Prosecution
before the High Court that there was no reason to disbelieve the
testimony of the mother of the deceased, Lata Bai (PW-10) merely
because her statement was recorded belatedly as her name finds
place in the FIR filed by Santosh (PW-6) which was filed within half
an hour of the incident and the filing of the FIR was proved by the
evidence of the hostile witness Santosh (PW-6), and there were
other corroborating evidence. The Prosecution also relied on the
decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114
in submitting that mere delay in examination of witnesses would not
be fatal if plausible and acceptable explanations are offered.
14. The High Court, after a detailed analysis of the evidence on record,
repelled the contentions of the appellants and convicted them while
acquitting Accused No. 3, their father, Chintaram, giving him benefit
of doubt about his participation in the crime.
15. Thus, the two appellants before us are impugning the judgment
passed by the High Court upholding their conviction.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 667
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
16. The pleas of the appellants before us summarized as below:
(i) Since the third accused namely Chintaram, who is the father
of the two appellants had been acquitted by the High Court on
the same set of evidence on which the two appellants had been
convicted, the two appellants should have also been acquitted
on the ground of parity since there is no material difference in
the nature and quality of evidence qua all the three accused.
(ii) That otherwise also, conviction could not have been sustained
on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a sole eye
witness, who is also an interested witness namely, Lata Bai
(PW10), the mother of the deceased.
(iii) The Sessions Court had convicted the appellants primarily on
the testimony of the Lata Bai (PW-10), the alleged eyewitness,
though she could not have been an eye witness, as Santosh
(PW-6), in his FIR mentioned that he informed about the
incident to the mother and father of Suraj, which shows that
Lata Bai (PW-10) only after being informed of the incident after
the incident had occurred, came to know of the incident and
hence, could not have seen the incident.
(iv) Further, the statement of Lata Bai (PW-10) was recorded after
5 days of the incident and the Prosecution has not explained
the delay in recording her statement under Section 161 of the
Code and in absence of a proper explanation, her statement is
not reliable in connection with which the defence relied upon on
the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Brahmananda
Nanda, (1976) 4 SCC 288 wherein this Court held that failure to
mention the names of the accused for one and half days is fatal.
(v) It was also contended that according to the Prosecution, the
mother (PW-10) and father (PW-5) of the deceased were
present but they made no attempt to intervene or try to rescue
the victim which shows that, they did not witness the incident
and hence the statement of Lata Bai is highly doubtful. In this
regard, the defence had cited the decision of this Court in
State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh, (2003) 3 SCC 153 wherein,
it was observed by this Court that any father, worth the name,
who was claiming to be present at the place of incident would
not remain a mute spectator when his son is being inflicted as
many as twenty-four injuries under his very nose.
668 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(vi) It was also contended that there have been improvements,
and embellishments in the testimony of Lata Bai (PW-10), thus
rendering her evidence unreliable and not credible.
(vii) The appellants also have contended that almost all the non-
official prosecution witnesses, except the mother, had turned
hostile and had not supported the prosecution case including
the informant Santosh (PW-6) and seizure witnesses, PW-2
and PW-12.
17. On the other hand, before us also, it has been contended on behalf
of the Prosecution that as far as the two appellants are concerned,
it can be said that the conclusion drawn by the Trial Court as well
as the High Court is based on admissible and relevant evidence
and as such their conviction cannot be said to be suffering from
any illegality, and since there is no perversity in the finding arrived
at by the two courts below, this Court ought not interfere with the
judgment of the High Court.
ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT
18. In case of a crime committed, upon completion of investigation by
the investigation agency, the accused are brought before the court
to face trial. Under our criminal jurisprudence, the court ordinarily is
not privy to the evidence collected during the investigation by the
investigation agency. After completion of the investigation, what is
brought before the trial court is an array of evidence, both documentary
and oral, collected by the investigating agency against the accused
which are required to be marshalled and analyzed by the court to
arrive at appropriate conclusions. The prosecution seeks to recreate
the incident of crime before the court in sequence, based on the
evidence so collected, linking the accused with the commission of
crime. Such recreation of crime by the prosecution before the court is
akin to putting the evidence together as in a jigsaw puzzle whereby
all the relevant pieces of evidence are put together to complete
the picture of the crime. The prime responsibility of the court is to
see whether this jigsaw puzzle has been properly placed by the
prosecution from which a clear picture emerges as to the happening
of the incident with the assigned role of the accused as part of the
aforesaid jigsaw puzzle. Only, thereafter, the role of the accused in
perpetrating the offence can be properly ascribed and proved and
accordingly, criminal liability fastened on the accused.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 669
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
19. As per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a fact can be
said to have been proved when, after considering the matters before
it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
particular case, to act up on the supposition that it exists. The court
undertakes this exercise of examining whether the facts alleged
including the particular criminal acts attributed to the accused are
proved or not.
20. It is also to be noted that the law does not contemplate stitching the
pieces of evidence in a watertight manner, for the standard of proof
in a criminal case is not proof beyond all doubts but only beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, if a clear picture emerges on
piecing together all evidence which indicates beyond reasonable
doubt of the role played by the accused in the perpetration of the
crime, the court holds the accused criminally liable and punishes
them under the provisions of the penal code, in contradistinction to
the requirement of proof based on the preponderance of probabilities
as in case of civil proceedings.
21. It will be relevant to discuss, at this juncture, what is meant by
“reasonable doubt”. It means that such doubt must be free from
suppositional speculation. It must not be the result of minute
emotional detailing, and the doubt must be actual and substantial
and not merely vague apprehension. A reasonable doubt is not an
imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based
upon reason and common sense as observed in Ramakant Rai v.
Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 wherein it was observed as under :
“24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable
doubt, it must be free from an overly emotional response.
Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt
of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from
the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions.
A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely
possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the
case.”
670 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
22. While applying this principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt the
Court has to undertake a candid consideration of all the evidence
in a fair and reasonable manner as observed by this Court in State
of Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC 96 as follows:
“8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove all
the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal court
could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the range of a
reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression ‘reasonable
doubt’ is incapable of definition. Modern thinking is in favour
of the view that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the
same as proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge.
9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law in
the United States has quoted from judicial pronouncements
in his book Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1
of the 12th Edn.) as follows:
‘It is difficult to define the phrase “reasonable doubt”.
However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of the
term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or followed
is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the Webster case
[Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush 295 : 59 Mass 295
(1850)] . He says: “It is not mere possible doubt, because
everything relating to human affairs and depending upon
moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves
the minds of the jurors in that consideration that they cannot
say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of
the truth of the charge.” ’
10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored
by H.C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th
Edn.) thus:
‘The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as
an honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with
reason, entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to
ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt
is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference
of the possibility of the innocence of the accused is not
a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one which
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 671
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
arises from a consideration of all the evidence in a fair and
reasonable way. There must be a candid consideration of
all the evidence and if, after this candid consideration is
had by the jurors, there remains in the minds a conviction
of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a
reasonable doubt.’
23. The concept of reasonable doubt has to be also understood in the
Indian context, keeping in mind the social reality and this principle
cannot be stretched beyond a reasonable limit to avoid generating a
cynical view of law as observed by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 as follows:
“6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers
of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the
expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment
that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to
the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in
the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape.
The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The
cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond
reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our
law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every
hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive
solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty
men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is
a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the
accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will
then break down and lose credibility with the community.
The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as
a learned Author [ Glanville Williams in ‘Proof of Guilt’.]
has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple
fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If
unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead
to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to
a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted “persons” and more severe punishment of those
who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of
the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually
672 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all
these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that
“a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of
the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent
.…” In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed
innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to
make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has
to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good
enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic
of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.
We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence
and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions
reached by the courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis
reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the
appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these
lines long ago.”
24. Further, what would be the standard degree of “proof” which would be
required in any particular case was also discussed in the aforesaid
case of Ramakant Rai (supra) in the following words:
“23. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,
however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability
amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to (sic) of probability amounts to “proof” is
an exercise, the interdependence of evidence and the
confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, as
learned author says : [see The Mathematics of Proof II :
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet
and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]
“The simple multiplication rule does not apply if
the separate pieces of evidence are dependent.
Two events are dependent when they tend
to occur together, and the evidence of such
events may also be said to be dependent. In
a criminal case, different pieces of evidence
directed to establishing that the defendant did
the prohibited act with the specified state of
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 673
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
mind are generally dependent. A juror may feel
doubt whether to credit an alleged confession,
and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact
that the defendant fled from justice. But since
it is generally guilty rather than innocent people
who make confessions, and guilty rather than
innocent people who run away, the two doubts
are not to be multiplied together. The one piece
of evidence may confirm the other.”
24. ………………..
………………..
25. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such
units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There
is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation
of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on
a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be
eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of
trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of
criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by
Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State
of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [(1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 928 : AIR 1988 SC 2154] .”
25. At this point, it may be also relevant to mention an observation
made by Lord Denning, J. in Miller v. Miller of Pensions (1947) 2
All ER 372, 373 H:
“That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty,
but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow
of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it
admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the court of justice….”
26. Thus, the requirement of law in criminal trials is not to prove the case
beyond all doubt but beyond reasonable doubt and such doubt cannot
674 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be imaginary, fanciful, trivial or merely a possible doubt but a fair
doubt based on reason and common sense. Hence, in the present
case, if the allegations against the appellants are held proved beyond
reasonable doubt, certainly conviction cannot be said to be illegal.
27. In the present case, as far as the death of the deceased is concerned,
there is no dispute about the same. The appellants have not contested
the case of the Prosecution that the deceased died on account of
grievous injuries caused by sharp weapons. Their plea is that of
ignorance of the death and also alibi, that they were in another
village. As such, it may be unnecessary for us to go into detail as
regards the nature of injuries received by the deceased which has
been already described in the earlier part of the judgment and the
cause of the injury, except for corroboration of the evidence of the
sole eye witness.
28. Since the appellants have contended that the non-official prosecution
witnesses, except for one, have not supported the prosecution case,
it would be necessary for us to revisit the evidence and testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and to see whether appreciation of
the same by the Trial Court and the High Court suffers from any
material illegality.
29. For this, it may be appropriate to commence our analysis of the
evidence of the complaint filed by Santosh (PW-6) which triggered
the criminal process and his testimony in the court in which he
resiled from his previous incriminating statement made against the
appellants under Section 161 CrPC as well as the FIR.
30. Though the FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence, especially,
when the Complainant, i.e., PW-6 did not fully support the contents
of the FIR, yet, it cannot be totally ignored and is to be treated as
a relevant circumstance if the same is proved by other prosecution
witness, in this case by PW-14, the SHO who recorded the report
in the form of FIR as stated to him by the complainant.
In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision of this Court
in Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 11 SCC 181 wherein it
was observed as follows:
“14. Once registration of the FIR is proved by the police
and the same is accepted on record by the court and the
prosecution establishes its case beyond reasonable doubt
by other admissible, cogent and relevant evidence, it will
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 675
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
be impermissible for the Court to ignore the evidentiary
value of the FIR. The FIR, Ext. P-1, has duly been proved
by the statement of PW 10, Sub-Inspector, Suresh Bhagat.
According to him, he had registered the FIR upon the
statement of PW 1 and it was duly signed by him. The
FIR was registered and duly formed part of the records
of the police station which were maintained in the normal
course of its business and investigation. Thus, in any case,
it is a settled proposition of law that the FIR by itself is
not a substantive piece of evidence but it certainly is a
relevant circumstance of the evidence produced by the
investigating agency. Merely because PW 1 had turned
hostile, it cannot be said that the FIR would lose all its
relevancy and cannot be looked into for any purpose.”
31. In the present case, PW-14, Ram Krishna Dubey who was the SHO
of the Police Station, Newra at the relevant time testified that on
23.09.2001 he registered the FIR No. 125 of 2001 under Section
307 IPC against the three accused persons at 7:30 am on oral
information of the informant Santosh Mandley (PW-6), and proved the
FIR (Ex-P/12) and his signature and the signature of the informant
PW-6 which was marked as ‘A’ to ‘A’ on Ex P/12. Therefore, we have
no reason to doubt the filing of the FIR which stands proved by the
evidence of PW-14, the SHO.
32. It is to be noted that the informant PW-6 in his testimony did not
deny the filing of the FIR, though denied having mentioned the
names of the accused in the FIR during his testimony. Under the
circumstances, it must be considered as to how far his denial can
be believed contrary to his complaint and his previous statement
made under Section 161 CrPC.
33. For better appreciation, the relevant portions of the FIR registered
based on the statement of Santosh, PW-6 are reproduced below:
“I am residing near to the house of Shatrughna Sharma at
Shikshak Colony and work as a dishwasher in their house.
It is about an incident that has occurred on 23.9.01 at
about 7 A.M. As usual, when I was clearing and washing
the household utensils, from outside the house I could hear
the shouts “Rescue me, Rescue me” and on alerted as
such, I came out of the house from my work spot and saw
676 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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that Suraj was being assaulted by Govardhan, Rajendra
and their father Chintaram Sahu by using Pipe, Tangia
etc. due to which Suraj’s body was drenched in blood.
Govardhan hit with Tangia whereas Rajendra hit Suraj’s
with pipe and Chintaram Sahu was kicking and giving first
blows to Suraj and were instigating the other assaulters to
beat Suraj to death by· abusing him meanwhile by calling
the victim as “harlot’s son”. Immediately I informed Suraj’s
parents about the said incident by alerting them. Guru,
Bhau’s mother, and neighbouring residents have also
witnessed the said incident. At 11 P.M. on the previous
night, Suraj visited the house of Chintaram Sahu for
asking him some Ganja Seeds where they had a quarrel
there too when Chintaram has asked him why he visited
his house for procuring Ganja. In the attack upon· Suraj
that has occurred in the morning Suraj suffered serious
injuries on head, both his hands, on the eyes which bleed
too, thereby Suraj has become unconscious after which
I am reporting this matter to you and request you to take
necessary proceeding further.”
34. From the aforesaid Complaint/FIR, it can be inferred that the
informant who was examined by the prosecution as PW-6 would
be an eyewitness. However, during the trial, he resiled from his
narration and turned hostile by not mentioning the names of any of
the three accused in his testimony though he had specified them
as the assailants in the FIR.
35. Since PW-6, who was declared hostile is vital to understanding
of the real picture that unfolded before the trial court, it may be
appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the same as per
records as follows:
“1. I know all the three members of the accused party
present before me in this Court. Of them, one person’s
name is known to me as Chintaram and the other two are
his sons, but I don’t know their names .. I am not literate.
I am staying in the house of Shatrughna Sharma _since
past 2 -.2.5 years. I know Suraj, he is 1 - 2 years elder
to me. It’s about an incident that occurred before about
three months back. It was about 7 A.M. on that day. I was
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 677
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
engaged in dish washing at that time. In that particular
house where I was washing the dishes at the relevant house
of which the residents are ‘papa’ Shatrughna Sharma,
‘mummy’ Lata Sharma,’sister’ Anju Sharma. When I was
thus engaged in washing dishes of the said hold, these
residents of the said house were sleeping. It that time,
suddenly I heard the shouts “Rescue me, Rescue me”, I
thought that Suraj is calling from outside and went outside,
but could not see anybody present there, but Suraj was
only lying on the ground flat. Then I went near him and
saw that he was lying there unconscious. His temple and
back portion of the head had injuries and blood was even
scattered on the ground.
2. It is correct to say that I have reported the matter in
the Police Station and got it recorded in writing there. The
report got dictated by me is marked Ex. P-12. On the said
report my signature is ‘A to A’. The incident narrated to
the police was told to them as seen by me. The police
too recorded my statement. Although I am not a literate,
but I know to write my signature. Whatever I knew, I have
informed the same to the police.”
(emphasis added)
Because of the aforesaid discrepant testimony before the trial court
where he omitted to mention the presence of any of the accused/
appellants as the assailants, PW-6 was declared hostile by the
Prosecution.
36. We will also reproduce the remaining part of the testimony of PW-6
in the course of the cross-examination as recorded which will indicate
the nature of his evidence which are as follows:
“In the ‘B to B’ part of my police report Ex. P-12 I have
not told them “I came out and saw .......... Killed him”. I
have also dictated the police in my said report that the
said incidence has also been witnessed by Bhuru Bai’s
mother and neighborhood residents. In my Police Station
I have not said that in the night at 11 o’clock Suraj went to
the house of Chintaram to ask for ganja seeds regarding
which Chintaram came to the house of Suraj and indulged
678 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in a brawl with him. But if in Ex. P-12, if it has not been
mentioned the ‘C to C’ portion - “In the night, Suraj ...........
why went to ask Ganja” has not been said to the police,
but I do not know the reason for the police mentioning as
such in Ex. P-12.
4. In my police report, I have not told them that when
went out of the house I saw Suraj was being beaten by
the accused party members with pipe, tangiya. Ex. P-8
map too contains my signature. I have showed the place
where Suraj was found lying to the Patwari. It is correct
to say that on either sides of the road houses exist in
Shikshak Colony.
5. It is correct to say that the houses of Shatrughan Sharma,
Ram Kumar Sahu, Govardhan Sahu, Ramesh Kumar
Varma and Pramila Pandey exist adjoining each other. It
is· also correct to say that all these houses exist within
a circumference of 30 - 40 foot. The distance between
the place where I was washing the dishes and where the
victim Suraj fell down was approximately 30 - 35 feet. It
is also correct to say that if one shouts from the very spot
where Suraj’s body was lying, the ‘call’ can be heard at
the house of Shatrughan Sharma. After I started shouting,
the neighbors woke-up.
6. In my Police station Ex. P-12, how police could write
about the assault related matter of Suraj is not known
to me or I do not even know the reason why they have
written as such. On being persuaded the police, I put my
signature· on ‘A to A’ part of Ex. P-12. I am not a literate,
but still able to put my own signature. It is wrong to say
that whatever I narrated to the police have been recorded
by them as it is. I have not informed the police that the
accused party members have assaulted Suraj. I can’t give
any reason for the action of the Police who wrote like that
on this own in Ex. P-12 as I do not know to read what
they have written in it except putting my own signature.
A copy of my report has not been issued to me by -the
Police. The police have also not read over the contents
of my report back to me. I have not come to know only
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 679
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
later that the brawl of Suraj occurred with the accused
party members due to hearsay discussions going in our
village. The accused party members too stay at a very
short distance from the house of Shatrughan Sharma. The
accused Chintaram never came to or visited the house of
Shatrughan Sharma for Ganja usage. Not even to Suraj too.
8. It. is wrong to say that in order to protect the accused
persons, I am not deposing correctly before the Court.
(emphasis added)
37. From the above, the following important aspects of the evidence of
PW-6 emerge :
(a) In paragraph no. 2 of his evidence in the cross examination
PW-6 categorically states that, it is correct to say that he had
reported the matter at the Police Station and got it recorded
in writing there and also proved it which was marked as Ex.
P/12 (FIR). He admitted the signature on Ex P/12 as his and
he also testified that the incident was narrated to the police as
seen by him. He also states that it was mentioned in the report
that the incident was seen by Bhuri Bai and other passers-by.
Thus, filing of the FIR by PW-6 is proved, though there is some
controversy about its actual contents.
(b) It may be also noted that when asked, PW-6 merely states that
he cannot tell the reason as to how the statement in respect of
causing of assault to Suraj was recorded by the police in his
statement in Ex P/12 and states that he had not stated the fact
of assault by the appellants. From this, it is clear that he did
not allege any coercion or threat meted out by the police to him
to implicate the appellants falsely by naming them in the FIR,
as alleged by some other witness (PW-2). Shailu, PW-2 who
was produced by the Prosecution as a seizure memo witness
to Ex-P/3 had claimed that the police obtained his signature
by threatening him. As far as putting his signature on the
FIR is concerned, he states that he was persuaded to do so.
Thus, there can be no inference of wrongdoing or coercion by
the police, if the police asked him to put his signature on the
complaint, as the complainant is required to put the signature
if present in the police station. After all it is not a statement
680 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
recorded under Section 161 CrPC which does not require
signature to be put, but the first information report is expected
to be signed by the informant.
(c) PW-6 also states that if anyone shouts from the very spot where
Suraj’s body was lying, the ‘call’ can be heard at the house
of Shatrughan Sharma and as he shouted, on the day of the
incident, the neighbours woke up. This indicates that when the
incident happened, people were alerted. Hence, it was very
natural for the mother of the victim, Lata Bai (PW-10) who was
already in the house, being alerted and to witness the incident.
(d) PW-6 also stated that he came to know only later that a brawl
occurred between Suraj and the accused party due to hearsay
discussions going on in the village. He admitted that the accused
persons were staying at a very short distance from the house
of the deceased. Even if it is assumed that he did not know
the identity of the assailants and came to know from the talk in
the village about the involvement of the accused, the fact that
there was no talk of involvement of others who were not the
appellants assumes significance. The fact that there was no
discussion of involvement of persons other than the appellants
speaks volumes about what had happened. Further, no defence
witness was produced from the village about the absence of
the accused from the village on the fateful day or their non
involvement in the incident. There was no witness categorically
stating that the accused persons were not the assailants. The
non official prosecution witnesses merely feigned ignorance
of this incident. We are, however, not suggesting that merely
because no one came forward to testify in defence of the
accused, it should go against them, inasmuch as the onus is
always on the prosecution to prove the charge and not the
other way round. However, this is a circumstance which does
not diminish the credibility of the eyewitness account of Lata
Bai (PW-10) or prejudices the prosecution case.
(e) Thus, in our view, during the cross-examination, even if the PW-6
had denied mentioning the names of the appellants to the police,
it will be difficult to believe that he did not mention their names
to the police when he himself stated that he informed the police
what he saw and the police recorded the same in the FIR. We
find it hard to believe that the police somehow wrote the names
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 681
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
of the appellants in the FIR on their own within such a short
period of the occurrence by falsely implicating the appellants.
The incident happened at about 7 am as mentioned in the FIR
and the complaint was lodged at 7:30 am within half an hour
of the incident on the basis of which the FIR was registered.
Apparently, there was also a talk in the village of the assault
by the appellants as also stated by PW-6.
38. From the above discussion, we have no reason to question the
reliance placed on the FIR (Ex-P/12) by the trial court as well as the
High Court as corroborating the prosecution case.
39. As discussed above, since the complainant (PW-6) who filed the
FIR was initially projected as the eye witness but later turned hostile
during the trial and it is only Lata Bai (PW-10) who claims to be
the eye witness, it would be necessary to examine the evidence of
Lata Bai (PW-10), as the prosecution case and the conviction by the
Sessions Court and High Court are primarily based on her account.
40. PW-10, Lata Bai is the mother of the deceased who was an eye
witness as per the Prosecution. If it is established that this eye-witness
testimony is credible and is corroborated by the other evidence
on record as held by the trial court as well as the High Court, the
conviction of the appellants cannot be said to be illegal and would
not warrant interference from this Court. On the other hand, if her
evidence is found to be not credible and not reliable as contended
on behalf of the appellants, they would certainly be entitled to the
benefit of doubt and would warrant reversing the decision of the
courts below. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the evidence of
the PW 10 in more detail.
41. PW-10, Lata Bai deposed to have witnessed the three accused
including the present appellants assaulting the deceased, her son,
on the fateful day as narrated below:
“I recognize all the three accused present in the court.
Name of old man is Chintaram and the name of two
sons are Govardhan and Raju. Accused persons reside
at some distance from my house. Suraj was my son, he
was running small shop from the house. It was incident of
Sunday at 7:00 O’clock in the morning on 23 September.
I was standing near the door with broom and my husband
Shatrughan Sharma and daughter Anju Sharma were
682 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
sleeping. My servant Santosh was cleaning utensil near
the door of house. Santosh and Suraj went outside for
excretion and come back from there. Suraj asked me to
get the tea ready, he said that I am coming from Verma’s
house. After 5 minute son of Verma came to me in my
house and told that brother Suraj is sitting with father and
has demanded Chilam, then the boy take Chilam and went
away. After some time the same boy come to return the
Chilam. Then after 10 minutes heard the voice of Suraj
calling ‘papa’. My servant Santosh went outside the house
and came inwards in a disturbed way and stated that they
killed brother Suraj. I immediately came out with broom,
Govardhan, Chinta and Raju, all three were causing attack
over my son. Chintaram was armed with Pipe one accused
was armed with small Axe and one with Adze. All three
were assaulting Suraj and he was lying on earth. I went
inside the house calling my husband. I got awaken my
husband by pulling his hand that they had killed Suraj.
When I and my husband reached near Suraj then all three
accused person fled away after assaulting him. All three
accused were saying “kill-kill”.
42. She also stated that she used to visit the house of the appellants
quite frequently but was not aware of occurrence of any fight involving
her husband or her son with the appellants. She also stated that her
husband was already scared as soon as he went out and he told her
to go to the police station and accordingly, she went to the police
station. In the meantime, the appellants Rajendra and Govardhan
too came to the police station and on seeing them she informed the
police that these two persons had killed her son and these two also
informed the police that they had come there after killing Suraj. Then
the police detained both of them at the police station. Thereafter,
the police accompanied her back to the Shikshak Colony, and with
the assistance of police, she immediately took her injured son to
the Government Hospital, Tilda on a rickshaw where he was given
treatment and later was advised to be taken to Specialist Hospital
at Mekahari.
43. She also deposed that when Suraj shouted for help, she came
out and saw that many of her neighbours were already present at
the place of the incident namely Verma, Shyam Bai, Bhoori, Bhau,
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 683
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
Govardhan alias Bhuru, Neelu, Kumari etc. and it was Verma (PW-9)
who advised her to take her injured son immediately to the hospital.
She then narrated how she took Suraj to the Government Hospital
and then to the MMI Hospital for his treatment and she was present
throughout the treatment till he expired. She was also present during
the preparation of panchnama of the dead body.
44. Since Lata Bai (PW-10) testified as the eye witness to the assault and
had given a detailed account of the incident, she was subjected to a
lengthy cross-examination by the defence to discredit her evidence.
It is therefore, of utmost importance that her evidence be analysed
minutely to ascertain whether the same is credible and trustworthy,
which the defence has strenuously sought to project as such.
45. A sustained endeavour was made by the defence counsel to establish
that the deceased son of the PW-10 had a criminal background
having been involved in numerous acts of brawls and hooliganism
because of which he earned the enmity of many, thus suggesting
that he could be a victim of retaliation or vengeance of his other
enemies but not of the appellants.
46. During the cross examination of PW-10, by way of suggestion there
was a specific insinuation that the deceased had a quarrel with another
neighbour, Verma (PW-9) the previous day and it was Verma’s family
who had assaulted the deceased near the house of Verma. We shall
refer to the testimony of the said Verma (PW-9) at a later stage.
47. The following aspects of the statement of the PW-10 during the
cross-examination, deserve to be noticed.
(i) When asked whether the neighbours too had heard her son’s
distress call, she stated,
“I am also not sure whether they have heard the
instigational calls of Chintaram who said “Beat him!
Kill him” as my attention was upon son who was
getting beaten at the relevant time I could not make
any other observation in the surrounding keenly. I
rushed out, saw him, then again rushed back inside
and woke my husband, when any son was being
beaten when I saw him, he has already fallen on the
ground with his face too facing the ground.
684 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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(ii) She mentioned about the delayed response of her husband to
the incident and her anger at her husband for not responding
promptly on her urging to come out and abusing him as a “dog”.
(iii) She stated that she had also gone to the police station and
informed that the accused Goverdhan and Rajendra had
assaulted her son and when they came to the Police Station,
she slapped one of them in the police station.
(iv) She also stated that she did not inform the police that the
accused party held weapons such as pipe, basoola and tangia
as the police did not give any opportunity to tell all these nor
did they enquire from her. She also states that police did not
make a formal enquiry from her as she was in a state of shock.
(v) Interestingly, when a suggestion was made on behalf of the
appellants during the cross-examination that police told her in
the police station when she went to inform them that the report
will be recorded later and they should visit to spot first, she
admitted it to be correct.
(vi) She reiterates that she had seen with her own eyes the
appellants fleeing away from the spot after assaulting Suraj.
(vii) She admits to have met and talked to Vaishnav, ASI (PW-15)
outside the courtroom but denied her being pressured by him
to give a statement as per their dictation that she did not see
anybody assaulting Suraj.
48. The grounds for questioning the credibility and reliability of the
evidence of the Lata Bai, PW-10 by the appellants may be stated
below: -
(a) Her statement was recorded very belatedly after 5 days on
28.09.2001 after the incident which occurred on 23.09.2001
giving scope for fabrication.
(b) There are material contradictions in the statements made before
the police and the court.
(c) There are improvements, and embellishments in her testimony
before the court over the statement, recorded during the
investigation.
(d) Her presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful as she is
an interested witness who is not supported even by her own
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 685
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
husband (PW5) who was staying with her at the time of the
incident.
(e) Her testimony is contradictory to the testimony of her husband
who also was present in the house when the incident occurred,
who apparently did not see the appellants assaulting their son.
(f) The name of Lata Bai was not mentioned as an eye-witness
in the complaint/FIR, which would indicate that she was not
an eyewitness.
49. It goes without saying that to be an eyewitness, the witness must
have been at the place of occurrence or in the vicinity within the
range of visibility when the incident occurred.
50. If we critically examine the other evidence on record, it cannot be
said that Lata Bai (PW-10) did not see the incident.
For this, we will first refer to the evidence of Santosh (PW-6). Even
though Santosh (PW-6) had claimed during his court testimony that
he did not see who the assailants were, yet, in the cross-examination
he specifically stated that it is true that the information of the incident
was given immediately by him to the mother (PW-10) and father
(PW-5) of Suraj. Therefore, the presence of Lata Bai near the place
of occurrence cannot be doubted. It is to be noted that in the site
map of the place of occurrence (Ex/16) it is mentioned that the body
of the victim was found very near about 21ft on the lane opposite the
house of the deceased. Thus, it cannot be said that it was impossible
on her part to have witnessed the incident. PW-10 is not a chance
witness but a natural witness. She did not suddenly appear at the
place of occurrence where she was not expected to be present.
If the presence of Lata Bai (PW-10) at the place of occurrence
cannot be doubted, the next consideration will be whether she had
witnessed the incident when the appellants assaulted Suraj.
Therefore, the critical question is whether Lata Bai PW-10 saw
the incident as claimed by her which has been questioned by the
appellants.
51. As we proceed to examine this crucial aspect, it may be apposite
to keep in mind certain observations made by this Court relating to
discrepancies in the account of eye witnesses.
686 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
In Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana,
(1999) 9 SCC 525 it was observed as follows:
“9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction
being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence,
but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two
witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the
credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are
bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations
of different witnesses when they speak on details, and
unless the contradictions are of a material dimension,
the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in
its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with
mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal
cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations
by reason therefore should not render the evidence of
eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought
not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. In
this context, reference may be made to the decision of
this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC
505 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 105]. In para 10 of the Report, this
Court observed : (SCC pp. 514-15)
‘10. While appreciating the evidence of a
witness, the approach must be whether the
evidence of the witness read as a whole appears
to have a ring of truth. Once that impression
is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the
court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly
keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks
and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as
a whole and evaluate them to find out whether
it is against the general tenor of the evidence
given by the witness and whether the earlier
evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to
render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies
on trivial matters not touching the core of
the case, hypertechnical approach by taking
sentences torn out of context here or there from
the evidence, attaching importance to some
technical error committed by the investigating
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 687
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
officer not going to the root of the matter would
not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as
a whole. If the court before whom the witness
gives evidence had the opportunity to form the
opinion about the general tenor of evidence
given by the witness, the appellate court which
had not this benefit will have to attach due
weight to the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court and unless there are reasons weighty
and formidable it would not be proper to reject
the evidence on the ground of minor variations
or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even
honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some
details unrelated to the main incident because
power of observation, retention and reproduction
differ with individuals.’
10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State of M.P.
[(1999) 8 SCC 649 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 26] this Court
observed : (SCC p. 656, para 24)
‘24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true
witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant
details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can
successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But
courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies
in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with
the credibility of his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be
adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an
incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses
or as between two statements of the same witness) is an
unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.’
This Court further observed : (SCC pp. 656-57, paras
25-27)
‘25. It is a common practice in trial courts to
make out contradictions from the previous
statement of a witness for confronting him
during cross-examination. Merely because there
688 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient
to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt
Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope
for impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of
an inconsistent former statement. But a reading
of the section would indicate that all inconsistent
statements are not sufficient to impeach the
credit of the witness. The material portion of
the section is extracted below:
“155. Impeaching credit of witness.—The credit of a
witness may be impeached in the following ways by the
adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the
party who calls him—
(1)-(2) ***
(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any
part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;”
26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with
the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount
to contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent statement
which is liable to be “contradicted” would affect the credit of
the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act also enables
the cross-examiner to use any former statement of the
witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to “contradict” the
witness the cross-examiner is enjoined to comply with the
formality prescribed therein. Section 162 of the Code also
permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement
of the witness (recorded under Section 161 of the Code)
for the only limited purpose i.e. to “contradict” the witness.
27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit
the particular version of the witness. Unless the former
statement has the potency to discredit the present
statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former
to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that
witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1959
SC 1012 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231] ).’ ”
52. Further, this Court also cautioned about attaching too much
importance on minor discrepancies of the evidence of the witnesses
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 689
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3
SCC 217 as follows:
“5. … We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to
enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence
in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly
highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor
discrepancies. The reasons are obvious:
(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to
possess a photographic memory and to recall the
details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is
replayed on the mental screen.
(2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken
by events. The witness could not have anticipated
the occurrence which so often has an element of
surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be
expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
(3) The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one
person’s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the
part of another.
(4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the main
purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect
a witness to be a human tape-recorder.
(5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment
at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect
people to make very precise or reliable estimates in
such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense
of individuals which varies from person to person.
(6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which takes
place in rapid succession or in a short time span.
690 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when
interrogated later on.
(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination made by the counsel and out of
nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding
sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination
on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind
of the witness sometimes so operates on account of
the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though
the witness is giving a truthful and honest account
of the occurrence witnessed by him—perhaps it is a
sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated
on the spur of the moment.”
53. To the same effect it was also observed in Appabhai v. State of
Gujarat (1988) Supp SCC 241 as follows:
“13. … The court while appreciating the evidence must
not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The
discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the
prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies
which are due to normal errors of perception or observation
should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse
of memory may be given due allowance. The court by
calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters
in different cases must evaluate the entire material on
record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any
witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts
alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore
that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so
as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses
nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version
perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by
the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the
evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise
trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this Court
in Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 751 : 1972 SCC
(Cri) 819] observed : [SCC p. 756, para 8 : SCC (Cri) p.
824, para 8]
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 691
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
‘8. … This Court has held that falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the
reason that hardly one comes across a witness
whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries
or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses
when asked about details venture to give some
answer, not necessarily true or relevant for
fear that their evidence may not be accepted
in respect of the main incident which they
have witnessed but that is not to say that their
evidence as to the salient features of the case
after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered….’ ”
54. We must also remember that the scene of the crime was in a rural
area and the witness being rustic, their evidence has to be appreciated
in the light of the behavioral pattern in the rural environment. In this
regard, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) wherein it was held that:
“8. Now to the facts. The scene of murder is rural, the
witnesses to the case are rustics and so their behavioural
pattern and perceptive habits have to be judged as such.
The too sophisticated approaches familiar in courts based
on unreal assumptions about human conduct cannot
obviously be applied to those given to the lethargic ways
of our villages. When scanning the evidence of the various
witnesses we have to inform ourselves that variances
on the fringes, discrepancies in details, contradictions in
narrations and embellishments in inessential parts cannot
militate against the veracity of the core of the testimony
provided there is the impress of truth and conformity to
probability in the substantial fabric of testimony delivered.
The learned Sessions Judge has at some length dissected
the evidence, spun out contradictions and unnatural
conduct, and tested with precision the time and sequence of
the events connected with the crime, all on the touchstone
of the medical evidence and the post-mortem certificate.
Certainly, the court which has seen the witnesses depose,
has a great advantage over the appellate Judge who
reads the recorded evidence in cold print, and regard
692 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
must be had to this advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge
of observing the demeanour and delivery, of reading the
straightforwardness and doubtful candour, rustic naiveté
and clever equivocation, manipulated conformity and
ingenious inveracity of persons who swear to the facts
before him. Nevertheless, where a Judge draws his
conclusions not so much on the directness or dubiety of
the witness while on oath but upon general probabilities
and on expert evidence, the court of appeal is in as good
a position to assess or arrive at legitimate conclusions as
the court of first instance. Nor can we make a fetish of
the trial Judge’s psychic insight.”
55. This Court also reminded that while dealing with the evidence of
witnesses who are rustic, because of minor inconsistencies, the
evidence should not be ignored. It was held in in Prabhu Dayal v.
State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127 wherein dealing with witnesses
from rustic background it was observed as follows;
“18. It is a common phenomenon that the witnesses are
rustic and can develop a tendency to exaggerate. This,
however, does not mean that the entire testimony of
such witnesses is falsehood. Minor contradictions in the
testimony of the witnesses are not fatal to the case of the
prosecution. This Court, in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony
[State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505 : 1985
SCC (Cri) 105], held that inconsistencies and discrepancies
alone do not merit the rejection of the evidence as a whole.
It stated as follows : (SCC p. 514-15, para 10)
“10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness,
the approach must be whether the evidence of the
witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of
truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly
necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence
more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it
is against the general tenor of the evidence given by
the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 693
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the
core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking
sentences torn out of context here or there from the
evidence, attaching importance to some technical
error committed by the investigating officer not going
to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before
whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity
to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence
given by the witness, the appellate court which had
not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the
appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless
there are reasons weighty and formidable it would
not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground
of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial
details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ
in some details unrelated to the main incident because
power of observation, retention and reproduction differ
with individuals. Cross-examination is an unequal
duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. Having
examined the evidence of this witness, a friend and
well-wisher of the family carefully giving due weight
to the comments made by the learned counsel for
the respondent and the reasons assigned to by the
High Court for rejecting his evidence simultaneously
keeping in view the appreciation of the evidence of
this witness by the trial court, we have no hesitation
in holding that the High Court was in error in rejecting
the testimony of witness Nair whose evidence appears
to us trustworthy and credible.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. … … … … … … … ….
20. The Court can separate the truth from the false
statements in the witnesses’ testimony. In Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana [Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, (1999)
9 SCC 525 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 222] , this Court held as
follows : (SCC p. 534, para 12)
694 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“12. It is indeed necessary to note that one hardly
comes across a witness whose evidence does not
contain some exaggeration or embellishment —
sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt
to offer embellishment and sometimes in their
overanxiety they may give a slightly exaggerated
account. The court can sift the chaff from the grain and
find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses.
Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The
evidence is to be considered from the point of view
of trustworthiness. If this element is satisfied, it
ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the court
to accept the stated evidence though not however
in the absence of the same.”
21. Moreover, it is not necessary that the entire testimony
of a witness be disregarded because one portion of such
testimony is false. This Court observed thus in Gangadhar
Behera v. State of Orissa [Gangadhar Behera v. State of
Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 32] : (SCC
p. 392, para 15)
“15. To the same effect is the decision in State of
Punjab v. Jagir Singh [State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh,
(1974) 3 SCC 277 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886 : AIR 1973
SC 2407] and Lehna v. State of Haryana [Lehna v.
State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 76 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
526] . Stress was laid by the appellant-accused on
the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some
witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out
the entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to
apply the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
(false in one thing, false in everything). This plea
is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of the
evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is
sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding
acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons,
his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the
court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff
can be separated from the grain, it would be open
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 695
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding
the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient
to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a
particular material witness or material particular would
not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application
in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as
liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
has not received general acceptance nor has this
maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It
is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is
that in such cases testimony may be disregarded,
and not that it must be disregarded.”
56. Keeping the aforesaid observations of this Court in mind, we will
examine the evidence of the mother of the deceased, Lata Bai,
PW-10. The High Court had meticulously examined the evidence of
PW-10 before coming to the conclusion that her evidence is reliable
and credible.
57. Much emphasis was laid on the plea of delayed recording of the
statement of PW-10 by the defence, which was duly considered
by the High Court. The High Court observed that the Investigating
Officer (IO) was not questioned as to why there was a delay in the
examination of the witness, failing which the defence cannot gain
any advantage therefrom.
In this regard, we may refer to the decision of this Court in the State
of U.P. v. Satish, (supra), wherein it was held that,
“18. As regards delayed examination of certain witnesses,
this Court in several decisions has held that unless the
investigating officer is categorically asked as to why there
was delay in examination of the witnesses the defence
cannot gain any advantage therefrom. It cannot be laid
down as a rule of universal application that if there is
any delay in examination of a particular witness the
prosecution version becomes suspect. It would depend
upon several factors. If the explanation offered for the
delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the
court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason
to interfere with the conclusion. (See Ranbir v. State of
696 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Punjab [(1973) 2 SCC 444 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 858 : AIR
1973 SC 1409] , Bodhraj v. State of J&K [(2002) 8 SCC
45 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 201] and Banti v. State of M.P. [(2004)
1 SCC 414 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 294] )
19. ……………………………………..
20. It is to be noted that the explanation when offered
by the IO on being questioned on the aspect of delayed
examination by the accused hhas to be tested by the
court on the touchstone of credibility. If the explanation is
plausible then no adverse inference can be drawn. On the
other hand, if the explanation is found to be implausible,
certainly the court can consider it to be one of the factors
to affect credibility of the witnesses who were examined
belatedly. It may not have any effect on the credibility of the
prosecution’s evidence tendered by the other witnesses.”
58. In the present case, we have also noted that, no such question was
asked by the defence from the IO about the delayed recording of
the statement of PW-10. The witness was also not asked about it,
which would have afforded an opportunity to the witness to explain
the reason for such a delayed recording of her evidence. Hence,
such a plea could not be taken now to discredit PW-10.
Moreover, what we have noticed, as also observed by the High
Court is that PW-10 being the mother and on seeing the serious
condition of her injured son was more concerned about his well-
being and survival and rushed to the Police Station for informing
the police about the incident, and thereafter, she immediately went
to the government hospital taking her injured son and thereafter to
other specialist hospitals for treatment. She was throughout with
the injured son for his treatment till he succumbed to the injuries.
Thus, she was busy in getting proper treatment of her injured son
and was not in the village till she returned after the death of her son
and she was present also when the post-mortem examination was
conducted. Therefore, if PW-10 was preoccupied with the treatment
of her son soon after the incident and her statement under Section
161 CrPC could not be recorded earlier, it could not render her
evidence untrustworthy, more so when her presence in the house
when the incident occurred was proved by the evidence of PW-6,
the informant, who is not a member of the family of the deceased.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 697
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
59. PW-10 claimed that she had rushed to the Police Station to inform
about the incident and the police told her that they would go to the
place of occurrence first and would later record her evidence. That
she went to the Police Station is also supported by the evidence of
her husband (PW-5), who testified that after he and his wife (PW-10)
came out of the house and saw their injured son, he immediately
sent his wife to the police station. It may be also noted that the
defence did not cross examine PW-5 at all including on this aspect,
perhaps in view of his non mentioning the names of the accused
as assailants, because of which he was declared a hostile witness
by the court at the instance of the Prosecution.
As mentioned above, PW-10 agreed to the suggestion made on
behalf of the appellants during the cross-examination that police
told her in the police station when she went to inform them that the
report will be recorded later and they should visit to spot first. Her
response was in the following words:
“It is true to say that police person asked me that your
report will be recorded later, let’s visit the spot first.”
This suggestion from the defence neutralises the very plea of the
defence on the issue of delay in recording the statement of PW-10.
This is also natural for the reason that since PW-10, the mother was
in a state of shock and was more interested in the treatment of her
son, if the police did not record the statement of PW-10 at that time,
it could not be said to be abnormal. We are of the view that under
the circumstances, the delay in recording the statement of PW-10
under Section 161 CrPC can not be said to be a deliberate act on the
part of the Investigating Officer to manipulate or fabricate evidence
to falsely implicate innocent persons. Accordingly, we are of the view
that the decision in State of Orissa vs. Brahmanada Nanda (supra)
relied upon by the appellants is not applicable in the present case.
In the said case, the High Court as well as this Court did not find the
evidence of the sole eye witness trustworthy for not mentioning the
name of the accused for one and a half day and declined to accept
her plea of fear of the accused by not naming him as the police and
her nephew had already arrived at the scene and that the accused
was not known to be a gangster or a confirmed criminal of whom
people would be afraid. In the said case this Court also found that
there were many other reasons assigned by the High Court in not
believing the evidence of the said sole witness.
698 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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60. We have also considered the evidence of Shatrughan Sharma, PW-5,
the father of the deceased who denied having seen the appellants
assaulting his son on whose evidence, the defence has harped much
to contend that he being the father of the victim did not support his
wife’s evidence. He stated in the examination-in-chief that on the
fateful day when he was sleeping he was woken up by his wife, Lata
Bai (PW-10) informing that there was a quarrel outside the house
and when he came out he saw blood spread everywhere and his
son drenched in blood and he then immediately sent his wife to the
police station. He also saw some other neighbours standing near
the body of his son. During the cross examination he denied having
mentioned the names of the appellants in his statement recorded
under Section 161 CrPC.
61. What is to be noted is that his wife Lata Bai (PW-10) stated that after
seeing the assault of her son by the appellants, she went inside the
house and woke up her husband and came out pulling his hands
and when both of them reached the place of occurrence, all the
assailants had fled.
It may be also noted that PW-10 in the cross-examination stated that
after her husband was woken up, he rather than rush to the scene,
was looking for his shoes to which the PW-10 abused him calling
him a “dog” and only then he came out in his underwear. Thus,
from this statement of PW-10, it can be clearly inferred that PW-5
could not have seen the assailants. Thus, there is no question of
his testimony being contrary to the evidence of PW-10, since PW-5
did not witness the assault. Thus, the evidence of PW-5 does not
contradict the evidence of PW-10 and supports her on certain critical
areas as discussed above.
62. What we have also noted is that Shatrughan Sharma, PW-5 in the
cross examination clearly admits his close association with the father
of the appellants, Chintaram on account of smoking of ganja. PW-5
admits that he used to consume ganja and liquor. He also stated
that he and Chintaram, the acquitted father of the appellants, were
regular smokers of ganja.
It may be also noted that in the cross-examination by the Prosecution
after PW-5 was declared a hostile witness, he stated (as per the
case court records) as follows:
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 699
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
“ (8) … … It is true that I and Chintaram had smoked Ganja
several times together. It is true that I also came to the
court yesterday. It is true that I and Chintaram hugged each
other. It is also true that all the three accused obeisance
my leg. … … … ….”
Thus, in spite of denials to the suggestion that due to old friendship
he was not giving statements against accused persons, it is apparent
that he was won over, as otherwise, there was no reason for the
accused to be so warm to him and all the three accused pay obeisance
to him by touching his feet.
63. If we examine the evidence of PW-10 in the light of other evidence
brought on record and proved by the Prosecution, it can be seen
that the evidence of PW-10 stands corroborated and hence, we have
no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-10.
64. We have taken note of the fact that the High Court had noticed
that the victim Suraj was examined by Dr G.R. Agarwal (PW-1) on
23.9.2001 at about 8 a.m. which is about one hour after the assault
vide Ex.P/1 and in the said document, the names of the two appellants,
Goverdhan and Rajendra were mentioned as the ones who had
assaulted the victim by axe and iron pipe but the name of the third
accused Chintaram was not mentioned. Though mere mention of
the names of the two appellants in the said medical record may
not be the basis to implicate the two appellants, yet, it provides the
circumstances in which the victim came to be brought to the hospital
and thus, lends credence to the truthfulness of the contents of the
FIR in which the appellants were named as the assailants.
65. The noting made by the doctor on the medical record that the
appellants, Goverdhan and Rajendra were the ones who assaulted
the victims can partake the character of hearsay evidence, yet,
this was recorded within about half an hour of the filing of the FIR
in the police station and within about one hour of incident and is
directly related to the incident. Though the medical report was not
made immediately after the incident, it was made without much time
gap and it was made almost contemporaneously with the incident.
Further, the medical record was in conformity with the FIR filed by
the complainant, PW-6, thus corroborating the contents of the FIR in
which the appellants were named as the assailants. In our opinion,
since the FIR was filed soon after the incident occurred and the
700 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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names of the appellants were again mentioned in the medical record
as the assailants within a very short span of time, there was hardly
any scope for fabrication of evidence and falsely implicating the
appellants in the case, as they were already named in the FIR. The
matter would have been otherwise, if the names of the appellants
were not mentioned in the FIR but subsequently mentioned in the
medical record in which event, a valid plea could be taken by the
defence that it was an afterthought. However, such is not the situation
in the present case.
66. We must also keep in mind that in a trial, the assessment of evidence
cannot be made in a technical manner and the realities of life must
be kept in mind for arriving at the truth as observed by this Court in
State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 SCC 247 as follows;
“10. The High Court appears to have adopted a technical
approach in disposing of the appeal filed by the respondents.
This Court in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC
277 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886] held: (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23)
‘23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one
is free to give flight to one’s imagination and fantasy. It
concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused
arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is
charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product
of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the
conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the
commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence
by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and
the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis
would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the
benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the
accused, the courts should not at the same time reject
evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which
are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.’
The criminal trial cannot be equated with a mock scene
from a stunt film. The legal trial is conducted to ascertain
the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned. In arriving
at a conclusion about the truth, the courts are required
to adopt a rational approach and judge the evidence by
its intrinsic worth and the animus of the witnesses. The
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 701
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
hypertechnicalities or figment of imagination should not
be allowed to divest the court of its responsibility of sifting
and weighing the evidence to arrive at the conclusion
regarding the existence or otherwise of a particular
circumstance keeping in view the peculiar facts of each
case, the social position of the victim and the accused,
the larger interests of the society particularly the law and
order problem and degrading values of life inherent in the
prevalent system. The realities of life have to be kept in
mind while appreciating the evidence for arriving at the
truth. The courts are not obliged to make efforts either to
give latitude to the prosecution or loosely construe the
law in favour of the accused. The traditional dogmatic
hypertechnical approach has to be replaced by a rational,
realistic and genuine approach for administering justice in a
criminal trial. Criminal jurisprudence cannot be considered
to be a utopian thought but have to be considered as part
and parcel of the human civilisation and the realities of
life. The courts cannot ignore the erosion in values of life
which are a common feature of the present system. Such
erosions cannot be given a bonus in favour of those who
are guilty of polluting society and mankind.”
67. As regards the seizure of the weapons of crime, the Investigating
Officer (IO) Ram Kumar Vaishnav, (PW-15) testified that at the
instance of the Appellant No. 1 (Goverdhan), the small axe was
recovered and the Panchanama was prepared (Ex-P/3). Similarly, one
iron pipe was recovered at the instance of Appellant No.2, Rajendra
and the Panchanama (Ex-P/5) was prepared. Both the seizures were
witnessed by Shailu (PW-2) and Kanhaiya (PW-12). Though the IO
(PW-15) proved his signature and preparation of the aforesaid two
seizure memos, both the witnesses turned hostile claiming that they
merely put their signatures at the instance of the police and they put
their signatures on blank forms.
What is important to note is that these two witnesses, however, did
admit putting their signatures on the seizure memos. What they
pleaded is that they did so at the instance/threat of the police and
they did not know what was written on these documents. They also
stated that the seizure was not preceded by any enquiry by the
police from the accused persons.
702 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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It is also to be noted that while both the witnesses, Shailu (PW-2) and
Kanhaiya (PW-11) were from the same village, Tilda where the murder
took place and both of them claimed that they had no knowledge
of this case, both of them admitted that they knew the appellants.
Shailu (PW-2) stated that he knew the appellants and they resided
at some distance from his house. In the cross-examination, Shailu,
PW-2 claims that he had no knowledge of the case.
Kanhaiya, PW-11, the other seizure witness, admits that the seizure
memo was prepared in his presence, and the police asked him to
put his signature on the same and admitted his signature, though he
also stated that no seizure was made from the Appellant Rajendra
in his presence. He also states that the police seized the small axe
and showed it to both the witnesses and police informed that the
axe was found in the house of the appellants.
In his cross-examination by the Prosecution after being declared
hostile, PW-11, admitted that he used to smoke ganja with the
appellants often and whenever he used to pass through the Teachers
Colony, he used to stay with Chintaram, the acquitted accused and
father of the two appellants for smoking ganja and admitted being
familiar with Chintaram. He, however, denied the suggestion of the
Prosecution that he was not telling the truth as he was well acquainted
with Chintaram.
68. Thus, what emerges from the above is that both the seizure witnesses
have not denied their signatures on the seizure memo and admitted
putting their signatures. PW-11 even goes to the extent that the police
showed to them a small axe which the police said was seized from
the house of the appellants.
Though both the witnesses have denied having any knowledge of
the actual recovery of the weapons at the instance of the appellants,
their denials do not appear convincing. However, since the IO of the
case, PW-15 had proved the said seizure memos, we find no reason
to hold that there was no seizure that was affected merely because
the two seizure witnesses had turned hostile.
It may be noted that the axes were seized on the same day of the
incident on 23.9.2001 at 4:45 pm and these were blood stained as
recorded in Ex-P/6 and also mentioned by Dr. G.R. Agarwal, PW-1
while forwarding these items for chemical examination.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 703
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
69. Even assuming that the seizure of the weapons was effected without
meticulously following the procedures and thus doubtful, in the view
of the medical evidence which clearly showed that the deceased died
because of the injuries caused by sharp weapon which was seen
by a direct eye witness, namely, Lata Bai (PW-10), in our opinion,
it would not prejudice the prosecution case. The doctor (PW-1)
who examined the victim testified that he examined the weapons
of crime on 29.9.2001 which were brought to him by the police in a
sealed packet and he opined that the injuries no. (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi)
and (vii) may be caused by the sharp edge of an axe and injuries
no. (i), (vi), (viii) and (ix) may be caused by the iron pipe. There
was no cross examination of this witness PW-1 by the defence on
this crucial medical evidence. Thus, this medical opinion remained
unshaken, which supports the prosecution case and evidence of
Lata Bai, PW-10.
70. It is now well settled that non recovery of the weapon of crime is not
fatal to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction,
if there are direct reliable witnesses as held in Rakesh v. State of
U.P., (2021) 7 SCC 188, wherein it was observed as follows:
“12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused
that as per the ballistic report the bullet found does not
match with the firearm/gun recovered and therefore the
use of gun as alleged is doubtful and therefore benefit
of doubt must be given to the accused is concerned, the
aforesaid cannot be accepted. At the most, it can be said
that the gun recovered by the police from the accused
may not have been used for killing and therefore the
recovery of the actual weapon used for killing can be
ignored and it is to be treated as if there is no recovery
at all. For convicting an accused recovery of the weapon
used in commission of offence is not a sine qua non. PW
1 and PW 2, as observed hereinabove, are reliable and
trustworthy eyewitnesses to the incident and they have
specifically stated that A-1 Rakesh fired from the gun and
the deceased sustained injury. The injury by the gun has
been established and proved from the medical evidence
and the deposition of Dr Santosh Kumar, PW 5. Injury 1 is
by gunshot. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the credible
704 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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ocular evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 — eyewitnesses who
witnessed the shooting. It has no bearing on credibility of
deposition of PW 1 and PW 2 that A-1 shot deceased with
a gun, particularly as it is corroborated by bullet in the body
and also stands corroborated by the testimony of PW 2
and PW 5. Therefore, merely because the ballistic report
shows that the bullet recovered does not match with the
gun recovered, it is not possible to reject the credible and
reliable deposition of PW 1 and PW 2.
(emphasis added)
71. In this context one may also refer to the decision of this Court in
Karamjit Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (2003) 5 SCC 291 in which
it was observed that the testimony of the police personnel involved
in recovery of articles need not be disbelieved and testimony of
police personnel is to be treated similarly as testimony of any other
witness. It was held that,
“8. Shri Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
has vehemently urged that all the witnesses of recovery
examined by the prosecution are police personnel and in
the absence of any public witness, their testimony alone
should not be held sufficient for sustaining the conviction
of the appellant. In our opinion the contention raised is too
broadly stated and cannot be accepted. The testimony of
police personnel should be treated in the same manner as
testimony of any other witness and there is no principle of
law that without corroboration by independent witnesses
their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption
that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour
of a police personnel as of other persons and it is not
a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them
without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and no principle of general
application can be laid down. … … … … … … … …..”
(emphasis added)
Thus, we do not find any reason to doubt the testimony of the
police/I.O. (PW-15).
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 705
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
72. It is to be noted that the plea of the defence is of total denial. The
appellants also claimed complete ignorance of the incident. They have
taken the plea that they were not in the village during the time of the
incident and had gone on 22.9.2001 to another place at Nayapara,
to attend the housewarming ceremony of one Champa Lal Sahu on
23.09.2001 and returned only in the evening of 23.09.2001. However,
the defence did not lead any evidence about the plea of alibi.
The appellants also sought to put the blame of assault to Ramesh
Kumar Verma, PW-9 which miserably failed.
They also took the plea that the prosecution witnesses, more
particularly PW-10, were coerced by the police to falsely implicate
the accused in support of which the appellants had adduced two
defence witnesses. However, we find their evidence unconvincing
as also held by the High Court.
73. We have also noted the testimonies of other neighbours, which we
consider to be highly unnatural and untruthful and they appear to be
reluctant to come up with the truth in order to protect the appellants.
Shyam Bai, PW-3, who was mentioned by PW-6, the complainant
and both the husband and wife, PW-5 and PW-10 (parents of the
deceased) to have been present at the place of occurrence feigned
ignorance of the cause of the death of Suraj and did not support her
previous statement recorded under Section 161CrPC where she had
named the appellants as the assailants. In the cross -examination,
she stated that when she came after bath, she saw the mother and
father of Suraj taking the injured in a rickshaw and saw blood on
the body, but she did not ask how the injured suffered the injuries.
It defies logic and appears to be contrary to human instinct and
nature that when a person sees a neighbour in a seriously injured
condition, no query is made about the injury. PW-3 obviously is not
telling the truth.
74. Same is the case with Ramesh Kumar Verma, PW-9, in front of
whose house the incident occurred and an immediate neighbour of
the deceased. He was also named by both PW-5 and PW-10 to be
present at the place of occurrence and at the time of occurrence.
However, he categorically states that, he was having no knowledge of
the incident and that he had neither seen nor heard of what happened
to the victim. It is very strange and rather unbelievable that though
706 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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he admitted seeing blood spread over in the corner of his garden,
he did not make any query about it. He states that he read about
the news of the death of a boy in the newspaper and he came to
know about the injuries received by Suraj from the newspaper and
that he did not have any knowledge as to who had killed Suraj. He
also admits that he drinks liquor and that Chintaram used to drink
liquor with him and had good terms with Chintaram till date.
Interestingly, the appellants made unsubstantiated suggestion to
PW-10 that Verma (PW-9) and his family had in fact assaulted the
deceased.
The only inference we can draw is that the statement of PW-9 is
untrue, being highly unnatural and defying normal human instinct and
behaviour and he appears to have been influenced by Chintaram
because of his close acquaintance as a comrade in arms in drinking,
which relationship he admitted in the cross examination.
75. Because of the unnaturalness of the testimonies of these neighbours
before the court, which defy human behaviour, the reasonable
inference one can draw is that these witnesses have been won
over. The fact that all these witnesses had close association with
Chintaram on account of consumption of ganja also clearly indicates
the influence Chintraram, the acquitted father of the present two
appellants may have on these witnesses.
76. However, it is also to be noted that merely because the witnesses
turn hostile does not necessarily mean that their evidence has to be
thrown out entirely and what is supportive of the prosecution certainly
be used. In Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa (2002) 8 SCC
381, it was observed as following:-
“15. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 277 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886]
and Lehna v. State of Haryana [(2002) 3 SCC 76 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 526] . Stress was laid by the appellant-accused
on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some
witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out the
entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the
principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one
thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable.
Even if a major portion of the evidence is found to be
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 707
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an
accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other
co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is
the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff.
Where chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be
open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding
the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to
prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular
material witness or material particular would not ruin it
from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses
cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance
nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of the rule
of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts
to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded,
and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely
involves the question of weight of evidence which a court
may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not
what may be called ‘a mandatory rule of evidence’. (See
Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [AIR 1957 SC 366 : 1957 Cri
LJ 550] ) Merely because some of the accused persons
have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them,
so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not
lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been
convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a
court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted
from those who were convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh v.
State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 460 : 1956 Cri LJ 827] .)
The doctrine is a dangerous one especially in India for if a
whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because
a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some
aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal
justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot
help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the
main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as
to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and
merely because in some respects the court considers
the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the
testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as
708 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects
as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The
aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that
one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does
not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration,
embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of
M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 751 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 819] and Ugar
Ahir v. State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ
256] .) An attempt has to be made to, as noted above,
in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from
the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible
to separate the truth from falsehood, because grain and
chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of
separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed
by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution
completely from the context and the background against
which they are made, the only available course to be
made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee
Ariel v. State of M.P. [(1952) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 1954 SC
15 : 1954 Cri LJ 230] and Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab
[(1975) 4 SCC 511 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 601] .) As observed
by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [(1981) 2
SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] normal discrepancies
in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of
observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of
time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror
at the time of occurrence and those are always there
however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material
discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not
expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the
category to which a discrepancy may be categorised.
While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility
of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These
aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi v.
State of Bihar [(2002) 6 SCC 81 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220] .
Accusations have been clearly established against the
appellant-accused in the case at hand. The courts below
have categorically indicated the distinguishing features
in evidence so far as the acquitted and the convicted
accused are concerned.”
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 709
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
77. To the same effect it was held in Raja v. State of Karnataka, (2016)
10 SCC 506 as follows:
“32. That the evidence of a hostile witness in all eventualities
ought not stand effaced altogether and that the same
can be accepted to the extent found dependable on a
careful scrutiny was reiterated by this Court in Himanshu
[Himanshu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] by drawing sustenance of the
proposition amongst others from Khujji v. State of M.P.
[Khujji v. State of M.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627 : 1991 SCC (Cri)
916] and Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat
[Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1999)
8 SCC 624 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 13] . It was announced that
the evidence of a hostile witness remains admissible and is
open for a court to rely on the dependable part thereof as
found acceptable and duly corroborated by other reliable
evidence available on record.”
78. We are also mindful of the position of law that the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength
from the weakness of the defence. However, in the present case,
inspite of the untruthful and evasive testimony of the neighbours,
the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and the false plea of the appellants only strengthens the case
of the prosecution.
79. There is no compelling reason or such material on record on the
basis of which this Court should take the view that Lata Bai (PW-
10), did not really witness the assault of the victim by the appellants.
Merely because her statement under Section 161 CrPC was recorded
belatedly i.e. after five days which have been duly considered by the
High Court and there are some inconsistencies and embellishments
in her testimony before the trial court, we are not persuaded to take
the view that PW-10 cannot be an eye-witness and her testimony
not credible.
PW-10 was subjected to intense and extensive cross-examination
by the defence, yet her testimony could not materially be shaken,
except for pointing out minor discrepancies.
No material contradiction between the statement made by her before
the court and the previous statement recorded under Section 161
710 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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CrPC could be shown by the defence under Section 162 (1) and
Explanation thereto as to render her testimony doubtful.
A careful perusal of the testimony of PW-10 shows that her narration
of the incident was natural, and trustworthy.
80. The appellants had also contended that the PW-10 was an interested
witness and her testimony may not be believable. In this regard, it
must be noted that PW-10, the mother of the deceased though was
related to the victim cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to
be an interested witness. As to who is an “interested witness” and
the “related witness” has been succinctly explained by this Court in
the case of Mohd. Rojali Ali Vs. The State of Assam, (2019) 19
SCC 567, wherein it was held that:
“13. As regards the contention that all the eyewitnesses
are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-
settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an
“interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative
of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference
between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora
of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested
only when he or she derives some benefit from the result
of a litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would
mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in
seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other
reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the
accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State
of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
593] ; Amit v. State of U.P. [Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4
SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] ; and Gangabhavani v.
Rayapati Venkat Reddy [Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat
Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182] ).
Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathiv.
State of T.N. [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC
549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793] , in the following terms,
by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State
of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981)
2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] : (Ganapathi case
[Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2
SCC (Cri) 793] , SCC p. 555, para 14)
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 711
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
“14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A
witness may be called “interested” only when he or
she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation;
in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused
person punished. A witness who is a natural one and
is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances
of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.”
14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence
is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose
presence on the scene of the offence would be natural.
The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be
discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed,
one of the earliest statements with respect to interested
witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [Dalip Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36 : 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC
364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465] , wherein this Court observed:
(AIR p. 366, para 26)
“26. A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which are likely to be tainted and that usually means
unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against
the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily
a close relative would be the last to screen the real
culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.”
15. In case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his
or her testimony as inherently tainted, and needs to ensure
only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable,
cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations
of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry)
[Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC
199 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966] : (SCC p. 213, para 23)
“23. We are of the considered view that in cases where
the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of
the interested witnesses, the approach of the court,
while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses
must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious
712 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by
the interested witnesses but the court must not be
suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour
of the court must be to look for consistency. The
evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown
out solely because it comes from the mouth of a
person who is closely related to the victim.”
81. As also observed by the High Court, we do not see any reason
why the mother of the victim should falsely implicate the appellants
without any rhyme or reason more so when apparently there was no
previous animosity of the mother Lata Bai with any of the appellants.
Lata Bai, PW-10 is certainly not an interested witness even though
she was related to the victim and her testimony cannot be impeached
on this ground.
82. We must also remember that, while recording the testimony of Lata
Bai PW-10, the trial court noted the demeanour of the witness. Section
280 of the CrPC enjoins upon the Judge to record such remarks as
he thinks material respecting the demeanour of the witness while
under examination since the demeanour can provide insights into
the witness’s truthfulness and reliability, which are critical for the
court’s assessment of the evidence presented, which ought not be
ignored by the Appellate Court.
It was noted by the trial court in para 2 of her examination-in-chief,
that the witness was crying while deposing that there were several
injuries on her son’s body and that he sustained grievous injuries
over the right auricle and was bleeding. She stated that she then
carried him on her lap with the help of the police and took him to
the hospital in a rickshaw.
83. The trial court after recording the testimony of the PW-10 and on
consideration of the same found her evidence trustworthy and credible.
We see no reason to question the assessment about the credibility of
the witness by the Trial Court which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing above the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has been
brought to our notice of any serious illegality or breach of fundamental
law so as to warrant taking a different view of the evidence of PW-10.
In this regard we may keep in mind the valuable observations made
by this Court in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC
497 in the following words:
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 713
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is
expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded
by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that
the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing
the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court’s
conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt,
the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of
the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper
care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact
has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation
of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless
the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is
erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law
or unreasonable.
29. …………………………………..
30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48) 75
IA 252 : AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on the
point, stated [ Quoting from Watt v. Thomas, (1947) 1 All
ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A.] : (IA p. 255)
“… but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably
be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at
at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has
been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal
which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate
court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this
opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as
to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight.
This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can
be treated as infallible in determining which side is
telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration.
Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question
of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge
of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal
testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to
courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him
and observing the manner in which their evidence
is given.”
714 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
84. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that even if there are
certain embellishments and improvements and contradictions which
are of minor nature, the evidence of PW-10 on the whole does
appear to be consistent and we do not see any cogent reason to
disbelieve her claim that she had witnessed the incident. Thus, we
are of the opinion that there appears to be no patent illegality in the
view taken by the trial court and the High Court.
85. We also hold that just because the Chintaram, father of the Appellants
was acquitted will not warrant their acquittal as there is sufficient and
cogent material evidence against them to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt whereas the case against the acquitted Chintaram
is doubtful.
Since there is no appeal against the acquittal of the father, we do
not wish to go into the subsequent acquittal of Chintaram.
The High Court had noted that, on close scrutiny of the evidence on
record, there is no clinching evidence of the said Chintaram taking
part in the assault and his name does not figure in the Ex-P/1 which
was prepared soon after the incident by the police for referring the
injured to the Community Hospital, Tilda and also the evidence of
PW-10 that she did not mention his presence in the police station
while naming the appellants. We are of the opinion that the role of
Chintaram does not come out clearly as to fasten criminal liability
on him along with the appellants. Thus, the present two appellants
cannot be placed at par with the case of the acquitted accused,
Chintaram.
86. As regards applicability of the case of State of Punjab vs. Sucha
Singh (supra) is concerned wherein this court found the inaction of
the father to come to the rescue of the victim son is concerned, it
is to be noted that, unlike in the said case, the evidence which has
emerged is that the father PW-5 came to the scene after the assailants
appellants had fled. Hence, the question of his intervening does not
arise. If the said case of Sucha Singh (supra) is to be applicable
as contended by the appellant, it would mean that the father, PW-5
would have witnessed which goes against their own case.
As far as the mother PW-10 is concerned, on seeing the assault she
ran inside to wake up her husband and when they came out, the
assailants had fled. It cannot be considered to be highly unnatural
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 715
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
for a woman not rushing to intervene and instead seek the help of
a male member (her husband) when there were two persons with
deadly weapons assaulting her.
87. In conclusion, we are of the view that, the evidence of the sole eye
witness, a hapless rustic illiterate woman visited with the vicissitude
and tragedy of her son being fatally assaulted by co-villagers before
her own eyes, has withstood intensive cross examination and judicial
scrutiny. She has answered the questions put to her during her cross
examination with spontaneity without any jitteriness and her response
was natural and not elusive and prevaricating, which all are signs
of truthfulness of the witness. We, therefore, have no hesitation to
hold that her testimony is trustworthy and reliable. Her evidence
finds corroboration from the admissible part of the evidence of the
complainant, and her husband even though they had turned hostile,
and the medical evidence, evidence of the Investigating Officer and
other official witnesses.
88. In the present case, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances
as evident from the records, the Prosecution has been able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were responsible for
the death of the deceased, Suraj for which they were convicted by
the trial court under Section 302 of the IPC.
89. We do not see any glaring illegality or perversity in the findings arrived
at the trial court and the High Court causing any grave miscarriage
of justice to the appellants.
90. However, in spite of our finding that the appellants had assaulted the
deceased with deadly weapons causing the death of the deceased,
we have noted that the death of the deceased was not instantaneous.
He survived the brutal attack for a few days and later succumbed to
his injuries. The deceased was assaulted in the morning of 23.9.2001
and died on the night of 25.9.2001.
The doctor, Dr. G. R. Agarwal, PW-1, opined that the injuries no. (i),
(vi), (viii) and (ix) might be caused by the iron pipe and these were
not described as grievous. On the other hand, the other injuries no.
(ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vii) were described as grievous head injuries
which might be caused by the axe. The deceased later succumbed
because of the accumulated effect of these head injuries as testified
by PW-13, Dr. Arvind Neralwar who conducted the post mortem
716 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
examination of the body of the deceased. According to him the
cause of death was coma due to head injuries. If we closely examine
these injuries, it is seen that though the injuries on the head were
identified as grievous, these are shown as skin deep injuries and
no particular injury was identified as being the fatal one. Since the
cause of death is attributed to coma because of the head injuries
and it was opined that the injuries are sufficient in ordinary course
of nature to cause death, it appears that it is the cumulative effect
of these head injuries.
What is also observable is that he did not succumb to the injuries
immediately and he died on the third day of the incident.
It is also noticeable that the circumstances under which the assault took
place and the reason for causing the injuries by the appellants and the
motive behind their assault has not come out clearly. Even the sole
eye witness, Lata Bai (PW-10), the mother of the deceased testified
that her son was having visiting terms with the accused persons as
they were residing in the same locality and she cannot tell why the
quarrel occurred suddenly. It has not been established clearly that it
was premeditated and the assault was preplanned with the intention
to kill the deceased. Any prior enmity between the appellants and the
deceased has not been established. Thus, the motive for committing
the crime has not been clearly established and proved.
91. However, it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants
had caused the death of the deceased fully knowing that the bodily
injuries caused by the appellants were likely to cause death as the
appellants were armed with deadly weapons, we are inclined to
convert the conviction of the appellants from Section 302 IPC to
Part I of Section 304 IPC. Accordingly, we convict the appellants
under Part I of Section 304 IPC.
92. Having convicted the appellants under Part I of Section 304 IPC,
the next consideration is the quantum of punishment that may be
imposed on them.
93. Under Part I of Section 304 IPC, whoever commits culpable homicide
not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life,
or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 717
Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
As per the records, the appellants have already undergone 10 years 3
months of incarceration during the trial and pendency of the appeals
before the High Court and this Court.
This Court by an order dated 06.01.2012 had enlarged the appellants
on bail during the pendency of this appeal and the appeal has
remained pending before this Court since 2011.
94. Under the facts and circumstances discussed above, we are of
the view that interest of justice will be served if the appellants are
sentenced to the period already undergone by them and impose
a fine of Rs.50,000/- each on the appellants, which shall be paid
to the family of the deceased through his mother, namely Lata Bai
(PW-10), failing which the appellants will undergo additional 6 (six)
months simple imprisonment. In the event of the appellants paying
the amount, as ordered above, the bail bonds shall stand discharged.
In the event of non-payment, the bail bonds shall stand discharged
after undergoing the default sentence.
95. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is partly allowed as
above.
Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
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