Supreme Court of India
GUNJAN @ GIRIJA KUMARI AND OTHERSversusSTATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 468
- Decided
- 11 May 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
An offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act requires the insult or abuse to occur in a place within public view, and the FIR and charge‑sheet failed to disclose this essential ingredient, rendering both the SC/ST Act charges and the Section 506/34 IPC charge untenable.
Summary
The appellants, who were family members, were charged under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act and Section 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC for allegedly hurling caste‑based insults and threatening the complainant inside a residential house. The trial court framed charges, which the High Court upheld, but the appellants contended that the offences were not made out because the alleged abuse did not occur "in a place within public view", a statutory requirement under the SC/ST Act, and that the elements of criminal intimidation were also absent. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, prior precedents, and the FIR’s contents, finding that the FIR did not disclose the essential ingredient of a public‑view location nor the intent to cause alarm. Consequently, the Court held that both the SC/ST Act charges and the IPC charge of criminal intimidation were improperly framed. The Court set aside the trial‑court and High‑Court orders, quashed the FIR and charge‑sheet, and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the FIR and charge‑sheet alleging offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 can be quashed on the ground that the alleged abuse did not occur in a place within public view.
- Whether the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is sustainable where the element of intent to cause alarm is absent.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 503, s. 506
- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(r), s. 3(1)(s)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the FIR and the charge-sheet filed against the appellants- accused for offences u/ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act as well as for the offences u/s.506 r/w s.34, IPC, ought to be quashed. Headnotes† Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Act, 1989 – ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – “a place within public view”, when not – Offence u/s.3(1)(r) and/or s.3(1)(s) not made out if alleged caste-based abuses are hurled inside a house, not exposed to public eye or public gaze – Charge framed by trial
Subjects
Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST ActSection 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST ActCaste‑based abusesPlace within public viewPrivate placePublic eyeFIR quashedChargesheet quashedSection 503 IPCSection 506 IPCIntent to cause alarmCriminal intimidationAbuse of process of law
Judgment
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 550 : 2026 INSC 468
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others
v.
State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 2446 of 2026)
11 May 2026
[Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the FIR and the charge-sheet filed against the appellants-
accused for offences u/ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act
as well as for the offences u/s.506 r/w s.34, IPC, ought to be
quashed.
Headnotes†
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – “a place within
public view”, when not – Offence u/s.3(1)(r) and/or s.3(1)(s)
not made out if alleged caste-based abuses are hurled inside
a house, not exposed to public eye or public gaze – Charge
framed by trial court against the appellants-accused for
offences u/ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act and u/s.506
r/w s.34, IPC – High Court rejected the prayer of the appellants
to quash the said orders and dismissed the Criminal Revision
Petition – Interference with:
Held: In order to make out the offence u/s.3(1)(r) and/or
s.3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and
the act and conduct of hurling of caste-based abuses must take
place at “a place within public view” – It must be a place within
the public gaze – Even if it happens to be a private place, then
in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to be able
to notice what happens there or what is taking place that will only
make the “place within public view” – Alleged incident took place
in a private place and within four walls of the house of respondent
No.2-complainant and the appellants, who all are family members –
While the allegation in the FIR was that respondent No.2 had
been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and for last
one year, it was not stated anything specific in respect of those
* Author
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 551
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
earlier incidents with regard to the incident for which the complaint
was filed, it was not indicated that any independent member of
public was present to witness the occurrence – Once that is so,
to suggest that the house place was not exposed to public eye
or public gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place
within public view” – The requirement that the place must be one
“within public view” is a sine qua non for making out the offence
under the SC/ST Act – In the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was stated
that the said incident wherein appellant No.1 and other appellants
are stated to have abused and threatened complainant, took
place where there was a public gaze – The necessary ingredient
of occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was
conspicuously absent – The charge could not have framed and
was wrongly framed by the trial court against the appellants for
offences u/ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act – Furthermore, the
charge framed u/s.506 r/w s.34, IPC against all the appellants was
also wrongly framed – Impugned judgment of the High Court and
the orders of the trial court set aside – FIR and the charge-sheet
filed against the appellants for offences u/ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of
the SC/ST Act and for offences u/s.506 r/w s.34, IPC, quashed –
Penal Code, 1860 – s.506 r/w s.34. [Paras 5.9, 6.4, 6.7, 9, 9.1]
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – “a place within
public view”, a sine qua non for making out the offence under
the SC/ST Act:
Held: The occurrence of the incident to become an offence under
the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place within public view” –
This is a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients – The
other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation” and “an
intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity when the insult,
intimidation, humiliation or abusive utterances, as the case may
be, takes place in “a place within public view”, in the presence of
members of the public – The requirement that the place must be
one “within public view” substantiates the other elements of the
offence under the SC/ST Act – Therefore, it is a sine qua non for
making out the offence under the SC/ST Act. [Para 9.1]
Complaint/FIR – Contents of, giving initial description more
reliable:
552 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing
of a complaint and registration of FIR – The complaint/FIR provides
the first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged
as commission of offence – A reaction and revelation at the first
blush is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy – The
contents of the complaint giving the initial and primary description
could be treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage,
there would be a scope and room for improvisation – FIR becomes
liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not
disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged
therein – The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR
must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR – In
order that the FIR alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a
good and acceptable document to proceed criminally against any
accused named therein or any person to be made accused on its
basis, it must manifest and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s)
alleged therein – For an offence to be made out u/ss.3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the
requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public
view” is not satisfied, is missing and absent. [Paras 7, 9]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.506 r/w s.34 – Offences under, not made
out:
Held: Offence of criminal intimidation as defined u/s.503, IPC and
made punishable u/s.506, IPC requires that whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or property and
when such threat is with the intent to cause alarm to that person,
commits criminal intimidation – The “intent to cause alarm” is an
pivotal aspect and consideration to judge whether the offence of
criminal intimidation is made out or not – In the present case,
even after closely reading the averments in the complaint, it is
difficult to come to the conclusion that the appellants-accused
exerted threat with an intent to cause “alarm” to respondent No.2-
complainant – The element of “alarm” to the complainant was
“absent” – Even otherwise the offence u/s.506, IPC was alleged
against the appellants to conjunct the same with the offence
alleged under the SC/ST Act which are not made out – As far as
the charge u/s.34, IPC is concerned, nothing is suggested either
from the facts or attendant circumstances that the appellants had
any common intention to do a criminal act and that they acted
in furtherance of such common intention – Thus, it would be an
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 553
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
abuse of the process of law and would amount to harassment
to the appellants to subject them to the criminal proceedings in
relation to s.506 r/w s.34, IPC. [Paras 10-10.2]
Case Law Cited
Swaran Singh and Others v. State through Standing Counsel and
Another [2008] 12 SCR 132 : (2008) 8 SCC 435; Hitesh Verma v.
State of Uttarakhand and Another [2020] 9 SCR 593 : (2020) 10
SCC 710; Karuppudayar v. State Represented by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others [2025] 1
SCR 1381 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215; State of Haryana and
Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992)
Supp. 1 SCC 335; Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh and
Others (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2023] 6 SCR 643 : (2023) 17
SCC 615 – referred to.
Sri Rithesh Pais v. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S. and
Another, ILR 2022 KAR 4613 – referred to.
List of Acts
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989;
Caste-based abuses; Caste-based abuses hurled; “a place within
public view”; “within public view”; A place within public gaze;
Private place; Public-eye; “place within public view”; Within four
walls of the house; House place; Residential house; FIR quashed;
Chargesheet quashed; Section 503, IPC; Section 506, IPC; “intent
to cause alarm”; Criminal intimidation; Abuse of the process of law.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2446 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLREVP No. 114 of 2023.
554 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Avadh Bihari Kaushik, Ms. Urvashi Bhatia, Pawan Kumar Veerma,
Rishabh Kumar, Ms. Reeya.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Kamal
Rattan Digpaul, Ms. Harshita Choubey, Digvijay Dam, Udit Dediya,
Ms. Rajkumari Banju.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
N.V. Anjaria, J.
Leave granted.
2. The challenge in this appeal is directed against judgment and order
dated 22.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi1,
dismissing Criminal Revision Petition No.114 of 2023 and Criminal
Miscellaneous Application No.3181 of 2023, filed by the appellants-
accused herein.
2.1. In the Criminal Revision Petition, what was called in question,
was the order passed by the Court of Additional Sessions
Judge-02, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi2 dated 26.11.2022 on framing
of charges as well as order dated 30.11.2022, whereby the
charges were framed. Against appellant No.1-accused No.1
Smt. Gunjan @ Girija Kumari w/o Shri Laxman Dass, charge
came to be framed by the trial court in respect of the offences
under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893, whereas
against all the appellants-accused including appellant No.1,
charge was also framed under Section 506 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, 18604. The prayer of the appellants to
1 Hereinafter, “High Court”.
2 Hereinafter, “trial court”.
3 Hereinafter, “SC/ST Act”.
4 Hereinafter, “IPC”.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 555
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
quash the said orders was rejected and the Criminal Revision
Petition came to be dismissed by the High Court.
3. The complainant and the accused persons happen to be family
members. Appellant Nos.2 and 3 and respondent No.2-complainant
are real brothers. Appellant Nos.1 and 4 are legally wedded wives of
appellant Nos.2 and 3 respectively. The wives hail from castes other
than Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Their husbands, that
is appellant Nos.2 and 3 as well as respondent No.2-complainant,
belong to Scheduled Castes. By virtue of marriage, the wives, it was
contended, also stood to belong to caste and community of their
husband’s as well as that of respondent No.2-complainant. The facts
on record and the pleadings suggest that a dispute existed between
the parties in respect of the properties of their late father named Shri
Nand Kishore, situated at Hari Nagar and Ramesh Nagar.
3.1 First Information Report5 No.42 of 2021 came to be registered
on 30.01.2021 with the Kirti Nagar Police Station, pursuant
to a complaint lodged by respondent No.2-complainant. It
was inter-alia stated that on the day of the incident, that is on
28.01.2021, the appellants misbehaved with the complainant.
According to the complainant, appellant No.1 hurled casteist
abuses against respondent No.2-complainant and the other
appellants gave threats.
3.1.1 It was stated in the complaint that when the friends
of respondent No.2-complainant named Chandra
Prakash @ Chini and Bobby had come to meet him,
appellant No.1, by making caste-based slurs, using words
like chura, chamar, harijan, dirty drain etc., addressed
and insulted the complainant and his wife. It was stated
that the accused were trying to break open the lock of
the house when the incident took place.
3.1.2 The narration in the complaint was prefaced by mentioning
that appellant No.1, who belonged to a particular upper
caste, was in the habit of using abusive words as above
and that it was for over one year that appellant No.1 had
been harassing by addressing the complainant, his wife
5 Hereinafter, “FIR”.
556 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and their child with derogatory words as above, from her
balcony or from the ground floor in the house particularly
when some friends or other persons would come.
3.2 The complaint resulted into registration of FIR as above,
culminating into Sessions Case being SC No. 253 of 2021
upon completion of the investigation. The trial court, in its order
dated 26.11.2022, viewed that the charges were required to
be framed. It actually framed the charges as per order dated
30.11.2022 under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST
Act against appellant No.1 and under Section 506 read with
Section 34, IPC against all the appellants. The High Court
rejected the challenge to the said orders and maintained the
charges by the impugned judgment and order.
3.3 According to the High Court, charges were properly framed
inasmuch as at the stage of framing of charges, the court was
not required to evaluate the evidence, nor was supposed to hold
a mini trial. According to the High Court, there were allegations in
the complaint that the appellants acted in furtherance of common
intention, that appellant No.1 hurled abuses towards respondent
No.2-complainant and that the appellants also threatened to
kill him and to falsely implicate him in a molestation case. The
High Court observed that witness Chandra Prakash, in his
statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 19736 corroborated the statement of respondent
No.2-complainant made in the complaint to go to show that
the caste-based remarks were used against respondent No.2-
complainant and the offences as per the charges framed were
committed.
4. Heard learned counsel Mr. Avadh Bihari Kaushik for the appellants
as well as learned Additional Solicitor General Ms. Archana Pathak
Dave assisted by learned advocate-on-record Mr. Mukesh Kumar
Maroria and other learned advocates on behalf of the respondents.
4.1 Assailing the impugned judgment and order, it was submitted
on behalf of the appellants that neither the offences under
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act were made out
6 Hereinafter, “Cr.PC”.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 557
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
from the statements and contents of the FIR, more particularly,
when the offence under the SC/ST Act was not shown to have
been committed at “a place within public view” which was an
essential requirement to constitute the offences in question,
nor the averments in the complaint revealed the ingredients of
offence under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. On the
other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned judgment and order, urging to dismiss the appeal.
5. While examining the challenge to the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court and in turn, the merits of the order of
framing of the charge passed by the trial court, the provisions of
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which are the offences
alleged against appellant No.1 and for which she has been charged,
may be looked into.
5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as under,
“3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—3(1) Whoever,
not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe,—
(a) to (q) ………..
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within
public view;”
5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act can be
said to have been committed when a person not belonging
to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally
insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a person
belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any
place within public view. Offence under Section 3(1)(s)
of the SC/ST Act is made out when any member of the
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste
name in any place within public view.
5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to be an
intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with an intent
558 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
or that such member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
is abused by caste name by a person who does not belong to
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The common essential for
constituting the offence under both the Sections is that the insult
or intimidation under sub-clause (r) or hurling of abuses under
sub-clause (s) have taken place “in any place within public view”.
5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under Section 506
read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is about punishment
for the offence of criminal intimidation whereas the offence of
criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503, IPC. It says
that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone
in whom that person is interested, and when the same is done
with an intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal
intimidation. Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by
several persons in furtherance of common intention.
5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge framed and
the charge-sheet for its details and contents in respect of the
aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/
ST Act, it would be useful to survey few decisions of this Court
which have explained the scope and purport of the phrase “in any
place within public view” pinpointing that the said requirement
is indispensable to be fulfilled in order that the offence under
the SC/ST Act is constituted.
5.5 In Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing
Counsel and Another7, the place where the informant was
insulted by the appellant by calling him ‘chamar’ was one where
he had been standing near the car which was parked at the
gate of the premises of his employer. This Court held that such
place was “a place within public view”. The argument that the
alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence
did not come within the purview of the offence under the SC/
ST Act was negatived by explaining a fine distinction between
the expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the
provision and the expression ‘public place’.
7 (2008) 8 SCC 435
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 559
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within public
view’ could not be confused with the expression ‘public
place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private
place yet can be within public view,
“….It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a
building, and also was not in the public view.
However, if the offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the
lawn can be seen by someone from the road or
lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. Also,
even if the remark is made inside a building,
but some members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it would
be an offence since it is in the public view….”
(Para 28)
5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this Court
in Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another8
in respect of the concept of ‘place within public view’ as an
ingredient of the offence. The very observations in Swaran
Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in Hitesh Verma
(supra) when the Court noticed the allegations in the FIR about
abusing the informant. It was stated in the FIR that the incident
of abuse happened within the four walls of the building of the
informant, and it was not the case of the informant that any
member of the public was present at the time of the incident in
the house. The Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement
that the abusive words were uttered in ‘a place within public
view’ was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses
whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not the
persons present within the four walls of the building.
5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar vs. State
represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi
8 (2020) 10 SCC 710
560 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Trichy and Others9, this Court considered its own decisions in
Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh Verma (supra), and
elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as under,
“It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within
public view’, the place should be open where the
members of the public can witness or hear the
utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the
alleged offence takes place within the four corners
of the wall where members of the public are not
present, then it cannot be said that it has taken
place at a place within public view.”
(Para 11)
5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the allegations
in the FIR at their face value, what was alleged was that
when the complainant was in the office, the accused
came there, made inquiries from the complainant and
upon not being satisfied, started abusing the complainant
in the name of his caste and insulted him. Thereafter,
three colleagues of the complainant came later to pacify
the accused and took him away. The Court thus noticed
that the incident had taken place within the four corners
of the chambers of the complainant, which was not “a
place within public view”.
5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri Rithesh Pais vs.
State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S. and Another10 may
also be noticed to be relevant, in which the offence was held
to be not made out as the chargesheet material showed that
the hurling of the abuses had happened in the basement and
within the walls of the basement, holding that the basement of
the building was not “a place within public view”.
5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from the ratio
of the decisions of this Court discussed above is that in
order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or
9 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215
10 ILR 2022 KAR 4613
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 561
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident
and the act and conduct of hurling of caste-based abuses must
take place at “a place within public view”. It must be a place
within the public gaze. Even happens to be a private place,
then in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to
be able to notice what happens there or what is taking place
that will only make the “place within public view”.
6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement that the
occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse, towards the member of
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has to be in “a place within
public view”, making the same a necessary condition for constituting
the offence under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may
be attentively noticed.
6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse, on 28.01.2021,
the statements were made by respondent No.2-complainant
that the appellants were in the habit of harassing and hurling
caste-based slurs at him for over a year and that they used to
do it when some other persons or friends come to meet him,
by using the abusive words from their balcony or at the ground
floor of the house.
6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous conduct did
not speak of any specific instance or happening on a particular
day and they are too irrelevant to contribute to make out an
offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST
Act. It was next stated that because of such behaviour of the
appellants, respondent No.1-complainant had to send his son
in a separate house. Such general accusations lead nowhere
when it comes to allegation about the commission of offence.
6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date that is
on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time when the
appellants were trying to break open the house of respondent
No.2-complainant. According to respondent No.2-complainant,
appellant No.1 hurled casteist slur in an abusive way to insult
him and his wife. All the appellants-accused, it was further
alleged, intimidated respondent No.2-complainant and also
threatened to implicate him in molestation charge.
6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was
stated that the said incident wherein appellant No.1 and other
562 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
appellants are stated to have abused and threatened respondent
No.1-complainant, took place where there was a public gaze.
The necessary ingredient of occurrence of the incident “in a
place within public view” was conspicuously absent.
6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place within public
view” or that the outsiders or the members of the family were
present at the time, the details mentioned in the FIR clearly
indicated that the place of occurrence of the incident was
inside the residential house. Referring to the facts stated and
the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the FIR is silent about
the place of occurrence of the alleged incident. Secondly, point
No.5(b) in the FIR mentioned the place of occurrence at the
address stated as “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi”, which
was admittedly a residential home. Similarly was recorded the
address of respondent No.2-complainant in point No.6(e) in the
FIR to reinforce that it was the place of residential house where
the occurrence took place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed
before the court, the very residential address “7/38, Ramesh
Nagar, Kirti Nagar, Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place
of occurrence.
6.6 Respondent No.2-complainant named two witnesses, one Love
Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash. Not only
that both were the friends of respondent No.2-complainant,
from their statements, nothing could be elicited to show that
they witnessed the incident. Love Manchanda stated that “on
28.12.2020, Bhim Sain (complainant) asked me to accompany
him to his house where he wanted to take a picture of the
locked lock of his house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash
stated that “he went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the
complainant Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock
of his house, the accused interjected”.
6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged incident took
place in a private place and within four walls of the house of
respondent No.2-complainant and the appellants, who all are
family members. While the allegation in the FIR was, as stated,
that respondent No.2-complainant had been suffering similar
kind of incidents since long and for last one year, it was not
stated anything specific in respect of those earlier incidents
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 563
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
with regard to the incident for which the complaint was filed, it
was not indicated that any independent member of public was
present to witness the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest
that the house place was not exposed to public eye or public
gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place within
public view”.
7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing of
a complaint and registration of FIR. The complaint/FIR provides the
first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged as
commission of offence. A reaction and revelation at the first blush
is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents
of the complaint giving the initial and primary description could be
treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there would
be a scope and room for improvisation.
8. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others11, this
Court laid down the acid test that if the contents of the FIR, taken
at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused,
such an FIR registered with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed.
In Hitesh Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place
within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet failed
to disclose the precise contents of abusive language employed by
the applicant to attract the offence under the SC/ST Act. In other
words, when the essentials to constitute the offence did not come out
from and were not satisfied in the contents of the FIR, the offence
was held to have not been made out, rendering the FIR liable to
be quashed.
8.1 In Amar Nath Jha vs. Nand Kishore Singh and Others12,
this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in the nature of
non-mentioning of the name of material witness PW-1 which
was treated as a basic defect in the hypothesis portrayed by the
prosecution. The Court, in that context, observed, “although we
accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime,
but absence of certain essential facts which are conspicuously
missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the
crime itself may have been staged”.
11 (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
12 (2018) 9 SCC 137
564 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another13, this Court found absence of requisite ingredients
of the offence under the SC/ST Act holding that the offence was
not committed at “a place within public view”. It was observed
that even though the appellant in that case might have abused
the complainant, but such abuse by itself and without anything
more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial,
particularly in view of the clear absence of the ingredients
necessary to constitute the offence.
9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to
be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The
basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and
stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR. In order that the FIR
alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable
document to proceed criminally against any accused named therein
or any person to be made accused on its basis, it must manifest
and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein. For
an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the requirement
that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public view” is not
satisfied, is missing and absent.
9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an
offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place
within public view”, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst
the other ingredients. The other aspects namely “intentional
insult or intimidation” and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind
of intensity when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive
utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within
public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The
requirement that the place must be one “within public view” can
be said to be substantiating the other elements of the offence
under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non for making
out the offence under the SC/ST Act.
10. This leaves the Court to the charge framed under Section 506 read
with Section 34, IPC against all the appellants. As noted hereinabove,
13 (2023) 17 SCC 615
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 565
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
the offence of criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503,
IPC and made punishable under Section 506, IPC requires that
whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation
or property and when such threat is with the intent to cause alarm
to that person, commits criminal intimidation. The “intent to cause
alarm” is an pivotal aspect and consideration to judge whether the
offence of criminal intimidation is made out or not.
10.1 In the present case, even after closely reading the averments
in the complaint, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that
the appellants-accused exerted threat with an intent to cause
“alarm” to respondent No.2-complainant. The submission could
be countenanced that the element of “alarm” to the complainant
was “absent”. Even otherwise, the offence under Section 506,
IPC was alleged against the appellants to conjunct the same
with the offence alleged under the SC/ST Act which are not
made out.
10.2 As far as the charge under Section 34, IPC is concerned,
nothing is suggested either from the facts or attendant
circumstances that the appellants-accused had any common
intention to do a criminal act and that they acted in furtherance
of such common intention. In that view, it would be an abuse
of the process of law and would amount to harassment to
the appellants to subject them to the criminal proceedings in
relation to Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC.
11. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, it is evident that the charge
could not have framed and was wrongly framed by the trial court
against the appellants-accused for the offences under Sections 3(1)
(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act and under Section 506 read with
Section 34, IPC. The judgment and orders dated 22.08.2024 passed
by the High Court of Delhi, dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition
No.114 of 2023 and Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.3181 of
2023, are not sustainable in eye of law.
12. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 22.08.2024
as well as both the above orders of the trial court dated 26.11.2022
and 30.11.2022 are hereby set aside.
13. FIR No. 42 of 2021 dated 30.01.2021 registered with the Police
Station, Kirti Nagar, Delhi and the charge-sheet filed against the
566 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
appellants-accused for the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)
(s) of the SC/ST Act as well as for the offences under Section 506
read with Section 34, IPC stand quashed.
14. The appeal is allowed.
In view of disposal of the appeal as above, the interlocutory
applications, if any, shall not survive.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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