Holding

The Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974 is constitutionally valid and does not offend the basic structure, though Section 48(8) prohibiting advocates is unenforceable as repugnant to the Advocates Act.

Summary

The petitioners challenged the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974, which removed a landlord's right to resume tenanted land for personal cultivation, omitted protective provisions for certain classes, created tribunals with members of unspecified qualifications, and barred advocates from appearing before them. They argued that these changes violated the basic structure of the Constitution, were ultra vires the State Legislature, and conflicted with the Advocates Act and Bar Councils Act. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was a valid law aimed at agrarian reform and did not offend the basic structure, that tribunals could be constituted without judicial qualifications, but that Section 48(8) prohibiting advocates was repugnant to the Advocates Act and would not be enforced. The Court dismissed the appeals, leaving existing tribunal decisions untouched.

Issues considered

The amendment's removal of the landlord's right to resume land for personal cultivation violates the basic structure of the Constitution (Arts 31A, 31B, 31C, 39(b), 39(c)).
Whether the amendment is a law of agrarian reform within the State's legislative competence despite being placed in the Ninth Schedule.
Whether the constitution of tribunals under Section 48, with members of unspecified qualifications, is ultra vires the State Legislature.
Whether Section 48(8) barring legal practitioners from appearing before tribunals is repugnant to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926.
Whether the malfunctioning of some tribunals invalidates the entire tribunal scheme under the Act.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 30
Bar Councils Act, 1926s. 14
Constitution of Indias. 31A, s. 31B, s. 31C, s. 39(b), s. 39(c)
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961s. 44, s. 48(8), s. 48A
Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974

Subjects

agrarian reformland resumptionbasic structure doctrinetribunalsadvocates' rightsNinth Scheduleconstitutional validityKarnataka Land Reforms Act

Judgment

H.S. SRINIVASA RAGHAVACHAR ETC. ETC. A
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

APRIL 23, 1987

[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND MURARI MOHON DUTT, JJ.) B

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961-Sections 44, 48(8) and
48A-Right of landlord to resume land if bona fide required for
personal cultivation-Taken away by Karnataka Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1974-Whether constitutionally valid-Amendment
law aimed at agrarian reform-Advocates not to be prevented from C
appearing before Tribunals functioning under the Act-Tribunals func-
tions under the Act-Whether to be manned by judicial personnel.

Administrative law-Statutory Tribunals-Whether to be a lay
tribunal or judicial tribunal-Some disputes required trained judicial
mind, many do not require application of trained judicial mind-Land D
Tribunals under Section 48(8) of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961
do not require trained judicial personnel.

Advocates Act, 1961/lndian Bar Councils Act, 1926-section 30/
Section 14-Advocates-Right of appearance before Tribunals-
t Section 48(8) of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 not to be enforced E

- so as to prevent Advocates from appearing before Tribunals under the
Act.

Constitution of lndia, 1950-Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C, 39(b)
J.. and (c) and Ninth Schedule--Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment)
Act, 1974-Constitutional validity of-Law clearly aimed at agrarian F
reform.

The Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 1961 was substantially
amended by the Amendment Act I of 1974 and it was included in the
Ninth Schedule as was the principal Act. Section 5 was amended and the
provisos were omitted. Sections 14 and 16 were deleted. Section 44 was G
amended. New sub-section (1) provided that:-

"All lands held by or in the possession of tenants (including
tenants against whom a decree or order for eviction or a certifi-
cate for resumption is made or issued) immediately prior to the H
date of commencement of the Amendment Act, other than lands
1189
1190 SUPREM)3 COURT RlifORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A held by them under leases per01itted under Section S, shall, with
effect on and from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in
the State Government.''

A new Section 48 providing for the constitution of Tribunals was
introduced, Sub-section (8) of Section 48 provided that no legal
B practitioner shall be allowed to appear in any proceeding before the
Tribunal. Section 48A dealt with the procedure to be atlopted by tile
Tribunal in its enquiry into applications !'lllde uq!ler &e~tion 45 for
registration of a person as an occupant.

The provision for an appeal from the decision of the court and the
~. -
C further right of revision under the amended Act were taken away and
there was no right of appeal or revision against the decision of the
Tribunal. The 1974 Amending Act took away the righ~ which was saved ,>-
by the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried woman, minor
and disabled person to create a tenancy or lease of the land. The more
important right which was taken aw11y ~y t)Je 1974 Amendment was the
D right of the landlord to resume the land if he bona fitle required the land
for personal cultivation or for a non.agricultural purpose. This right
was denied by the Amending Act even if the income by the cultivation of
the land which he was entitled to resume was tile 11rincipal source of
income for the maintenance of the landlord. f
E The Writ Petitions challenging the amendments filed by the
appellants were dismissed by the High Court.

In the appeals, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that
-
the 1974 Amendment insofar as it took away the right of a landlord to
resume possession of the tenanted land where he bona fide required the
F land for personal cultivation and had no other principal source of
income was ultra vires, notwithstanding its inclusion in the Ninth
Schedule, as it offended the basic structure of the Constitution, that the
provision for the constitution of a Tribunal consisting of persons with
unspecified qualifications in the place of a court was similarly ultra
vires .the powers of the State Legislature, and that Section 48(8) which
G · excluded legal practitioners from appearing before the Tribunals was
repugnant to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 14 of
the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and the State Legislature was not
competent to make a law repugnant to laws made by Parliament
pursuant to entries 77 and 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution and that important questions which fall for consideration
H under Section 48A should not be left to a Tribunal consisting of mem·
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE 1191

hers nominated by the Siate Government with no regard for any A
qualification.

It was also contended that the 1974 Amendment Act was not a law
pertaining to agrarian reform; nor was It a law directed towards secur-
ing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the
community w~tf so dlstriblited as besi to subserve the common good or B
that the operatillll ilf the ecortomic system did not result in the concen-
tration of wealth and niearts Of production to the common detriment.
that far from setting atlt to achieve these goals, the Amendment Act set
out in quite opposite direction by seeking to reduce to destitution small
landlorils whose sole means of livelihood was the tenanted land which
they were allbwed Id resume for personal cultivation, that the original C
Act was very fair as It recogllised poverty amongst landlords as well as
poverty amongst lenallis and afforded a measure of protection to the
poorer sections of the landlords, and that Waman Rao's case to the
eident it upheld Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C and the validity of the
legislations impugned therein required re-consideration.
D
Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD: 1. No provisioil of the Amending Act offends the basic
structure of the Constitution. [1204G-H)
t
2. The 1974 Amending Act took away the right which was saved E
by the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried wamen, minor
and disabled person to create a tenancy or lease of the land. The more
important right which was taken away by the 1974 Amendment was the
right of the landlord to resume the land if he bona fide required the land
for personal cultivation or for a non-agricultural purpose. l 1201E-F)
F
3. It is too late in the day to contend that, in the existing system of
economic relations, ownership of land to the tiller of the land is not the
best way of securing the utmost utilisation of land, a material resource
of the community for the common good of the entire community. It is
now well recognised that in the absence of common ownership of land in
the existing system of economic relations, the greatest incentive G
for maximum production is the feeling of identity ·and security which
is possible only if the ownership of the land is with the tiller. It
is in recognition of this principle that 'landlordism' was sought to
be totally done away with by the amendment of Section 5 of the Act,
by the omission of Sections 14 and 16 and by the amendment of
Section 44. ll204C-E) H
1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!987] 2 S.C.R.

A 4. If between a landlord who did not himself personally cultivate
the land and a tenant who so cultivated the land, the legislature prefer- ,._.
red the cultivating tenant, it is not possible to hold that such preference
is not part of a programme of agrarian reform pursuant to the Directive
Principles contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. There
is not the slightest doubt that the amendment was a law clearly aimed at
B agrarian reform to secure these Directive Principles. It is tme that one
of the conditions subject to which alone a landlord could resume land
for personal cultivation under Section 16 of the Act was that the income
from the land proposed to be cultivated by the landlord on resumption
•
should be the principal source of income for the maintenance of the _,, ,_
landlord, but the question of resumption of land from a tenant would
not arise unless a tenant was already cultivating the land. If, therefore,
c a tenant is already cultivating the land and if, presumably, that is the
source of his livelihood, there is no reason why he should be disposses-
sed to enable a landlord whose source of livelihood it was not until then >-
to make it his principal source of maintenance hereafter. [1204E-G]

D 5.1 The mal-functioning of some of the Tribunals cannot possibly
vitiate the provision relating to the constitution of the Tribunal and
entrustment of the decision of certain issues to the Tribunal. There can
be no doubt that while the decision of some disputes require a trained
judicial mind to be applied to it, there are many other questions which
+
-
do not require the application of any trained judicial mind. The dis-
E pules contemplated by Section 48A do not appear to be disputes of a
nature where the application of a trained judicial mind is absolutely
essential. (1205C, DJ
......'
5.2 Land Tribunals have functioned very well in some of the
States where under the respective State Acts more complicated ques-
F lions than ones under Section 48A were entrusted to the Land Tribun-
¥
als. The failnre of the Land Tribunals to function efficiently in the State
bas apparently been taken note of by the Legislature itself and the Act
bas since been amended making provision for an appeal and revision.
The failure of some of the Land Tribunals to function efficiently cannot
be said to be sufficient to stigmatise wholesale, the functioning of all the
G Tribunals constituted under the Act and invalididate the provisions of
the Act relating to Tribunals. l 12050-F] ·+
6.1 Section 48(8) will not he enforced so as to prevent Advocates
from appearing before the Tribunals functioning under the Act, since
this provision is repugnant to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961
H and Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and the State
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE (REDDY, J.J 1193

Legislature is not competent to make a law repugnant to laws made by A
Parliament pursuant to Entries 77 and 78 of List I of the Seventh
...._ Schedule oftbe Constitution. [120SG·H; 120liA]

6.2 In regard to decisions already rendered by the Tribunals, it is
not necessary to re-open them on the ground that legal practitioners
were not allowed to appear before the Tribu"nals in those cases. [12058] B

7. It is not necessary either to re-consider or to go behind the
i decision in Waman Rao's case for the purpose of this case. [12020]
I

Wamiln Rao & Ors. v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1 and
Jaswant Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221, C
referred to.

~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
3828·3832 of 1983 etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.8.82/1.9.1982 of the D
Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos. 19486, 23347 23348, 23349 and
25366 of 1981.

B.R.L. Iyengar, Soli J. Sorabjee, S.K.V. Iyenger and Mrs.
Shyamala Pappu, S. Lakshminarasu, K. Ram Kumar, Mrs. Indira
Sawhney and P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellants. E

M. Veerappa and Ashok Sharma for the Respondents.

~-. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The question raised in the several F
-,i appeals is primarily that of the vires of sec. 44 of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, 1961 as amended by the Karnataka Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act I of 1974. In order to appreciate the submissions
made to us, it will be useful to set out the relevant provisions of the
Act before it was amended by Act I of 1974. Section 2(6) as it stood
before the amendment defined "basic holding" as meaning land which G
..l was equal to two standard acres. "Ceiling area" was defined as mean-
..- ing land which was equal to eighteen standard acres. "Court" was
defined to mean the court of Munsif within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the land was situate. "Family holding" was defined as
meaning land equal to six standard acres. "Small holder" was defined
to mean a land owner owning land not exceeding two basic holdings H

'
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 2 S.C.R.

whose total net annual income including the income from such land
A
did not exceed one thousand two hundred rupees. "Standard acre"
was defined to mean one acre of the first class of land or an extent
equivalent thereto consisting of any one or more classes of land
specified in Part A of Schedule I determined in accordance with the
formula in Part B of the said Schedule. Chapter II (Sections 4 to 43)
B contained 'General provisions relating to Tenancies' and Chapter III
(Sections 44 to 62) dealt with 'Conferment of owner-ship on tenants'.
Section 5 prohibited the creation or continuation of any tenancy in
respect of any land after the appointed day and barred the leasing of
land for any period whatsoever. It was, however, provided that (a) any
small holder might create or continue a tenancy or lease the land
owned by him and (b) any land owner who was a minor, a widow, an
C unmarried woman, a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of
any physical or menta·l disability or a soldier in service in the Armed
Forces of the Union or a seaman, might create or continue the tenancy
or lease the land owned by him or her. It was further provided that
tenancies of resumable lands could be continued until the disposses-
D sion of the tenants unders s. 14 and of non-resumable land until the
date of vesting under s. 44. Section 14 provided for resumption of
lands from tenants. Sub-section 1, 4 and 6 s. 14 may be usefully
extracted here. Sub-sections 2, 3 and 5 do not appear to be necessary
for the purposes of the present case. Sub-Sections 1, 4 and 6 were as
follows:- +
E
'14. Resumption of land from tenants-(1) Notwith-
standing anything contained in sections 22 and 43, but sub-
ject to the provisions of this section and of sections 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20 and 41, a landlord may, if he bona fide
requires land, other than land referred to in the first pro-
F viso to clause (29) of sub-section (A) of section 2,

(i) for cultivating personally, or

(ii) for any non-agricultural purpose, file with the Court a
statement indicating the land or lands owned by him and
G which he intends to resume and such other particulars as
may be prescribed. On such statement being filed, the
Court shall, as soon as may be after giving an opportunity
to be heard to the landlord and such of his tenants and
other persons as may be affected, and, having due regard to
continuity, fertility and fair distribution of lands, and after
H making such other inquiries as the Court deems necessary,
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE [REDDY, J.J 1195

determine the land or lands, which the landlord shall be A
entitled to resume, and shall issue a certificate to the land-
lord to the effect that the land or lands specified in such
certificate has been reserved for resumption; and there-
upon the right to resume possession shall be exercisable
only in respect of the lands specified in such certificate and
shall not extend to any other.land. 8

Explanation:- Subject to such rules as may be prescribed.
the Court within the jurisdiction of which the greater part
- ~--
of the land held by the landlord is situated shall be the
Court competent to issue a certificate under this section."
'C
(2) x x x x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x x x x
(4) In respect of tenancies existing on the appointed day, as
soon as may be after the expiry of fifteen months from the
0
appointed day, as soon as may be after the statement under
sub-section( I) is filed, the Court shall after such inquiry as it
deems fit, determine the lands which will be non-resumable
lands leased to tenants for purposes of this Act.
(5) x x x x x X1~ X x x
(6) Notwithstanding anything .contained in sub-section (5), E
where the landlord belongs tO any of the following cate-
gories, namely:-

(i) minor;

(ii) a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of any F
physical or mental disability,

. (iii) a widow;

(iv) an unmarried woman;
G
Then, the application to the Court for possession of land
shall be made, within fifteen months from the appointed day
or one year from the date on which- ·

(a) in the case of category (i), he attains majority;
H
1196 \ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.CR.

A (b) in the case of cateogy(ii), he ceases to be subject to such
, '
physical or mental disablity; . )'

. ;; (c)
.
in the case of category (iii),
...
she remarrie,:. .< ,
(d) in the case of category (iv), she marries, whichever is later:
B
Provided that where land is held by two or more joint
landlords, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply .~
unless all such landlords, belong to the categories specified
in clauses (i) and (ii) and the application shall be made
within one year from the date on which any one of such ~
landlords ceases to belong to any such category and an appli- . J
- -C cation by any one of the joint-holders shall be deemed to be
a valid application on behalf of all the joint holders:

Provided further that where a person belonging to any
of the categories specified in clause (i) or (ii) of this sub-
D I
section, is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this
' I -sub-section shall not apply unless all the members of the joint
family belong to the categories specified in clauses (i) and (ii),
a
but where the share in the joint family of person belonging
to 'any of such categories has been separated by metes and
bounds before the filing of the statement under sub-section
' E (i), if the Court on mquiry is satisfied that the share of such
, .. person in the land separated, having regard to the area, asses-
.. :: ' sment; classification and value of the land is in the same pro-
portion as the share of that person in the entire joint family
property, and not in a larger proportion, the provisions of the
sub-"section shall be applicable to such person."
F, x )
,., '
(7) x. .x x x. x x x. x
(8) x x x x x x .x x x 'r
-_Section 15 provided for resumption of land by soldiers and seamen.
Section 16 prescribed the conditions restricting resumption of land
G under s. 14. It is necessary to extract the whole of s. 16. It was as
follows:-
•·/

' "' 16. Conditio.ns restricting resumption of land under sec-
-----.-- tion 14, The right of a landlord to resume for cultivating the
· land personally under section 14, shall be subject to the
H ' following conditions, namely:-
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE (REDDY, l.l 1197

( 1) If the landlord owns land not exceeding two basic hold-
A
ings he shall be entitled to resume one half of the land
.__,, leased to the tenant:

Provided that the right to resume by such landlord
shall be subject to the condition that in the case of a pro-
tected tenant, such tenant, shall be left with at least one B
standard acre of* the land actually held by him, which-ever
is less.
-+
... ~-
(2) If the landlord owns land exceeding two basic hold-
ings, he shall be entitled to resume one-half of the area
leased to the tenant, provided that the total area resumed
by the landlord does not exceed three family holdings.
c
(3) No landlord who has been cultivating personally land
exceeding three family holdings shall be entitled to resume
. any land leased.
D
(4) The right to resume land under clauses (1) to (3) shall
be subject to the further condition that the land resumed
from all the tenants holding under the landlord together
with the extent of land, if any, cultivated by the landlord
_,. personally and any non-resumable land held by him shall
not exceed three family holdings . E
.._
(5) In respect of lands cultivated with plantation crops, the
landlord shall not be entitled to resume more than one-half
..... of the land leased to a tenant.

(6) If more tenancies than one are held under the same F
landlord, then the landlord shall be entitled to resume land
only from tenants whose tenancy or tenancies are the
shortest in point of duration:

Provided that the landlord shall be 'entitled to resume
lands held by protected tenants only if the required extent G
of land cannot be resumed from tenants other than pro-
..... tected tenants:

Provided further that where such tenancy or tenan-
cies shortest in point of duration shall on resumption leave
with the tenants land in_ extent which will be less than a H
I
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' [1987] 2 S.C.R.
\
basic holding, the resumption shall be made In respect tJf
tenancy or tenancies next longer in point of duration. r
(7) The right to resume land by the landlord, other than a
·landlord owning land llot exceeding-two basic hnldlrtgs •.
shall be subject to the further 'condition that !rt the case of
B protected tenants, each protected tenant shall be left with a
ba'Sic holding or the land actually held by him, whichever is
less. l
'
·,,.-- ..
; '··'
(8) The right to resume land from any' tetiant sha11 be exer-
~if~ble _under~; 14 only once ..·. · '· · · · _,
-c '< (9) The income by the cultivati~n of th~ latld ~hvhich he is
entitled to resume shall be the principal source of income
for the maintenance of the landlord. · ·
:-·- f; :.

(IO) If as a result of the resumption of land urtder section
0 I 14, a fragment is created, the person entitled to the larger
I
' .. ·' , : : .
·part of fhe land shall be entitled to the fragment also.
. . .. .
' ~ . " . : . . ..
(10 A) If any pers6n h~s after the '18th November, 1961
and before the appointed day transferred any land, other-
. wise than by 'partitimi, then; in calculating the extent of
E land owned by such person for purposes of the preceding
clauses, the area so transferred shall be taken into consi-
deration, and land exceeding the resumable area so calcu-
· lated shall be deemed.to be non-resumable land, and such
person shall not be entitled to resume such non-resumable
land.
)
·.·. Explanation-For purp~ses of this clause: a land shall be
'deemed to have been transferred;' if it has been transferred 'r
by act of parties (whether by sale; gift; 'mortgage, with
possession, exchange, lease or any other disposition) made
• '"'"· ·.i · intervivas. · · · ·· ·'( ·' · .: · "· .
1
; :1'-· 1 •' J '·' ·.c;.' · '· • • '. , ' : ' '. !, · ' '

-v: ' · ;, '(iO BfNotwithstanding any.thing contained in clauses (1)
to ( 10) (both inclusive). ors. 142, the exient of land, if any.
'---- · . . resumable, by any lan.dlord in Bombay Area shall be sub-
-:- ''• 01 " ' -:ject to the restrictions arid conditions specified in sections
''31A;31B and 31C of the.Bombay Tenancy and Agricul-
H ·: .•!> • •' tural LandsAct, 1948;·a.sinserted by the Bombay Tenancy
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STAIE [REDDY, J.[ 1199

and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1955 (Bombay A
Act 13 of 1956), notwithstandii'lg the provisions of the
Bombay Tanancy (Suspension of Provisions and Amend-
ment) Act, 1957 (Mysore Act 13 of 19571.

(10 C} Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (!)
to ( 10) (both inclusive), ors. 142, the extent of land, if apy, B
resumable, by any landlord in the Hyderabad Area, shall
be subject to the restrictions and conditions specified in the
Hyderabad Tenancy and.Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, as
in force in the Hyderabad Area on the !st November 1956.

( 11) No landlord who at any time before the appointed day
had resumed land from any tenant for personal cultivation
c·
under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948, or the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act, 1950, shall be entitled to resume again under section
14 any land left with the same tenant." ·
D'
Section 44 provided for the vesting of certain lands in the State
Government. Sub-sec. I was as follows:

"(I) As soon as may be after the determination of the
non-resumable lands under sub-section (4) of section 14, by
each Court, the State Government may by notification E
declare that with effect from such date as may be specified
in such notification (hereinafter referred to as the date of
vesting) all the non-resumable lands determined by such
Court which are leased to tenants, whether protected or
otherwise, and all lands leased to permanent and other
tenants referred to in the first proviso to clause (29) of F•
sub-section (A) of section 2 in the area wiihin jurisdiction
of such Court shall stand transferred to and vest in the
State Government."

Section 45 provided for the registration of tenants as occupants of land
on certain conditions. Section 47 provided for the payment of compen- G
sation to the land owner in regard to the extinguishment of rights in
lands vesting in the State Government under s. 44. Chapter IV (sec-
tions 63 to 79) dealt with 'ceiling on land holdings'. Section 63 pres-
cribed the ceiling on the extent of land which any person may hold
either as a land-owner, landlord' or tenant or as a mortgagee with
possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another. H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 68 provided for the vesting of land surrendered by the owner in
the State Government, Section 72 provided for payment of compensa-
tion for lands surrendered to and vested in the State Government. We
are not concerned,with Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII. Chapter IX
dealt with 'Procedure and Jurisdiction of Court and Appeals'. Section
112 prescribed the duties of the court and among the duties were "(g)
B to issue a certificate relating to reservation of land for resumption
under sub-section ( 1) of s. 14 and (h) to determine the non-resumable
lands under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 14." Sections 113, 114 and 115 pro-
vided for enquiry by the court and the procedure to be adopted. Sec-
tion 118 provided for an appeal from the Court to the District Court.

c The broad scheme of the provisions mentioned or set out above
was that there was not only to be a ceiling on the holding of land, the
system of leasing of land was to be abolish~d and cultivating tenants
were to be invested with rights of ownership. However, certain limited
classes of cases were recognised where leases were permitted on the
one hand and on the other tenants were deprived of the right to remain
D in possession of the land. It was provided that leases were permissible
in cases when the landlord was under some disability as specified in
s. 5. It was also provided that a land owner could seek, subject to the
prescribed limits, resumption of land from tenants, if he bona fide
required the land for cultivating personally or for any non-agricultural
purpose. The right to resume land for personal cultivation was no
+-
E doubt subject to several severe conditions, one of the most important
of which was that the income by the cultivation of the land which he
was entitled to resume should be the principal source of income for the
maintenance of the land owner. In other words, the Act while fixing a
ceiling on the holding of land and generally conferring ownership
rights on tenants, did not altogether ignore the interests of the smaller
F landlords and did in fact offer some measure of protection to those
who desired to personally cultivate the tenanted land. ~

'
The Act was substantially amended in 1974. 'Basic holding' and
'family holding' ceased to be defined. "Ceiling area" was defined to
G mean the extent of land which the person or family was entitled to hold
under s. 63. Section 5 was amended and the provisos were omitted. It -f
was however provided by sub-sec. 2 that the prohibition against crea-
tion of tenancies or leases would not apply to tenancies created by a
soldier or a seaman. The savings in respect of a minor widow or a
minor woman under the original sec.,,:; was taken away. Section 14 was
H omitted. Section 16 was also omitted. Section 44 was amended. The
new sub-section 1 of sec. 44 is as follows:-
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE [REDDY, J.) 1201

"44(1) All lands held by or in the possession of tenants A
(including tenants against whom a decree or order for evic-
tion or a certificate for resumption is made or issued)
immediately prior to the date of commencement of the
Amendment Act, other than lands held by them under
leases permitted under Section 5, shall, with effect on and
from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in the B
State Government."

A new section 48 was introduced providing for the Constitution of
• \'r Tribunals, a Tribunal for each taluq consisting of the Assistant Com-
missioner of the Revenue Division and four other members to be
nominated by the State Government of whom one shall be a person C
belonging to the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. No qualifica-
"'- tions were prescribed for the nomination of persons to membership of
the Tribunal. Sub-section 8 of section 48 provided that no legal
practitioner shall be allowed to appear in any proceeding before the
Tribunal. Section 48A dealt with the procedure to be adopted by the
Tribunal in its enquiry into applications made under s. 45 for registra- D
lion of a person as an occupant. Sec. 112A provided for the .duties of
the Tahsildar ands. J !2B provided for the duties of the Tribunal. The
provision for an appeal from the decision of the court and the forther
~- right of revision under the amended Act were taken away and there
"as no right of appeal or revision against the decision of the Tribunal.
-... Thus, we see that the 1974 Amending Act took away the right which E
was saved by the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried
woman, minor and disabled person to create a tenancy or lease the
.i,.c land. The more important right which was taken away by the 1974
Amendment was the right of the landlord to resume the land. if he
bona-fide required the land for personal cultivation or for a non-
..,. agricultural purpose. The right to resume the land if he bona-fide F
required the land for personal cultivation was denied by the Amending
Act even if the income by the cultivation of the land which he was
entitled to resume was the principal source of income for the mainte-
nance of the landlord.

The principal submission of the learned counsel for the appel- G
Iants was that the 1974 amendment in so far as it took away the right of
a landlord to resume possession of the tenanted land where he bona-
fide required the land for personal cultivation and had no other princi-
pal source of income for his own maintenance, was ultra vires, not-
withstanding its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, as it offended the
basic structure of the Constitution. Another submission which was H
1202, SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987) 2 S.C.R.
\ .

A made by the learned counsel was that the provision for the constitution
ol a 'Tribunal consisting of persons with unspecified qualifications in
the place of a court was similarly ultra Vires the powers of the State
Legislature. The third submission of the learned counsel was that
s. 47(8) which excluded legal practitioner from appearing before the
Tribunals was in conflict with s. 30 of the Advocates' Act and had,
B therefore, to yield. · ·

It is necessary for us to mention here that the principal Act was
. included in the JXth Schedule of the Constitution on October 20, 1965
and the Amendment Act of 1974 was similarly included in ihe IXth the
Schedule on September 7, 1974.
-
c
'•We do not think that it is necessary to hark back .to' the decisions
' ' ' '

of this court.rendered prior to the one in Waman Rao & Ors . .v. Union, )
'

of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1. One of the petitioners who presented his case
in person did argue that Waman Rao's case to the extent that ,it upheld
Arts.'31-A, 31-B and '.ll-C and to the extent that it upheld the validity
D 1 of the. legislations impugned therein required reconsideration. We do
not agree that it is necessary either to reconsider or to go behind
Waman Rao for the purposes of this case. Chandrachud, CJ.. speaking
for the majority of the judges of the Constitution Bench stated their
conclusions in regard to Arts. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C as follows:-

E "( 1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which
introduced Article 3 !A into the Constitution· with retros-
. " pective effect and section 3 of the Consiituiion (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause(!),
-· sub-clauses (a) to (e), for ·the original clause'(!) with
retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic. or
F essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure
and are valid ;md .constitutional being within the consti-
tuent power of the Parli.ament.

(2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment)
Act !951 introduced Article 3 lB into the Constitution
G which reads thus:

"3 lB x x x x x x x . x x

In Keshvananda Bharati ( 1973, Suppl., SCR 1) de-
cided on April 24, 1973 i_t was held by the majority that
H Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to
"
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE [REDDY, J.] 1203

damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic A
structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution·
which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the
9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to
time by .the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations
therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the
Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the B
9th schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to
_,., time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations

... ,..-"
therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or
any one or more of them, are beyond constituent power of
the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential
features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do
not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent con- c
stitutional amendments except to say that if any Act/Regu-
lation included in the 9th Schedule by a Constitutional
amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by
Article 3 lA, or by Article 3 lC as it stood prior to its amend-
ment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity D
of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that
Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground
that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essen-
tial features of the Constitution or its basic structure as
+
-
reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31,"will become otiose.
E
(3) Article 31 C of the Constitution, as it stood prior
to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its
..-
. ' constitutionality was upheld in Keshavananda Bharati .
Article 3JC, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or
F
essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure.
"' (4) All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relat-
ing to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
Ceiling Acts are dismissed with costs."

In the course of the submissions, the learned counsel suggested G
that the 1974 Amendment Act was not a law pertaining to agrarian
reform; nor, it was said, was it a law directed towards securing that the
ownership and control of the material resources of the community
were so distributed as best to subserve the common good or that the
operation of the economic system did not result in the concentration of
H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A wealth and means of production to the common detriment. It was
suggested that the 1974 Amendment Act far from setting out to
achieve these goals set out in quite opposite direction by seeking to
reduce to destitution small landlords whose sole means of livelihood
was the tenanted land which they were allowed to resume for personal
cultivation. It was said that the original Act was very fair as it recog-
B nised poverty amongst landlords as well as poverty amongst tenants
and afforded a measure of protection to the poorer sections of the
}-
landlords. We are unable to agree with the submission that the !
Amendment is not aimed at agrarian reform or at securing the objec-
tives mentioned in Arts. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. It is too late
in the day to contend that, in the existing system of economic rela-
tions, ownership of land to the tiller of the land is not the best way of
-
C securing the utmost utilisation of land, a material resource of the com-
munity for the common good of the entire community. It is now well
recognised by leading economists everywhere that in the absence of
common ownership of land and in the existing system of economic
relations, the greatest incentive for maximum production is the feeling
D of identity and security which is possible only if the ownership of the
land is with the tiller. It is obviously in recognition of this principle that
'landlordism' was sought to be totally done away with by the amend-
ment of s. 5 of the Act, by the omission of secs, 14 and 16 and by the
amendment of s. 44. If between a landlord who did not himself person-
ally cultivate the land and a tenant who so cultivated the land, the
E legislature preferred the cultivating tenant, we are unable to hold that
such preference is not part of a programme of agrarian reform
pursuant to the Directive Principles contained in Arts. 39(b) and (c).
We do not have the slightest doubt that the amendment was a law
clearly aimed at agrarian reform, to secure the Directive Principles
contained in Arts. 39(b) and (c). It is true that one of the conditions
subject to which alone a landlord could resume land for personal culti-
F vation under s. 16 of the Act was that the income from the land
proposed to be cultivated by the landlord on resumption should be the
principal source of income for the maintenance of the landlord. But it
is important to notice that the question of resumption of land from a
tenant would not arise unless a tenant was already cultivating the land.
If, therefore, a tenant is already cultivating the land and if, presum-
G ably. that is the source of his livelihood, there is no reason why h_e
should be dispossessed to enable a landlord whose source of hveh-
hood it was not until then to make it his principal source of mainte-
nance hereafter. We do not think that any provision of the Amending
Act offends the basic structure of the Constitution.

H In regard to the constitution of the Tribunal, it was argued that
H.S. SRINIVASA v. STATE (REDDY. J.] 1205

very important questions fell for consideration under s. 48A and it was A
wholly wrong that the decision of such questions should be left, not to
a judicial Tribunal, but to a Tribunal consisting of members nomi-
nated by the State Government with no regard for any qualification.
Our attention was invited to several decisions of the Karnataka High
Court where the functioning of such ill-constituted Tribunals was ex-
posed and castigated. It is true that it was commented in some of those B
cases that the Tribunals were functioning in a most unjudicial manner.
+ quite often without applying their minds at all to the questions at issue
-~
and in some cases, in utter violation of the principles of natural justice.
We are unable to see how the mal-functioning of some of the Tribunals
can possibly vitiate the provision relating to the Constitution of the
Tribunal and the entrustment of the decision of certain issues to the
Tribunal. We do not want to enter into a discussion of the question c
whether a lay Tribunal cannot function more efficiently than judicial
Tribunal in resolving certain peculiar questions. There can be no
doubt that while the decision of some disputes require a trained judi-
cial mind to be applied to it, there are many other questions which do
not require the application of any trained judicial mind. The disputes D
contemplated bys. 48A do not appear to be disputes of a nature where
the application of a trained judicial mind is absolutely essential. We
also notice that Land Tribunals have functioned very well in West
Bengal and Kerala where under the respecting State Acts more
complicated questions than the ones under s. 48A are entrusted to
Land Tribunals. The failure of the Land Tribunals to function effi-
ciently in the State of Karnataka has beeri apparently taken note of by E
the Legislature itself and the Act has since been amended making
provision for an appeal and revision. So much to the credit of the
Karnataka Legislature. But we do not see how the failure of some of
the land Tribunals to function efficiently can be said to be sufficient to
stigmatise wholesale, the functioning of all the Tribunals constituted
under the Act and to invalidate the provisions of the Act relating to F
Tribunals.

The last submission was in regard to sub-sec. 8 0£ sec. 48 which
prohibited legal practitioners from appearing in proceedihgs befqre the
Tribunals. The argument was thats. 48(8) was repugnant to s. 30 !if the
Advocates Act, 1961 and s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act. It ~as G
said that the State Legislature was not competent to make a Jaw
repugnant to laws made by Parliament pursuant to Entries 77 and 78 of
List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The submission of the
learned counsel is fully supported by the judgment of a Full Bench--of
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Jaswant Kaur v. State of
Haryana, AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221. We adopt the reasoning of H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ !987) 2 S.C.R.

A the High Court of Punjab & Haryana and direct that s. 48(8) .;,ill not
be enforced so as to prevent Advocates frow appearing befor~ tlW
Tribunals functioning under the Act. In regard to the decisions already
rendered by the Tribunals we do. not think that it is necessary to
reopen them on the ground that legal practitioners were not allowed to
appear before the Tribunals in those cases. AU the civil appeals are,
B therefore, dismissed, in the circumstances without cost.

N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.

+