Supreme Court of India
HARSHIT HARISH JAIN & ANR.versusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 104
- Decided
- 24 January 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- VIKRAM NATH
Holding
The amendment reducing the limitation period to six months cannot be applied retrospectively to a vested right of action that accrued before the amendment, and the CCRA lacks statutory authority to review its own orders, so the appellants are entitled to refund under the pre‑amendment two‑year provision.
Summary
The appellants purchased a flat and paid stamp duty, but later cancelled the booking due to the developer's delay and executed a cancellation deed on 17 March 2015, which was registered on 28 April 2015 after an amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act reduced the refund limitation period from two years to six months. They applied for a refund of the stamp duty in August 2016, initially receiving approval from the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) which was later withdrawn on the ground that the amended six‑month period applied. The appellants contended that their right to claim a refund accrued at the time of execution of the cancellation deed, thus falling under the pre‑amendment two‑year window, and argued that the CCRA lacked statutory power to review its own earlier order. The Supreme Court held that the amendment could not retroactively curtail a vested cause of action and that the CCRA had no authority to recall its earlier refund order. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, restored the original refund order, quashed the subsequent CCRA orders, and directed payment of the stamp duty with interest. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 reducing the limitation period to six months applies to refund claims where the cancellation deed was executed before but registered after the amendment.
- Whether a vested right of action accrued at the time of execution of the cancellation deed is governed by the pre‑amendment two‑year limitation.
- Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority possesses statutory power to review or recall its own final orders.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 governs the Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund, particularly when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the thereafter. Headnotes† Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – s.48(1) – Amendment thereto, curtailed the time limit for seeking refund of stamp duty on a registered cancellation deed from two years to six months (from the date of registration of the deed) – Appellants executed
Subjects
Amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958Refund of Stamp DutyTime limitTwo year windowSix‑month limitationCancellation deedDate of registration of the Cancellation deedTechnical delayLegitimate refundRight to claim a refundQuasi‑judicial authorityVested cause of actionAccrued cause of actionRegistered cancellation deedRefund not time‑barredDeveloper’s inability to deliver timely possessionRefund orderReview jurisdictionPower to review/recall
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 934 : 2025 INSC 104
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr.
v.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 1002 of 2025)
24 January 2025
[Vikram Nath*, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the
24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp
Act, 1958 governs the Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund,
particularly when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the
amendment but registered thereafter.
Headnotes†
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – s.48(1) – Amendment thereto,
curtailed the time limit for seeking refund of stamp duty on
a registered cancellation deed from two years to six months
(from the date of registration of the deed) – Appellants
executed Cancellation Deed on 17.03.2015 canceling the
booking of the flats however, it was registered on 28.04.2015
(post-amendment) – On 06.08.2016, the appellants’ claimed
refund of stamp duty – Claim was initially allowed but was
later rejected as time-barred – Appellants, if entitled to the
benefit of the unamended proviso of s.48(1):
Held: Yes – Appellants refund application cannot be repelled as
time-barred merely because the deed’s registration was post-
amendment – Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund arose the
moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed – The legislative
scheme governing the earlier proviso to s.48(1) contemplated a
broader two-year window – Constricting it retroactively merely
because registration happened post-amendment defeats a vested
cause of action – Amendment to provision as to limitation is
inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the amendment
has reduced the period earlier provided – The scheme of stamp
duty refund provisions is designed to ensure fairness when
* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 935
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
the underlying transaction is rescinded for bona fide reasons –
Appellants were compelled to cancel the purchase due to the
developer’s inability to deliver timely possession and were in no
way at fault – The limitation provision to seek refund of stamp duty
should not be enforced to oust the remedy when the applicant is
otherwise not blameworthy – Impugned judgment dismissing the
writ petition filed by the Appellants is set aside, writ petition allowed.
[Paras 8-11, 15, 16]
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune (CCRA) – Absence of
statutory review power – Appellants’ application for refund of
stamp duty was initially allowed by the CCRA – However, it
later recalled the said order and rejected the refund request
as time-barred – Whether CCRA had power to review its own
orders:
Held: No – CCRA having once granted a refund lacked any express
statutory power to review or recall that decision – A quasi-judicial
authority can only exercise such powers as the statute confers –
There is no provision in the Act enabling the CCRA to sit in review
of its own orders – In the absence of any enabling clause, the
subsequent orders and ultimately the Order dated 16.12.2022,
reversing the earlier sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained
solely because the Appellants participated in the proceedings –
Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver – High Court
erred in endorsing of the CCRA’s review-like exercise – Participation
in an erroneous procedure cannot confer review jurisdiction upon
the CCRA where none exists in law – Thus, the subsequent orders
recalling the already sanctioned refund, including the Order dated
16.12.2022 are quashed. [Paras 12-15]
Case Law Cited
M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2015]
7 SCR 291 : (2015) 7 SCC 58; Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority & Inspector General of Registration
& Controller of Stamps [2024] 5 SCR 730 : 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 979 – relied on.
List of Acts
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958.
936 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
List of Keywords
Amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act,
1958; Refund of Stamp Duty; Time limit; Two year window; Six-
month limitation; Cancellation deed; Date of registration of the
Cancellation deed; Technical delay; Technical grounds of limitation;
Legitimate refund; Right to claim a refund; Fiscal or quasi-judicial
determinations; Vested cause of action; Accrued cause of action;
Registered cancellation deed; Deed registered post-amendment;
Refund not time-barred; Developer’s inability to deliver timely
possession; Uncertainty over timely possession; Booking of flats
cancelled; Refund order; Review jurisdiction; Review of own final
orders; Absence of review power; Quasi-judicial authority; Power
to review/recall.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1002 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.04.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 2018 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Santosh Krishnan, Adv. for the Appellants.
Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha
Pande, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal assails the final judgment and order dated
18.04.2024, rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
in Writ Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024, whereby the writ petition
preferred by the Appellants stood dismissed. The gravamen of the
dispute concerns the rejection of the Appellants’ claim for refund
of stamp duty under the provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act,
1958 (hereinafter “the Act”).
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 937
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
3. The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as follows:
3.1. The Appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell dated
30.08.2014 with a real estate developer, M/s. Krona Realties
Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “the Developer”), for the purchase of a
residential flat (Flat No. 5102) in the “Lodha Venezia” project
at Mumbai. The total consideration agreed was ₹5.46 crores,
against which an advance payment of ₹1.08 crores was made
to the Developer.
3.2. Pursuant to the execution of the Agreement to Sell, the
Appellants paid stamp duty of ₹27,34,500, as mandated under
the Act. The said Agreement was registered on 18.09.2014,
upon payment of an additional registration charge of ₹30,000.
3.3. Sometime thereafter, on 05.11.2014, the Developer informed
the Appellants of unavoidable delays tied to issues involving
adjacent slums, thereby making it impossible to hand over
possession of the flat by 31.03.2017, the date earlier envisaged.
The Developer offered three options to the Appellants: (i) transfer
the booking to another project, (ii) opt for cancellation with a
refund along with interest at 12% per annum, or (iii) continue
with the present booking but with a revised possession timeline.
3.4. Constrained by the uncertainty over timely possession, the
Appellants chose to cancel the booking. Consequently, a
Deed of Cancellation was executed on 17.03.2015. However,
the said Cancellation Deed came to be registered only on
28.04.2015 before the Sub-Registrar of Assurances, Mumbai
City. Subsequently, on 23.05.2016, a Deed of Rectification was
also executed, clarifying the refund details and other particulars
of the cancellation.
3.5. Meanwhile, by an amendment dated 24.04.2015 to Section 48(1)
of the Act, the time limit for seeking a refund of stamp duty on
a registered cancellation deed was curtailed from two years to
six months (counted from the date of registration of such deed).
On 06.08.2016, the Appellants filed an application for refund of
the stamp duty amounting to ₹27,34,500, contending that they
were governed by the earlier (pre-amendment) statutory regime,
since their Cancellation Deed was executed before 24.04.2015.
3.6. The refund application was initially allowed by the Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune
938 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(CCRA), vide its Order dated 08.01.2018. Soon thereafter,
however, the same authority, by a subsequent Order dated
03.03.2018, recalled its earlier decision and rejected the refund
request as time-barred, citing the amended limitation period.
3.7. Aggrieved by the 03.03.2018 order recalling the earlier sanction
of refund, the Appellants first attempted to challenge it before
the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) by way of an
appeal under Section 53 of the Act. The CCRA dismissed the
appeal on 16.04.2019, prompting the Appellants to file Writ
Petition No. 8276 of 2019 before the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay. In its judgment dated 04.10.2022, the High Court
set aside the orders dated 03.03.2018 and 16.04.2019, noting
that the Appellants had not been accorded proper opportunity
of hearing. The matter was remanded to the CCRA for fresh
consideration, particularly on the question of whether the original
(unamended) or the amended provision under Section 48(1) of
the Act would apply to the cancellation. Pursuant to that remand,
the CCRA passed a fresh order on 16.12.2022, again rejecting
the refund claim on the ground that the amended six-month
limitation governed the Appellants’ case.
3.8. Aggrieved by the CCRA’s stance, the Appellants filed Writ
Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024 before the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay, urging, inter alia, that (i) the right to seek refund
accrued on the date of execution (17.03.2015), thus invoking
the unamended two-year window, and (ii) the CCRA had no
statutory power of review to recall its initial order granting refund.
3.9. By the impugned judgment dated 18.04.2024, the High Court
dismissed the writ petition, holding, in essence, that the date
of registration (28.04.2015) triggered the Appellants’ claim,
which fell under the amended provision stipulating a six-month
limitation. The High Court further opined that, in the specific
facts, the CCRA’s recall could not be struck down solely on the
ground of no express power of review.
4. Aggrieved with the dismissal of their writ petition, the Appellants have
now approached this Court by way of the present appeal.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the Appellants and the
Respondents, the primary issue for consideration before us is whether
the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 939
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
amendment to Section 48(1) of the Act governs the Appellants’ claim
for stamp duty refund, particularly when the Cancellation Deed was
executed prior to the amendment but registered thereafter.
6. Section 48(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“48. The application for relief under section 47 shall be
made within the following period, that is to say,—
(1) in the cases mentioned in clause (c)(5), within [six
months] of the date of the instruments:
Provided that where an Agreement to sale immovable
property, on which stamp duty is paid under Article 25 of the
Schedule I, is presented for registration under the provisions
of the Registration Act, 1908 and if the seller refuses to
deliver possession of the immovable property which is
the subject matter of such agreement the application may
be made within two years of the date of the Instrument
[or where such agreement is cancelled by a registered
cancellation deed on the grounds of, dispute regarding the
premises concerned, inadequate finance, financial dispute
in terms of agreed consideration, or afterwards found to
be illegal construction or suppression of any other material
fact, the application may be made within two years from
the date of such registered cancellation deed.]”
Through the amendment on 24.04.2015, the two-year
period was curtailed to six months from the date of
registration of the cancellation deed, thus altering the time
frame under which a party could claim a refund.
7. The Appellants assert that, although the Cancellation Deed was
registered on 28.04.2015, it was executed on 17.03.2015 — prior
to the amendment dated 24.04.2015, which curtailed the time
limit for seeking a refund from two years to six months. They rely
upon Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, emphasizing that
“a registered document shall operate from the time from which it
would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had
been required or made.” In other words, the operative date for their
right to seek refund would be 17.03.2015, placing them under the
un-amended regime.
940 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
8. In our view, this contention carries substantial weight. The High
Court laid undue emphasis on the registration date without fully
appreciating that the Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund
arose the moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed. The
legislative scheme governing the earlier proviso to Section 48(1) of
the Act, contemplated a broader two-year window. Constricting that
window retroactively, merely because registration happened post-
amendment, unduly defeats a vested cause of action.
9. Moreover, in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central
Excise1 , this Court has held that amendment to provision as to
limitation is inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the
amendment has reduced the period earlier provided. The relevant
paras of this judgement have been extracted hereunder:
“53. Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Revenue, has strongly contended before
us that the present appeal must attract the limitation period
as on the date of its filing. That being so, it is clear that
the present appeal having been filed before Cestat only on
23-5-2003, it is Section 128 post amendment that would
apply and therefore the maximum period available to the
appellant would be 60 plus 30 days. Even if time taken
in the abortive proceedings is to be excluded, the appeal
filed will be out of time being beyond the aforesaid period.
54. It is settled law that periods of limitation are procedural
in nature and would ordinarily be applied retrospectively.
This, however, is subject to a rider. In New India Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR
266] , this Court held : (SCC p. 844, para 5)
5. “On the plain language of Sections 110-A and 110-
F there should be no difficulty in taking the view that
the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e.
a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of
substantive law. It is a well-established proposition
that such a change of law operates retrospectively
and the person has to go to the new forum even if
1 (2015)7 SCC 58
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 941
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to
the change of forum. He will have a vested right of
action but not a vested right of forum. If by express
words the new forum is made available only to causes
of action arising after the creation of the forum, then
the retrospective operation of the law is taken away.
Otherwise, the general rule is to make it retrospective.”
55. In answering a question which arose under Section
110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court held : (Shanti
Misra case [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266] , SCC
p. 846, para 7)
7. “… ‘(1) Time for the purpose of filing the application
under Section 110-A did not start running before the
constitution of the tribunal. Time had started running
for the filing of the suit but before it had expired
the forum was changed. And for the purpose of the
changed forum, time could not be deemed to have
started running before a remedy of going to the new
forum is made available.
(2) Even though by and large the law of limitation has
been held to be a procedural law, there are exceptions
to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which
is in vogue on the date of the commencement of the
action governs it. But there are certain exceptions
to this principle. The new law of limitation providing
a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor
can it suddenly extinguish a vested right of action by
providing for a shorter period of limitation.’”
56. This statement of the law was referred to with approval
in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
[(1991) 4 SCC 333] as follows : (SCC p. 337, para 7).
7. “It is true that the appellant earlier could file an
application even more than six months after the expiry
of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to
be a right which the appellant had acquired. The
answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation
which the appellant was entitled to, by reason of the
accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So
942 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
far the period of limitation for commencing a legal
proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature,
and has to be governed by the new Act—subject to
two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy
suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period
of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the
case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor
of an accrued right. The second exception is where
the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a
short period for commencing the legal proceeding
so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the
remedy. This principle has been followed by this
Court in many cases and by way of illustration we
would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR
266] . The husband of the respondent in that case
died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years
was available to the respondent for instituting a suit
for recovery of damages. In March 1967 the Claims
Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the
civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of
limitation. The respondent filed the application in July
1967. It was held that not having filed a suit before
March 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by
way of an application before the Tribunal. So far the
period of limitation was concerned, it was observed
that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter
period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of
action. In view of the change of the law it was held
that the application could be filed within a reasonable
time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the
time of about four months taken by the respondent in
approaching the Tribunal after its constitution, could
be held to be either reasonable time or the delay
of about two months could be condoned under the
proviso to Section 110-A(3).”
Both these judgments were referred to and followed
in Union of India v. Harnam Singh [(1993) 2 SCC
162 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 375 : (1993) 24 ATC 92],
see para 12.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 943
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
57. The aforesaid principle is also contained in Section 30(a)
of the Limitation Act, 1963:
30. “Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed
period is shorter than the period prescribed by
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.—Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act—
(a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter
than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908, may be instituted within a period
of seven years next after the commencement of this
Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period
expires earlier:”
58. The reason for the said principle is not far to seek.
Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be
applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation
is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period
would render the vested right of action contained in the
statute nugatory as such right of action would now become
time-barred under the amended provision.”
10. Even if one were to hold that the Appellants’ claim is examined under
the amended six-month period, we are of the considered opinion that
a mere technical delay should not, by itself, extinguish an otherwise
valid claim. The scheme of stamp duty refund provisions is designed
to ensure fairness when the underlying transaction is rescinded for
bona fide reasons. The Appellants were compelled to cancel the
purchase due to the developer’s inability to deliver timely possession,
and were in no way remiss or at fault.
11. Denying a legitimate refund solely on technical grounds of limitation,
especially when the timing of registration fell close to the legislative
amendment, fails to strike the equitable balance ordinarily expected
in fiscal or quasi-judicial determinations. A measure of discretion
or consideration for good faith conduct is not alien to statutory
processes that safeguard citizens from unjust enrichment by the
State. It has been laid down by this Court in Bano Saiyed Parwaz v.
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Inspector General of
944 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Registration & Controller of Stamps2 that the limitation provision in
stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should not be enforced so as
to oust the remedy when the applicant is otherwise not blameworthy.
The relevant paras of the same have been reproduced hereunder:
“14. In Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private Limited3,
wherein the issue of refund of stamp duty under the same
Act was in question, this Court has observed and held
inter alia as under:
“29. This case reminds us of the observations made
by M.C. Chagla, C.J. in Firm Kaluram Sitaram v.
Dominion of India [1953 SCC OnLine Bom 39: AIR
1954 Bom 50]. The learned Chief Justice in his
distinctive style of writing observed as under in para
19: (Firm Kaluram case, SCC OnLine Bom)
“19. … we have often had occasion to say that when
the State deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily
rely on technicalities, and if the State is satisfied that
the case of the citizen is a just one, even though
legal defences may be open to it, it must act, as has
been said by eminent Judges, as an honest person.”
We are in respectful agreement with the aforementioned
observations, as in our considered opinion these
observations apply fully to the case in hand against
the State because except the plea of limitation, the
State has no case to defend their action.
Xxxxxxxxx
32. In our considered opinion, even if we find that
applications for claiming refund of stamp duty amount
were rightly dismissed by the SDM on the ground of
limitation prescribed under Section 50 of the Act yet
keeping in view the settled principle of law that the
expiry of period of limitation prescribed under any law
may bar the remedy but not the right, the applicants
are still held entitled to claim the refund of stamp
duty amount on the basis of the grounds mentioned
2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 979
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 945
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
above. In other words, notwithstanding dismissal of
the applications on the ground of limitation, we are
of the view that the applicants are entitled to claim
the refund of stamp duty amount from the State in
the light of the grounds mentioned above.”
15. The legal position is thus settled in Libra Buildtech
(supra) that when the State deals with a citizen it
should not ordinarily rely on technicalities, even
though such defences may be open to it.
16. We draw weight from the aforesaid judgment and
are of the opinion that the case of the appellant is
fit for refund of stamp duty in so far as it is settled
law that the period of expiry of limitation prescribed
under any law may bar the remedy but not the right
and the appellant is held entitled to claim the refund
of stamp duty amount on the basis of the fact that
the appellant has been pursuing her case as per
remedies available to her in law and she should not
be denied the said refund merely on technicalities as
the case of the appellant is a just one wherein she
had in bonafide paid the stamp duty for registration
but fraud was played on her by the Vendor which led
to the cancellation of the conveyance deed.”
12. We also find merit in the Appellants’ submission that the CCRA,
having once granted a refund by its order dated 08.01.2018, lacked
any express statutory power to review or recall that decision.
A quasi-judicial authority can only exercise such powers as the
statute confers. There is no provision in the Act enabling the CCRA
to sit in review of its own orders. In the absence of any enabling
clause, the subsequent orders dated 03.03.2018, 16.04.2019, and
ultimately 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier sanction of the refund,
cannot be sustained solely because the Appellants participated in
the proceedings.
13. We are unable to concur with the High Court’s reasoning that the
Appellants “submitted themselves” to the authority’s review process
or somehow acquiesced in the second decision. Jurisdiction cannot
be created by consent or waiver. The law does not permit a statutory
functionary to assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of
946 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
how the parties engage in subsequent litigation. Hence, we see clear
infirmity in the High Court’s endorsement of the CCRA’s review-like
exercise.
14. In light of the above, the findings recorded by the High Court in
the impugned judgment warrant interference. The High Court’s
focus on the date of registration as determinative of the applicable
legal regime under Section 48(1) of the Act overlooks the accrued
right crystallizing at the time of execution of the Cancellation Deed.
Further, its refusal to disturb the recall of the earlier refund order,
despite acknowledging the absence of statutory review power, is
difficult to sustain. Participation in an erroneous procedure cannot,
in our considered view, confer review jurisdiction upon the CCRA
where none exists in law.
15. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the Appellants are
entitled to the benefit of the un-amended proviso of Section 48(1)
of the Act. Their refund application, therefore, cannot be repelled
as time-barred merely because the deed’s registration was post-
amendment. Equally, the subsequent orders recalling the already
sanctioned refund stand vitiated, given the CCRA’s lack of statutory
mandate to review its own final orders.
16. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Appellants’ claim for
refund falls under the un-amended proviso to Section 48(1) of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Consequently, the impugned judgment
dated 18.04.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in W.P.
No. 2018 of 2024, is hereby set aside and the writ petition stands
allowed.
17. The subsequent orders of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
(CCRA) recalling the earlier sanction of refund, including the Order
dated 16.12.2022, are accordingly quashed. The Order dated
08.01.2018, which allowed the Appellants’ refund, shall stand restored.
18. The appellant had applied for refund of the stamp duty on 6th
August, 2016. The same had been allowed by the CCRA vide order
dated 08.01.2018. Instead of refunding the amount, the CCRA, by
a subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 illegally recalled its earlier
decision of 08.01.2018 and rejected the request for refund. We have
already held above that the subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 was
vitiated in law and secondly that the appellant was entitled to refund.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 947
Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
In such circumstances, we find that the amount of Rs.27,34,500/-
had been wrongly retained by the State from 08.01.2018 for almost
seven years. As such, we are of the view that the appellant would
be entitled to simple interest @ 6 per cent per annum on the above
amount from the date of the first order of CCRA dated 08.01.2018
till the date it is paid.
19. The Respondents are directed to process and disburse the refund
of stamp duty, already paid by the Appellants along with accrued
interest as directed above within a period of four weeks from today,
in accordance with law. Any further delay will entail further interest
component @ 12% p.a.
20. The appeal stands allowed.
21. There shall be no order as to costs.
22. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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