HEM CHANDversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                               HEM CHAND                                         A
                                      v.
                         STATE OF HARYANA

                            OCTOBER 6, 1994

 [P.B. SAWANT, G.N. RAY AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.]                           B

      Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 304-B and 498-A.

      Dowry Death-CrnellfWife's unnatural death by strangulation within.
seven years of maniage-Conviction-Sentence-Held extreme sentence of life         C
imprisonment should be awarded in rare cases-Life imprisonment reduced
to 10 years rigorous imprisonment by Supreme Coun.

      Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 113-B.

      Presumption as to Dowry Deatlt--Applicability of                           D

      The appellant, a police employee, was prosecuted under Section
304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution case was
that the appellant was married to one S on 24.S.82. After the marriage he
had demanded dowry in kind and cash on many occasions. On 16.6.87, S             E
died of strangulation i.e. to say that she died otherwise than in normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage. The medical report also
opined that the death was due to strangulation. the accused pleaded that
It was a case of suicide by stating that on the date of occurrence when he
returned from office In the evening and entered his room, he found the
deceased hanging from the hook in the ceilfug and thereafter he took the         F
body to his village and that he also informed the police.

      The trial court noted two sets of medical evidence, the first indicating
no injury on the highly decomposed dead body while the second opinion
noted some injury at the time of re- post-mortem examination. However,           G
having examined the evidence of the material witnesses It convicted the
appellant under sections 304-B and .498-A and awarded the extreme sen-
tence i.e. imprisonment for life under section 304-B.

       On appeal the High Court confirmed the extreme punishment for
life under section 304-B. The appellant preferred appeal in this Court.          H
                                   295
    296                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         Dismissing the appeal but reducing the sentence only in respect of
    conviction under Section 304-B, this Court

          HELD : 1. The plea set up by the accused that he (cmnd the dead
    body hanging, thereby suggesting that it could be a case of suicide com·
    milted by the de.ceased for unknown reasons is, under the circumstance,
B   wholly unacceptable. Though the case rests on circumstantial evidence, the
    presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has rightly been
    drawn and the appellant is convicted under section 304-IPC. (298-GJ

          2. A reading of Section 304-B I.P.C. would show that when a question
c   arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a
    woman, what all that is necessary is, it should be shown that soon before
    her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage,
    the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment
    for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court
    shall presume that such a person has caqsed the dowry death. Likewise
D   there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the
    dowry death. (299-B, C, DJ

          3. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution bas proved that the
    deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there
E   is no direct evidence connecting the accused. There is no charge under
    Section 302 I.P.C. The trial court also noted two sets of medical evidence.
    This bas certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence
    to be awarded to the accnsed. Therefore, a sentence of 10 years' Rigorous
    imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. (299-F, 300-A, DJ

F         4. Section 304-B of the I.P.C. only raises presumption and lays down
    that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to im·
    prisonment for life. Therefore, awarding extreme punishment of Imprison·
    ment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. (300-DJ

G         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    690 of 1994.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 5.12.90 of the Punjab &
    Haryana High Court in Cr!. A. No. 580-D.B. of 1988.

H         BK Mehta, and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.
       HEM CHAND v. STATE[K.JAYACHANDRAREDDY,J.]                      297

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                            A

      K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. Leave granted.

       S.L.P. (Cr!.) No. 2846/91 was filed by the sole accused in the case
against the judgment of High Court of Punjab & Haryana confirming the B
conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B and 498-A I.P.C. and the
sentence of imprisonment for life and two years respectively awarded
thereunder by the trial court. The S.L.P. was dismissed by this Court at the
notice stage on 16.9.91 As against the same Review Petition (Cr!.) No.
452/92 was filed. This Court issued notice and the Review Petition was
listed for hearing on 18.3.94 but by mistake it was dismissed without hearing C
either party. Therefore Cr. M.P. No. 1753/94 has been filed to recall the
order dismissing the Review Petition. Accordingly the order aated 8.3.94
dismissing the Review Petition is recalled and it is taken on file. After
hearing the respective connsel we allowed the Review Petition and restored
the S.L.P.                                                                    D

       The appellant Hem Chand married the deceased Saroj Bala on
24.5.1982. She stayed for two months in the matrimonial home and retnrned
to her parents' house and told them that the accused was wanting more
dowry in the form of a television and a fridge. Her father gave Rs. 6000
and sent her back to her matrimonial home. The accused again demanded E
another sum of Rs. 25,000 for purchasing a plot. On 13.11.1984 the accused
took his wife and left her in her parents' house thereby making them
understand that the deceased could get back to the matrimonial home at
Hissar with Rs. 25,000 and not otherwise. The appellant after undergoing
one year's course in connection with his service took his wife back. On F
20.5.1987 the deceased, however, went to her father and told him that her
husband was wanting Rs. 25,000. She came back to her husband with Rs.
15,000 with a promise that the balance would be remitted by her father
soon. On 16.6.1987 at about 11.15 A.M. the deceased died of strangulation
that is to say that she died otherwise than in normal circumstances within G
seven years of her marriage. The father, after coming to know that the dead
body of the deceased had been brought to Village Lakhan Majra, reached
there. Thereafter he lodged a complaint with the police that his daughter
was murdered by the accused because of dowry. The police registered the
crime, held the inquest over the dead body and sent the same for post-
mortem. As the dead body was highly decomposed, the Doctors referred H
    298                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the same to the Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine, Medical
    College, Rohtak. Dr. Dalbir Singh, Demonstrator, Department of Forensic
    Medicine examined the body and found a ligature mark around the neck
    and on dissection of the ligature mark he found that ecchy mosis were
    present, trachea was congested and was containing bloody froth. He also
    found a contusion over the chin. The Doctor also found several other
B
    contusions on the hands, axilla and other parts of the body. He opined that
    the death was due to strangulation. After completion of the investigation,
    the charge- sheet was laid.

          The plea of the accused was one of denial and he stated that when
C   he returned from his office in the evening and entered the room, he found
    the deceased hanging from the hook in the ceiling. He got confused and
    with the help of the people he took the dead body to his native Village
    Lakhan Majara and that he also informed the police.

          The trial court having examined the evidence of the material wit-
D   nesses held that this is a case of strangulation and therefore the death was
    unnatural and that there was demand for dowry and there was cruelty on
    the part of the accused and accordingly convicted him under Sections
    304-B and 498-A l.P.C. However, the trial court awarded sentence of
    imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 304-B l.P.C.
E   On appeal the High Court having examined the evidence agreed with the
    conclusions reached by the trial court and dismissed the appeal and the
    extreme punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B I.P.C.
    was confirmed.

           In this appeal, the same contentions have been put forward. We find
F   only from the second set of medical evidence that it is a case of strangula-
    tion. However, for the purpose of this case, it should be accepted that it
    was an unnatural death. The plea set up by the accused that he found the
    dead body hanging thereby suggesting that it could be a case of suicide
    committed by the deceased for unknown reasons is, under the cir-
G   cumstance, wholly unacceptable. Though the case rests on circumstantial
    evidence, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has
    rightly been drawn and the appellant is convicted under Section 304-B
    I.P.C. Having given our careful consideration we agree with the findings of
    the courts below.

H         Now coming to the que3tion of sentence, it can be seen that Section
         HEM CHAND v. STATE[K.JAYACHANDRAREDDY,J.]                      299

    304-B I.P.. C. lays down that "Whoever commits dowry death shall be A
    punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
    years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." The point for
    consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life
    is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B I.P:C. would
    show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the B
    offence of dowry death of a woman that all that is necessary is it sould be
    shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven
   years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person,
    to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If
 . that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused
· the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact C
, whether such person is di!ectly responsible for the death of the deceased
    or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the
    dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the
    unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage.
    Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act D
    as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the
   person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death
   shall presume to have caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her
    death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or
   harassment'in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is E
   the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B I.P.C. also.
   It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused
   has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to
   have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements men-
   tioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has
                                                                                F
   proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangula-
   tion, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also
   important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302
   I.P.C. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical
   evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr. Usha Rani,
   P.W. 6 and Dr. Indu Lalit, P.W. 7 gave one opinion. According to them no· G
   injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decom-
   posed. On the other hand, Dr. Dalbir Singh, P.W. 13 who also examined
   the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries
   at the time of re-post mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can
   be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which H
    300                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A case also Section 304-B l.P.C. would be attracted. But this aspect has
  certainly io be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be
  awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that
  the death was unoatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and
  therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 I.P.C. have
B been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that
  it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home
  was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of
  cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B
  I.P.C. was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out
  that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking
C the crime he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride
  killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be
  taken. As mentioned above Section 304-B I.P.C. only raises presumption
  and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may
  extend te imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment'
D of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.
          Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' R.I. would
    meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction
    of the appellant under Section 304-B l.P.C., red;:ce the sentence of im-
    prisonment for life to 10 years' R.I. The other conviction and sentence
E   passed against the appellant are, however, confirmed. In the result, the
    appeal is dismissed subject to the above modification of sentence.

    T.NA.                                                   Appeal dismissed.