Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellant's statement was the basis of the FIR, not a Section 161 statement, and that the trial court's order was an intermediate, revisable order, making the criminal revision maintainable.

Summary

The appellant, Honnaiah T.H., was an injured victim and the informant whose statement led to the registration of an FIR on 26 December 2016 for multiple offences arising from a violent dispute in Thoppanahalli village, Karnataka. During trial, the prosecution sought to mark the appellant's recorded statement as an exhibit, but the trial court refused, deeming it a Section 161 statement and thus inadmissible. The appellant filed a criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC, which the High Court dismissed on the ground that the order was interlocutory and the appellant lacked locus standi. The Supreme Court held that the statement was the basis of the FIR, not a Section 161 statement, and that the trial court's order was an intermediate order affecting substantive rights, not merely interlocutory. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial and High Court orders, and directed that the statement be marked as an exhibit and the trial concluded by 31 March 2023.

Issues considered

The nature of the appellant's statement: whether it was a Section 161 statement inadmissible as an exhibit or a statement forming the basis of the FIR.
Whether the trial court's order refusing to mark the statement as an exhibit constitutes an interlocutory order barred by Section 397(2) CrPC.
The maintainability of a criminal revision filed by a private complainant/informant under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC.
The scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction in criminal matters, especially concerning victim/complainant rights.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 161, s. 173, s. 372, s. 397, s. 397(2), s. 401

Subjects

criminal procedurerevision jurisdictioninterlocutory orderSection 161 CrPCevidence as exhibitvictim rightsFIRmiscarriage of justice

Judgment

1108 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 1108 [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A HONNAIAH T.H.
v
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS
(Criminal Appeal No. 1147 of 2022)
B AUGUST 04, 2022
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
J B PARDIWALA, JJ]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.161. 397(2) –
Prosecution csae was that FIR was registered on 26 December 2016
C
for offences punishable under ss.143, 147, 148, 504, 323, 302,
307, 114 and 149 of the IPC – According to the FIR, on 25
December 2016, the accused came to the village of the appellant
armed with knives and rods, and abused and assaulted some of the
villagers – A few of the accused allegedly assaulted and stabbed
D the appellant, his elder brother and another villager with knives –
The grievously injured persons were first taken to the Government
Hospital at Maddur – The injured were referred to Mandya District
Hospital from where they were further transferred to K R Hospital,
Mysore – Appellant claimed that the FIR was registered on the
information furnished by him, making him the informant – During
E
trial, PW 2 (doctor of Maddur Government Hospital), stated that
the appellant and another injured witness were brought by the police
to Maddur Government Hospital and that he had referred both the
patients to Mandya District Hospital for further treatment – PW 4,
working at K R Hospital, Mysore stated that the statement of the
F appellant was recorded in his presence by the PSI Maddur on 26
December 2016 – During the course of his examination-in-chief,
the Public Prosecutor wanted to mark the complaint together with
the signature of the appellant as an exhibit – An objection was
raised by the defense counsel on the ground that in view of the
statement of PW 2, during the course of his examination, the
G
statement of the appellant is referable to s.161 of the CrPC and
cannot be marked as an exhibit – Trial court refused to mark the
complaint on the basis of the statement by PW 2, and on the ground
that PW 7 did not depose in his evidence that he gave the complaint
to the police – The State did not pursue its remedies against the
H order of the trial court – Appellant instituted a criminal revision
1108
HONNAIAH T.H. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS 1109

under ss.397(1) and 401 of the CrPC before High Court – High A
Court upheld the order of the trial court, holding that the appellant
as the de-facto complainant had no locus standi to file the revision
petition and the powers of revision cannot be exercised in relation
to an interlocutory order and therefore dismissed the revision petition
in view of the bar contained in s.397(2) of CrPC – Hence instant
B
appeal – Held: On the basis of the deposition of PW 4, it prima
facie appears that the statement of the appellant was recorded on
26 December 2016 at K R Hospital, Mysore in the presence of PW
4 – On the basis of the statement of PW7, intimation about the offence
was received at PS Maddur following which the FIR was registered
on 26 December 2016 – Thus, the basis of the order of the trial C
court, which has been upheld by the High Court, namely, that the
statement of the appellant is a statement under s.161 CrPC is
erroneous – The statement of the appellant, in fact, was the basis
on which the FIR was registered – Hence, it was legitimately open
to the prosecution to have the statement proved and marked as an
D
exhibit during the course of the trial – There would be a serious
miscarriage of justice in the course of the criminal trial if the
statement were not to be marked as an exhibit since that forms the
basis of the registration of the FIR – The order of the trial judge
cannot in these circumstances be treated as merely procedural or of
an interlocutory in nature since it has the potential to affect the E
substantive course of the prosecution.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.397(2) – Revisional
Jurisdiction of High Court in criminal matter – Scope of – The
revisional jurisdiction u/s.397 of CrPC can be exercised against
the final order of acquittal or conviction, or an intermediate order F
not being interlocutory order where the interest of the public justice
requires to subvert manifest illegality and to prevent gross
miscarriage of justice – In the present case, the order of the trial
court declining to mark the statement of the informant as an exhibit
is an intermediate order affecting important rights of the parties
and cannot be said to be purely of an interlocutory nature – The G
revisional jurisdiction u/s 397 r/w 401 of CrPC is a discreationary
in nature and can be exercised suo motu and there can be no bar
on the third party invoking such jurisdiction inviting the attention
of the High Court that an occasion to exercise the power has arisen
– Since the order of the trial court is not interlocutory in nature H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A and that the bar u/s.397(2) of the CrPC in inapplicable, a criminal
revision filed by an appellant-informant against the said order of
the trial court was maintainable.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. There would be a serious miscarriage of justice
B in the course of the criminal trial if the statement were not to be
marked as an exhibit since that forms the basis of the registration
of the FIR. The order of the trial judge cannot in these
circumstances be treated as merely procedural or of an
interlocutory in nature since it has the potential to affect the
C substantive course of the prosecution. The revisional jurisdiction
under Section 397 CrPC can be exercised where the interest of
public justice requires interference for correction of manifest
illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. A court
can exercise its revisional jurisdiction against a final order of
acquittal or conviction, or an intermediate order not being
D interlocutory in nature. Any order which substantially affects the
right of the parties cannot be said to be an “interlocutory order”.
[Para 12][1116-B-D]
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460
[2012] 7 SCR 988; Sheetala Prasad v. Sri Kant (2010)
E 2 SCC 190 : [2009] 16 SCR 686; KK Patel v State of
Gujarat (2000) 6 SCC 195 : [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 312;
Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137 :
[1978] 1 SCR 222; Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 : [1978] 1 SCR 749
F – relied on.
2. In the present case, the objection taken by the defense
counsel (which was upheld by the trial judge) that the statement
of the informant is a statement under Section 161 CrPC travels
to the root of the case of the prosecution and its acceptance would
G substantially prejudice the case of the prosecution. According to
the charge sheet, the statement of the appellant/ informant formed
the basis of the FIR and set the criminal law in motion. Rejection
of the prayer of the Public Prosecutor to mark the statement as
an exhibit would possibly imperil the validity of the FIR. In this
background, the order of the trial court declining to mark the
H
HONNAIAH T.H. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS 1111

statement of the informant as an exhibit is an intermediate order A
affecting important rights of the parties and cannot be said to be
purely of an interlocutory nature. In the present case, if the
statement of the appellant/ informant is not permitted to be
marked as an exhibit, it would amount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. [Para 13][1117-G; 1118-A-B]
B
3. The challenge to the maintainability of the revision at
the instance of the appellant impugning an order passed during
the pendency of the trial must also be rejected. The revisional
jurisdiction of a High Court under Section 397 read with Section
401 of the CrPC, is a discretionary jurisdiction that can be
exercised by the revisional court suo motu so as to examine the C
correctness, legality or propriety of an order recorded or passed
by the trial court or the inferior court. As the power of revision
can be exercised by the High Court even suo moto, there can
be no bar on a third party invoking the revisional jurisdiction and
inviting the attention of the High Court that an occasion to D
exercise the power has arisen. [Para 14][1118-C-E]
4. The view of the High Court that a victim/ complainant
needs to restrict his revision petition to challenging final orders
either acquitting the accused or convicting the accused of a lesser
offence or imposing inadequate compensation (three E
requirements mentioned under Section 372 CrPC) is
unsustainable, so long as the revision petition is not directed
against an interlocutory order, an inbuilt restriction in Section
397(2) of the CrPC. In the present case, the appellant filed a
criminal revision as his interests as an informant and as an injured
victim were adversely affected by the trial court rejecting the F
prayer to mark the statement of the informant as an exhibit. Having
held that the order of the trial court is not interlocutory in nature
and that the bar under Section 397(2) of the CrPC in inapplicable,
a criminal revision filed by an informant against the said order of
the trial court was maintainable. [Para 15][1119-A-C] G
K Pandurangan v. SSR Velusamy (2003) 8 SCC 625;
Sheetala Prasad v. Sri Kant (2010) 2 SCC 190 : [2009]
16 SCR 686; Menoka Malik v. State of West Bengal
(2019) 18 SCC 721 – relied on.
H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[2012] 7 SCR 988 relied on Para 12
[2009] 16 SCR 686 relied on Para 12
[1978] 1 SCR 222 relied on Para 12
B [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 312 relied on Para 12
[1978] 1 SCR 222 relied on Para 13
[1978] 1 SCR 749 relied on Para 13
(2003) 8 SCC 625 relied on Para 14
C
[2009] 16 SCR 686 relied on Para 15
(2019) 18 SCC 721 relied on Para 15
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1147 of 2022.
D From the Judgment and Orders dated 20.12.2021 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Revision Petition No. 1384
of 2019.
Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Remya Raj, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan,
Ms. Sajal Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.
E
Shubhranshu Padhi, Ashish Yadav, Vishal Banshal, Ms. Rajeshwari
Shankar, Anil V. Katarki, Anil C. Nishani, Ms. Veena Katarki, T. R. B.
Sivakumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from a judgment dated 20 December 2021 of
a Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka by which the criminal
revision filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground of
G maintainability. The appellant, who is the original informant moved this
Court.
3. It has been alleged that a dispute occurred on 25 December
2016 between the accused and villagers of Thoppanahalli village in
Maddur, Karnataka on the allocation of water. The dispute is alleged to
H have led to a series of altercations and culminated in the murder of two
HONNAIAH T.H. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS 1113
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

persons and injuries to several others, including the appellant. A First A
Information Report1 under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
19732 was registered on 26 December 2016 at PS Maddur, District
Mandya, being Crime No. 0582 of 2016, for offences punishable under
Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 323, 302, 307, 114 and 149 of the Indian
Penal Code.3 According to the FIR, around 1830 hours on 25 December
B
2016, the accused came to the village of the appellant armed with knives
and rods, and abused and assaulted some of the villagers. A few of the
accused allegedly assaulted and stabbed the appellant, his elder brother,
Mutthuraju, and another villager named Nandeesha with knives. The
grievously injured persons were first taken to the Government Hospital
at Maddur. The doctors at the hospital referred the injured to Mandya C
District Hospital from where they were further transferred to K R
Hospital, Mysore. Both Nandeesha and Mutthuraju succumbed to the
injuries.
4. The appellant claims that the FIR was registered on the
information which was furnished by him, making him the informant. Upon D
investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted under Section 173 CrPC
before the competent court and the case was committed for trial.
5. During the course of the trial in SC No. 82 of 2017, the
prosecution examined seven prosecution witnesses. 4 PW 2, Dr
Chikkaboregowda stated that the appellant and another injured witness
were brought by the police to Maddur Government Hospital at 1925 E
hours on 25 December 2016 and that he had referred both the patients
to Mandya District Hospital for further treatment. PW 4, Dr Manjoj P
working at K R Hospital, Mysore stated that the statement of the appellant
was recorded in his presence by the PSI Maddur at 0115 hours on 26
December 2016. F
6. The appellant was examined as PW 7. During the course of his
examination-in- chief, the Public Prosecutor wanted to mark the complaint
together with the signature of the appellant as an exhibit. An objection
was raised by the defense counsel on the ground that in view of the
statement of PW 2, during the course of his examination, the statement
G
of the appellant is referable to Section 161 of the CrPC and cannot be
marked as an exhibit.
1
“FIR”
2
“CrPC”
3
“IPC”
4
“PW” H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A 7. The trial court in its order dated 3 October 2019 refused to
mark the complaint on the basis of the statement by PW 2, and on the
ground that PW 7 did not depose in his evidence that he gave the complaint
to the police. The trial court observed:
“The witness has not deposed in his evidence that he has given
B complaint to the police. He has deposed that he has given
statement while he was taking treatment in the hospital in presence
of the Investigating Officer and the Doctor. On the basis of the
above evidence of P.W.2, the statement of this witness cannot be
marked by treating the same as First Information Report. And, as
requested by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the statement
C of the witness and his signature cannot be marked as ‘exhibit’,
since the witness has stated that he has given his statement.”
8. The State did not pursue its remedies against the order of the
trial court. The appellant instituted a criminal revision under Sections
397(1) and 401 of the CrPC. The High Court by the impugned judgment
D dated 20 December 2021 upheld the order of the trial court, and dismissed
the revision petition on the ground of maintainability. The High Court
observed that the appellant as the de- facto complainant had no locus
standi to file the revision petition. The relevant observations of the High
Court are extracted below:
E “12. The State has left the matter as it is. However, it is the
complainant who is now agitating before this Court by
challenging the said order. The word ‘victim’ is defined in
Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. which reads as under:
“victim” means a person who has suffered any loss
F or injury caused by reason of the act or omission
for which the accused person has been charged and
the expression “victim” includes his or her guardian
or legal heir;
13. In a given case, it also includes the rights of the complainant
G which is carved out under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. only for
the purpose of challenging the order passed by the Court
acquitting the accused or convicting the accused for a
lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. Except
these three requirements in the amended CrPC for the
victim/complainant, when the CrPC is silent as to the further
H
HONNAIAH T.H. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS 1115
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

rights of a victim/complainant, the filing of the revision A
petition challenging every order that would be passed during
the pendency of the trial is not maintainable. Therefore,
revision petition at the instance of the defacto complainant/
victim, in the considered opinion of this Court, is not
maintainable.”
B
The High Court also observed that under Section 397(2) of CrPC,
the powers of revision cannot be exercised in relation to an interlocutory
order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The High
Court held that the order of the trial court declining to mark the statement
of the appellant as an exhibit is an interlocutory order, and dismissed the
revision petition in view of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of CrPC. C

9. The appellant moved this court, aggrieved by the order of the High
Court dated 20 December 2021. Notice was issued on 11 March 2022,
when the proceedings in SC No. 82 of 2017 pending before the trial
court were stayed. By an order dated 11 April 2022, this Court modified
its earlier order and stayed only the further recording of the evidence of D
PW 7 (the appellant) at the trial.
10. We have heard Mr Senthil Jagadeesan, counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, Mr Shubranshu Padhi, counsel for the State of
Karnataka and Mr T.R.B. Sivakumar, counsel for the respondents-
accused. E

11. The case of the prosecution is that the injured persons, including
the appellant, were shifted from the Government Hospital at Maddur to
Mandya District Hospital to K R Hospital, Mysore on 26 December
2016. The appellant has not stated at any stage that he was brought by
the police to any of the hospitals for treatment. On the basis of the F
deposition of PW 4, it prima facie appears that the statement of the
appellant was recorded at 0115 hours on 26 December 2016 at K R
Hospital, Mysore in the presence Dr Manoj P who was examined as
PW 4. On the basis of the statement of PW7, intimation about the offence
was received at PS Maddur following which the FIR was registered as G
Crime No 0582 of 2016 at 0230 hours on 26 December 2016. Thus, the
basis of the order of the trial court, which has been upheld by the High
Court, namely, that the statement of the appellant is a statement under
Section 161 CrPC is erroneous. The statement of the appellant, in fact,
was the basis on which the FIR was registered. Hence, it was legitimately
H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A open to the prosecution to have the statement proved and marked as an
exhibit during the course of the trial.
12. There would be a serious miscarriage of justice in the course
of the criminal trial if the statement were not to be marked as an exhibit
since that forms the basis of the registration of the FIR. The order of
B the trial judge cannot in these circumstances be treated as merely
procedural or of an interlocutory in nature since it has the potential to
affect the substantive course of the prosecution. The revisional jurisdiction
under Section 397 CrPC can be exercised where the interest of public
justice requires interference for correction of manifest illegality or the
prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.5 A court can exercise its
C revisional jurisdiction against a final order of acquittal or conviction, or
an intermediate order not being interlocutory in nature. In the decision in
Amar Nath v State of Haryana,6 this Court explained the meaning of
the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) CrPC. This Court held
that the expression “interlocutory order” denotes orders of a purely interim
D or temporary nature which do not decide or touch upon the important
rights or liabilities of parties. Hence, any order which substantially affects
the right of the parties cannot be said to be an “interlocutory order”.
Speaking for a two-Judge Bench, Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali observed:
“6. […] It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in Section
E 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and
not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a
purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch
the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which
substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain
rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so
F as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because
that would be against the very object which formed the basis for
insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973
Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning
cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other
G steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to
interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under
Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters
5
Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460; Sheetala Prasad v Sri Kant,
(2010) 2 SCC 190.
6
H (1977) 4 SCC 137
HONNAIAH T.H. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS 1117
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused A
or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory
order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction
of the High Court.”
Explaining the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2)
CrPC, this Court observed in Amar Nath (supra) that the wide power B
of revision of the High Court is restricted as a matter of prudence and
not as a matter of law, to an order that “suffered from any error of
law or any legal infirmity causing injustice or prejudice to the
accused or was manifestly foolish or perverse.” In KK Patel v State
of Gujarat,7 where a criminal revision was filed against an order taking
cognizance and issuing process, this Court followed the view as C
expressed in Amar Nath (supra), and observed:
“11. [….] It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an
order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of
the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed
during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v State of Haryana, D
Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra,8 VC Shukla v State,9
and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v Uttam10). The feasible
test is whether upholding the objections raised by a party, it would
result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on
such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as E
envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if
the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court
the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated.
Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.”
13. In the decision in VC Shukla (supra), this Court noted that F
under the CrPC, the question whether an order such as an order
summoning an accused 11 or an order framing a charge 12 is an
“interlocutory order” must be analysed in the light of the peculiar facts
of a particular case. In the present case, the objection taken by the
defense counsel (which was upheld by the trial judge) that the statement
of the informant is a statement under Section 161 CrPC travels to the G
7
(2000) 6 SCC 195
8
(1977) 4 SCC 551
9
1980 Supp SCC 92
10
(1999) 3 SCC 134
11
Amar Nath v State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137
12
Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A root of the case of the prosecution and its acceptance would substantially
prejudice the case of the prosecution. According to the charge sheet,
the statement of the appellant/ informant formed the basis of the FIR
and set the criminal law in motion. Rejection of the prayer of the Public
Prosecutor to mark the statement as an exhibit would possibly imperil
the validity of the FIR. In this background, the order of the trial court
B
declining to mark the statement of the informant as an exhibit is an
intermediate order affecting important rights of the parties and cannot
be said to be purely of an interlocutory nature. In the present case, if the
statement of the appellant/ informant is not permitted to be marked as
an exhibit, it would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice.
C 14. The challenge to the maintainability of the revision at the instance
of the appellant impugning an order passed during the pendency of the
trial must also be rejected. The revisional jurisdiction of a High Court
under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC, is a discretionary
jurisdiction that can be exercised by the revisional court suo motu so as
D to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of an order recorded or
passed by the trial court or the inferior court. As the power of revision
can be exercised by the High Court even suo moto, there can be no
bar on a third party invoking the revisional jurisdiction and inviting the
attention of the High Court that an occasion to exercise the power has
arisen. Holding a revision petition instituted by a complainant maintainable,
E Justice Santosh Hegde writing for this Court in K Pandurangan
v SSR Velusamy13 observed:
“6. So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the
revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think
the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the
F provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court has
suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same
being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any
difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is
already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being
G exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done
by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such
power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following
judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi
Admn).”
13
H (2003) 8 SCC 625
HONNAIAH T.H. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS 1119
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

15. The view of the High Court that a victim/ complainant needs A
to restrict his revision petition to challenging final orders either acquitting
the accused or convicting the accused of a lesser offence or imposing
inadequate compensation (three requirements mentioned under Section
372 CrPC) is unsustainable, so long as the revision petition is not directed
against an interlocutory order, an inbuilt restriction in Section 397(2) of
B
the CrPC. In the present case, the appellant filed a criminal revision as
his interests as an informant and as an injured victim were adversely
affected by the trial court rejecting the prayer to mark the statement of
the informant as an exhibit. Having held that the order of the trial court
is not interlocutory in nature and that the bar under Section 397(2) of the
CrPC in inapplicable, a criminal revision filed by an informant against C
the said order of the trial court was maintainable. In Sheetala Prasad
v Sri Kant,14 a two Judge Bench of this Court has held that a
private complainant can file a revision petition in certain circumstances,
including when the trial court wrongly shuts out evidence which the
prosecution wishes to produce. Noting the principles on which revisional
D
jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court at the instance of a
private complainant, this Court observed:
“12. The High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction at
the instance of a private complainant and, therefore, it is necessary
to notice the principles on which such revisional jurisdiction can
be exercised. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the Code of Criminal E
Procedure prohibits conversion of a finding of acquittal into one
of conviction. Without making the categories exhaustive, revisional
jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court at the instance of
a private complainant
(1) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the F
prosecution wished to produce,
(2) where the admissible evidence is wrongly brushed aside as
inadmissible,
(3) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case and has G
still acquitted the accused,
(4) where the material evidence has been overlooked either by
the trial court or the appellate court or the order is passed by
considering irrelevant evidence, and
14
(2010) 2 SCC 190 H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A (5) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence
which is invalid under the law.”
The principles which have been enunciated in Sheetala Prasad
(supra) have been recently relied upon by this Court in Menoka Malik
v State of West Bengal15 to hold that the High Court can exercise its
B revisional jurisdiction in a revision petition filed by the first informant
where the trial court overlooked material evidence. Thus, the impugned
judgment of the High Court dated 20 December 2021 is incorrect in
holding that the appellant did not have locus to institute the criminal revision
against the order of the trial court.
C 16. In these circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside
the order of the trial court dated 3 October 2019 and the impugned
judgment of the High Court dated 20 December 2021. We accordingly
direct that the trial court shall allow the plea of the Public Prosecutor, in
the course of the examination of the appellant, to prove the statement of
the appellant which was recorded at 0115 hours on 26 December 2016
D so that it can be marked as an exhibit during the course of the trial.
17. Having regard to the fact that the trial is pending since 2016,
we direct the trial court to conclude the trial by 31 March 2023.
18. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
E
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.

F

G

15
H (2019) 18 SCC 721