IN RE: N. PEDDI RAJU AND OTHERS versus

                 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 183 : 2025 INSC 989

                   In Re: N. Peddi Raju and Others
             (Suo Moto Contempt Petition (C) No. 3 of 2025)
                               11 August 2025
             [B.R. Gavai,* CJI, K. Vinod Chandran and
                     Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Scandalous remarks made against a High Court Judge in a Transfer
       Petition. Suo moto contempt proceedings initiated against the
       lawyers involved in the filing of the petition.

                                  Headnotes†
       Contempt of Court – Scandalous allegations made against
       High Court Judge – Transfer Petition was filed seeking transfer
       of a Criminal Petition from the High Court of Telangana to
       the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
       wherein scandalous remarks were made against the High
       Court Judge hearing that matter – Dismissed – In view of
       the remarks made, contempt notice issued to the lawyers-
       alleged contemnors (the lawyer for the petitioner, the
       Advocate-on-Record who had filed the petition and the lawyer
       who had drawn the petition):
       Held: Though, the alleged contemnors have tendered their apology
       however, the apology is tendered only to this Court – Since the
       scandalous allegations were made against the High Court Judge
       therefore, alleged contemnors to tender unconditional apology to
       the concerned Judge – Liberty sought therefor, granted – Registrar
       General of the High Court to reopen the matter only for the limited
       purpose of tendering an unconditional apology by the alleged
       contemnors before the concerned Judge – After the question of
       acceptance of the apology is decided, Supreme Court to consider
       the issue with regard to acceptance of apology tendered to this
       Court. [Paras 15-19]

       Constitution of India – Judges of the High Court vis-à-vis
       Judges of the Supreme Court:


* Author
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       Held: Judges of the High Court are not inferior to the Judges of
       the Supreme Court – Though, as an appellate Court to the High
       Court, Supreme Court can affirm, reverse, modify or set aside the
       judgment of the High Court, it has no administrative control, either
       over the administration of the High Court or the Judges of the
       High Court – The Judges of the High Court are also Constitutional
       functionaries and they enjoy the same immunity as is enjoyed by a
       Judge of the Supreme Court – Practice amongst lawyers to criticize
       the Judges of the High Courts or Trial Courts without any reason
       and the trend seeking the transfer of matters involving a political
       figure in a particular State to another State, deprecated – Merely
       on the basis that a petition involves a political figure in a State
       cannot constitute a ground to transfer the proceedings from the
       High Court of that State to the High Court of another State – When
       scandalous allegations are made against the Judges of the High
       Court, it becomes the duty of this Court to protect the Judges of
       the High Court – Judges of the High Court are appointed under
       the Constitution of India and upon assuming the office, they take
       an oath to act without any fear or favour, affection or ill-will and
       to uphold the Constitution and the laws – To imply that because
       a political figure is involved in a case, and therefore, a holder of
       such a high constitutional office would not act independently, in our
       view, scandalizes the very institution of administration of justice –
       Judicial deprecation. [Paras 11-14]

                                Case Law Cited
       M.Y. Shareef and Another v. Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of
       Nagpur and Others [1955] 1 SCR 757 : (1954) 2 SCC 444; Civil
       Miscellaneous Petition No. 25533 of 1986 titled In the matter of
       T.V. Choudhary, A Member of the Indian Administrative Service
       (Under Suspension) with SLP(C) No. 14045 of 1985 [E.S. Reddi v.
       Chief Secretary, Government of A.P. and Another] [1987] 3 SCR
       146 : (1987) 3 SCC 258; N. Eswaranathan v. State represented
       by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, 2025 INSC 509 : [2025]
       5 SCR 128 – referred to.

                               List of Keywords
       Contempt of Court; Scandalous remarks/allegations made
       against High Court Judge; Scandalous remarks made against
       a Judge of the Telangana High Court; Judge of the High Court
       of Telangana; Suo moto contempt proceedings; Suo moto
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                               In Re: N. Peddi Raju and Others


       contempt proceedings initiated against lawyers/counsels; Alleged
       contemnors; Unconditional apology; Apology tendered; Transfer
       Petition dismissed; Administration of justice; Criticism of Judges;
       Political figure; Judges of the High Court; Judges of the Supreme
       Court.

                                         Case Arising From
       INHERENT JURISDICTION: Suo Moto Contempt Petition (Civil)
       No. 3 of 2025
       (Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)

                                    Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the alleged contemnors:
       S. Nagamuthu, Sanjay R. Hegde, M. R. Shamshad, Sr. Advs.,
       Varun Thakur, Ms. Shraddha Saran, Ramkaran, M/s Varun Thakur
       & Associate, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav, Puran Mal Saini,
       Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Yogesh Yadav, Mohammed Shahrukh, James P.
       Thomas, Ankit Tiwari, Tanay Hegde, Rahul Singh, Vishal Jogdand,
       Pratik Bombarde, Rishi Raj Singh, Saurabh Singh.
       Advs. for SCAORA:
       Vipin Nair, Amit Sharma, Nikhil Jain, Kaustabh Shukla.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                                 Judgment

       B.R. Gavai, CJI

1.     The present proceedings originate from the Transfer Petition (Criminal)
       No. 613 of 20251 which was filed seeking transfer of Criminal Petition
       No. 4162 of 2020 from the High Court of Telangana to the High Court
       of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench.
2.     The grounds, inter-alia, on which the said Criminal Petition No. 4162
       of 2020 was sought to be transferred was that the conduct of the
       learned Single Judge of the High Court of Telangana2, who was



1    Hereinafter referred to as, “Transfer Petition”.
2    Hereinafter referred to as, “High Court”.
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       hearing the matter, gave rise to serious apprehension of partiality
       and procedural discrimination, inasmuch as the arguments of the
       counsel for the petitioner3 was summarily curtailed. The petitioner
       stated that he was given only five minutes to argue the matter.
3.     Further averments were made in the transfer petition regarding the
       political status of Respondent No.1 therein and that the executive
       control was now led by him. Therefore, the alleged contemnor no.1
       believed that there existed a likelihood of derailment of justice.
4.     We had dismissed the transfer petition vide order dated 29th July
       2025. However, while dismissing the petition, taking into account
       the scandalous and scurrilous remarks made against the learned
       Judge of the High Court, we had issued show cause notice not
       only to the alleged contemnor no.1, but also to Mr. Ritesh Patil4,
       learned Advocate-on-Record, who had filed the petition and Mr.
       Nitin Meshram5, learned counsel, who had drawn the petition as to
       why an action for committing contempt of the court should not be
       initiated against them.
5.     In response to the notice issued, all the three alleged contemnors
       have filed their affidavits of apology.
6.     We have heard Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel for alleged
       contemnor no.1, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel for
       alleged contemnor no.2 and Mr. Sanjay R Hegde, learned Senior
       Counsel for alleged contemnor no.3.
7.     At the outset, we may gainfully refer to the judgment of the Constitution
       Bench of this Court in the case of M.Y. Shareef and Another v.
       Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur and Others6, wherein
       it was observed thus:
              “13. The fact however remains, as found by the High
              Court, that there was at the time these events happened
              considerable misconception amongst a section of the
              Nagpur Bar about advocates’ responsibilities in matters of
              signing transfer applications containing allegations of this


3    Hereinafter referred to as, “Alleged Contemnor No.1”
4    Hereinafter referred to as, “Alleged Contemnor No.2”
5    Hereinafter referred to as, “Alleged Contemnor No.3”
6    (1954) 2 SCC 444.
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                     In Re: N. Peddi Raju and Others


           character. It cannot be denied that a section of the Bar
           is under an erroneous impression that when a counsel is
           acting in the interests of his client, or in accordance with
           his instructions he is discharging his legitimate duty to his
           client even when he signs an application or a pleading
           which contains matter scandalizing the Court. They think
           that when there is conflict between their obligations to the
           Court and their duty to the client, the latter prevails. This
           misconception has to be rooted out by a clear and emphatic
           pronouncement, and we think it should be widely made
           known that counsel who sign applications or pleadings
           containing matter scandalizing the Court without reasonably
           satisfying themselves about the prima facie existence of
           adequate grounds there for, with a view to prevent or delay
           the course of justice, are themselves guilty of contempt of
           Court, and that it is no duty of a counsel to his client to
           take any interest in such applications; on the other hand,
           his duty is to advise his client for refraining from making
           allegations of this nature in such applications. Once the fact
           is recognized as was done by the High Court here, that the
           members of the Bar have not fully realized the implications
           of their signing such applications and are firmly under the
           belief that their conduct in doing so is in accordance with
           professional ethics, it has to be held that the act of the
           two appellants in this case was done under a mistaken
           view of their rights and duties, and in such cases even a
           qualified apology may well be considered by a Court. In
           borderline cases where a question of principle about the
           rights of counsel and their duties has to be settled, an
           alternative plea of apology merits consideration; for it is
           possible for a judge who hears the case to hold that there
           is no contempt in which case a defence of unqualified
           apology is meaningless, because that would amount to
           the admission of the commission of an offence.”
8.   It can be seen that this Court observed that a section of the Bar
     was under an erroneous impression that when a counsel is acting
     in the interests of his client, or in accordance with his instructions,
     he was discharging his legitimate duty to his client even when he
     signs an application or a pleading which contains matter scandalizing
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       the Court. This Court observed that the lawyers feel that whenever
       there is a conflict between the lawyer’s duty to the Court and the
       duty to the client, the duty to the client prevails over the duty of
       the Court. This Court found it necessary that such a misconception
       had to be rooted out by a clear and emphatic pronouncement. This
       Court, therefore, in unequivocal terms, held that the counsel who
       signs applications or pleadings containing matter scandalizing the
       Court without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie
       existence of adequate grounds are themselves guilty of contempt
       of court. This Court observed that it is not the duty of the counsel
       towards his client to take any interest in such applications. On the
       contrary, it is his duty to advise his client to refrain from making
       allegations of such nature. However, the Court taking note of the
       fact that such conduct could have been done under a misconception,
       this Court accepted the apology of the lawyers therein.
9.     It is equally apposite to refer to the following observations of this
       Court in the case of Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.25533 of
       1986 titled In the matter of T.V. Choudhary, A Member of the
       Indian Administrative Service (Under Suspension) with SLP(C)
       No.14045 of 1985 [E.S. Reddi v. Chief Secretary, Government
       of A.P. and Another]7:
             “9. We wish we could have rested content with concluding
             the judgment with the operative portion of our conclusions
             on the merits of the case but we find with a sense of
             anguish and heaviness of heart that we have to express
             our disapproval of the manner in which the arguments
             were advanced before us on behalf of the applicant T.V.
             Choudhary. Not only were the arguments advanced with
             undue vehemence and unwarranted passion, reflecting
             identification of interests beyond established conventions
             but were of degrees not usual of enlightened senior
             counsel to adopt. The majesty of law and the dignity of
             courts cannot be maintained unless there is mutual respect
             between the Bench and the Bar and the counsel act in full
             realisation of their duty to the court alongside their duty to
             their clients and have the grace to reconcile themselves


7    (1987) 3 SCC 258.
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                     In Re: N. Peddi Raju and Others


           when their pleas and arguments do not find acceptance
           with the court. It is needless for us to say that neither
           rhetoric nor tempestuous arguments can constitute the
           sine qua non for persuasive arguments.
           10. By virtue of the pre-eminence which senior counsel
           enjoy in the profession, they not only carry greater
           responsibilities but they also act as a model to the junior
           members of the profession. A senior counsel more or less
           occupies a position akin to a Queen›s counsel in England
           next after the Attorney General and the Solicitor General.
           It is an honour and privilege conferred on advocates of
           standing and experience by the Chief Justice and the
           Judges of this Court. They thus become leading counsel
           and take precedence on all counsel not having that rank.
           A senior counsel though he cannot draw up pleadings of
           the party, can nevertheless be engaged “to settle” i.e. to
           put the pleadings into “proper and satisfactory form” and
           hence a senior counsel settling pleadings has a more
           onerous responsibility as otherwise the blame for improper
           pleadings will be laid at his doors.
           11. Lord Reid in Rondel v. Worsley [(1967) 3 All ER 993,
           998] has succinctly set out the conflicting nature of the
           duties a counsel has to perform in his own inimitable
           manner as follows:
                “Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly
                to raise every issue, advance every argument,
                and ask every question, however distasteful,
                which he thinks will help his client’s case.
                As an officer of the court concerned in the
                administration of justice, he has an overriding
                duty to the court, to the standards of his
                profession, and to the public, which may and
                often does lead to a conflict with his client’s
                wishes or with what the client thinks are his
                personal interests. Counsel must not mislead
                the court, he must not lend himself to casting
                aspersions on the other party or witnesses
                for which there is no sufficient basis in the
                information in his possession, he must not
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              withhold authorities or documents which may
              tell against his clients but which the law or
              the standards of his profession require him to
              produce. By so acting he may well incur the
              displeasure or worse of his client so that if the
              case is lost, his client would or might seek legal
              redress if that were open to him.”
         12. Again as Lord Denning, M.R. in Rondel v. W [(1966)
         3 All ER 657, 665] would say:
              “He (the counsel) has time and again to choose
              between his duty to his client and his duty to the
              court. This is a conflict often difficult to resolve;
              and he should not be under pressure to decide
              it wrongly.... [W]hen a barrister (or an advocate)
              puts his first duty to the court, he has nothing
              to fear. (words in brackets added).”
         In the words of Lord Denning:
              “It is a mistake to suppose that he is the
              mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: . .
              He must disregard the most specific instructions
              of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the
              court. The code which requires a barrister to
              do all this is not a code of law. It is a code of
              honour. If he breaks it, he is offending against
              the rules of the profession and is subject to its
              discipline....”
         13. We are constrained to give expression to our views with
         a feeling of remorse to remind the counsel of that sense
         of detachment and non-identification they are expected
         to maintain with the causes espoused by them and not
         with a view to belittle the profession or cast aspersions
         on counsel.”
10. It can thus be clearly seen that this Court, in unequivocal terms,
    has held that when a lawyer is faced with a conflict between his
    duty towards the Court and duty towards the client, he has to give
    preference to duty to the Court rather than duty to the client.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                        191

                     In Re: N. Peddi Raju and Others


11. We have noticed that nowadays it has become a trend amongst
    lawyers to criticize the Judges of the High Court or the Trial Court for
    no reason. It has also become a recurring trend that whenever the
    matter involves a political figure in a particular State, to allege that
    in that State a litigant may not get justice and therefore, transfer of
    the proceedings from that State to any other State is sought. Such
    practices cannot be countenanced.
12. We are constrained to observe that within the constitutional edifice,
    the Judges of the High Court are in no way inferior to the Judges
    of the Supreme Court. Though, as an appellate Court to the High
    Court, this Court can affirm, reverse, modify or set aside the judgment
    of the High Court, it has no administrative control, either over the
    administration of the High Court or the Judges of the High Court.
    The Judges of the High Court are also Constitutional functionaries,
    and they enjoy the same immunity as is enjoyed by a Judge of the
    Supreme Court. In our view, when scandalous allegations are made
    against the Judges of the High Court, it becomes the duty of this
    Court to protect the Judges of the High Court.
13. As already discussed hereinabove, the Judges of the High Court
    are appointed under the Constitution of India and upon assuming
    the office, they take an oath to act without any fear or favour,
    affection or ill-will and to uphold the Constitution and the laws.
    To imply that because a political figure is involved in a case, and
    therefore, a holder of such a high constitutional office would not
    act independently, in our view, scandalizes the very institution of
    administration of justice.
14. We find that merely on the basis that a petition involves a political
    figure in a State cannot constitute a ground to transfer the proceedings
    from the High Court of that State to the High Court of another State.
15. A perusal of the affidavit of apology would reveal that the apology is
    tendered only to this Court. In our view, the scandalous allegations
    are made against the learned Judge of the High Court. Therefore,
    it would have been more appropriate for the alleged contemnors to
    tender an apology to the learned Judge of the High Court.
16. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel/counsel appearing for the
    alleged contemnors seek liberty from this Court to approach the
    High Cout to tender their unconditional apology.
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17. We, therefore, permit the alleged contemnors to tender unconditional
    apology before the learned Judge of the High Court.
18. Since the Criminal Petition No. 4162 of 2020 has already been
    disposed of, we direct the Registrar General of the High Court to
    reopen the matter. However, we clarify that the matter will be reopened
    only for the limited purpose of tendering an unconditional apology
    by the alleged contemnors before the learned Judge of the High
    Court, who had passed the final order in the said criminal petition.
19. The same shall be done within a period of one week from today. On
    reopening of the said proceedings, the respondents shall tender their
    unconditional apology before the learned Judge of the High Court,
    within a period of one week of reopening of the matter. The learned
    Judge would decide the question of acceptance of the apology
    within a period of one week thereafter. We will consider the issue
    with regard to acceptance of apology tendered to this Court by the
    alleged contemnors, after the matter is disposed of by the learned
    Single Judge of the High Court.
20. We hasten to add that the Courts gain no pleasure in penalizing or
    sentencing the lawyers for acting in a manner which would amount to
    Contempt of this Court. Recently, in the case of N. Eswaranathan v.
    State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police8, a
    three Judge Bench of this Court, to which two of us (The Chief
    Justice of India and Mr. Justice K.V. Chandran) were a party, decided
    a reference with regard to the difference of opinion between two
    learned Judges of this Court over the issue of the sentence imposed
    on two lawyers of this Court. This Court observed that the majesty
    of law lies in not punishing someone, but in forgiving someone who
    acknowledges their mistake. We had, therefore, agreed with the
    view taken by the learned Judge, who had accepted the apology
    tendered by the lawyers.
21. When we decide the matter on the next date, we would be guided
    by the aforesaid observations made by this Court.
22. Needless to state that the parties will be at liberty to file an affidavit
    of apology through email or any other permissible mode before the


8   2025 INSC 509
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                        In Re: N. Peddi Raju and Others


     High Court. If necessary, the learned Single Judge may consider
     permitting the parties to appear through video conference.
23. List after four weeks.

     Result of the case: Matter to be listed after four weeks.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey