IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAMversus-

                        IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM                                   A

                          DECEMBER 15, 2000

                  [K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

                                                                               B
         Contempt of Courts Act, 197 I/Penal Code, 1860/Rules to Regulate
Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court of India, 1975-Section 2
 (c)/Sections 52, 406, 420, 468 and 47 I Rule JO-Telegram sent by the
contemnor to the CJ/ calling upon him to step down from his office for having
falsified his age-In case of non-compliance, threatened to file criminal C
complaint and a writ of Quo Warranto-Three days thereafter, a criminal
complaint under Section 406, 420, 468 and 471 !PC filed against the CJ/
before Magistrate-Copy of telegram appended to the said complaint- -
Contempt of court (criminal) notices issued by Supreme Court to the
contemnor on its own motion--Solicitor General ofIndia appointed as Amicus D
to assist the Court-In reply, contemnor objected to the said notice on the
ground that sending of telegraphic message did not amount to publication
 and consequently no contempt constituted-Held, Criminal contempt of court
jurisdiction is not to protect an individual Judge but to protect the
administration ofjustice from being maligned-Scandalising or tendency of
scandalising the authority of any Court etc. constitutes criminal contempt- E
 This scandalising can be either by publication of such a matter or by
committing of such an act-Even if an act does not amount to publication
still it can fall under the category of commission-The contents of the telegram
certainly scandalised and lowered the authority of the courts as a whole and
particularly that of the Supreme Court of India.
                                                                               F
      A telegraphic message constitutes publication--The telegraph office is
manned by its staff-The destination office of the message is also manned by
staff-At all such levels the message is open to be read by those engaged in
the transmission process-Appending of a copy of the telegram with the
criminal complaint also amounts to publication.
                                                                               G
      Expression good faith connotes doing of an act with due care and
attention-Due care denotes degree of reasonableness in the care sought to
be exercised-The question of age of CJ/ when he was a Judge of High Court
had already been raked up by the contemnor himself in 199/.-·The said
question had already been resolved by the President of India-Thus. the H
                                    677
    678                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A telegram and the criminal contempt lacked bonafide.

         Power of the Court to appoint an Amicus for its assistance is plenary
    and beyond the objection by others-Rules Regulating Proceedings for
    Contempt of the Supreme Court nowheref txes a stage for such appointments-
    These can be made at any point of time.
B
           The Contemnor herein sent a telegraphic communication to Chief
    Justice oflndia, on 03-11-2000, calling upon him to step down from the office
    of Chief Justice of India forthwith, failing which he intimated that he would
    file a criminal complaint against him for offences under Sections 420, 406,
C   468 and 471 IPC for falsification of his age and writ of Quo Warranto and
    for a direction to deposit a sum of Rs. 3 crores for usurping the office of
    Chief Justice of India even after attaining the age of superannuation. Three
    days thereafter, the Contemnor filed a criminal complaint before the Chief
    Metropolitan Magistrate, M11dras in which he arraigned the CJI as an 11ccused
    in the case. He produced a copy of the above telegram as one of the documents
D   appended with the complaint. In the complaint he recited the allegations as
    mentioned in the telegram and charges under Sections 420, 406, 468 and
    471 IPC praying for issuance of notice to the CJI. On the said telegram a
    notice was issued to the Contemnor on 07-11-2000 on being prima facie
    satisfied that contents of the said telegram amounted to gross contempt of
E   Court. By the said order, the Solicitor General of India was also directed to
    assist the Court in these proceedings.

            In his reply to the notice issued, the Contemnor 11dmitted to sending
    the said telegram and filing the criminal complaint. He tried to justify his
    actions on the pretext of doing what he believed to be right and fair within the
F   bounds of his knowledge of law and language. In the reply he also mentioned
    that he had filed a writ petition earlier in this regard which was dismissed.
    The contemnor objected to the maintainability of the contempt proceedings
    on the ground of these not being initiated by a report of the witness to the
    contempt, which would be the basis for charging of the contemnor. The
G   appointment of Solicitor General of India as Amicus to assist the court at the
    initial stage was also objected by the Contemnor on the ground that the rules
    governing contempt proceedings permit appointment of Solicitor General only
    on the court framing charge and intending to proceed with the case. On merits,
    the Contemnor contended that the telegraphic communication sent by him to
    the CJI in no way amounted to publication as a result of which no contempt
H   action would lie against him and even if it amounted to publication, in no way
                           IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM                              679
it tends to undermine the administration of justice. The Contemnor also              A
submitted that he bonajide believed the year of birth of the CJI to be 1934
and therefore, he was 11ctuated by good faith in resorting to the acts done by
him.

      Holding the Contemnor guilty of criminal contempt of court, the Court
                                                                                     B
      HELD : 1. According to Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 criminal contempt is vivisected into two categories. One is publication
of any matter which scandalises or tends to scandalise the authority of any
court. Second is the doing of any act whatsoever which scandalise or tends to
scandalise the authority of any court. If an act is not a criminal contempt          C
merely because there was no publication such act would automatically fall
within the purview of the other category because the latter consists of "the
doing of any other act whatsoever". The latter category is thus a residuary
c11tesory so wide enough from which no act of criminal contempt Clln possibly
escap:. The common denominator for both is that it scandalises or tends to
scandalise any court. (685-H; 686-A, BJ                                              D
      Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. State of V.P., (1953) SCR 1169; Delhi
Judicial Services Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat,
(1991( 4 SCC 406; Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'b/e the Chief Justice of India,
(1996) 5 SCC 216 and In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey, (1996( 6 SCC 510, relied
en.                                                                                  E
      Halsbury's laws of England, Para 28 Vol. 9, referred to.

      2. The tc!:gmphic communiClltion sent by the Contemnor contnies four
bidding§. The first is a command hurled at the CJI to step down forthwith
from the cocistitutional office. The second is the threat 11dministered to him       F
that if the command is not obeyed forthwith, the CJI would be described as
offender having committed offences of cheating and falsification of records
and criminal breach of trust. The third is another intimidatory epithet that
he would file writ petition for a direction that CJI should pay a sum of Rs. 3
crores. Fourth is an imputation that the CJI is usurper of the office. Any one       G
of these postulates would certainly scandalise and at any rate would tend to
sc1111dlllise 1md lower the authority of the courts as a whole, and particularly
the Supreme Court of India. Chief Justice of India by virtue of his
constitutional ranking is the head of the llldian judiciary. When threats of
the above nature have been hurled at him they would unmistakably teed to
undermi:ne the position, mnjesty 1md dignity of the courts and the Iaw. (689-8, CJ   H
    680                    SUPREME COURT RFPURTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          3. A telegraphic message can be transmitted only after the sender gives
    the contents of the message to the telegraph office which would invariably be
    manned by staff of that office. The message after transmission reaches the
    destination office which also is manned by members of staff. From there only
    the message would be despatched to the sendee. At all those levels the message
B   is open to be read by at least those who are engaged in the process of
    transmission. It must be remembered that a telegraphic message is not like
    a letter handwritten by the sender and enveloped in a sealed cover to be opened
    only by the sendee for reading. That apart, it cannot be successfully contended
    by the Contemnor that there was no publication of the telegraphic
    communication despatched by him to the Chief Justice of India because when
C   he filed the criminal complaint in the court in implementation of the
    telegraphic threat hurled to the CJI, he appended a copy of the telegram
    therewith, Thus, he made it public at his own volition. [689-E, F; 690-81

          4.1. The expression "good faith" in criminal jurisprudence has a definite
    connotation. Its import is totally different from saying that the person
D   concerned has honestly believed the truth of what is said. The definition of
    "good faith" in Section 52 IPC starts in the negative tone excluding all except
    what is allowed to be in its amplitude. Insistence sought to be achieved through
    the commencing words of the definition "nothing is said to be done or believed
    in good faith" is that the solitary item included within the purview of the
E   expression "good faith" is what is done with "due care and attention". Due
    care denotes the degree of reasonableness in the care sought to be exercised.
    So before a person proposes to make an imputation on another the author
    must first make an inquiry into the factum of the imputation which he proposes
    to make. It is not enough that he does just a make-believe show for an inquiry.
    The enquiry expected of him is of such a depth as a reasonable and prudent
F   man would make with the genuine intention in knowing the real truth of the
    imputation which is up in his sleeves. If he does not do so he cannot claim
    that what he did was bona.fide. (690-0, E, F, H; 691-Al

          Harbhajan Singh v. State ofPunjab & Anr. AIR(I996) SC 97, referred to.

G         4.2. A contemnor, if he is to establish "good faith" has to say that he
    conducted a reasonable and proper enquiry before making an imputation that
    the CJI has usurped in his office as his year of birth was definitely 1934, and
    that was the reason which actuated the contemnor to venture for launching
    the acts which he perpet-rated. [691-El

H         5. 1. Once the question of age was determined by the President of India
                            IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM                               681
in exercise of his constitutional authority, in whom alone is the power reposed        A
to determine the question of the age of a Judge of the High Court, it was not
open to the contemnor to raise this question over again and again. When the
contemnor once again raised the question in the year 1991, the Government
of India issued a press communication which, after referring to the earlier
proceedings adopted by the Pre -;<tent of India, has stated thus : "This pleas         B
was again rejected on the grom J that there was no basis for reopening the
matter. The decision of the President is final under Article 217 of the
Constitution." 1692-FI

       5.2. There is absolutely no doubt that when the President of India resolved
the question of age of the CJI in 1991 when he was Judge of a High Court,              C
that too pursuant to the contemnor himself raking up the question then, he
should have, as a dutiful citizen of India, realized that the said decision attained
finality. Such decision was based on very weighty and formidable materials
available to the President of India then. Thus the telegrahic communication
and the criminal complaint launched by him smacks of utter lack of bonafides.
                                                                         1693-C, Df    D
      6. When the court appoints an Amicus it is for the court to get assistance
in the proceedings. Power of the court in making such appointment is plenary
and cannot be objected to by others. Also nowhere in the Rules to Regulate
Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, a particular stage
has been fixed for the court to make such appointment. The power of the court          E
to make such appointment is thus unrestricted and it can be ordered at any
stage. [684-H; 685-Bf

      7. The contempt of court jurisdiction is not to protect an individual
Judge; it is to protect the administration of justice from being maligned.             F
Hence, when the expectation of the contemnor that the Chief Justice of India
would have personally filed a petition against him did not fructify, he cannot
question the maintainability of the action which was initiated suo motu by the
court. (684-Ef

     ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Suo Motu Contempt Petition (CRL) No.                      G
5 of2000.

        Suo Motu Contempt Petition under section 420, 406, 4 7 I Indian Penal
Code.

        S. Kuruppan and Ashok Kumar Singh for the Contemnor.                           H
    682                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General to assist the Court.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:

          THOMAS, J. "The contempt of court jurisdiction is not exercised to
    protect the dignity of an individual judge, but to protect the administration
B   of justice from being maligned." While dealing with this contempt proceedings
    we remind ourselves of the said observation made by a Constitution Bench
    of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & anr.,
    [1998] 4 sec 409.

C         One S.K. Sundaram, Advocate (hereinafter referred to as the contemnor)
    sent a telegraphic communication to Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, the Hon'ble
    Chief Justice of India on 3.11.2000. As the present proceedings are founded
    on the wordings of that communication we feel it necessary to extract the
    material portion thereof. It reads thus:

D           "I call upon Shriman Dr. A.S. Anand Hon'ble Chief Justice of India
            to step down from the Constitutional office of Chief Justice of India
            forthwith, failing which I will be constrained to move the criminal
            court for offences under Sections 420, 406, 4 71 Indian Penal Code for
            falsification of your age, without prejudice to the right to file a writ
            of quo-warranto against you and for a direction to deposit a sum of
E           Rs. 3 crores for usurping to the office of Chief Justice of India even
            after attaining the age of superannuation."

          Within three days of despatch of the said telegram the contemnor filed
    a criminal complaint before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras {Chennai)
    in which he arraigned the Chief Justice of India as an accused in the case.
F   He produced a copy of the above quoted telegram as one of the documents
    appended with the complaint. He averred in the complaint, inter a/ia, thus:

           "The accused (CJ!) after attaining superannuation usurped the offi:c:
           of Chief Justice of India, travelled to foreign countries, taken part in
           many conferences, seminars inside and outside India making
G          appointments to the apex court, the High Courts and other local
           bodies and caused loss to the Exchequer to the tune of not less than
           three crores of rupees, apart from drawing salary and enjoying other
           perquisites and the same is estimated at not less than Rs. 1.50 crores
           which the accused is bound to indemnify to the Govemm·ent of India;
H          and the complainant reserves the right to take proceedings for recovery
                   IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM [THOMAS, J.]                        683
        of the same. The complainant states that in order to squat without any A
        legal right or justification, but solely on the basis of giving a deliberate
        false age, the accused is occupying the highly respected office of
        Chief Justice of India. The complainant charges the accused for
        offences under Sections 420, 406, 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal
        Code and prays that this Hon 'ble Court may be pleased to issue
        notice against the accused and he be dealt with according to law and B
        thus render justice."

      On a note put up by the Registrar-General of the Supreme Court regarding
the said telegraphic communication the matter was taken up on the judicial
side and we passed an order on 7.11.2000 that prima facie we are satisfied          C
that the contents of the said telegram sent by S.K. Sundaram, Advocate,
amount to gross contempt of court. Hence we issued notice to Mr. S.K.
Sundaram, Advocate. In the same proceedings we directed the Registry to
inform Mr. Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General of India to assist the Court in
these proceedings.
                                                                                    D
       The contemnor filed a written reply to the notice issued to him. Therein
he said, inter-alia, that he had sent a telegram and it was followed up with
the criminal complaint filed before the Magistrate concerned. The contemnor
endeavoured to justify his actions by saying that he had done what he
believed to be right and fair within the bounds of his knowledge of law and
language. In the succeeding paragraph the contemnor tried to defend his             E
actions stating that he had earlier filed a writ petition on behalf of his client
relating to the question of age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and that writ petition
was dismissed. We reproduce here what the contemnor has stated on that
aspect in his reply:

        "The contemnor submits that even as on date, the age factor of the          F
       Chief Justice stands shrouded by mystery. The confusion stands
       further confounded due to the documents supplied to the Press. The
       contemnor on dismissal of the writ appeal filed on behalf of his client,
       came to the conclusion that it was an uphill task and the question in
       hand was only a controversy. But on seeing the Publication in the            G
       Hindu on 3.11.2000 the annexure found in the book "Big Ego Small
       Men" he was subjected to the rudest shock of his life and became
       agitated. It led to the strong belief that Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice
       Anand is holding the post for the past one year even after reaching
       the age of superannuation and was on the verge of continuing for a
       further spell. He felt the whole world was reeling under his feet. The       H
    684                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A           contemnor also virtually had a heart attack. Immediately prompted by
            the desire for bringing th is constitutional crisis to an end he had
            rushed and sent the telegram. The contemnor was of the opinion that
            this was a matter, which cannot brook even a moment's delay. As he
            did not find any reaction to the telegram, actuated by his limited
            knowledge, attempted to seek redress through the criminal court by
B           filing a private complaint before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
            Court at Chennai."

           The contemnor raised two preliminary objections. First was that the
    contemp~ proceedings were initiated under Section 2(b )of the Contempt of
C   Courts Act 1971 (for short "the Act") and that refers only to civil contempt
    and hence the present proceedings must fail. However, when it was pointed
    out to the learned counsel to the contemnor that Section 2(b) was got typed
    in the notice due to a typographical error and that it was corrected subsequently
    as Section 2(c) of the Act, learned counsel did not pursue that objection.

D            The second objection was that "hitherto all suo motu contempts were
     initiated by a report of the witness to the contempt, which would be the basis
    on which the contemnor would be charged." In other words, he expected
     Hon 'ble Chief Justice of India to initiate the contempt proceedings against
    him. As mentioned by us at the very outset, the contempt of court jurisdiction
     is not to protect an individual judge, it is to protect the administration of
E   justice from being maligned. Hence, when his expectation that the Chief
    Justice of India himself would have personally filed a petition against the
    contemn or did not fructify, he cannot question the maintainability of the
    action which was initiated suo motu by the court.

F         The third objection relates to the appointment of Shri Harish N. Salve,
    learned Solicitor General for India, as Amicus, to assist the court. The said
    objection was elaborated by the contemnor by stating that the rules governing
    contempt proceeding envisage the appointment of Solicitor General only on
    the court framing the charge and when the court intends to proceed with the
    case. He felt that the appointment of the Solicitor General to assist the court,
G   made in these proceedings, amounted to putting the cart before the horse.

          There is neither any substance in nor any purpose for raising such an
    objection. It appears to us to be a frivolous objection. When the court
    appoints an advocate as Amicus it is for the court to get assistance in the
    proceedings. Power of the court in making such appointment is plenary and
H   cannot be objected to by others.
                    IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM (THOMAS, J.]                         685
       That apart, the said objection was raised without reference to the            A
relevant rules. The Supreme Court formulated rules in exercise of the powers
under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 145 of the
Constitution of India. It is called "Supreme Court of India Rules to Regulate
Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975". Rule 10 says: "The
court may direct the Attorney General or Solicitor General to appear and assist      B
the Court." Nowhere in the Rules a particular stage has been fixed for the
Court to make such appointment. The power of the Court to make such
appointment is thus unrestricted and it can be ordered at any stage. We
therefore repel the said objection.

      On the merits, Shri Karruppan, learned counsel for the contemnor raised        C
mainly three lines of arguments. First is that the action initiated against the
contemnor is on the telegraphic communication sent by him to the CJ! and
it would not amount to publication and hence no contempt action could be
taken on that premise. Second is that the contemnor bona fide believed that
the year of birth of Dr. Justice Anand was 1934 and hence he was actuated
by good faith in resorting to the acts done by him. Third is that sending of         D
the telegram, even if it amounts to publication, would not tend to undermine
the administration of justice and hence the proceedings are liable to be
dropped.

      Dealing with the first contention we may look at the definition of             E
"criminal contempt" in the Act. Section 2{c) contains the definition of"criminal
contempt" which reads thus:

            "Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words,
        spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
        otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever            F
        which-

       (i)    scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower
              the authority of, any court; or
       (ii)   prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course   G
              of any judicial proceedings; or
        (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
              obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner".

      Criminal contempt is thus vivisected into two categories. One is
publication of any matter which scandalises or tends to scandalise the authority     H
    686                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of any court etc. etc. Second is the doing of any act whatsoever which
    scandalises or tends to scandalise the authority of any court etc. etc. If an
    act is not a criminal contempt merely because there was no publication such
    act would automatically fall within the purview of the other category because
    the latter consists of "the doing of any other act whatsoever". The latter
    category is thus a residuary category so wide enough from which no act of
B   criminal contempt can possibly escape. The common denominator for both is
    that it scandalises or tends to scandalise etc. etc. of any court.

           One of the earliest occasions when this Court had to deal with criminal
    contempt of court was when a Constitution Bench of this Court (Patanjali
C   Sastri, CJ, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, Ghulam Hasan, and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.)
    decided the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma & ors. v. State of U.P., [1953)
    SCR 1169. Their Lordships referred to certain decisions of English courts
     including some observations of the Privy Council and pointed out that there
    are primarily two considerations in such matters. In the first place, the reflection
    on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his
D   judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise
    of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in
    respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. In the second place, when
    attacks or comments are made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character
    and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between
E   what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of court.

           The position is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so
    far as the judge is concerned and it would .be open to him to proceed against
    the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. The Constitution Bench laid
    down the ratio thus:
F
            "If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated
            to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of
             law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is
            a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done
            to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an
G           apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability
            or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants
            from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of
            justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the
            judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established
H           that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an
                   IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM [THOMAS, J.]                          687

        actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of           A
        such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any
        way, to interfere with the proper administration of law."

      In Halsbury's Laws of England, the learned author cited various decisions
of courts in England, of which one at paragraph 28 in Volume 9 is worth
extracting:                                                                           B
        "It is also a contempt to write threatening or abusive letters to a judge
        in relation to the exercise of his judicial functions."

      In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State
of Gujarat and Ors., [ 199 I] 4 SCC 406 a three Judge Bench of this Court             C
obsen'ed thus:

        "The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any
        act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration
        of justice or which would lower the authority of court. The public
        have a vital sta.'te ineffective and orderly administration of justice. The   D
        Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the
        due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power
        to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of the
        Court against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right
        of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted,         E
        prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."

       In Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the ChiefJustice ofIndia, [1996] 5 SCC
2 I 6 a contemnor filed a writ petition against the then Chief Justice of India
and sought a declaration that the then Chief Justice of India was unfit to hold
that office and hence he should be stripped of his citizenship. He also sought        F
for a direction to register an FIR against the then Chief Justice of India under
different provisions of !PC and to prosecute him under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, and lastly he prayed for a direction that the Chief Justice of
India should pay a sum from his personal pocket to defray the expenses
incurred by the petitioner. Dealing with the said acts of that individual a three
Judge Bench of this Court, after holding him guilty of criminal contempt, has         G
observed thus:

        "Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean hostile criticism of
        judges as judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection
      . with the office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slander. Yet
        defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the             H
    688                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A           court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an
            inroad on the majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated
            to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to
            undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the
            majesty of justice."

B         Dealing with the imputation that the then Chief Justice of India
    deliberately and willfully failed to perform his duties the three Judge Bench
    further observed thus:

            "It tends to lower the dignity and authority of the Court and also
            sows seeds for persons with similar propensity to undermine the
c           authority of the Court or the judiciary as a whole; he crossed all
            boundaries of recklessness and indulged in wild accusations."

             In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey, [ 1996) 6 SCC 510 the contemnor Ajay
    Kumar Pandey issued a notice to two Judges of this Court on I 0.8.1996
D   containing a warning that unless those two judges tender unconditional
    apology to him and pay a sum of Rs. 2000 as compensation, besides a further
    handsome amount towards the mental agony inflicted on him, he would
    initiate criminal proceedings against the judges. He also filed criminal complaint
    on 23.9.1996 before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi
    against the two Judges alleging offences under Sections 167, 504 and 506 of
E   the Indian Penal Code.

         This Court after making a survey of a number of decisions including
    Dr. D.C. Saxena's case, made the following observations:

            "We may observe that any threat of filing a complaint against the
F           Judge in respect of the judicial proceedings conducted by him in his
            own court is a positive attempt to interfere with the due course of
            administration of justice. In order that the Judges may fearlessly and
            independently act in the discharge of their judicial functions, it is
            necessary that they should have full liberty to act within the sphere
G           of their activity."

           It is unnecessary now to multiply the citations of decisions which deal
    with such threats and criminal complaints made against the judges, as the
    legal parameters are well neigh laid down through the decisions already
    referred to by us. The acts, admittedly done by the contemn or and ~eflected
H   poignantly in the telegraphic communication must be viewed from the above
                     IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM [THOMAS. J.)                      689

legal perspective.                                                                  A
      The telegraphic communication sent by the contemnor contains four
biddings. The first is a command hurled at the CJ! to step down forthwith from
the constitutional office. The second is a threat administered to him that if
the command is not obeyed forthwith, the CJI would be described as an
offender having committed offences of cheating and falsification of records         B
and criminal breach of trust. The third is another intimidatory epithet that he
would file a writ petition for a direction that Chief Justice of India should pay
a sum of Rs. 3 crore. Fourth is an imputation that the CJI A.S. Anand is a
usurper in the office of Chief Justice of India. Any one of those postulates
would certainly scandalise and at any rate would tend to scandalise and lower       C
the authority of the courts as a whole, and particularly the Supreme Court of
India. Chief Justice of India by virtue of his constitutional ranking is the head
of the Indian judiciary. When threats of the above nature have been hurled
at him they would unmistakably tend to undermine the position, majesty and
dignity of the courts and the law.
                                                                                    D
       In this connection we also considered the contention of the learned
counsel for the contemnor that sending such a telegram would not amount
to publication. On the legal premise the contention is unacceptable. A
telegraphic message can be transmitted only after the sender gives the contents
of the message to the telegraph office which would invariably be manned by
the staff of that office. The message after transmission reaches the destination    E
office which also is manned by the members of the staff. From there only the
message would be despatched to the sendee. At all those levels the message
is open to be read by at least those who are engaged in the process of
transmission. It must be remembered that a telegraphic message is not like a
letter handwritten by the sender and enveloped in a sealed cover to be              F
opened only by the sendee for reading.

      In this connection a reference can be made to Gatley on "Libel and
Slander" under the Chapter "Publication" (Chap.6). The learned author has
stated the following:
                                                                                    G
       "222. How publication is effected. Publication is effected by any act
       on the part of the defendant which conveys the defamatory meaning
       of the matter to the person to whom it is communicated.

       223. If for example, a person reads a defamatory letter, knowing it is
       defamatory, to any person other than the person defamed, there is            H
    690                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A           publication of the libel. Again, if the writer of a defamatory letter
            hands the letter to his clerk to be copied or typewritten before it is
            sent to the person defamed, and the clerk does copy or typewriter the
            letter, there is publication of the libel to the clerk."

          That apart, it is not now open to the contemnor to contend that there
B   was no publication of the telegraphic communication despatched by him to
    the Chief Justice of India because when he filed the criminal complaint in the
    court in implementation of the telegraphic threat hurled to the CJI, he appended
    a copy of the telegram therewith. Thus, he made it public at his own volition.

          Now, we will consider the alternative contention of the learned counsel
C for the contemnor that it was an act done in good faith as he believed
    honestly that the year of birth of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand was 1934.

          The expression "good faith" in criminal jurisprudence has a definite
    connotation. Its import is totally different from saying that the person
    concerned has honestly believed the truth of what is said. Good faith is
D   defined in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code thus:

            "Nothing is said to be done or believed in ·good faith' which is done
            or believed without due care and attention."

           See the language of the law in this regard. It starts in the negative tone
E   excluding all except what is allowed to be within its amplitude. Insistence
    sought to be achieved through the commencing words of the definition
    "nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith" is that the solitary item
    included within the purview of the expression "good faith" is what is done
    with "due care and attention". Due care denotes the degree of reasonableness
    in the care sought to be exercised. In Black's Law Dictionary, "reasonable
F   care" is explained as "such a degree of care, precaution, or diligence as may
    fairly and properly be expected or required, having regard to the nature of the
    action, or of the subject matter and the circumstances surrounding the
    transaction. It is such care as an ordinary prudent person would exercise
    under the conditions existing at the time he is called upon to act."
G
          So before a person proposes to make an imputation on another the
    author must first make an enquiry into the factum of the imputation which he
    proposes to make. It is not enough that he does just a make-believe show
    for an enquiry. The enquiry expected of him is of such a depth as a reasonable
    and prudent man would make with the genuine intention in knowing the real
H   truth of the imputation which is up in his sleeves. If he does not do so he
                   IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM [THOMAS, J.)                          691

cannot claim that what he did was bona fide i.e. done in good faith.                  A
      Dealing with the expression "good faith" in relation to the exceptions
enumerated under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code (relating to the
offence of defamation) this Court in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab and
anr. AIR ( 1966) SC 97 has stated thus:
                                                                                      B
        "The element of honesty which is introduced by the definition
        prescribed by the General Clauses Act is not introduced by the
        definition of the Penal Code; and we are governed by the definition
        prescribed by S.52 of that Code. So, in considering the question as
        to whether the appellant acted in good faith in publishing his impugned
        statement, we have to enquire whether he acted with due care and              C
        attention. There is no doubt that the mere plea that the accused
        believed that what he stated was true by itself, -will not sustain his
        case of good faith under the Ninth Exception. Simple belief or actual
        belief by itself is not enough. The appellant must show that the belief
        in his impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a             D
        blind simple belief. That is where the element of due care and attention
        plays an important role. If it appears that before making the statement
        the accused did not show due care and attention, that would defeat
        his plea of good faith."

      Thus, a contemnor, if he is to establish "good faith" has to say that he        E
conducted a reasonable and proper enquiry before making an imputation that
Dr. Justice A.S. Anand has usurped in the office of CJ! as his year of birth
was definitely 1934 and that was the reason which actuated him to venture
for launching the acts which he perpetrated.

       In the above context we may point out that the contemnor himself filed         F
a writ petition in l 99I, on behalf of his client, (one Smt. Kasturi Radhakrishnan)
.when Dr. Justice A.S. Anand was the Chief Justice of the High Court of
Madras. The contemnor in that writ petition arrayed the President of India as
respondent No. I, the then Chief Justice of India as respondent No. 2 and Dr.
Justice A.S. Anand as respondent No. 3 and prayed for a writ of mandamus              G
directing the President of India to decide the question of age of Dr. Justice
A.S. Anand in conformity with Article 217(3) of the Constitution of India.
Though the said writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge and the
Letters Patent Appeal filed by the contemnor against dismissal of the writ
petition was also dismissed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court
on 1.8.1991 the President of India in consultation with the then Chief Justice        H
    692                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   oflndia decided the question relating to his age as early as 16.5.1991 holding
    that the date of birth of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand was 1.11.1936. The documents
    which the President of India then considered for that purpose were (1) The
    certificate of matriculate examination dated 1.9.1951 issued by the University
    of J & K in respect of Adarsh Sein Anand (the present CJI) which showed
    explicitly that his date of birth was 1.11.1936. (2) The passport issued to
B   Adarsh Sein Anand (the present CJI) on 3.8.1960, also explicitly showed that
    his date of birth was 1.11.1936. (3) The report prepared by the then CJI in
    respect of the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, who was then a Judge of the
    High Court.

c whichThe  President's Secretariat issued an order way back on 16.5.1991,
        can be extracted below:

            "The petition from Shri S.K. Sundaram, Advocate, Madras, to the
            President on behalf of his client Shrimati Kasturi Radhakrishnan,
            Chairperson, Madras Citizens Progressive Council, Madras and the
D           records have been perused and the matter considered by the President,
            in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The President has
            come to the conclusion that the petitions of Shri S.K. Sundaram,
            Advocate, Madras, in respect of the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand of
            the Madras High Court, be rejected and that no inquiry as stipulated
            under Arti~le 217(3) of the Constitution need be undertaken."
E
          Once the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand was so determined by the
    President of India in exercise of his constitutional authority, in whom alone
    is the power reposed to determine the question of the age of a judge of the
    High Court, it was not open to this contemnor to raise this question over
F   again and again. When this contemnor once again raised the question of the
    age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, in the year 1999, the Government of India
    issued a press communication which, after referring to the earlier proceedings
    adopted by the President of India, has stated thus: "This plea was again
    rejected on the ground that there was no basis for reopening the matter. The
    decision of the President is final under Article 217 of the Constitution."
G
          When the contemnor filed a criminal complaint before the Chief
    Metropolitan Magistrate against the present CJI he adverted to the following
    as the basis for his case:

           "The complainant states that in the Hindu dated 3.11.2000 at page 13
H          a photostat copy of the age particulars of the accused printed which
                  IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM [THOMAS, J.)                         693

       categorically states that the accused had given his date of birth as         A
       1934. But the fact remains that the accused had not chosen to give
       any original date of birth from the School Certificate: Municipality or
       from the College authorities. The date of birth published in the Hindu
       dated 3 .11.2000 clearly reveals that the accused had already attained
       the age of superannuation but still he is holding the high constitutional    B
       office of the Chief Justice of India in charge of Administration of
       nearly 21 State High Courts."

       What was contained in the "Hindu" dated 3.11.2000 was a statement
issued by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, former Union Minister for Law, in answer to
a statement issued by Mr. K. Parasaran, former Attorney General for India, in       C
the Hindu published on 25.10.2000. We have absolutely no doubt that when
the President of India resolved the question of age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand
in 1991 when he was the Judge of the High Court, that too pursuant to the
contemnor himself raking up the question then, he should have, as a dutiful
citizen of India, realised that the said decision attained finality so far as the
question of the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand is concerned. Such decision           D
was based on very weighty and formidable materials available to the President
of India then. Thus the telegraphic communication and the criminal complaint
launched by him smacks of utter lack of bona jides.

      Well, if he is determined to feign that he would not look at any one of
those materials as well as the final decision rendered by the President of India    E
regarding the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, and then decided to persistently
jump into the foray with the tirade, putting himself into the outfit and chasuble
of his professional insignia, it is only reminiscent of the Spanish hero Don
Quixote of La Mancha. On the part of this Court we may observe that if the
contemnor had stopped with his telegram we would have persuaded ourselves
to ignore it as a case of ranting gibberish. But when he followed it up with        F
lodging of a criminal complaint before a criminal court in which CJ! was
arrayed as an accused having committed offences of cheating, criminal breach
of trust and falsification of records, we realised that he seriously meant to
malign and undermine the dignity and authority of this Court.
                                                                                    G
       It may be relevant to point out that the note of the Registrar, on the
basis of which Suo Motu Contempt w:is initiated against the contemnor
specifically referred to and reproduced the Presidential Order dated 16.5.1991
issued under Article 217(3) of the Constitution. The defiant and malajide
attitude of the Contemnor is apparent from the fact that despite knowing
about the actual date of birth of the Chief Justice of India and the Presidential   H
    694                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Order dated 16.5.1991 which was read over by the Solicitor General in the
    open Court on 21st November, 2000 in presence of the contemnor, he chose
    to adhere to his false claim alleging the age of the Chief Justice of India to
    be the year 1934.

          We have, therefore, not a speck of doubt in our mind that the impugned
B   action of the contemnor is a case of gross criminal contempt of court. It is
    a serious matter for this Court because vilification of the high personage of
    Chief Justice of India would undermine the majesty of the court and dignity
    of this institution. We, therefore, hold him guilty of criminal contempt and
    convict him thereunder. We sentence him to undergo imprisonment for six
C   months.

           But then, we consider another aspect. The contemnor said that he is a
    heart patient. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned Solicitor General pleaded with us
    that the said statement of the contemnor may be considered as a ground in
    deciding how to inflict the punishment. We therefore order that the sentence
D   of imprisonment for six months will stand suspended for a period of one
    month from today. If the contemnor would give an undertaking in this court,
    in the form of an affidavit, to the effect that he would not commit or even
    attempt to commit any act of criminal contempt, then the sentence now
    imposed by us would remain suspended for a further period of five years. But
    ifthe contemnor commits any act of criminal contempt during the said period
E   of five years, the suspension of the sentence will stand revoked and then he
    will have to undergo the sentence of imprisonment for six months. Otherwise
    the question of revival of the sentence would depend upon the order which
    this Court would pass on the expiry of five years. Ordered accordingly.

F         We place on record our gratitude to Shri Harish N. Salve, learned
    Solicitor General for India, for the assistance he rendered to us in these
    proceedings.

         A copy of this judgment will be forwarded to the Bar Council of Tamil
    Nadu and also to the Bar Council of India, for information.
G                                                           Petition disposed of.
    R.C.K.