Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's condonation of delay was justified because the dispute involves a claim against the State and merits must be adjudicated, but the State must bear costs and act promptly in future proceedings.

Summary

The appellant, Inder Singh, filed a suit seeking title and possession of a parcel of land, which the State later claimed as government land. After the trial court dismissed the suit, the first appellate court reversed that decision in favour of the appellant. The State filed a review petition, which was dismissed for delay, and subsequently filed a second appeal more than four years later; the High Court condoned the delay under Section 51 of the Limitation Act. The appellant challenged the condonation, arguing that the State had not shown sufficient cause and should not receive any special indulgence. The Supreme Court examined the principles of condonation, the need to consider merits in disputes involving the State, and the requirement of due diligence, ultimately upholding the High Court's order but imposing costs on the State. The appeal was dismissed, and the second appeal was allowed to proceed on its merits, subject to a cost payment by the State.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the 1537‑day delay in filing the Second Appeal under Section 51 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the State can be afforded a more liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" compared to ordinary litigants.
Whether the merits of a title dispute between a private party and the State warrant condonation of delay despite the lengthy lapse.
Whether the State must be cautioned to act with promptitude and may be penalised with costs for undue delay.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 12
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5, s. 51

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay in filing the Second Appeal. Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of delay – When justified – Dispute over title of a land between the appellant and the Respondent-State wherein land in its possession – Delay of 1537 days on part of the State in filing the Second Appeal was condoned by High Court – Challenge to: Held: Impugned order upheld – Though delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, however, if in a particular case, the merits have to

Subjects

Condonation of delaySecond AppealSufficient causePossession of landGovernment landSuit propertyUndue indulgenceDue diligencePromptitudeLimitationDelay of 1537 daysDispute over title of the landPrivate partiesLegal remediesLiberal approachSecond Appeal to be decided on meritsState under Article 12 of the Constitution of IndiaOrdinary litigantCosts

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 915 : 2025 INSC 382

Inder Singh
v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh
(Civil Appeal No. 4304 of 2025)
21 March 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay in
filing the Second Appeal.

Headnotes†
Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of delay – When justified –
Dispute over title of a land between the appellant and the
Respondent-State wherein the State claimed the land to be
government land in its possession – Delay of 1537 days on
part of the State in filing the Second Appeal was condoned
by High Court – Challenge to:
Held: Impugned order upheld – Though delay cannot be condoned
without sufficient cause, however, if in a particular case, the merits
have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis
of limitation – In the present case, the dispute over title of the
land is not between private parties, but rather between the private
party and the State – On facts, matter requires adjudication on its
own merits – Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, wherein the State claimed the land as government land in
its possession, impugned order not interfered with and the Second
Appeal is to be decided on merits – However, the delay is condoned
subject to costs of Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the respondent to
the appellant, failing which the Second Appeal to be treated as
dismissed. [Paras 14, 15, 18, 19]

Limitation Act, 1963 – Constitution of India – Article 12 – Matter
related to dispute over title of a land claimed by the State as
government land in its possession – Delay of 1537 days on
part of the State in filing the Second Appeal, condoned – State
cautioned:
Held: State to be cautious and exhibit promptitude in such matters,
failing which the Court may not be as liberal, costs imposed –
* Author
916 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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State cannot be given any undue indulgence as compared to an
ordinary litigant, especially in matters of limitation – All parties,
either State or not are required to act with due diligence and
promptitude. [Paras 13, 18]

Case Law Cited
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India [2023] 13 SCR 743 : (2023) 10
SCC 531; Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra
[1974] 2 SCR 216 : (1974) 1 SCC 317; A B Govardhan v. P
Ragothaman [2024] 8 SCR 1002 : (2024) 10 SCC 613 – relied on.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish Chand Shivhare And Brothers, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 2151; State of Manipur v. Kotin Lamkang [2019] 13
SCR 565 : (2019) 10 SCC 408; Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special
Deputy Collector [2024] 4 SCR 241 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513;
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [2000] 3 SCR 764 :
(2000) 9 SCC 94; State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah
Municipality [1972] 2 SCR 874 : (1972) 1 SCC 366 – referred to.

List of Acts
Limitation Act, 1963, Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Condonation of delay; Second Appeal; Sufficient cause; Possession
of land; Government land; Suit property; Undue indulgence; Due
diligence; Promptitude; Limitation; Delay of 1537 days; Dispute over
title of the land; Private parties; Legal remedies; Liberal approach;
Second Appeal to be decided on merits; State under Article 12 of
the Constitution of India; Ordinary litigant; Costs.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4304 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.01.2024 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in IA No. 2022 of 2020

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Appellant:
Arjun Garg.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Amit Sharma, A.A.G., Sarad Kumar Singhania, Kshitiz Singh.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 917

Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgement

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the Order dated 29.01.2024
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by a learned
Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) in I.A. No.2022/2020 in
Second Appeal No.1253 of 2020 filed by the respondent, whereby
the said I.A. under Section 51 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking
condonation of delay in filing the Second Appeal, has been allowed
with a direction for listing the Second Appeal to be heard on admission
as well as the accompanying stay application.
FACTS:
3. On 14.12.2012, the appellant filed Civil Suit No.17-A/2013 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘suit’) before the learned Second Additional District
Judge, Class-1, Ashoknagar, Madhya Pradesh(hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Trial Court’)for declaration of title, possession and permanent
injunction in respect of Land Survey No.8/1 having an area of 1.060
hectare (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit property’) situated in
Village Mohrirai, Tehsil and District Ashoknagar, contending that an
order dated 30.08.1977 was passed in his favour, wherein he was
allotted the suit property. Thereafter, by mistake, in place of the
appellant’s name i.e., Inder Singh, Ishwar Singh’s name was wrongly
recorded in the revenue records. Such mistake was rectified on an
application filed by the appellant before the Additional Collector,
Gwalior by order dated 24.08.1978. Pursuant thereto, the appellant
obtained a loan from a bank for digging a well in the suit property.
It is further averred in the suit that the respondent had declared the

1 ‘5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.—
The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High
Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of
this section.’
918 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

land in question to be ‘Government Land’, without any prior notice
to the appellant.
4. The respondent-State countered the pleadings of the appellant before
the Trial Court. The State contended that the entire area admeasuring
5.696 hectares of Land Survey No.1 was government land from the
very beginning and the aforesaid land has been recorded as graze
land, out of which, by order dated 14.09.2006 in Case No.15A6A/05-06
of the Tehsildar Ashoknagar, an area of 2.090 hectares land was
reserved for the Youth Welfare Department2 and the remaining area
of 3.606 hectares land for the Collectorate. It was denied that the
appellant was ever in possession of the land.
5. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 16.08.2013, following which
the appellant filed Civil Appeal No.32A of 2015 before the Second
Additional District Judge, Ashoknagar (hereinafter referred to as the
‘First Appellate Court’), which was allowed by order dated 01.10.2015,
overruling the Trial Court’s judgment dated 16.08.2013. The First
Appellate Court declared the appellant as the landlord of the suit
property.
6. The respondent filed a Review Petition viz. Case No.92 of 2018
before the First Appellate Court, which was dismissed on the ground
of delay on 30.09.2019, as the delay in filing the Review Petition
was not explained with any sufficient cause from the respondent’s
side. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent, in August, 2020,
filed the Second Appeal bearing No.1253 of 2020 along with I.A.
No.2022/2020, seeking condonation of delay in filing the Second
Appeal, in the High Court. The High Court by Impugned Order
condoned the delay and ordered for listing the Second Appeal for
hearing on admission as well as application for stay.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court had
failed to deal with how ‘sufficient cause’ had been shown by the
respondent for condoning the delay, moreso when the respondent’s
Review Petition before the First Appellate Court was also dismissed
on the ground of delay as they did not provide any justification for
filing the review after a delay of over two years. He contended that it

2 Now known as the Sports and Youth Welfare Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 919

Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

is settled law that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or failed to exercise due diligence.
Therefore, the appellant’s argument that the cause of delay was
due to COVID-19 cannot be accepted, as the respondent failed to
remain vigilant, since the cause of action arose much before the
pandemic hit.
8. With regard to the Impugned Order referring to the judgment in Sheo
Raj Singh v Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531,where it has been
observed that Courts must take a liberal approach regarding delays
in appeals filed by the State, the learned counsel for the appellant
drew the Court’s attention to Paragraphs no.17 and 22 of State of
Uttar Pradesh v Satish Chand Shivhare And Brothers, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 2151, wherein it was held:
‘17. The explanation as given in the affidavit in support
of the application for condonation of delay filed by the
Petitioners in the High Court does not make out sufficient
cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 337 days
in filing the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. The law of limitation binds everybody
including the Government. The usual explanation of red
tapism, pushing of files and the rigmarole of procedures
cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The Government
Departments are under an obligation to exercise due
diligence to ensure that their right to initiate legal
proceedings is not extinguished by operation of the law
of limitation. A different yardstick for condonation of delay
cannot be laid down because the government is involved.
xxx
22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted
against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical
ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards
consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach
towards ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay. The
Court considering an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits
of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners
failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal.
Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some
plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does
920 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the
cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not
waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning
inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent
manner of functioning.’
9. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the judgment in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 513, wherein Paragraph no.26(v) states: ‘Courts are
empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient
cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate
delay, negligence and want of due diligence.’ Hence, it was contended
that this Court should not waive limitation, for all practical purposes,
by condoning delay caused by the lackadaisical negligent manner
of functioning of the respondent. It was urged that the appeal ought
to be allowed and the Impugned Order be set aside.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
10. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that out of the delay
of 1537 days in filing the Second Appeal, around three years was
consumed in filing the Review Petition before the First Appellate Court
and after its eventual dismissal on 30.09.2019, by the time the filing
process could begin for the Second Appeal, the COVID-19 pandemic
arose and it could only get filed in August, 2020. Therefore, the delay
caused in filing the Second Appeal was unintentional, much less due
to any deliberate laches, and was well-explained by the State before
the High Court. It was contended that hence, rightly the delay caused
in filing of the Second Appeal was condoned. The respondent further
submitted that since the suit property was important and valuable
government land, this Court should sustain the Impugned Order
as it would entail substantial justice being done to both parties by
leading to the eventual disposal of the matter on merits. Reliance
was placed on the case of State of Bihar v Kameshwar Prasad
Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94.
11. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent
that the interpretation of the words ‘sufficient cause’ should be such
that it is construed liberally. By referring to the decision in State of
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 921

Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

West Bengal v Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1
SCC 366, the respondent contended that a liberal interpretation
should specially be taken in the present case as the State has
not been negligent in pursuing the remedies available to it under
law. Moreoever, the submission was that COVID-19 not being an
extraneous circumstance, the State should not be punished for the
delay in filing the Second Appeal.
12. With regard to the facts of the case, the respondent points out that the
Trial Court had initially dismissed the suit, inter alia, on the grounds
that he did not place any documentary evidence reflecting his title
and there were also instances of fraud played by the appellant as
he had exchanged certain vital documents. It was urged that this
was the reason why it was all the more important for the underlying
matter to be heard on merits by the High Court. It was canvassed that
the appeal should be dismissed and the Impugned Order be upheld.

ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
13. In the present case, the contentions of the appellant, on first blush
appears to be attractive, inasmuch as the State cannot be given any
undue indulgence as compared to an ordinary litigant, especially in
matters of limitation. There is no doubt that all parties, whether or
not State under Article 123 of the Constitution, are required to act
with due diligence and promptitude.
14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay
cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect
which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits
have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis
of limitation.
15. In the present case, the filing of the Review Petition before the First
Appellate Court was with a delay of two years and four months and
the Second Appeal before the High Court was delayed by about
a year from the date of the dismissal of the Review Petition i.e.,
30.09.2019. Pausing for a moment, it is necessary to indicate that
in the present case, the dispute over title of a land is not between

3 ‘12. Definition.—In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” includes the Government
and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or
other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.’
922 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

private parties, but rather between the private party and the State.
Moreover, when the land in question was taken possession of by the
State and allotted for public purpose to the Youth Welfare Department
and the Collectorate and has continued in the possession of the
State, the claim of the State that it is government land cannot be
summarily discarded. We find, upon a perusal of the record, that
the appellant had, in fact, filed an execution case for taking over
possession of the land, which would demonstrate clearly the admitted
position that he was not in possession thereof. Thus, the matter
would, in our considered view, require adjudication on its own merits
due to various reasons, inter alia, the fact that a new district has
been formed after the initial claim of the appellant of being allotted
the land in the years 1975-1976/1977-1978. Therefore, the delay of
1537 days reckoned from 01.10.2015 i.e. when the First Appellate
Court decreed the suit, includes two years and four months delay
in filing a Review Petition (which was itself dismissed on the ground
of delay by the First Appellate Court) and of about a year thereafter
for filing the Second Appeal before the High Court, in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, which, at the cost of repetition
relate to land claimed by the State as government land and in its
possession, persuade us to not interfere with the Impugned Order.
Relevantly, initially the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, which
decision was reversed by the First Appellate Court.
16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of Maharashtra,
(1974) 1 SCC 317 held:
‘10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve
years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause
of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents,
was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think
this contention should prevail with us. In the first place,
it must be remembered that the rule which says that the
Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not
a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and
proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule
that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily
refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on
its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah,
C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 923

Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

SCC 110, 116 :(1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of discretion for
this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower
limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on
what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy
claimed are and how the delay arose”.’
(emphasis supplied)

17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) relates to a
writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. Sheo
Raj Singh (supra) has also considered the impersonal nature of
the functioning of the State, taking note of what was observed
in State of Manipur v Kotin Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408. In
A B Govardhan v P Ragothaman, (2024) 10 SCC 613, the Court
considered as under:
‘37. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [Collector (LA v. Katiji, (1987)
2 SCC 107], the Court noted that it had been adopting
a justifiably liberal approach in condoning delay and that
“justice on merits” is to be preferred as against what
“scuttles a decision on merits”. Albeit, while reversing an
order of the High Court therein condoning delay, principles
to guide the consideration of an application for condonation
of delay were culled out in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649: (2014)
1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC
(L&S) 595]. One of the factors taken note of therein was
that substantial justice is paramount [Para 21.3 of Esha
Bhattacharjee [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713:
(2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]].
38. In N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India [N.L. Abhyankar v.
Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah
LJ 503], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at
Nagpur considered, though in the context of delay vis-à-vis
Article 226 of the Constitution, the decision in Dehri Rohtas
Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [Dehri
Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur,
(1992) 2 SCC 598] , and held that: (N.L. Abhyankar case
924 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

[N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom
574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], SCC OnLine Bom para 22)
“22. … The real test for sound exercise of discretion
by the High Court in this regard is not the physical
running of time as such, but the test is whether by
reason of delay there is such negligence on the part
of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up
his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved
the writ court, the rights of the third parties have
come into being which should not be allowed to be
disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for
the delay.”
(emphasis supplied)

39. The Bombay High Court’s eloquent statement of
the correct position in law in N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L.
Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574:
(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] found approval in Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48] and
Mool Chandra v. Union of India [Mool Chandra v. Union
of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878].
40. In the wake of the authorities abovementioned, taking
a liberal approach subserving the cause of justice, we
condone the delay and allow IA No. 16203 of 2019,
subject to payment of costs of Rs 20,000 (Rupees twenty
thousand) by the appellant to the respondent.’
(emphasis supplied)

18. Considering the above pronouncements and on an overall
circumspection, we are of the opinion that the Second Appeal
deserves to be heard, contested and decided on merits. However, a
note of caution is sounded to the respondent to exhibit promptitude
in like matters henceforth and in futuro, failing which the Court may
not be as liberal.
19. Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed. The Impugned
Order is upheld with the imposition of costs infra.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 925

Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

20. No order as to costs. I.A.s No.62432/20244 and 62433/20245 are
allowed.
21. To offset, to some extent, the hardship of the appellant in pursuing
his legal remedies, we deem it appropriate that costs of Rs.50,000/-
(Rupees Fifty Thousand) be paid by the respondent to the appellant,
subject to which the delay in filing the Second Appeal shall be
treated as condoned. Let such payment be made within one month
from today. Failure to do so shall entail peremptory dismissal of the
Second Appeal.
22. Further, if the payment is made within the timeline stipulated above,
the High Court is requested to take up the Second Appeal on priority
and endeavour to dispose it of expeditiously.
23. Our observations are in the context of the Impugned Order alone.
They will neither aid nor prejudice either party in the Second Appeal.
Parties are at liberty to raise all contentions of fact and law before
the High Court on merits.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey

4 Seeking exemption from filing Certified Copy of the Impugned Judgment.
5 Seeking exemption from filing Official Translation(s).