Holding

Rule 3(b) does not require the charge‑memo to be issued by the authority competent to impose the penalty; the Tribunal’s interpretation was erroneous.

Summary

A Sub‑Inspector of Police was charged with accepting a bribe and failing to register a criminal case. A Deputy Superintendent of Police framed the charge‑memo, conducted the inquiry and sent a report to the Deputy Inspector General, who imposed compulsory retirement. The Sub‑Inspector appealed to the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, which held that only the authority competent to impose the penalty could frame the charge‑memo, thus setting aside the retirement order. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court examined Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and held that the rule does not require the charge‑memo to be issued by the authority that can impose the penalty; the inquiry officer may be a lower authority. Consequently, the Tribunal’s interpretation was erroneous, the appeal was allowed, the Tribunal’s order was set aside and the matter remitted for further consideration.

Issues considered

Whether Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 mandates that the charge‑memo be issued by the authority competent to impose the penalty.
Whether a departmental inquiry conducted by a lower authority can result in a penalty beyond that authority’s competence.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 311(1)

Subjects

departmental proceedingsdisciplinary inquirycharge memocompulsory retirementpolice service rulesRule 3(b)authority competenceadministrative tribunalappealArticle 311

Judgment

- INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE AND ANR.
v.
THA VASIAPP AN

JANUARY 25, 1996
A

[S.C. AGRAWAL AND G.T. NANA VAT!, JJ.]
B

Se1vice Laiv:
) . .
Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1955: c
Rules 2(h), J(b )-Depmtmental proceedings against Sub-Inspector of
Police---lnqui1y Officer, a Deputy Supe1intendent of Police-Penalty of com-
pulsory retirement imposed by Deputy Inspector General of Police-Held,
inquily officer need not be the authority competent to impose penalties
refC1Ted to in Rule J(b ). D

The respondent, a Sub-Inspector of Police, was' subjected to
departmental proceedings. The Inquiry Ollicer, a Deputy Superintendent
of Police, framed the charges and served the same on the respondent; and
on completion of the inquiry, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector E
General of Police, who imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement O!'
the respondent. The respondent, being unsuccessful in the departmental
appeal, approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, which ac-
cepted his contention that only the authority competent to award the
proposed penalty could have framed and served the charge-memo and as
the inquiry ollicer was not competent to award the said penalty, imposition F
thereof even by the Deputy Inspector General of Police was illegal. Ag-
grieved, the Government filed the appeal.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The Tribunal erred in holding that in a case falling under
G
_ 1 rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1955 the charge-memo should be issued by the disciplinary
authority empowered to impose the penalties referred to therein and if the
charge memo is issued by any lower authority then only that penalty can
be imposed which that lower authority is competent to award. [983-F] H
977
)---.
(

978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
..
A State of Madhya p,.adesh v. Shardu/ Singh, [1970] 1 SCC lll8; P. V.
S1inivasa Saslly v. Comptroller and Auditor General, [1993] 1 SCC 419 and
Tran.1p01t Commis.rimw; Madras v. Radha !0islma Momthy, [1995] 1 SCC
332, relied on ..
-.
+---

1.2. Second paragraph of Rule 3(b)(i) itself contemplates that the
B inquiry oflicer may not he the authority competent to impose the penalties
referred to therein. If it was intended by the rule making authority that
the disciplinary authority should itself frame the charge and hold the
inquiry, then it would not have provided that a report of the inquiry shall
be prepared by the authority holding the inquiry whether or not such
C authority is competent to impose the penalty. Generally speaking, it is not
necessary that the charges should be framed by the authority competent
to award the proposed penalty or that the inquiry should be conducted by
such authority. There is nothing to read such a requirement in rule 3(b).
Besides, as to who shall initiate and conduct a disciplinary )Jroceeding, the
D Rules are silent. [983-D-E, 922-H]

2. The case is remitted hack to the Tribunal to consider the other
contentions raised before it and to dispose of the case in accordance with
law. [983-G]

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2299 of
1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.12.92 of the Tamil Nadu
Administrative Tribunal, Madras in 0.A. No. 4236 of 1991.
F
A. Mariarputham for Arputham Aruna & Co. for the Appellant.

R. Ayyam Perumal for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
NANAVATI, J.

Leave granted.

A departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent, a
H Sub-Inspector of Police, on an allegation that in January 1988, while he was

r
1.G.P. v. THAVASIAPPAN [NANAVATl, J.J 979

_, working as PSI at Anthiyur Police Station, he not only did not register a A
criminal case against one Smt. Jayalakshmi for the offences found to have
been committed by her but let her off and delivered back the seized articles
after accepting a bribe of Rs. 2,000 from her. A Deputy Superintendent of
Police was appointed as an enquiry officer. He framed rhe charges and
served the same on the respondent. He then held an enquiry and submitted B
his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was competent
.... to award the proposed penalty. The Dy. Inspector General of police agreed
't with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and imposed the penalty
of compulsory retirement by an order dated 26.3.91. The respondent filed
an appeal against that order to the Inspector General of Police who
dismissed it by an order dated 16.7.91.
c
The respondent then filed 0.A. No. 4236 of 1991 before the Tamil
Nadu Administrative Tribunal. It was contented before the Tribunal that
only the authority competent to award the proposed penalty could have
• -+ framed and served the charge memo and as that was done in this case by D
a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Only that penalty could have been
lawfully imposed upon the respondent which was within the powers of the
Deputy Superintendent of Police. As.the Deputy superintendent of Police
was not competent to award the penalty of compulsory retirement imposi-
tion of that penalty even by Deputy Inspector General of Police should be
regarded as illegal. It was also contended that there was no evidence to
E
prove the charge against the respondent. A contention was also raised that
the respondent was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
The Tribunal did not go into the other contentions raised by the respon-
dent and allowed his application as it was of the view that "the charge
memo under Rule 3(b) should be issued by the disciplinary authority F
empowered to impose the penalty specified therein and if any lower
authority has initiated proceedings by issuing the charge memo then the
penalty will be limited to those that such lower authority can award to the
delinquent concerned". As the Deputy Superintendent of Police could not
have imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement, the Tribunal set aside
the order of penalty and directed the petitioners herein to reinstate the
G
4 respondent and remitted the case back to the Deputy Inspector General
of Police to pass an appropriate order. Aggrieved by that order the
petitioners who were respondents in 0 .A. have filed this appeal.

The order of the Tribunal is challenged on the ground that it is based H
980 SUPREME COURT REP ORTS [1996) 1 S.C.R.

A on an erroneous interpretation of Rule 3(b). It was submitted that Rule
3(b) does not specifically or even by necessary implication so provide and
no such requirement can justifiably be read into it.

Rule 2 of the said Rules specifies the penalties that can be imposed
B upon members of the service. Compulsory retirement is specified as a
penalty in clause (h) of chat Rule. Rule 2A provides that the Governor or
any other authority empowered by him by general or special order can
institute disciplinary proceeding against any member of the service. Rule 4
specifies the authorities which can impose the penalties prescribed in Rule
2. Rule 3 provides the procedure that has to be followed before an order
C imposing penalty is passed. If any of the minor penalties mentioned in
clauses (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of Rule 2 is proposed to be imposed then
comparatively simple procedure prescribed in Rule 3(a) has to be followed.
If, however, it is proposed to impose any major penalty specified in clauses
(d), (h), (i) and (j) of Rule 2 then the elaborate procedure mentioned in
D clause (b) of that Rule is required to be followed. Rules 3 (a) and 3(b)(i)
and 3(b)(ii) read as under :

"Rule 3(a) - In every case where it is proposed to impose on a
member of a service any of the penalties mentioned in clauses (a),
(b), (c), (e) and (f) of Rule 2 he shall be given a reasonable
E opportunity of making any representation that he may desire to
make and such representation, if any shall be taken into considera-
tion before the order imposing the penalty is passed :"

"Rule 3(b)(i) - In every case where it is proposed to impose on
F a member of a service any of the penalties specified in clauses (d),
(h), (i) and (j) of Rule 2 the grounds on which it is proposed to
take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or
charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged
together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge
is framed and of any other circumstan<.es which it is proposed to
G take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be
required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement
of his defence and to state whether he desires an oral inquiry or
only to be heard in person. An oral inquiry shall be held if such
an inquiry is desired by the person charged or is directed by the
H authority concerned. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard
i.G.P.v. THAVASIAPPAN [NANAVATI,J.] 981

-
/
as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, the person A
charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give
evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may
wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for
special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to
call a witness. After the inquiry has been completed, the person
B
charged shall be entitled to put in, if he so desires, any further
written statement of his defence.

Whether or not the person charged desired or had an oral
enquiry, he shall be heard in person at any stage if he so desires
before final orders are passed. A report of the inquiry or personal C
hearing (as the case may be) shall be prepared by the authority
holding the inquiry or personal hearing whether or not such
authority is competent to impose the penalty. Such report shall
contain a sufficient record of evidence, if any, and a statement of
the findings and the grounds thereof.
D
·~
(ii) After the inquiry or personal hearing referred to in clause
(i) has been completed, and if the authority competent to impose
the penalty mentioned in that clause, is of the opinion, on the basis
of the evidence adduced during the inquiry that any of the penalties
specified therein should be imposed on the Government servant, E
it shall make an order, imposing such penalty and. it shall not be
necessary to give the person charged, any opportunity of making
representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed."

We have not set out the provisos to Rule 3(a) and Rule 3(b)(ii) as
they are not material for the purpose of this appeal. F

Before we consider the requirement of Rule 3(b) we will refer to the
three decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. He first
invited our attention to the decision of this Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Shardul Singh, (1970] 1 SCC 108. In that case a departmental G
enquiry was initiated against a Sub Inspector of Police by Superintendent
-'t of Police who after holding an enquiry sent his report to the Inspector
General of Police who ultimately dismissed the Sub Inspector of Police
from service. The order of dismissal from service was challenged before
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on the ground that the enquiry held
by Superintendent of Police was against the mandate of Article 311(1) of H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] l S.C.R.

A the Constitution as he was incompetent to conduct the enquiry. The Sub
Inspector of Police was appointed by the Inspector General of Police. The
High Court allowed the petition. The State preferred an appeal to this
Court. Rejecting the contention that the guarantee given under Article
311(1) includes within itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary
proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should be
B initiated or conducted by the authorities mentioned in that article, this
Court held as under :

"This Article does not in terms require that the authority
empowered under that provision to dismiss or remove an official,
c should itself initiate or conduct the enquiry preceding the dismissal
or removal of the officer or even that enquiry should be done at
its instance. The only right guaranteed to a civil servant under that
provision is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed."

D This Court further held that "we are unable to agree with the High
Court that the guarantee given under Article 311(1) includes within
itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting
in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated
and conducted by the authorities mentioned in that Article."
E The learned counsel also drew our attention to P. V. Srinivasa Sastry
v. Comptroller and Auditor General, (1993] 1 SCC 419, wherein this Court
in the context of Article 311(1) has held that in absence of a rule any
superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority can
initiate a departmental proceeding and that initiation of a departmental
F proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil conse-
quences. Transpo1t Conunissioner, Madras v. A Radha Klishna Moo1thy,
j 1995] 1 SCC 332 was next relied upon. Therein also this Court has held
that initiation of disciplinary enquiry can be by an officer subordinate to
the appointing authority. These decisions fully support the contention of
G the learned counsel for the appellants. that initiation of a departmental
proceeding and conducting an enquiry can be by an authority other than
the authority competent to impose the proposed penalty. 'f-

As to who shall initiate and conduct a disciplinary proceeding, the
Rules are silent. Rule 2A which provides that the Governor or any other
H authority empowered by him may institute disciplinary proceedings is an
tG.P. v. THAVASIAPPAN [NANAVATl,J.) 983

enabling provision. From the way it is worded it is not possible to infer that A
the rule making authority intended to take away the power of otherwise
competent authorities, like the appointing authority, disciplinary authority
or controlling authority and confine it to the authorities mentioned in Rule
2 A only. Moreover, it is difficult to appreciate how this provision can be
helpful in deciding whether the charge should be framed and the enquiry B
should be held by that authority only which is competent to impose the
penalties mentioned in Rule 3(b )(i). An act of instituting a disciplinary
proceeding is quite different from conducting an enquiry. Rule 3(b )(i)
provides how an enquiry should be held in a case where it is proposed to
impose on a member of the service any of the penalties specified in clauses
(d), (h), (i) and G) of Rule 2. It lays down the different steps that have to C
be taken in the course of the enquiry proceeding. This Rule is completely
silent as regards the person who should perform those acts except that the
report of the enquiry has to be prepared by the authority holding the
enquiry. Rule 3(b)(i) itself contemplates that the enquiry officer may not
be the authority competent to impose the penalties referred to therein and D
. -;
that becomes apparent from the second paragraph of that sub-rule. If it
was intended by the rule-making authority that the disciplinary authority
should itself flame the charge and hold the enquiry then it would not have
provided that a report of the enquiry shall be prepared by the authority
holding the enquiry whether or not such authority is competent to impose
the penalty. Generally speaking, it is not necessary that the charges should E
be framed by the authority competent to award the proposed penalty or
that the enquiry should be conducted by such authority. We do not find
anything in the rules which would induce us to read in Rule 3(b)(i) such a
requirement. In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal that in a case
falling under Rule 3(b) the charge memo should be issued by the discipli- F
nary authority empowered to impose the penalties referred to therein and
if the charge memo is issued by any lower authority then only that penalty
can be imposed which that lower authority is competent to award, is clearly
erroneous. We, therefore, allow this appeal. The order passed by the
Tribunal is set aside and the case is remitted back to the Tribunal to
consider the other contentions which were raised before it and to dispose G
of the case in accordance with law.

R.P. Appeal allowed.