J.J. IRANI & ANR.versusSTATE OF JHARKHAND

                   [2014] 8 S.C.R. 385


                    J.J. IRANI & ANR.                          A
                            v.
                 STATE OF JHARKHAND
         (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1668-70 of 2014)
                    AUGUST 8, 2014
                                                               B
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

     Factories Act, 1948 - s. 106 - Limitation for prosecµtion -
Fire accident dated 3.3.1989 - Complaint by Inspector of C
factories on 7.5.1990 - Whether barred by /imitation - Held:
A complaint is required to be filed within three months of the
date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the
knowledge of the Inspector - In the facts of the case, the date
of knowledge to the Inspector would be 5.3.1989 i.e. when the D
preliminary investigation was conducted - The date on which
the Inspector formally received the detailed inquiry report,
cannot be considered as date of knowledge, in the facts of the
case - Bihar Factory Rules, 1950.
                                                               E
     Practice and Procedure - Interim order/stay of
proceedings before lower forum - Continuation of, despite
disposal of the procee.dings in higher forum - Held: Such
continuation cannot be assumed.

    On 3.3.1989, during celebration of Foundation Day of       F
Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (TISCO), the temporary
pandals, constructed at the gate of the factory caught fire
resulting in death and injuries to the people present there.
Notice of intimation of the accident was given to the
Inspector" of Factories. Preliminary investigation was         G
conducted on 5,3.1989 and 6.3.1989, and thereby
recommended the State to constitute a Committee for
conducting detailed investigation. The report of the
enquiry was handed over by the Committee, to the
                             385                               H
    386      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A Inspector of Factories on 23.4.1990. Pursuant thereto, on
  7 .5.1990, the Inspector of Factories filed criminal
  complaints. Objection was raised as to maintainability of
  the complaint on the ground that the same was barred
  by limitation in view of s. 106 of Factories Act, 1948. As
B per s. 106, the complaint should have been filed within 3
  months of the date on which the alleged commission of
  offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector. Trial
  court dismissed the complaint, holding that limitation
  would be reckoned from 5.3.1989 as date of knowledge
c because the inspector would be considered to be having
  knowledge of the occurrence on 5.3.1989 when the
  preliminary inquiry was conducted . In Revision petition
  against the order of trial court, High Court held that there
  is difference between 'knowledge of accident' and
  'knowledge of commission of offence'; and that the
0
  Inspector could have known about the commission of ..
  offence only after receiving the inquiry report i.~. on
  23.4.1990 and thus the complaint was filed within
  limitation. Hence, the present appeals.

E      The State inter alia contended that the High Court
  could not have proceeded to decide the matter in view
  of the fact that the proceedings before High Court were
  stayed by Supreme Court in a writ petition filed by the
  victims of the accident. (However, the writ petition was
F disposed of before the High Court passed the order).

          Allowing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1.1. In the present case, the Inspector was
  himself part of the team, which conducted the preliminary
G inquiry between 5th and 6th March, 1989. The inquiry is
  a detailed investigation going into all aspects of the
  occurrence. In these circumstances, it is not possible to
  hold that the Inspector of Factories, who undertook a
  detailed inquiry into the accident along with the Chief
H
        J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND               387

Inspector of Factories, remained ignorant that the            A
offences in question have been allegedly committed. It is
proper to assume that an officer, conducting an
investigation, comes to know what has happened, that
being the only purpose of the investigation. It has not
been disputed at any stage that the complainant was not       B
associated with and did not participate in the preliminary
investigation. [Paras 15 and 16] [395-E-G]
     1.2. A perusal of allegations of the offence against
the appellants, makes it clear that an inquiry or
investigation at the site of the accident was not necessary   C
in order to gain knowledge of the alleged breach. For
instance, the failure to submit "Plans of Pandals and
Structures" as required under Section 6(1 )(aa) of the Act
read with Rule 8 of the 8ihar Factory Rules, 1950; not
drawing up an "on-sight" Emergency Plan and Disaster          D
Control for the Pandals and Structures as required under
Section 418(4) of the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987
are alleged breaches, which could have been ascertained
even from the office record of the Inspector. The third
breach is not taking precautions in case of fire as           E
envisaged under Section 38 of the Factories Act, 1948
read with Rule 62 of the 8ihar Factories Rules, 1950 or
providing a safe means of escape in the event of fire for
all persons, and providing necessary equipment and
facilities for extinguishing fire, can be easily and must     F
have been ascertained at the first inspection of the site.
It was not necessary for the Inspector to have waited to
receive the report on 23.04.1990 from the Government
under cover of the letter dated 21.04.1990 directing him
to file a complaint for the prosecution of the appellants.    G
[Para 16] [396-8-F]
     2. There is no warrant for assuming, unless
specifically directed or necessarily intended, that an
interim order such as the Stay of proceedings before a
lower forum continues even if the proceedings in the          H
    388      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A higher forum is disposed of. In the present case, the
  parties understood that the true position was that the
  Stay had ceased to operate and argued the matter on that
  understanding before the High Court. [Para 19] [397-H;
  398-A-B]
B
       P.O. Jambekar v. State of Gujarat (1973) 3 SCC 524:
  1973 (2) SCR 714 ; Prem Chandra Agarwal and Another v.
  Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation and Others (2009) 11
  SCC 479: 2009 (6) SCR 931; Lata Wadhwa and Others v.
C State of Bihar and Others (2001) 8 SCC 197: 2001 (1) Suppl.
  SCR 578
                         Case Law Reference:
          2009 (6) SCR 931            relied on        Para 19
D         2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 578     referred to      Para 19
          1973 (2) SCR 714            distinguished Para 15
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    Nos.1668-70 of 2014.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 15.06.2007 in CRLR
    No. 212/1990, 213/1990,214/1990 of the High Court of
    Jharkhand at Ranchi.

        F.S. Nariman, Amar Dave, R.N. Karanjawala, Manik
F   Karanjawala, Nandini Gore, Debmalya Banerjee, Abhishek
    Roy, Devina Sehgal for the Appellants.

         Tapesh Kumar Singh, Sukant Vikram, Mohd. Waquas for
    the Respondent.
G
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          S. A. BOBDE, J. : 1. Leave granted.

      2. In this batch of appeals, the appellants have challenged
H the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Jharkhand at
          J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND                               389
                     [S.A. BOBDE, J.]
Ranchi dated 15fh June, 2007 allowing the three Criminal                          A
Revision Nos. 212 - 214 of 1990·filed by the State, and
reversing the Order dated 29.06.1990 of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jamshedpur and further directing the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jamshedpur to proceed against the appellants in
accordance with law. Since they arise out of the same incident                    B
they have ,Peen taken up together for disposal.

     3. The only question that arises in these appeals is
whether the complaint made by the Inspector of Factories that
the appellants have allegedly committed offences was made                         C
within three months of the date on which the alleged
commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the
Inspector, as required by Section 106 of the Factories Act,
1948 (hereinafter reJerred to as 'the Act'). At the relevant time
the appellant No. 1 - Dr. J.J. Irani was "Occupier" and the
                                                                                  D .
appellant No. 2 - Mr. P.N. Roy was "Manager" of the factory
within the meaning of the Act.

     4. On 3rd March, 1989, the Tata Iron and Steel Company
Limited (TISCO) celebrated the 150th birthday of Mr. J.N. Tata,
as Foundation Day. They constructed temporary Pandals at the                      E
main gate of the Factory premises. All of a sudden a fire broke
out and two of the Pandals, where guests Vfere seated, were
badly gutted. There was panic due to the fire. As a result 18 to
20 persons died on the spot and a larger number were
admitted with burn injuries at the Tata Hospital, some of whom                    F
later succumbed to their injuries. The injured and the dead were
mainly employees of TISCO, its officers and their family
members.       ·

     5. As required by Section 88(1) 1 of the Act read with Rule
96 of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to                    G
as 'the Rules') formal notice of intimation of the accident was
given to the Inspector of Factories. In pursuance of the Notice

1.   Section 88 requires the authority, who receives the Notice, to make an
     inquiry into the occurrence within one month of the receipt of the Notice.   H
    390      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A on 5th and 6th March, 1989, the Chief Inspector of Factories
   of the then State of Bihar and the Deputy Chief Inspector of
   Factories, Jamshedpur, conducted a preliminary investigation.
   These Officers submitted a Report to the Commissioner of
   Labour, Patna on 08.03.1989. Before submitting the Report a
B preliminary inquiry was conducted, photographs of the Pandals
   and other affected areas were taken, Pandals were measured,
   and distances between Pandals and Roads were also
   measured. A list of those dead and injured was prepared and
   the cause of the accident was gone into and ascertained.
c Apparently, the cause was a high powered cracker fired on the
    occasion, which fell on roof of one of the Pandals made of
   combustible material, and started .the btaze. The officers also
                                       __..   ,...   >




   determined the factors that prevent~d the' stopping of the fire,
    such as the narrowness of the pathways 'and the distance of
D the fire hydrants from the place of occurrence and the seating
    arrangement because of which it was not possible for the
    guests to escape from the site. The Chief Inspector of
    Factories, who signed the preliminary report, recommended to
    the State Government that a Committee be constituted under
E Section 90 of the Act for conducting a detailed investigation
    into the cause of the accident. The preliminary report records
    that the Committee should be constituted by the State
    Government under the Chairmanship of the Chief Inspector of
    Factories in which other Members shall be (1) Dy. Chief
  . Inspector of Factories, Jamshedpur as Co-ordinator; (2) Dy.
F Chief Inspector of Factories, Ranchi as Member; (3) Dy. Chief
    Inspector of Factories, Patna as Member; and (4) Chief
    Security and Fire Extinguisher Officer, Barauni Oil Refinery,
    Begusarai as Member..

G       6. It is of significance that the Factory Inspector,
    Jamshedpur Circle, who filed the complaint was part of the
    team that conducted this preliminary detailed investigation (vide
    para 9 of the letter dated 08.03.1989).

          7. In pursuance of the recommendation of the Preliminary
H
         J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND                    391
                    [S.A. BOBDE, J.]
  Report, the State Government constituted a three Member            A
i :ommittee under Section 90 of the Act consisting of (i) Chief
' Inspector of Factories, Bihar (Ranchi) as Chairman; (ii) Dy.
  Chief Inspector of Factories (Jamshedpur) as Member; and (iii)
  Chief Safety,' and Fire Officer (Begusarai) as Member. The
  Government further directed the Committee to submit its report     B
  within two months of its constitution. Instead of submitting the
  report in two months, the Committee concluded its inquiry by
  03.09.1989. Two of its Members signed the Report on
  26.09.1989. The third Member signed on 16.03.1990. The
  Report is said to have been handed over to the Inspector of        c
  Factories on 23.04.1990.

    8. On 07.05.1990, three criminal complaints were filed .
under different provisions of the Act by the Inspector of
Factories, Jamshedpur Circle - I, Jamshedpur, w!"Jich are as
unde~                                                        D

     "(i) Complaint No. 224 of 1990 - (along with detailed
                                             I

     statement in support of the petition of complaint) alleging
     contravention of provisions of Section 6(1 )(aa) of the
     Factories Act read with Rule 8 of the .Bihar Factories Rules,   E
     1950, for not submitting the plans of Pandals and structures
     (6 in number) constructed inside the premises of T!SCO
     for the 150th Birthday celE;!brations of J.N. Tata (near the
     main gate around the statue of J.N. Tata and not getting
     the same approved by the Chief Inspector of Factories).         F

     (ii) Complaint No. 225 of 1990 (along with detailed
     statement in support of petition of complaint) for violating
     the provisions of Section 38 of the Factories Act, 1948,
     read with Rule 62 of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 by
     not taking precautions in case of fire as envisaged under       G
     Section 38 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with Rules 62
     of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 such as safe .means
     of escape in the event of fire for all persons, and by not
     providing necessary equipment and facilitie·s for
                                                                     H
    392       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 8 S.C.R.


A         extinguishing fire; and

          (iii) Complaint No. 226 of 1990 (along with detailed
          statement in support of petition of complaint) for violating
          the provisions of Section 418(4) of the Factories
          (Amendment) Act, 1987 by not drawing up with the
8
          approval of the Chief Inspector of Factories, Bihar, an "on-
          sight" Emergency Plan and Disaster Control for the
          Pandals and structures (6 in number) constructed inside
          the factory (TISCO), near its main gate around the statue
          of its founder Shri Jamshedji Tata for celebrating his 150th
c         Birthday, and constructing such pandals and structures of
          highly combustible material - an actual fire hazard."

       9. The dispute in these appeals centers around the
  question whether the filing of complaint on 07 .05.1990 was
D withil) three months of the date on which the alleged
  commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the
  Inspector (vide Section 106 of the Act).

        10. There is no dispute about the meaning of the term
E "commission of the offence" or "knowledge," hence the question
  is essentially: when did the Inspector come to know of the
  ~ommission of the offences? Section 106 of the Act reads as
  follows:

          "Section 106: Limitation of prosecution: No Court shall
F         take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act
          unless complaint thereof is made within three months of
          the date on which the alleged commission of the offence
          came to the knowledge of an Inspector:

          Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a
G
          written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may
          be made within six months of the date on which the offence
          is alleged to have been committed.

          [Explanation: - For the purpose of this section -
H
        J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND                  393
                   [S.A. BOBDE, J.]
    (a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of A
    limitation shall be computed with reference to every point
    of time during which the offence continues;

    (b) where for the performance of any act time is granted
    or extended on an application made by the occupier or
                                                                  8
    manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be
    computed from the date on which the time so granted or
    extended expired.]"

      11. The Respondent - State claims that the Inspector of
Factories, who filed the complaints, came to know of the          C
commission of the offences on 23.04.1990, when the Report
of the Committee, constituted under Section 90 of the Act, was
received by him. According to the appellants, who are accused,
by virtue of the Occupier and Manager of the Factory within the
premises of which the accident occurred, the complaint is         D
clearly barred by the limitation of three months provided by
Section 106 of the Act because the Inspector of Factories had
knowledge of the commission of the offence as early as
05.03.1989 when he conducted ~he preliminary investigation
into the accident between 5th and 6th March, 1989 along with      E
the. Chief Inspector of Factories and Dy. Chief Inspector of
Factories, Jamshedpur. In any case, he had been directed to
carry out an intensive investigation, and having been inducted
into the Committee under Section 90 of the Act on 8.3.1989,
he knew of the alleged commission of the offence much earlier.    F
According to the Respondent - State the copy of the inquiry
report and the Government's letter were handed over to the
complainant on 23.04.1990 by the Chief Inspector of Factories
under cover of letter dated 21.04.1990, and therefore
23.04.1990 must be taken as the date on which the                 G
complainant came to know about the commission of the offence
alleged against the Occupier and Manager of the Factory. It
was argued also before the High Court that he was directed
by the letter of the Government to file a complaint for that
prosecution and accordingly he filed the complaint on 7.5.1990.   H
    394      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   According to the respondent, the complaint has been filed well
    within three months from 23.4.1990 on 7.5.1990.

         12. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, who heard the complaint
    found that the Factory Inspector - Complainant, had knowledge
    of the occurrence at least on 5.3.1989 when a detailed inquiry
8
    was conducted by the Chief Inspector of Factories. The Chief
    Judicial Magistrate, therefore, dismissed the complaint as being
    barred by limitation holding that the offence was not a continuing
    offence and that the limitation be reckoned from 5.3.1989 - i.e.
    the date of knowledge.
c
          13. The High Court accepted that the starting point for
    limitation was the date of knowledge of the commission of
    offence but took the view that in the present case the date of
    a9cident and the date of knowledge of the commission of the
D   cfffence are different. The High Court relied on the decision of
    this Court in P.O. Jambekar v. State of Gujarat, (1973) 3 SCC
    524, in which this Court observed as follows:

          "As Section 106 makes the date of knowledge of the
          commission of the offence the starting point of the period
E
          of limitation, we find it difficult to read the section so as to
          make the date on which the Inspector would or oughl'to
          have acquired knowledge of the commission of the offence
          had he been diligent, the starting point of limitation,
          especially where, as here the statute does not provide for
F         an inquiry into the accident much less the period with which
          the inquiry has to be made. It is only in the jurisprudence
          of Humpty Dumpty that we can equate the "date on which
          the alleged offence came to the knowledge of an
          Inspector" with the date on which the alleged offence ought
G         to have come to his knowledge. We think that the High
          Court was right in its conclusion (para 8)."

         14. The High Court took the view that it cannot be said that
    the complainant came to know of the commission of the offence
H   in the preliminary inquiry conducted on 5.3.1989 by the Chief
         J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND                   395
                    [S.A. BOBDE, J.]
Inspector of Factories in his presence by distinguishing the         A
difference between "knowledge of an accident" and
"knowledge of commission of the offence." The High Court
observed that the complainant could have known of the breach
only when the cause of accident, which was inquired into, was
reported by the Chief Inspector of Factories in his report, which    B
was received by the complainant on 23.04.1990; and it was
only from the inquiry report that it could be gathered that the
accident of fire took place because of breach of provisions of
law.

      15. We have heard the matter and considered the issue          C
at length and we find ourselves unable to uphold the reasoning
of the High Court.Jambekar's case (supra) is of no assistance
in deciding the present case. In that case this Court accepted
that from a reading of the report of the incident it was difficult
for anyone to come to the conclusion that an offence under           D
Section 21 (1 )(iv)(c) has been committed. The Inspector's
statement that the report did not convey to him any knowledge
that the offence was committed was accepted and this Court.
concluded that the Inspector did not acquire the knowledge of
the 'commission of the offence' when he received the report.         E
The case before us is entirely different. Here the Inspector was
himselfpart of the team, which conducted the preliminary
inquiry between 5th and 6th March, 1989. As observed earlier,
the inquiry is a detailed investigation going into all aspects of
the occurrence. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold    F
that the Inspector of Factories, who undertook a detailed inquiry
into the accident along with the Chief Inspector of Factories,
remaine;t ignorant that the offences in question have been
allegedly committed. It is proper to assume that an officer,
conducting an investigation, comes to know what has                  G
happened, that being the only purpose of the investigation.

     16. We find that it has not been disputed at any stage that
the complainant was not associated with and did not participate
in the preliminary investigation from 5th to 6th March 1989
                                                                     H
    396      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2014] 8 S.C.R.

A   along with the Chief Inspector of Factories. This is obvious from
    the letter/report of preliminary investigation dated 08.03.1989.
    The Inspector must be taken as having acquired knowledge of
    the alleged commission of the offence soon before or at least
    on 08.03.1989, when the report of preliminary investigation was
B   sent to the Commissioner of Labour, Bihar. In fact, a perusal
    of allegations of the offence against the appellants, makes it
    clear that an inquiry or investigation at the site of the accident
    was not necessary in order to gain knowledge of the alleged
    breach. For instance, the failure to submit "Plans of Pandals
c   and Structures" as required under Section 6(1 )(aa) of the Act
    read with Rule 8 of the Bihar Factory Rules, 1950; n·ot drawing
    up an "on-sight" Emergency Plan and Disaster Control for the
    Pandals and Structures as required under Section 418(4) of
    the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987 are alleged breaches,
    which could have been ascertained even from the office record
0
    of the Inspector. The third breach is not taking precautions in ·
    case of fire as envisaged under Section 38 of the Factories
    Act, 1948 read with Rule 62 of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950
    or providing a safe means of escape in the event of fire for all.
    persons, and providing necessary equipment and facilities for
E   extinguishing fire, can be easily and must have been
    ascertained at the first inspection of the site. We are clearly of
    the view that it was not necessary for the Inspector to have
    waited to receive the report on 23.04.1990 from the
    Government under cover of the letter dated 21.04.1990
F   directing him to file a complaint for the prosecution of the
    appellants. We thus agree with the view of the learned Chief
    Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur and disagree with the view of
    the High Court.

G         17. Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing
  for the State/respondent pointed out that whilst these Criminal
  Revision Petitions against the judgments of the Chief Judicial
  Magistrate in the three criminal cases were pending in the High
  Court, Writ Petition 232 of 1991 was filed under Article 32 of
H the Constitution of India against State of Bihar, TISCO and its
           J.J. IRANI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND                     397
                      [S.A. BOBDE, J.]
 directors and officers ·to which the Inspector of Factories,           A
 Jamshedpur was also a party. This Writ Petition was filed by
                                               ~

 victims on behalf of themselves and all other persons affected
 by the fire. A prayer was made in the Writ of Mandamus
 ordering prosecution of Directors and Officers of TISCO for
 negligence in organizing of the function. A prayer for                 B
 appropriate compensation was also made in the said Writ
 Petition. By Preliminary Order dated 15.12.1993, this Court
 after laying down certain principles of compegsation directed
 that the retired Chief Justice Mr. Chandrachud should determine
 the compensation. It was then directed as follows:                     c
      "Pending further orders, the following.criminal cases shall
      be stayed:
                                                                            /
      "1. G.R. Case No. : 365-A/89 pending in the Court of Sub-
      Divisional Magi~trate, Jamshedpur.                                D

      2. Crl. Rev. Nos. 212, 213 and 214 of 1991 pending
      before Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court."
                                                                   /
      18. Chief Justice Ch_andrachud {Retd.) eventually                 E
 assessed the compensation in November, 2000 for an
 aggregate sum.of Rs.5.47 crores. Finally, this Court dis.posed
 of the Writ Petition on 16.8.2001 [reported as (2001) 8 SCC
 197] after observing that Criminal Revision Petitions had been
 stayed by its ea~lier Order dated 15.12.1993. This Court then
 enhanced the aggregated compensation amount by adding a                F
 certain amount on compassionate grounds. The Writ Petition
 was accordingly disposed of.

       19. It was argued by Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh that the
· above sequence of events meant that the Criminal Revisions            G
  before the High Court remained stayed notwithstanding the
  disposal of the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution,
  and therefore, it could not have proceeded to decide the
· matter. We fail to understand this submission coming from the
  State. In the first place, there is no warrant for assuming, unless   H
    398      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 8 S.C.R.

A specifically directed or necessarily intended, that an interim
  order such as the Stay of proceedings before ·a lower forum
  continues even if the proceedings in the higher forum is
  disposed of. This Court has made observations to that effect
  in Prem Chandra Agarwal and Another v. Utter Pradesh
B Financial Corporation and Others, (2009) 11 SCC 479. In any
  case, in this case the parties understood that the true position
  was that the Stay had ceased to operate and argued the matter
  on that understanding before the High Court. What is more
  surprising is that this contention comes from the State, which
c has succeeded before the High Court. Accordingly, we see no
  reason whatsoever to consider this submission any further. We
  are informed that in pursuance of the Order of this Court in Late
  Wadhwa and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, (2001)           a·
  sec 197 the TISCO has deposited an amount of Rs. 6.95
  crores in the Registry of the Supreme Court. Shri F.S. Nariman,
0
  learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants has very
  fairly submitted that the appellants and TISCO have no
  grievance whatsoever in making any payment to the victims by
  way of compensation since the accident was a terrible tragedy.
  Shri Nariman submitted that the TISCO has not treated any
E litigation in this matter as an adversarial litigation.

        20. In the result, appeals are allowed. The Judgment and
    Order of the High Court dated 15.6.2007 is set aside and
    Criminal complaints are dismissed.
F
    Kalpana K. Tripathy                             Appeals allowed.