Holding

The Court held that the State must collect cadre‑wise quantifiable data to establish backwardness and inadequate representation of SCs/STs for reservation in promotions, without a fixed yardstick, and that the principles of M. Nagaraj are to have prospective effect.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the legal framework governing reservation in promotions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under Articles 16(4‑A) and 16(4‑B) of the Constitution. It clarified that the State must collect quantifiable, cadre‑wise data to demonstrate backwardness and inadequate representation, but no fixed yardstick can be prescribed for measuring these factors. The Court held that the appropriate unit for data collection is the cadre, not the entire service or a ‘group’, and that the proportion of SC/ST population to the national population is not the test for adequacy. It affirmed that the principles laid down in M. Nagaraj are to operate prospectively to avoid disruption of seniority. The Court also ruled that the data must be reviewed periodically, and that the sampling method approved in B.K. Pavitra II is inconsistent with the law. Consequently, the appeal was disposed after answering the six formulated issues.

Issues considered

What is the yardstick for arriving at quantifiable data showing inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs in public employment?
What is the unit with respect to which quantifiable data showing inadequacy of representation must be collected?
Should the proportion of the SC/ST population to the population of India be the test for determining adequacy of representation in promotional posts?
Should there be a time period for reviewing inadequacy of representation?
Does the judgment in M. Nagaraj operate prospectively?
Can quantifiable data showing inadequacy of representation be collected on the basis of sampling methods as held in B.K. Pavitra II?

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art.142, s. Art.16(4), s. Art.16(4-A), s. Art.16(4-B), s. Art.335

Subjects

Reservation in promotionScheduled CastesScheduled TribesQuantifiable dataCadreArticle 16(4‑A)Article 335Prospective overrulingBackwardnessInadequate representation

Judgment

[2022] 19 S.C.R. 711 711

JARNAIL SINGH & ORS. A
v.
LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.629 of 2022)
JANUARY 28, 2022 B
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, SANJIV KHANNA AND
B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts.16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B)
and 335 – Reservation in promotion – Collection of quantifiable
data regarding inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs – C
Yardstick for arriving at quantifiable data – In M. Nagaraj case the
key issue that was identified and decided by the Supreme Court
was whether any constitutional limitation mentioned in Art.16(4)
and Art.335 stood obliterated by the constitutional amendments
resulting in Arts. 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) – The Supreme Court upheld D
the constitutional amendments – The amendments were held to be
enabling provisions – It was observed that the State is not bound to
make reservation for SCs and STs in matters of promotion, however,
if it wishes to exercise its discretion, the State has to collect
quantifiable data showing the backwardness of the class and
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment, in E
addition to compliance with Art.335 of the Constitution – What is
the yardstick by which, according to M. Nagaraj case, one would
arrive at quantifiable data showing inadequacy of representation
of SCs and STs in public employment – Held: Laying down of criteria
for determining the inadequacy of representation would result in F
curtailing the discretion given to the State Governments – In addition,
the prevailing local conditions, which may require to be factored
in, might not be uniform – Moreover, in M. Nagaraj case, the Court
made it clear that the validity of law made by the State Governments
providing reservation in promotions shall be decided on a case-to-
case basis for the purpose of establishing whether the inadequacy G
of representation is supported by quantifiable data – Therefore, no
yardstick can be laid down by the court for determining the adequacy
of representation of SCs and STs in promotional posts for the
purpose of providing reservation – Reservation.
H
711
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts.16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B)
and 335 – Reservation in promotion – Collection of quantifiable
data regarding inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs – Unit
for collecting quantifiable data – In M. Nagaraj case the key issue
that was identified and decided by the Supreme Court was whether
any constitutional limitation mentioned in Art.16(4) and Art.335
B
stood obliterated by the constitutional amendments resulting in Arts.
16(4-A) and 16(4-B) – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
amendments – The amendments were held to be enabling provisions
– It was observed that the State is not bound to make reservation
for SCs and STs in matters of promotion, however, if it wishes to
C exercise its discretion, the State has to collect quantifiable data
showing the backwardness of the class and inadequacy of
representation of that class in public employment, in addition to
compliance with Art.335 of the Constitution – What is the unit with
respect to which quantifiable data showing inadequacy of
representation is required to be collected – Held: In M. Nagaraj
D
case, the Supreme Court approved that the percentage of reservation
in promotions was to be applied to the entire cadre strength, as held
in R.K. Sabharwal case – While doing so, the court in M. Nagaraj
made it clear that the unit for operation of the roster would be the
cadre strength – Before providing for reservation in promotions to
E a cadre, the State is obligated to collect quantifiable data regarding
inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs – Collection of
information regarding inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs
cannot be with reference to the entire service or ‘class’/‘group’ but
it should be relatable to the grade/category of posts to which
promotion is sought – Cadre, which should be the unit for the purpose
F
of collection of quantifiable data in relation to the promotional
post(s), would be meaningless if data pertaining to representation
of SCs and STs is with reference to the entire service – Reservation.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts.16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B)
and 335 – Reservation in promotion – Quantifiable data regarding
G representation of SCs and STs – Proportionate representation as
test of adequacy – In M. Nagaraj case the key issue that was identified
and decided by the Supreme Court was whether any constitutional
limitation mentioned in Art.16(4) and Art.335 stood obliterated by
the constitutional amendments resulting in Arts. 16(4-A) and 16(4-
H B) – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional amendments –
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 713

The amendments were held to be enabling provisions – It was A
observed that the State is not bound to make reservation for SCs
and STs in matters of promotion, however, if it wishes to exercise its
discretion, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing the
backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that
class in public employment, in addition to compliance with Art.335
B
of the Constitution – Whether proportion of the population of SCs
and STs to the population of India should be taken to be the test for
determining adequacy of representation in promotional posts for
the purposes of Art.16(4-A) – Held: In M. Nagaraj case, the Court
was of the considered view that the exercise of collecting quantifiable
data depends on numerous factors, with conflicting claims to be C
optimised by the administration in the context of local prevailing
conditions in public employment – As equity, justice and efficiency
are variable factors and are context-specific, how these factors
should be identified and counter-balanced will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case – The Court in Jarnail Singh found
D
no fault with M. Nagaraj case regarding the test for determining the
adequacy of representation in promotional posts in the State – It is
for the State to assess the inadequacy of representation of SCs and
STs in promotional posts, by taking into account relevant factors –
Reservation.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts. 16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B) E
and 335 – Reservation in promotion – Quantifiable data regarding
inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs – Review of – Period
for review – In M. Nagaraj case the key issue that was identified
and decided by the Supreme Court was whether any constitutional
limitation mentioned in Art.16(4) and Art.335 stood obliterated by F
the constitutional amendments resulting in Arts. 16(4-A) and 16(4-
B) – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional amendments –
The amendments were held to be enabling provisions – It was
observed that the State is not bound to make reservation for SCs
and STs in matters of promotion, however, if it wishes to exercise its
discretion, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing the G
backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that
class in public employment, in addition to compliance with Art.335
of the Constitution – Should there be a time period for reviewing
inadequacy of representation – Held: Data collected to determine
inadequacy of representation for the purpose of providing H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A reservation in promotions needs to be reviewed periodically – The
period for review should be reasonable and is left to the Government
to set out – Reservation.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts.16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B),
142 and 335 – Reservation in promotion – Prospective operation
B of the judgment in M. Nagaraj case – In M. Nagaraj case the key
issue that was identified and decided by the Supreme Court was
whether any constitutional limitation mentioned in Art.16(4) and
Art.335 stood obliterated by the constitutional amendments resulting
in Arts. 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) – The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional amendments – The amendments were held to be
C enabling provisions – It was observed that the State is not bound to
make reservation for SCs and STs in matters of promotion, however,
if it wishes to exercise its discretion, the State has to collect
quantifiable data showing the backwardness of the class and
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment, in
D addition to compliance with Art.335 of the Constitution – Whether
the judgment in M. Nagaraj case can be said to operate prospectively
– Held: In Golak Nath and Ashok Kumar cases, it was laid down that
Art. 142 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to mould
the relief to do complete justice – The purpose of holding that
M. Nagaraj would have prospective effect is only to avoid chaos
E and confusion that would ensue from its retrospective operation, as
it would have a debilitating effect on a very large number of
employees, who may have availed of reservation in promotions
without there being strict compliance of the conditions prescribed
in M. Nagaraj case – Most of them would have already retired from
F service on attaining the age of superannuation – The judgment of
M. Nagaraj was delivered in 2006, interpreting Art.16(4-A) of the
Constitution which came into force in 1995 – As making the
principles laid down in M. Nagaraj effective from the year 1995
would be detrimental to the interests of a number of civil servants
and would have an effect of unsettling the seniority of individuals
G over a long period of time, the judgment of M. Nagaraj should be
declared to have prospective effect – Reservation.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts.16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B)
and 335 – Reservation in promotion – Quantifiable data regarding
inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs – In M. Nagaraj case
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 715

the key issue that was identified and decided by the Supreme Court A
was whether any constitutional limitation mentioned in Art.16(4)
and Art.335 stood obliterated by the constitutional amendments
resulting in Arts. 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) – The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutional amendments – The amendments were held to be
enabling provisions – It was observed that the State is not bound to
B
make reservation for SCs and STs in matters of promotion, however,
if it wishes to exercise its discretion, the State has to collect
quantifiable data showing the backwardness of the class and
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment, in
addition to compliance with Art.335 of the Constitution – Whether
quantifiable data showing inadequacy of representation can be C
collected on the basis of sampling methods, as held by the court in
B.K. Pavitra II case – Held: The State should justify reservation in
promotions with respect to the cadre to which promotion is made –
Taking into account the data pertaining to a ‘group’, which would
be an amalgamation of certain cadres in a service, would not give
D
the correct picture of the inadequacy of representation of SCs and
STs in the cadre in relation to which reservation in promotions is
sought to be made – For collection of quantifiable data to assess
representation of SCs and STs for providing reservation in
promotions, cadre, which is a part of a ‘group’, is the unit and the
data has to be collected with respect to each cadre – Therefore, the E
conclusion of the court in B.K. Pavitra II case approving the
collection of data on the basis of ‘groups’ and not cadres is contrary
to the law laid down in M. Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh cases.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Art.142 – Art.142 of the
Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to mould the relief to do F
complete justice.
Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of Prospective Overruling
– Discussed.
Administrative action – Judicial review of – Scope – Held: It
is neither legal nor proper for the Courts to issue directions or G
advisory sermons to the executive in respect of the sphere which is
exclusively within their domain under the Constitution.
Service Jurisprudence – Term “cadre” – Meaning and legal
connotation of – Discussed – Words and Phrases.
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A Answering the issues, the Court
HELD:
1. YARDSTICK FOR ARRIVING AT QUANTIFIABLE
DATA
B 1.1. Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A) of the Constitution are
enabling provisions. It was held in M. Nagaraj case that the
discretion of the State to provide reservation is subject to the
existence of backwardness and inadequacy of representation in
public employment. It was further held that backwardness has to
be based on objective factors whereas inadequacy has to factually
C exist. There is no fixed yardstick to identify equality, justice and
efficiency which are variable factors and it depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The Court was of the further
opinion that the concepts of efficiency, backwardness, inadequacy
of representation are required to be identified and measured on
D the basis of data. In case of a challenge made to reservations
provided by the State Government, it is incumbent on the State
Government to satisfy the Court that the decision is supported
by quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment,
in addition to compliance with Article 335 of the Constitution of
E India. [Para 11][732-E-H]
1.2. The exercise of identifying and measuring concepts of
efficiency, backwardness and inadequacy of representation on the
basis of data depends on numerous factors. It is for this reason
that the enabling provisions are required to be made because
F each competing claim seeks to achieve certain goals. How best
one should optimise these conflicting claims can only be done by
the administration in the context of local prevailing conditions in
public employment. [Para 12][733-A-B]
1.3. It is well-established that it is neither legal nor proper
G for the Courts to issue directions or advisory sermons to the
executive in respect of the sphere which is exclusively within
their domain under the Constitution. [Para 14][733-A-D]
1.4. Determination of inadequate representation of SCs and
STs in services under a State is left to the discretion of the State,
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 717

as the determination depends upon myriad factors which the court A
cannot envisage. A conscious decision was taken by the court in
M. Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh to leave it to the States to fix the
criteria for determining inadequacy of representation. The
submission of the Attorney General for India that the court has
to lay down the yardstick for measuring adequacy of
B
representation did not yield a favourable result as the court in
Jarnail Singh found it befitting for the States to have the liberty
to evaluate the representation of SCs and STs in public
employment. Laying down of criteria for determining the
inadequacy of representation would result in curtailing the
discretion given to the State Governments. In addition, the C
prevailing local conditions, which may require to be factored in,
might not be uniform. Moreover, in M. Nagaraj, the Court made
it clear that the validity of law made by the State Governments
providing reservation in promotions shall be decided on a case-
to-case basis for the purpose of establishing whether the
D
inadequacy of representation is supported by quantifiable data.
Therefore, no yardstick can be laid down by the court for
determining the adequacy of representation of SCs and STs in
promotional posts for the purpose of providing reservation. [Para
16][734-D-H]
2. UNIT FOR COLLECTING QUANTIFIABLE DATA E

2.1. In M.Nagaraj case, the Court observed that the
appropriate Government has to apply cadre strength as a unit in
the operation of the roster in order to ascertain whether a given
class/group is adequately represented in the service. Cadre
strength as a unit also ensures that the upper ceiling limit of 50 F
per cent is not violated. Following the law laid down in R.K.
Sabharwal, the court in M. Nagaraj further held that the roster
has to be post-specific and not vacancy based. [Para 19][736-A-
B]
2.2. In M. Nagaraj case, the Court held that it is open to G
the State to provide for reservation in promotions subject to
limitation that there must exist compelling reasons for
backwardness, inadequacy of representation in a class of post(s)
keeping in mind the overall administrative efficiency. While
H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A referring to the roster, the Court observed that the appropriate
Government has to apply the cadre strength as a unit in the
operation of the roster in order to ascertain whether a given class/
group is adequately represented in the service. Collection of
quantifiable data regarding inadequacy of representation as
stipulated by M. Nagaraj is relatable to the cadre concerned,
B
according to Jarnail Singh. [Para 20][736-B-D]
2.3. It is clear from the statutory regime and the law laid
down by the Supreme Court that civil posts under the
Government are organised into different services. A service
constitutes ‘classes’/ ‘groups’ of posts. A ‘class’/‘group’ is further
C bifurcated into grades. Though the nomenclature might be
different, the structure of services under the Union and the States
is similar. According to the instructions issued by the Union of
India, cadres are constituted for each grade. Fundamental Rule
9(4) defines “cadre” to mean the strength of a service or part of
D a service sanctioned as a separate unit. It is the choice of a State
to constitute cadres. The entire service cannot be considered to
be a cadre for the purpose of promotion from one post to a higher
post in a different grade. Promotion is made from one grade to
the next higher grade, in relation to which cadres are constituted.
A cadre is constituted by the Government by taking into account
E several factors within its sole discretion. [Para 28][741-C-F]
2.4. In the Office Memorandum dated 02.07.1997, the
Union of India set out the principles for making and operating
post-based rosters, in which it has been expressly stated that
cadre is to be construed as the number of posts in a particular
F grade. It is made clear that rosters have been prepared grade-
wise which are reviewed on a yearly basis and that reservation in
promotions is implemented on the basis of these rosters, which
operate grade-wise. In M. Nagaraj, the Supreme Court approved
that the percentage of reservation in promotions was to be applied
G to the entire cadre strength, as held in R.K. Sabharwal. While
doing so, the court in M. Nagaraj made it clear that the unit for
operation of the roster would be the cadre strength. Before
providing for reservation in promotions to a cadre, the State is
obligated to collect quantifiable data regarding inadequacy of

H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 719

representation of SCs and STs. Collection of information A
regarding inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs cannot
be with reference to the entire service or ‘class’/‘group’ but it
should be relatable to the grade/category of posts to which
promotion is sought. Cadre, which should be the unit for the
purpose of collection of quantifiable data in relation to the
B
promotional post(s), would be meaningless if data pertaining to
representation of SCs and STs is with reference to the entire
service. [Para 29][741-F-H; 742-A-B]
3. PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION AS TEST OF
ADEQUACY
C
In R.K. Sabharwal, it was observed that State Governments
may take the total population of a particular Backward Class and
its representation in the State services for the purpose of coming
to a conclusion that there is inadequate representation in the
State services. In M. Nagaraj, the Court was of the considered
view that the exercise of collecting quantifiable data depends on D
numerous factors, with conflicting claims to be optimised by the
administration in the context of local prevailing conditions in
public employment. As equity, justice and efficiency are variable
factors and are context-specific, how these factors should be
identified and counter-balanced will depend on the facts and E
circumstances of each case. The Court in Jarnail Singh found no
fault with M. Nagaraj regarding the test for determining the
adequacy of representation in promotional posts in the State.
While emphasising the contrast in the language used between
Article 330 and Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) of the Constitution,
the Court declined the invitation of the Attorney General for India F
to hold that the proportion of SCs and STs to the population of
India should be the test for determining inadequacy of
representation in promotional posts. Therefore, this Court is not
persuaded to express any opinion on this aspect. It is for the
State to assess the inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs G
in promotional posts, by taking into account relevant factors. [Para
30][742-C-G]
4. TIME PERIOD FOR REVIEW
There is near unanimity amongst the counsel for both sides
that the data collected to establish inadequacy of representation, H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A which forms the basis for providing reservation for promotions,
should be reviewed periodically. This Court is not inclined to
express any view on discontinuation of reservations in totality,
which is completely within the domain of the legislature and the
executive. As regards review, the data collected to determine
inadequacy of representation for the purpose of providing
B
reservation in promotions needs to be reviewed periodically. The
period for review should be reasonable and is left to the
Government to set out. [Para 31][742-H; 743-C-D]
5. PROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF THE JUDGMENT
IN M. NAGARAJ
C
In Golak Nath and Ashok Kumar cases, it was laid down that
Article 142 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to
mould the relief to do complete justice. The purpose of holding
that M. Nagaraj would have prospective effect is only to avoid
chaos and confusion that would ensue from its retrospective
D operation, as it would have a debilitating effect on a very large
number of employees, who may have availed of reservation in
promotions without there being strict compliance of the conditions
prescribed in M. Nagaraj. Most of them would have already
retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. The
E judgment of M. Nagaraj was delivered in 2006, interpreting Article
16(4-A) of the Constitution which came into force in 1995. As
making the principles laid down in M. Nagaraj effective from the
year 1995 would be detrimental to the interests of a number of
civil servants and would have an effect of unsettling the seniority
of individuals over a long period of time, it is necessary that the
F judgment of M.Nagaraj should be declared to have prospective
effect. [Para 42][752-G; 753-A-C]
6. QUANTIFIABLE DATA AND SAMPLING METHOD
6.1. Collection of quantifiable data for determining the
G inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs is a basic requirement
for providing reservation in promotions, as laid down by this court
in M. Nagaraj case. The unit for the purpose of collection of data
is a cadre, according to Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh. For the
purpose of collection of quantifiable data for providing reservation
in promotions, the entire service cannot be taken to be a unit
H and treated as a cadre. [Para 45][755-F-G]
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 721

6.2. The State should justify reservation in promotions with A
respect to the cadre to which promotion is made. Taking into
account the data pertaining to a ‘group’, which would be an
amalgamation of certain cadres in a service, would not give the
correct picture of the inadequacy of representation of SCs and
STs in the cadre in relation to which reservation in promotions is
B
sought to be made. Rosters are prepared cadre-wise and not
group-wise. Sampling method adopted by the Ratna Prabha
Committee (which submitted ‘Report on Backwardness,
Inadequacy of Representation and Administrative Efficiency in
Karnataka’) might be a statistical formula appropriate for
collection of data. However, for the purpose of collection of C
quantifiable data to assess representation of SCs and STs for the
purpose of providing reservation in promotions, cadre, which is
a part of a ‘group’, is the unit and the data has to be collected
with respect to each cadre. Therefore, the conclusion of the court
in B.K. Pavitra II approving the collection of data on the basis of
D
‘groups’ and not cadres is contrary to the law laid down by the
court in M. Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh. [Para 47][756-D-G]
M. Nagaraj & Ors.v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 8
SCC 212 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 – held
prospectively applicable.
E
I.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. [1967]
2 SCR 762 and Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of
U.P. & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 201 : [1997] 3 SCR 269 –
relied on.
A.K. Subraman & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1975) F
1 SCC 319 : [1975] 2 SCR 979; Dr Chakradhar
Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1988) 2 SCC 214 :
[1988] 3 SCR 130; Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of
India & Ors. 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl.
SCR 454; Union of India & Ors. v. Virpal Singh
Chauhan & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 684 : [1995] 4 Suppl. G
SCR 158; State of Tripura & Ors. v. Jayanta
Chakraborty & Ors. (2018) 1 SCC 146 : [2017] 11
SCR 247; State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Vijay Ghogre
& Ors. (2018) 17 SCC 261; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v.
Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Ors. (2018) 10 SCC 396 : H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A [2018] 10 SCR 663; B.K. Pavitra & Ors. v. Union of
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B
of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. 1989 Supp. 2 SCC 364:
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v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 745 : [1995] 2
SCR 35; K. Manickaraj v. Union of India (1997) 4 SCC
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D
& Anr. v. Lt. Governor & Ors. (2000) 1 SCC 644 : [1999]
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Thomas & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 6 SCC
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E of Orissa & Ors. 1991 Supp (1) SCC 430 : [1991]
2 SCR 105; Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. & Anr. v.
State of U.P. & Anr. (2001) 5 SCC 519 : [2001] 3 SCR
33; General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari
[1962] 2 SCR 586; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal
Action v. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 281 :
F
[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 507; Goan Real Estate and
Construction Limited & Anr. v. Union of India& Ors.
(2010) 5 SCC 388 : [2010] 3 SCR 1160; M.A. Murthy
v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 517 : [2003]
3 Suppl. SCR 327; Ashok Kumar Sharma & Anr. v.
G Chander Shekher & Anr. (Ashok Kumar Sharma case
No.I ) 1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR
768; Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Chander Shekhar
& Anr. (Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. II ) (1997) 4
SCC 18 : [1997] 2 SCR 896; H.H. Maharajadhiraja
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 723

& Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (1971) 1 SCC 85 : A
[1971] 3 SCR 9 and Girnar Traders v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 555 : [2007] 9 SCR
383 – referred to.
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co. 215 U.S. 349 (1910);
Linkletter v. Walker 1965 SCC Online US SC 126; Mapp B
v. Ohio 643 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States
232 U.S. 383 (1914); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25
(1949) – referred to.
Blackstone, Commentaries (15 th ed. 1809) – referred
to. C
Case Law Reference
[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 referred to Para 2
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 158 referred to Para 5
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 held prospectively D
applicable Para 7
[2017] 11 SCR 247 referred to Para 8
(2018) 17 SCC 261 referred to Para 8
[2018] 10 SCR 663 referred to Para 8 E

[2019] 7 SCR 1086 referred to Para 10
(2012) 7 SCC 1 referred to Para 12
[1990] 2 SCR 418 referred to Para 14
F
[1989] 3 SCR 19 referred to Para 14
(2002) 4 SCC 578 referred to Para 15
[1995] 2 SCR 35 referred to Para 17
[1975] 2 SCR 979 referred to Para 24
G
[1988] 3 SCR 130 referred to Para 24
[1997] 3 SCR 504 referred to Para 25
[2008] 11 SCR 440 referred to Para 25
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 559 referred to Para 26
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A [2016] 2 SCR 426 referred to Para 26
[1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 310 referred to Para 26
[1994] 1 SCR 754 referred to Para 33
[2000] 3 SCR 1081 referred to Para 33
B [1967] 2 SCR 762 relied on Para 34
[1997] 3 SCR 269 relied on Para 35
[1991] 2 SCR 105 referred to Para 35
[2001] 3 SCR 33 referred to Para 35
C
[1962] 2 SCR 586 referred to Para 38
[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 507 referred to Para 39
[2010] 3 SCR 1160 referred to Para 39
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 327 referred to Para 40
D
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 768 referred to Para 40
[1997] 2 SCR 896 referred to Para 40
[1971] 3 SCR 9 referred to Para 41
[2007] 9 SCR 383 referred to Para 41
E
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL/INHERENT JURISDICTION
: Civil Appeal No.629 Of 2022
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.07.2011 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.13218 of 2009.
F With
Civil Appeal Nos.630, 631, 632, 636, 635, 633, 637, 638, 642, 753,
759, 643-644, 646, 703-704, 735, 645, 713 And 648 of 2022, Civil Appeal
Nos.4876-4877, 4878-4879, 4880, 4881, 4882 of 2017, Civil Appeal
Nos.11817, 11816 And 11820 of 2016, Civil Appeal No.651 Of 2022,
G Civil Appeal Nos.4833 And 701-704 Of 2017, Civil Appeal Nos.11822-
11825, 11837-11840, 11842-11845, 11829-11832, 11847-11850 And 11828
of 2016, Contempt Petition (C) No.13 Of 2017 In Civil Appeal Nos.4562-
4564 of 2017, Civil Appeal Nos.734, 724-727, 736 of 2022, Contempt
Petition (C) No.11 Of 2017 In Civil Appeal Nos.4562-4564 of 2017,
Contempt Petition (C) No.314 Of 2016 In Slp (C) No.4831 of 2012,
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 725

Civil Appeal No.5247 Of 2016, T.p. (C) Nos.608-609 Of 2017, Civil A
Appeal Nos.652, 764, 656, 654-655, 647, 649, 650, 653, 657, 663, 754,
755, 768-775, 752, 659-660, 658, 683-694, 661, 765, 761-763, 777-780,
695-702, 766, 776, 767 And 662 of 2022, Slp (C)….@ Diary No.38895
of 2017, Civil Appeal Nos.677, 678, 670, 671, 679, 672, 673, 674, 707-
708, 782, 757, 715-723, 681-682, 756, 666, 750-751, 667, 747-749, 668-
B
669, 758 of 2022, Contempt Petition (C) No.985 of 2018 In Civil Appeal
No.5247 of 2016, Civil Appeal Nos.516, 705, 760, 675-676, 517-519,
706, 711, 634 And 680 of 2022, Contempt Petition (C) No.1067 of 2019
In Slp (C) No.30621 of 2011, Civil Appeal Nos.522-627, 714, 730, 729,
732 And 728 of 2022, Writ Petition (C) No.1371 of 2019, Civil Appeal
Nos.731 And 1078 Of 2022, Civil Appeal No.1004 of 2020, Civil Appeal C
No.2434 of 2019, Civil Appeal Nos.664, 738-739, 709-710, 737, 733,
741, 740, 742, 743, 744, 628, 745 And 746 of 2022, Contempt Petition
(C) Nos.200-201 of 2021 In Slp (C) Nos.5724-5725 of 2019, Contempt
Petition (C) Nos.211-212 of 2021 In Civil Appeal No.5247 of 2016, Writ
Petition (C) No.882 of 2021, Contempt Petition (C) Nos.378-379 of 2021
D
In Civil Appeal Nos.11837-11840 of 2016
K. K. Venugopal, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Madhvi Divan, Balbir
Singh, Sanjay Jain, Vikramjit Banerjee, Rupinder Singh Suri, Aman Lekhi,
ASGs, Saurabh Mishra, Vinod Diwakar, AAGs, R. Balasubramanium,
K. M. Nataraj, P. S. Patwalia, Ms. Kiran Suri, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Dr.
Menaka Gurusamy, R. D. Agrawala, Sanjay R. Hegde, Ranjit Kumar, E
Krishnan Venugopal, Shyam Divan, Nidhesh Gupta, Rana Mukherjee,
Ms. Indira Jaising, Atul Yeshwant Chitale, Ms. Soumya Chakraborty,
Ms. Priya Hingorani, Ms. Nalini Chidambaram, Rakesh Dwivedi, Basant
Kumar Choudhary, Dinesh Dwivedi, Gopal Shankar Narayan, D. K.
Goswami, V. K. Shukla, Rakesh Khanna, Kapil Sibal, Ashok Kumar F
Sharma, B. H. Marlapally, Arun Bhardwaj, Ms. Indira Jaising, Vinay Kr.
Garg, Sr. Advs., M. K. Maroria, Rajesh Ranjan, Shyam Gopal, Ms.
Shradha Deshmukh, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Ms. Chinmayee Chandra,
Apoorv Kurup, Siddhant Kohli, Ankur Talwar, Suhasini Sen, Ms.
Deepabali Dutta, A. K. Sharma, Amrish Kumar, B. V. Balaram Das,
Gurmeet Singh Makker, D. L. Chidanand, S. S. Rebello, Mehul Gupta, G
B. K. Satija, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Avneesh Arputham, M/s Arputham Aruna
and Co., Manish Kumar, Pratik R. Bombarde, Suraj Kumar, Devendra
Singh, Ajay Singh, Pradeep S. Wathore, Devendra Kumar, Abhishek
Kumar, Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Prakash, Ms. Rakhi M., Ms. Sruthi
Iyer, Ms. Neha Jain, Vaibhav Sabharwal, Dr. K. S. Chauhan, Ajit Kumar H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A Ekka, Murari Lal, R. S. M. Kalky, Ajit Kumar, Ravi Prakash, Sandeep
Malik, Sumit Kishore, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Sunil Kumar, S. P. Singh,
K. C. Lamba, Ramesh Kumar, Abhinav Mukerji, Ms. Pratishtha Vij,
Ms. Bihu Sharma, Akshay C. Shrivastava, Ms. Prerna Mehta, Naresh
Aditya Madhav, Ms. Shreyas Gacche, Vishal Jogdand, Ms. Swati Vaibhav,
Akshay Amritanshu, Dr. Gunratan Sadavarte, Dr. Jay Shree Patil, Raj
B
Singh Rana, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Pawan Kumar Shukla, Kamal Kumar
Pandey, Makrand Pratap Singh, S. J. Amith, Krishna Kumar, Dr. (Mrs.)
Vipin Gupta, Irshad Ahmad, Dr. Dinesh Rattan Bharadwaj, Anurag
Rawat, Som Raj Choudhury, Kumar Parimal, Smarhar Singh, Sanjeev
Chowdhary, Prashant R. Dahat, Sangharaj D. Rupwate, Vijay
C Nirbhavane, Akash Moon, Ms. Smita Kamble, Ms. Shraddha Vavhal,
Puneet Yadav, Sourabh Gupta, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Pradeep Kumar
Mathur, Chiranjeev Johri, Sameer Agrawal, Manoj Gorkela, M/s Gorkela
Law Office, Ms. Preeti Nair, Aditya Giri, Ms. Nikita Capoor, Shivendra
Singh, Ms. Apurva, Shuvodeep Roy, Ishaan Borthakaur, Deepak Jain,
Ms. Jaspreet Aulakh, Tanpreet Gulati, Georgey V. M., Ms. A. Sumathi,
D
Ms. Tanvi Kakar, Ansh Pandey, Atulesh Kumar, Ms. Suchitra A Chitale,
Mrinal Elker Mazumdar, Vansaja Shukla, Manish Yadav, Anuradha
Mishra, Shobhit Tiwari, Lal Pratap Singh, Umesh Pratap Singh, Arjun
Aggarwal, Bhaskar Aditya, Gaurav Kejriwal, Chandra Bhushan Prasad,
Kripa Shankar Prasad, Pradeep Aggarwal, Vishal Singh, Ms. N.
E Annapoorani, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sidheshwar Namdev Biradar,
Yash Prashant Sonavane, Yogesh Ramesh Joshi, Rajat Sehgal, Vikas
Mehta, Dr. Sukhdev Sharma, Dr. Shivani, J. B. Mudgil, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Suyash Guru, Amol Shrivasta,
Sandeep Devashish Das, Ms. Alka Sinha, Anuvrat Sharma, Chandan
Kumar, Mayan Prasad, P. Soma Sundaram, Suyash Mohan Guru, Ms.
F
Lalita Kaushik, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Manan Bansal, D. S. Rawat, Kumar
Parimal, Smarhar Singh, Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Ankur Chibber, H. S. Tiwari,
Anshuman Mehrotra, Nikunj Arora, Harsh Dhankar, Santosh Kumar
Pandey, P. V. Yogeswaran, Babul Kumar, Randheer Singh, Amit Pal,
Vaibhav Joshi, Suhaas Ratna Joshi, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Anmol
G Chandan, G. S. Makker, Praveen Jain, Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan, Fuzail
Ahmad Ayyubi, Ms. Kanishka Prasad, Ibad Mushtaq, M. L. Lahoty,
Paban K Sharma, Anchit Sripat, P. N. Sharma, Himanshu Gupta, Manoj
C. Mishra, Ms. Rekha Pandey, L. C. Patne, Raghav Pandey, Aldanish
Rein, Ms. Maheravish Rein, Sanjay Kharde, Satyajeet Kharde, Sunil
Kumar Verma, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, S. Asif Ali Zaidi, Ms. D. Bharathi
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 727

Reddy, Mrigank Prabhakar, Ms. Trishna Das, Ms. Sakshi Banga, Ms. A
Tanuj Bagga, Saharsh Jauhari, Kuldeep Singh, Aditya Soni, M. Gireesh
Kumar, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Shivam Singh, Yasharth Kant, B.
Karunakaran, M. R. Jothimanian, K. Balu, G. Sanjay, S. Gowthaman,
Nitin Meshram, Sourabh Singh, Rishi Raj Singh, Ranbir Singh Yadav,
Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Ms. Mrinal Kanwar, Sajal
B
Jain, Sudarshan Rajan, Mahesh Kumar, Ramesh Rawat, Hiten Bajaj,
Rohit Bhardwaj, A. Venkatesh, ADN Rao, Rahul Mishra, Ms. Ananya
Khandelwal, Ms. Sangeetha MR, Ms. Agrimaa Singh, Vishal Gupta,
Dheeresh Kumar Dwivedi, Avijit Bhattacharjee, Ms. Upma Shrivastava,
Abhay Kant Mishra, Dinesh P. Rajbhar, Mayank C. L. Gupta, Ms. Anzu
K. Varkey, Uday Gupta, Ms. Shivani M. Lal, Hiren Dasan, M. K. Tripathi, C
Harish Dasan, Rajiv Ranjan, Mohan Pandey, Avijit Mani Tripathi, Ms.
Tarini K. Nayak, Somesh Chandra Jha, Upendra Mishra, Vinod Kumar,
Satpal Singh, Anjali Dubey, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Satish Kumar, Sridhar
Potaraju, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Aayush, Abhay
Kumar, Sriharsh Nahush Bundela, Kumar Milind, Shagun Ruhil, Vishal
D
Nautiyal, Kumar Parimal, Smarhar Singh, Sachin Patil, Rahul Chitnis,
Rakesh Rathod, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Namit Saxena,
Sudhanshu Chandra, Awnish Maithani, Ms. Arushi Dhawan, P. V. Dinesh,
Vikalp Mudgal, Kshitij Mudgal, Ms. Monica Goel, Nihal Rathore, Satya
Mitra, Ms. K. Saradadevi, R. Vijaynandan Reddy, Naresh Kaushik,
Vardhman Kaushik, Ms. Lalitha Kaushik, B. Purushottama Reddy, Manoj E
Joshi, Dhruv Joshi, Satyajit A Desai, Ms. Anagha S Desai, Siddharth
Gautam, Himanshu Sharma, Amit Anand Tiwari, Ms. Shakun Sharma,
Ms. Mary Mitzy, Ms. Devyani Gupta, Ms. Damini Thaker, Ms. Mrigna
Shekhar, Brajesh Pandey, Ms. Suchita Dixit, Rajeev Dixit, Anilendra
Pandey, Ashok K Mahajan, Ms. Gauraan, Abhishek Sharma, Rahul
F
Kumar Sharma, Ms. Amita Singh Kalkal, K. K. L. Gautam, Chicalwar
Rastrapal, A. K. Suman, Manoj Sharma, Aditya Agarwal, Abhishek
Gurawa, Sandeep Kr. Singh, K. S. Rathod, Ravi Bharuka, Ms. Sarvshree,
Justine George, Ankit Agarwal, Manas Syal, Devashish Bharuka, Sunil
Fernandes, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Prastut Dalvi, Paras Nath Singh, Ms.
Ujjaini Chatterjee, Darpan Sachdeva, Shubham Sharma, Ms. Gyan Mitra, G
Vishwa Pal Singh, Brijender Singh Dhull, Vikas Gothwal, Ashish Pandey,
Dr. Pooja Jha, Ms. Nandita Jha, Anil Kumar, Vijay Pal, Varinder Kumar
Sharma, Sushil Karanjkar, Dhawesh Pahuja, K. N. Rai, Gaurav Agarwal,
Shivaji M Jadhav, Anish R Shah, Ms. Qurratulain, Brij Kishor Sah, Aditya
S. Jadhav, Nicholas Chaudhary, M/s S. M. Jadhav and Company, Satya
H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A Prakash Gautam, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Dr. K. S.
Chauhan, M. Vijaya Bhaskar, Ravi Prakash, Sandeep Malik, Ramesh
Kumar, Ravindra Kumar, Navjot Neelam, Prakash Yadav, Yadav
Narender Singh, Parv Garg, Pawas Kulshrestha, Karandeep Singh Rekhi,
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Arvind S. Avhad, Shantanu Krishna, B. Krishna
Prasad, R. C. Kaushik, Samir Ali Khan, B. Sridhar, Kuldip Singh, Mrs.
B
Anil Katiyar, M. K. Dua, Ravindra Kumar, Gopal Singh, Rahul Kaushik,
Hrishikesh Baruah, Ms. Christi Jain, Arjun Garg, Nikilesh Ramachandran,
Ms. Chandan Ramamurthi, M. C. Dhingra, P. N. Puri, Anil Kumar Mishra,
Ranjan Mukherjee, S. N. Bhat, Prashant Bhushan, Sanjeev Malhotra,
Dhananjay Garg, Advs. for the appearing parties.
C Respondent-in-person
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. Leave granted (except Diary No.38895/2017).
D
2. Reservation of 27 per cent in favour of backward classes was
the subject matter of dispute in Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of
India & Ors.1. This Court was of the opinion that Article 16(4) of the
Constitution of India does not provide for reservation in the matter of
promotions. It was clarified that the judgment shall have prospective
E operation and shall not affect the promotions already made, whether
made on regular or on any other basis. Reservation provided in the matter
of promotions in the Central services or State services were directed to
be continued for a period of five years from the date of the judgment.
3. By the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995,
F which came into force on 17.06.1995, Article 16 of the Constitution was
amended by insertion of Article 16(4-A), which then read as below:-
“Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any
class or classes of posts in the services under the State in
G favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately
represented in the services under the State”.
4. The above amendment was made in view of the State’s opinion
that representation of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
1
H 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 729
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

(“SCs” and “STs”) in services in the States had not reached the required A
level and that it was necessary to continue the existing dispensation by
providing reservation in promotions. Therefore, the Government decided
to continue the existing policy of reservation in promotions for the SCs
and the STs, according to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995.
B
5. In Union of India & Ors. v. Virpal Singh Chauhan & Ors.2,
this Court held that roster-point promotees who were given the benefit
of accelerated promotion would not get consequential seniority. As the
Government was of the opinion that the concept of “catch-up” rule was
not in the interest of SCs and STs in the matter of seniority on promotion,
Article 16(4-A) was further amended by the Constitution (Eighty-fifth C
Amendment) Act, 2001 to give the benefit of consequential seniority in
addition to accelerated promotion. At present, Article 16(4-A) reads as
follows:-
“(4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, D
with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts
in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the
State, are not adequately represented in the services under
the State.” E
6. A number of vacancies which were reserved for SCs and STs
could not be filled up due to non-availability of candidates belonging to
these categories. Such of these vacancies which were not filled up were
treated as “backlog vacancies” and were carried forward. In Indra
Sawhney (supra), this Court held that reservations contemplated in a F
year under Article 16(4) shall not exceed 50 per cent. In practice, backlog
vacancies were not included within the ceiling of 50 per cent reservation
in a year. An office memorandum was issued on 29.08.1997 making the
50 per cent limit applicable to current as well as backlog vacancies, in
accordance with Indra Sawhney (supra). Thereafter, several
representations were made to the Central Government about the injustice G
that would be caused to the members of SCs and STs in view of the
office memorandum dated 29.08.1997, which led to a further amendment
to Article 16 of the Constitution of India, by insertion of Article 16(4-B)
2
(1995) 6 SCC 684
H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A by the Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000. Article 16(4-B)
reads as under: -
“(4-B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are
reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with
B any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause
(4-A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any
succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall
not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in
which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of
fifty per cent reservation on total number of vacancies of
C
that year.”
7. The validity of the above amendments made to Article 16 (4)
was considered by this Court in M. Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India
& Ors.3. The key issue that was identified and decided in M. Nagaraj
(supra) is whether any constitutional limitation mentioned in Article 16(4)
D
and Article 335 stood obliterated by the constitutional amendments
resulting in Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B). This Court upheld the
constitutional amendments. The amendments were held to be enabling
provisions. This Court observed that the State is not bound to make
reservation for SCs and STs in matters of promotion. However, if it
E wishes to exercise its discretion, the State has to collect quantifiable
data showing the backwardness of the class and inadequacy of
representation of that class in public employment, in addition to compliance
with Article 335 of the Constitution of India.
8. This Court in State of Tripura & Ors. v. Jayanta Chakraborty
F & Ors. 4 referred M. Nagaraj (supra) to a larger bench for
reconsideration. Further, in State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Vijay
Ghogre & Ors.5, this Court thought it appropriate that the request for
reconsideration of the judgment in M. Nagaraj (supra) should be heard
by a constitution bench. The request made for referring M. Nagaraj
(supra) to a seven-judge bench was not entertained by this Court in
G Jarnail Singh & Ors. v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Ors. 6.However,
the conclusion arrived at in M. Nagaraj (supra) relating to collection of
3
(2006) 8 SCC 212
4
(2018) 1 SCC 146
5
(2018) 17 SCC 261
6
H (2018) 10 SCC 396
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 731
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

quantifiable data showing backwardness of the SCs and the STs was A
held to be invalid as the same was contrary to a larger bench judgment
of this Court in Indra Sawhney (supra), wherein it had been held by the
Court that conditions of social and educational backwardness are
presumed to be satisfied in case of SCs and STs as they are identified
and grouped as such because of prior discrimination and its continuing ill
B
effects. The Court rejected the remaining grounds of challenge to the
decision in M. Nagaraj (supra) and reiterated that the State has to
collect quantifiable data regarding inadequate representation of SCs and
STs in the services of the State, if reservation is sought to be provided in
promotions.
9. In the meanwhile, some High Courts have dealt with matters C
where reservation in promotions provided by the Central Government
and the State Governments to SCs and STs have been assailed as being
violative of the law laid down by this Court in M. Nagaraj (supra). The
judgments of the High Courts have been challenged before this Court.
In view of the broad similarities in the issues involved, all the cases were D
tagged together. On 18.01.2021, a direction was given to the Advocates-
on-Record appearing for each State to submit a note to the learned
Attorney General for India, identifying the issues involved in their
respective cases. The learned Attorney General for India was requested
to hold a conference with the counsel appearing in the matters to finalise
the issues for determination and a list of issues with reference to each E
State was directed to be prepared thereafter. A note was submitted by
the learned Attorney General formulating issues that arise for our
consideration.
10. When the matter was listed for hearing on 14.09.2021, it was
made clear that this Court would not entertain any arguments for F
reconsideration of the law laid down by this Court in M. Nagaraj (supra)
as a constitution bench in Jarnail Singh (supra) had rejected such a
request. This Court was informed that the cases in this batch of matters
can be bifurcated into eleven categories. As the common issues that
have been raised could be decided without reference to the facts of G
each case, the learned counsel appearing for the parties were requested
to make submissions on the issues that had been identified by the learned
Attorney General. After considering the issues identified by the learned
Attorney General and other learned counsel and hearing them, the
following six points are formulated for determination:-
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A 1) What is the yardstick by which, according to M. Nagaraj
(supra), one would arrive at quantifiable data showing
inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs in public
employment?
2) What is the unit with respect to which quantifiable data
B showing inadequacy of representation is required to be
collected?
3) Whether proportion of the population of SCs and STs to the
population of India should be taken to be the test for
determining adequacy of representation in promotional posts
for the purposes of Article 16(4-A)?
C
4) Should there be a time period for reviewing inadequacy of
representation?
5) Whether the judgment in M. Nagaraj (supra) can be said
to operate prospectively?
6) Whether quantifiable data showing inadequacy of
D
representation can be collected on the basis of sampling
methods, as held by this Court in B.K. Pavitra & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors.7(“B.K. Pavitra II”)?
1) YARDSTICK FOR ARRIVING AT QUANTIFIABLE
DATA
E
11. Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A) are enabling provisions. It was
held in M. Nagaraj (supra) that the discretion of the State to provide
reservation is subject to the existence of backwardness and inadequacy
of representation in public employment. It was further held that
backwardness has to be based on objective factors whereas inadequacy
F has to factually exist. There is no fixed yardstick to identify equality,
justice and efficiency which are variable factors and it depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. This Court was of the further
opinion that the concepts of efficiency, backwardness, inadequacy of
representation are required to be identified and measured on the basis of
data. In case of a challenge made to reservations provided by the State
G Government, it is incumbent on the State Government to satisfy the Court
that the decision is supported by quantifiable data showing backwardness
of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public
employment, in addition to compliance with Article 335 of the Constitution
of India.
H 7
(2019) 16 SCC 129
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 733
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

12. The exercise of identifying and measuring concepts of A
efficiency, backwardness and inadequacy of representation on the basis
of data depends on numerous factors. It is for this reason that the enabling
provisions are required to be made because each competing claim seeks
to achieve certain goals. How best one should optimise these conflicting
claims can only be done by the administration in the context of local
B
prevailing conditions in public employment.8
13. The learned Attorney General argued before this Court in
Jarnail Singh (supra) that this Court did not indicate any test for
determining adequacy of representation in service in M. Nagaraj (supra).
He submitted that it is important to decide the yardstick applicable for
arriving at quantifiable data showing inadequacy of representation of C
SCs and STs to avoid multiple litigation. This Court refused to lay down
any criteria for determining the adequacy of representation, as the States
were given liberty to determine the factors relevant for deciding adequate
representation, depending upon the promotional posts in question.
14. It is well-established that it is neither legal nor proper for the D
Courts to issue directions or advisory sermons to the executive in respect
of the sphere which is exclusively within their domain under the
Constitution9. In Asif Hameed & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir
& Ors.10, this Court observed as under: -
“When a State action is challenged, the function of the court E
is to examine the action in accordance with law and to
determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted
within the powers and functions assigned under the
Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action.
While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed F
limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate
branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial
review of administrative action, the court is not an Appellate
Authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct
or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize
qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the G
sphere of legislature or executive…”.

8
Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar & Ors.(2012) 7 SCC 1
9
Mallikarjuna Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.(1990) 2 SCC 707
10
1989 Supp (2) SCC 364
H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A 15. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka 11, R. C.
Lahoti, J. referred to a monograph “Judicial Activism and
Constitutional Democracy in India”by T.R. Andhyarujina, in his
judgment. While lauding judicial activism, a note of caution was sounded
in the said monograph to the effect that the Supreme Court should leave
“the decision-making to other branches of government after
B
directing their attention to the problems rather than itself entering
into the remedial field”. The following sentences from the monograph
are very well borne out in this particular context: “…courts lack the
facilities to gather detailed data or to make probing enquiries.
Reliance on advocates who appear before them for data is likely to
C give them partisan or inadequate information. On the other hand if
courts have to rely on their own knowledge or research it is bound
to be selective and subjective. … Moreover, since courts mandate
for isolated cases, their decrees make no allowance for the differing
and varying situations which administrators will encounter in
applying the mandates to other cases.”
D
16. Determination of inadequate representation of SCs and STs
in services under a State is left to the discretion of the State, as the
determination depends upon myriad factors which this Court cannot
envisage. A conscious decision was taken by this Court in M. Nagaraj
(supra) and Jarnail Singh (supra) to leave it to the States to fix the
E criteria for determining inadequacy of representation. The submission
of the learned Attorney General for India that this Court has to lay down
the yardstick for measuring adequacy of representation did not yield a
favourable result as this Court in Jarnail Singh (supra) found it befitting
for the States to have the liberty to evaluate the representation of SCs
F and STs in public employment. Laying down of criteria for determining
the inadequacy of representation would result in curtailing the discretion
given to the State Governments. In addition, the prevailing local conditions,
which may require to be factored in, might not be uniform. Moreover, in
M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court made it clear that the validity of law
made by the State Governments providing reservation in promotions shall
G be decided on a case-to-case basis for the purpose of establishing whether
the inadequacy of representation is supported by quantifiable data.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that no yardstick can be laid down by
this Court for determining the adequacy of representation of SCs and
STs in promotional posts for the purpose of providing reservation.
H 11
(2002) 4 SCC 578
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 735
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

2) UNIT FOR COLLECTING QUANTIFIABLE DATA A
17. Seniority of Superintending Engineers in the Irrigation
Department of the State of Punjab was the subject matter of a writ
petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in R.K.
Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.12.The relevant instructions
issued by the State of Punjab provided for 14 per cent reservation for B
SCs. Two points came up for consideration before this Court in the said
judgment, the first being that in case more than 14 per cent of the Scheduled
Caste candidates are appointed/promoted in a cadre on their own merit/
seniority, then the purpose of reservation having been achieved in the
said cadre, the Government instructions providing reservations would
become inoperative. The second point on which arguments were heard C
is that roster cannot operate once the posts earmarked for the SCs, STs
and Backward Classes are filled. Any post falling vacant in a cadre,
thereafter, is to be filled from the category - reserved or general - due to
retirement etc. of whose member the post fell vacant. The first point
raised by general category candidates was rejected by this Court by D
holding that reserved category candidates can compete for non-reserved
posts and in the event of their appointment to the said posts, their number
cannot be added and taken into consideration for working out the
percentage of reservation. This Court was of the opinion that Article
16(4) of the Constitution of India enables the State Government to make
provision for reservation in favour of any Backward Class of citizens E
which, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the
services. The percentage of posts reserved for Backward Classes, as
prescribed by the State, has to be strictly followed and cannot be varied
or changed simply because some members of the Backward Class have
already been appointed/promoted against the general seats. F
18. The second point relates to the implementation of the roster in
the form of “running account” year to year. Roster points were fixed in
a lot of 100 posts. This Court held that once 14 per cent posts earmarked
in the roster are filled up, the result envisaged by the instructions is
achieved. Thereafter, there is no justification for operating the roster.
This Court observed that the “running account” is to operate only till the G
quota provided by the instructions is reached and not thereafter. The
vacancies arising in the cadre, after the initial posts are filled, will have
to be filled from amongst the category to which the post belonged in the
roster.
12
(1995) 2 SCC 745 H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A 19. In M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court observed that the appropriate
Government has to apply cadre strength as a unit in the operation of the
roster in order to ascertain whether a given class/group is adequately
represented in the service. Cadre strength as a unit also ensures that the
upper ceiling limit of 50 per cent is not violated. Following the law laid
down in R.K. Sabharwal (supra), this Court in M. Nagaraj (supra)
B
further held that the roster has to be post-specific and not vacancy based.
20. In M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court held that it is open to the
State to provide for reservation in promotions subject to limitation that
there must exist compelling reasons for backwardness, inadequacy of
representation in a class of post(s) keeping in mind the overall
C administrative efficiency. While referring to the roster, this Court
observed that the appropriate Government has to apply the cadre strength
as a unit in the operation of the roster in order to ascertain whether a
given class/group is adequately represented in the service. Collection of
quantifiable data regarding inadequacy of representation as stipulated
D by M. Nagaraj (supra) is relatable to the cadre concerned, according to
Jarnail Singh (supra).
21. While it is clear that the unit for collection of quantifiable data
is with respect to a cadre, it is necessary to understand what cadre
means. For a better appreciation, it would be profitable to relate to the
E historical background of the concerned rules applicable to services under
the Centre as well as the states. In exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (2) of Section 96B of the Government of India Act, 1919,
the Secretary of State in Council made the Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Public services in India were classified
as per Rule 14 of the said Rules in the following manner: (i) the all India
F Services; (ii) the Central Services, Class-I; (iii) the Central Services,
Class-II; (iv) the Provincial Services; (v) the Specialist Services; and
(vi) the Subordinate Services. The First Central Pay Commission
considered the classification of services to “secure fair treatment to
the employees on the basis of their services to Government, fair
G return to the Government for the salary paid to its employees, and
relative fairness to employees in different kinds of position on the
basis of the nature of the duties performed”. According to the Report
of the First Central Pay Commission, the Central Services were broadly
divided into four categories, i.e., Class I, Class II, Subordinate Services
and Inferior Services. After taking note of some objections regarding
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 737
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

the use of the words “subordinate” and “inferior” as being derogatory, A
the First Central Pay Commission recommended that those categories
be referred to as Class III and Class IV. The classification of the Civil
Services of the Union of India as per the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (“CCA Rules, 1965”)
is: (1) Central Civil Services, Class I; (2) Central Civil Services; Class
B
II; (3) Central Civil Services, Class III; and (4) Central Civil Services,
Class IV. Rule 4 of the said Rules provides that a particular class can
comprise of different grades. All civil posts under the Union were
reclassified from ‘Class’ to ‘Group’ by way of the notification of the
Government of India in the Department of Personnel and Administrative
Reforms number S.O. 5041 dated 11.11.1975 and as recorded in Rule 6- C
A of the CCA Rules, 1965. Thereafter, the Central Civil Services/the
Central Civil Posts were organised into Group ‘A’, Group ‘B’, Group
‘C’ and Group ‘D’. The present structure of the Central Civil Services
is that a particular Service is divided across Groups, which further consist
of grades.
D
22. During the course of the hearing, the Union of India has filed
an affidavit informing this Court of the compliance of the conditions
prescribed in M. Nagaraj (supra) before making reservation in
promotions in services under the Centre. The Union of India referred to
an Office Memorandum dated 02.07.1997, which heavily relied on R.K.
Sabharwal (supra), wherein this Court had held that the cadre-strength E
is always measured by the number of posts comprising the cadre. Right
to be considered for appointment can only be claimed in respect of a
post in a cadre. As a consequence, the percentage of reservation has to
be worked out in relation to the number of posts which form the cadre-
strength. The Union of India has brought to the notice of this Court that F
there are around 90 Ministries/Departments under the Government of
India in which 30 lakh employees are working. Referring to information
received from 44 Ministries/Departments out of the 90, the Union of
India has stated that there are around 3800 cadres. We were also apprised
of the fact that instructions have been in existence since 2013 for
appointment of an officer of the rank of Deputy Secretary to the G
Government of India as a Liaison Officer, who is responsible for ensuring
compliance of the instructions on reservation. According to the affidavit
filed by the Union of India, thousands of reservation rosters are being
maintained in the various offices/units/sub-units of the Departments and
Ministries in the Government of India. Office Memorandum dated H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A 02.07.1997 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and
Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India
contains principles for preparing the rosters. According to para 4(c) of
the said Office Memorandum, “cadre”, for the purpose of a roster, shall
mean a particular grade and shall comprise the number of posts to be
filled by a particular mode of recruitment in terms of the applicable
B
recruitment rules. Explanatory Notes which are appended to the Office
Memorandum dated 02.07.1997 elaborate the principles for making and
operating post-based rosters. Para 5 of the Explanatory Notes reads as
follows:
“While cadre is generally to be construed as the number of posts
C in a particular grade, for the purpose of preparation of roster, it
shall comprise posts required to be filled by a particular mode of
recruitment in terms of the applicable recruitment rules. To
illustrate, in a cadre comprising 200 posts, where the recruitment
rules prescribe a ratio of 50:50 for direct recruitment and
D promotions, the roster for direct recruitment shall have 100 points
and that for promotion shall have 100 points – thus making a total
of 200.”
23. The Union of India has filed the prevalent service rules of the
States of Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Rajasthan,
E Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh for the purpose of
demonstrating the implementation of reservation in promotions in services
under these States. Rule 2(8) of the Andhra Pradesh State and
Subordinate Services Rules, 1996 defines “cadre” as posts in various
classes, categories and grades in a service. “Service” has been defined
in Rule 2(30) as a post or a group of posts or categories of posts classified
F by the State Government as State or Subordinate Service, as the case
may be. Rule 22 which deals with Special Representation (Reservation)
empowers the State Government to make a provision for reservation in
promotions. The said Rule refers to the implementation of a 100-point
roster for promotion to the next higher category. It would be relevant to
G refer to the reservation policy of the State of Punjab according to which
reservation for SCs and STs is on the basis of roster registers maintained
for each category of posts. The State of Himachal Pradesh has decided
to provide reservation in promotions by following the Explanatory Notes
to the Office Memorandum issued by the Government of India dated
02.07.1997.
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 739
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

24. It would be relevant to refer to the judgments of this Court A
which have dealt with the scope of the expression “cadre”. Rule 4(2) of
the Central Engineering Service, Class I, Recruitment Rules, 1954 provided
that 75% of the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer, Class I
shall be filled by promotion from Assistant Executive Engineers, Class I.
Interpreting the words “vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer”,
B
this Court in A.K. Subraman & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.13 held
that the word “grade” is used in the sense of cadre. The dispute that
arose for consideration of this Court in Dr Chakradhar Paswan v.
State of Bihar & Ors.14 relates to the posts of Director and three Deputy
Directors in the Directorate of Indigenous Medicines, Department of
Health, State of Bihar being grouped together for the purpose of C
implementing the policy of reservation under Article 16(4) of the
Constitution of India. This Court was of the opinion that though the
Director and three Deputy Directors are Class I posts, the posts of
Director and Deputy Directors do not constitute one ‘cadre’. It was
held that the term “cadre” has a definite legal connotation in service
D
jurisprudence. This Court referred to Fundamental Rule 9(4) which
defines the word “cadre” to mean the strength of a service or part of a
service sanctioned as a separate unit. It was observed that as the post
of Director is the highest post in the Directorate of Indigenous Medicines
for which a higher pay scale is prescribed in comparison to Deputy
Directors, who are entitled to a lower scale of pay, they constitute two E
distinct cadres or grades. This Court further expressed its view that it is
open to the Government to constitute as many cadres in any particular
service as it may choose, according to administrative convenience and
expediency. This Court concluded that the post of Director and Deputy
Directors constitute different cadres in the service.
F
25. In K. Manickaraj v. Union of India15, the appellant was a
Welfare Inspector, Grade III belonging to Scheduled Caste category.
He claimed promotion to Grade II by contending that four posts were
reserved for Scheduled Castes as there were 26 Grade II posts. The
Respondent contended that there were only 23 Grade II posts as three
Grade III posts which were temporarily upgraded to Grade II did not G
form part of the cadre strength of Grade II Inspectors. While allowing
the appeal of K. Manickaraj, this Court recognized that promotions take
13
(1975) 1 SCC 319
14
(1988) 2 SCC 214
15
(1997) 4 SCC 342 H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A place from one grade to a higher grade, with the cadre strength for the
purpose of providing reservation in such promotion to be the total number
of posts available in the grade to which promotion was sought. The
meaning of “cadre” fell for consideration of this Court again in Union of
India v. Pushpa Rani & Ors.16. “Cadre” in the 1985 edition of the
Railway Establishment Code is defined as the strength of a service or a
B
part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit. This Court held that the
posts sanctioned in different grades would constitute independent cadres,
even for the purpose of implementing the roster. The reason for giving
an enlarged meaning to the term “cadre” was that the posts in the railway
establishment are sanctioned with reference to grades. Even temporary,
C work-charged, supernumerary and shadow posts created in different
grades can constitute part of the cadre.
26. It is relevant to refer to another judgment of this Court in
State of Rajasthan v. Fateh Chand Soni17,wherein the meaning of
“promotion” was looked into. This Court held that ‘promotion’ not only
D covered advancement to higher position or rank but also implied
advancement to a higher grade. Whether the officers serving in Arms,
Arms Support and Services comprise a single cadre for purposes of
promotion was the question adjudicated by this Court in Union of India
& Anr. v. Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Choudhary & Ors.18. This Court
held that they do not constitute a single cadre, even though they might be
E drawing the same salary, holding the same rank, wearing the same
uniform and serving the same employer with similar service benefits. As
the officers were allocated to different Arms and Services which put
them in distinct cadres, with promotional avenues being made available
against the posts comprising that cadre alone, there cannot be constitution
F of a common cadre. This Court referred to an earlier judgment in Sub-
Inspector Rooplal & Anr. v. Lt. Governor & Ors.19 in which it was
held that equivalence of two posts is not judged by the sole factor of
equal pay. There are four factors in that regard, namely: (i) the nature
and duties of the post, (ii) the responsibilities and powers exercised by
the officer holding a post; the extent of territorial or other charge held or
G responsibilities discharged; (iii) the minimum qualifications, if any,
prescribed for recruitment to the post; and (iv) the salary of the post.
16
(2008) 9 SCC 242
17
(1996) 1 SCC 562
18
(2016) 4 SCC 236
19
(2000) 1 SCC 644
H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 741
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

This Court, in Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Choudhary (supra), was of the A
further opinion that transferability or interchangeability of one incumbent
to another in the cadre are essential attributes of a common cadre.
27. In R.K. Sabharwal (supra), this Court held that the right to be
considered for appointment can only be claimed in respect of a post in a
cadre and that the concept of ‘vacancy’ has no relevance in operating B
the percentage of reservation. It was further held that the cadre strength
is always measured by the number of posts comprising the cadre.
28. It is clear from the above statutory regime and the law laid
down by this Court that civil posts under the Government are organised
into different services. A service constitutes ‘classes’/ ‘groups’ of posts. C
A ‘class’/‘group’ is further bifurcated into grades. Though the
nomenclature might be different, the structure of services under the
Union and the States is similar. According to the instructions issued by
the Union of India, cadres are constituted for each grade. At the cost of
repetition, the Union of India submitted that there are 3800 cadres in 44
Ministries/Departments. Fundamental Rule 9(4) defines “cadre” to mean D
the strength of a service or part of a service sanctioned as a separate
unit. It is the choice of a State to constitute cadres. The entire service
cannot be considered to be a cadre for the purpose of promotion from
one post to a higher post in a different grade. Promotion is made from
one grade to the next higher grade, in relation to which cadres are E
constituted. This Court in Dr Chakradhar Paswan (supra) has
categorically stated that the post of Director and Deputy Director cannot
form one cadre. A cadre is constituted by the Government by taking into
account several factors within its sole discretion.
29. In the Office Memorandum dated 02.07.1997, the Union of F
India set out the principles for making and operating post-based rosters,
in which it has been expressly stated that cadre is to be construed as the
number of posts in a particular grade. It is made clear that rosters have
been prepared grade-wise which are reviewed on a yearly basis and
that reservation in promotions is implemented on the basis of these rosters,
which operate grade-wise. In M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court approved G
that the percentage of reservation in promotions was to be applied to the
entire cadre strength, as held in R.K. Sabharwal (supra). While doing
so, this Court in M. Nagaraj (supra) made it clear that the unit for
operation of the roster would be the cadre strength. Before providing
for reservation in promotions to a cadre, the State is obligated to collect H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A quantifiable data regarding inadequacy of representation of SCs and
STs. Collection of information regarding inadequacy of representation
of SCs and STs cannot be with reference to the entire service or ‘class’/
‘group’ but it should be relatable to the grade/category of posts to which
promotion is sought. Cadre, which should be the unit for the purpose of
collection of quantifiable data in relation to the promotional post(s), would
B
be meaningless if data pertaining to representation of SCs and STs is
with reference to the entire service.
3) PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION AS TEST OF
ADEQUACY
C 30. In R.K. Sabharwal (supra), it was observed that State
Governments may take the total population of a particular Backward
Class and its representation in the State services for the purpose of
coming to a conclusion that there is inadequate representation in the
State services. In M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court was of the considered
view that the exercise of collecting quantifiable data depends on numerous
D factors, with conflicting claims to be optimised by the administration in
the context of local prevailing conditions in public employment. As equity,
justice and efficiency are variable factors and are context-specific, how
these factors should be identified and counter-balanced will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. The attempt of the learned
E Attorney General for India to impress upon this Court that the proportion
of SCs and STs in the population of India should be taken as the test for
determining whether they are adequately represented in promotional posts,
did not yield results. This Court in Jarnail Singh (supra) found no fault
with M. Nagaraj (supra) regarding the test for determining the adequacy
of representation in promotional posts in the State. While emphasising
F the contrast in the language used between Article 330 and Articles 16(4-
A) and 16(4-B) of the Constitution, this Court declined the invitation of
the learned Attorney General for India to hold that the proportion of SCs
and STs to the population of India should be the test for determining
inadequacy of representation in promotional posts. Therefore, we are
G not persuaded to express any opinion on this aspect. It is for the State to
assess the inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs in promotional
posts, by taking into account relevant factors.
4) TIME PERIOD FOR REVIEW
31. There is near unanimity amongst the counsel for both sides
H that the data collected to establish inadequacy of representation, which
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 743
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

forms the basis for providing reservation for promotions, should be A
reviewed periodically. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for members of the reserved categories, supported the
submissions of the learned Attorney General for India that a review
should be conducted every 10 years. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
learned Senior Counsel, submitted that it is time for reservation in public
B
employment to be discontinued. Additionally, he submitted that the lion’s
share of reservation for members of SCs and STs accrued to the benefit
of a select few within these categories, which further strengthened the
requirement for review to appraise whether certain groups/classes within
these categories had achieved the desired representation. We are not
inclined to express any view on discontinuation of reservations in totality, C
which is completely within the domain of the legislature and the executive.
As regards review, we are of the opinion that data collected to determine
inadequacy of representation for the purpose of providing reservation in
promotions needs to be reviewed periodically. The period for review
should be reasonable and is left to the Government to set out.
D
5) PROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF THE JUDGMENT
IN M. NAGARAJ
32. While holding that Article 16(4-A) does not provide for
reservation in matters of promotion, this Court in Indra Sawhney (supra)
saved the promotions that were already made. It was made clear that E
the judgment shall operate only prospectively and shall not affect
promotions already made, whether on temporary, officiating or regular/
permanent basis. Already-existing provisions made for reservation in
promotions in Central or State services were permitted to continue to
operate for a period of five years from the date of the judgment in Indra
Sawhney (supra). Article 16(4-A) was brought into force from F
17.06.1995. This Court upheld the validity of Article 16(4-A) in M.
Nagaraj (supra) on 19.10.2006 and observed that reservation in
promotions in public services can be made, subject to collection of
quantifiable data by the State showing backwardness of the class and
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment, in G
addition to compliance with Article 335 of the Constitution. Reservation
in promotions provided by various State Governments and the Central
Government have been challenged in the High Courts on the ground of
non-compliance with the requirement of collection of quantifiable data
showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation.
H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A It is relevant to mention at this stage that collection of quantifiable data
regarding backwardness of SCs and STs is no more required in view of
the judgment of this Court in Jarnail Singh (supra). In respect of the
data relating to inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs, the High
Courts have adjudicated writ petitions which are the subject matter of
special leave petitions pending in this Court.
B
33. The duty of the court is not to ‘pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one’.20 Holmes, J., in his dissent in Kuhn
v. Fairmont Coal Co.21, held “I know of no authority in this court to
say that, in general, state decisions shall make law only for the
future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near
C a thousand years.” In M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court upheld the
constitutional validity of Article 16(4-A), subject to the State collecting
quantifiable data showing inadequate representation. The law declared
by this Court interpreting Article 16(4-A) in M. Nagaraj (supra) applies
from 17.06.1995, i.e., the date on which Article 16(4-A) came into force
D (See: Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India & Ors.22; Lily Thomas & Ors.
v. Union of India & Ors.23). The contention put forth by the learned
Attorney General for India and the learned counsel appearing for the
reserved category candidates, which requires to be examined, is regarding
the prospective applicability of the law laid down in M. Nagaraj (supra),
i.e., from the date of the judgment.
E
34. This Court, in I.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
Anr.24, held that the Parliament had no power to amend Part III of the
Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights.
However, to save the past transactions, the doctrine of prospective
overruling was invoked and the judgment was given prospective operation.
F The following propositions were laid down in Golak Nath case (supra):
“(1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked
only in matters arising out of the Constitution;
(2) it can be applied only by the highest court of the country,
G i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction
to declare law binding on all the courts in India;
20
Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (15 th ed. 1809)
21
215 U.S. 349 (1910)
22
1994 Supp (2) SCC 641
23
(2000) 6 SCC 224
24
H (1967) 2 SCR 762
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 745
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

(3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared A
by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is left
to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice
of the cause or matter before it.”
While interpreting the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution,
this Court held that the law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of B
the land and in so declaring, the operation of the law can be restricted to
the future, thereby saving past transactions.
35. The power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution
is a constituent power transcendental to statutory prohibition.25 In Orissa
Cement Ltd.v.State of Orissa & Ors.26, this Court observed that relief C
can be granted, moulded or restricted in a manner most appropriate to
the situation before it in such a way as to advance the interests of justice.
The doctrine of prospective overruling is in essence a recognition of the
principle that the Court moulds the reliefs claimed to meet the justice of
the case, as has been held in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. & Anr. v.
State of U.P. & Anr.27. It was further clarified that while in Golak Nath D
(supra), ‘prospective overruling’ implied an earlier judicial decision on
the same issue which was otherwise final, this Court had used the power
even when deciding on an issue for the first time. There is no need to
refer to other judgments of this Court which have approved and applied
the principle of prospective overruling or prospective operation of E
judgments. There cannot be any manner of doubt that this Court can
apply its decision prospectively, i.e.,from the date of its judgment to save
past transactions.
36. While objecting to the contention of the learned Attorney
General for India to declare the law laid down by M. Nagaraj (supra) F
as having prospective operation, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the unreserved candidates, submitted that relief
can be moulded in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the
Constitution. It is no doubt true that M. Nagaraj (supra) did not state
that it would be prospective in operation. It is necessary for this Court to
examine whether a judgment can be made prospectively applicable G
subsequently by a different bench of this Court. The doctrine of
prospective overruling was applied to Indian law in Golak Nath (supra)
25
Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 201
26
1991 Supp (1) SCC 430
27
(2001) 5 SCC 519 H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A by following the theory which was prevalent in the United States of
America. Reference was made to the judgment of Linkletter v. Walker28
which declared an earlier decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mappv.
Ohio29 to be prospective in operation.
37. For a better understanding, it is necessary to refer to the issue
B in Linkletter (supra). The United States Supreme Court in Weeks v.
United States30 held that illegally-seized evidence cannot be used in
federal courts, by establishing the exclusionary rule. The applicability of
the exclusionary rule to states fell for consideration in Wolf v. Colorado31.
Taking note of the fact that 16 States adopted the exclusionary rule laid
down in Weeks (supra) while 31 other States rejected the exclusionary
C rule, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was not a departure from basic
standards of due process to allow States to introduce illegally-obtained
evidence in State trials. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mapp (supra)
held that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of search and
seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment was required of the States
D by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Linkletter
(supra), the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the question of
prospective operation of its earlier judgment in Mapp (supra). The
overruling of the judgment in Wolf v. Colorado (supra) by Mapp (supra)
was made prospective by the U.S. Supreme Court by making the following
observations:
E
“22. We believe that the existence of the Wolf doctrine prior
to Mapp is ‘an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.’ Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, supra, 308 U.S. at 374,
F 60 S.Ct. at 319. The thousands of cases that were finally
decided on Wolf cannot be obliterated. The ‘particular
conduct, private and official,’ must be considered. Here ‘prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly’ have ‘become vested.’ And finally, ‘public policy
G in the light of the nature both of the (Wolf doctrine) and of its
previous application’ must be given its proper weight. Ibid. In
short, we must look to the purpose of the Mapp rule; the
28
381 U.S. 618 (1965) : 1965 SCC Online US SC 126
29
367 U.S. 643 (1961)
30
232 U.S. 383 (1914)
31
H 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 747
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

reliance placed upon the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the A
administration of justice of a retrospective application of
Mapp.
23. It is clear that the Wolf Court, once it had found the Fourth
Amendment’s unreasonable Search and Seizure Clause
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of B
the Fourteenth Amendment, turned its attention to whether
the exclusionary rule was included within the command of
the Fourth Amendment. This was decided in the negative. It is
clear that based upon the factual considerations heretofore
discussed the Wolf Court then concluded that it was not
necessary to the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment for C
the exclusionary rule to be extended to the States as a
requirement of due process. Mapp had as its prime purpose
the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the
inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights. This, it
was found, was the only effective deterrent to lawless police D
action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf requiring the
exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity
for an effective deterrent to illegal police action. See, e.g.,
Rea v. United States, supra. We cannot say that this purpose
would be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The
misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred E
and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved.
Nor would it add harmony to the delicate state-federal
relationship of which we have spoken as part and parcel of
the purpose of Mapp. Finally, the ruptured privacy of the
victims’ homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation F
comes too late.
24. It is true that both the accused and the States relied upon
Wolf. Indeed, Wolf and Irvine each pointed the way for the
victims of illegal searches to seek reparation for the violation
of their privacy. Some pursued the same. See Monroe v. Pape, G
365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). In addition,
in Irvine, a flag in a concurring opinion warned that Wolf
was in stormy weather. On the other hand, the States relied
on Wolf and followed its command. Final judgments of
conviction were entered prior to Mapp. Again and again this
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A Court refused to reconsider Wolf and gave its implicit approval
to hundreds of cases in their application of its rule. In rejecting
the Wolf doctrine as to the exclusionary rule the purpose was
to deter the lawless action of the police and to effectively
enforce the Fourth Amendment. That purpose will not at this
late date be served by the wholesale release of the guilty
B
victims.
25. Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice
and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make
the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration
of justice to the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on
C the excludability of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced
or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the witnesses available at
the time of the original trial will not be available or if located
their memory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an
extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt
D would seriously disrupt the administration of justice.”
The point to be noticed is that the U.S. Supreme Court in Linkletter
(supra) declared its earlier judgment in Mapp (supra) to be prospective
in operation, after considering the consequences of Mapp (supra) being
given retrospective effect.
E 38. This Court in Indra Sawhney (supra) interpreted Article 16(4-
A) of the Constitution by holding that reservation cannot be provided in
promotions. However, reservation in promotions were permitted for a
further period of five years from the date of the judgment. In Ashok
Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.32, promotions in Public
F Works Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh were challenged.
One of the grounds of challenge was that the direction of the Supreme
Court for prospective overruling of the judgment of this Court in General
Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari33and for operation of the
ratio in Indra Sawhney (supra) after five years from the date of the
judgment was inconsistent with and contrary to the scheme of the
G Constitution. In other words, it was contended by the appellants in Ashok
Kumar Gupta (supra) that after having declared reservation in
promotions under Articles 16(1) and 16(4) as unconstitutional and
overruling Rangachari (supra) as not being correct in law, the Court
32
(1997) 5 SCC 201
33
H (1962) 2 SCR 586
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 749
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

cannot postpone the operation of the judgment to a future date as it A
amounts to perpetration of void action and is violative of the appellants’
fundamental rights. In Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra), this Court was of
the opinion that there is no prohibition for this Court to postpone the
operation of the judgment in Indra Sawhney (supra) or to prospectively
overrule the ratio in Rangachari (supra). This Court further held that:
B
“60. It would be seen that there is no limitation under Article
142(1) on the exercise of the power by this Court. The necessity
to exercise the power is to do “complete justice in the cause
or matter”. The inconsistency with statute law made by
Parliament arises when this Court exercises power under
Article 142(2) for the matters enumerated therein. C
Inconsistency in express statutory provisions of substantive
law would mean and be understood as some express
prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. The
power under Article 142 is a constituent power transcendental
to statutory prohibition. Before exercise of the power under D
Article 142(2), the Court would take that prohibition
(sic provision) into consideration before taking steps under
Article 142(2) and we find no limiting words to mould the
relief or when this Court takes appropriate decision to mete
out justice or to remove injustice. The phrase “complete
justice” engrafted in Article 142(1) is the word of width E
couched with elasticity to meet myriad situations created by
human ingenuity or cause or result of operation of statute
law or law declared under Articles 32, 136 and 141 of the
Constitution and cannot be cribbed or cabined within any
limitations or phraseology. Each case needs examination in F
the light of its backdrop and the indelible effect of the decision.
In the ultimate analysis, it is for this Court to exercise its power
to do complete justice or prevent injustice arising from the
exigencies of the cause or matter before it. The question of
lack of jurisdiction or nullity of the order of this Court does
not arise. As held earlier, the power under Article 142 is a G
constituent power within the jurisdiction of this Court. So,
the question of a law being void ab initio or nullity or voidable
does not arise.
61. Admittedly, the Constitution has entrusted this salutary
duty to this Court with power to remove injustice or to do H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A complete justice in any cause or matter before this Court.
The Rangachari [(1962) 2 SCR 586 : AIR 1962 SC
36] ratio was in operation for well over three decades under
which reservation in promotions were given to several persons
in several services, grades or cadres of the Union of India or
the respective State Governments. This Court, with a view to
B
see that there would not be any hiatus in the operation of that
law and, as held earlier, to bring about smooth transition of
the operation of law of reservation in promotions, by a judicial
creativity extended the principle of prospective overruling
applied in Golak Nath case [(1967) 2 SCR 762 : AIR 1967
C SC 1643] in the case of statutory law and of the judicial
precedent in Karunakar case [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] and further elongated the
principle postponing the operation of the judgment in Mandal
case [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 :
(1992) 22 ATC 385] for five years from the date of the
D
judgment. This judicial creativity is not anathema to
constitutional principle but an accepted doctrine as an
extended facet of stare decisis. It would not be labelled as
proviso to Article 16(4) as contended for.”
39. Whether the judgment of this Court in Indian Council for
E Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India & Ors.34 was prospective was
the subject-matter of consideration in Goan Real Estate and
Construction Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.35. After a
detailed consideration of the judgment in Indian Council for Enviro-
Legal Action (supra), this Court in Goan Real Estate (supra) concluded
F that though not stated categorically in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal
Action(supra), it was the intention of this Court to give prospective effect
to the judgment. The above is an instance where this Court declared an
earlier judgment to have prospective effect.
40. A contrary view was expressed by this Court in M.A.
G Murthy v. State of Karnataka & Ors.36 in which it was held that
prospective overruling can be done only by the Court which has rendered
the decision. The dispute that arose for consideration of this Court in the
said judgment pertained to appointment to the posts of Manager (Finance
34
(1996) 5 SCC 281
35
(2010) 5 SCC 388
36
H (2003) 7 SCC 517
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 751
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

and Accounts) in the Karnataka State Financial Corporation. The A
appellants challenged the selection of respondent no. 4 before the
Karnataka High Court. Though the learned Single Judge of the High
Court found respondent no. 4 therein to be ineligible as on the date of his
appointment, the selection was not disturbed on the ground that he
obtained qualifications by the time of interview. The learned Single Judge
B
relied upon the judgment of this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma &
Anr.v. Chander Shekher & Anr.37(Ashok Kumar Sharma case No.
I). The judgment of the learned Single Judge was upheld by the Division
Bench of the High Court. Thereafter, a review application was filed
informing the Division Bench of the High Court that the judgment of this
Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma case No.I was overruled in Ashok C
Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Chander Shekhar & Anr.38(Ashok Kumar
Sharma case No. II). By holding that on the date of the judgment of
the Division Bench, Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. I held the field,
the High Court dismissed the review petition. Taking note of the fact
that Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. II was a judgment of this Court
D
in review of the judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. I, which,
therefore, merged with the subsequent judgment, making the later
decision the one and only judgment rendered for all purposes, this Court
found that the High Court had committed an error in not following the
law laid down by this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. II.
While holding so, this Court referred to the doctrine of prospective E
overruling and earlier judgments of this Court in Golak Nath (supra),
Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra) and others. This Court proceeded to
observe that there shall be no prospective overruling unless it is so
indicated in a particular decision.
41. The facts of the case and the dispute resolved by this Court in F
M.A. Murthy (supra) relate to the applicability of the subsequent judgment
of Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. II rendered in review of an earlier
judgment. The question of prospective overruling did not arise in the said
case. The observation made in M.A. Murthy (supra) that there shall be
no prospective overruling unless indicated in the particular decision is
obiter. Obiterdictum is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Edn., G
2009), as follows:
“Obiter dictum.— A judicial comment made while delivering a
judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
37
1993 Supp (2) SCC 611
38
(1997) 4 SCC 18 H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered
persuasive). — Often shortened to dictum or, less commonly,
obiter.
…
Strictly speaking an “obiter dictum” is a remark made or opinion
B expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, “by the way”—
that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question
before the court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the
Judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy,
or suggestion…. In the common speech of lawyers, all such
C extrajudicial expressions of legal opinion are referred to as “dicta”,
or “obiter dicta”, these two terms being used interchangeably.”
Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th Edn., 1993) defines the term “obiter
dictum” as “an opinion not necessary to a judgment; an observation
as to the law made by a Judge in the course of a case, but not
necessary to its decision, and therefore, of no binding effect; often
D
called as obiter dictum, ‘a remark by the way’”. A decision on a point
not necessary for the purpose of or which does not fall for determination
in that decision becomes an obiter dictum.39 It is a well-settled proposition
that only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or authoritative
precedent. Reliance placed on mere general observations or casual
E expressions of the Court, is not of much avail.40 Therefore, the casual
and unnecessary observation in M.A. Murthy (supra) that there shall be
no prospective overruling unless it is so indicated in a particular decision
is obiter and not binding. Moreover, in M.A. Murthy (supra), this Court
failed to consider the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Ashok Kumar
Gupta (supra), even after referring to it. As stated above, the prospective
F
overruling of Rangachari (supra) by Indra Sawhney (supra) was upheld
in Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra).
42. This Court in Golak Nath (supra) and Ashok Kumar Gupta
(supra), referred to above, has laid down that Article 142 empowers this
Court to mould the relief to do complete justice. To conclude this point,
G
the purpose of holding that M. Nagaraj (supra) would have prospective
effect is only to avoid chaos and confusion that would ensue from its
retrospective operation, as it would have a debilitating effect on a very
39
H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior & Ors.
v. Union of India & Anr. (1971) 1 SCC 85
40
H Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 555
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 753
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

large number of employees, who may have availed of reservation in A
promotions without there being strict compliance of the conditions
prescribed in M. Nagaraj (supra). Most of them would have already
retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. The judgment
of M. Nagaraj (supra) was delivered in 2006, interpreting Article 16(4-
A) of the Constitution which came into force in 1995. As making the
B
principles laid down in M. Nagaraj (supra) effective from the year 1995
would be detrimental to the interests of a number of civil servants and
would have an effect of unsettling the seniority of individuals over a long
period of time, it is necessary that the judgment of M. Nagaraj (supra)
should be declared to have prospective effect.
6) QUANTIFIABLE DATA AND SAMPLING METHOD C

43. The Karnataka Legislature enacted the Karnataka
Determination of Seniority of the Government Servants Promoted on
the Basis of Reservation (to the Posts in the Civil Services of the State)
Act, 2002. This Court declared the provisions of the said Act as
unconstitutional on the ground that the Government of Karnataka failed D
to produce quantifiable data to show any compelling necessity for
exercising power under Article 16(4-A) and therefore, Sections 3 and 4
of the said Act were held to be unconstitutional. Thereafter, the
Government of Karnataka constituted a committee, headed by the
Additional Chief Secretary to the State of Karnataka, and entrusted the E
following tasks to the committee:-
“(1) Collect information in cadre-wise representation of SCs
and STs in all the Government departments.
(2) Collect information regarding backwardness of SCs and
STs. F
(3) Study the effect on the administration due to the provision
of reservation in promotion to SCs and STs.”
44. On 05.05.2017, the ‘Report on Backwardness, Inadequacy of
Representation and Administrative Efficiency in Karnataka’ was
G
submitted by the Ratna Prabha Committee. The Government of
Karnataka accepted the Report and the Karnataka Extension of
Consequential Seniority to Government Servants Promoted on the Basis
of Reservation (to the Posts in the Civil Services of the State) Bill 2017
was passed by the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council
and thereafter, received Presidential assent on 14.06.2018. The grievance H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A of the petitioners therein was that the data was collected only from 31
departments out of a total of 62, based on Groups ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’
and not on cadre. A further complaint was made that no data was
collected with respect to public sector undertakings, boards, corporations,
local bodies, grant-in-aid institutions and autonomous bodies, and therefore,
the data is only representative in nature. This Court reproduced a summary
B
of the Ratna Prabha Committee Report, which is as follows:
“2.5. Summary:
(1) The analysis of time series data collected for the last 32 years
(1984-2016 except for 1986) across 31 departments of the State
C Government provides the rich information on the inadequacy of
representation of SC and ST employees in various cadres of
Karnataka Civil Services.
(2) The total number of sanctioned posts as per the data of 2016
is 7,45,593 of which 70.22% or 5,23,574 are filled up across 31
D departments.
(3) The vacancies or posts are filled up through Direct Recruitment
(DR) and Promotions including consequential promotion.
(4) The overall representation of the SC and ST employees of all
31 departments in comparison with total sanctioned posts
E comprises of 10.65% and 2.92% respectively. This proves
inadequacy of representation of SCs and Sts.
(5) On an average the representation in Cadre A for SCs is at
12.07% and STs 2.70% which sufficiently proves the inadequacy
of representation.
F
(6) The extent of representation in Cadre B is on an average of
9.79% and 2.34% for STs for all the years of the study period.
(7) It is observed that on an average 3.05% of SC representation
is inadequate in the Cadre ‘C’ whereas, 0.05% excess
representation is seen for Sts.
G
(8) On an average of 2% and 1% over-representation of employees
of SCs and STs is found in Cadre D respectively. However, in the
last 5 years, inadequacy of representation of SCs by 3% is found
in this cadre.

H
JARNAIL SINGH & ORS.v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA 755
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

(9) The representation of Scheduled Caste in Cadres A, B and C A
is on an average 12, 9.79 and 12.04% respectively whereas in
Cadre D it is 16.91.
(10) In case of STs in the Cadres A and B the representation is
2.70 and 2.34%. However, excess representation of 0.04 and
0.93% is found in case of Group C and Group D respectively. B
(11) Over-representation in some years and departments is
attributed to either Direct Recruitment or retirement of employees
or filling up of backlog vacancies as the latter does not fall under
50% limitation of reservation.
2.6: Conclusion: C

The data clearly shows the inadequacy of representation of SCs
and STs in the civil services in Groups A, B and C and adequate
representation in Group D.”
This Court found the challenge to the Report on the ground of D
data having been collected on the basis of Groups A, B, C and D as
opposed to cadres, to be without merit. The basis of the said conclusion
of the Court was that there is no fixed meaning ascribed to the term
‘cadre’ in service jurisprudence. Further, this Court held that collection
of quantifiable data on the inadequacy of representation is in the services
of the State, according to M. Nagaraj (supra). In addition, this Court E
was also of the view that Article 16(4-A) referred to inadequacy of
representation in the services of the State. It was further declared that
collection of data on the basis of groups does not exclude data pertaining
to cadres, as a group includes posts in all the cadres in that group.
45. Collection of quantifiable data for determining the inadequacy F
of representation of SCs and STs is a basic requirement for providing
reservation in promotions, as laid down by this court in M. Nagaraj
(supra). The unit for the purpose of collection of data is a cadre, according
to M. Nagaraj (supra) and Jarnail Singh (supra). For the purpose of
collection of quantifiable data for providing reservation in promotions,
G
the entire service cannot be taken to be a unit and treated as a cadre, as
already stated. The structure of services in the State of Karnataka is
along the same lines as that of services in the Central Government.
Services are divided into ‘groups’, which are further bifurcated into
cadres. There is no confusion that a cadre is not synonymous with a
‘group’. H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 19 S.C.R.

A 46. The first term of reference for the Ratna Prabha Committee
was to collect data cadre-wise. The conclusion of this Court in B.K.
Pavitra II (supra) that the expression ‘cadre’ has no fixed meaning in
service jurisprudence is contrary to the judgments of this Court, which
have been referred to above while answering point 2. In clear terms, M.
Nagaraj (supra) held that the unit for collection of quantifiable data is
B
cadre, and not services as has been held in B.K. Pavitra II (supra).
Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution enables the State to make reservation
in promotions for SCs and STs, which are not adequately represented in
the services of the State. However, the provision for reservation in matters
of promotion is with reference to class or classes of posts in the services
C under the State. That ‘groups’ consist of cadres is a fact which was
taken into consideration by this Court in B.K. Pavitra II (supra). The
conclusion that the collection of data on the basis of ‘groups’ is valid, is
contrary to the decisions of this court in M. Nagaraj (supra) and Jarnail
Singh (supra).
D 47. The State should justify reservation in promotions with respect
to the cadre to which promotion is made. Taking into account the data
pertaining to a ‘group’, which would be an amalgamation of certain cadres
in a service, would not give the correct picture of the inadequacy of
representation of SCs and STs in the cadre in relation to which reservation
in promotions is sought to be made. Rosters are prepared cadre-wise
E and not group-wise. Sampling method which was adopted by the Ratna
Prabha Committee might be a statistical formula appropriate for collection
of data. However, for the purpose of collection of quantifiable data to
assess representation of SCs and STs for the purpose of providing
reservation in promotions, cadre, which is a part of a ‘group’, is the unit
F and the data has to be collected with respect to each cadre. Therefore,
we hold that the conclusion of this Court in B.K. Pavitra II (supra)
approving the collection of data on the basis of ‘groups’ and not cadres
is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in M. Nagaraj (supra) and
Jarnail Singh (supra).
G 48. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on
the merits of any individual case as we have only answered the common
issues that were formulated after hearing the parties.
49. List the matters on 24/2/2022 for further hearing.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Issues answered.
H (Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)