Holding

A consensual sexual relationship based on a promise to marry, which is not a false promise intended to obtain consent, does not satisfy the ingredients of offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC, and the Sessions Court was justified in discharging the appellant under Section 227 CrPC.

Summary

The appellant, Jaspal Singh Kaural, had a consensual physical relationship with the complainant after promising to marry her and care for her children, leading her to obtain a divorce. When the appellant later refused to marry and threatened her children, the complainant filed an FIR under Sections 376 and 506 IPC. The Sessions Court discharged the appellant under Section 227 CrPC, finding no material to establish rape or criminal intimidation. The Delhi High Court set aside that discharge, holding that the promise to marry constituted a false promise that vitiated consent. The Supreme Court examined the material on record, applied the precedent of Naim Ahmed, and concluded that the relationship was consensual, the promise was not a false one intended to obtain consent, and the elements of the offences were not proved. Consequently, the Court upheld the Sessions Court’s discharge and allowed the appeal, terminating the criminal proceedings.

Issues considered

The whether a promise to marry, made without intent to fulfill it, constitutes a false promise that vitiates consent, thereby attracting liability under Section 376 IPC.
Whether the facts alleged establish the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC.
Whether, at the charge‑framing stage, the Sessions Court may discharge the accused under Section 227 CrPC on the basis of the material on record without conducting a mini‑trial.
Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Sessions Court’s discharge order.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 375, s. 376, s. 506

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Appellant established physical relationship with the complainant on promise of marriage. Complainant obtained divorce from her husband on the assurance of the appellant that he will marry her. Later, on refusal of the appellant to marry her, complainant lodged FIR The Sessions Court discharged the appellant. High Court set aside the order of discharge. The issue for consideration was whether there was sufficient material on record for the Sessions Court to have discharged the appellant for offences under ss.376 and 506 IPC. Headnotes† Penal Code,

Subjects

Promise to marryCriminal intimidationFalse promise to marryConsensual physical relationshipFraming of chargeMini trial at time of framing chargeScope of revisional jurisdictionGrossly erroneous decisionNon-compliance of provisions of lawFinding based on no evidenceJudicial discretion exercised arbitrarily/perversely

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 23 : 2025 INSC 457

Jaspal Singh Kaural
v.
The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.
Criminal Appeal No. 1841 of 2025
07 April 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Appellant established physical relationship with the complainant
on promise of marriage. Complainant obtained divorce from her
husband on the assurance of the appellant that he will marry her.
Later, on refusal of the appellant to marry her, complainant lodged
FIR u/ss.376 and 506 IPC. The Sessions Court discharged the
appellant. High Court set aside the order of discharge. The issue
for consideration was whether there was sufficient material on
record for the Sessions Court to have discharged the appellant
for offences under ss.376 and 506 IPC.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.375, 376 – Mere establishing of physical
relations pursuant to a promise to marry – Will not amount to
rape in every case:
Held: An offence under Section 375 IPC could only be made out,
if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view
to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false
promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving
her consent for sexual relations. [Para 14]

Penal Code, 1860 - ss.376 and 506 – Prosecutrix was in a
consensual physical relationship with accused-appellant – No
element of force or deceit in the relationship – Ingredients of
offences u/ss.375/506 IPC not established:
Held: On facts, physical relationship between Appellant and
Respondent no. 2-prosecutrix was consensual – Even if the case of
the prosecutrix is accepted, there is no material on record to show
that there was any dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of

* Author
24 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the Appellant – There is also no material on record, to establish
an offence of criminal intimidation under section 506 IPC against
the Appellant – In the eventuality of a fall-out or split between the
parties, it cannot be said that the promise to marry was false, and
the corresponding conduct dishonest – The prolonged period of the
relationship, during which the sexual relations continued between
the parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element
of force or deceit in the relationship. [Para 15]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.227 – Discharge – Trial at
the time of framing charge – Scope of revisional jurisdiction:
Held: On facts, there was sufficient material on record for the
Sessions Court to exercise powers under Section 227 of CrPC,
and discharge the Appellant – At the time of framing of charge, a
mini trial is not permissible and the Trial Court has to proceed with
the material brought on record by the prosecution and determine
whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face
value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the
offence alleged – High Court undertook an exhaustive analysis of
the allegations while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of
charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material on
record – Scope of interference and exercise of revisional jurisdiction
is extremely limited – In the present matter, findings of sessions
court are based on material on record – Order passed by sessions
court upheld. [Paras 16, 17]

Case Law Cited
Naim Ahmed v State (NCT) of Delhi [2023] 1 SCR 1061: [2023] 15
SCC 385 – held applicable.
Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3471; Prashant v. State of NCT Delhi, 2024 SCC
Online SC 3375; Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra
[2019] 11 SCR 423 : (2019) 9 SCC 608; State of Rajasthan v. Ashok
Kumar Kashyap [2021] 4 SCR 158 : 2021 SCC Online SC 314;
State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan and Others [2014] 1 SCR
135 : (2014) 11 SCC 709 – relied on.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 25

Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

List of Keywords
Promise to marry; Criminal intimidation; False promise to marry;
Consensual physical relationship; Framing of charge; Mini trial at
the time of framing charge; Scope of revisional jurisdiction; Grossly
erroneous decision; Non-compliance of provisions of law; Finding
based on no evidence; Judicial discretion exercised arbitrarily/
perversely.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1841
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.01.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLREVP No. 1161 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Shekhar Nanavaty, Jitesh Kumar Singh, Shubham Dhyani,
Ms. Shikha Gupta, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave, Sr. Adv./A.S.G., Ms. Samridhi Arora,
Ms. Sanjana, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Navin Kumar, Ms. Shagun
Thakur, Sudhakar Kulwant, Ms. Astha Singh.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

Leave granted.
2. The Appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved by the
Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi
in Criminal Revision Petition no. 1161/2023, whereby the Order dt.
08.06.2023 passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge/Spl. FTC
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi [“Ld. Sessions Court”] discharging
the Appellant in FIR no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 registered at PS
Sagarpur, U/s 376/506 IPC (“FIR”), was set aside.
3. The captioned FIR came to be registered at the behest of the
Complainant/Respondent no.2, alleging that the Appellant had
26 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

established physical relations with her, with the promise to marry
her, and take care of her two children. The Complaint reveals, that
the Appellant was known to the prosecutrix since 2011, prior to their
respective marriages; however, their love re-kindled in 2016, once
their matrimonial lives became unsettled.
4. It is the case of the Complainant/Respondent no.2 that she was in a
relationship with the Appellant since 2016, who was living in Canada
at the time, and had come to India, and met her for the first time on
05.02.2017. On that day, he had met the Complainant/Respondent
no. 2 in his brother’s rental house in Dwarka and established physical
relationship with her on the promise that he will marry her after obtaining
divorce from his first wife. It is alleged that the Appellant harassed
the Complainant into obtaining a divorce from her husband, and had
subsequently, also spoken to & assured the first husband, that he
would marry the Complainant/Respondent no.2 and take good care
of her and her children.
5. The Appellant purportedly lived with the Respondent no. 2 at her house
for twenty five days, where he sexually harassed her, and told her that
if she refused to establish physical relations with him, he would not
marry her. The Complainant has alleged that she obtained divorce from
her husband in 2019, on the assurance from the Appellant, that he will
marry her; however, on 20.05.2021, the Appellant refused to marry her
and even threatened to kill her children. Subsequently thereof, the FIR
no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 was registered upon the Complaint filed
by the Complainant/Respondent no.2, when the Appellant failed to
appear before the Mahila Police Station for counselling and mediation.
6. During the investigation, the Appellant admitted to having physical
relations with the Complainant/Respondent no.2, and paying for the
mangalsutra with his initials “Jas” on them. The investigation finally
culminated into a charge-sheet on 15.05.2022, under Sections 376/506
IPC against the Appellant.
7. The Appellant filed an Application under Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short ‘CrPC’) seeking discharge,
whereby the Ld. Sessions Court vide Order dt. 08.06.2023, was pleased
to discharge the Appellant of the offences under Section 376/506
IPC. It was observed by the Ld. Sessions Court that consent by
prosecutrix was very well reasoned and was given after understanding
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 27

Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

the nature and consequence of sexual indulgence and not out of any
misconception of fact.
8. Aggrieved thereby, the Complainant/Respondent no.2 filed a Criminal
Revision Petition no. 1161/2023 before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court,
which was allowed vide Impugned Judgment dt. 03.01.2024. Vide the
Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024, the High Court whilst assailing the
order on discharge, made specific observations holding that there
is prima-facie material to establish that the Appellant had indulged
in sexual relationship with the Complainant/Respondent, with the
promise to marry her, and frame charges against the Appellant, for
offences under U/s 376/506 IPC in FIR no. 281/2021. The Impugned
Order dt. 03.01.2024 is under challenge before this Court.
9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the relationship
between the Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent was purely
consensual, and there is no question of an offence either under
Section 376 IPC or 506 IPC. A perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet
would establish that there is no material on record, to establish that
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had entered into a relationship
with the Appellant, under coercion or undue influence, or under the
mistaken belief or a false assurance of marriage.
10. It is also argued that the Respondent no.2/Complainant was very
well aware of the consequences, of her actions, and had reasonably
considered them before entering in a relationship with the Appellant.
As a matter of fact, it is the own case of the Respondent no.2/
Complainant, that she was in a relationship with the Appellant since
2016, while both the parties were in subsisting marriages. Thus, the
element of inducement for marriage by the Appellant is manifestly
absent and the criminal proceedings registered against the Appellant
tantamount to a gross abuse of the process of law.
11. On the other hand, it is argued by the prosecutrix, that she had
entered into a physical relationship with the Appellant solely for
the reason that he had promised to marry her & take care of her
children, and had it not been for the promise of marriage made by the
Appellant she would have never entered into a physical relationship
with him. It was submitted that the Appellant had not only promised
the prosecutrix, but also her family, and her ex-husband, that that
he will marry her and take care of the children. It was owing to such
conduct of the Appellant that the prosecutrix got divorced from her
28 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

ex-husband, leaving aside her matrimonial life for him. It is submitted
that the conduct of the Appellant amounts to a dishonest inducement,
and the physical relationship on a false pretext amounts to rape.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

12. We have heard counsel for both the parties and have carefully
considered the Impugned Order and the material on record. The
intervention of this Hon’ble Court is limited to the question as to
whether there was sufficient material on record, for the Sessions
Court to have discharged the Appellant for offences under section 376
and 506 IPC, arising out of FIR bearing no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021
registered at PS Sagarpur.
13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim Ahmed Vs
State (NCT) of Delhi1 whereby this Hon’ble Court had decided a
similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her
consent for a sexual relationship with the accused/Appellant, upon
an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married
woman having three children, had continued to have such relationship
with the accused Appellant, at least for about five years till she gave
the complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances,
this Court had observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent
for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as
the accused had given a false promise to marry her and
subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent
was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell
under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard,
it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between
giving a false promise and committing breach of promise
by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right
from the beginning would not have any intention to marry
the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the
prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only
with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach

1 (2023) 15 SCC 385
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 29

Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused
might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry
her, and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise.
So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to
marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for
the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each
case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.
22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a
married woman having three children, could not be said to
have acted under the alleged false promise given by the
appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving
the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant.
Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with
him at least for about five years till she gave complaint
in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in
her deposition before the court, are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape”
by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far.
The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother
of three children was mature and intelligent enough to
understand the significance and the consequences of the
moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to.
Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course
of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it
appears that she had betrayed her husband and three
children by having relationship with the accused, for whom
she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay
with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her
husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time
she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011,
and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of
the accused, she did not have any complaint against the
accused of he having given false promise to marry her or
having cheated her. She also visited the native place of
the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he
was a married man having children also, still she continued
to live with the accused at another premises without any
30 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband
by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with
her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some
disputes must have taken place between them, that she
filed the present complaint. The accused in his further
statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC had stated
that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her
demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard
to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not
be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix
had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the
appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold
the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the
meaning of Section 375 IPC.”
14. The decision in Naim Ahmed (supra) is squarely applicable to the
conspectus of present case. It has been time and again settled by
this Hon’ble Court, that the mere fact that physical relations were
established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape
in every case. An offence under Section 375 IPC could only be made
out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a
view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent
of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false
promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving
her consent for sexual relations.2
15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, the following
facts are clearly established:
(i) The physical relationship between the Appellant and the
Respondent no. 2 was consensual from the very beginning and
cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of
the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted,
there is no material on record to show that there was any
dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the Appellant.
(ii) There is also no material on record, to establish an offence of
criminal intimidation under section 506 IPC against the Appellant.
In-fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the Appellant, that he

2 Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 31

Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

was acting in furtherance of the promise to marry. It is the own
observation of the High Court, that the Appellant had made a
promise to marry the Respondent no.2 and was acting accordingly.
The Mangalsutra being prepared with the initials of the name
of the Complainant/Respondent no.2 does reflect his intention
and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a fall-out
or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the promise
to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct dishonest.
(iii) There is also no element of criminality that can be accrued to
the Appellant, insofar as it is the own case of the prosecutrix,
that she was in a relationship with the Appellant, while being in a
subsisting marriage. It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix
could have sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged
period of five years,3 while being in a subsisting marriage, and
even subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the relationship.
The prolonged period of the relationship, during which the
sexual relations continued between the parties, is sufficient to
conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit
in the relationship.4 The prosecutrix was thus, conscious and
cognizant of the consequences of her actions, and had given
her consent after an active and reasoned deliberation.5
16. In view of the aforesaid, we find that there was sufficient material
on record for the Ld. Sessions Court to exercise powers under
section 227 CrPC, and discharge the Appellant. It is trite law that
at the time of framing of charge, a mini trial is not permissible6 and
the Trial Court has to proceed with the material brought on record
by the prosecution and determine whether the facts emerging from
the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the
ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.7 A bare review of the
FIR and the charge-sheet and material placed on record by the
prosecution, would clarify that the ingredients of offences under
Section 375/506 IPC are not established.

3 Prashant Vs State of NCT Delhi, 2024 SCC Online SC 3375
4 Mahesh Damu Khare Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr., 2024] SCC Online SC 3471
5 Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608
6 State of Rajasthan vs Ashok Kumar Kashyap, 2021 SCC Online SC 314
7 State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Rajan And Others (2014) 11 SCC 709
32 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

17. We also find that the High Court has undertaken an exhaustive
analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the Charge-sheet, while
failing to consider that at the stage of framing of charges, the court
must only adjudicate on the basis of material on record. It is trite law
that the scope of interference and exercise of revisional jurisdiction is
extremely limited and should be exercised very sparingly, specifically
in instances, where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous,
or there is non-compliance of the provisions of law, or the finding
recorded by the trial court is based on no evidence, or material
evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely by framing the charge. This is certainly not the case in
the present matter insofar as the findings of the Ld. Sessions Court
are based on the material on record.
18. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and set aside
the order of the High Court dated 03.01.2024 and uphold the Order
dt. 08.06.2023 passed by the Sessions Court. At this stage, we deem
it appropriate to terminate the criminal proceedings arising out of
FIR bearing no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 registered at PS Sagarpur,
U/s 376/506 IPC against the Appellant.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No order as
to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose