Holding

The High Court transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC by quashing the FIR and interfering with the investigation on the basis of a draft charge‑sheet and without examining the alleged conspiracy, and such inherent powers must be exercised sparingly and cannot override statutory provisions.

Summary

The appellant filed a criminal complaint alleging fraud and extortion in a land‑title dispute, leading to an FIR under Sections 465, 467, 468 and 120B IPC. The respondents filed petitions under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashment of the FIR; the High Court allowed the petitions, quashing the FIR except for the extortion allegation against two respondents and also restrained the police from filing the charge‑sheet before the magistrate. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by relying on a draft charge‑sheet not yet placed before the magistrate and by interfering with the statutory investigative process. It emphasized that inherent powers under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly, cannot override statutory provisions, and cannot be used to test the veracity of allegations or to direct the police to withhold a final report. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order, allowing the appeals arising from SLP (Crl) Nos 5736‑39 and dismissing the appeals arising from SLP (Crl) Nos 5734‑35. The investigation must continue against the accused for extortion, and the FIR cannot be quashed on the basis of a draft charge‑sheet or unexamined conspiracy allegations.

Issues considered

The High Court may quash an FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC on the basis of a draft charge‑sheet not yet submitted to the magistrate.
Whether the High Court can direct the police to withhold submission of the final report under Section 173 to the magistrate.
Whether anticipatory bail or fear of arrest justifies a petition for quashing under Section 482.
The scope and limits of the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 in relation to statutory investigation provisions.
Whether the High Court must examine alleged criminal conspiracy before quashing an FIR where a specific role of an accused is alleged.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 156, s. 173, s. 207, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 34, s. 385, s. 389, s. 418, s. 465, s. 467, s. 468, s. 477, s. 506(2)

Subjects

Section 482inherent powersquashing FIRdraft charge‑sheetinvestigationCrPCIPCcriminal conspiracyanticipatory bailabuse of process

Judgment

[2021] 11 S.C.R. 9 9

JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC.
(Criminal Appeal Nos 1328-1333 of 2021)
NOVEMBER 12, 2021 B
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
B V NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s. 482 – Inherent powers of High Court – Exercise of – On C
facts, dispute over title of land – FIR registered against respondents
u/ss 465, 467, 468 and 120B IPC by the appellant – Respondents
nos. 2 to 7 filed petitions u/s 482 before the High Court for quashing
of FIR – Interim order by the High Court that investigation to be
continued but charge-sheet to be filed only with its permission –
D
Draft charge-sheet placed before the High Court for offences
punishable u/ss. 385, 389, 418, 477, 506(2), 120B and 34 IPC –
Draft charge-sheet also arraigned respondents nos. 8 and 9 – High
Court quashed the FIR except for the allegations against respondents
nos. 4 and 5 u/s. 385 IPC – On appeal, held: High Court
transgressed the limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction u/s.482 E
in quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings, and by
restricting the police from submitting the charge-sheet before the
magistrate and by further perusing the contents of the draft charge-
sheet in the proceedings before it – High Court cannot place reliance
on a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before the
F
magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings u/s 482 – High Court’s
direction to not submit report to Magistrate prior to placing the
same before it was devoid of any reasoning – Interim direction
amounted to an unnecessary interference in the investigative process
envisaged under the CrPC – Furthermore, allegations in the FIR
prima facie indicate that respondent nos 6 and 7 entered into G
champertous agreements with the legal heirs of SB and were alleged
to be involved in the extortion of money from the appellant – High
Court held that the allegations on their face disclose that respondent
nos 4 and 5 committed the offence of extortion u/s 385 IPC and
directed that the investigation be continued against them – However,
H
9
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A the High Court completely failed to examine the allegation of criminal
conspiracy qua the other accused – Thus, when a specific role was
attributed to the accused, the High Court could not have quashed
the FIR u/s.482 – As regards, respondent nos. 8 and 9 who were
named as accused in the draft charge-sheet and not in the FIR,
instituted quashing petitions, before the draft charge-sheet was
B
placed before the High Court and the High Court proceeded to
entertain their petitions u/s.482 – Interference by the High Court in
the investigation against respondent nos. 8 and 9 was at a premature
stage and not warranted – There has been a clear abuse of the
process – Thus, the order passed by the High Court set aside.
C s. 482 – Inherent powers of High Court – Exercise of – Held:
Inherent powers by High Court must be exercised sparingly and
with circumspection – Inherent powers do not confer arbitrary
jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim and caprice
– Inherent powers cannot be invoked to sidestep statutory provisions
D – High Court can neither direct an investigating agency to submit
the investigation report before it nor can it quash a criminal
proceeding u/s. 482 relying on such report when the report has not
been submitted to the Magistrate.
Allowing the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-39
E of 2019 and dismissing the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos
5734 and 5735 of 2019, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court must exercise its inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedurre,
1973 sparingly and with circumspection. The inherent powers do
F not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act
according to whim or caprice. The inherent powers of the High
Court cannot be invoked to sidestep statutory provisions. [Para
20][29-F-H]
Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi (2009) 14 SCC
G 683 : [2009] 10 SCR 857; Simrikhia v. Dolley
Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437 : [1990] 1 SCR 788;
Pratibha v. Rameshwari Dev (2007) 12 SCC 369 :
[2007] 9 SCR 1038 – referred to.
2.1. The police have a statutory right to investigate a
cognizable offence under sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC. Sub-
H
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 11
ETC.

Section 2(i) of section 173 of the CrPC provides that after the A
completion of investigation, the police officer in charge of the
police station shall forward the final report to the magistrate who
is empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged in the
report. Before taking cognizance of the offence, the magistrate
has to apply their own mind and is not bound by the conclusions
B
drawn by the police. The High Court can neither direct an
investigating agency to submit the investigation report before it
nor can it quash a criminal proceeding under s. 482 relying on
such a report when the report has not been submitted to the
Magistrate. [Para 20][30-C-E]
2.2. The High Court in its interim order dated 2 May, 2016, C
allowed the investigation to continue against the accused but
directed that the final report cannot be submitted to the magistrate
without its permission. The direction was not supported by any
reasoning whatsoever. Even at the interim stage, the High Court
must demonstrate an application of mind and furnish reasons for D
issuing any interlocutory direction, which is capable of being
tested before this Court in an appropriate case. The interim
direction amounted to an unnecessary interference in the
investigative process envisaged under the CrPC. The High Court
transgressed the scope of powers conferred upon it by restricting
the police from submitting the charge-sheet before the magistrate E
and by further perusing the contents of the “draft charge-sheet”
in the proceedings before it. [Para 20][31-D-F]
2.3. A distinct position arises when the charge-sheet has
been filed before a magistrate and proceedings u/s 482 are
pending before the High Court. In such cases, the High Court F
must take into consideration the material collected during the
investigation. However, the High Court cannot place reliance on
a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before the
magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings u/s 482. [Para 21][31-
G-H; 32-A] G
Kaptan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal
Appeal No. 787 of 2021; Mahendra KC v. State of
Karnataka Criminal Appeal No. 1238 of 2021 - referred
to.
H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 2.4. The allegations in the FIR prima facie indicate that
the sixth and seventh respondents entered into champertous
agreements with the legal heirs of SB and were alleged to be
involved in the extortion of money from the appellant. In the
impugned judgment, the High Court held that the allegations on
their face disclose that the fourth and fifth respondents committed
B
the offence of extortion u/s 385, IPC and directed that the
investigation be continued against them. However, the High Court
completely failed to examine the allegation of criminal conspiracy
qua the other accused where it has been alleged that they were
also privy to such extortion. Thus, in such circumstances, when
C a specific role was attributed to the accused, the High Court could
not have quashed the FIR under s. 482 of the CrPC. [Para 23][33-
F-H; 34-A]
2.5. During the course of its impugned judgment, the High
Court noted that certain persons (the eighth and ninth
D respondents) who were named as accused in the draft charge-
sheet had instituted quashing petitions, evidently before the draft
charge-sheet was placed before the High Court. In this backdrop,
there is substance in the submission on behalf of the appellant
that the proceedings before the High Court have followed an
unusual, if not extraordinary course. The High Court proceeded
E to entertain petitions for quashing under s. 482 at the behest of
persons who were not named in the FIR purely on the basis of
their names appearing in the draft charge-sheet. A draft charge-
sheet was placed before the High Court by the investigating
officer only in order to seek its permission, pursuant to the interim
F order, for submitting the charge-sheet to the competent court.
Knowledge in regard to what has transpired during the course of
the investigation is obtained by the accused once a copy of the
chargesheet is made available under Section 207 of the CrPC.
Evidently, the persons whose names were mentioned in the draft
charge-sheet had already moved the High Court in proceedings
G under Section 482 at a point of time anterior to the investigating
officer submitting the charge-sheet to the High Court for seeking
its permission to submit it before the competent court in
accordance with law. The draft charge-sheet records filing of the
petitions for quashing in the High Court which would indicate
H that even before the charge-sheet was brought to the notice of
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 13
ETC.

the High Court, petitions for quashing had already been filed. A
The High Court ought to have taken note of these development.
The appellant has submitted both in the course of the oral and
written submissions that these developments indicate that the
accused were complicit with the police. The High Court should
have been alive to the abuse of its process. [Para 24][34-A-E;
B
35-A-B]
2.6. While the apprehension of arrest may have led to the
filing of an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions
Judge, this could not furnish the basis of a petition for quashing
under Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not named
in the FIR and who, as stated earlier, had instituted proceedings C
for quashing even before the draft charge-sheet came to be
submitted before the High Court. The judgment of the High Court
indicates that while analyzing the case set up before it by the
applicants in various quashing petitions, it has proceeded to quash
the FIR and draft charge-sheet in respect of applicants who were D
not even arraigned as accused in the FIR. The interference by
the High Court in the investigation against the eighth and ninth
respondents was at a premature stage and was not warranted.
[Para 25][35-C-E]
2.7. During the course of oral arguments, it was urged on E
behalf of the respondents that a prior complaint had been
registered against the appellant which had resulted into the
submission of a charge-sheet. The respondents ought to have
drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that on July 8, 2021,
the High Court in Criminal Misc. Application No 10523 of 2021
had quashed the prior complaint as well as the charge-sheet and F
all consequential proceedings at the behest of the appellant, a
fact which emerged out of the written submissions filed on behalf
of the appellant. Another submission which was urged on behalf
of the respondents is that the appellant had arrived at a
compromise in respect of some of the accused and the entire G
FIR was quashed. On this aspect, the appellant in the written
submissions has recorded that the memo of Criminal Misc.
Application No 10529 of 2021 was filed by two persons (the fourth
and fifth respondents) in respect of whom proceedings were
directed to be continued. In this backdrop that the order dated
H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 9 July 2021 records that the entire FIR stands quashed. The
FIR against all the accused except the said two persons stood
quashed as a result of the impugned order dated 8 January, 2019.
Hence, order dated 9 July 2021 only quashed the FIR against
the remaining two accused with whom there was a subsequent
compromise. In this backdrop, the appellant stated that SLP (Crl)
B
Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 are not being pressed. The respondent
to the above SLPs are the legal heirs of the seller of the land
from whom the appellant and his family members purchased the
land and their spouses. The other accused are allegedly the
persons who had executed champertous agreements or aided in
C their execution (eighth respondents) and who are alleged to have
been party to the extortion of money from the appellant. Hence,
the High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise of
its jurisdiction under s. 482 of the CrPC in quashing the FIR and
all consequential proceedings. There has been a clear abuse of
the process before the High Court. Thus, the impugned judgment
D
and order of the High Court are set aside. [Para 26, 27][35-F-H;
36-A-E]
Case Law Reference
[2009] 10 SCR 857 referred to Para 20
E [1990] 1 SCR 788 referred to Para 20
[2007] 9 SCR 1038 referred to Para 20
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1328-1333 of 2021.
F From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2019 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Crl.M.A. Nos.9885, 10534, 10612 and 10651
of 2016 and S.Crl.A. Nos.10140 and 5859 of 2016.
Nikhil Goel, Jay M. Thakkar, Ms. Naveen Goel, Vinay Mathew,
Advs. for the Appellant.
G Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Somesh
Chandra Jha, Rahul Narang, Karan Bharihoke, Siddhant Sharma,
Ms. Neha Sahai Bharihoke, Khilan Chandrani, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 15
ETC.

DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J. A
1. This batch of appeals arises from a judgment and order dated
8 January 2019 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat. The High
Court quashed an FIR1 which was registered against the private
respondents under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19732,
except for the allegations against the fourth and fifth respondentsunder B
Section 385 of the Indian Penal Code 18603, in respect ofwhich the
investigation has been permitted to continue.
2. On 13 April 2016, an FIR4 was registered against the private
respondents under Sections 465, 467, 468 and 120B of the IPC by the
Gandhigram Police Station, Rajkot on a complaint made by the appellant. C
The contents of the FIR are elucidated below.
3. A property located in Village Veja at Rajkot is alleged to have
been allotted to Shamjibhai Jesabhai Koli by the government on account
of his service in the Army. The appellant has alleged that he and his
brother purchased the property for a consideration of Rs 7,75,000 and D
an agreement to sell was executed in their favour by Shamjibhai before
a notary. An irrevocable power of attorney was allegedly executed in
favour of the appellant and his brother for clearing the title to the land
and for obtaining the sanction of the government. The appellant alleged
that in 1999, he paid an amount of Rs 4,00,000 by a demand draft and
Rs 4,00,000 in cash to the vendor. Shamjibhai is alleged to have registered E
a sale deed on 19 May 1999 in favour of the appellant, his father and his
brothers. Shamjibhai is alleged to have also executed a power of attorney
in favour of the appellant and his father-in-law on the same date. The
power of attorney mentioned that Shamjibhai had accepted the
consideration for the land and had handed over possession to the appellant F
and his family. Shamjibhai is alleged to have executed another agreement
mentioning that an amount of Rs 2,00,000 was due to be paid to him. On
9 January 2006, the Government of Gujarat granted permission for the
sale of the land and a premium of Rs 13,76,000 was allegedly paid by the
appellant and his family. As the power of attorney holder, the appellant’s
father-in-law sold the land to Om Prakash Kotecha, Mukul Kotecha, G
Ketan Kotecha and his wife Deepaben and registered a sale deed in this
1
FIR No I-124 of 2016
2
“CrPC”
3
“IPC”
4
FIR No I-124 of 2016 H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A regard. The appellant claims that he has been in possession of the property
since 1999.
4. The appellant has alleged that the second and third respondents,
who are daughters of Shamjibhai, instituted a suit5 in 2011 for cancellation
of the sale deed executed by Shamjibhai in favour of the appellant. The
B civil court by its order dated 8 February 2013 granted an interim injunction
restraining the appellant from alienating, transferring or assigning the
property during the pendency of the suit.
5. It is alleged that the second and third respondents executed a
power of attorney in favour of the seventh respondent in relation to the
C property, for a consideration of Rs 5,51,000. A Memorandum of
Understanding6 was also executed stipulating that the land is to be sold
for Rs 2 crores. The second and third respondents are alleged to have
executed another power of attorney and MoU with the sixth respondent,
against a payment of Rs 5,00,000.

D 6. On 20 March 2015, prior to the FIR which was registered at
the behest of the appellant, an FIR7 was registered against the appellant
and the members of his family on a complaint lodged by the second
respondent for offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 465,
467, 471, 447, 34, 114 and 120B of the IPC at DCB Police Station,
Rajkot alleging that the property had been obtained by the appellant
E without payment of the entire consideration. The appellant has contended
that the second respondent did not disclose that a payment of Rs 4,00,000
was made by the appellant by a demand draft which was deposited in
the account of Shamjibhai.
7. The appellant has further alleged that the fourth respondent
F who is the spouse of the second respondent called him to the office of
an advocate to pressurize him to enter into a compromise. A sum of
money running into crores of rupees is alleged to have been demanded
from the appellant, stating that the lands had been sold to land mafias.
The fifth respondent, the spouse of the third respondent,is also alleged to
G have demanded money from the appellant to arrive at a compromise.
The fourth and fifth respondents are alleged to have acted as witnesses
to the powers of attorney and deeds executed by the second and third
respondents with third parties.
5
Civil Suit No 157 of 2011
6
"MoU”
H 7
FIR No I-11 of 2015
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 17
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

8. The appellant lodged a complaint with the Gandhigram Police A
Station against the respondents and a FIR8 was registered on 13 April
2016 for offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468 and 120B of
the IPC. The second to seventh respondents filed petitions9 before the
High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR10 registered
at the behest of the appellant against them.By an interim order dated
B
2 May 2016, the High Court directed that the investigation may continue
but the charge-sheet be filed only with its permission.
9. The eighth and ninth respondents were not named in the FIR.
Apprehending arrest, they sought and were granted anticipatory bail by
the Sessions Court, Rajkot. Thereafter, they also filed petitions11 for
quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC. C

10. A draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court for
offences punishable under Sections 385, 389, 418, 477, 506 (2), 120B
and 34 of the IPC. The draft charge-sheet also contains allegations against
the eighth and ninth respondents. It is alleged that the eight respondent
who is an advocate, helped the other accused in drafting false documents D
– the powers of attorney and MoUs. The ninth respondent is alleged to
have entered into a settlement with the second respondent on 25 February
2015 against a payment of Rs 41,51,000.
11. The petitions for quashing the FIR were allowed by the High
Court by its impugned judgement dated 8 January 2019 save in respect E
of the investigation for offences punishableunder Section 385 of the IPC
againstthe fourth and fifth respondents. The conclusion of the High Court
is extracted below:
“10.4 The upshot of the foregoing analysis and observations is
that prima facie, it appears that the offence under section 385 of F
attempt to commit extortion is said to have been established against
Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki and Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela
(applicants of Criminal Misc. Application No. 10534/2016). Hence,
the investigation shall proceed further for the offence under section
385 against them. No offence as alleged in the FIR and draft G

8
FIR No I-124 of 2016
9
Crl. M.A. No 9885 of 2016, Crl. M.A. No 10534 of 2016, Crl. M.A. 10612 of 2016
and Crl. M.A. No 10651 of 2016
10
FIR No I-124 of 2016
11
S. Crl. A No. 10140 of 2016 and S. Crl. A. No. 5859 of 2016 H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A charge sheet is said to have been established against the rest of
the accused. Necessary report shall be filed in this regard as
expeditiously as possible.”
The High Court has held that an offence under Section 385 of the
IPC is prima facie made out against the fourth and fifth respondents
B who are alleged to have demanded money from the appellant to enter
into a compromise. The High Court observed thus:
“9. 1 In the present case, the contents of the FIR reveal that the
daughter of Shamjibhai namely Ritaben and Savitaben have
executed various powers of attorneys with other accused in order
C to jeopardize the right and title of the land belonging to the first
informant for the purpose of extorting money. It is also alleged
that before three months, the husband of Ritaben @ Ramaben
had called him at the office of one advocate Mr. B.B. Mehta, for
compromise, and informed him that he has already executed the
title of land to land mafias and has taken the money from them,
D and if he wants to compromise, he will have to give crores of
rupees. After, one or two days, Kalubhai called him and told that
Karanbhai has informed him (Kalubhai) that the husband of
Savitaben, i.e Maganbhai has demanded money in order to enter
into compromise. It is also alleged that before one and half years,
E Karan had visited at his hotel Europine along with his broker friend
Puneet Koli, and had demanded five crores from him, and also
told, if does not do so, he will lodge a complaint against him and he
will have to go to jail. Both these persons Magan and Karan have
signed as witness in the power of attorney documents.

F The first informant has alleged that Karanbhai Gordhanbhai
(Applicants Solanki and Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela of
Application No. 10534/2016) had contacted him and have said
that the land has been transferred to land mafias and if he wants
to compromise he has to part with corers of rupees. The demand
of money by way of compromise will satisfy the ingredients of
G section 385. The foregoing analysis and observations, prima facie
reveal that there is an attempt to extort money from the first
informant by Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki (Applicant no. 1 of
Cri. Misc Application No. 10534/2016) husband of Ritaben @
Ramaben and Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela (Applicant No. 2 of
H
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 19
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Cri. Misc. Application No. 10534/2016), who is the husband of A
Savitaben.”
In respect of the allegations against the second and third
respondents, the High Court observed that the allegation that they had
executed powers of attorney and settlement deeds in favour of third
parties would not constitute offences of forgery, extortion or cheating. B
The relevant extract of the judgement is reproduced below:
“9.2 It is not in dispute that Ritaben and Savitaben have executed
various powers of attorney in favour of other accused. Ritaben
has also lodged FIR against the first informant on 20.03.2015.
The power of attorney reveals that the same are executed to file C
appropriate proceedings on their behalf in the Special Civil Suit
No. 157/11 and further to carry out legal proceedings pertaining
to the suit land. One of the power of attorney dated 20.11.2012
reveals that Ritaben and Savitaben are paid Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees
Five Lacs Only) towards the cost of proceedings and further it
stated that if the proceedings result in their favour, then the power D
of attorney holders will have 50% share in the property. Thus,
merely because the applicant Ritaben and Savitaben, daughters
of Shamjibhai have executed power of attorney and settlement
deeds with other accused, such an act will not satisfy the
requirement of offence of forgery, extortion or cheating. The E
validity of such documents can always be examined in civil
proceedings.”
The High Court held that the allegations against the sixth to ninth
respondents do not constitute the offences alleged in the FIR. The High
Court observed thus: F
“10. As far as Criminal Misc. Application No 10612 of 2016 is
concerned, the applicant-accused-Ashwin Parshottambhai Lila is
the power of attorney holder of Ritaben. It is alleged that he and
Ritaben have also entered in to settlement deed on 07.06.2011 by
which they have agreed to sell the land for Rupees Two Crores G
and an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs Only) is also
paid to Ritaben.
10.1 In Criminal Misc. Application No. 10651 of 2016, applicant-
accused-Kiran Parshottam Hapaliya, another power of attorney
is executed by Ritaben and Savitaben in his name and a settlement
H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A deed is executed on 20.11.2012 in which it is mentioned that they
have received an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs) by
cheque and Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs) by cash from
one Ashwin and Ramesh Nishit. Further it is recorded in the
settlement deed that if any share of the property is effected then
they will part with 50% of the same and if any compromise is
B
arrived then they will be paid 50% of the amount. Thus, in both
the aforesaid cases no offence as alleged in the FIR or the draft
charge sheet is made out against the two applicants.
10.2 In Cri. Misc. Application No. 5859/2016, the name of
applicant-accused Jatin Hasmukh Pipaliya does not figure in the
C FIR. Subsequently in the draft charge sheet he has been arraigned
as an accused. It is stated that he had entered in the settlement
deed dated 25.2.2015 with Ritaben for which he had paid
Rs 41, 51,000/- by cheque and cash.
10.3 In Criminal Misc. Application No. 10140/16, the applicant-
D accused Babubhai Nanjibhai Bhokhodiya’s name does not figure
in the charge sheet. The role attributed to him in the draft charge
sheet is that have helped the other accused in making the documents
relating to power of attorney and settlement deed. Thus, even if
the allegations are accepted then alsono offence under section
E 385, 389, 418, 423, 477, 506(2), 120-B and section 34 are
established against both the applicants.”
The second, third, fourth and fifth respondentsand the appellant
have apparently settled the dispute. The High Court by its order dated
9 July 2021 quashed the FIR and the charge-sheet, including all
F consequential proceedings against the fourth and fifth respondents since
the parties had settled the dispute. On account of the compromise, the
appellant is not pressing the special leave petitions12 against the second
to fifth respondents, who are the legal heirs of Shamjibhaiand their
spouses.

G 12. On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged by Mr Nikhil
Goel learned counsel that:
(i) An argument of prejudice was sought to be urged against the
appellant by highlighting that the earlier FIR against the
appellant (which stands quashed as of date) was registered
12
H SLP (Crl) No 5734 and 5735 of 2019
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 21
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

before the DCB police station and therefore, the appellant A
was sent to the Gandhigram police station to register the FIR.
However, as a matter of fact, it is the DCB police station
which has investigated the offence against the respondents;
(ii) The investigation conducted by the DCB police station has
revealed that: B
(a) there existed a pre-planned criminal conspiracy among
the accused to create a dispute in relation to the title of
land by executing false MoUs;
(b) the land was transferred to the appellant and his family
members by Shamjibhai in 1999 through a registered C
agreement to sell and a power of attorney was also
executed in favour of the appellant’s father-in-law;
(c) a possession receipt was issued;
(d) a consideration of Rs 8,00,000 was received by D
Shamjibhai;
(e) permission for the sale of land was obtained from the
government in 2006 by which time Shamjibhai had passed
away; and
(f) the power of attorney holder had then executed four E
sale deeds on the strength of the power of attorney after
the death of Shamjibhai;
(iii) The second respondentregistered an FIR before the DCB
police station after a lapse of nine years. The FIR and the
ensuing charge-sheet have been quashed by the High Court F
on 8 July 2021 in a separate proceeding;
(iv) Certain accused, who had not been named in the FIR, had
filed quashing petitions based on the apprehension that they
may be named in the charge-sheet. An apprehension of arrest
may give rise to an application for anticipatory bail but not to G
a quashing petition at the behest of a person not named in the
FIR. The fact that these accused knew that they will be
named in the draft charge-sheet gives rise to the inference
that the accused were in collusion with the police. The High
Court should have taken serious note of the maintainability of
H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A such petitions and questioned the accused on the source of
their knowledge that they will be arraigned as accused in the
draft charge-sheet;
(v) The findings of the High Court are based on the contents of
the FIR and do not take into consideration the final report of
B the investigation under Section 173 of the CrPC that was
placed before it; and
(vi) The legal heirs of Shamjibhai and their spouses were not
pressured to enter into a compromise with the appellant.
13. On the other hand, Mr Karan Bharihoke and Mr Khilan
C Chandrani appearing for the sixth to ninth respondents submitted that:
(i) The FIR only contains allegations against the sixth and
seventh respondents and the eighth and ninth respondents
have not been named in the FIR;

D (ii) At the highest, the sixth to ninth respondents can be said to
have financed the litigation as noted by the High Court in
its impugned judgement;
(iii) There is no allegation of extortion against the answering
respondents;
E (iv) The powers of attorney and MoUs were executed before
a notary. Thus, on the face of it, these documents cannot
be termed as false or forged;
(v) The eighth respondent has been roped in only on account
of having drafted the documents, which shows the frivolous
F nature of theallegations;
(vi) The earlier FIR against the appellant gave rise to a charge-
sheet which mentioned that the powers of attorney and sale
deeds were forged and on the basis of such forged
documents, the appellant had obtained the permission to
G convert the land from new tenure to old tenure, in
connivance with revenue officers;
(vii) The request for permission to file the charge-sheet dated 9
August 2017 by DCB police station merely reiterates the
allegations in the FIR. Further, this document was never
H placed on record and is an attempt by the appellant, in
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 23
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

collusion with the police inspector, to create a document A
favouring the appellant;
(viii) The FIR was registered with the Gandhigram police station
and DCB police had no role to play in the investigation.
Thus, the request for permission to file the charge-sheet by
the DCB police station shows the influence of the appellant B
and the malafide nature of the investigation conducted by
DCB police station;
(ix) The draft charge-sheet was considered by the High Court
in its impugned judgement, which is evident from the
discussion of the offence of extortion, which bears no C
reference in the FIR. Further, the High Court has referred
to statements and documents that were part of the draft
charge-sheet;
(x) The respondents who were not named in the FIR were
harassed by the police duringthe investigation. They had D
preferred an application for anticipatory bail before the
Sessions Court, Rajkot, which was allowed. Thereafter, they
filed the quashing petitions before the High Court;
(xi) The civil court had allowed the application for interlocutory
injunction filed by the second and third respondents. This E
order was challenged by the appellant before the Sessions
Court, 13 under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 1908 but this was rejected on 22 November 2016.
The appellant has moved the High Court14 in appeal, before
which proceedings are pending;
F
(xii) The appellant has misled the Court by claiming that
Shamjibhai had registered a sale deed in his favour in 1999.
The document is not registered. The power of attorney and
sale deeds are forged documents and were a subject matter
of a prior FIR;
G
(xiii) The dispute between the parties is essentially of a civil nature
which has been given a criminal colour;

13
Civil Appeal No 32 of 2013
14
SCA No 5558 of 2017 H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A (xiv) The appellant has entered into a settlement with the fourth
and fifth respondents, who were the only persons accused
of extortion. An attempt is being made to pressurize the
sixth to ninth respondentsto enter into a compromise with
the help of the police machinery;
B (xv) The FIR was registered after a lapse of 3 years and 6
months; and
(xvi) There are no allegations against the answering respondents
which constitute an offence.
14. The rival contentions will now be considered.
C 15. Insofar as the sixth to ninth respondents are concerned, their
position before this Court in SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-5739 of 2019 is as
follows:

D

E

While the sixth and seventh respondents were named in the FIR,
the eighth and ninth respondents were arraigned as accused in the draft
charge-sheet. The allegations against the sixth to ninth respondents are
F that as a part of a criminal conspiracy, they colluded to execute false
powers of attorney and MoUs to jeopardize the right and title to the land
belonging to the appellant and were party to the extortion of money from
him. It is alleged that sixth, seventh and ninth respondents executed
champertous agreements with the legal heirs of Shamjibhai to finance
the civil litigation pertaining to the title of the land. The eighth respondent,
G who is an advocate, is alleged to have helped the other accused in drafting
the powers of attorney and MoUs.
16. Before we examine whether the High Court transgressed the
limitations on the exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
it will be useful to give an overview of how the proceedings have evolved.
H
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 25
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

17. An FIR15 was registered at the behest of the appellant on A
13 April 2016 for offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468 and
120B of the IPC. Eight persons were named as accused:
“(1) Ritaben alias Ramaben
(2) Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki,
B
(3) Savitaben
(4) Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela
(5) Jayaben
(6) Kiran Parshottambhai Hathaliya,
C
(7) Ashwin Parshottambhai Leela (Patel)
(8) Jaimingiri Magangiri Goswami”
18. Upon the registration of the FIR, petitions under Section 482
of the CrPC were instituted before the Gujarat High Court. By an order
dated 2 May 2016, a Single Judge permitted the investigation to continue D
but directed that no final report (under Section 173 of the CrPC) shall be
submitted without the permission of the High Court. The interim order
of the High Court records that it is based on two considerations:
(i) An earlier complaint had been lodged by the second respondent
against the appellant. In those proceedings, a charge-sheet E
had been submitted against the appellant and others; and
(ii) A suit had been instituted before the Senior Civil Judge,
Rajkot16 in which an interlocutory order of injunction was
passed on 8 February 2013 protecting the second respondent.
It was in this backdrop that the following interim order was F
passed by the High Court during the pendency of the petitions
for quashing the FIR :
“6. The investigation in this case shall CONTINUE. The I.O.
shall bear in mind, while investigating this matter, the lodgment of
the earlier complaint by the present petitioners, wherein, charge- G
sheet has been filed against present Respondent No.2 and others
and the details of the pending civil suit. Without the PERMISSION
of this Court, no final report shall be submitted. The right of
15
FIR No I-124 of 2016
16
Regular Civil Suit No 157 of 2011 H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Respondent No.2 to file reply is kept open. Direct service is
permitted.”
19. The FIR lodged by the appellant was investigated, upon which
an application was moved on 9 August 2017 by the Police Inspector,
DCB Police Station, Rajkot city to the Registrar General of the High
B Court seeking permission to file a charge-sheet. In the course of the
proceedings before the High Court, submissions were advanced by the
APP, alluding to the contents of the FIR and the charge-sheet. The
charge-sheet has been described as a “draft charge-sheet” since in view
of the interim order of the High Court, there was a restraint on the
submission of the charge-sheet before the competent court without the
C permission of the High Court. At this stage, it becomes necessary to
advert to the submissions which were urged before the High Court by
the APP, setting out the material which had emerged during the course
of the investigation, following the registration of the FIR. The submissions
have been summarized in the judgment of the High Court and read thus:
D “6.2 Learned APP… on instructions of the Investigating officer
has submitted that so far the offences of forgery are concerned,
the same are not made out against the present applicants. However,
he has submitted that further investigation reveals that the offences
of extortion and cheating are prima facie established against them.
E He has placed reliance on the statement of various witnesses in
this regard.
6.3 Learned APP … has placed reliance on the various statements
of the witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer. He has
placed reliance on the statement of Jitulbhai Jentilal Kotecha and
F Lalbhai Koraiya recorded by the Investigating Officer on
18.07.2016. He has stated that prior eight months from today, he
has called his advocate friend Harshadbhai on mobile phone, at
that time, his friend Harshadbhai informed him that advocate
Babubhai is with him and he wanted to talk him about the disputed
land, and thereafter, he talked to said advocate. The advocate
G informed him that in order to compromise, a huge money has to
be paid to Karanbhai, Maganbhai etc, and when he asked about
the amount, advocate Babubhai informed him that they are
demanding Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores Only) in order
to enter into compromise otherwise he will enter into settlement
H agreement with head strong persons.
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 27
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

6.4 Learned APP has also placed reliance on the statement of A
Mr.Jenish Premjibhai Motivaras recorded by the Investigating
Officer on 20. 05. 2016 in which he has stated that he was
contacted by one Shri Kapilbhai Kotecha, who had taken him to
one shop, wherein one person was sitting and was talking about
the dealing to be done in some land, and thereafter, he informed
B
him that, if he would like to invest in the said land, he can sign on
the documents brought by him. The said persons informed him
that the land belongs to two ladies and accordingly, he has prepared
the compromise in his name on the stamp paper of Rs.100/-. It is
submitted by Mr.Jenish Premji that thereafter, he signed the said
documents pertaining to the compromise and accordingly, the said C
person had asked him to pay Rs.25,000/- and further
Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lacs Only) to be paid within a period
of three months. It is further stated by Mr. Jenish Premji that he
did not take any receipt from that unknown persons about the
amount and only received business card in which his name and
D
address was given. It is lastly submitted by him that that unknown
person had committed fraud of Rs.25,000/- (Rs.Twenty Five
Thousand Only), however, he has not lodged any police complaint
in that regard.
6.5 Learned APP has also placed reliance on the statement dated
21.05.2016 taken by the Investigating Officer of one Prakash E
Kishorbhai Jariya, who has stated that he had given Rs.90,000/-
(Rupees Ninety thousand Only) to one Ashwinbhai
Parshottambhai Lila on 12.04.2016, but he did not take any receipt
to that effect. It is submitted by him he read in the news-paper
about the incident. When he tried to contact Ashwinbhai, his mobile F
phone was switch off, and thereafter, he contacted Jetul Kotecha
and went with him at DCB Police Station for giving statements. It
is submitted by him that Ashwinbhai had given him one compromise
on the stamp paper of Rs.100/- as well as copy of power of
attorney.
G
6.6 Learned APP has also relied upon one statement of
Narendrabhai Chaganbhai Nasit recorded by the Investigating
Officer on 21.05.2016 in which he has stated that he was
approached by one Mr.Ashwinbhai to invest in the said land and
also demanded Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty
H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Thousand Only) for investment and accordingly, he had paid cheque
of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac Only) on 18.11.2012 which
was in the name of his brother Ramesh Chagan Nasit, and
thereafter, he paid cash of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lac Fifty
Thousand only), and thereafter, he was called on 20.11.2012 at
Rajkot Court to execute a compromise deed where Geetaben and
B
Savitaben were present with their husbands. It is stated by him
that Ashwinbhai thereafter was talking to the said farmers that
Jitulbhai Kotecha is a Businessman and if we forced him, he would
pay Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lacs Only) or Rs.1,00,00,000/-
(Rupees One Crore Only), at that time, he told Ashwinbhai that
C he would not like to do such, and thereafter, went from there with
his younger brother. He has submitted that he has not signed
anywhere on the compromise deed and had put a cross on the
name of his younger brother and the said compromise was written
by the Ashwinbhai after one and half months. He has further
submitted that he had not filed any police complaint in relation to
D
Rs 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty Thousand) taken by
Ashwinbhai.
6.7 Learned APP has further placed reliance on the statement of
one Punit S/o. Narsibhai Udesa recorded by the Investigating
Officer on 09.06.2016 and he has specifically stated there was a
E dispute going on between Karanbhai Solanki and Jetulbhai and
one half prior, his uncle Karanbhai met Jitulbhai Kotecha at
Europine Hotel for entering into compromise, at that time, Jetulbhai
had made an offer of Rs.2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty
Thousand) for compromise and on hearing that, his uncle Karan
F Solanki left the hotel. It is further stated that when he met his
uncle Karanbhai outside the hotel, at that time, his uncle informed
that he would not accept Rs.2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lacs Fifty
Thousand) for compromise with Jitulbhai.
6.8 In view of the aforesaid statement, learned APP has submitted
G that prima facie, case of extortion is made out against the present
applicants and hence, FIR may not be quashed at this stage.”
The above extract from the judgment of the High Court would
make it abundantly clear that the Single Judge was duly apprised of the
statements which were recorded by the Investigating Officer during the
H course of the investigation on 20 May 2016, 21 May 2016 and 9 June
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 29
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

2016. When the High Court took up the petitions under Section 482, the A
Investigating Officer upon the completion of the investigation, sought
permission to submit the final report under Section 173 before the
competent court. This was noted by the High Court in paragraph 9 of its
impugned order which reads as follows:
“9.0 The impugned FI.R being C.R. I-124 of 2016 is registered B
for the offences under section 465, 467, 468, 120B and 34 of the
IPC against the present writ applicants. During the pendency of
the writ applications a draft charge sheet is produced in which
offences are altered to section 385, 389, 418, 423, 477, 506(2),
120B, 34 of IPC. Thus, this court has to examine whether the
contents of the F.I.R reveal the offence of extortion and cheating C
against the present applicants.”
In the above extract, the High Court noted that a “draft charge-
sheet” was produced before it. The High Court nonetheless proceeded
to formulate the issue before it as being whether the contents of the FIR
revealed that offences of extortion and cheating had been committed by D
the respondents. But in its final order, the High Court quashed FIR I-124
of 2016 as well as “other consequential proceedings arising out of the
same FIR” in relation to the accused under Section 482. However, the
High Court concluded that an alleged offence of extortion punishable
under Section 385 of the IPC had been made out on the face of the FIR E
against accused Karanbhai and Maganbhai (the fourth and fifth
respondents) and the investigation was permitted to proceed against them
for the offence of extortion. No offence as alleged in the FIR and draft
charge-sheet was held to have been established against the other accused.
20. It is trite law that the High Court must exercise its inherent F
powers under Section 482 sparingly and with circumspection. In the
decision in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi,17 this Court has
held that, “[t]he inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction
on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.” In Simrikhia v.
Dolley Mukherjee,18 this Court in another context, while holding that
the High Court cannot exercise its inherent powers to review its earlier G
decision in view of Section 362 of the CrPC,observed that the inherent
powers of the High Court cannot be invoked to sidestep statutory
provisions. This Court held:
17
(2009) 14 SCC 683
18
(1990) 2 SCC 437 H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A “5. …Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or
to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are
controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers
by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law,
B
the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions
and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent
jurisdiction.”
(emphasis added)
C The police have a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence
under Sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC. Sub-Section 2 (i) of Section
173 of the CrPC provides that after the completion of investigation, the
police officer in charge of the police station shall forward the final report
to the Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance of the offence
alleged in the report. Before taking cognizance of the offence, the
D Magistrate has to apply their own mind and is not bound by the conclusions
drawn by the police. In Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi19 a two-judge
Bench of this Court has held that the High Court can neither direct an
investigating agency to submit the investigation report before it nor can
it quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 relying on such a report
E when the report has not been submitted to the Magistrate. Justice Tarun
Chatterjee held thus:
“18. In our view, the High Court has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction by relying on the investigation report and the High
Court was also wrong in directing the report to be submitted before
F it. It is now well settled that it is for the investigating agency to
submit the report to the Magistrate…
….
From a bare reading of this provision [Section 173 (2) (i)], it cannot
be disputed that after completion of the investigation, the officer
G in charge of the police station shall forward the report not to the
High Court where the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code
is pending but to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
the offence on such police report. Therefore, the High Court had

19
H (2007) 12 SCC 369
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 31
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

acted beyond its power to direct the investigating agency to file A
the said report before it in the exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code.
…..
21. Therefore, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, while
exercising power under Section 482 of the Code, it is not open to B
the High Court to rely on the report of the investigating agency
nor can it direct the report to be submitted before it as the law is
very clear that the report of the investigating agency may be
accepted by the Magistrate or the Magistrate may reject the same
on consideration of the material on record. Such being the position, C
the report of the investigating agency cannot be relied on by the
High Court while exercising powers under Section 482 of the
Code. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court has
erred in quashing the FIR on consideration of the investigation
report submitted before it even before the same could be submitted
before the Magistrate.” D

In its interim order dated 2 May 2016, the High Court allowed the
investigation to continue against the accused but directed that the final
report cannot be submitted to the Magistrate without its permission. The
direction was not supported by any reasoning whatsoever.Even at the
interim stage, the High Court must demonstrate an application of mind E
and furnish reasons for issuing any interlocutory direction, which is capable
of being tested before this Court in an appropriate case. The interim
direction amounted to an unnecessary interference in the investigative
process envisaged under the CrPC. The High Court transgressed the
scope of the powers conferred upon it by restricting the police from F
submitting the charge-sheet before the Magistrate and by further perusing
the contents of the “draft charge-sheet” in the proceedings before it.
21. We would like to clarify that a distinct position arises when
the charge-sheet has been filed before a Magistrate and proceedings
under Section 482 are pending before the High Court. In such cases, the G
High Court must take into consideration the material collected during
the investigation, as has been held by a two-judge Bench of this Court in
Kaptan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh20, of which one of us
(Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part. However, the High Court cannot

20
Criminal Appeal No. 787 of 2021 H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A place reliance on a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before
the Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482.
22. Recently, in Mahendra KC v. State of Karnataka21 this
Court has reiterated the well settled test to be applied by the High Court
for exercise of its powers under Section 482 for quashing an FIR:
B “16…the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the
complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the
complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence
alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of
the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner
C that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence
collected during the course of trial.”
23. In the present case, the FIR clearly mentions the role played
by the sixth and seventh respondentsin the following extract:
“…in spite of the possession of the aforesaid land being with us
D since year 1999, the daughters of Shamjibhai Jashabhai Koli i.e.
Ramaben Koli, Savitaben Koli and Jayaben Koli all three of them
had executed a power of attorney on 07/06/2011 in favour of one
Karanbhai Parshotambhai Hathaliya on the stamp paper of
Rs.100/- bearing No. 20942, wherein they have stated that as
E they are the owners of the said land by way of their right they
have all kind of authority to do all kinds of work pertaining to the
said land besides, these people had also executed one Memorandum
of Understanding in favour of Kiranbhai Hathaliya, wherein it
was decided to sell this land for an amount of Rs.2 Crores besides,
towards the same an amount of Rs. 5, 51, 000/- (Rupees Five
F Lakhs and Fifty one Thousand Only) was paid in cash to the
Party No.1 such facts were stated.
Besides, Savitaben and Ritaben had executed one another power
of attorney and Memorandum of Understanding in favour of
Ashwinbhai Parshottambhai Patel and in that Memorandum
G of Understanding also it was stated that an amount of
Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Only) was paid by Ashwinbhai
Patel through cheque to the executed, they have further stated
that, if they are given shares in the aforesaid property then they

21
H Criminal Appeal No. 1238 of 2021
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 33
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

will get 50% of the property in their share besides, it was also A
stated in the said deed that if the compromise is settled by way of
giving cash then the said amount also fifty percent of the amount
will be in their share etc
…..
Thus, in this way I have purchased the above mentioned land B
from Shamjibhai Jashabhai Koli and the heirs of Shamjibhai Koli
i.e. Ritaben alias Ramaben wife of Karanbhai Solanki and her
husband Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki, both residing at
Ghanshyamnagar Kothariya road and Savitaben wife of Maganbhai
Vaghela and her husband Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela, both C
residing at HUDCO quarters, Near Janta Fatak, Jamnagar and
other Kiran Parshottambhai Hathaliya, residing at 7, Patel
Colony, Chandreshnagar Main Road, Rajkot and Ashwinbhai
Parshottambhai Leela (Patel) Residing at Mota Mava Taluka
District Rajkot and Jaimingiri Magangiri Goswami residing at
A/ 5, Samrajya Apartment, New Collegewadi, Kalavad Road, D
Rajkot have by hatching illegal conspiracy as a part thereof
in order to grab the above stated land of my ownership by
making the same as disputed and sub-judice before the
court intends to obtain huge amount of money or to obtain
the said land for their economic benefit for which legally E
they do not have any right by implanting false, fabricated
and forged documents and hence, this is my legal complaint
against them as well as against those who emerges out of
the investigation.”
(emphasis added) F
The allegations in the FIR prima facie indicate that the sixth and
seventh respondents entered into champertous agreements with the legal
heirs of Shamjibhai and were alleged to be involved in the extortion of
money from the appellant. In the impugned judgment, the High Court
has held that the allegations on their face disclose that the fourth and G
fifth respondents committed the offence of extortion under Section 385
of the IPC and directed that the investigation be continued against them.
However, the High Court completely failed to examine the allegation of
criminal conspiracy qua the other accused where it has been alleged
that they were also privy to such extortion. Thus, in such circumstances,
H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A when a specific role was attributed to the accused, the High Court could
not have quashed the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC.
24. During the course of its impugned judgment, the High Court
noted that certain persons (the eighth and ninth respondents) who were
named as accused in the draft charge-sheet had instituted quashing
B petitions, evidently before the draft charge-sheet was placed before the
High Court. In this backdrop, there is substance in the submission which
has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings before
the High Court have followed an unusual, if not extra-ordinary course.
The High Court proceeded to entertain petitions for quashing under
Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIR
C purely on the basis of their names appearing in the draft charge-sheet. A
draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court by the investigating
officer only in order to seek its permission, pursuant to the interim order,
for submitting the charge-sheet to the competent court. Knowledge in
regard to what has transpired during the course of the investigation is
D obtained by the accused once a copy of the charge-sheet is made available
under Section 207 of the CrPC22. Evidently, the persons whose names
were mentioned in the draft charge-sheet had already moved the High
Court in proceedings under Section 482 at a point of time anterior to the
investigating officer submitting the charge-sheet to the High Court for
seeking its permission to submit it before the competent court in
E accordance with law. As a matter of fact, the draft charge-sheet records
22
‘‘207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report and other documents. In any
case where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shall
without delay furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the following:-
(i) the police report;
(ii) the first information report recorded under section 154;
F (iii) the statements recorded under sub- section (3) of section 161 of all persons whom
the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses, excluding therefrom any part in
regard to which a request for such exclusion has been made by the police officer under
sub- section (6) of section 173;
(iv) the confessions and statements, if any, recorded under section 164;
(v) any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate with
the police report under sub- section (5) of section 173: Provided that the Magistrate
G may, after perusing any such part of a statement as is referred to in clause (iii) and
considering the reasons given by the police officer for the request, direct that a copy of
that part of the statement or of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks proper,
shall be furnished to the accused: Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfied
that any document referred to in clause (v) is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing
the accused with a copy thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either
H personally or through pleader in Court.”
JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 35
ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the filing of the petitions for quashing in the High Court which would A
indicate that even before the charge-sheet was brought to the notice of
the High Court, petitions for quashing had already been filed. The High
Court ought to have taken note of these developments. The appellant
has submitted both in the course of the oral and written submissions that
these developments indicate that the accused were complicit with the
B
police. The High Court should have been alive to the abuse of its process.
25. On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted that during
the course of the investigation, the sixth to ninth respondents, who were
apprehending arrest, moved an application for anticipatory bail, which
was allowed by the Sessions Judge, Rajkot. Hence, it has been urged
that it was thereafter that the petitions for quashing came to be instituted. C
While the apprehension of arrest may have led to the filing of an
application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Judge, this could not
furnish the basis of a petition for quashing under Section 482 at the
behest of persons who were not named in the FIR and who, as stated
earlier, had instituted proceedings for quashing even before the draft D
charge-sheet came to be submitted before the High Court. The judgment
of the High Court indicates that while analyzing the case set up before it
by the applicants in various quashing petitions, it has proceeded to quash
the FIR and the draft charge-sheet in respect of applicants who were
not even arraigned as accused in the FIR. The interference by the High
Court in the investigation against the eighth and ninth respondents was E
at a premature stage and was not warranted.
26. During the course of oral arguments, it was urged on behalf
of the respondents by learned counsel that a prior complaint had been
registered against the appellant which had resulted into the submission
of a charge-sheet. The respondents ought to have drawn the attention F
of this Court to the fact that on 8 July 2021, the High Court in Criminal
Misc. Application No 10523 of 2021 had quashed the prior complaint as
well as the charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings at the behest
of the appellant, a fact which emerged out of the written submissions
filed on behalf of the appellant. Another submission which was urged on G
behalf of the respondents is that the appellant had arrived at a compromise
in respect of some of the accused and the entire FIR was quashed. On
this aspect, the appellant in the written submissions has recorded that
the memo of Criminal Misc. Application No 10529 of 2021 was filed by
two persons (the fourth and fifth respondents) in respect of whom
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A proceedings were directed to be continued. It is in this backdrop that the
order dated 9 July 2021 records that the entire FIR stands quashed. The
FIR against all the accused except the aforesaid two persons stood
quashed as a result of the impugned order of the High Court dated 8
January 2019. Hence, the order dated 9 July 2021 only quashed the FIR
against the remaining two accused with whom there was a subsequent
B
compromise. The compromise has been annexed as Annexure R-1 to
the counter affidavit filed by the sixth respondent. In this backdrop, the
appellant stated that SLP (Crl) Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 are not being
pressed. The respondents to the above SLPs are the legal heirs of the
seller of the land from whom the appellant and his family members
C purchased the land and their spouses. The other accused are allegedly
the persons who had executed champertous agreements or aided in their
execution (eighth respondent) and who are alleged to have been party to
the extortion of money from the appellant.
27. For the above reasons we have come to the conclusion that
D the High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC in quashing the FIR and all
consequential proceedings. There has been a clear abuse of the process
before the High Court. We accordingly set aside the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court dated 8 January 2019 and allow the Criminal
Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-39 of 2019 in terms of the
E above judgment. However, Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl)
Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 shall stand dismissed.
28. Pending application(s), if any stand disposed of.

F Nidhi Jain Appeals disposed of.

G

H