JSW STEEL LTD.versusTHE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MUMBAI PORT TRUST MUMBAI & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 257
- Decided
- 13 February 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH
Holding
The High Court erred in declaring the writ petition infructuous; liability for wreck removal lies with the vessel owner, and the petition must be decided on its merits.
Summary
JSW Steel Ltd. (appellant) challenged a High Court order that allowed the Mumbai Port Trust (respondent No.1) to withdraw Rs.70 lakh it had deposited as security for the removal of a capsized barge wreck. The dispute centered on whether liability for removing the wreck under Section 14 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908 fell on the vessel’s owner, M/s Shivam Engineers (respondent No.3), or on the appellant. The High Court had dismissed the writ petition as infructuous, citing the passage of time, and directed the withdrawal of the deposited amount. The Supreme Court held that the High Court wrongly treated the matter as closed, as the issue was a pure question of law requiring adjudication, and that lapse of time alone does not defeat a claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order, revived the writ petition, and remanded the case to the High Court for a merits-based determination, allowing the appellant to seek compensation if it succeeds.
Issues considered
- Does liability for removal of a wreck under Section 14 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908 rest on the owner of the vessel?
- Can a writ petition be declared infructuous solely on the basis of lapse of time and systemic delay?
- Was the High Court obligated to decide the pure question of law despite the absence of disputed facts?
Legislation cited
- Indian Ports Act, 1908s. 14(1), s. 14(3)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the High Court by which it allowed respondent no.1 to withdraw the amount deposited in the court by the appellant and disposed of the writ petition as – s.14 – Raising or removal of wreck impeding navigation within limits of port – Appellant called upon to deposit a sum of Rs.70 lakhs for removal of wreck of a barge belonging to respondent no.3 which capsized while ferrying iron ore from the ship of the appellant to the port
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 701 : 2025 INSC 257
JSW Steel Ltd.
v.
The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust
Mumbai & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 3169 of 2025)
14 February 2025
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah* and
Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by
the High Court by which it allowed respondent no.1 to withdraw
the amount deposited in the court by the appellant and disposed
of the writ petition as being infructuous.
Headnotes†
Ports Act, 1908 – s.14 – Raising or removal of wreck
impeding navigation within limits of port – Appellant called
upon to deposit a sum of Rs.70 lakhs for removal of wreck
of a barge belonging to respondent no.3 which capsized
while ferrying iron ore from the ship of the appellant to the
port concerned – Writ petition by the appellant praying for
prohibiting the respondents from insisting upon the appellant
to remove the wreck of the barge and to deposit any amount
as costs of such wreck – Case of the appellant that the Act
places liability on the owner of the vessel concerned and,
the owner of the vessel was respondent no.3 and not the
appellant – High Court allowed respondent no.1-Mumbai Port
Trust to withdraw the amount deposited in the court by the
appellant and disposed of the petition as being infructuous –
Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – The way the High Court approached the
issue appears to be erroneous since the lis was very much alive,
as a pure question of law stood raised was on whom the liability
for clearing the wreckage was to be fastened – Impugned order
did not deal with this fundamental issue – When on a purely legal
issue, the appellant raised a legal objection, and also deposited the
* Author
702 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
amount demanded by respondent no.1 in the High Court, the High
Court was required to answer the question of law – No exercise
was required involving disputed factual questions – Efflux of time
is a result of systemic delay, not due to any laches on the part
of the appellant – Impugned order set aside – Matter remanded
back to High Court to dispose it expeditiously – Constitution of
India – Art. 226. [Paras 6-9]
Case Law Cited
Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar [2004] Supp.
1 SCR 494 : (2004) 5 SCC 1; B S Hari Commandant v. Union of
India [2023] 3 SCR 431 : (2023) 13 SCC 779; Union Territory of
Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference [2023] 12
SCR 68 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140 – relied on.
List of Acts
Ports Act, 1908.
List of Keywords
Wreck of barge; Removal of wreck; Capsized barge; Deputy
conservator; Owner of the vessel; Liability for the wreckage; Writ
petition becoming infructuous; Pure question of law; Efflux of time;
Systematic delay.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3169 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.08.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 2127 of 1996
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala,
Ms. Aanchal Mullick, Ms. Kamakshi Sehgal, Rohan Sharma,
E. C. Agrawala.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Abhishek Puri, Ms. Surbhi Gupta, Sahil Grewal, Mrs. Reeta Dewan
Puri, P. N. Puri, Apoorv Shukla, Puneet Chahar, Ms. Prabhleen
A. Shukla.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 703
JSW Steel Ltd. v.
The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust Mumbai & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.
Leave granted. Heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties.
BACKGROUND:
2. The appellant is aggrieved by the Impugned Order, by which Writ
Petition No.2127/1996 filed by it before the High Court was disposed
of. The High Court noted that the said writ petition principally sought
the following reliefs:
‘(a) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ
of prohibition or a writ in the nature of prohibition or any
other appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, prohibiting the Respondents
from insisting upon the Petitioners to remove the wreck of
SATYAM or take any steps in that behalf and/or to deposit
any amounts as costs of such wreck removal;
(b) For a permanent injunction restraining the Respondents,
their servants and agents from taking any steps against the
Petitioners and preventing the Petitioners from availing of
the services of the Mumbai Port Trust and its waters for the
purpose of safely transitting their barges containing iron ore
being moved from the mother vessel to Dharamtar jetty;’
3. The writ petition has been disposed of by the High Court in the
following terms:
‘(i) We permit the Respondent No.1 Mumbai Port Trust
to withdraw the amount deposited in this Court by the
Petitioner alongwith accrued interest without prejudice to
the rights and contentions of the parties;
(ii) Inasmuch there are disputed facts involved and since
the Petition is now rendered infructuous, it could be open
for the Petitioner to file a suit against the Respondents
for refund/recovery of Rs.70,00,000/- alongwith accrued
interest, if so advised. The remedies of the Respondent
704 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
No.1 Mumbai Port Trust to recover further amounts, if any,
are also kept open;
(iii) The Writ Petition and the Notice of Motion are disposed
of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to
costs.’
SUBMISSIONS:
4. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the crux of the
issue is as to whether the appellant is liable to pay the charges for
removal of the wreck of a barge (‘Satyam’) belonging to respondent
no.3 (M/s Shivam Engineers) which capsized while ferrying iron ore
from the ship of the appellant to the port concerned. Learned counsel
drew the attention of this Court to the Notice/Communication dated
19.04.1995 issued by the then Deputy Conservator of respondent
no.1, which specifically states that power under Section 14(1)1 of
the Indian Ports Act, 19082 was being exercised and the appellant
(in its then avatar as ‘M/s Nippon Denro Ispat Ltd.’) was called upon
‘to deposit a sum Rs.70 lakhs3 as adequate security to ensure that
the said wreck has been raised or removed within the stipulated
period’.4 It was submitted that though the appellant had deposited
the amount, the question was as to whether it was liable since
Section 14(1) of the Act places liability on the owner of the vessel
concerned and, admittedly, in the present position, the owner of the
vessel was respondent no.3 and not the appellant. It was further
1 ‘14. Raising or removal of wreck impeding navigation within limits of port.—(1) If any vessel is
wrecked, standard or sunk in any port in such a manner as to impede or likely to impede any navigation
thereof, the conservator shall give notice to the owner of the vessel to raise, remove or destroy the
vessel within such period as may be specified in the notice and to furnish such adequate security to the
satisfaction of the conservator to ensure that the vessel shall be raised, removed or destroyed within the
said period:
Provided that the conservator may extend such period to such further period as he may consider
necessary having regard to the circumstances of such case and the extent of its impediment to
navigation.
xxx’
2 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’.
3 Under Section 14(3) of the Act, which reads as under:
‘(3) The expenses and further sum aforesaid shall be payable to the conservator out of the sale-proceeds
of the property, and the balance shall be paid to the person entitled to the property recovered, or, if no
such person appears and claims the balance, shall be held in deposit for payment, without interest, to
any person thereafter establishing his right thereto:
Provided that the person makes his claim within three years from the date of the sale.’
4 The stipulated period was 30 days.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 705
JSW Steel Ltd. v.
The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust Mumbai & Ors.
contended that the High Court disposed of the writ petition on the
erroneous presumption that it has become infructuous and that the
parties (appellant and respondent no.1 inter-se) have the remedy to
recover further amount(s), which was kept open. It was submitted
that once the law is clear as to on whom the liability for the wreckage
or its removal lies, the appellant could not be saddled with the cost
therefor. Lastly, it was urged that the further direction in favour of
respondent no.1 to encash Rs.70 lakhs (alongwith accrued interest),
deposited by the appellant pursuant to earlier order(s) of the High
Court, is totally unjustified in law.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.1 submits that the
High Court has merely closed the issue as 20 years had passed. It
was submitted that the wreckage has already been cleared. Learned
counsel also advanced that the right of the appellant has been
safeguarded, inasmuch as, it has the right to move a suit, where
the dues, if any, against the parties concerned can be thrashed out.
DECISION:
6. Having considered the matter, we find merit in the submissions put
forth by the appellant. The way the High Court approached the issue
appears to be erroneous for the simple reason that the lis was very
much alive, as a pure question of law stood raised i.e., on whom the
liability for clearing the wreckage was to be fastened. The Impugned
Order has not dealt with this fundamental issue. When on a purely
legal issue, the appellant raised a legal objection, and also deposited
the amount demanded by respondent no.1 in the High Court, in our
considered view, the High Court was required to answer the question
of law. In this analysis, no exercise was required involving disputed
factual questions. Moreover, the efflux of time is a result of systemic
delay, not due to any laches on the part of the appellant.
7. Our view on the aspects of (a) lapse of time alone not being a ground
to close the matter, and (b) adjudicating a petition under Article 226
when it does not really involve a disputed factual setting, finds support
from the decisions of this Court, extracted below:
B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, (2023) 13 SCC 779:
‘51. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedy
injustice, and any limit on exercise of such power, is
706 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
only self-imposed. Gainful reference can be made to,
amongst others, A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj
Wadhwani [A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj
Wadhwani, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 16: (1962) 1 SCR 753:
AIR 1961 SC 1506] and U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v.
Kamal Swaroop Tandon [U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v.
Kamal Swaroop Tandon, (2008) 2 SCC 41: (2008) 1 SCC
(L&S) 352]. The High Courts, under the constitutional
scheme, are endowed with the ability to issue prerogative
writs to safeguard rights of citizens. For exactly this reason,
this Court has never laid down any straitjacket principles
that can be said to have “cribbed, cabined and confined”
[to borrow the term employed by the Hon. Bhagwati, J.
(as he then was) in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [E.P.
Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 165] ], the extraordinary powers vested under Articles
226 or 227 of the Constitution. Adjudged on the anvil of
Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan [Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan v.
Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur, (2009) 5 SCC 162: (2009) 2
SCC (Civ) 421], this was a fit case for the High Court to
have examined the matter threadbare, more so, when it
did not involve navigating a factual minefield.’
(emphasis supplied)
Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National Conference,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140:
‘32. The Court would categorically emphasize that no
litigant should have even an iota of doubt or an impression
(rather, a misimpression) that just because of systemic
delay or the matter not being taken up by the Courts
resulting in efflux of time the cause would be defeated,
and the Court would be rendered helpless to ensure
justice to the party concerned…’
(emphasis supplied)
8. In the above circumstances, we are unable to sustain the order
impugned. Accordingly, the same is set aside. WP No.2127/1996 is
revived. The matter is remanded to the High Court to consider all
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 707
JSW Steel Ltd. v.
The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust Mumbai & Ors.
issues on merits as raised in the writ petition. As the monies deposited
by the appellant are stated to have already been withdrawn by
respondent no.1, were the appellant to eventually succeed in the writ
petition, the appellant would be suitably compensated on this score.
9. Having regard to the fact that the writ petition is of the year 1996,
we request the High Court to give priority to the matter and dispose
it of as expeditiously as possible. Our request is to be construed in
line with Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v State of Bihar, (2004)
5 SCC 1. Parties are not precluded from raising any question(s) of
law and fact.
10. The appeal stands allowed in the afore-mentioned terms.
11. I.A. Diary No.40046/2024 (seeking impleadment) stands disposed of
with the observation that it shall be open to the applicant/proposed
respondent to make such prayer before the High Court, which may
consider the same as per law. Remaining I.A.s stand closed forthwith,
in view of the appeal itself being allowed.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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