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Supreme Court of India

JUST SOCIETYversusUNION OF INDIA

Citation
2017 INSC 410
Decided
27 April 2017
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The challenged provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 are constitutionally valid and not ultra vires Articles 14 and 50.

Summary

The petitioners, a society, challenged several provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, alleging they violated Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution. The main contentions were that the Chief Justice of India or his nominee, as a mere member of the selection committee, should have primacy in appointing the Lokpal Chairperson and members, and that the Act lacked clear criteria for appointing an eminent jurist. The Supreme Court examined whether the legislature could lawfully give equal weight to the Chief Justice’s opinion and whether the absence of detailed norms rendered the provisions unconstitutional. The Court held that the legislature’s choice to treat the Chief Justice’s view on par with other members is a permissible legislative decision and not violative of the basic structure. It also found no illegality in the provision concerning the appointment of an eminent jurist. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether Sections 3(2)(a), 4(1)(d), 4(1)(e), 4(2), the second proviso to 4(3), 10, the proviso to 14(3), 16, 37(2) and 63 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 are ultra vires Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution.
  • Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India or his nominee should have primacy in the Lokpal selection committee under Section 4(1)(d).
  • Whether the lack of prescribed norms for appointing an eminent jurist under Section 4(1)(e) makes the provision unconstitutional.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Lokpal ActConstitutional validityArticle 14Article 50Selection CommitteeChief Justice of Indiaappointment of eminent juristultra virespublic interest litigation

Judgment

                          [2017) 3 S.C.R. 335


                           JUST SOCIETY                                     A
                                     v.
                           UNION OF INDIA
                (Transferred Case (C) No. 25 of2015)
                           APRIL27,2017                                     B

               [RANJAN GOGOi AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
       Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 - ss.3(2)(a), 4(1)(d), 4(1)(e),
4(2), second proviso to s. 4(3), s.10, proviso to s. 14(3), s.16, s.37(2)
ands. 63 - Constitutional validity of - Plea of the petitioner that the     C
said provisions ultra vires Art. 14 and 50 on the ground that the
Chief Justice of India or his nominee Judge of the Supreme Court,
uls. 4(1)(d) is a mere Memb~r of the Selection Committee and the
opinion rendered by him has no primacy in the matter of selection
of Chairperson and Members of the Lokpal; that the the Chief Justice
of India or his nominee Judge alone who would be best situated to           D
decide on the suitability of any such former judge of this Court;
and that there are no norms/criterion laid down for appointment of
eminent jurist uls. 4(1 )(e) - Held: Impugned provisions are
constitutionally valid - if the Legislature in its wisdom had thought
it proper not to accord primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice         E
or his nominee and accord equal status to the opinion rendered by
the Chief Justice or his nominee and treat such opinion at par with
the opinion rendered by other members of the Selection Committee,
such legislative wisdom cannot be questioned on the ground of
constitutional infirmity - if the legislative opinion engrafted in the
Act is in contrast to what is provided.for in other statute(s), such        F
legislative intention cannot be understood to be constitutionally
impermissible - Decision regarding the appointment of eminent jurist
is left to the body consisting of high constitutional fimctionaries
enumerated in s. 4(J)(a) to 4(J}(d), no ex-facie illegality discerned
in the provisions contained in s.4(1)(e) - Constitution of India -          G
Arts. 14 and 50.
      CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case (Civil)
No. 25 of2015.
    From the Order dated 03 .03.2014 by the High Court ofJudicature,
Bombay, at Mumbai in Writ Petition No. 4374 of2014.                         H
                                335
336            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A         Mukul Rohatgi,AG,A. Mariarputham,AG, Sikkim, Maninder Singh,
    ASG, Nalin Kohli, D. K. Thakur, Sanchar Anand, Ms. Kiran Bala Sahay,
    AAGs, Shanti Bhushan, Vikas Singh, B. Prabakaran, Sr. Advs., Prashant
    Bhushan, Kartiketh, Rohit Kumar Singh, Ms. Sushrna Suri, Abhay Nevagi,
    Krishan Kumar, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Zeeshan Diwan, Ms. Pooja
    Dhar, G. Ananda Selvam, Ram Sankar, Vasantha Kumar (For Gopal
 8
    Balwant Sathe), J.P. Tripathi, Girdhal Upadhyay, Ms. Asha Upadhyay,
    R. D. Upadhyay, D. L. Chidananda, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Ritesh Kumar,
    Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Abhinav Mukerji, Mrs. Bihu Sharma,
    Ms. Purnima Krishna, Aniruddha P. Mayee, A. Selvin Raja, Devendra
    Singh, Ankit Roy, Indrajeet Singh, Ms. VishakhaAhuja, Milind Kumar,
 C Mishra Saurabh, Naveen Sharma, M. Yogesh Kanna, Ms. Nithya,
    Mrs. Mahalakshmi, Partha Sarathy, Sunil Fernandes, V. G. Pragasam,
    S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Ms. Anma Mathur, Avneesh Arputham,
    Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Amit Arora (For Mis. Arputham Anma &
    Co.), Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Puja Singh, Ms. Mamta
 D Singh, V. K. Sharma, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Rachna Srivastava, Sukrit
    R. Kapoor, Nitya Madhusoodhanan, Shishir Deshpande, Ms. Ruchira
     Gupta, Salvador Santosh Rebello,Anurag Sharma, Ms. K. Enat•Jli Serna,
     Edward Belho, Amit Kumar Singh, Ranjan Mukherjee, S. Bhowmick,
     Suvendu Suvasis Das, Apoor\r Singhal, Anant K. Vataya, Narsingh N.
     Rai, Kuldip Singh, M. Shoeb Alam, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Ujjwal Singh,
  E Mojahid Karim Khan, Tapesh Kumar Singhj, Mohd. Waquas, Aditya
     Pratap Singh, Ms. Priyanka, Ms. Priyadarshini Priya, Sarad Kumar
     Singhania, Noopur Singhal, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Rajaram Narayanan,
     P. Jeegan, Arun Singh, V. J. Usha, Ms. Divya, Ms. Sujatha,
     R. V. Kameshwaran, Advs. for the appearing parties.
  F          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            RANJAN GOGOi, J. I. The petitioner seeks a declaration to
    the effect that certain provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act,
    2013 (hereinafter for short 'the Act') namely, Sections 3(2)(a) and
    4(1 )( d), 4(1 )(e), 4(2), the second proviso to Section 4(3), Section 10, the
  G proviso to Section 14(3), Section 16, Section 37(2) and Section 63 are
    ultra vires Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution oflndia. The challenge
    in the aforesaid transferred case (No.25 of2015) is primarily founded
    on the ground that the Chief Justice oflndia or his nominee Judge of the
    Supreme Court, under Section 4(1 )( d) of the Act, is a mere Member of
     the Selection Committee and the opinion rendered either by the Chief
  H
                 JUST SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA                                    337
                       [RANJAN GOGOi, J .]

Justice of India or his nominee judge has no primacy in the matter of A
selection of Chairperson and Members of the Lokpal. The aforesaid
contention is sought to be fortified on the basis that four former judges
of this Court had exercised their option to be considered for the post of
Chairperson and in such a situation it is the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of
India or his nominee Judge alone who would be best situated to decide
                                                                             8
on the suitability of any such former judge of this Court who has/may
have opted to be considered for appointment. It is also contended on
behalf of the petitioner, that there are no norms/criterion laid down for
appointment ofan 'eminent jurist' under Section 4(1 )( e) of the Act thereby
rendering the aforesaid provision of the Act legally and constitutionally
fragile.                                                                     C
       2. We fail to see how any of the aforesaid contentions can establish
any infirmity or fragility of the provisions of the Act in the light of any of
the constitutional provisions so as to render the relevant sections of the
Act ultra vires.
        3. The fact that primacy of the opinion of the Chief Justice or his        D
nominee is accorded by certain statutes by use of the expression "in
consultation", which expression has been understood by judicial opinion
to confer primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice, the absence thereof
in the Act, by itself, will not render Section 4( 1)( d) thereof ultra vires
the basic structure of the Constitution. lfthe Legislature in its wisdom           E
had thought it proper not to accord primacy to the opinion of the Chief
Justice or his nominee and accord equal status to the opinion rendered
by the Chief Justice or his nominee and treat such opinion at par with the
opinion rendered by other members of the Selection Committee, we do
not see how such legislative wisdom can be questioned on the ground of
constitutional infirmity. It is not the mandate of the Constitution that in all    F
matters concerning the appointment to various Offices in different bodies,
primacy must be accorded to the opinion of the Chief Justice or his
nominee. Whether such primacy should be accorded or not is for the
legislature to decide and ifthe legislative opinion engrafted in the present
Act is in contrast to what is provided for in other Statute(s), such legislative   G
intention, by itself, cannot be understood to be constitutionally
impermissible.
       4. Insofar as the appointment of an eminent jurist is concerned,
we do not consider it necessary to delve into the issue except to say that
the decision being left to a high power body consisting of high Constitutional     H
338                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A functionaries enumerated in Section 4(1 )(a) to 4(1 )( d) of the Act, no ex-
  facie illegality can be discerned in the provisions contained in Section
   4( I)( e) of the Act. Even if the Act is to lay down norms, it would be
   difficult to understand the same to be all comprehensive, satisfying all
   concerned. No declaration of infirmity of the provisions contained in
B Section 4(l)(e) of the Act can be made on the basis of the grounds
   urged.
             5. Consequently and in the light of the above, we find no merit in
      this Transferred Case. The writ petition filed by the petitioner-Society is
      dismissed accordingly.
 c
      Nidhi Jain                                                  Motter dismissed.


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