K. KUMARA GUPTAversusSRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS

968                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    8 S.C.R. 968                [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A                           K. KUMARA GUPTA
                                       v.
         SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI OMKARESWARA SWAMY
                       TEMPLE & ORS.
                      (Civil appeal Nos. 791-792 of 2022)
B
                             FEBRUARY 18, 2022
              [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
             Auction: Auction conducted on 26.06.1998 by the Executive
      Officer of the Temple Trust following due procedure under the
C     provisions of the Endowments Act 1987 – Appellant was the highest
      bidder – After confirming the sale in favour of the appellant by the
      Commissioner, the appellant deposited the balance amount –
      Thereafter, sale deed was held confirmed and executed in the year
      1998 – On challenge before High Court, re-auction of the property
      was ordered after a period of more than 23 years solely on the
D     basis of the offer made by one JK in the year 1998 and the offer
      made by one LKR that they are ready to offer/pay a higher price
      than fetched in the public auction – On appeal, held: Neither did
      JK nor LKR had participated in the auction proceedings and made
      any offer – Both of them ought not have been permitted to raise any
E     objection subsequently on the valuation when they had not
      participated in the public auction and made any offer – After the
      public auction is held and the highest bid is received and the
      property is sold in a public auction in favour of a highest bidder,
      such a sale cannot be set aside on the basis of some offer made by
      third parties subsequently – Further, unless and until it was found
F     that there was any material irregularity and/or illegality in holding
      the public auction and/or vitiated by any fraud or collusion, it is
      not open to set aside the auction or sale in favour of a highest
      bidder – If there was any error in the decision-making process
      adopted by the authority, the remedy available was to question the
G     sale deed in an appropriate proceeding available under the law
      and not by filing a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of
      India – Moreover, respondents are not in a position to point out any
      material on which it can be said that what was offered by the
      appellant in the year 1998 was not a fair value – Hence, order of
      the High Court set aside – Endowments Act 1987 – Constitution of
H     India – Art.226.
                                      968
     K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                          969
         OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS.

      Allowing the appeals, the Court                                   A
       HELD: 1. Once the appellant was found to be the highest
bidder in a public auction in which 45 persons had participated
and thereafter when the sale was confirmed in his favour and
even the sale deed was executed, unless and until it was found
that there was any material irregularity and/or illegality in holding   B
the public auction and/or auction/sale was vitiated by any fraud or
collusion, it is not open to set aside the auction or sale in favour
of a highest bidder on the basis of some representations made by
third parties, who did not even participate in the auction
proceedings and did not make any offer. [Para 8.1][982-C-D]
                                                                        C
       2. The sale was confirmed in favour of the appellant by the
Commissioner, Endowments Department after obtaining the
report of the Assistant Commissioner. Therefore, in the aforesaid
facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court ought not to
have ordered re-auction of the land in question after a period of
23 years of confirmation of the sale and execution of the sale          D
deed in favour of the auction purchaser by observing that the
value of the property might have been much more, otherwise,
the object and purpose of holding the public auction and the
sanctity of the public auction will be frustrated. Unless there is
concrete material and it is established that there was any fraud        E
and/or collusion or the land in question was sold at a throw away
price, the sale pursuant to the public auction cannot be set aside
at the instance of strangers to the auction proceeding. The sale
pursuant to the public auction can be set aside in an eventuality
where it is found on the basis of material on record that the
property had been sold away at a throw away price and/or on a           F
wholly inadequate consideration because of the fraud and/or
collusion and/or after any material irregularity and/or illegality is
found in conducing/holding the public auction. After the public
auction is held and the highest bid is received and the property
is sold in a public auction in favour of a highest bidder, such a       G
sale cannot be set aside on the basis of some offer made by third
parties subsequently and that too when they did not participate
in the auction proceedings and made any offer and/or the offer is
made only for the sake of making it and without any serious intent.

                                                                        H
970            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     In the present case, though JK immediately after finalising the
      auction stated that he is ready and willing to pay a higher price,
      however, subsequently, he backed out. If the auction/sale
      pursuant to the public auction is set aside on the basis of the
      such frivolous and irresponsible representations made by such
      persons then the sanctity of a public auction would be frustrated
B
      and the rights of a genuine bidder would be adversely affected.
      The so-called lucrative offer initially made by third parties appears
      to be made only to frustrate the auction proceedings with a mala
      fide intent. If there was any error in the decision-making process
      adopted by the authority, the remedy available was to question
C     the sale deed in an appropriate proceeding available under the
      law and not by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
      of India. [Paras 8.2, 8.3][983-G-H; 984-A-E, G]
            Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir
            Ahmed and Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 671 : [1976] 3 SCR 58;
D           State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal and
            Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 402 : [2010] 1 SCR 678 – relied
            on.
            Valji Khimji and Company vs. Official Liquidator of
            Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Limited and Others
E           (2008) 9 SCC 299 : [2008] 12 SCR 1; Paramananda
            Mahapatra vs. Commissioner of Hindu Religious
            Endowments, Orissa and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1544 :
            [1966] 1 SCR 791; Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji vs. S.P.
            Sahi [1959] Supp (2) SCR 583; Princess Fatima Fauzia
            and Anr. vs. Syeed UI-Mulk alias Nawab Saheb Chathari
F           & Ors. AIR 1979 AP 229; Divya Manufacturing
            Company (P) Ltd. vs. Union Bank of India and Ors.
            (2000) 6 SCC 69 : [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 474; Chairman
            and Managing director, SIPCOT, Madras and Ors. vs.
            Contromix Pvt. Ltd. (1995) 4 SCC 595 : [1995] 1 Suppl.
G           SCR 415; Union Bank of India vs. Official Liquidator
            H.C of Calcutta and Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 274 : [2000]
            3 SCR 691; Navalkha and Sons vs. Sri Ramanya Das
            and Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 537 : [1970] 3 SCR 1 – referred
            to.

H
     K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                971
         OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS.

                         Case Law Reference                                   A
[2008] 12 SCR 1                     referred to                 Para 4.6
[1966] 1 SCR 791                    referred to                 Para 5
[1959] Supp (2) SCR 583             referred to                 Para 5
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 474             referred to                 Para 5.3      B
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 415             referred to                 Para 5.3
[2000] 3 SCR 691                    referred to                 Para 5.3
[1970] 3 SCR 1                      referred to                 Para 6.1
[1976] 3 SCR 58                     relied on                   Para 8.1      C
[2010] 1 SCR 678                    relied on                   Para 8.12
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 791-
792 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2019 of the High Court          D
of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in Writ Appeal Nos. 790 and 1069 of
2018.
      Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Y. Rajagopala Rao, K. Pramod Kumar,
D. Gopi Krishna, Kartikey Kanojiya, Ms. Sukanya Singh, Advs. for the
Appellant.                                                                    E
     S. Niranjan Reddy, Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Advs., Abhijit Sengupta,
Mahfooz A. Nazki, Polanki Gowtham, Shaik Mohamad Haneef, T. Vijaya
Bhaskar Reddy, K. V. Girish Chowdary, Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee,
Abhishek Sharma, Rajendra Singhvi, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the
Respondents.                                                                  F
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      M. R. SHAH, J.
       1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 18.09.2019 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
                                                                              G
at Amaravati in Writ Appeal Nos.790 and 1069 of 2018 by which the
High Court has allowed the said writ appeals and has directed the
authorities concerned to conduct a re-auction of the entire properties by
fixing the upset price higher than what has been fixed earlier, the auction
purchaser, who purchased the property in question in the year 1998, has
preferred the present appeals.                                                H
972             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A           2. The facts leading to the present appeals and the chronological
      dates and events are as under:-
             2.1 That a proposal was published by the office of Commissioner,
      Endowments Department to auction the land in question belonging to Sri
      Markendaya and Omkareswara Swamy Devasthanam, Eluru, which was
B     published in the newspaper on 10.03.1997. Notification to sell the subject
      land was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 22.05.1997. Nobody
      raised any objection against the said proposal. That the probable expected
      price of the land was fixed at Rs. 4,00,000/- per acre and the total extent
      of land was about 1.81 acre. That thereafter the Commissioner of
      Endowments Department granted permission to sell the land in question
C
      on 13.11.1997. The Executive Officer of the Temple Trust issued tender/
      public notice to sell the land in question by way of an open auction in the
      presence of the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments on 22.05.1998. As
      per the notice, the date and time of the open auction was 24.06.1998 at
      11.00 AM and the interested participants had to deposit Rs.20,000/- as
D     EMD. Forty-five persons participated including the appellant herein –
      K. Kumara Gupta. At this stage, it is required to be noted that Shri L.
      Kantha Rao, original writ petitioner did not participate in the auction and
      nor did he deposit the EMD of Rs.20,000/-.
              2.2 Thereafter the auction took place on 24.06.1998 in which 45
E     people participated. The appellant herein was declared as the highest
      bidder quoting price of Rs.5,55,000/- per acre against the expected price
      of Rs.4,00,000/-. However, thereafter, the highest offer of the appellant
      was Rs.13,01,000/- per acre as per the bid submitted by the appellant
      herein. Thus, the appellant became the highest bidder fixing the price at
      Rs.13,01,000/- per acre. The appellant deposited Rs.7,85,000/- being 1/
F
      3rd of the bid amount immediately as per the tender conditions. It appears
      that thereafter the first round of litigation started at the instance of one
      Shri Jagat Kumar, who as such did not participate in the auction which
      was held on 24.06.1998. He made a representation on 20.07.1998 that
      the subject land has a potential of getting more money. Though, initially
G     he had shown his readiness and willingness to pay the higher price but
      did not deposit the money. On the contrary, he expressed his willingness
      to buy only 1200 square yards but not the entire land put to auction. On
      the representation of the said Shri Jagat Kumar, the auction came to be
      cancelled vide order dated 24.07.1998. The appellant filed the revision
      under Section 93 of the Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to
H
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                  973
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

as the “Act of 1987”) against the order dated 24.07.1998 cancelling the       A
auction. However, thereafter by order dated 22.12.1998, the order
confirming the sale was issued by the Office of the Commissioner,
Endowments Department in favour of the appellant. The Executive
Officer of the Temple was directed to get the sale deed registered in the
name of the highest bidder.
                                                                              B
       2.3 That thereafter the appellant deposited balance amount of
Rs.15,69,810/- vide four banker cheques dated 30.12.1998. The sale
deed was executed in favour of the appellant by Executive Officer on
behalf of the Temple vide Sale Deed dated 31.12.1998. As mentioned in
the sale deed, the physical possession of the land in question was also
delivered to the appellant.                                                   C

       2.4 That at the relevant time, the sale deed could not be registered
because of the non-availability of the Clearance Certificate from the
Income Tax department. The sale deed was presented for registration
before the Sub-Registrar, Eluru on 01.01.1999. On 01.01.1999, the
Executive Officer of the Temple/Devasthanam filed an affidavit before         D
the Income Tax Office for Clearance Certificate so that the sale deed
could be registered. The Clearance Certificate was granted to the
Executive Officer on 12.01.1999. Thus, the first round of litigation ended
there.
       2.5 However, the second round of litigation begun at the instance      E
of one Shri L. Kantha Rao, the original writ petitioner before the High
Court, and one of the respondents in these appeals, who as such and as
observed hereinabove did not even participate in the public auction
proceedings. The said Shri L. Kantha Rao filed a Writ Petition No. 41 of
1999 before the High Court to direct the Executive Officer/ the Temple        F
Committee not to execute the sale deed in respect of the auctioned land.
Vide interim order dated 05.01.1999, the High Court granted interim
stay of all further proceedings subject to the condition that he furnishes
a bank guarantee of a sum of Rs.30 lakhs within two weeks from the
date of the said interim order. That during the pendency of the aforesaid
writ petition and in light of the interim order passed by the High Court in   G
the aforesaid writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 41 of 1999, the office
of the Commissioner, Endowments Department unilaterally passed an
order dated 10.02.1999 cancelling the auction held on 24.06.1998. The
Executive Officer of the Temple was instructed to conduct a re-auction
for the land in question keeping the upset price of Rs.30 lakhs. As the       H
974            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     order dated 10.02.1999 was passed without hearing the appellant, the
      appellant preferred revision before the Government under Section 93 of
      Act of 1987. The Government stayed the order dated 10.02.1999 of the
      Commissioner vide its order dated 08.03.1999. Questioning the order of
      the Government dated 08.03.1999 staying the order of the Commissioner
      dated 10.02.1999, the said Shri L. Kantha Rao filed another Writ Petition
B
      No. 11552 of 1999 before the High Court. That by order dated 11.03.1999,
      the Commissioner himself revoked his order dated 10.02.1999. That by
      order dated 09.07.1999, the High Court disposed of both the writ petitions,
      i.e., Writ Petition No. 41 of 1999 and Writ Petition No. 11552 of 1999. It
      appears that the High Court while disposing of the aforesaid writ petitions
C     observed that as the Commissioner had revoked the order dated
      10.02.1999, the revision filed against the same had become infructuous
      and Government was not required to decide the issue on merits unless
      suo moto revision was taken up by the Government. However, liberty
      was granted to the said Shri L. Kantha Rao to file a revision against the
      original order passed by the Commissioner dated 22.12.1998 confirming
D
      the sale in favour of the appellant. The second round of litigation ended
      there.
             2.6 Then the third round of litigation began. On the basis of the
      liberty granted by the High Court, the said Shri L. Kantha Rao filed a
      revision before the Government challenging the order dated 22.12.1998
E     although he was not a participant in the auction in which appellant herein
      was declared the highest bidder. By order dated 26.11.1999, the said
      revision came to be allowed quashing and setting aside the order dated
      22.12.1998 and directing the Commissioner to refund the amount paid
      by the appellant and to conduct a re-auction. Even the said order dated
F     26.11.1999 was passed without hearing the appellant. The appellant filed
      Writ Petition No. 25407 of 1999 before the High Court challenging the
      order dated 26.11.1999. By a detailed judgment and order dated
      02.02.2018, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition No.25407
      of 1999 (which shall be dealt with hereinbelow). The said Shri L. Kantha
      Rao died on 01.03.2018. That the respondent No.1 herein – the Temple
G     through its Executive Officer filed Writ Appeal No.790 of 2018 before
      the Division Bench challenging the judgment and order dated 02.02.2018
      passed in Writ Petition No.25407 of 1999 on 16.03.2018. The wife of
      Shri L. Kantha Rao also filed Writ Appeal No. 1069 of 2018 challenging
      the judgment and order passed by the Learned Single Judge in Writ
H     Petition No.25407 of 1999.
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                   975
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       2.7 By the impugned common judgment and order, the Division             A
Bench of the High Court has allowed the said appeals and has set aside
the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge passed in
Writ Petition No.25407 of 1999 and has directed the authorities concerned
to conduct the re-auction of the entire land by fixing the upset price
higher than what had been fixed earlier by observing that since more
                                                                               B
than twenty years had elapsed from the date of issuance of GO Rt. No.
1808 dated 26.11.1999 and price of the land in question had risen. The
Division Bench of the High Court has further observed that as the
appellant has agreed and even the learned Single Judge had directed the
appellant to pay Rs.30 lakhs as the said Shri L. Kantha Rao furnished a
bank guarantee of Rs. 30 lakhs and therefore, the Temple would get             C
more than Rs.30 lakhs. While passing the impugned judgment and order,
the Division Bench of the High Court has also observed that the writ
petitioner as well as the appellant shall also be allowed to participate in
the re-auction, if they are otherwise eligible.
      2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common          D
judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the
original respondent No.4 before the High Court, the auction purchaser
has preferred the present appeals.
       3. Shri Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
behalf of the appellant, Shri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Advocate       E
has appeared on behalf of the respondent – Temple Trust and Shri
Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of
the wife of Shri L. Kantha Rao – the original writ petitioner.
      4. Shri Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that in the facts and         F
circumstances of the case the Division Bench of the High Court has
committed a grave error in setting aside the auction/sale in favour of the
appellant, which was held in the year 1998.
       4.1 It is submitted that as such the auction sale was conducted
after wide publicity in the well-known newspapers and in fact, 45 people       G
participated in the auction. It is submitted that the appellant was found to
be the highest bidder and therefore the sale in favour of the appellant
was confirmed and the appellant paid the full sale consideration and
even the sale deed was also executed in favour of the appellant on
31.12.1998. It is submitted that as there was no illegality in conducting
the auction, therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to      H
976             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     have set aside such a sale after a period of approximately twenty years
      from the date of conducting the public auction and the sale that too at
      the instance of a person, who never participated in the auction.
             4.2 It is submitted that Division Bench of the High Court ought to
      have appreciated that as the said Shri L. Kantha Rao did not even
B     participate in the public auction and did not submit any offer, thereafter,
      he had no locus to challenge the public auction and/or the sale in favour
      of the appellant, who was found to be the highest bidder.
             4.3 It is submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court ought
      to have appreciated that merely because somebody, subsequently to the
C     completion of the public auction and the sale deed has been executed in
      the favour of the highest bidder states that he is ready and willing to pay
      a higher amount than the highest bid amount, would frustrate the object
      and purpose of holding the public auction, if at such a person’s instance,
      the auction/sale is interfered with in any manner. It is submitted that the
      Division Bench of the High Court ought to have appreciated that at the
D     relevant time, nobody restrained the said Shri L. Kantha Rao from
      participating in the public auction and submit his offer.
             4.4 It is further submitted by Shri Raval, learned Senior Advocate
      appearing on behalf of the appellant that as such the Division Bench of
      the High Court has not at all observed and/or held that the auction was
E     illegal and/or there was any illegality in holding the public auction. It is
      submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court has passed the
      impugned judgment and order and has directed for re-auction solely on
      the ground that subsequently the said Shri L. Kantha Rao offered Rs. 30
      lakhs, which was higher than the amount paid by the appellant even
F     when the learned Single Judge had also directed the appellant to pay a
      total sum of Rs.30 lakhs, which the appellant had agreed; therefore, the
      Division Bench of the High Court has presumed that the value of the
      land would have been much more than Rs.30 lakhs at the time when it
      was put up for auction/sale. It is submitted that the High Court has not at
      all appreciated the fact that as such the said L. Kantha Rao had no locus
G     to challenge the sale in favour of the appellant, who was the highest
      bidder firstly, on the ground that he did not participate in the public auction.
            4.5 It is submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court has
      not properly appreciated the fact that the proceedings initiated by Shri
      L. Kantha Rao were by way of “Public Interest Litigation (PIL)” and
H     therefore after his death, his wife could not have continued the PIL
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                    977
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

proceedings by way of writ petition before the High Court as a private          A
litigation. It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate for the appellant
that the entire litigation was at the instance of the second highest bidder
namely, Shri M.M. Gupta, brother-in-law of Shri L. Kantha Rao, who
had purchased the nearby lands to the auctioned land in the name of his
family members at Rs.7,50,000/- per acre on 28.07.1998 and 22.09.1998
                                                                                B
and who had an eye on the land in question.
       4.6 It is submitted by Shri Raval, learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the appellant that filing of objections and entertaining the
same after the conclusion of the auction and after execution of the sale
deed cannot be permitted at the instance of a stranger to the auction
proceeding. It is submitted that in the present case, the sale deed was         C
executed in favour of the appellant herein being the highest bidder in the
public auction in which 45 persons had participated and therefore to
maintain the sanctity of the public auction, the objections ought not to
have been entertained that too by a person, who never participated in
the public auction, more particularly, when no allegation of fraud was          D
even pleaded, much less established or proved by the respondents.
Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Valji
Khimji and Company Vs. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro
Product (Gujarat) Limited and Others, (2008) 9 SCC 299 (paras
11, 12, 25 and 28).
                                                                                E
        4.7 It is further submitted by Shri Raval that as such the wife of
the deceased Shri L. Kantha Rao could not have preferred an appeal as
an heir of Shri L. Kantha Rao, a petitioner, who had filed the petition as
a Public Interest Litigation. It is submitted that as such the litigation
initiated on behalf of Shri M.M. Gupta the second highest bidder by Shri
L. Kantha Rao, was in fact a private interest litigation only in the guise      F
of a Public Interest Litigation to thwart the auction sale. It is submitted
that the learned Single Judge had rightly reached to the conclusion that
the respondents – writ petitioners had no locus standi to raise the objection
as well as to file the writ petitions before the High Court as admittedly
they did not participate in the auction.                                        G
       4.8 It is further submitted that the Temple Trust never objected at
any stage of auction or after the auction until the order/judgment dated
02.02.2018 was rendered by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted
that the Executive officer of the Temple, who was aware of the entire
proceedings including conducting of the public auction and after receiving      H
978             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     the full and total consideration could not have challenged the judgment
      and order passed by the learned Single Judge rendered on 02.02.2018 at
      a belated stage, i.e., almost after twenty years from the date of the
      execution of the sale deed. It is submitted that filing of an appeal by the
      Temple Trust against the judgment and order dated 02.02.2018 before
      the Division Bench without any allegation of fraud or collusion against it
B
      reeks of mala fides and collusion, which ought not to have been allowed.
      In fact, the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have entertained
      the same, is the submission.
              4.9 Making the above submissions, it is urged that the Division
      Bench of the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing and
C     setting aside the sale in favour of the appellant after a period of 23 years
      and when the appellant had paid the entire sale consideration on
      30.12.1998 and was put in the possession on execution of the sale deed.
      It is contended that the Division Bench of the High Court has not properly
      appreciated the fact that as such the sale was confirmed in favour of the
D     appellant after the approval by the competent authority of the Endowments
      Department.
             5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.3
      has submitted that the respondent No.1 – Temple is a public religious
      institution and registered under Section 6(b)(ii) of Act of 1987. It is
E     submitted that the Government under the Act of 1987 is necessarily
      bound to act for the benefit of the temples and ensure revenue
      maximization for the temples. That as held by this Court in a catena of
      decisions Government acts as a trustee of the said properties. It is
      submitted that as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions,
      the duty of the State is parens partriae in respect of the charitable
F     endowments and to ensure its due protection. Reliance is placed on the
      decisions in Paramananda Mahapatra Vs. Commissioner of Hindu
      Religious Endowments, Orissa and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1544
      and Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji Vs. S.P. Sahi, 1959 Supp (2) SCR
      583.
G            5.1 It is submitted that therefore the Government cannot act against
      the interest of the temple. That in the present case the auction was
      conducted on behalf of the Deity, which is in law a perpetual minor.
      Therefore, it is important to ensure that the trustees act strictly in
      accordance with the interest of the Deity. It is submitted that in the
H     present case, the consideration paid was inadequate as on the date of
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                     979
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

auction. That initially the appellant offered Rs.13,01,000/- per acre, which     A
was treated as the highest bid and the same was confirmed. That one
Shri Jagat Kumar through representation dated 24.07.1998 stated that
he was willing to offer Rs. 22,00,000/- per acre, i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs more
than the price on which the bid was confirmed in favour of the appellant.
Also one Shri L. Kantha Rao submitted a bank guarantee for an amount
                                                                                 B
of Rs. 30 lakhs on 05.01.1999 pursuant to the directions passed by the
High Court in Writ Petition No. 41 of 1999 on his submission that he was
ready and willing to purchase the property in question at Rs. 30 lakhs. It
is submitted that thereafter the State Government vide its order dated
26.11.1999 fixed the reserved at Rs.32 lakhs and allowed the parties to
participate in the auction. It is submitted that the aforesaid facts evidently   C
reveal that within a period of one year, the price of the property
significantly increased by more than 125%. That the value of the property,
as on date, is about 15 crores. It is submitted that therefore in the interest
of the Deity, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court may not be interfered with.
                                                                                 D
      5.2 Relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of the High
Court in the case of Princess Fatima Fauzia and Anr. Vs. Syeed UI-
Mulk alias Nawab Saheb Chathari & Ors., AIR 1979 AP 229, it is
submitted that as held the Division Bench of the High Court, the authorities
ought to have permitted re-auction where, in case of a trust, the
consideration is inadequate.                                                     E

       5.3 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the respondent No.3 that it is the duty of the Court to ensure
that the price fetched is adequate – especially in the case of a Public
Trust even though there is no suggestion of irregularity or fraud. Reliance
is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Divya                     F
Manufacturing Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Union Bank of India and
Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 69.
       5.4 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of respondent No.3 that by the impugned judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, no prejudice shall be            G
caused to the appellant as the Division Bench of the High Court has
directed that the money deposited including the amount incurred on account
of purchase of stamp papers be refunded to the appellant and the
appellant will also be getting the benefit of the prevailing bank interest
on the deposited amount. Further, the appellant is also permitted to             H
980             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     participate in the re-auction. It is therefore prayed not to interfere with
      the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the
      High Court considering the interest of the charitable institution.
             6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent
      No.1 – Temple Trust / Devasthanam in addition to the submissions made
B     by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No.3
      has submitted that in the matter of sale of public property/auction, the
      dominant consideration is to secure the best price for the property. It is
      submitted that the court should always keep the larger interest of the
      public in mind while interfering with the decision of the authority. Further,
      the concept of locus standi has been widened by this Court while dealing
C     with matters of public interest. It is submitted that it is the duty of the
      Court to see that the price fetched is adequate.
             6.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1
      has relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Chairman and
      Managing director, SIPCOT, Madras and Ors. Vs. Contromix
D     Pvt. Ltd., (1995) 4 SCC 595; Union Bank of India Vs. Official
      Liquidator H.C of Calcutta and Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 274 and
      Navalkha and Sons Vs. Sri Ramanya Das and Ors., (1969) 3 SCC
      537 in support of his submission that in the matter of sale of public
      property/auction the dominant consideration is to secure the best price
E     for the property.
            6.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon above
      decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.
             7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
      at length.
F
              8. At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned
      judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High Court has ordered
      re-auction of the land in question by fixing the upset price more than
      what has been fixed earlier by observing that since more than 20 years
      have elapsed from the date of the issuance of G.O. dated 26.11.1999, it
G     is in the interest of the Temple that the property in auction is put to re-
      auction. However, it is required to be noted that the appellant purchased
      the property in question in a public auction, which took place on
      24.06.1998. He was found to be the highest bidder, who offered
      Rs.13,01,000/- per acre. It is also required to be noted that in the said
      auction, which took place on 24.06.1998, in all 45 people participated.
H
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                 981
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

The auction was conducted after following due procedure under the            A
provisions of the Act of 1987 and the auction was conducted by none
other than the Executive Officer of the Temple Trust. It is also to be
noted that after receiving a detailed report of Assistant Commissioner of
Endowments, office of the Commissioner, Endowments Department vide
order dated 22.12.1998 confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant.
                                                                             B
Consequently, the appellant deposited the balance amount. The sale deed
came to be executed in his favour vide Sale Deed dated 31.12.1998.
Even thereafter on the application made by the Executive Officer of the
Devasthanam/Temple, the Income Tax Department granted Clearance
Certificate to the Executive Officer on 12.01.1999. Therefore, as such
the sale, which was held and confirmed in the year 1998 and for which        C
the sale deed was executed on 31.12.1998, the Division Bench of the
High Court has ordered re-auction of the property in question after a
period of more than 23 years solely on the basis of the offer made by
one Shri Jagat Kumar in the year 1998 (after the public auction was
concluded) and the offer made by one Shri L. Kantha Rao that they are
                                                                             D
ready to offer / pay a higher price than fetched in the public auction
already concluded and therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court
has presumed that the value of the property must have been much more
than the sale consideration realized in the public auction. However, the
Division Bench of the High Court has not at all appreciated and considered
the lack of bona fides on the part of the said Shri Jagat Kumar and even     E
Shri L. Kantha Rao. It is to be noted that though in the month of July,
1998, i.e., after the public auction was held, the said Shri Jagat Kumar,
who even did not participate in the auction proceedings initially came out
with a case that he was ready and willing to pay a higher price for the
auctioned land. But subsequently, he backed out and did not deposit any
                                                                             F
money. Neither did the said Shri Jagat Kumar nor Shri L. Kantha Rao
had participated in the auction proceedings and made any offer. Therefore,
as such both of them ought not have been permitted to raise any objection
subsequently on the valuation when they had not participated in the public
auction and made any offer. The Division Bench of the High Court
ought to have considered whether these subsequent objectors had acted        G
in a bona fide manner. At this stage, it is required to be noted that even
Shri Jagat Kumar subsequently did not prosecute the matter further and
subsequently it was only Shri L. Kantha Rao, who filed the revision
before the Government by way of a “Public Interest Litigation”. It is
also to be noted that neither the Government nor even the Division Bench
                                                                             H
982             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     of the High Court have given any finding that the auction, which was
      conducted/held on 24.06.1998 was in any way irregular and/or illegal.
      Even the Division Bench of the High Court has as such not set aside the
      auction/sale in favour of the appellant, however, it has ordered re-auction
      by observing that as Shri L. Kantha Rao deposited a sum of Rs. 30 lakhs
      pursuant to the interim order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition
B
      No. 41 of 1999 and as even the learned Single Judge had also directed
      the appellant to pay a total sum of Rs. 30 lakhs, which the appellant had
      agreed, the Division Bench of the High Court has observed that the
      value of the property can be said to be much more than what was realized
      in the public auction.
C            8.1 Once the appellant was found to be the highest bidder in a
      public auction in which 45 persons had participated and thereafter when
      the sale was confirmed in his favour and even the sale deed was executed,
      unless and until it was found that there was any material irregularity
      and/or illegality in holding the public auction and/or auction/sale was
D     vitiated by any fraud or collusion, it is not open to set aside the auction or
      sale in favour of a highest bidder on the basis of some representations
      made by third parties, who did not even participate in the auction
      proceedings and did not make any offer. In this context, we rely on the
      following observations of this Court in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai
      Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Ors., (1976) 1
E     SCC 671 made in paragraphs 34, 37 and 49, which are as under:-
             “34. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in
             order to have the locus siandi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction
             under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a
             personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application,
F            though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo
             warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a
             general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some
             legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a
             locus standi in the matter, (see State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal
G            Rungta [AIR 1952 SC 12 ]; Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of
             W.B. [AIR 1962 SC 1044]; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member,
             Board of Revenue, Orissa [(1967) 1 SCA 413]; Gadde
             Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P. [AIR 1966 SC
             828]; State of Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall [(1973) 3 SCC
             739]; Satyanarayana Sinha Dr v. S. Lal & Co. [(1973) 2 SCC
H            696] ).
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                    983
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a    A
      writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these
      categories: (i) “person aggrieved”; (ii) “stranger”; (iii) busybody
      or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily
      distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories.
      Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They
                                                                                B
      masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the
      name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the
      public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime
      of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or
      from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to
      win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some      C
      applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels
      of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the
      applications of such busybodies at the threshold.
      49. It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under
      Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary.    D
      But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the
      High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict
      ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to
      invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The
      broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other well-
      established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability      E
      of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go
      a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of
      writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public
      time and money.”
       In the aforesaid decision, it was also observed that despite adequate    F
opportunity, if a person has not lodged any objection at an appropriate
stage and time, he could not be said to have been in fact, grieved.
       8.2 It is also required to be noted that the sale was confirmed in
favour of the appellant by the Commissioner, Endowments Department
after obtaining the report of the Assistant Commissioner. Therefore, we         G
are of the opinion that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court ought not to have ordered re-auction of the land in
question after a period of 23 years of confirmation of the sale and execution
of the sale deed in favour of the auction purchaser by observing that the
value of the property might have been much more, otherwise, the object          H
984             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     and purpose of holding the public auction and the sanctity of the public
      auction will be frustrated. Unless there is concrete material and it is
      established that there was any fraud and/or collusion or the land in question
      was sold at a throw away price, the sale pursuant to the public auction
      cannot be set aside at the instance of strangers to the auction proceeding.
      The sale pursuant to the public auction can be set aside in an eventuality
B
      where it is found on the basis of material on record that the property had
      been sold away at a throw away price and/or on a wholly inadequate
      consideration because of the fraud and/or collusion and/or after any
      material irregularity and/or illegality is found in conducing/holding the
      public auction. After the public auction is held and the highest bid is
C     received and the property is sold in a public auction in favour of a highest
      bidder, such a sale cannot be set aside on the basis of some offer made
      by third parties subsequently and that too when they did not participate
      in the auction proceedings and made any offer and/or the offer is made
      only for the sake of making it and without any serious intent. In the
      present case, as observed hereinabove, though Shri Jagat Kumar
D     immediately after finalising the auction stated that he is ready and willing
      to pay a higher price, however, subsequently, he backed out. If the auction/
      sale pursuant to the public auction is set aside on the basis of the such
      frivolous and irresponsible representations made by such persons then
      the sanctity of a public auction would be frustrated and the rights of a
E     genuine bidder would be adversely affected.
              8.3 Further, the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have
      appreciated that the objector – Shri L. Kantha Rao, who did not participate
      in the auction proceedings and submit any bid can be said to be a fence
      sitter having no stakes on his shoulder and had simply come forward just
F     to nullify the registered sale deed executed in favour of the appellant by
      adopting an indirect method of making a public offer by way of filing a
      “Public Interest Litigation” before the High Court. The so-called lucrative
      offer initially made by Shri Jagat Kumar and the subsequent offer made
      by Shri L. Kantha Rao appears to be made only to frustrate the auction
      proceedings with a mala fide intent. As observed hereinabove, if there
G     was any error in the decision-making process adopted by the authority,
      the remedy available was to question the sale deed in an appropriate
      proceeding available under the law and not by filing a petition under
      Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
             8.4 The Division Bench of the High Court has observed that as
H     the said Shri L. Kantha Rao submitted a bank guarantee of Rs. 30 lakhs
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                  985
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

as he offered to pay Rs. 30 lakhs and even the learned Single Judge had       A
also directed the appellant to pay a total sum of Rs.30 lakhs against his
original offer and the appellant had agreed to pay the same, the High
Court has presumed that the value of the property at the time of auction
would have been much more. There was no concrete material before
the Division Bench of the High Court to come to such a conclusion that
                                                                              B
what was received in the public auction in the year 1998 was a lesser
amount and/or at the relevant time, the valuation of the property was
much more than the highest bid received. Merely because the appellant
might have agreed to pay a total sum of Rs.30 lakhs (after deducting
whatever he paid earlier), by that itself, it cannot be presumed and/or
held against the appellant that in the year 1998 what was offered by him      C
was a lesser amount than the actual valuation. The appellant agreed to
pay a higher price for the land in question in order to save his rights.
      8.5 At the cost of repetition, it is observed that as such there was
no material available with the Division Bench to the effect that the
valuation of the property in the year 1998 was much more and that the         D
highest bid of the appellant was for a lesser consideration than the actual
value of the land.
      8.6 In fact, the learned Single Judge had passed a detailed judgment
and order quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Government
dated 26.11.1999. Learned Single Judge specifically observed in               E
paragraphs 8, 9, 12 and 14 as under:-
             “8. The repeated orders of the second respondent passed
      time and again in this matter are found to be without assigning
      any cogent reasons. Under the Indian Contract Act, which is a
      Central Act, having an over riding effect upon the Endowments           F
      Act, more particularly when the matter pertains to contractual
      obligations between both the parties i.e., between the vendor and
      the vendee and also when the matter pertains to tender-cum-
      auction, where both parties have fulfilled their part of obligations
      and where no fraud played by the parties has been established,
      the action of the second respondent in canceling the sale deed is       G
      unwarranted. The conduct of the 4 th respondent cannot be
      appreciated, where he has not participated in the tender-cum-
      auction and more so, he is not an effected party. Only after knowing
      the tender and auction amount, the 4th respondent appears to have
      either got tempted by the sale of the property or he has been           H
986            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A           planted by the persons having vested interest. This kind of conduct
            cannot be encouraged. It is an undisputed fact that petitioner, 45
            persons filed tenders and participated in the auction, nothing
            prevented the 4th respondent from filing tender and participating
            in the auction.
B                  9. As stated supra, the respondents have not made out a
            case of fraud in conducting the sale and also they have not raised
            any objection at the time of conducting sale proceedings. The
            respondents conveniently causing interference, at a later stage
            cannot be accepted and they are estopped from raising objections
            after conducting the sale proceedings……………
C
                   12. Respondent No.4 has not approached this Court with
            clean hands. He has no locus standi. He did not participate in the
            tender-cum-auction and when 45 persons participated in tender-
            cum-auction, nothing prevented the 4th respondent to participate
            in tender-cum-auction proceedings. Mere depositing the money
D           saying that the amount would fetch more is of no argument that
            can be looked into without establishing malafides or fraud played
            by the vendor or vendee. No relief can be granted to respondent
            No.4 in the writ petition filed by the petitioner.
                   14. Once the contractual obligation has been completed by
E           both parties and sale deed is executed, the second respondent has
            no jurisdiction in the matter to cancel the same and it is the
            competent Court of law which has jurisdiction to decide the
            validity.”
            8.7 None of the aforesaid aspects have been dealt with and/or
F     considered by the Division Bench of the High Court while passing the
      impugned judgment and order. Even it was the specific case of the
      appellant before the learned Single Judge that the order dated 26.11.1999
      passed by the Government cancelling the sale and ordering for re-auction
      was passed without hearing him. The same is also not dealt with by the
G     Division Bench of the High Court.
             8.8 Now, in so far as the submission on behalf of the respondents
      that the value of the property as on today is Rs. 15 crores approximately
      and therefore in the interest of the Deity/Temple, the impugned judgment
      and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court may not be
      interfered with by this Court is concerned, it is to be noted that by the
H
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                        987
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

passage of time the value of the property is bound to increase. In the              A
present case, subsequent to the auction and the sale, more than 23 years
have passed, therefore, whatever was the value in the year 1998 would
not be same at a future date and that too, after 20-23 years. What is
required to be considered is, at the relevant time, when the sale was
conducted, what was the value of the land/property. Learned Senior
                                                                                    B
Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents are not in a position to
point out any material on which it can be said that what was offered by
the appellant in the year 1998 was not a fair value. The base price was
Rs.4,00,000/- per acre in the public auction, in which 45 persons
participated and what was offered by the appellant, i.e., Rs. 13,01,000/-
per acre was much higher than the base price. Under normal                          C
circumstances, unless there are allegations of fraud and/or collusion and/
or cartel and/or any other material irregularity or illegality, the highest
offer received in the public auction may be accepted as a fair value.
Otherwise, there shall not be any sanctity of a public auction.
         8.9 By the impugned judgment and order by ordering re-auction,             D
the Division Bench of the High Court has permitted both, the appellant
as well as the original writ petitioner to participate in the re-auction. It is
to be noted that as such the original writ petitioner never participated in
the public auction, which was conducted/held on 24.06.1998. Therefore,
by such a liberty being granted, the High Court has given one another
                                                                                    E
opportunity to the original writ petitioner, who has died, and/or to his
heirs to participate in the re-auction, which liberty could not have been
reserved. As a result, the writ petition filed by the deceased petitioner
Shri L. Kantha Rao has ceased to be a “Public Interest Litigation” but it
is a litigation with a private mala fide interest as the original writ petitioner
had no locus to file such a case, not being a participant in the auction and        F
being unable to point out any irregularity or illegality in the auction.
      8.10 Even the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have
passed the impugned judgment and order in an appeal preferred by the
Temple Trust for the simple reason that it was the Executive Officer of
the Temple Trust, who had conducted the auction; it was the Executive               G
Officer, who had obtained the Clearance Certificate from the Income
Tax department and who executed the sale deed in favour of the highest
bidder – appellant herein. At no point of time till the judgment and order
was passed by the learned Single Judge, the Temple Trust had challenged
the auction/sale on the ground that the amount realized was inadequate.
                                                                                    H
988             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     Therefore, the Temple Trust could not have challenged their own decision,
      which they had never challenged earlier.
             8.11 Similarly, the appeal preferred by the heirs of Shri L. Kantha
      Rao also ought not to have been entertained. Shri L. Kantha Rao never
      participated in the auction. He never submitted any offer. The proceedings
B     initiated by Shri L. Kantha Rao was in the nature of a Public Interest
      Litigation and therefore being heir of Shri L. Kantha Rao, his wife could
      not have been permitted to prosecute further with the Public Interest
      Litigation.
              8.12 Now, in so far as the decisions relied upon by the learned
C     Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents referred to
      hereinabove are concerned, there cannot be any dispute to the proposition
      of law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions. However, in
      the facts and circumstances of the case narrated hereinabove, none of
      the decisions are of any assistance to the respondents. There was/is no
      material to show that the market value at the time of auction/sale in
D
      favour of the appellant was more than what was offered by the appellant
      as a highest bidder. The base price fixed was Rs. 4,00,000/- per acre
      against which the appellant being highest bidder offered Rs.13,01,000/-
      per acre. In all 45 persons participated in the auction, in which the
      appellant was found to be the highest bidder. There are no allegations of
E     fraud and/or collusion. According to the appellant, the entire litigation
      started at the instance of Shri L. Kantha Rao when one Shri M.M.
      Gupta, brother-in-law of Shri L. Kantha Rao, who was the second highest
      bidder and who had purchased lands in the name of his family members
      near the auction land at Rs.7,50,000/- per acre on 28.07.1998 and
      22.09.1998. Therefore, it is observed that the proceedings initiated by
F
      Shri L. Kantha Rao as such cannot be said to be a Public Interest
      Litigation but is squarely a private interest litigation in the garb of espousing
      a public cause, which also did not exist in the instant case. Therefore, in
      the facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench of the High
      Court ought not to have passed an order for re-auction of the property
G     after a period of 23 years from the date of auction/sale to the detriment
      of the rights of the appellant who was the successful bidder in the auction
      sale. In this regard, we wish to rely on some of the observations made
      by this Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh
      Chaufal and Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 402, cautioning the High Courts to
      be more discerning / vigilant and/or cautious while entertaining writ
H
   K. KUMARA GUPTA v. SRI MARKENDAYA AND SRI                                  989
 OMKARESWARA SWAMY TEMPLE & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

petitions apparently filed in public interest. In the said decision, it is    A
observed and held that: (1) The Courts must encourage genuine and
bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for
extraneous considerations; (2) The Courts should prima facie verify the
credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a PIL; (3) The Courts
should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents
                                                                              B
of the petition before entertaining a PIL; (4) The Courts should be fully
satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining
the petition; (5) The Courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure
that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury.
The Court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive
or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation; and (6) The   C
Courts should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for
extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing
exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous
petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations.
       8.13 The submission on behalf of the respondents that as on today      D
the value of the property is Rs.15 crores and therefore, this Court may
not interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted.
After a period of 20-23 years, the prices of lands are bound to increase.
The auction was conducted and held in the year 1998 and was sold in
                                                                              E
favour of the appellant then on payment of the full sale consideration as
per the highest bid offered by him. Therefore, the valuation as on the
date of auction is the relevant consideration and not the value after so
many years and over two decades after conducting the auction and
confirming the sale.
                                                                              F
       9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside and is
accordingly quashed and set aside. The judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.25407 of 1999 is hereby
ordered to be restored. However, as the appellant had agreed to deposit       G
the balance amount of Rs.6,45,190/- being the balance of Rs. 30 lakhs
and considering the fact that the respondent is a Temple Trust /
Devasthanam, we direct the appellant to pay to the respondent – Temple
Trust / Devasthanam a further sum of Rs. 15 lakhs (Rs.6,45,190/- plus
interest from 1998), to be paid by the appellant to the respondent –
                                                                              H
990              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     Temple Trust /Devasthanam by demand draft /banker cheque within a
      period of two weeks from today and take all consequential steps pursuant
      to the auction/sale being confirmed in his favour including getting
      registration of the sale deed in his name and taking possession of the
      land in question in case the same have not yet taken place till date.
B           Present appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent.
      However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no
      order as to costs.
             Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

C     Devika Gujral                                               Appeals allowed.
      (Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)




D




E




F




G




H