Holding

The High Court was correct to overturn the acquittal; minor inconsistencies do not vitiate eye‑witness evidence and Section 149 IPC applies where the unlawful assembly consisted of at least five persons.

Summary

On 5 July 1993, an unlawful assembly of twenty‑seven persons, armed with swords, spears and other weapons, attacked Sadruddin and four female members of his family at his house. The victim and several injured witnesses positively identified the four appellants as the assailants. The trial court acquitted all twenty‑seven, relying on alleged enmity, lack of an independent eyewitness and minor inconsistencies in the eye‑witness statements. The Madhya Pradesh High Court set aside the acquittal for four of the appellants, convicting them under Sections 323, 324 and 326 read with Section 149 IPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that minor inconsistencies do not defeat the credibility of eye‑witness testimony, that prior enmity is not a ground to reject such evidence, and that Section 149 applies where the assembly comprised at least five persons, even if only four are convicted. Consequently, the High Court’s interference was proper and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The appellate court may set aside an acquittal on the basis of minor inconsistencies in eye‑witness testimony.
Whether prior enmity between the victim and accused precludes reliance on eye‑witness statements.
Whether conviction under Section 149 IPC is sustainable when only four members of a larger unlawful assembly are found guilty.
Whether the trial court's acquittal was perverse or unreasonable, warranting interference.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378(3)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 307, s. 323, s. 324, s. 326

Subjects

unlawful assemblySection 149 IPCeye‑witness testimonyappellate review of acquittalminor inconsistenciespresumption of innocencecriminal procedure

Judgment

KALLU @ MASIH AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JANUARY 4, 2006

(S.B. SINHA AND R.V. RA VEENDRAN, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 147, 148,. 3071149, 3241149 and 3231149/Arms
Act, 1959; Ss. 25 and 27/Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 378(3):

Unlawful assembly of 27 persons-Attack-Injuring victim and four C
female family members-Trial of accused for offences under Sections 147.
148, 307, 323 and 327 r/w Section 149-Acquittal of all the accused by trial
Court on the ground that no independent witness examined and also
inconsistencies found in the statements of the eye-witnesses-On appeal, High
Court found four of the accused persons guilty of committing offences D
punishable under Ss. 323, 324 and 326 rlw Section 149 a~d sentenced them
accordingly-On appeal, Held: Victim clearly identified the accused, weapons
used by them and part of the body attacked-All the prosecution witnesses
also identified the accused-Evidence of prosecution witnesses clearly show
that accused armed with weapons assaulted the victim and other woman folk
and injured them-Trial Court disbelieved their evidence merely on account E
of minor inconsistencies in their evidence-High Court rightly held that such
minor inconsistencies/discrepancies not sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of
eye-witness-Enmity between the victim and the accused could not be a ground
1
· to reject the clear evidence of the ef~witnesses-Criminal trial.

Appeal against acquittal-Power of the Appellate Court-Reid: No less F
than the power exercised by it in appeal against conviction-However, it
cannot reverse the decision of the trial Court merely because a different view
is possible and without assigning reasons-Since High Court assigned reasons
for reversing the order of acquittal into conviction. it rightly interfered with
the order of the trial Court. G
Unlawful assembly-Forming of-Held: Trial Court held trial of 27
> accused persons and acquitted all of them-On appeal, High Court granted
leave against jive of the accused and disposed oft he appeal giving benefit of

201 H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] I S.C.R.

A doubt to one and convicted four of them--Since evidence clearly show that
more than five persons armed with weapons came and assaulted the victim
and others with the common object of injuring them, unlawful assembly
constituted/formed.

According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, an unlawful
B .assembly of 27 persons including the accused-appellants armed with
weapons came to the house of the victim-PW4. Appellants dealt a blow
on the head of the victim with a sword and other weapons and injured
him when four female members of his family/prosecution witnesses PW6,
PW7, PW9 and PWIO came to his rescue, they were also attacked by the
C accused. PW3 took the injured to a Hospital and also lodged an FIR in
the Police Station against 27 accused persons. Trial Court tried them for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323 and 324 IPC and under
Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act and acquitted all of them. On appeal,
High Court allowed the appeal partly and found four of the accused guilty
of committing offences punishable under Section 323, 324 and 326 r/w
D Section 149 IPC and sentenced them accordingly. Hence the present
appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD.I.I. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of
E the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing
appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to
review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an
order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate Court, where
the judgment of the trial Court is based on evidence and the view taken
F is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial
Court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will
also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt.
Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with
the decision of the trial Court. (206-F-G-HI
G
Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, 120021 10 SCC 46112, referred to.

1.2. Though the Trial Court referred to the evidence of the eye-
witnesses, it chose to disbelieve them merely on account of minor
inconsistencies in their evidence, relatiag to the exact site of occurrence
H and failure to name all who landed blows and the exact nature of injuries.
KALLU@ MASIH v. STATE OF MAD HY A PR/,DESH 203
J The High Court, on the other hand, held that minor inconsistencies and A
discrepancies regarding the exact place or the point at which the incident
took place or as to who landed the blows is not sufficient to disbelieve the
evidence of injured eye-witnesses. It is not necessary that all eye-witnesses
should specifically refer to the distinct acts of each member of an unlawful
assembly. In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible. (208-E-FJ
B
Masa/ti v. State of UP., (1964) 8 SCR 133, relied on.

1.3. The trial Court chose to acquit all the 27 accused. In the appeal
filed by the State, leave was granted by the High Court only in regard to
five of the accused, as they were specifically named as the persons wielding
weapons and causing injuries to the victim and others and as the names c
of others were mentioned only as being members of the assembly without
any specific act being attributed to them. The High Court gave benefit of
doubt to one of the five though his presence as a member of the group
.__,. was accepted. This resulted in conviction of only four. This does not mean
that there is no finding that there was an unlawful assembly. When the D
evidence clearly shows that more than five persons armed with swords,
spears etc. had come to the house of the victim with the common object
of causing injury, and injured him, the mere fact that several accused were
acquitted and only four were convicted, does not enable the four who are
found guilty to contend that Section 149 IPC is inapplicable.
(210-F-G-H; 211-AJ E

Mohan Singh and Anr. v. Slate of Punjab AIR (1963) SC 174; Ram
Bi/as Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, (1964) I SCR 775; Dharam Pal
and Ors. v. The State of UP., 119751 2 SCC 596; Masalti v. State of UP,
[ 1964) 8 SCR 133 and Triloki Nath v. State of UP, JT (2005) 9 SC 370, relied
F
on.

1.4. The Trial Court was of the view that absence of an independent
eye-witness in the background of previous enmity, was a serious lacuna.
But what the trial Court failed to notice is that previous enmity was not
denied and the prosecution case is that the accused persons came in a G
group to the house of the victim specifically to beat him up. Therefore,
)- the mere fact that there was enmity between the victim and the main
accused cannot be a ground to reject the clear evidence of the eye-
witnesses, who were the injured and the High Court has, therefore, rightly
held that the appellants and other accused were the assaulting party; that
they had come together with weapons and had acted jointly and had run H
204 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [2006[ I S.C.R.

A away after injuring the victim and four female members of his family.
The High Court has not interfered in the matter in a routine manner
merely because a different view is possible. It has interfered rightly
because the trial Court unreasonably disbelieved the evidence of six eye-
witnesses on insufficient grounds. It has also assigned reasons for
B interfering with acquittal. Hence, no error is found in the decision of the
High Court. (208-H; 209-A-B-q

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 520
of 2005.

C From the Judgment and Order dated 13 .12.2004 of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in Crl. Appeal No. 874 o" 1995.

Anish Ahmed Khan for the Appellant.

Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija for the State of Madhya Pradesh.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAVEENDRAN, J. This appeal is by the four convicted accused against
the judgment dated 13.12.2004 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowing
in part, Criminal Appeal No.874 of 1995 filed by the State.

E 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 5.7.1993, at about 6 p.m., an
unlawful assembly of27 persons, including Kallu, Safi, Madaniya and Bhuria
(appellant nos. I to 4 herein) and one Anwar, came to the house of Sadruddin
(PW-4), armed with swords, Ballams, lathis, hockey sticks, farsas and dharias,
shouting "kill/cut Sadruddin". Kallu dealt a blow on the head of Sadruddin
F with a sword. Madaniya also dealt a blow with a sword on his hand. Shafi
gave a blow of sword injuring his forehead, nose and jaw. Bhuria gave a
blow with a spear injuring his thigh and calf. On seeing Sadruddin being
attacked, Sabdar Bano (PW-6), Noorbano (PW-7), Baby (PW-9) and Annobai
(PW- I0) rushed to the rescue of Sadruddin. They were also beaten up by the
appellants and their associates. Sabdarbano received'injuries on her head and
G body. Annobai received injuries on the head. Baby and Noorbano received
injuries on their hands. By then, a Police van came near the spot. On seeing
it, the appellants and others took to their heels. Kanizbano (PW-3) who was
sitting outside her house and who witnessed the entire incident, along with
some others, took the injured persons to the hospital. Kanizbano also lodged
H an FIR (Ex. P-28) within half an hour of the incident in Police Station. Dhar,
KALLU@ MASIH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [RAVEENDRAN,J] 205
naming all the 27 persons. They were tried by the 3rd Additional Se·ssions A
Judge, Dhar, for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 307/149, 324/149 and
323/149 of the Indian Penal Code. Appellant Nos. I and 2 and one Nazir
Khan were also charged under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act.

3. The trial court by judgment dated 16.8.1995 acquitted all 27 accused
primarily on three grounds. The first is that all the eye-witnesses belonged B
-~ to Sadruddin group who had enmity with the accused and, therefore, their
statements were not reliable. The second is that no independent eye-witness
was examined even though some spectators were stated to be present. The
third is that there were inconsistencies in the statements of the eye- witnesses.

4. The State filed an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C
Criminal Appeal No.874 of 1995. Leave to appeal was granted by the High
Court under section 378(3) of Cr.P.C. in regard to five accused (the four
appellants and one Anwar) who were specifically named in the evidence as
r· persons who attacked and injured PWs. 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10. Thus, the acquittal
of other 22 who were not named by any of the witnesses and to whom no D
specific overt act was attributed, attained finality.

5. The High Court by its judgment dated 13.12.2004 allowed the appeal
in part, convicted appellant Nos. I to 4 and sentenced each of them as follows:

(i) RI for two years with fine of Rs. 1,000 in default six months RI E
under Section 326 !PC (appellant no. I) and 326/149 !PC
(appellant nos. 2 to 4) for causing skull injury to PW-4;
(ii) RI for one year with fine of Rs.500, in default 3 months RI
under Section 324/149 !PC for causing injuries to PW-6 and
PW-9; F
(iii) RI for six months with fine of Rs.500 each, in default 3 months
RI to each, under Section 323/149 !PC, for causing injuries to
PWs.7 and 10.

6. The High Court directed that all substantive sentences shall run
concurrently, and that the period of detention shall be set off against the G
substantive sentences awarded to them. The app,eal, in so far as accused
Anwar was, however, dismissed by giving him the benefit of doubt. Feeling
aggrieved, Respondents I to 4 in the appeal before the High Court (Accused
Nos.I, 11, 19 and 23) have filed this appeal by special leave. The appellants
contend thatthe trial court which had observed the demeanour of the witnesses H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) I S.C.R.

A and considered all the facts and circumstances, had rightly acquitted them of
all charges. It is also contended that the High Court failed to notice that (a)
appellants had been falsely implicated on account of previous enmity betw~en
the two groups; (b) there are several inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
evidence of the eye-witnesses; and (c) though several members of public
were allegedly present at the time of the incident, no independent witness
B was examined. It is submitted that in the absence of any perversity or omission
to consider material evidence or apparent error in law, the judgmrnt of the
Trial Court was not open to interference in an appeal against acquittal. Lastly,
it is contended that when only four persons are found guilty, conviction
invoking section 149 IPC is not warranted.
c 7. The circumstances in which an appellate court will interfere with the
finding of acquittal recorded by a Trial Court are reiterated in Bhim Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2002] I0 SCC 461), thus :-

"Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a
D number of cases has held that an appellate court entertaining an appeal
from thr judgment of acquittal by tne trial court though entitled to
reappreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it
should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the
same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has
taken one view on the said evidence, unless the appellate court comes
E to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either
perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that
conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any
material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion
is possible reverse the finding of the trial court."
F 8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate
Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against
conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire
evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal
will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the
G trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible.
It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different
view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled
to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should
assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court.
H
KALLU@MASIH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (RAVEENDRAN, .I.] 207
9. Kanizbano, PW-3, who does not belong to the family of the injured A
Sadruddin and lives near the house of Sadruddin has stated that Kallu, Safi,
Madaniya, (appellant Nos. I, 2 and 3) had beaten Sadruddin. She has also
stated that they along with others, including Bhuria, (appellant No.4), had
come armed with dharias, farsas, lathis etc., shouting "kill, kill".

10. Sadruddin (PW-4) has named all the four appellants and 18 other B
-,._, accused as the persons who came armed with swords, ballams, hockey sticks,
farsas and dharias. He also described the manner in which each of the
appellants had inflicted blows on him. He stated that Kallu hit him on his
head with a sword; that Madaniya hit him with· a sword .on his hand; that
Shafi hit him with a sword on his face injuring his forehead, eye and nose C
and breaking his tooth; and that Bhuria gave a blow with Ballam causing
injuries to his thigh and calf.

11. PW-6, Sabdarbano, daughter of Sadruddin, specifically stated that
appellant nos. I to 4 and their friends (who were present in court) had come
armed with spears, dariyas, lathis etc., and that they were shouting "Maro, D
kato". She also stated that Kallu hit her father with a sword; that Shafi had
a sword and Bhuria had a spear. She stated that when she along with PW-
7 and PW- I 0 went to rescue her father, they attacked her and she received
sword hits on her hand and ribs and spear hit on her shoulder and head and
that her fingers were fractured. Noorbano, PW-7, another daughter of
Sadruddin stated that appellant Nos. I to 4 and other accused had come running E
and Kallu hit her father on the head using a sword. She also stated that when
she, PW-6, PW-9 and PW-10 went to rescue her father, they were all beaten
up by all the accused and that her hand was injured. Baby (whose father is
a nephew of Sadruddin) examined as PW-9, stated that appellants I to 4
chased Sadruddin; that Kallu hit him with a sword on the head and Shafi hit p
him on the face with a sword, and that all of them beat Sadruddin. She also
stated that she was hit by someone on right hand. Annobai (PW- I 0), niece
of Sadruddin stated that Kallu and others came to the house of Sadruddin,
shouting "kill/cut" and Kallu, Bhuria and Altaf hit Sadruddin with sword/s.
She also states that she was hit by a sword on her head· by someone.
G
} 12. It is true that only Sadruddin clearly stated as to who hit him with
what weapon and at which part of his body. The other four eye-witnesses
(PWs 6, 7, 9 and I 0) have not stated who landed the blows on them. All of
them, however, identify Kallu as hitting Sadruddin on the head. In addition,
Baby (PW-9) has stated that Shafi hit Sadruddin on the nose and Annobai H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 1 SC.R.

A (PW- I0), stated that Bhuria hit Sadruddin with a sword.
13. The evidence of PWs. 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 when read with the evidence
of PW-3 makes it clear that appellants I to 4 along with others, had come
armed with swords, spears, hockey sticks etc.; that a blow was given when
Sadruddin was sitting on Olla of his house and, thereafter, he ran a few steps
B and there all the appellants landed him blows with different weapons. It is
also clear that when the womenfolk, namely, PWs.6, 7, 9 and IO ran to save ,....
him, they were also beaten up. The evidence also clearly show5 that neither
Sadruddin nor the womenfolk were armed. On the other hand, appellants I
to 4 were armed when they came in a group along with others to Sadruddin 's
C house shouting "kill/hit". The evidence of the eye-witnesses is also clear that
but for a Police van intervening at that time, there was the likelihood of
Sadruddin aRd the women who went to save him, sustaining more injuries.
Though there was a cross-complaint by the defence group, significantly,
none of the appellants was injured. The evidence also shows that there was
a longstanding enmity between Sadruddin and Kallu. In these circumstances,
D the High Court held the appellants guilty.
14. Though the trial court referred to the evidence of the eye-witnesses,
it chose to disbelieve them merely on account of minor inconsistencies in
their evidt:nce, relating to the exact site of occurrence and failure to name all
who landed blows and the exact nature of injuries. The High Court, on the
E other hand, held that minor inconsistencies and discrepancies regarding the
exact place or the point at which the incident took place or as to who landed
the blows is not sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of injured eye-witnesses.
It is not necessary that all eye-witnesses should specifically refer to the
distinct acts of each member of an unlawful assembly. In fact, it is difficult,
p if not impossible. This Court in Musa/ti v. State of UP .. (1964] 8 SCR 133,
observed :

"Where a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful
assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of
the common o~ject of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible
G for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of
the assailants. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons
assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them
have to take part in the actual assault.

15. The trial court was of the view that absence of an independent eye-
H witness in the background of previous enmity, was a serious lacuna. But
J KALLU@MASIH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [RAVEENDRAN, l] 209
'
what the trial court failed to notice is that previous enmity was not denied A
and the prosecution case is that Kallu and other accused came in a group to
Sadruddin's house specifically to beat him up. Therefore, the mere fact that
there was enmity between Sadruddin and Kallu cannot be a ground to reject
the clear evidence of the eye-witnesses - PWs 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 who were
the injured, and PW-3. The High Court has, therefore, rightly held that the
appellants and other accused were the assaulting party; that they had come B
together with weapons and had acted jointly and had run away after injuring
Sadruddin and four female members of his family.

16. We find that the High Court has not interfered in the matter in a
routine manner merely because a different view is possible. The High Court
has interfered rightly, in our view, because the trial court unreasonably C
disbelieved the evidence of six eye-witnesses on insufficient grounds. The
High Court has also assigned reasons for interfering with acquittal. We find
no error in the decision of the High Court.

17. The contention that when only four persons are found guilty, there
cannot be conviction under section 149 IPC, has no merit. Section 149 provides D
that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members
of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a
member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence. Section 141 requires · E
a minimum of five persons for being designated as an 'unlawful assembly'.
/.
18. The question has been specifically considered by this Court in
Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC 174 and Ram Bi/as
Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, [ 1964] I SCR 775, and in Dharam Pal
and Ors. v. The State of UP. [1975] 2 SCC 596. It is sufficient to refer to F
the principle as stated in Dharam Pal (supra), for our purpose :

"It is true that the acquittal of an accused person does raise, in the eye
of law, a presumption that he is innocent even if he was actually
guilty. But, it is only the acquittep accused person and not the convicted
accused persons who can, as a rule, get the benefit of such a G
presumption. The effect of findings on questions of fact depends
upon the nature of those findings. If, for example, only five known
persons are alleged to have participated in an attack but the courts
find that two of them were falsely implicated, it would be quite
natural and logical to infer or presume that the participants were less H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] I S.C.R.

A than five in number. On the other hand, if the court holds that the
assailants were actually five in number, but there could be a doubt as
to the identity of two of the alleged assailants, and, therefore, acquits
two of them, the others will not get the benefit of doubt about the
identity of the two accused so long as there is a firm finding, based
on good evidence and sound reasoning, that the participants were
B five or more in number. Such a case is one of doubt only as to
,.. -
identity of some participants and not as to the total number of
participants. It may be that a definite conclusion that the number of
participants was at least five may be very difficult to reach where the
allegation of participation is confined to five known persons and
c there is doubt about the identity of even one. But, where a large
number of known persons (such as eighteen, as is the case before us),
are alleged to have participated and the Court acts on the principle
that it is better to err on the side of safety, so that no injustice is done
to a possibly wrongly implicated accused, and benefit of doubt is
reaped by a large number, with the result that their acquittal, out of
D abundant caution, reduces the number of those about whose
participation there can be no doubt to less than five, it may not be
really difficult at all, as it is not in the case before us, to reach the
conclusion that, having regard to undeniable facts, the number of
participants could not possibly be less than five."
E [Emphasis supplied]

19. The accused before the trial court were 27 in number. PW-4 •
specifically named 22 persons and further named the four out of them who
landed him the blows. PW-3 names 12 persons who came as a group. Other
F eye-witnesses also clearly stated that the appellants with other accused who
were present in court had come to attack Sadruddin. As noticed above, the
trial court chose to acquit all the 27 accused. In the appeal filed by the State,
leave was granted by the High Court only in regard to five of the accused,
as they were specifically named as the persons wielding weapons and causing
injuries to Sadruddin and others and as the names of others were mentioned
G only as being members of the assembly without any specific act being
attributed to them. The High Court gave benefit of doubt to one of the five
(Anwar) though his presence as a member of the group was accepted. This
resulted in conviction of only four. This does not mean that there is no
finding that there was an unlawful assembly. When the evidence clearly
H shows that more than five persons armed with swords, spears etc. had come
KALLU@MASIH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [RAVEENDRAN, J] 211

to the house of Sadruddin with the common object of causing injury, and A
injured him, the mere fact that several accused were acquitted and only four
are convicted, does not enable the four who are found guilty to contend that
Section 149 is inapplicable. We may also in this context refer to the following
observations in Masa/ti v. State of UP [ 1964) 8 SCF. 133, reiterated in Tri/oki
Nath v. State of UP, reported in JT (2005) 9 SC 370 :-
B
"In fact, section 149 makc;i it clearJhat if an offence is committed by
any member of an unlawful assembly in pro>ecution of the common
object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly
knew to be likely to be. committed in :1~osecution of that object, every
person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member C
of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence; and that emphatically
brings out the principle that the punishment prescribed by section
149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always proceed on the basis
that the offence has been actually committed by everx,. member of the
unlawful assembly."
D
20. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is,
accordingly, dismissed.

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.