Holding

Parliamentary Standing Committee reports may be consulted for legislative intent but cannot be used as evidence to establish facts; the matter is referred to a Constitution Bench for further consideration.

Summary

The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus challenging the approval and administration of the HPV vaccine, relying heavily on a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee. The Union of India contended that such a report could not be used as evidence to establish facts, invoking parliamentary privilege and the doctrine of restraint. The Court examined the nature of Parliamentary Standing Committees, noting that their procedures are sui generis, not inquisitorial or adjudicative, and that the principles of natural justice do not apply. It held that while the report may be consulted to understand legislative intent, it cannot be tendered as evidence to substantiate factual allegations. Consequently, the Court refrained from deciding the merits and referred the questions on the admissibility and limits of reliance on the report to a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3).

Issues considered

Whether a court can refer to and place reliance upon a Parliamentary Standing Committee report in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution.
Whether parliamentary privilege and Articles 105, 121 and 122 of the Constitution restrict such reliance.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 105, s. Article 118, s. Article 121, s. Article 122, s. Article 136, s. Article 145(3), s. Article 32
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of Lok Sabhas. Rule 270, s. Rule 274, s. Rule 277, s. Rule 278

Subjects

Parliamentary privilegeStanding Committee reportJudicial reviewArticle 32Article 136Constitutional lawEvidenceNatural justiceParliamentary procedureConstitution Bench referral

Judgment

(2017) 4 S.C.R. 477

KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS A

v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 558 of 2012)
APRIL 05, 2017 B

[DIPAK MISRA AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.]
Constitution of India:
Arts. 32, 136, 105, 121, 122 and 145(3) - Reference io or
reliance on Parliamentary Standing Committee Report - By Supreme C
Court- In exercise o.fjurisdiction u/Arts. 32 and 136 -·Permissibility
- Question referred to Cn11stitution Bench.
Referring the matter to the Constitution Bench, the Court
HELD: 1. The procedure of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee is neither inquisitorial nor adjudicative. It has its own D
character. The procedure is sui generis. In the Westminister
system, Parliament also deals with the matter of accountability of
the executive and Standing Committees of Parliament, on many
an occasion, examine the propriety and wisdom of the conduct of
the executive. The reports of the Committees arc for the E
assistance of Parliament. The procedure for drawing up such
reports, is entirely a matter for the Committee and it has authority
to receive evidence from witnesses - but it is for their own
assistance. No person has a right to be heard by the Committee
even if the Committee is examining a matter which may result in
an adverse comment on the conduct of such person. The principles F
of natural justice are not applicable. [Para 20][490-H; 491-A-C]
2. The reference to Constituent Assembly debates, reports
of the Parliamentary Standing Committee and the speeches made
in the Parliament or for that matter, debates held in Parliament
are only meant for understanding the Constitution or the G
legislation, as the case may be. It is quite different than to place
reliance upon Parliamentary Standing Committee Report as a piece
of evidence to establish a fact. As the Constituent Assembly
debates are referred to for interpretation of a constitutional
H
477
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A provision and especially to understand the context, similarly
judicial notice of parliamentary proceedings can be taken note of
for the purpose of appreciating the intention of the legislature.
[Paras 32, 38](494-B-C; 496-B-C]
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon 'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and others
B [2007] 1 SCR 317: (2007) 3 SCC 184; Krishan Lal
Gera v. State of Haryana and others (2011] 7 SCR 722
.: (2011) 10 SCC 529; A.K. Roy v. Union of lndia and
others (1982] 2 SCR 272 : (1982) 1 SCC 271; MS.M
Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and Others AIR
1960 SC 1186; Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India
' c and others [1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 108: (1992) 4 SCC
506; Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India and others
(2013] 3 SCR 508 : (2013) 7 SCC l; Indra Sawhney
v. Union of India [1992) 2 Suppl. SCR 454: (1992) 3
Suppl. SCC 217; Madh11 Limaye, In re (1969)
D 3 SCR 154 : (1969) 1 SCC 292; Union of India v.
Harbhajan Sinhg Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 : (1971)
2 SCC 779; Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v.
State of Kerala and another (1973] Suppl. SCR 1 :
(1973) 4 SCC 225; Mano} Narula v. Union of
India [2014] 9 SCR 965 : (2014) 9 SCC 1; Jyoti
'E
Harshad Mehta and others v. Custodian and others
[2009] 12SCR1229: (2009) 10 SCC 564; State of W.R.
v. Union of India 1963 AIR 1241 : [1964] SCR 371;
K.P Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam and
another [1982) 1SCR629: (1981) 4 SCC 173;
F Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath
Kunte [1995) 6 Suppl. SCR 371 : (1996) 1 SCC 130;
Novartis AG v. Union of India [2013] 13
SCR 148: (2013) 6 SCC 1; Siale of MP. v. Dadabhoy's
New Chirimiri Ponri Hill Collie1y Co. (P) Ltd. [1972) 2
SCR 609 : (1972) 1 SCC 298; Union of India v. Slee!
G Stock Holders' Syndicate [1976) 3 SCR 504: (1976)
3 SCC 108; Surana Steels (P) Ltd. v. CIT [19991
2 SCR 589 : (1999) 4 SCC 306; State Bank of India
through General Manager v. National Housing Bank
and others (2013) 16 sec 538 - referred to.
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 479
OTHERS

R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and others ex parte A
Anderson Strathclyde pie [1983] 2 All ER 233 -
referred to.
3. As per Article 105(2) of the Constitution, no member of
the Parliament can be made liable for any proceeding in any court
because of what he has stated in a committee. The Parliamentary B
Standing Committee is a committee constituted under the Rules
and what a member speaks over there, is absolutely within the
domain of that Committee. Freedom of speech of a member of a
Committee is only guided subject to provisions of the
Constiti;tion and the Rules and standing orders regulating the
procedure of Parliament. It is also seemly to note that Article c
105(4) categorically lays the postulate that clauses 1, 2 and 3
shall apply to any committee of the Parliament. [Para 42)(499-C-
E]
R v. Murphy (1986) 5 NSWLR 18; Office of Government
Commerce v. Information Commissioner [2008] EWHC D
737 (Adnin) - referred to.
4. Article 118 of the Constitution deals with rules of
procedure. Clause 1 of the said Article stipulates that each House
of Parliament may make rules for regulating, subject to the
provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of E
its business. Thus, the said Article empowers the Parliament to
regulate its procedure apart from what has been stated directly
in the Constitution. [Para 43][499-E-F]
5. Article 121 makes it vivid that the Parliament shall not
discuss as regards the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court F
or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties, except upon a
motion been presented before the President of India praying for
removal of the Judge as provided in the Constitution. Thus, the
discussi:m of the Parliament is restricted by a constitutional
provision. Article 122 stipulates a restraint on courts to inquire G
into proceedings of the Parliament. [Para 45][499-H; 500-A-B]
6. Thus, while exercising the power of judicial review or to
place reliance on the report of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee, the doctrine of restraint has to be applied by this
Court as required under the Constitution. The submission H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R.

A "looking at the report," is nothing but placing reliance thereupon.
The view of a member of the Parliament or a member of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee who enjoys freedom of speech
and expression within the constitutional parameters and the rules
or regulations framed by the Parliament inside the Parliament or
the Committee is not to be adverted to by the court in a /is. [Para
B
47][5il0-D-GJ
Hamilton l'. Al Fayed [2001) 1 A.C. 395 - referred to.
7. The basic principle of judicial review is to ascertain the
propriety of the decision making process on the parameters of
C reasonableness and propriety of the executive decisions not the
parameters pertaining to the challenge of amendments to the
Constitution or the constitutionality of a statute. When a writ of
mandamus is sought on the foundation of a factual score, the Court
is required to address the facts asserted and the averments made
D and what has been stated in oppugnation. Once the Court is
asked to look at the report, the same can be challenged by the
other side, for it cannot be- accepted without affording an
opportunity of being heard to the respondents. The invitation to
contest a Parliamentary Standing Committee report is likely to
disturb the delicate balance that the Constitution provides
E between the constitutional institutions. If the Court allows contest
and adjudicates on the report, it may run counter to the spirit of
privilege of Parliament which the Constitution protects. [Para
50][501-G-H; 502-A-C]
8. Therefore, the Parliamentary Standing Committee report
F may not be tendered as a document to augment the stance on the
factual score that a particular activity is unacceptable or erroneous.
However, regard being had to the substantial question of law
relating to interpretation of the Constitution involved, it would
be appropriate that the issue be referred to the Constitution
G Bench under Article 145(3) of the Constitution. The following
questions are framed for the purpose of reference to the
ConStitution Bench:- (i) Whether in a litigation filed before this
CQurt either under Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution
of India, the Court can refer to and place reliance upon the report
of the Parliamentary Standing Committee? (ii) Whether such a
H
l •.

KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 481
OTHERS

Report can be looked at for the purpose of reference and, if so, A
can there be restrictions for the purpose of reference regard being
.had to the concept of parliamentary privilege and the delicate
balance between the constitutional institutions that Articles 105,
121 and 122 of the Constitution conceive? [Para 51)[502-C-F]
Case Law Reference B
[2007) 1 SCR 317 referred to Para 21
[2011] 7 SCR 722 referred to Para 22
[1982) 2 SCR 272 referred to Para 23
AIR 1960 SC 1186 referred to Para 25 c
[1992) 1 Suppl. SCR 108 referred to Para 27
(2013] 3 SCR 508 referred to Para 28
(1992) 2 Suppl. SCR 454 referred to Para 30
[1969) 3 SCR 154 referred to Para 30 D
(1972) 2 SCR 33 referred to Para 30
[1973) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 30
(2014) 9 SCR 965 referred to Para 30
[2009] 12 SCR 1229 referred to Para 33
E
[1964) SCR 371 referred to Para 34
[1982) 1 SCR 629 referred to Para 35
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 371 referred to Para36
[2013) 13 SCR 148 referred to Para 36
F
(1972) 2 SCR 609 referred to Para 36
(1976) 3 SCR 504 referred to Para 36
[1999] 2 SCR 589 referred to Para 36
(2013) 16 sec 538 referred to Para 39
G
[2001] 1 A.C. 395 referred to Para 48
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
558 of 2012.
Ui;der Article 32 of the Constitution of India
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A WITH
W. P. (C) No. 921 of 2013.
Colin Gonsalves, Anand Grover, Sr. Advs., Kabir Ali Zia
Choudhary, Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, Kumesh
Kumar Singh, Lorraine M., Advs. for the Petitioners.
B
Gourab Banerji, A. K. Panda, Sr. Advs., Ms. Krishna Sarma,
'Ms. Manisha Singh, Navnit Kumar, Ms. Vartika Walia, Jaya Krishnan
Kr., Riku Sarma, Ms. Barndi Das, Mis. Corporate Law Group,
Ms. Sushma Suri,AbhishekNaik, (for Mis. Parekh & Co.), Jasbir Bidhuri,
Ms. N. Annapoorani, R. N. Karanjawala, Ms. Nandini Gore, Abhishek
C Roy, Ms. Tahira Karanjawala, Ms. Natasha Sehrawat, Ms. Trishala
Kulkarni, Mrs. Manik Kara1tjawala, Ms. Vaidehi Misra, Sahil Tagotra,
Mis. Karanjawala & Co., Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi,
Ms. Puja Singh, Ms. Mamta Singh, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Guntur
Prabhakar, Ms. C. K. Sucharita, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Ms. Sun it a Sharma,
D Ajay Sharma, G. S. Makker, D. S. Mahra, Mrityunjai Singh, Advs. for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. l. Though the present writ petitions were
preferred in the years 2012 and 2013 and the debate had centered around
E on many an aspect relating to action taken by the Drugs Controller
General of India and the Indian Council of Medical Research (fCMR)
pertaining to approval of a vaccine, namely, Human Papilloma Virus
(HPV) manufactured by the respondent No. 7, Mis. GlaxoSmithKline
Asia Pvt. Ltd. and the respondent No.8, MSD Pharmaceuticals Private
F Limited, respectively for preventing cervical cancer in women and the
experimentation of the vaccine was done as an immunization by the
Governments of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh (before bifurcation, the
State of Andhra Pradesh, eventually the State of Andhra Pradesh and
the State of Telangana) with the charity provided by the respondent
No.6, namely, PATH International. The issue also arose with regard to
G the untimely death of certain persons and grant of compensation. Certain
orders were passed by this Court from time to time.
2. A stage came in the life span of this litigation, which is still in
continuation, when the Court vide order dated !2'h August, 2014, had
posed the following questions:-
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 483
OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

"i) Whether before the drug was accepted to be used as a vaccine A
in India, the Drugs Controller General ofindia and the ICMR had followed
the procedure for said introduction?
ii) What is the action taken after the Parliamentary Committee
had submitted the 72nct report on 30.08.2013?
.. iii) What are the reasons for choosing certain places in Gujarat 8
and Andhra Pradesh?
iv) What has actually caused the deaths and other ailments who
had been administered the said vaccine?
v) Assuming this vaccine has been administered, regard being c
had to the nature of the vaccine, being not an ordinary one, what steps
have been taken for monitoring the same by the competent authorities
of the Union oflndia, who are concerned with health of the nation as
well as the State Governments who have an equal role in this reg&rd?
vi) The girls who were administered the vaccine, whether proper D
·consent has been taken from their parents/guardians, as we have been
apprised at the Bar that the young girls had not reached the age of
majority?
vii) What protocol is required to be observed/followed, assuming
this kind of vaccination is required to be carried out?" - 'E
3. In the said order, the Court had also directed as follows:-
"At this juncture, we are obligated to state the Union of India,
who is required to assist this Court in proper perspective, shall
direct its competent authority to produce the file by which the
Drugs Controller General of India had approved the vaccine for F
introduction in India. Mr. Suri, learned senior counsel for the
Union ofindia will produce the said file. Additionally, the relevant
documents shall also be provided to the concerned counsel for
the petitioners."
4. In the course of proceedings, affidavits were filed by the Union G
oflndia and the State of Gujarat. Learned counsel for the petitioners,
Mr. Colin Gonsalves in Writ Petition (C) No. 558of2012 and Mr. Anand
Grover in Writ Petition (C) No. 921 of2013 had drawn the attention of
this Court to the 8 l" Report dated 22"c1 December, 2014 of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee. Be it noted, when the report of the
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Parliamentary Standing Committee was produced, the question arose
with regard to the "concept of consent'' for administration of vaccine
and the resultant illness suffered by the victims and such other issues
and the Court had issued certain directions for filing ofaffidavits pertaining
to s~eps that have been taken by the concerned Governments keeping in
view the various instructions given from time to time including what has
B
been stated in the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee.
S. It is worthy to note here that certain affidavits were filed about
the safety measures being undertaken with regard to the consent and
the method of trial and the improvements made thereon. In essence, the
stand of the Union of India and the States was that the vaccine was
c necessary and steps have been taken to avoid any kind of hazards. That
apart, the factual allegations made by the petitioners were also
controverted.
6. On 18th November, 2015, an issue was raised by the learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 8, MSD Pharmaceuticals
D Private Limited and. by the learned Additional Solicitor General whether
this Court while exercising the power ofjudicial review or its expansive
jurisdiction under Article 32 dealing with the public interest litigation, can
advert to the report of the Par! iamentary Standing Committee and on
that basis issue directions. After the said issue was posed, the learned
E counsel for the parties sought time to file written notes of submissions
and argue the matter. Regard being had to importance of the matter,
assistance of the learned Attorney General for India was sought.
7. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India has
filed a written note of submission contending, inter alia, that the reports
. F of the Parliamentary Standing Committee are at best external aids of
construction in order to determine the surrounding circumstanct:s or the
historical facts for the purpose of discerning the mischief sought to be
remedied, but not for any other purpose. He has referred to certain
authorities which we shall refer to in the course of our deliberation. We
may clarify that though Mr. Rohatgi has filed the written note of
G submissions, today we have been assisted by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned
Solicitor General, Mr. A.K. Panda and Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned
senior counsel and Mrs. Rekha Pandey, learned counsel on behalf of
Union oflndia.
8. Mr. Grover and Mr. Gonsalves, learned senior counsel appearing
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 485
OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J .]

for the petitioners, who intend to reply on the repo1t of the Parliamentary A
Standing Committee submitted that looking at the report of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee by this Court in a writ petition
preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution is only to be apprised
about facts to arrive at a conclusion for the purpose of issue of necessitous
directions and there cannot be absolute rule that it cannot be looked at.
B
According to them, there is no impediment to rely on the said report as
the reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee are put on the
website and in such a situation, the Court can always take aid of the
report not only for the purpose of understanding the legislative intendment
of a legislation, but also for taking the facts into consideration to issue
any prerogative writ. Learned senior counsel would contend that as C
long as the reference to report does not violate the freedom of speech of
the members of the Committee or there is no attempt to impugn the
report or criticize the same, reliance on the same should not be prohibited.
It is urged by Mr. Gonsalves thatthe role of the Parliament in the modern
democracy has gone beyond the traditional concept and the perception
D
is to have a transparent society and when there is access to the report,
there is no warrant not to utilize the same in a proceeding before the
Court.
9. Learned senior counsel appearing forthe Union ofindia would
in reply submit that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for
the;etitioners are to be tested on the constitutional parameters and E
various Articles of the Constitution are to be read in proper perspective.
It!is asserted by him that the constitutional scheme does not favour the
interpretation which is sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioners. According to the learned counsel for Union of India, the
report of the Parliamentary Standing Committees are meant to guide the F
functioning of the departments and work as a precursor to the debate in
Parliament but not meant to be used in court as it does not countenance
any contest in a court of law.
l 0. To appreciate the controversy, we may usefully refer to the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of Lok Sabha Rules (for G
short, 'the Rules'). Rule 2 of the Rules defines the "Parliamentary
Committee". For the sake of completeness, we reproduce the same:-
""Parliamentary Committee" means a Committee which is
appointed or elected by the House or nominated by the Speaker
and which works under the direction of the Speaker and presents H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A its report to the House or to the Speaker and the Secretariat for
which is provided by the Lok Sabha Secretariat."
11. Chapter 26 of the Rules deals with Parliamentary Con1mittees
and the matters regarding appointment, quorum, decisions of the
committee, etc. There are two kinds of Parliamentary Committees: (i)
B Standing Committees, and (ii) Adhoc Committees. The Standing
Committees are categorized by their nature of functions. The Standing
Committees of the Lok Sabha are as follows:-
"a) Financial Committees;
b) Subject Committees or Departmentally related standing
c committees of the two houses;
c) Houses Committee i.e. the Committees relating to the day to
day business of the House;
d) Enquiry Committee;
D e) Scrutiny Committees;
t) Service Committees;
vi) A list of Standing Committees of Lok Sabha along with its
membership is reproduced as under:
Name of Committee Number of
E
Members
Business Advisory Committee 15

Committee of Privileges 15
'
Committee on Absence of 15
F
Members from the Sittings of the
House Committee on
Empowerment of Women.

Committee on Estimates 30
G
Committee on Government 15
Assurance5 ·

Committee on Papers Laid on the 15
Table
.
H Committee on Petitions 15
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 487
OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

A
Committee <mPrivate Members Bills and 15
Resolutions
Committee on Public Accoonts 22

Committee on Public Und ngs 22 B
Committee on Subordiriate Legislation 15

Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled 30
Castes and Schedu1edTribes
- c
House Committee 12
Joint Committee on Offices ofProfit 15
Joint Committee on Salaries and 15
Allowances
..
of Members of Parliament
.D
'
Library Committee 9

Rules Committee 15

E
vi) Apart from the above, there are various departmentally related
Standing Committees under various ministries."
12. From the aforesaid, it is quite clear that there are various
departmentally related Standing Committees under various Ministries.
It is apt to note here that in the case at hand, Rule 270 of the Rules F
which deals with the functions of the Parliamentary Committee meant
for Committees Rajya Sabha is relevant. It reads as follows:-
"270. Functions
Each of the Standing Committees shall have the following ·
functions, namely:- G
(a) to consider the Demands for Grants of the related Ministries/
Departments and report thereon. The report shall not suggest
anything of the nature of cut motions;
(b) to examine Bills, pertaining to the related Ministries/
H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Departments, referred to the Committee by the Chairman or
the Speaker, as the case may be, and report thereon;
(c) to consider the annual reports of the Ministries/Departments
and report thereon; and
(d) to consider national basic long term policy documents p~esented
B · to the Houses, if referred to the Committee by the Chairman
or the Speaker, as the case may be, and report ti1ereon:
Provided that the Standing Committees shall not consider
matters of day-to-day administration of the related Ministries/
Departments."
c 13. Rule 27 1 provides for applicability of provisions relating to
functions. Rule 274 deals with the report of the Committee. The said
Rule reads as follows:-
"274. Report of the Committee

D (I) The report of the Standing Committee shall be based on broad
consensus.
(2) Any member of the Committee may record a minute of dissent
on the repo11 of the Committee.
(3) The report of the Committee, together with the minutes of
E dissent, if any, shall be presented to the Houses."
14. Rule 274(3) is extremely significant, for it provides that the
report of the Committee together with the Minutes of the dissent, if any,
is to be presented to the House. Rule 277 stipulates that the report is to
have persuasive value. The said Rule is as follows:-
F "277. Reports to have persuasive value.- The report of a
Standing Committee shall have persuasive value and shall be
treated as considered advice given by the Committee."
15. Relying on the said Rule, it is argued by the learned counsel
for the petitioners that the report of the Standing Committee has a
. G persuasive value and hence, it can be taken note of for the purpose of
fact finding by this Court. The learned counsel for the Union oflndia,
on the contrary, would contend that as per the scheme of the Rules, it is
meant to have persuasive value and considered as an advice given by
the Standing Committee to the Parliament.
H
"

KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 489
' OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

16. It is submitted on behalf of the Union of India that the Rules A
277 - 279 deal with submission of the Report of the Committee and
provide that if no time frame is given, the same would be submitted
within a month from the appointment of the Committee and the reports
shall be presented to the House by the Chairperson. It is further urged
that the reports submitted by the different Committees are examined/ B
debated by the House and only thereafter they are adopted. Out: attention
has been drawn to Rule 277 and Rule 278 made for Lok Sabha which
provide for Scope ofAdvice regarding reports submitted by Select/Joint
Committees. In essence, the purpose of reliance is, it is a matter of
concern to the debates in the Parliament,
17.At this juncture, we may look at the origin and working of the C
Parliamentary Committee. The Committee system in India, as has been
stated in "The Committee System in India : Effectiveness in Enforcing
Executive Accountability", Hanoi Session, March 2015, is as follows:-
"The origin of the Committee system in India can be traced back
to the Constitutional Reforms of 1919. The Standing Orders of D
the Central Legislative Assembly provided for a Committee on
Petitions relating to Bills, ~elect Committee on Amendments of
Standing Orders, and Select Committee on Bills. There was also
a provision for a Public Accounts Committee and a Joint Committee
on a Bill. Apart from Committees of the Legislative Assembly, E
members of both Houses of the Central Legislature also served
on the Standing Advisory Committees attached to various
' Departments of the Government of India. All these committees
were purely advisory in character and functioned under the control
of the Government with the Minister-incharge of the Department
acting as the Chairman of the Committee. F
After the Constitution came into force, the position of the Central
Legislative Assembly changed altogether and the committee
system underwent transformation. Not only did the number of
committees increase, but their functions and powers were also
enlarged. G
By their nature, Parliamentary Committees are of two kinds:
Standing Committees and Ad hoc Committees. Standing
Committees are permanent and regular committees which are
constituted from time to time in pursuance of the provisions bf an
H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Act of Parliament or Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
in Lok Sabha. The work of these Committees is of continuous
nature. The Financial Committees, Departmentally Related
Standing Committ.ees (DRSCs) and some other Committees come
under the category of Standing Committees. Ad hoc Committees
are appointed for a specific purpo~e and they cease to exist when
B
they finish the task assigned to them and submit a report. The
principal Ad hoc Committees are the Select and Joint Committees
on Bills. Railway Convention Committee, Joint Committee on Food
Management in Parliament House Complex, etc. also come under
the category of ad hoc Committees."
c l 8. In the said document in respect of Standing Committees of
Parliament, it has been observed:-
"Standing Committees are those which are periodically elected
by the House or nominated by the Speaker, Lok Sabha, or the
Chairman, Rajya Sabha, singly or jointly and are permanent in
D nature. In terms of their functions, Standing Committees may be
classified into two categories. One category of Committees like
the Departmentally Related Standing Committees (GRSCs),
Financial Committees etc., scrutinize the functioning of the
Government as per their respective mandate. The other category
E of Committees like the Rules Committee, House Committee, Joint
Committee on Salaries and Allowances, etc. deal with matters
relating to the Houses and members.''
19. We have referred to the same as a holistic readi1ig of the said
document conveys that the Parliamentary Standing Committee makes
F the e;;ecutive accountable to it on certain issues. As is indicated
hereinbefore, Mr. Grover and Mr. Gonsalves, learned senior appearing
for the writ petitioners, would contend that the executive being
accountable to the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the report of the
Committee which is in the public domain and hence, that can be relied
upon by them to buttress a fact situation and in any way, establish it.
G Learned counsel for the Union oflndia and the contesting respondents,
per ccntra, would urge that the Parliamentary Standing Committee report
cannot be tendered as a piece of evidence to prove a fact and once it is
referred to, it invites a contest and criticism.
20. We may fruitfully state that the procedure of the Committee
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND. 491
OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

is neither inquisitorial nor adjudicative. lt has its own character. The A
procedur~ is sui generis. In the Westminister system, Parliament also
deals with the matter of accountability of the executive and standing
Committees of Parliament, on many an occasion, examine the propriety
and wisdom of the conduct of the executive. The reports of the
Committees are for the assistance of Parliament. The procedure for B
drawing up such reports, is entirely a matter for the Committee and it
has authority to receive evidence from witnesses- but it is for their own
assistance. No person has a right to be heard by the Committee even if
the Committee is examining a matter which may result in an adverse
comment on the conduct of such person. The principles ofnaturaljustice
are not applicable. C
21. It is apt to note here that Mr. Grover and Mr. Gonsalves have
placed reliance on the authority of Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker,
Lok Sabha and others 1, wherein in paragraph 43 l(a), it has been said:-
"(a) Parliament is a coordinate organ and its views do decerve
defence even while its acts are amenable to judicial scrutiny." D
22. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also placed reliance
on a two-Judge Bench decision in Kris/tan Lal Gera v. State of
Haryana and other!>:;.. ln the said case, the report submitted by the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resources Develop;nent
has been referred to. They have also cited certain English authorities E
which relate to reliance upon the report in trials without impugning the
same.
23. At this stage, we may gainfully refer to the authorities cited by
the learned counsel for Union oflndia and the contesting respondents.
In A.K. Roy v. Union of India and others3 , it has been held thus:- F
"But we find ourselves unable to. intervene in a matter of this
nature by issuing a mandamus to the Central Government obligating
it to bring the provisions of Section 3 into force. The Parliament
having left to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government
the question as regards the time for bringing the provisions of the G
44th Amendment into force, it is not for the court to compel the
government to do that which, according to the mandate of the
1
(2007) 3 sec 184
2 (2011) 10 sec s29
, (1982) 1 sec 211
H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201.7] 4 S.C.R.

A Parliament, lies in its discretion to do when it considers it opportune
to do it. The executive is responsible to the Parliament and ifthe
Parliament considers that the executive has betrayed its trust by
not bringing any provision of the Amendment into force, it can
censure the executive. It would be quite anomalous that the
inaction of the executive should have the approval of the Parliament
B
and yet we should show our disapproval of it by issuing a
mandamus. The court's power of judicial review in such cases
has to be capable ofbeing exercised both positively and negatively,
if needed it has that power: positively, by issuing a mandamus
calling upon the government to act and negatively by inhibiting it
c from acting. If it were permissible to the court to compel the
government by a mandamus to bring a constitutional amendment
into force on the ground that the government has failed to do
what it ought to have done, it would be equally permissible to the
court to prevent the government from acting, on some such ground
as that, the time was not yet ripe for issuing the notifici;tion for
D
bringing the Amendment into force."
24. The aforesaid passage shows that the Court does not have
the power to direct the Parliament to bring an Act into force. Drawing
an analogy, it is canvassed that as the Court cannot issue a writ to
E implement the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee or rely
on it for the purpose of issuance of a writ.
25. Ms. Manisha Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.6, PATH International, contl\llded that the repo;t of the
Part iamentary Standing Committee cannot be assailed as has been held
in M.S.M. Sltarma v. Dr. Sltree Krisltna Si111ta and Otllers4. In this
F regard, she has drawn our attention to paragraph 43 l(o) of Raja Ram
Pal (supra) which states thus:-
"The truth or correctness of the material will not be questioned by
the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material or substitute
its opinion for that of the legislature.''
G
26. Reliance has been placed on the aforesaid conclusion to lay
thrust on the point that there cannot be a combat or dispute over the
report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee in a court of law and,
therefore, the respondents are debarred from contesting the same and
4 AIR 1960 SC 1186
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNfON OF INDIA AND 493
OTHERS [DrPAK MfSRA, J.]

that is the singular ground not to place reliance upon the same. A
27. In Sarojini Ramaswami vs. Union of India amt otlters 5,
the Court observed that a finding of guilt recorded by the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on the charges is not conclusive and final and the
Parliament can still hold that charges levelled against the person
concerned do not amount to misbehavior and may decide not to adopt B
the motion. Though the decision was rendered in a different context, it
has been taken aid of to bolster the proposition that the report of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee does not attain finality, inasmuch as
it is subject to debate in the Parliament and subject to further a::tion
taken by the Parliament.
c
28. Inspiration has also been drawn from the authority in Aru11
Kumar Agrawal vs. Union of India and otlters6, wherein it has been
stated in the context of the report of the Comptro lier and Auditor General
of India (CAG) that the report of the CAG is always subject to
Parliamentary debates and it is possible that the Parliamentary Accounts
Committee can accept the Ministry's objection to the CAG report or D
reject thfi report of the CAG. What has been stated is that CAG though
indisputably is an independent constitutional functionary, yet it is for the
Parliament to decide whether after receiving the repo11, i.e. the
Parliamentary Accounts Committee to make its comments on the CAG 's
report. The emphasis is on the areas of demarcation of power of the E
Parliament and its supremacy within its sphere.
29. On behalf of the Union oflndia, two decisions, namely, R v.
Murplty1 and Office of Govemme11t Commerce v. Informotion
Commissioner have been referred to highlight that there has been
exclusion of discussion of the Parliamentary report. F
30. At this juncture, we may note with profit, how this Court has
taken aid of the debates of the Constituent Assembly, Parliamentary
notes, speeches given .in the Parliament and the report of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee. In Indra Sawltney v. Union of
India 9, Jeevan Reddy, J ., speaking for the majority, held that debates in G
Constituent Assembly can be relied upon as an aid to interpretation of a
'(1992) 4 sec so6
,; (2013) 1sec 1
7
(1986) 5 NSWLR 18
8
[2008] EWHC 737 (Adnin)
• 1992 Supp (3) sec 217 H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A constitutional provision and for the said purpose the learned Judge relied
upon the decisions in Mad/tu Limaye, In re 10 , Union of India v.
Harbltajan Sinltg Dltillon 11 and several opinions in Kesavananda
Bltarati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a and anotlter 12 •
31. In Manoj Narula v. Union of India 13 , the majority of the
B Constitution Bench relied on the Constituent Assembly debates while
dealing with the concept of constitutional trust.
32. As the Constituent Assembly debates are referred to for
interpretation of a constitutional provision and especially to understand
the context, similarly judicial notice of parliamentary proceedings can be
c taken note of for the purpose of appreciating the intention of the
legislature.
33. In Jyoti Harsltad Melrlit and others v. Custodian and
14
otflers , it has been held that reports of the Joint Parliamentary Committee
are admissible only for the purpose of tracing the legal history of the
D legislation.
34. In this regard, we may also usefully state that the speeches of
Ministers in the Parliament are referred to on certain occasions for limited
purposes. A Constitution Bench in State of W.B. v. U11io11 of I11dia 15
has held:-
E "It is however well-settled that the Statement of Objects and
Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliament,
cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the
substantive provisions of the statute. They cannot be used except
forthe limited purpose ofunderstanding the background and the
F antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. But we
cannot use this statement as an aid to the construction of the
enactment or to show that the legislature did not intend to acquire
the proprietary rights vested in the State or in any way to affect
the State Governments' rights as owners of minerals. A statute,
as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective
G intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement rnade by
10
(1969) 1 sec 2n
11
(!971) 2 sec 779
12
<1973) 4 sec 225
" (2014) 9 sec 1
"(2009) 1 osec
564
H " AIR 1963 SC 1241
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 495
OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and objects of the A
Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used
in the statute."
35. In K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam tmd
another16 the Court while referring to the budget speech of the Minister
ru~~ B
"Now it is true that the speeches made by the Members of the
Legislature on the floor of the House when a Bill for enacting a
statutory provision is being debated are inadmissible for the purpose
of interpreting the statutory provision but the speech made by the
Moverof the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the c
Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascerta~ning
the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object
and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. This is in accord
with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in western countries
but also in India that interpretation of a statute being an exercise
in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically D
relevant should be admissible. In fact there are at least three
decisions of this Court, one in Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT17 ,
the other in Indian Chamber of Commerce v. Commissioner of
Income Tax' 8 and the third in Additional Commissioner ofIncome
Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association 19 where E
the speech made by the Finance Minister while introducing the
exclusionary clause in Section 2, clause (15) of the Act was relied
upon by the Court for the purpose of ascertaining what was the
reason for introducing that clause."
36. Similar references have also been made inRameslt Yeshwant F
Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kuntew. That apart, Parliamentary
debates have also been referred to appreciate the context relating to the
construction of a statute in Novartis AG v. Union of lmtia 11 , State of
M.P. v. Dadabltoy's New Chirimiri Po11ri Hill Colliery Co. (P) Ltd.zz,
16
AIR 1981 SC 1922 G
17
AIR 1976 SC 10
"AIR 1976 SC 348
19
AIR 1980 SC 387
20
(1996) 1 sec 130
21 (2013) 6 sec 1
22
(1972) 1 sec 29s
H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 l 7] 4 S.C.R.

A Union of India v. Steel Stock Holders' Syndicate 23 , K.P. Varghese
(supra) and Sural1a Steels (P) Ltd. 11• CIP-1•
37. We have referred to these authorities to highlight that the said
speeches have been referred to or not referred to for the purposes
indicated therein and when the meaning of a statute is not clear or
B ambiguous, the circumstances that led to passing of the legislation can
be looked into to ascertain the intention of the legislature.
38. Thus observed, the reference to Constituent Assembly debates,
reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee and the speeches made
in the Parliament or for that matter, debates held in Parliament are only
c meant for understanding the Constitution or the legislation, as _the case
may be. It is quite different than to place reliance upon Parliamentary
Standing Committee report as a piece of evidence to establish a fact.
We have been commended to the authority by the learned counsel
appearing for the Union oflndia reported in R. v. Secretary of!;tate for
Trade and others ex parte Anderson Stratflclyde plc15 :-
D . .
"In my judgment there is no distinction between using a report in
Hansard for the purpose of supporting a cause of actior. arising
out of something which occurred outside the House, and using a
report for the purpose of supporting a ground for relief in
proceedings for judicial review in respect of something which
E occurred outside the House. In both cases the court would have
to do more than take note of the fact that a certain statement was
made in the House on a certain date. It would have to consider
the statement or statements with a view to determining what was
the true meaning of them, and what were the proper inferences
F to be drawn from them. This, in my judgment, would be contrary
to art 9 of the Bill of Rights. It would be doing what Blackstone
said was not to be done, namely to examine, discuss and adjudge
on a matter which was being considered in Parliament. Moreover,
it would be an invasion by the court of the right of every member
of Parliament to free speech in the House with the possible.adverse
G effects referred to by Browne J."
39. In this regard, a reference to a three-Judge Bench decision in
State Bank of India through General Manager v. National Housing
"(I976J 3 sec 10s
"(1999) 4 sec 306
H "[1983] 2 All ER 233
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 497
OTHERS [DlPAK MISRA, J .]

Bank and others26 would be apposite. The Court was dealing with an A
appeal preferred under Section 10 of the Special Court (Trial ofOJfonces
Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act 27 of 1992. lri the said case,
this Court noticed that the learned Judge of the Special Court had
extensively relied upon the Second Interim of the Janakiraman
Committee27 on the ground that the same was filed by the first defendant.
B
The Court in that context held:-
"50. It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the
findings of even a statutory commission appointed under the
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio
vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R..Tendolkar 28
and the statements made before such Commission are expressly C
made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal.
The leading judicial pronouncements on that question were
succinctly analysed by this Court in TT Antony v. State of
Kerala29 , sec paras 29-34. Para 34 of the judgment inte1 alia
re~: D
"34 . ... In our view, the courts, civil or criminal, are not bound
by the report or findings of the Commission oflnquiry as they
have to arrive at their own decision on the evidence placed
before them in accordance with Jaw."
51. Therefore, comts are not bound by the conclusions and findings E
rendered by such commissions. The statements made before such
commission cannot be used as evidence before any civil or criminal
court. It should logically follow that even the conclusions based
on such statements can also not be used as evidence in any court.
The Janakiraman Committee is not even a statutory body F
authorised to collect evidence in the legal sense. It is a body set
up by the Governor of Reserve Bank oflndia obviously in exercise
of its administrative functions,
. " ... the Governor, RBI set up a committee on 30-4-1992 to
i1westigate into the possible irregularities in funds management G
by commercial banks and financial institutions, and in pa1ticular,
"(2013) 16 sec 538
27
Commiaee set up by RBI on 30.04.1992 which submitted six reports and the Final
Report was on 07.05.1993
28
AIR 1958 SC 538
" (2001) 6 sec 181 H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 l 7] 4 S.C.R.

A in relation to their dealings in government securities, public
sector bonds and similar instruments. The Committee was
required to investigate various aspects of the transactions of
SBI and other commercial banks as well as financial institutions
in this regard. "30
B Andagain:-
"53. The report of such a committee in our view can at best be
the opinion of the Committee based on its own examination of the
records of the various banks (including the plaintiff and the first
defendant) and the statements recorded (by the Committee) of
c the various persons examined by the Committee. In our considered
view the report of the Janakiraman Committee is not evidence
within the meaning of Evidence Act which the Special Court is
bound to follow."
40. We have referred to the said authority as this Court has thought
D it appropriate to state following the precedents that the repo11 of a
statutory committee cannot be received as evidence of facts stated in
the report.
41. Having dwelled upon this aspect, we may refer to certain
relevant Articles of the Constitution. Article 105 deals with with powers,
E privileges, etc. of the Houses of Parliament and of the members and
committees thereof. To have a complete picture, the said Article is
reproduced in entirety:-
" I 05. Powers, privileges, etc., of the Houses of Par!iament
and of the members and committees thereof.- (I) Subject to
F
the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and ~tanding
orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be
freedom of speech in Parliament.
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in
any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in
Parliament or any committee thereof,.and no person shall be so
G
liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of
either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or
proceedings.
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of
30 See the Janakiraman Committee's first interim report, May 1992, p. I.
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND 499
OTHERS [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees A
of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined
by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, 1[shall be those of that
House and of its members and committees immediately before
the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (F01ty-
fourth Amendment) Act, J978.
B
(4) The provisions ofclauses ( 1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation
to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to
sp~ak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House
of Parliament or any committee thereof as they apply in relation
to members of Parliament."
c
42. What is necessary to understand from Article 105(2) is that
no member of the Parliament can be made liable for any proceeding in
any court because of what he has stated in a committee. The
Parliamentary Standing Committee is a committee constituted under the
Rules and what a member speaks over there is absolutely within the
domain of that committee. Freedom of speech of a member of a D
Committee is only guided subject to provisions of the Constitution and
the Rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament. It
is also seemly to note that Article 105(4) categorically lays the postulate
that clauses 1, 2 and 3 shall apply to any committee of the Parliament.
43. Article 118 deals with rules of procedure. Clause 1 of the said E
Article stipulates that each House of Parliament may make rules for
regulating, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure
and the conduct of its business. Thus, the said Article empowers the
Parliament to regulate its procedure apart from what has been stated
directly in the Constitution. F
44. A1ticle 121 provides restriction on discussion in Parliament.
The samP- is extracted below;-
" 121. Restriction on discussion in Parliament.- (I) No
discussion shall take place in Parliament with respect to the
conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in G
the discharge of his duties except upon a motion for presenting an
address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge as
hereinafter provided?
45. The aforesaid Article makes it vivid that the Parliament shall
H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] 4 S.C.R.

A not discuss as regards the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court
or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties, except upon a motion
bel;)n presented before the President of India praying for removal of the
Judge as provided in the Constitution. Thus, the discussion of the
Parliament is restricted by a constitutional provision.
B 46. Article 122 stipulates a restraint on courts to inquire into
proceedings of the Parliament. The said Article being absolutely significant
is reproduced below:-
" 122. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament.-
( l) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shal~ not be
c called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of
procedure.
(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are
vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure.or
the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament
D shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the
exercise by him of those powers."
47. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid Articles is th ~t while
exercising the power ofjudicial review or to place reliance on the report
of the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the doctrine of restraint has
E to be applied by this Court as required under the Constitution. What is
argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners is thatthere is no question
of any kind ofjudicial review from this Court or attributing anything on
the conduct ofany of the members of the Committee, but to look at the
report for understanding the controversy before us. The submission
"looking at the report," as we perceive, is nothing but placing reliance
F thereupon. The view of a member of the Parliament or a membu bfthe
Parliamentary Standing Committee who enjoys freedom of speech and
expression within the constitutional parameters and the rules or
regulations framed by the Parliament inside the Parliament or the
Committee is not to be adve1ted to by the court in a !is.
G 48. In this regard, it is appropriate to refer to the obsetvations
made by the House of Lords in Hamilton 11. Al Fayeff 1
:-

"The Court of Appeal held, first, that apart from any question of
parliamentary privilege the principle in Hunter's case [I 982] AC
" [200 I) I AC. 395
H
KALPANA MEHTA AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDJA AND 50 I
OTHERS [D.IPAK MISRA, J.]

529 had no application: a parliamentaiy decision was not analogous A
to a decision of the court. Next, the Court of Appeal held that the
proceedings before the PCS, his report and its acceptance by the
CSP were all "parliamentary proceedings" and therefore any
attempt to investigate or cha Ilenge any of the procedures adopted
constituted a breach of par! iamentary privilege: they constituted a
B
"questioning" of parliamentary procedures. They therefore held
that the judge had been in error and had himself brea::hed
parliamentary procedure by criticizing the procedures adopted by
the PCS. The conclusion of the Court of Appeal on these two
po'ints met the concerns of the Solicitor General. The Court of
Appeal were clearly correct on these points and they were not C
fu11her challenged on appeal to your Lordship's House ....
Presumably because of the way the case was presented to them,
the Court of Appeal never considered the relevant question (viz
whether there should be a fair trial stay) raised by question 2 of
the summons. The only way in which Mr Al Fayed could justify D
his defamatory statements was by detailed challenge to Mr
Hamilton's conduct in Parliament, which challenge would be
precluded by parliamentary privilege. That being so it would in
my judgment have been impossible for Mr Al Fayed to have had
a fair trial in this action if he had been precluded from challenging
the evidence produced to the parliamentary committees on behalf E
of Mr. Hamilton. Had it not been for section 13, the court should,
in my judgment, have stayed the libel action brought by Mr.
Hamilton by making an order under paragraph 2 of the summons.
However, section 13 does apply to this case and provides a complete
answer to it." F
49. We will be failing in our duty if we do not note another
submission of the learned Solicitor General that for issuance of a writ of
mandam 11s, it is primary to establish that one has a right and, in the case
at hand, an effort has been made to rely on the Parliamentary Star~ding
Committee's report to create a right which is legally not permissible. G
50. The controversy has to be seen from the perspective ofjudicial
review. The basic principle ofjudicial review is to asce11ain the propriety
of the decision making process on the parameters of reasonableness
and propriety of the executive decisions. We are not discussing about
the parameters pertaining to the challenge of amendments to the H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I7] 4 S.C.R.

A Constitution or the constitutionality of a statute. When a writ of
mandamus is sought on the foundation of a factual score, the Court is
required to address the facts asserted and the averments made and
what has been stated in oppugnation. Once the Court is asked to took at
the report, the same can be challenged by the otherside, for it cannot be
B accepted without affording an opportunity of being heard to the
respondents. The invitation to contest a Parliamentary Standing
Committee report is likely to disturb the delicate balance that the
Constitution provides between the constitutional institutions. If the Comt
allows contest and adjudicates on the report, it may run counter to the
spirit of privilege of Parliament which the Constitution protects.
·c 51. As advised at present, we are prima facie of the view that
the Parliamentary Standing Committee report may not be tendt;red as a
document to augment the stance on the factual score that a pa1ticular
activity is unacceptable or erroneous. However, regard being h:::d to the
substantial question oflaw relating to interpretation of the Constitution
D involved, we think it appropriate that the issue be referred to the
Constitution Bench under Aiticle 145(3) of the Constitution. We frame
the following questions for the purpose of reference to the Constitution
Bench:-
(i) Whether in a litigation filed before this Comt either under Article
E 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia, the Court can
refer to and place reliance upon the report of the Parliamentary
Standing Committee?
(ii) Whether such a Report can be looked at for the put pose of
reference and, if so, can there be restrictions for the purpose
F of reference regard being had to the concept of par Iiainentary
privilege and the delicate balance between the constitutional
institutions that Articles I05, 12 l and 122 of the Constitution
conceive?
52. Let the papers be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of
G India for constitution of appropriate Bench.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Matter rett:rred tu
larger bench.