KALPANA VYASversusRAJ KUMAR RANGWANI

572                      [2018]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   13 S.C.R. 572              [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A                              KALPANA VYAS
                                        v.
                          RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI
                        (Civil Appeal No.10811 of 2018)
B                             OCTOBER 29, 2018
      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
             Constitution of India – Art.227 – Jurisdiction of High Court
      – Scope of – Eviction petition filed by the appellant-landlady against
      the respondent-tenant on ground of bona fide need – Petition
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      dismissed by Rent Tribunal – Appellate Tribunal set aside the order
      of the Rent Tribunal – High Court restored the order of the Rent
      Tribunal – Held: High Court while allowing the respondent’s writ
      petition held that the Appellate Tribunal allowed the appellant’s
      appeal with casual approach and failed to record any categorical
D     finding on the plea of bona fide need – Having held that, the High
      Court had two options, either to remand the case to the Appellate
      Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on merits or to decide the
      matter itself on merits – High Court ought to have resorted to the
      first option and remanded the case back to the Appellate Tribunal,
      since it was hearing the matter in its writ jurisdiction u/Art.227 and
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      it was not possible to examine the issue on facts in detail like an
      Appellate Court – High Court committed error in not taking recourse
      to any option and without deciding the issue arising in the case on
      its merit, simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal – There was
      no factual finding recorded on the question of bona fide need –
F     Case remanded to the Appellate Tribunal to be decided afresh on
      merits – Rent Control and Eviction.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 The need to remand the case to the Rent
      Appellant Tribunal occasioned because the High Court, while
G     allowing the respondent’s writ petition, came to a conclusion and
      accordingly held that the Rent Appellate Tribunal allowed the
      appellant’s appeal with a casual approach and failed to record any
      categorical finding on the plea of bona fide need. Having held
      that, the High Court had two options: first either to remand the
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                                       572
         KALPANA VYAS v. RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI                             573


case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh      A
on merits in accordance with law and second, to decide the matter
itself on merits in accordance with law. Since the High Court heard
the matter in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, it was not possible to examine the issue on facts in
detail like an Appellate Court. It is for this reason, the High
                                                                        B
Court ought to have resorted to first option and remanded the
case back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
afresh on merits in accordance with law. [Paras 15, 16] [576-A-B]
       1.2 The High Court committed error in not taking recourse
to any option and without deciding the issue arising in the case
on its merit, simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal. This      C
approach of the High Court caused prejudice to the appellant
because there was no factual finding recorded either by the first
appellate Court or the High Court on the question of bona fide
need. [Paras 17, 18] [576-C-D]
      1.3 It is for this reason that the finding of the High Court is   D
upheld in relation to the approach and the manner in which the
Rent Appellate Tribunal decided the appellant’s appeal but it
would be just and proper to remand the case to the Rent Appellate
Tribunal for its decision on merits afresh in accordance with law.
Impugned order is modified to the extent that the case is               E
remanded to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
afresh on merits in accordance with law. [Paras 19, 20] [576-E-F]
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10811
of 2018.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2018 of the High         F
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 5403 of 2015.
      Dr. Manish Singhvi, Satyendra Kumar, Irshad Ahmad, Advs. for
the Appellant.
                                                                        G
      Purvish Jitendra Malkan, Utkarsh Tiwari, Ms. Khushboo Vinodray
Malkan, Bhaskar Singh, Ms. Dharita P.Malkan, Advs. for
the Respondent.


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574             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
            2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order
      dated 02.01.2018 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur
      in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5403/2015 whereby the High Court has
B     allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein.
             3. The issue involved in the appeal is short, as also the facts of the
      case lie in a narrow compass, which would be clear from the narration
      infra.

C            4. The appellant is the applicant, whereas the respondent is the
      non-applicant in the eviction petition filed by the appellant against the
      respondent before the Rent Control Tribunal, Rajasthan out of which
      this appeal arises.
             5. The appellant - a landlady of the suit premises filed the eviction
D     petition against the respondent-tenant of the suit premises under Section
      9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act (for short called “The Act”) before
      the Rent Tribunal Kota (R-84/2005) praying therein for respondent’s
      eviction from the tenanted suit premises.
             6. The appellant claimed respondent’s eviction from the suit
      premises on the ground of her personal bona fide need for raising
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      construction in the existing suit premises to be used for her children and
      for stay of appellant’s guest in the suit premises.
            7. The respondent denied the appellant’s need and, inter alia,
      contended that the appellant is in possession of an alternative
      accommodation in the city and hence her alleged need set up in the
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      eviction petition can be accomplished by using the alternative
      accommodation available in the city.
            8. By order dated 8.2.2011, the Rent Tribunal dismissed the
      appellant’s eviction petition holding that appellant’s need can be
      accomplished with an alternative space available with her in the city.
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            9. The appellant (landlady) felt aggrieved and filed an appeal
      (144/2014) before the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal by order
      dated 12.2.2015 allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Rent
      Tribunal, decreed the appellant’s eviction petition and passed the eviction
      decree against the respondent, in relation to the suit premises.
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          KALPANA VYAS v. RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI                                    575
               [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      10. The respondent (tenant) felt aggrieved and filed writ petition        A
before the High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur). By impugned order, the
learned Single Judge allowed the respondent’s writ petition and set aside
the order of the Appellate Tribunal and restored the order of the Rent
Tribunal which gives rise to filing of the special leave to appeal in this
Court by the landlady.
                                                                                B
      11. So the short question, which arises for consideration in this
appeal, is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the
respondent’s (tenant’s) writ petition thereby justified in setting aside the
appellate order of the Rent Appellate Tribunal and restoring that of the
Rent Tribunal.
                                                                                C
     12. Heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Purvish Jitendra Malkan, learned counsel for the respondent.
       13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal, modify the
impugned order and remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for           D
deciding the appeal (144/2014) afresh on merits.
        14. In our opinion, the need to remand the case to the Rent Appellant
Tribunal has occasioned because the High Court, while allowing the
respondent’s writ petition, came to a conclusion and accordingly held
that the Rent Appellate Tribunal allowed the appellant’s (landlady’s) appeal    E
with a casual approach and failed to record any categorical finding on
the plea of bona fide need. The operative part of the High Court order
reads as under:-
          “Taking into consideration the fact aforesaid, I do not
      find any reason for Rent Appellate Tribunal for setting aside             F
      the order of the Rent Tribunal. The perusal of the impugned
      order shows a casual approach of the Rent Appellate
      Tribunal in reversing the finding of the Rent Tribunal, that
      too, without going into the issue of personal bonafide
      necessity. The Rent Appellate Tribunal was expected to
      first decide the issue as to whether respondent is having                 G
      personal bonafide necessity or not. Accordingly, impugned
      order passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal is set aside.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)

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576            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A             15. Having held that, the High Court had two options: first either
      to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
      afresh on merits in accordance with law and second, to decide the matter
      itself on merits in accordance with law.
             16. Since the High Court heard the matter in its writ jurisdiction
B     under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was not possible to examine the
      issue on facts in detail like an Appellate Court. It is for this reason, in
      our view, the High Court ought to have resorted to first option and
      remanded the case back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the
      appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.
C            17. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in not taking
      recourse to any option and without deciding the issue arising in the case
      on its merit, simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal.
            18. This approach of the High Court caused prejudice to the
      appellant (landlady) because there was no factual finding recorded either
D     by the first appellate Court or the High Court on the question of bona
      fide need.
            19. It is for this reason that we uphold the finding of the High
      Court in relation to the approach and the manner in which the Rent
      Appellate Tribunal decided the appellant’s appeal but consider it just and
E     proper to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for its decision
      on merits afresh in accordance with law.
            20. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is
      allowed. Impugned order is modified to the extent that the case is
      remanded to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
F     (No. 144/2014)(Old No. 41/11) afresh on merits in accordance with
      law.
             21. Since the matter pertains to bona fide need and eviction, the
      Rent Appellate Tribunal will decide the appeal within six months as an
      outer limit strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by
      any observations made by this Court and the High Court.
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            22. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.


      Divya Pandey                                                   Appeal allowed.

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