KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITIversusASHOK KUMAR DINESH CHANDRA AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

A              KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI
                            v.
       ASHOK KUMAR DINESH CHANDRA AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

                                 AUGUST 29, 1996

B    (MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.]

          Constitution of India, 1950.

          Art. 226-W!it petition claiming that Mandi Samitis not providing
C services and so no market fee is chargeable-Mandi Samitis claimed that
    certain services were rendered and some more services are likely to be
    rendered in further--High Cowt remitted the matter back to the Mandi
    Samitis to adjudicate upon the claim of the w1it petitioners-On appeal held,
    the High Cowt should have gone into the question itself as to whether the
    claim of the Samitis in rendeling se1vices was authentic or not, or else should
D   have gone by the word of the Sa mitis that they were rendeling such ser-
    vices-Not to have remitted the matter t_o the Mandi Samitis thereby opening
    flood-Gates of never-ending disputes : counter-productive _to the good objects
    sought to be achieved by the concemed enactment-Market fee-Mandi
    Samitis.
E        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1678 of
    1982 Etc. Etc.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 21.5.81 of the Allahabad High
    Court in W.P. 2109 of 1977.
F        E.C. Agrawala, (T. Mahipal) for Pradeep Misra, Girish Chandra,
    H.K. Puri and M.K. Garg for the appearing parties.

          The following Order of t~e Court was delivered :

          By the impugned common judgment, the High Court has remitted
G the matter back to the Mandi Samitis concerned to adjudicate upon the
    claim of the writ petitioners/respondents herein, that no market fee is
    chargeable from them as no service is rendered. This direction was made
    despite the averment made by the Mandi Samitis in the counter affidavits
    that they were rendering some services like arrangement for electric light,
H   water, scavenging, other amenities in the marketyards, provision of tents,
                                       352
  KRISHI UTP ADAN MANDI SAMIT! v. ASH OK KR. DINESH CHANDRA 353

urinals, culverts and construction of link roads. Besides the existing services   A
being rendered, infrastructure of future services likely to be rendered had
been disclosed inasmuch as the process was said to be going on for
acquisition of land for construction of marketyards, market complexes
consisting of godowns, post-offices, banks, warehouses, shelters and rest-
houses etc. The High Court in taking that step has put the Mandi Samitis
                                                                                  B
into a war of wits between them and the traders; the Samitis contending
that they have provided some facilities and are likely to provide more in
future and the traders contending that no such facilities have been provided
and none were expected to be provided in the future. This controversy has
been enlivened on the supposition that on the principle of quid pro quo,
there should be near- balance of the fee demanded and services rendered.          c
That, in our view, is not the correct approach. The High Court should not
have left the matter at large with the Mandi Samitis who in the nature of
things, would have to be Judges in their own cause; something undesirable.

       This Court in M.C.D. and Others v. Mohd. Yasin and A11othe1; [1983]        D
3 sec 229 at 235 summing up the judge-made law on the point, observed
as follows :

        "......Though a fee must have relation to the services rendered, or
        the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere
        casual relation may be enough. Further neither the incidence of E
        the fee nor the service rendered nei:;d be uniform. That others
        besides those paying the fees are also benefitted does not detract
        from the character of the fee. In fact, the special benefit or
        advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as
        compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public p
        interest. Nor is the court to assume the role of a cost accountant.
        It is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the
        cost of the services rendered etc. against the amount of fees
        collected to as to evenly balance the two. A broad co-relationship
        is all that is a necessary quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the
        one and only true index of a fee; nor is it necessarily absent in a G
        tax."

      This view has been constantly followed in later decisions. The ele-
ment of quid pro quo in its strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a
fee. See in this connection City Corporation of Calicut v. 11iachambalath         H
    354                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Sadali11a11 and Others, [1985) 2 SCR 1008 wherefrom the following passage
    may by read with advantage :

            "It is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court
            that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing
            a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the
B           services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need
            not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not
            necessary to . establish that those who pay the fee must receive
            direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being
            paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the
c           authority levying the fee the element of service required for col-
            lecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to
            pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment
            of the fee."

          Applying the ratio of the above decisions to the facts emerging on
D   the present files, it becomes patent that the appellant-Samitis do render a
    number of services to persons transacting their business and deals in the
    market-yards as elsewhere, and it is not necessary that what they are
    charging, would be shown to have been spent penny by penny for the
    benefit of the fee payers and others concerned with them. The High Court
E   should have, if doubting, gone into the question itself, whether the claim
    of the Samitis in rendering services was authentic or not, or else to have
    gone by the word of the Samitis that they were rendering such services.
    There was no occasion for the High Court to have remitted the matter to
    the Mandi Samitis and thereby open flood-gates of never ending disputes;
    counter-productive to the good objects sought to be achieved by the
F   concerned enactment.

           For the foregoing reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the
    impugned orders of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition preferred
                                                                                      -
    by the respondents before the High Court, but 'without any order as to
G   costs.

    G.N.                                                        Appeals allowed.