Supreme Court of India
KRISHNA KUMAR OJHA & ORS.versusJITENDRA CHAUDHARY & ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 662
- Decided
- 1 July 2026
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- N KOTISWAR SINGH
Holding
The compromise decree was not in accordance with Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC and is therefore void, and the delay does not defeat the relief.
Summary
The appellants, heirs of the original plaintiffs in a partition suit, challenged a compromise decree entered on 22 February 1994 that purportedly settled the suit but was signed without the consent of Defendant No.5, Chaturbhuj Chaudhary. The lower courts had set aside the decree on grounds of fraud and lack of signature, a decision affirmed by the High Court, which the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court examined Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which requires a written compromise signed by all parties or their expressly authorised representatives, and held that no express authorisation or exigent circumstance existed for the counsel to sign on behalf of Defendant No.5. Consequently, the compromise was deemed non‑voluntary and contrary to law, rendering the decree void. The Court also considered the 25‑year delay, concluding that the delay could not be allowed to perpetuate an illegal decree. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the compromise decree set aside and the partition suit to be tried on its merits.
Issues considered
- Whether the compromise decree of 22 February 1994 complied with Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requiring the signatures of all parties or their expressly authorised representatives.
- Whether the 25‑year delay in challenging the decree bars the relief sought under Section 151 CPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 11, s. 151
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the compromise as accepted by the Civil Court on 22.02.1994 was in accordance with Or.XXIII r.3 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or not. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXIII r.3 – The plaintiff filed a partition suit, including, present respondent, seeking 1/4th share in the total property of common ancestor – During the pendency thereof, a compromise petition was filed by the plaintiffs and defendants ‘jointly’ which was accepted by Sub-Judge-01 Muzaffarpur vide order dated 22.02.1994 – Pursuant
Subjects
Or.XXIII r.3 CPCSection 151 CPCCompromise DecreeMissing SignatureAdvocate’s Express AuthorityProfessional ResponsibilityDelayVitiation by FraudLimitation
Judgment
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 504 : 2026 INSC 662
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors.
v.
Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 8739 of 2026)
01 July 2026
[Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the compromise as accepted by the Civil Court on
22.02.1994 was in accordance with Or.XXIII r.3 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 or not.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXIII r.3 – The plaintiff
filed a partition suit, including, against the predecessors
of the present respondent, seeking 1/4th share in the
total property of common ancestor – During the pendency
thereof, a compromise petition was filed by the plaintiffs and
defendants ‘jointly’ which was accepted by Sub-Judge-01
Muzaffarpur vide order dated 22.02.1994 – Pursuant thereto,
a final decree was prepared on 27.05.1997 in terms of the
above said compromise petition – After a quarter of a century,
defendant no.5 represented through LRs-the respondents
herein filed a Miscellaneous Case seeking setting aside of the
aforesaid compromise decree on the ground that the same
had been obtained by fraud and without the signatures of
defendant no.5 – The same was allowed by the Trial Court –
Appeal against the same, was dismissed by the High Court –
Correctness:
Held: In the present case, there is no express authorisation by
defendant no.5 allowing the counsel-M to sign the compromise
on his behalf, nor is there anything on record to demonstrate the
exigent circumstances which prompted the counsel to act without
seeking a clear approval from defendant no.5 – In absence of
the aforesaid, the ‘voluntary’ aspect mandated by Or.XXIII r.3
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is essential for a
compromise decree cannot be established on the record – As
such, the requirements of Rule 3 have not been complied with –
* Author
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 505
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
The resulting compromise is contrary to law – As far as delay is
concerned, in view of this Court, if the delay had been the ground to
dismiss the miscellaneous case, the effect would be to perpetuate
something which is not in accordance with law – The same cannot
be permitted – In this case, although the compromise was not
signed by him, defendant no.5’s rights in the property which is not
miniscule were directly affected by the compromise – Also, most
basic facts in the instant case are disputed – It is for the aforenoted
reasons that the delay of 25 years has to be given a go-by in the
facts of this case – It is not in all cases that such large delay can
be set aside – Whether or not a particular case warrants taking
such a view is to be determined after a detailed examination of
the record in each case – The compromise decree has been
correctly set aside – The issues of the partition suit require to be
adjudicated in a full trial. [Paras 5.6, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7]
Case Law Cited
Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh [2015] 4
SCR 616 : (2015) 7 SCC 373; Prasanta Kumar Sahoo v. Charulata
Sahu 2023 INSC 319 : [2023] 5 SCR – relied on.
Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [1988] 2 SCR 401 : (1988)
1 SCC 270; Som Dev v. Rati Ram [2006] 5 SCR 778 : (2006) 10
SCC 788); Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi [1992] 3 SCR 524 : (1993)
1 SCC 581; Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India [1991]
Supp. 1 SCR 187 : (1992) 1 SCC 31; Pushpa Devi Bhagat v.
Rajinder Singh [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 370 : (2006) 5 SCC 566;
Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd. [1970]
1 SCR 435 : (1969) 2 SCC 201; Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha
Mohan Sharma [2024] 12 SCR 453 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3720;
M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit, Pachama,
District Sehore and Others v. M/s. Modi Transport Service [2022]
4 SCR 647 : (2022) 14 SCC 345 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
Or.XXIII r.3 CPC; Section 151 CPC; Compromise Decree;
Missing Signature; Advocate’s Express Authority; Professional
Responsibility; Delay; Vitiation by Fraud; Limitation.
506 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8739 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.03.2025 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in CR No. 103 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
S.B.Upadhyay, Sr. Adv., Abhinav Kathuria, Ms. Nisha Thakur,
Ms. Anisha Upadhyay.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
R K Sanghi, Sr. Adv., Arun Maittri, Rabin Majumder, Ms. Radhika
Chandrasekhar, Ms. Mousumi Roy, Shivam Majhi.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. This appeal has been filed by the Appellants (the legal heirs of the
original plaintiffs and other co-sharers) who are aggrieved by the
dismissal of civil revision no.103 of 2024 by learned single judge
of the High Court of Judicature at Patna which was in turn directed
against order dated 7th February 2024 passed by Sub-Judge-01(East)
Muzaffarpur in Miscellaneous Case No.07 of 2022, whereby petition
for setting aside decree dated 22nd February 1994 in Suit 128 of
19891, on the basis of a compromise entered by Sub-Judge-01,
Muzaffarpur2, was allowed.
3. The plaintiff, Dinbandhu Ojha, filed a partition suit, including, against
the predecessors of the present respondent, seeking 1/4th share
in the total property of common ancestor by the name of Thakur
Ojha. Chaturbhuj Chaudhary (Defendant No. 5), the abovesaid
predecessor of the respondents appeared through counsel on
1 Partition suit
2 Civil Court
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 507
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
summons in the suit. During the pendency thereof, a compromise
petition was filed by the plaintiffs and defendants ‘jointly’ which
was accepted by Sub-Judge-01 Muzaffarpur vide order dated 22nd
February 1994. Pursuant thereto, a final decree was prepared on
27th May 1997 in terms of the above said compromise petition. All
appeared fine for approximately a quarter of a century thereafter,
but it was not so. The defendant no.5 represented through LRs -
the respondents herein filed a Miscellaneous Case No.07 of 2022
before the concerned Court on 7th April 2022, seeking setting aside
of the aforesaid compromise decree on the ground that the same
had been obtained by fraud and without the signatures of defendant
no.5. The same was allowed by the Trial Court, on 07.02.2024.
Appeal thereagainst has been dismissed by the High Court. Hence,
the case is before us.
4. The short question which arises for consideration is whether the
compromise as accepted by the Civil Court on 22nd February 1994
was in accordance with Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure,
19083 or not?
5. We are of the considered view that it was not. Our reasons for such
a conclusion shall be made clear in the following paragraphs.
5.1 Order XXIII is titled ‘Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits’ and
Rule 3 thereof provide for compromise of suit in the following
terms:
“3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to
the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been
adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement
or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or
where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to
the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit,
the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or
satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree
in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the
parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter
of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the
same as the subject-matter of the suit:
3 CPC
508 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and
denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction
has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question;
but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose
of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons
to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation.— An agreement or compromise which
is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act,
1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful
within the meaning of this rule.”
(emphasis supplied)
5.2 A perusal of various decisions of this Court reveals the following
aspects regarding compromise decree:
(a) Prior to the 1976 Amendment to the CPC, a compromise
could be either oral or written, and the Court could decide
the same on the basis of general evidence by the parties,
Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel4
(b) After the amendment, it has been clarified that a
compromise must be in writing and must be signed by
the parties, Som Dev v. Rati Ram5
(c) The objective of the amendment is to prevent false and
frivolous pleas of compromise having been entered into
between the parties; (Gurpreet Singh supra)
(d) A compromise decree being signed by all parties is a
mandate of the law; (Gurpreet Singh supra)
(e) It has to be voluntarily accepted by parties and once such
acceptance is recorded by the Court, it acquires the sanctity
of the judicial order, Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi6
(f) A counsel/duly authorised representative/GPA holders is
permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of those
he represents, granted there is express authorisation or
4 (1988) 1 SCC 270)
5 (2006) 10 SCC 788)
6 (1993) 1 SCC 581)
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 509
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
exigency of circumstance (Byram Pestonji Gariwala v.
Union Bank of India7; Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder
Singh8,
(g) In accepting a compromise decree, while it is true that the
court merely put a seal of approval, but its role cannot
be reduced to being only a recorder. It has to apply its
judicial mind to the terms to ensure that they are lawful;
(Banwari Lal supra)
(h) A consent decree which is the conclusion of a compromise,
does not operate as a resjudicata for it does not meet
Section 11 (CPC) requirements; (Baldevdas Shivlal v.
Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd.9)
(i) The only remedy available against a compromise decree
is a recall application. A fresh suit or an appeal is not
maintainable against this kind of decree; (Navratan Lal
Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma10
5.3 The compromise that has been furnished to this Court by the
respondents along with the written submissions records that
there is no objection on behalf of defendant no.5 Chaturbhuj
Chaudhary, and the said statement has come through his
counsel Ram Krishna Mehta, whose vakalatnama is dated 27th
August 1992. The question is whether Mr. Mehta learned counsel
had been permitted by his client to act in a way that sealed, the
fate regarding the entire property. In Byram Pestonji Gariwala
supra, subsequently referred in M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak
Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. Modi Transport Service11 it has
been categorically observed that a counsel should not act on
implied authority in the absence of exigent circumstance.
5.4 Similar observations have been made in Himalayan Coop.
Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh12 by a three judge
Bench as under:
7 (1992) 1 SCC 31
8 (2006) 5 SCC 566)
9 (1969) 2 SCC 201
10 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3720
11 (2022) 14 SCC 345
12 (2015) 7 SCC 373
510 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“31. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of an advocate
not to transgress the authority conferred on him by
the client. It is always better to seek appropriate
instructions from the client or his authorised agent
before making any concession which may, directly
or remotely, affect the rightful legal right of the client.
The advocate represents the client before the court
and conducts proceedings on behalf of the client.
He is the only link between the court and the client.
Therefore his responsibility is onerous. He is expected
to follow the instructions of his client rather than
substitute his judgment.
32. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel
are binding upon their principals as long as they are
unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a
purported admission, the court should be wary to
accept such admissions until and unless the counsel
or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make
such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound
by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer
was not authorised to make. A lawyer generally has no
implied or apparent authority to make an admission or
statement which would directly surrender or conclude
the substantial legal rights of the client unless such
an admission or statement is clearly a proper step
in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer
was employed. We hasten to add neither the client
nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s statements or
admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions.
Thus, according to generally accepted notions of
professional responsibility, lawyers should follow
the client’s instructions rather than substitute their
judgment for that of the client. We may add that in
some cases, lawyers can make decisions without
consulting the client. While in others, the decision is
reserved for the client. It is often said that the lawyer
can make decisions as to tactics without consulting the
client, while the client has a right to make decisions
that can affect his rights.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 511
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
5.5 Recently, the decision authored by J.B. Pardiwala J., in Prasanta
Kumar Sahoo v. Charulata Sahoo, noted that almost sixty
years ago the Madras High Court had observed that express
authorisation is the norm and has to be followed:
“105. Almost six decades back, the Madras High
Court speaking through Ramaswami, J. (as his
Lordship then was) in Govindammal v. Marimuthu
Maistry [Govindammal v. Marimuthu Maistry, 1957
SCC OnLine Mad 47 : AIR 1959 Mad 7] had sounded
the note of caution observing as under : (SCC OnLine
Mad para 5)
“5. … The decisions appear to be fairly
clear that even in cases where there is
no express authorisation to enter into a
compromise, under the inherent authority
impliedly given to the Vakil he has power
to enter into the compromise on behalf
of his client. But in the present state of
the clientele world and the position in
which the Bar now finds itself and in
the face of divided judicial authority and
absence of statutory backing prudence
dictates that unless express power is
given in the vakalatnama itself to enter
into compromise, in accordance with
the general practice obtaining a special
vakalatnama should be filed or the specific
consent of the party to enter into the
compromise should be obtained. If an
endorsement is made on the plaint, etc.
it would be better to get the signature or
the thumb impression of the party affixed
thereto, making it evident that the party is
aware of what is being done by the Vakil
on his or her behalf.”
5.6 In the present case, there is no express authorisation by
defendant no.5 allowing Mr. Mehta to sign the compromise on
his behalf, nor is there anything on record to demonstrate the
exigent circumstances which prompted the counsel to act without
512 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
seeking a clear approval from defendant no.5. In absence of
the aforesaid, the ‘voluntary’ aspect mandated by Order XXIII
Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is essential
for a compromise decree cannot be established on the record.
As such, the requirements of Rule 3 have not been complied
with. The resulting compromise is contrary to law.
6. On the aspect of delay, prima facie the gap between 1994 and 2022
is egregiously large and it requires to be examined in detail. To that
end, we must consider the application filed under Section 151 CPC
and the reasoning on this aspect given both by the Civil Court and
also the High Court.
6.1 The paragraph in the application is reproduced as under:
“10. That after inspection of record following facts
were revealed to the applicants first of all
…
(v) That the plaintiff has not sought for any relief
against Chaturbhuj Chaudhary with respect to R.S.
Khata- 77 and 78.
(vi) That Chaturbhuj Chaudhary was made formal
party (defendant) vide para 7 of the plaint.
(vii) That a fraudulent compromise petition with
respect to R.S. Khata- 77 and 78 was filed on
18-02-1994 but not signed by Chaturbhuj Chaudhary.
(viii) That a power and written statement without
supported with an affidavit and statement etc. alleged
to be signed by Chaturbhuj Chaudhary was filed on
27-08-1992 by the lawyer Shri Ram Kishor Mahto.
(ix) That one lawyer namely Ramkishor Mahto
allegedly wrote no objection on behalf of defendant
no.-5 on compromise petition.
(x) That the compromise petition was accepted by
the Learned Court on 22-02-1994 without calling for
the case as well as parties including defendant no.-5.
The compromise petition does not bear the signature
of Chaturbhuj Chaudhary.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 513
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
(xi) That the above said compromise decree dated
22-02-1994 is fraudulent and illegal one.
…
11. That it is submitted that no notice of Partition
Suit- 128/1989 was ever served to the father of the
applicants.
12. That Chaturbhuj Chaudhary never engaged any
lawyer much less namely Ramkishor Mahto to do
Pairvee of Partition Suit-128/1989.
13. That the signature appearing on written
statement dated 27-08-1992 as well as Wakalatnama
dated 27-08-1992 are not of Chaturbhuj Chaudhary
rather it is fake one got created by plaintiff and other
defendants of Partition Suit-128/1989 in collusion
with each other.
…
16. That Chaturbhuj Chaudharv never said any
where that R.S. Khata-77 and 78 have been wrongly
recorded in his name.
17. That since Chaturbhuj Chaudhary was not
acquainted with Partition Suit – 128/1989 then
question of taking part in Partition Suit-128/1989 by
any mode does not and cannot arise by him.
…
28. That cause of action arose to the Applicants on
03-04-2022 when the members of opposite parties
came to the spot and asked the applicants to vacate
the lands of R.S. Khata-77 and 78 on the basis of
fraudulent Compromise Decree on 04-04-2022 when
the applicants filed “Inspection Petition” on 06-04-
2022 when record of Partition Suit-128/1989 was
available to the applicants for inspection then the
applicants finally came to know about the fraudulent
Compromise Decree got passed by Learned Sub
Judge First, Muzaffarpur.”
514 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
6.2 The plaintiff took objection to the aforesaid pleadings and
instead averred as follows:
“12. That from the said G.T. it would clear that
Chatarbhuj Ojha was the own Mama of opp. Party no.
1 (Krishna Kumar Ojha), maternal uncle of Opp. Party
no.1 and Nana (grand father) of other opp. Parties. It
is necessary to mention here that Chatarbhuj Ojha has
much affection with his two sisters namely- Ramjhari
Devi and Asarfi Kuer, so he mostly lived in her sister’s
house situated in village Khabara, P.S. -Sadar,
District- Muzaffarpur and look after the cultivation
work of his sisters and also helped his Bhagina (Nati)
grandson and in the cultivation work. It is necessary
to mention here that Thakur Ojha died in the 1956,
so the ancestral Revisional Survey Khatian has been
prepared in the guidance of Chatarbhuj Chaudhary
who is the own mama of opp. Party no.1 and own
(nana) grand father of the opp. Parties.
13. That while living with her sister’s house chaterbhuj
Ojha has got recorded some ancestral land of these
opp. Parties in his name under Khata No. 77and 78.
It is a settled principle of law that Revisional Survey
Entry does not creates title as discussed in A.I.R.
1972 Patna page 27 (FB). It is necessary to mention
here that inspite of wrong survey entry the disputed
land bearing Khata no. 77 and 78 has been coming
in possession of these opp. Parties.
14. That when these opp. Party no.1 and other opp.
Party have raised their objection before his mama
about the wrong survey entry with respect to the land
of Khata no. 77 and 78 then Chatarbhuj Chaudhary
executed a registered Ladavi on 14.12.88 in favour
of Daya Sindhu Ojha, Din Bandhu Ojha, Sri Krishna
Kumar Ojha sons of Thakur Ojha, Smt. Raj Kumari
Devi wife of Ramchandra Ojha with with respect to
the land of Khata No. 77 and 78 to the knowledge
of applicant and the sold land has been mentioned
in Sch. B and C of P.S. No. 128/89.
…
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 515
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
16. That Chatarbhuj Chaudhary had filed his written
statement on 27.8.92 where Chatarbhuj Ojha admitted
that the lands of Khata no. 77 and 78 belonged to
the family of these opp. Parties and it is the ancestral
lands of these opp. Parties.
17. That thereafter Chaterbhuj Chaudhary had also
joined in the compromise petition and duly signed on
the compromise petition. It is necessary to mention
here that since filing of the partition suit no. 128
of 1989 till final Decree, Chatarbhuj Ojha had pay
a big role for passing of the final Decree because
Chaterbhuj Chaudhary was acquainted with the
court’s work.
…
34. That the contents of para no. 10 (vii) and vii of
the injunction petition are wrong and incorrect. It is
wrong to say that a fraudulent compromise petition
with respect to P.S. Khata no. 77 and 78 was filed on
18.02.1994 but not signed. Fact is that Chatarbhuj
Chaudhary in his written statement as well as in
compromise of P.S. No. 128/89 after going through
the contents has signed his signature in the written
statement as well as in the compromise petition.
35. That the contents of para no. 10(ix) of the
injunction petition are wrong and incorrect. It is
wrong to say that one lawyer namely Ram Kishore
Mahto allegedly wrote no objection on behalf of the
defendant need on compromise petition. Fact is
that Ram Kishore Mahto the lawyer of Chatarbhuj
Chaudhary after instruction from his client has dully
signed objection in the compromise petition.”
6.3 The Sub-Judge-01(East) Muzaffarpur in Miscellaneous case
no.07 of 2022 rejected the ground of limitation observing that the
case of the applicant is that he came to know of the allegedly
fraudulent compromise decree, just shortly before filing the said
application. Whether or not this was the case, is a matter of
evidence to be decided at trial. Further, it was observed that
the law of limitation applies against act of parties and not action
516 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the Court. It was also observed that assuming truth to the
matter of knowledge being subsequent, the power under Section
151CPC can be exercised by the Court for the ends of justice
especially where fraud is alleged to have been perpetuated and
the same cannot be defeated due to irregularity in procedure.
6.4 The aspect of delay was not gone into by the High Court and
instead the order overall was affirmed as there was no illegality
or jurisdictional error therein.
6.5 In our view, if the delay had been the ground to dismiss the
miscellaneous case, the effect would be to perpetuate something
which is not in accordance with law. The same cannot be
permitted. The law of limitation, while undoubtedly an important
facet of the legal system, cannot be used as a means to defeat
substantive rights. In this case, although the compromise was
not signed by him, defendant no.5’s rights in the property which
is not miniscule were directly affected by the compromise.
6.6 There is another aspect that requires to be noted. All of the
essential facts which form the basis of the compromise are itself
contested. One party says that they are not family members
while the other, in the objection via family chart demonstrates
them to be relatives; One submits that the defendant no.5 had
been made party only because his name had been inadvertently
recorded in the survey register, while the other says that they
have full right over the property and no part of the disputed
property had been given up by them; there is also a statement
regarding the complete lack of authorisation any which way,
to the counsel for defendant no.5; the appellants submit that
they/their father (defendant no.5) were not aware of the suit
proceedings whereas the other party submits that defendant
no.5 knew about all of the going-ons that led to the compromise
decree. It was nearly 22 years after defendant no.5 died, which
was in itself eight years after the decree of 1994, that the
respondents sought to dispossess the appellants thereby setting
into motion the present proceedings. Clearly, the most basic
facts are disputed. This, along with the fact that the compromise
decree is not in accordance with law gives us enough reason
to agree with the reasoning of the Court below. It is for the
aforenoted reasons that the delay of 25 years has to be given
a go-by in the facts of this case. It is not in all cases that such
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 517
Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
large delay can be set aside. Whether or not a particular case
warrants taking such a view is to be determined after a detailed
examination of the record in each case.
6.7 The compromise decree has been correctly set aside. In fact,
we are of the view that the issues of the partition suit require to
be adjudicated in a full trial. While we acknowledge the difficulty
that may arise in 1989 suit being taken to trial 37 years later, but
it is not possible to decide the rights of the parties without the
due process of collection and weighing of evidence, whatever
may be available.
7. In view of the aforenoted, appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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