Holding

The fresh private complaint was an impermissible improvement on the earlier complaint, constituting abuse of process, and all criminal proceedings arising from the incident were quashed under the Court’s inherent powers.

Summary

The appellants, Krishna Lal Chawla and others, challenged a private complaint filed in 2018 by their neighbour (Respondent No.2) under Section 200 CrPC, which alleged offences arising from a 2012 altercation. The complaint was filed six years after the incident, despite a charge‑sheet already being filed against the complainant and his wife for the same facts, and it contained material improvements over the earlier complaint. The Supreme Court held that the fresh complaint constituted an abuse of process, violating the accused’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21, and that the magistrate erred in issuing process without scrutinising the delay and suppression of material facts. Invoking its inherent powers under Article 142, the Court quashed the private complaint, the earlier NCR proceedings, and all other criminal cases arising from the 2012 incident. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a second private complaint filed by the same complainant against the same accused for the same incident, after a charge‑sheet has been filed, amounts to an abuse of process and can be quashed.
Whether the magistrate erred in issuing process despite the delay and material improvements, infringing the accused’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
Whether the Supreme Court may exercise its inherent powers under Article 142 to quash multiple criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process.
Whether Section 162 CrPC bars subsequent complaints that are merely improvements on an earlier complaint.
Whether the High Court’s order upholding the private complaint should be set aside.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 155(2), s. 162, s. 200, s. 202, s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 142, s. Article 21
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 165
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 323, s. 325, s. 504, s. 506, s. 506(II)
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960s. 10, s. 11

Subjects

abuse of processmultiple complaintsprivate complaintSection 200 CrPCArticle 21speedy trialArticle 142quashfrivolous litigationcriminal procedure

Judgment

550 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 2 S.C.R. 550 [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA & ORS.
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 2021)
MARCH 08, 2021
B
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
R. SUBHASH REDDY JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s. 482 – Complaint u/s. 200 Cr.P.C – Alleging offences u/ss.
323, 504, 506, 429 IPC and ss.10 and 11 of Prevention of Cruelty
C
to Animals Act, 1960 – Lodged by respondent No. 2, against the
appellants, in the year 2018, in respect of an incident that occurred
in the year 2012 – Magistrate issued process against the appellants
– Confirmed by Sessions Judge – Appellants’ petition for quashing
the orders of Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed – Appeal
D to Supreme Court – Held: In the complaint in question, the
complainant (respondent No. 2) had suppressed the material fact
that a charge-sheet was already filed u/ss. 323, 325, 504 and 506
IPC against him and his wife in relation to the same incident –
Institution of fresh complaint was a concerted effort to mislead the
Court with the oblique motive to harass the appellants – conduct of
E
respondent No. 2 in filing delayed complaint case, suppressing
material facts and utilizing the fresh proceedings to materially
improve on his earlier version, amounts to gross abuse of the process
of the Court – Permitting multiple complaints by the same party in
respect of same incident would run counter to the principles
F envisaged u/Art.21 of the Constitution i.e. right to life and liberty
and right to speedy trial – In exercise of inherent powers u/Art. 142
of the Constitution, in order to prevent abuse of process of the Court,
the criminal proceedings against the appellants are quashed – All
other litigations between the parties arising out of the incident in
question, are also quashed – Constitution of India – Arts.21 and
G
142.
Administration of Criminal Justice:
Role of lower judiciary – The trial Judge has a duty under
the Constitution and Cr.P.C. to identify and dispose of frivolous
litigation at an early stage.
H
550
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 551

Judiciary: A
Justice delivery system – Should not be used as a tool to fulfill
personal vendetta – Frivolous litigations by misusing PIL jurisdiction
or by abusing criminal procedure should not become order of the
day.
Constitution of India: B
Art. 21 – Right to speedy trial – Would include not only the
actual trial, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police
investigation as well.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
C
HELD: 1.1 Any further complaint by the same complainant
against the same accused, after the case has already been
registered, will be deemed to be an improvement from the
original complaint. [Para 5][561-D-E]
Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC
292 – relied on D
1.2 Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that the right
to life and liberty shall not be taken away except by due process
of law. Permitting multiple complaints by the same party in respect
of the same incident, whether it involves a cognizable or private
complaint offence, will lead to the accused being entangled in E
numerous criminal proceedings. As such, he would be forced to
keep surrendering his liberty and precious time before the police
and the Courts, as and when required in each case. Such an absurd
and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the CrPC
will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and therefore F
cannot be adopted. [Para 6][562-D-E]
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 : [2001]
3 SCR 942; Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI & Anr.
(2013) 6 SCC 348 : [2013] 6 SCR 623 – relied on
1.3 Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to preserve the G
delicate balance between the power to investigate offences under
the CrPC, and the fundamental right of the individual to be free
from frivolous and repetitive criminal prosecutions forced upon
him by the might of the State. [Para 7][563-B-C]

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552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A 1.4 If Respondent No. 2 was aggrieved by lack of speedy
investigation in the earlier case filed by him, the appropriate
remedy would have been to apply to the Magistrate under Section
155(2), CrPC for directions to the police in this regard. Filing a
private complaint without any prelude, after a gap of six years
from the date of giving information to the police, smacks of mala
B
fide on the part of Respondent No. 2. [Para 7][563-C-D]
1.5 It is also crucial to note that, in the fresh complaint
case, Respondent No. 2 seems to have deliberately suppressed
the material fact that a charge-sheet was already filed in relation
to the same incident, against him and his wife, pursuant to NCR
C No.160/2012 (Crime No. 283/2017) filed by Appellant No.1’s son.
No reference to this charge-sheet is found in the private
complaint, or in the statements under Section 200, CrPC filed by
Respondent No. 2 and his wife. In fact, both the private complaint
and the statement filed on behalf of his wife, merely state that the
D police officials have informed them that investigation is ongoing
pursuant to their NCR No.158/2012. The wife’s statement
additionally even states that no action has been taken so far by
the police. It is the litigant’s bounden duty to make a full and true
disclosure of facts. It is a matter of trite law, and yet bears
repetition, that suppression of material facts before a court
E amounts to abuse of the process of the court, and shall be dealt
with a heavy hand. [Para 8][563-D-G]
Ram Dhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2012) 5
SCC 536:[2012] 3 SCR 1059; K.D. Sharma v. Steel
Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481:[2008] 10
F SCR 454 – relied on
1.6 It is also pertinent to note that as on 5.08.2012,
Appellant No.1 was a 76-year-old man; Appellant No.2 was
suffering from epileptic seizures; and Appellant No. 4 was of
unsound mind. There is no equity in allowing them to be dragged
G into criminal proceedings pertaining to a petty offence, instituted
6 years after the alleged incident. The sword of Damocles cannot
be allowed to forever hang on their heads, falling unpredictably
at the whims of a litigant seeking to harass and persecute at will.

H
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 553

The right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which encapsulates A
the right to a speedy trial would include not only the actual trial
before the Court, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and
police investigation as well. [Para 9][563-G-H; 564-A-B]
Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC
355 : [2009] 1 SCR 517; Abdul Rehman Antulay & B
Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr. (1992) 1 SCC 225 : [1991] 3
Suppl. SCR 325 – relied on.
1.7 Thus, respondent No. 2’s institution of the fresh
complaint case in 2018 under Section 200 CrPC was a concerted
effort to mislead the Magistrate with the oblique motive of C
harassing the appellants with a frivolous and vexatious case
against them. That the same was a counter-blast to the charge
sheet dated 17.09.2017 filed against respondent No. 2 and his
wife in the case registered by the appellant. The history of ill-will
and malice between the parties leads further credence to
respondent No.2’s motivations for tying up the appellants in D
frivolous and harrowing criminal litigation, long years after the
alleged incident. Respondent No.2’s conduct in filing a delayed
complaint case, suppressing material facts, and utilising fresh
proceedings to materially improve on his earlier version, in
totality, amounts to gross abuse of the process of court. E
[Para 10][564-C-E]
2.1. The justice dispensation machinery in India is plagued
with backlogs, with 70% of the pendency before the subordinate
courts being on the criminal side. A significant factor in this backlog
is the vast mass of frivolous litigation instituted year after year F
by litigants with an intent to use the courts of justice for their
own mischievous ends. Curtailing such vexatious litigation is,
thus, a crucial step towards a more effective justice system – a
step that cannot be taken without the active involvement of the
lower judiciary, especially in criminal proceedings. [Para 11]
[564-F-H] G
Roshni Sinha, ‘Examining pendency of cases in the
Judiciary’, PRS India (August 8, 2019) – referred to
2.2 Sections 154 and 200 Cr.P.C make it abundantly clear
that the Magistrate carries the stream of criminal proceeding
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554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A forward after it is set in motion by the informant/complainant.
Consequently, and automatically, the Magistrate also carries the
responsibility for ensuring this stream does not carry forward in
cases where it should not. The aforesaid powers bestowed on
the Magistrate have grave repercussions on individual citizens’
life and liberty. Thus, these powers also confer great responsibility
B
on the shoulders of the Magistrate – and must be exercised with
great caution, and after suitable judicial application of mind. [Paras
12 and 13][565-B-D]
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998)
5 SCC 749 : [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 12 – relied on.
C
2.3 The power conferred on the Magistrate under Section
202, CrPC to postpone the issue of process pursuant to a private
complaint also provides an important avenue for filtering out of
frivolous complaints that must be fully exercised. [Para 14]
[566-A-B]
D
Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose & Anr.,
AIR 1963 SC 1430 : [1964] SCR 639 – relied on.
2.4 It is said that every trial is a voyage of discovery in
which the truth is the quest. In India, typically, the Judge is not
E actively involved in ‘fact-finding’ owing to the adversarial nature
of justice system in India. However, Section 165 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 by providing the Judge with the power to order
production of material and put forth questions of any form at any
time, marks the influence of inquisitorial processes in legal
system. This wide-ranging power further demonstrates the
F central role played by the Magistrate in the quest for justice and
truth in criminal proceedings, and must be judiciously employed
to stem the flow of frivolous litigation. [Para 15][566-F-H]
2.5 Thus, the Trial Judge has a duty under the Constitution
and the CrPC, to identify and dispose of frivolous litigation at an
G early stage by exercising, substantially and to the fullest extent,
the powers conferred on him. [Para 16][567-A-B]
All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (1992)
1 SCC 119 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 206 – relied on.

H
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 555

2.6 Frivolous litigation should not become the order of the A
day in India. From misusing the Public Interest Litigation
jurisdiction of the Indian courts to abusing the criminal procedure
for harassing their adversaries, the justice delivery system should
not be used as a tool to fulfil personal vendetta. [Para 17][567-D-
E]
B
2.7 A falsely accused person not only suffers monetary
damages but is exposed to disrepute and stigma from society.
While running from pillar to post to find a lawyer to represent his
case and arranging finances to defend himself before the court of
law, he loses a part of himself. The trial courts and the Magistrates
have an important role in curbing this injustice. They are the C
first lines of defence for both the integrity of the criminal justice
system, and the harassed and distraught litigant. The trial courts
have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of
the accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous
litigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by D
discharging the accused in fit cases. This would not only save
judicial time that comes at the cost of public money, but would
also protect the right to liberty that every person is entitled to
under Article 21 of the Constitution. In this context, the trial
Judges have as much, if not more, responsibility in safeguarding
the fundamental rights of the citizens of India as the highest court E
of this land. [Paras 17 and 18][567-H; 568-A-D]
Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC
470 : [2014] 12 SCR 573 – relied on.
2.8 The present controversy poses a typical example of F
frivolous litigants abusing court process to achieve their
mischievous ends. In the case, the Magistrate was aware of the
significant delay in the filing of private complaint by Respondent
No. 2, and of the material improvements from the earlier NCR
No. 158/2012 which were made in the private complaint. It was
incumbent on the Magistrate to examine any possibility of abuse G
of process of the court, make further enquiries, and dismiss the
frivolous complaint at the outset after judicial application of mind.
However, the Magistrate issued process against the appellants
by order dated 4.04.2019, and this controversy has now reached
this Court for disposal. [Paras 19 and 20][568-D-F] H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A 3.1 This Court has inherent powers to prevent the abuse
of its own processes, that this Court shall not suffer a litigant
utilising the institution of justice for unjust means. Thus, it would
be only proper for this Court to deny any relief to a litigant who
attempts to pollute the stream of justice by coming to it with his
unclean hands. Similarly, a litigant pursuing frivolous and
B
vexatious proceedings cannot claim unlimited right upon court
time and public money to achieve his ends. [Para 21][568-G-H]
3.2 This Court’s inherent powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution to do ‘complete justice’ empowers to give preference
to equity and a justice-oriented approach over the strict rigours
C of procedural law. It is the constitutional duty of this Court to
quash criminal proceedings that were instituted by misleading
the court and abusing its processes of law, only with a view to
harass the hapless litigants. In order to do complete justice, and
to bring peace between the parties, who are fighting various
D litigations since 2006, in exercise of powers under Article 142,
all the litigations between the parties arising out of this incident
are quashed. [Paras 22 and 23][569-A-D]
State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (Whitewasher) (2014) 8
SCC 883 : [2014] 8 SCR 228; Monica Kumar (Dr.) &
E Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]
9 SCR 943 – relied on.
Sirajul & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2015) 9 SCC 201: [2015] 6 SCR 1021; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SCC 604 : [1990]
F 3 Suppl. SCR 259 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2004) 13 SCC 292 relied on para 4
[2001] 3 SCR 942 relied on para 4
G [2013] 6 SCR 623 relied on para 6
[2012] 3 SCR 1059 relied on para 8
[2008] 10 SCR 454 relied on para 8
[2009] 1 SCR 517 relied on para 9
H
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 557

[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 325 relied on para 9 A
[1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 12 relied on para 13
[1964] SCR 639 relied on para 14
[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 206 relied on para 16
[2014] 12 SCR 573 relied on para 17 B
[2014] 8 SCR 228 relied on para 22
[2008] 9 SCR 943 relied on para 22
[2015] 6 SCR 1021 relied on para 22
C
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 referred to para 22
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
283 of 2021
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.09.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Misc. Petition No. 2561 of 2020. D
Praveen Agrawal, Gautam Kumar Laha, Advs. for the Appellants.
Jitendra M. Sharma, Sr. Adv. Pawanshree Agrawal, Sarvesh Singh
Baghel, Ms. Shivranjani Ralawata, Ajit Sharma, Advs. for the
Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of final order and judgement of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’) dated F
28.09.2020, dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition No. 2561 of 2020 filed
by Appellants herein praying for quashing of the following orders:
(i) Order dated 4.04.2019 of Learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Meerut (hereinafter, ‘Magistrate’) in Complaint Case No.
2943/2018, issuing summons against the Appellants; G

(ii) Order dated 13.01.2020 of the Ld. Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Meerut (hereinafter, ‘Sessions Judge’) in Criminal
Revision No.202/2019, dismissing the Appellants’ revision application
against the aforesaid summoning order.
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A 3. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
3.1 The Appellants and Respondent No. 2 are neighbours. The
genesis of the proceedings before us lies in a physical altercation that
took place between the Appellants, and the Respondent No. 2 and his
wife on 5.08.2012. While the occurrence of such an altercation is an
B admitted fact between the parties, the details thereof form the crux of
this prolonged litigation.
3.2 On 5.08.2012, the Respondent No. 2 filed a Non-Cognizable
Report (NCR) No. 158/2012 against the Appellants alleging offences
under Sections 323, 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter,
C ‘IPC’). It was his case that the Appellants came to his house, beat him
and his wife with iron rods, and threatened to kill them.
3.3 The son of Appellant No. 1 also filed information on 5.08.2012,
which was registered as Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) No. 160/2012
with the Daurala Police Station, alleging offences under Sections 323,
D 504 and 506, IPC against the Respondent No. 2 and his wife. This Report
counter-alleged that the Respondent No. 2 and his wife came to the
Appellants’ house, beat them up with wooden sticks and iron rods, and
threatened to kill their family.
3.4 It seems that even prior to the alleged occurrences, there
E were disputes between the parties in 2006. A mutual settlement took
place on 6.02.2006 by which Respondent No. 2 agreed to pay a penalty
of Rs. 3,000/- to the Appellant No. 1. Subsequently, in another dispute,
on 21.12.2013 the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate imposed a penalty
of Rs. 1,500/- on Appellant No. 4. Be that as it may, the fact remains
that the parties have been at loggerheads from 2006 onwards. It appears
F that they have been fighting litigations on one pretext or the other since
2006. Though they were agriculturists and neighbours, peace did not
prevail between them, which resulted in a number of cases being lodged
by them against each other.
3.5 The Appellants filed an application under Section 155(2) of
G the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’) before the
Magistrate on 27.04.2017, almost 5 years after the alleged incident,
seeking permission for the police to investigate NCR No. 160/2012. The
learned Magistrate directed that NCR No. 160/2012 filed by the
Appellants be registered as FIR in Crime No. 283/2017. Investigation
was conducted, and on 17.09.2017 a charge sheet was filed against the
H
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 559
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]

Respondent No. 2 and his wife under Sections 323, 325, 504 and 506 of A
the IPC. Subsequently, the Magistrate framed charges against
Respondent No. 2 and his wife. There is nothing on record to show that
even a single witness has been examined till date, though charges were
framed by the Magistrate long back. Thus, there has been considerable
delay in these proceedings, during both the investigation and trial stages.
B
3.6 Being unsatisfied with the allegations made and charge sheet
filed against him, the Respondent No. 2 instituted a fresh private complaint
against the Appellants under Section 200 of CrPC in Complaint Case
No. 2943 of 2018 in respect of the very incident that took place on
5.08.2012. This private complaint was filed only on 11.05.2018, that is
C
about six years from the date of alleged incident. In the private complaint,
not only new allegations were added but all allegations are wilder and
different from the averments made in NCR No. 158/12, though the incident
is the same as of 5.08.2012 and between the same parties. It may not be
necessary for us to narrate the contents of the private complaint inasmuch
as we find and have satisfied ourselves that the allegations made in the D
private complaint are absolute material improvements over the allegations
in NCR No. 158/12. Among other things, not only three additional eye
witnesses are inducted in the private complaint, but allegations of fraud,
injury to bull, forging of affidavit, etc. which were not found in the 2012
complaint are also found in the private complaint. The private complaint
E
for the first time mentions commission of offences under Section 429,
IPC and Sections 10 and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act,
1960. It is an admitted fact that Appellant No. 4 had inflicted injury on
Respondent No. 2’s bull on 26.09.2011, for which Appellant No. 4 had
voluntarily confessed and accepted penalty of Rs. 1,500 from the
Magistrate as mentioned supra. Be that as it may, we see no reason F
why Respondent No. 2 chose to rehash this incident in the private
complaint given that Appellant No. 4 has already been convicted for the
offence, and it is of no relevance to the present case.
Curiously, the Magistrate was pleased to issue process against
the Appellants based on this vexatious private complaint, which came to G
be confirmed by the Learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order. The
Learned Sessions Judge has thus not only misunderstood Section 200,
CrPC and its scope but also made a new case in favour of Respondent
No.2 by reading Section 506 Part II, IPC which is punishable by 7 years
in the place of Section 506, IPC, probably only to bring the private
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560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A complaint within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 468
CrPC. It is nobody’s case that the offence under Section 506(II) has
taken place, which means that the Courts took extra interest to improve
the case of the respondent/complainant.
This appeal is filed challenging both the orders of the Magistrate
B as well as the Sessions Judge in respect of issuance of process, as
mentioned supra.
4. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 sought to justify the
impugned orders by relying on the following excerpt from this Court’s
decision in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & ors., (2004) 13 SCC 292,
C which clarified the import of its previous holding in T.T. Antony v. State
of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181:
“23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T.
Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be
accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same
D incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code
then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious
consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example
given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the
real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint
E and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the
aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a
complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently
he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused
to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.”

F Therefore, Upkar Singh clarified that this Court’s previous
decision in T.T. Anthony will not bar the filing of a second complaint
with respect to the same incident, if such second complaint is filed as a
counter-complaint by the other party. We are in agreement with the
aforementioned construction of T.T. Anthony. However, we fail to see
how this position of law comes to Respondent No.2’s rescue. The question
G posed in the present case for consideration before us is wholly different,
and concerns the validity of the private complaint filed by Respondent
No. 2, after an earlier information filed as NCR No. 158/2012 – both of
which were filed by the same party, against the same accused, and in
relation to the same incident that too after the charge sheet was filed in
H case arising out of NCR No. 160/12 in Crime No. 283/2017 after taking
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 561
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]

due permission of Magistrate. The aforementioned portion of Upkar A
Singh relied on by Respondent No. 2, thus, does not benefit his case.
5. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh takes us
to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the question of material
improvements made in a subsequent private complaint by the same
complainant against the same accused with regard to the same incident, B
it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt from Upkar Singh,
which further clarifies the holding in T.T. Antony:
“17…In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any
further complaint by the same complainant or others against the
same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is C
prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard
would have already started and further complaint against the same
accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in
the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162
of the Code.” (emphasis supplied)
D
It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh that
bears directly and strongly upon the present case. This Court in Upkar
Singh has clearly stated that any further complaint by the same
complainant against the same accused, after the case has already been
registered, will be deemed to be an improvement from the original
E
complaint. Though Upkar Singh was rendered in the context of a case
involving cognizable offences, the same principle would also apply where
a person gives information of a non-cognizable offence and subsequently
lodges a private complaint with respect to the same offence against the
same accused person. Even in a non-cognizable case, the police officer
after the order of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence F
in the same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrest
without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject the accused
to a double whammy of investigation by the police and inquiry before the
Magistrate.
We are cognizant of the fact that in the present case, no G
investigation had begun pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 filed by the
Respondent No. 2 for a certain period. However, the overall concern
expressed by this Court in Upkar Singh, about the misuse of successive
complaints by the same party, where the second complaint is clearly
propped up to materially improve on the earlier one, resonates with us.
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562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A We regret to say that the same thing which this Court had categorically
prohibited in Upkar Singh has happened in the present case.
6. The grave implications of allowing such misuse may be
understood better in light of the following exposition by this Court in
Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI & anr., (2013) 6 SCC 348:
B “37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issue
interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offence
or different offences committed in the course of the same
transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of
the Constitution. In T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC
C (Cri) 1048] , this Court has categorically held that registration of
second FIR (which is not a cross-case) is violative of Article 21
of the Constitution…” (emphasis supplied)
Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that the right to life and
liberty shall not be taken away except by due process of law. Permitting
D multiple complaints by the same party in respect of the same incident,
whether it involves a cognizable or private complaint offence, will lead
to the accused being entangled in numerous criminal proceedings. As
such, he would be forced to keep surrendering his liberty and precious
time before the police and the Courts, as and when required in each
case. As this Court has held in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra),
E such an absurd and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the
CrPC will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and therefore
cannot be adopted by us.
7. The implications of such successive FIRs on an individual’s
rights under Article 21 of the Constitution has been elaborated further in
F T.T. Antony (supra):
“27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive
power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be
struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-
G section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make
further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and
documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the
Magistrate. In Narang case [Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi
Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however,
H observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 563
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]

investigation with the permission of the court. However, the A
sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a
citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of
the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,
consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after
filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC…”
B
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to preserve this delicate
balance between the power to investigate offences under the CrPC,
and the fundamental right of the individual to be free from frivolous and
repetitive criminal prosecutions forced upon him by the might of the C
State. If the Respondent No. 2 was aggrieved by lack of speedy
investigation in the earlier case filed by him, the appropriate remedy
would have been to apply to the Magistrate under Section 155(2), CrPC
for directions to the police in this regard. Filing a private complaint without
any prelude, after a gap of six years from the date of giving information D
to the police, smacks of mala fide on the part of Respondent No. 2.
8. It is also crucial to note that, in the fresh complaint case instituted
by him, Respondent No. 2 seems to have deliberately suppressed the
material fact that a charge sheet was already filed in relation to the
same incident, against him and his wife, pursuant to NCR No.160/2012 E
(Crime No. 283/2017) filed by Appellant No.1’s son. No reference to
this charge sheet is found in the private complaint, or in the statements
under Section 200, CrPC filed by Respondent No. 2 and his wife. In
fact, both the private complaint and the statement filed on behalf of his
wife, merely state that the police officials have informed them that
investigation is ongoing pursuant to their NCR No.158/2012. The wife’s F
statement additionally even states that no action has been taken so far
by the police. It is the litigant’s bounden duty to make a full and true
disclosure of facts. It is a matter of trite law, and yet bears repetition,
that suppression of material facts before a court amounts to abuse of
the process of the court, and shall be dealt with a heavy hand (Ram G
Dhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 5 SCC 536; K.D.
Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481).
9. It is also pertinent to note that as on 5.08.2012, Appellant No.1
was a 76-year-old man; Appellant No.2 was suffering from epileptic
seizures; and Appellant No. 4 was of unsound mind. There is no equity H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A in allowing them to be dragged into criminal proceedings pertaining to a
petty offence, instituted 6 years after the alleged incident. The sword of
Damocles cannot be allowed to forever hang on their heads, falling
unpredictably at the whims of a litigant seeking to harass and persecute
at will. We gain strength in our conclusions from Article 21 of the
Constitution, which encapsulates the right to a speedy trial. This right
B
has been interpreted to include not only the actual trial before the Court,
but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police investigation as well
(Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355; Abdul
Rehman Antulay & ors. v. R.S. Nayak & anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225).
10. The sum of the above circumstances and precedents leads us
C to what we see as an inevitable conclusion. That Respondent No. 2’s
institution of the fresh complaint case in 2018 under Section 200 CrPC
was a concerted effort to mislead the Magistrate with the oblique motive
of harassing the Appellants with a frivolous and vexatious case against
them. That the same was a counter-blast to the charge sheet dated
D 17.09.2017 filed against Respondent No. 2 and his wife in the case
registered by the Appellant. The history of ill-will and malice between
the parties leads further credence to Respondent No.2’s motivations for
tying up the Appellants in frivolous and harrowing criminal litigation, long
years after the alleged incident. Respondent No.2’s conduct in filing a
delayed complaint case, suppressing material facts, and utilising fresh
E proceedings to materially improve on his earlier version, in totality, amounts
to gross abuse of the process of court.
Role of the Lower Judiciary in Preventing Abuse of Court
Process:

F 11. We find it imperative to observe that this is a case that should
not have been allowed to reach as far as this Court. The justice
dispensation machinery in India is plagued with backlogs, with 70% of
the pendency before the subordinate courts being on the criminal side.1
A significant factor in this backlog is the vast mass of frivolous litigation
instituted year after year by litigants with an intent to use the courts of
G justice for their own mischievous ends. Curtailing such vexatious litigation
is, thus, a crucial step towards a more effective justice system – a step
that cannot be taken without the active involvement of the lower judiciary,
especially in criminal proceedings.
1
Roshni Sinha‘Examining pendency of cases in the Judiciary’, PRS India (August 8,
H 2019).
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 565
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]

12. Immediately after the criminal justice system is set in motion, A
its course is almost entirely dependent on the judicial application of mind
by the Magistrate. When a police complaint is filed on the commission
of a cognizable offence under Section 154 CrPC, the Magistrate decides
if the charge against the accused person is made out before the trial
begins. Separate procedure is prescribed if the complaint under Section
B
200 CrPC is filed. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear
that the Magistrate carries the stream of criminal proceeding forward
after it is set in motion by the informant/complainant. Consequently, and
automatically, the Magistrate also carries the responsibility for ensuring
this stream does not carry forward in cases where it should not.
13. The aforesaid powers bestowed on the Magistrate have grave C
repercussions on individual citizens’ life and liberty. Thus, these powers
also confer great responsibility on the shoulders of the Magistrate – and
must be exercised with great caution, and after suitable judicial application
of mind. Observations in a similar vein were made by this Court in Pepsi
Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749: D
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious
matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two
witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the
criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate E
summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind
to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to
examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the
evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would
that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge
home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent F
spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before
summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully
scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself
put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers
to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and G
then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or
any of the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court, thus, clearly emphasised that the power to issue a
summoning order is a matter of grave importance, and that the Magistrate
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A must only allow criminal law to take its course after satisfying himself
that there is a real case to be made.
14. Similarly, the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section
202, CrPC to postpone the issue of process pursuant to a private complaint
also provides an important avenue for filtering out of frivolous complaints
B that must be fully exercised. A four-Judge Bench of this Court has
eloquently expounded on this in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash
Chandra Bose & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 1430:
“7. …No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Section
202 CrPC is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the
C allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person
named therein as accused from being called upon to face an
obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind
this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support
the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of
the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely
D with a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person,
but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against
whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is
frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on
the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant...”
E (emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that, on receipt of a private complaint, the
Magistrate must first, scrutinise it to examine if the allegations made in
the private complaint, inter alia, smack of an instance of frivolous
litigation; and second, examine and elicit the material that supports the
F case of the complainant.
15. It is said that every trial is a voyage of discovery in which the
truth is the quest. In India, typically, the Judge is not actively involved in
‘fact-finding’ owing to the adversarial nature of our justice system.
However, Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by providing the
G Judge with the power to order production of material and put forth
questions of any form at any time, marks the influence of inquisitorial
processes in our legal system. This wide-ranging power further
demonstrates the central role played by the Magistrate in the quest for
justice and truth in criminal proceedings, and must be judiciously employed
to stem the flow of frivolous litigation.
H
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 567
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]

16. All of this leads to one inescapable conclusion. That the Trial A
Judge has a duty under the Constitution and the CrPC, to identify and
dispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by exercising, substantially
and to the fullest extent, the powers conferred on him. This Court has
earlier emphasised on the high degree of responsibility shouldered by
the trial Judges in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India,
B
(1992) 1 SCC 119. Ranganath Misra CJ (as he was then) writing for
himself and two others stated:
“42. The trial Judge is the kingpin in the hierarchical system of
administration of justice. He directly comes in contact with the
litigant during the proceedings in Court. On him lies the responsibility
of building up of the case appropriately and on his understanding C
of the matter the cause of justice is first answered. The personality,
knowledge, judicial restraint, capacity to maintain dignity are the
additional aspects which go into making the Court’s functioning
successful.”
17. Frivolous litigation should not become the order of the day in D
India. From misusing the Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction of the
Indian courts to abusing the criminal procedure for harassing their
adversaries, the justice delivery system should not be used as a tool to
fulfil personal vendetta. The Indian judiciary has taken cognizance of
this issue. In 2014, this Court elucidated as follows, the plight of a litigant E
caught in the cobweb of frivolous proceedings in Subrata Roy Sahara
v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470:
“191…One needs to keep in mind, that in the process of litigation,
there is an innocent sufferer on the other side, of every
irresponsible and senseless claim. He suffers long drawn anxious F
periods of nervousness and restlessness, whilst the litigation is
pending, without any fault on his part. He pays for the litigation,
from out of his savings (or out of his borrowings), worrying that
the other side may trick him into defeat, for no fault of his. He
spends invaluable time briefing counsel and preparing them for
his claim. Time which he should have spent at work, or with his G
family, is lost, for no fault of his...”
While the Court’s ruling pertained to civil proceedings, these
observations ring true for the criminal justice machinery as well. We
note, with regret, that 7 years hence, and there has still been no reduction
in such plight. A falsely accused person not only suffers monetary H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R.

A damages but is exposed to disrepute and stigma from society. While
running from pillar to post to find a lawyer to represent his case and
arranging finances to defend himself before the court of law, he loses a
part of himself.
18. As aforesaid, the trial courts and the Magistrates have an
B important role in curbing this injustice. They are the first lines of defence
for both the integrity of the criminal justice system, and the harassed and
distraught litigant. We are of the considered opinion that the trial courts
have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of the
accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations
in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the
C accused in fit cases. This would not only save judicial time that comes at
the cost of public money, but would also protect the right to liberty that
every person is entitled to under Article 21 of the Constitution. In this
context, the trial Judges have as much, if not more, responsibility in
safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens of India as the highest
D court of this land.
19. As recorded by us above, the present controversy poses a
typical example of frivolous litigants abusing court process to achieve
their mischievous ends. In the case before us, the Magistrate was aware
of the significant delay in the filing of private complaint by Respondent
E No. 2, and of the material improvements from the earlier NCR No. 158/
2012 which were made in the private complaint. It was incumbent on
the Magistrate to examine any possibility of abuse of process of the
court, make further enquiries, and dismiss the frivolous complaint at the
outset after judicial application of mind.

F 20. However, this was not done – the Magistrate issued process
against the Appellants by order dated 4.04.2019, and this controversy
has now reached this Court for disposal.
21. It is a settled canon of law that this Court has inherent powers
to prevent the abuse of its own processes, that this Court shall not suffer
G a litigant utilising the institution of justice for unjust means. Thus, it would
be only proper for this Court to deny any relief to a litigant who attempts
to pollute the stream of justice by coming to it with his unclean hands.
Similarly, a litigant pursuing frivolous and vexatious proceedings cannot
claim unlimited right upon court time and public money to achieve his
ends.
H
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P. 569
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]

22. This Court’s inherent powers under Article 142 of the A
Constitution to do ‘complete justice’ empowers us to give preference to
equity and a justice-oriented approach over the strict rigours of procedural
law (State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (Whitewasher), (2014) 8 SCC
883). This Court has used this inherent power to quash criminal
proceedings where the proceedings are instituted with an oblique motive,
B
or on manufactured evidence (Monica Kumar (Dr.) & anr. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781). Other decisions have held that
inherent powers of High Courts provided in Section 482, CrPC may be
utilised to quash criminal proceedings instituted after great delay, or with
vengeful or malafide motives. (Sirajul & ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2015) 9 SCC 201; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SCC C
604). Thus, it is the constitutional duty of this Court to quash criminal
proceedings that were instituted by misleading the court and abusing its
processes of law, only with a view to harass the hapless litigants.
23. In this Court’s quest for complete justice, and to bring peace
between the parties, who are fighting various litigations since 2006, we D
exercise our powers under Article 142 to quash all the litigations between
the parties arising out of this incident.
Our Conclusions:
24. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 28.09.2020
in Miscellaneous Petition No. 2561 of 2020 is set aside. E

25. The proceedings in Complaint Case No.2943/2018, including
the order of summons against the Appellants dated 4.04.2019 be quashed.
26. Further, proceedings pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 dated
5.08.2012 filed by Respondent No. 2 also be quashed, in order to foreclose F
further frivolous litigation.
27. Any other criminal cases between the parties initiated by them
in relation to the incident dated 5.08.2012, including the criminal
proceedings arising from NCR No.160/2012 (Crime No. 283/2017)
instituted by the Appellants, are quashed in exercise of our powers under
G
Article 142 of the Constitution, in the interests of giving quietus to these
criminal proceedings arising out of a petty incident 9 years ago.
28. The Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed. H