KUNHIMUHAMMED@KUNHEETHUversusTHE STATE OF KERALA

                 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 392 : 2024 INSC 937

                    Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu
                                 v.
                         The State of Kerala
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 5097 of 2024)
                              06 December 2024
            [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether appellant had the intention to commit murder; whether
       the appellant’s act can be brought under section 304, IPC in light
       of the offence being committed in exercise of private defense and
       thereby exceeding the power given under the law, that is under
       exception 2 to section 300, IPC; whether appellant’s sentence
       should be reduced on the grounds of parity with his co-accused.

                                   Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 324 and 326/34 – The sympathizers
       of two political groups fought against each other – Appellant
       along with other accused committed murder of victim-S and
       injured CW-1 – Trial Court held appellant guilty u/ss.302, 324
       and 326/34 of IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment
       and the same was upheld by the High Court – Correctness:
       Held: The severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased has been
       central to the Courts’ conclusion that the act qualifies as murder
       under Section 300 of the IPC – As per the post-mortem report, the
       deceased sustained both external and internal ante-mortem injuries
       that were identified as being inflicted by a sharp-edged knife –
       The prosecution established beyond doubt that these injuries
       were inflicted by the appellant-accused no. 1 using a knife, which
       was recovered during the investigation based on the appellant’s
       disclosure statement – Further, the doctor PW-6 has stated that
       these injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
       of nature – Cross-examination of these witnesses did not reveal
       any inconsistencies that could undermine the credibility of the
       evidence – Consequently, the courts have rightly concluded that
       the fatal injuries inflicted by the appellant were the direct cause of
       the deceased’s death – As far as intention of appellant to commit

* Author
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                             393

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


     murder is concerned, the injuries were concentrated on the vital
     parts of the deceased’s body, such as the chest and ribs, which
     house critical organs like the heart and lungs – The deliberate
     targeting of these areas indicates a clear intent to cause harm
     that could lead to death – There is also the testimony of the
     injured witnesses that accused used considerable force while
     stabbing – The other co-accused were reportedly armed with sticks,
     the appellant-accused no. 1 was in possession of a sharp knife,
     which was used to inflict severe injuries – The decision to carry
     and use such a weapon during the scuffle reflects a readiness
     to escalate violence beyond a mere physical altercation – The
     third clause of Section 300, IPC defines murder as the act of
     causing death by causing such bodily injury as is likely to result
     in death in the ordinary course of nature – In the instant case,
     the appellant’s actions satisfy these criteria – The appellant was
     armed with a knife, which he used to inflict multiple injuries on
     vital organs – The fatal nature of these injuries, as confirmed by
     medical evidence, and the circumstances of the attack clearly
     point to an intent to cause death or at least an intention to inflict
     injuries with the knowledge that they were likely to result in death –
     Even if it is presumed that the appellant-accused no. 1 did not
     have an intention to cause such bodily injury, the act of causing
     injuries with knife to vital parts is reflective of the knowledge that
     causing such injuries is likely to cause death in the ordinary course.
     [Paras 25.1, 25.7, 25.8, 25.16]

     Penal Code, 1860 – s.304 – Whether the appellant’s act can
     be brought under section 304, IPC in light of the offence
     being committed in exercise of private defense and thereby
     exceeding the power given under the law, that is under
     exception 2 to section 300, IPC:
     Held: The courts below have made a categorical finding that the
     appellant-accused no.1 and his co-accused were the aggressors
     in the altercation – The attack was initiated by the accused group,
     who were armed with sticks and a knife, with the intent to intimidate
     or harm the victim and his companions – This fact is substantiated
     by the testimony of PW-1, an injured eyewitness, who described
     the sequence of events leading up to the stabbing – Even if it were
     assumed that the appellant-accused no. 1 acted in self-defense,
     the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the force used was
     excessive and disproportionate – The act of stabbing the deceased
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       multiple times in vital organs such as the chest and heart goes far
       beyond what is permissible under the right of private defense – In
       the post-mortem report and corroborated by the testimony of PW-6
       (the police surgeon), the injuries inflicted on the deceased were
       severe and intentional, including a fatal wound to the heart – In
       light of the above findings, the plea of exceeding the right of private
       defense under Exception 2 to Section 300, IPC, is not applicable
       to the appellant’s case. [Paras 26.5, 26.6, 26.7]

       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 324 and 326/34 – Appellant- accused
       no.1 was convicted u/ss.302, 324 and 326/34 of IPC and
       sentenced to life imprisonment – Whereas, accused no.2 was
       found guilty of offences punishable u/s.326 and u/ss.324/34
       of IPC and he was sentenced to six years imprisonment
       u/s.326 and two years rigorous imprisonment u/s.324 of IPC –
       The third accused was also awarded the same sentence as
       accused no.2 – The sentences were to run concurrently –
       All the three accused filed separate appeals before the High
       Court, which were dismissed – The second and third accused
       preferred a separate SLP, wherein this Court extended
       benefit of doubt to accused no.3 whereas accused no.2’s
       conviction was upheld, however, his sentence u/s.326 for
       six years was reduced to three years – Whether appellant’s
       sentence should be reduced on the grounds of parity with
       his co-accused:
       Held: The doctrine of parity ensures fairness in sentencing when
       co-accused persons are similarly situated and share the same level
       of culpability – However, parity is not an automatic entitlement;
       the role, intent, and actions of each accused must be individually
       assessed to determine their degree of involvement in the crime – In
       the instant case, the courts have carefully evaluated the evidence
       against each accused and tailored their sentences accordingly –
       The appellant’s argument for parity fails to recognize the qualitative
       differences in their roles and the gravity of their actions – The
       appellant’s actions were not only more severe but also demonstrated
       a clear intent to cause death – The fatal injuries inflicted on the
       deceased, as detailed in the post-mortem report, leave no room
       for doubt about the appellant-accused no. 1’s culpability – The
       courts below have correctly observed that the appellant’s role in
       the crime is incomparable to that of his co-accused – The principle
       of parity does not apply in the present case, as the appellant’s
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                                 395

          Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


     actions were materially different from those of his co-accused.
     [Paras 27.2, 27.6, 27.7]

     Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 324 and 326/34 – Appellant
     convicted u/ss.302, 324 and 326/34 of IPC and sentenced to
     life imprisonment – Plea of old age and deteriorating health:
     Held: A murder committed with the intent to target vital organs,
     particularly in a group setting, reflects a level of intent and cruelty
     that demands an appropriate punitive response – To reduce the
     sentence in such a case would risk undermining the seriousness
     of the crime and the sanctity of life itself, principles that the judicial
     system is duty-bound to uphold – While the Court acknowledges the
     appellant’s advanced age and medical condition, these factors cannot
     outweigh the need for justice and the imperative to uphold the rule of
     law – When the minimum sentence itself is life imprisonment, then
     grounds like parity, leniency, old age, health concerns, etc. shall not
     be of any aid to the accused while seeking reduction of sentence –
     Therefore, the appellant herein has been granted the minimum
     sentence for committing the offence of murder. [Paras 28.4, 28.5, 29]

                                Case Law Cited
     Manubhai Atabhai v. State of Gujarat [2007] 7 SCR 1115 : (2007)
     10 SCC 358; Arun Nivalaji More v. State of Maharashtra [2006]
     Supp. 4 SCR 301 : (2006) 12 SCC 613; Nishan Singh v. State of
     Punjab [2008] 4 SCR 500 : (2008) 17 SCC 505; Vinod Kumar v.
     Amritpal [2021] 11 SCR 954 : (2021) 19 SCC 181; Balkar Singh
     v. State of Uttarakhand [2009] 5 SCR 242 : (2009) 15 SCC 366;
     Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab [2010] 1 SCR 642 : (2010) 2
     SCC 333; V. Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu [2005] 2 SCR 536 :
     (2005) 10 SCC 358; Sone Lal v. State of U.P. [1981] 3 SCR 352 :
     (1981) 2 SCC 531 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure,
     1973.

                               List of Keywords
     Third clause of Section 300, IPC; Injuries were sufficient to cause
     death in the ordinary course of nature; Exception 2 to section 300,
     IPC; Private defence; Doctrine of parity; Reduction of sentence;
     Old age of accused; Deteriorating health of accused.
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                             Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       5097 of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 18.09.2018 of the High Court
       of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLA No. 1477 of 2012

                          Appearances for Parties
       Nikhil Goel, Sr. Adv., Haris Beeran, Azhar Assees, Anand
       B. Menon, Ms. Maneesha Sunilkumar, Radha Shyam Jena,
       Advs. for the Appellant.
       P.V. Dinesh, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy,
       Alim Anvar, Ms. Anna Oommen, Ms. Urvashi Chauhan, Advs. for
       the Respondent.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

       Vikram Nath, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     This appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and order
       dated 18.09.2018 whereby the appeal of the appellant-accused
       no.1, against his conviction under sections 302, 324 and 326/34
       of Indian Penal Code, 18601 has been dismissed. The prosecution
       story in brief is:
       2.1. On 10.04.2006, the sympathizers of United Democratic Front
            (UDF) and Left Democratic Front (LDF) fought against each
            other in connection with the dispute regarding the drawing of
            their election symbol at a place near a library in Kunnappalli,
            Pathaikkara Village. A criminal case with non-bailable offences
            was registered against the sympathisers of UDF in connection
            with the above incident.
       2.2. On 11.04.2006, The appellant along with the other accused
            who are sympathisers of Indian Union Muslim League on


1    IPC
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       397

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


          account of above enmity and with the intention to commit
          murder of deceased Subrahmannian and CW-1 Vasudevan
          Ramachandra, waited at Mukkilaplavu Junction for their
          arrival and at about 08:45 PM when the deceased along with
          Vasudevan Ramachandra reached at the above-mentioned
          place, the first accused attempted to beat the deceased with a
          tamarind stick, on his head. The deceased saved himself from
          the said attack and snatched the stick from the first accused
          and started assaulting the first accused on his forehead and
          back with the same stick. At this stage, the first accused took
          out a knife from his hip region and stabbed the deceased on
          the left side of chest, back of the head and the left shoulder. On
          seeing the above incident, CW-1 made an attempt to obstruct
          the first accused from assaulting the deceased, however, the
          first accused stabbed him on the left side of the buttock of
          CW-1 with the same knife. When CW-1 fell on the ground, the
          second accused caused a fracture on the right foot bone of
          CW-1 by beating him with another tamarind stick. Thereafter,
          the third accused assaulted CW-1 by beating on his right chest
          with a wooden stick.
     2.3. After the said incident, the injured and the deceased were
          taken to the Maulana Hospital where Additional Sub-Inspector
          CW-32 reached and recorded the statement of CW-1 on the
          basis of which the First Information Report was registered
          as Crime No.260 of 2006 against the three accused under
          sections 302/324 read with section 34 IPC. The accused were
          thereafter arrested. The Investigating Officer prepared the
          inquest report, spot map, and recovered the knife under the
          seizure memo on the basis of the disclosure statement made
          by the first accused.
     2.4. After completing the investigation, the charge sheet was
          submitted under sections 302/307 read with section 34 IPC.
          The Magistrate took cognizance and committed the case for
          trial to the Sessions Court. The Trial Court framed the charges
          under the aforesaid sections and read them over to the accused
          who denied the same and claimed trial.
3.   The Prosecution examined 19 witnesses and filed 28 Exhibits and 18
     material objects. The statements of the accused under section 313
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       of Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 were recorded wherein again
       they claimed that they were innocent and had nothing to do with
       the said incident. They claimed to have been falsely implicated on
       account of political rivalry at the instance of the leaders of Communist
       Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)).
4.     The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence led by the parties
       held that the appellantwas found guilty of offences punishable
       under sections 302, 324 and 326/34 IPC and accordingly
       sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1 Lakh under
       section 302, IPC, six years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of
       Rs.25,000/- under section 326, IPC, and two years imprisonment
       under section 324, IPC. Accused no.2 was found guilty of offences
       punishable under section 326 and under sections 324/34 IPC and
       he was sentenced to six years imprisonment under section 326, IPC
       with a fine of Rs.25,000/- and two years rigorous imprisonment under
       section 324 IPC. The third accused was also awarded the same
       sentence as accused no.2. The sentences were to run concurrently.
5.     Three appeals were preferred before the High Court by the three
       accused separately. The High Court by the impugned order dismissed
       all the three appeals. The second accused and the third accused had
       preferred a separate SLP registered as SLP(Crl.) No.2822 of 2019.
       In the said SLP, leave was granted, and it was partly allowed vide
       judgment and order dated 29.07.2019. This Court extended benefit
       of doubt to accused no.3 whereas accused no.2’s conviction was
       upheld, however, his sentence under section 326 for six years was
       reduced to three years.
6.     We have heard Shri Nikhil Goel, learned senior counsel appearing for
       the appellant and Shri P.V. Dinesh, learned senior counsel appearing
       for the State of Kerala and perused the material on record. The
       submissions of Shri Goel are limited to the extent that this was not
       a case of premeditated pre planned murder. There was no mens rea
       for committing culpable homicide amounting to murder. The intention
       was only of assaulting with the stick but later on during the fight as
       the deceased overpowered the appellant and started assaulting him
       with the same stick after snatching it from the appellant, the appellant
       pulled out the knife from his back and stabbed the deceased and


2    CrPC
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        399

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


     also the injured to save him. He has drawn attention to the evidence
     on record as also to the judgment of the Trial Court wherein specific
     finding was recorded to that extent by the Trial Court but despite
     the same, the Trial Court proceeded to record conviction under
     section 302 IPC and not section 304 IPC.
7.   He also submitted that the appellant is aged 67 years and is suffering
     from multiple ailments and that having undergone almost twelve and
     half years of actual sentence, this Court may consider reducing the
     sentence by converting the conviction to under section 304 IPC Part II.
8.   On the other hand, Mr. P.V. Dinesh, learned senior counsel appearing
     for the respondent-State submitted that the Trial Court and the
     High Court have both dealt with this aspect of the matter and
     have concurrently found that this was a case of culpable homicide
     amounting to murder. The fact that the appellant was carrying a knife
     and the number of assaults made by him on the deceased as also
     the injury would clearly show that the intention was to commit murder.
9.   Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, we find it imperative
     to look into the evidence, witness testimonies, and injury reports to
     better understand and analyse the incident to see whether the culpable
     homicide in the present case amounts to murder or not. A meticulous
     analysis of the evidence on record is necessary to check whether
     the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased or if he can be
     given the benefit of reduction of sentence on the grounds pleaded
     in the appeal. To understand the evidence and their probative value
     in establishing the offence, it is necessary to look at the categorical
     findings of both the courts below.

     FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
10. The Trial Court found appellant guilty of offences under Sections 302,
    326, and 324, IPC. The Trial Court’s findings were primarily based on
    the direct testimony of PW1, an eyewitness who was also injured in
    the incident, and corroborative evidence from medical and forensic
    reports.
11. The evidence of PW1 was crucial to the prosecution’s case. The Trial
    Court carefully analyzed his testimony and found it credible, reliable,
    and consistent with the injuries sustained by the deceased and PW1,
    as recorded in the medical reports. Although the defense argued
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       that PW1 was an interested witness and highlighted omissions and
       contradictions in his testimony, the Trial Court concluded that these
       discrepancies were minor and did not affect the core narrative. The
       Trial Court also noted that PW1’s statements were corroborated by
       PW2, who arrived at the scene shortly after the incident and observed
       the accused fleeing. PW2’s account was deemed trustworthy and
       supported the prosecution’s version.
12. The recovery of the murder weapon (a knife, marked as MO1) at
    the instance of appellant was a significant factor in the Trial Court’s
    findings. The knife was recovered under Section 27 of the Indian
    Evidence Act, 1872 based on information provided by appellant
    during his custodial interrogation. Forensic examination confirmed that
    the knife bore human blood matching the deceased’s blood group.
    This finding provided compelling corroboration of PW1’s testimony
    regarding the role of Accused No. 1 in the fatal assault. Additional
    physical evidence, such as blood-stained sticks recovered from the
    crime scene, further substantiated the prosecution’s case.
13. Medical evidence also played a vital role. The postmortem report
    of the deceased, prepared by PW-6 (a police surgeon), confirmed
    that the cause of death was multiple stab injuries inflicted with a
    sharp-edged weapon like MO1. PW6 identified specific fatal injuries
    to the heart and lungs, which were consistent with the prosecution’s
    narrative of the assault. Similarly, the wound certificate of PW1
    corroborated his account of the injuries he sustained during the
    attack. The Trial Court observed that the injuries detailed in the
    medical reports aligned with the testimonies of PW1 and PW2,
    reinforcing the prosecution’s case.
14. The defense attempted to argue that the incident occurred in the
    exercise of private defense, claiming that the accused were attacked
    by CPI(M) workers, including the deceased and PW1. However,
    the Trial Court rejected this claim, finding it unsubstantiated and
    improbable. The injuries on appellant, documented in the wound
    certificate, were deemed minor and inconsistent with the defense’s
    narrative of a large-scale attack. The Court concluded that the
    accused were the aggressors and were not entitled to claim the
    right of private defense.
15. Ultimately, the Trial Court held that the prosecution had proved beyond
    reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally caused the death of
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        401

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


     Subrahmannian and grievously injured PW1. The recovery of the
     murder weapon, corroborative forensic and medical evidence, and the
     reliable testimony of PW1 and PW2 were central to this conclusion.
     Accordingly, appellant was convicted under Sections 302, 326, and
     324 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder charge,
     along with additional terms for the other offenses.

     FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT
16. The High Court of Kerala meticulously analyzed the roles and
    culpability of each accused based on the evidence presented
    during the trial. The findings highlight the distinct involvement of
    each accused in the crime, with a particular focus on the actions of
    appellant. This comprehensive assessment ensures that the degree
    of liability is proportionate to their individual actions and intentions
    as discerned from the evidence on record.
17. The High Court affirmed the findings of the Trial Court that Accused
    No. 1 played a pivotal role in the murder. The evidence of PW-1,
    an injured eyewitness, was central to establishing the sequence of
    events. PW-1 testified that appellant first beat the deceased with a
    wooden stick, causing injuries to his left shoulder. When the deceased
    tried to flee, appellant – accused no. 1 drew the knife and inflicted a
    stab wound to his back. As PW-1 intervened to protect the deceased,
    appellant–turned on him, stabbing him in the buttock. This act of
    aggression was corroborated by medical evidence, which indicated
    that PW-1 sustained injuries consistent with the use of the weapon
    recovered during the investigation. Despite PW-1’s injuries, appellant
    resumed his attack on the deceased, stabbing him multiple times in
    the chest and other vital areas.
18. The High Court emphasized the significance of the post-mortem
    report, which revealed eight incised wounds on the deceased,
    including fatal injuries to the chest, heart, and lungs. PW-6, the police
    surgeon, testified that these injuries were consistent with the knife
    recovered and that the fatal wounds were sufficient in the ordinary
    course of nature to cause death. The chemical analysis linking
    the knife to appellant was further corroborated by the presence of
    human blood matching the deceased’s blood group on the weapon.
    The recovery of the knife, facilitated by a disclosure statement from
    appellant, lent further credence to the prosecution’s case.
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19. The High Court also addressed the appellant’s argument that the
    testimony of PW-1 was unreliable due to alleged embellishments
    regarding the number of stab injuries. The Court rejected this
    contention, noting that minor omissions in the First Information
    Statement (FIS) could not undermine the credibility of PW-1’s account,
    especially given the traumatic circumstances under which the FIS
    was recorded. The court reasoned that PW-1, having sustained a
    stab injury himself, may not have been able to provide exhaustive
    details at the time but consistently identified appellant – accused no. 1
    as the primary assailant. The testimony of PW-2, an independent
    eyewitness, corroborated PW-1’s account, further strengthening the
    prosecution’s case against appellant.
20. The High Court concluded that the actions of appellant demonstrated
    clear intent to cause death. The deliberate targeting of vital organs
    with a sharp weapon indicated premeditation or, at the very least,
    the formation of intent during the incident. The court observed that
    while the altercation may have initially involved the use of sticks,
    appellant’s decision to escalate the violence by drawing and using a
    knife was an intentional and unilateral act. This conduct set him apart
    from the other accused, whose actions were limited to assaulting
    the victims with sticks.
21. In contrast, accused nos. 2 and 3 were found guilty of lesser offenses
    under Section 326 IPC for causing grievous hurt to PW-1. The
    evidence established that they used sticks to beat PW-1, resulting
    in non-fatal injuries, including a fracture to his leg. The High Court
    concurred with the Trial Court’s finding that there was insufficient
    evidence to prove that Accused Nos. 2 and 3 shared a common
    intention with appellant to commit murder. The court noted that
    there was no evidence to suggest that they were aware of the knife
    concealed by appellant or his intent to use it. This lack of knowledge
    precluded the application of Section 34, IPC to hold them vicariously
    liable for the murder.
22. The High Court underscored the principle that liability must be
    determined based on the specific actions and intentions of each
    accused. While accused nos. 2 and 3 were complicit in the assault,
    their participation did not extend to the homicidal attack perpetrated
    by accused no. 1. The court further noted that the initial assault with
    sticks did not indicate a pre-arranged plan to kill the deceased. Had
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        403

          Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


     there been such an intention, the attack would have begun with the
     use of the knife rather than sticks.
23. The High court also dismissed the appellant’s plea for leniency
    based on parity with the co-accused. It emphasized that the role of
    appellant was materially different and far more culpable than that of
    accused Nos. 2 and 3. The fatal injuries inflicted by appellant on the
    deceased were deliberate, targeted, and intended to cause death,
    whereas the actions of the co-accused were confined to non-fatal
    assaults on PW-1. The principle of parity, therefore, did not apply
    in this case.
24. The High Court upheld the conviction of appellant under Section 302
    IPC for the murder of Subrahmannian. The court noted that the evidence
    against him was overwhelming, including eyewitness testimonies,
    medical reports, and forensic findings. The sentences imposed on
    Accused Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 326 IPC were also affirmed, as
    they appropriately reflected their limited roles in the incident.

     FINDINGS ON THE GROUNDS FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
25. SCUFFLE AND LACK OF INTENT: The appellant’s counsel has
    argued that the incident arose out of a scuffle between two rival
    factions, during which the act of stabbing and killing the deceased
    was not premeditated but rather occurred spontaneously in the heat
    of the moment. According to the appellant, there was no deliberate
    intent to commit murder, and the unfortunate event resulted from
    a confrontation that escalated during the altercation. However, this
    submission has been closely examined and dismissed by both
    the Trial Court and the High Court, based on substantial evidence
    presented during the proceedings.

     A.   Fatal Injuries:
     25.1 The severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased has been
          central to the Courts’ conclusion that the act qualifies as murder
          under Section 300 of the IPC. As per the post-mortem report,
          the deceased sustained both external and internal ante-mortem
          injuries that were identified as being inflicted by a sharp-edged
          knife. These injuries, detailed in the Trial Court’s order, include
          multiple incised penetration wounds to vital regions such as
          the chest, rib cage, lungs, and heart.
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       25.2 The evidence of PW-6, the police surgeon who conducted the
            post-mortem examination, was instrumental in establishing the
            fatal nature of the injuries. He testified that the death resulted
            from multiple injuries, including several incised wounds
            caused by the knife recovered during the investigation. The
            injuries sustained by the deceased, as per the report, were
            as follows:

             External Antemortem Injuries:
             1.    (a) Incised wound 4x2x0.5cm involving back of right side
                   of head, horizontal, upper inner end at 2 cm below occiput
                   and 2 cm outer to midline back, with tapering ends.
             2.    Incised penetrating wound 12x3x1-2cm involving top and
                   back of left shoulder, extending vertically downwards and
                   backwards, upper inner end at 17 cm outer to mid line
                   front and on top of shoulder.
             3.    (a) Incised penetrating wound (stab wounds) 3x2x3.5cm
                   involving front of left chest, oblique, upper end near to
                   midline front than lower, upper inner end at 12 cm outer
                   to midline front and II cm below middle of collar bone,
                   directed downwards. backwards and right wards, with
                   tapering ends, and contusion of margins.
             4.    (a) Incised penetrating wound (stab wound) 2x1.5x3.5cm
                   including · front of right chest, oblique, upper end away
                   from midline front than lower end, upper inner end at 10
                   cm outer to midline front and 17 cm below middle of collar
                   bone, directed downwards, backwards and leftwards, with
                   tapering ends and contusion of margins.
             5.    Incised wound 2x0.8x0.5cm involving dorsum of left hand
                   at the root of middle finger.

             Internal Antemortem Injuries:
             1. (b) Contusions of scalp 17x10 em involving front half and
                    5x3cm involving right side of back. Inter one is. under
                    neath and around the injury No. 1-(a).
              2. (b) (i) contusion 23x9cm involving left front chest wall
                         upper inner end at collar bone and in midline front.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                             405

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


                     (ii) Incised penetrating wound 8x0.5x I cm involving
                          left front chest wall (rib cage and inter costal
                          muscles), oblique, which penetrates into chest
                          cavity, with fracture separation of 3rd and 4th ribs
                          and contusion of edges the upper inner end at I 0
                          cm outer to midline front and 9 cm below middle
                          of collar bone.
                     (iii) Incised penetrating wound 7x2x1.5 em involving
                           left atrium and upper part of left ventricle of heart,
                           which penetrates through entire thickness of antero
                           lateral wall into cavity, tearing mitral valve leaflets,
                           with contusion at the edges of the wound.
                     (iv) Laceration of left lung 4xlx0.5cm involving outer
                          aspect of upper lobe and 2x2x0.5cm including
                          outer aspect · of lower lobe and contusion 6x3 cm
                          involving outer aspect of lower lobe just below the
                          previous injury
                          Injury No. 3 (b) is underneath and corresponds with
                          and continuation of injury no. (3) (a), and total depth
                          of both injuries taken together is 6 cm.
            4. (b) (i) Contusion 10x7 cm involving right front chest wall
                       upper inner end at 13 cm belowcollar bone and in
                       midline front.
                     (ii) Incised penetrating wound 4x2x2cm involving
                          right front chest wall (rib cage and intercostale
                          muscles), oblique, penetrates into the chest cavity,
                          with fracture separation of 5th rib, the upper inner
                          end at 9 cm outer to midline front and 20 cm below
                          middle of collar bone, with contusion of edges.
                     (iii) Laceration of right lung 2x1x0.5 cm involving outer
                           aspect of middle lobe.
                          Injury No. (4) (b) is underneath, corresponds with
                          and continuation of injury No. (4) (a) and the total
                          depth of both injuries taken together is 5 cm.
     25.3 Among the injuries, some were specifically identified as fatal,
          including:
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              i.      Penetrating wounds to the chest and rib cage. These
                      injuries caused significant trauma to the internal organs,
                      including the lungs and heart.
              ii.     Laceration of the heart. The most critical injury involved
                      a penetrating wound measuring 7x2x1.5 cm in the left
                      atrium and the upper part of the left ventricle, which
                      extended through the entire thickness of the anterolateral
                      wall of the heart. This injury also tore the mitral valve
                      leaflets and caused contusions at the edges of the
                      wound. The medical expert opined that this particular
                      injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
                      of nature. Additionally, other injuries inflicted on the
                      deceased were of such severity that they compounded
                      the fatal outcome.
       25.4 This Court held in Virsa Singh vs. State of Pepsu,3 that
            to see whether the injury intended and thus caused by the
            accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
            cause death or not, it must be examined in each case on
            the basis of the facts and circumstances. In that case, the
            injury was caused with a knife blow to the stomach and it
            was inflicted with such force that the knife penetrated the
            abdomen of the deceased and caused injuries to the bowel.
            The expert opinion of the doctor therein stated on record that
            such an injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
            to cause death. Further, in the absence of any evidence or
            circumstances to prove that the injury was accidental or
            unintentional, it was presumed that the accused had intended
            to cause such injury, thus making it fall under clause 3 of
            Section, 300 IPC.
       25.5 It has been held by this Court in several cases such as
            Manubhai Atabhai vs. State of Gujarat,4 and Arun Nivalaji
            More vs. State of Maharashtra, 5 that when the ocular
            evidence of eye witnesses are reliable and well corroborated
            by medical, and other evidence also inspires the confidence


3   [1958] SCR 1495
4   [2007] 7 SCR 1115 : (2007) 10 SCC 358
5   [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 301 : (2006) 12 SCC 613
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                         407

           Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


              that the accused had the intention to cause such fatal injuries,
              then such evidence is enough to prove the charge of murder
              beyond reasonable doubt. This intention is to be gathered
              from a number of circumstances and evidence like the place
              of injury the nature of the weapon, the force applied while
              inflicting the injury, and other such considerations. Whether
              the accused had any intention to kill the deceased has to be
              judged upon taking into consideration the facts of each case.
     25.6 This position has been elaborated by this Court in the case
          of Nishan Singh vs. State of Punjab,6 where the accused
          person had snatched the weapon carried by someone else
          and brutally inflicted injuries on the deceased. The Court stated
          that in such a case it cannot be said that he did not have the
          intention to cause death.
     25.7 The prosecution established beyond doubt that these injuries
          were inflicted by the appellant–accused no. 1 using a knife,
          which was recovered during the investigation based on the
          appellant’s disclosure statement. PW-18, the Investigating
          Officer, corroborated this recovery, and the seizure report
          was further attested by PW-16, an independent witness.
          Further, the doctor PW-6 has stated that these injuries are
          sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
          Cross-examination of these witnesses did not reveal any
          inconsistencies that could undermine the credibility of the
          evidence. Consequently, the courts have rightly concluded
          that the fatal injuries inflicted by the appellant were the direct
          cause of the deceased’s death.

     B.     Intention to Commit Murder
     25.8 The appellant’s primary defence has been the absence of
          intent to commit murder. However, intent can be inferred from
          the circumstances surrounding the act, including the nature
          and location of the injuries inflicted, the weapon used, and
          the actions of the appellant during the incident. The injuries
          were concentrated on the vital parts of the deceased’s body,
          such as the chest and ribs, which house critical organs like


6   [2008] 4 SCR 500 : (2008) 17 SCC 505
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             the heart and lungs. The deliberate targeting of these areas
             indicates a clear intent to cause harm that could lead to
             death. According to the testimony of the injured eyewitness,
             the appellant stabbed the deceased with considerable force,
             further corroborating the prosecution’s argument that the
             injuries were inflicted intentionally or at least with the knowledge
             of their natural consequence. While other co-accused were
             reportedly armed with sticks, the appellant–accused no. 1
             was in possession of a sharp knife, which was used to inflict
             severe injuries. The decision to carry and use such a weapon
             during the scuffle reflects a readiness to escalate violence
             beyond a mere physical altercation. Even if the appellant
             did not have a prior intention to murder the deceased, the
             circumstances demonstrate that such injuries were caused
             which were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death.
             The deliberate act of stabbing vital parts of the body, coupled
             with the force used, indicates that the appellant must have been
             aware of the likely fatal consequences of his actions. Under
             the provisions of Section 300 IPC, an intention to cause such
             injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
             cause death qualifies as murder, and even if ingredients other
             than intention to cause murder are proved, mere knowledge
             of the result of fatal actions is enough to ascribe culpability
             to the accused person.
       25.9 The lower courts have also dismissed the appellant’s argument
            that the act was not premeditated. While the attack may not
            have been planned in advance, intent can emerge in the heat
            of the moment, particularly during a violent confrontation. The
            appellant’s decision to use a lethal weapon and the precise
            targeting of the victim’s vital organs are sufficient to establish
            the requisite intent for murder or at least knowledge of the
            possible consequences of one’s actions and to hold the
            appellant liable for death of the deceased as per clause 3 of
            Section 300, IPC.
       25.10 This Court held in Virsa Singh (Supra), that the prosecution
             must prove that there was an intention to inflict that particular
             injury, that is to say that the injury was not accidental or
             unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended,
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                           409

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


            and that particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course
            of nature to cause death.
     25.11 The third clause of section 300 speaks of an intention to cause
           bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
           to cause death. This Court in the above-mentioned judgment
           held that to bring the case under this part of the section the
           prosecution must establish objectively:
            1.   That a bodily injury is present;
            2.   That the nature of injury must be proved;
            3.   It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict
                 that particular bodily injury;
            4.   That the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the
                 ordinary course of the nature.
     25.12 The Court further held that:
            “13. Once these four elements are established by
            the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the
            prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under
            S. 300, “Thirdly. It does not matter that there was no
            intention to cause death. It does not matter that there
            was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that
            is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
            nature (not that there is any real distinction between the
            two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge
            that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death.
            Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually
            found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry
            is purely objective and the only question is whether,
            as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury
            is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
            death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting
            injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
            course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of
            murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face
            the consequences; and they can only escape if it can
            be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was
            accidental or otherwise unintentional.”
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       25.13 This position has further been upheld by this Court recently in
             the case of Vinod Kumar vs. Amritpal,7 wherein the bench
             observed that:
              “24. Once the prosecution establishes the existence of the
              three ingredients forming a part of “thirdly” in Section 300,
              it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the
              part of the accused to cause death. Further, it does
              not matter that there was no intention even to cause
              the injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in
              ordinary course of nature. Even the knowledge that an
              act of that kind is likely to cause death is not necessary
              to attract “thirdly”.”
       25.14 This Court in the case of Balkar Singh vs. State of
             Uttarakhand,8 while following the judgment in Virsa Singh
             (Supra) further elaborated the position of law and laid down
             that culpable homicide is murder if two conditions are fulfilled:
              a.     the act which caused death is done with the intention of
                     causing death or is done with the intention of causing a
                     bodily injury; and
              b.     the injury intended to be inflicted in sufficient in the
                     ordinary course of nature to cause death.
       25.15 The Court in the above-mentioned judgment clarified that even
             if the intention of accused was limited to inflicting a bodily injury
             sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the
             offence of murder would still be made out.
       25.16 The third clause of Section 300, IPC defines murder as the act
             of causing death by causing such bodily injury as is likely to
             result in death in the ordinary course of nature. In the present
             case, the appellant’s actions satisfy these criteria. The appellant
             was armed with a knife, which he used to inflict multiple
             injuries on vital organs. The fatal nature of these injuries, as
             confirmed by medical evidence, and the circumstances of



7   [2021] 11 SCR 954 : (2021) 19 SCC 181
8   [2009] 5 SCR 242 : (2009) 15 SCC 366
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          411

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


            the attack clearly point to an intent to cause death or at least
            an intention to inflict injuries with the knowledge that they
            were likely to result in death. Even if it is presumed that the
            appellant – accused no. 1 did not have an intention to cause
            such bodily injury, the act of causing injuries with knife to vital
            parts is reflective of the knowledge that causing such injuries
            is likely to cause death in the ordinary course.
     25.17 The defence’s argument that the incident was a spontaneous
           scuffle does not absolve the appellant of liability. While the
           scuffle may have triggered the attack, the appellant’s use of
           a lethal weapon and the manner in which the injuries were
           inflicted elevate the act from culpable homicide to murder.
           Courts have consistently held that intent can be inferred from
           the nature and severity of injuries, as well as the choice of
           weapon and the manner of its use. The use of a lethal weapon
           and the deliberate targeting of vital parts of the body are strong
           indicators of such intent.
     25.18 In light of the evidence and the legal principles involved, the
           appellant’s plea for leniency on the grounds of spontaneity
           and lack of premeditation cannot be sustained. The nature and
           location of the injuries inflicted, the choice of weapon, and the
           circumstances of the attack unequivocally establish the liability
           of the appellant for causing the death of Subrahmannian.
           The argument that the act was committed in the spur of the
           moment does not diminish the gravity of the offence or the
           appellant’s culpability.
26. Plea of Private Defence: The appellant’s counsel has invoked the
    right of private defence arguing that the act of stabbing was carried
    out under a perceived threat to the appellant–accused no. 1’s life. It
    is further contended that the appellant exceeded the bounds of lawful
    defence, thereby bringing the act within the ambit of Exception 2 to
    Section 300, IPC, which reads:
          “Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the
          exercise of good faith of the right of private defence of
          person or property, exceeds the power given to him by
          law and causes the death of the person against whom he
          is exercising such right.”
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       26.1 To bring the appellant’s act under section 304, IPC in light of
            the offence being committed in exercise of private defense and
            thereby exceeding the power given under the law, that is under
            exception 2 to section 300, IPC – the ingredients therein must
            be proved. The ingredients for this exception are:
            1.      The accused must be free from fault in bringing about
                    the encounter;
            2.      There must be an impending peril to life or of great bodily
                    harm, either real or apparent;
            3.      Injuries received by the accused;
            4.      The injuries caused by the accused;
            5.      The accused did not have time or opportunity to take
                    recourse to public authorities.
       26.2 This Court in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab,9 held that the
            law provides for the right of private defense to citizens to enable
            them to protect themselves when confronted with imminent
            danger or unlawful aggression. But such protection must not
            be misused or extend beyond the necessities of the case.
       26.3 The counsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant
            acted under a genuine belief of impending harm. However, this
            argument falls short upon scrutiny of the injuries sustained by
            the appellant during the altercation. As per the wound certificate,
            the appellant suffered only minor injuries:
            i.      A contusion on the back of the buttock.
            ii.     An abrasion over the forehead.
       26.4 The medical evidence confirms that these injuries were superficial
            and did not pose any real or imminent threat to the appellant’s
            life or safety. The courts below have rightly concluded that the
            appellant’s perception of danger was neither reasonable nor
            proportional to the force he employed in response. It is a settled
            position of law that the number of injuries on the accused side by
            itself may not be sufficient to establish right of private defense,



9   [2010] 1 SCR 642 : (2010) 2 SCC 333
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        413

            Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


             as has been held by this Court in V. Subramani vs. State of
             Tamil Nadu.10 But it has further been held that an overall view
             of the case has to be taken to check whether a case for private
             defense is made out from the evidence on record.
      26.5 Even if the appellant claims to have acted in defense, his role in
           bringing about the altercation cannot be overlooked. The appellant
           cannot benefit from the exception when he was instrumental in
           creating the circumstances that led to the confrontation. It has
           been held in the case of Sone Lal vs. State of U.P.,11 that when
           the aggressors, even if they receive injuries from the victims of
           their aggression, cannot have the right of private defence. The
           courts below have made a categorical finding that the appellant–
           accused no.1 and his co-accused were the aggressors in the
           altercation. The attack was initiated by the accused group, who
           were armed with sticks and a knife, with the intent to intimidate
           or harm the victim and his companions. This fact is substantiated
           by the testimony of PW-1, an injured eyewitness, who described
           the sequence of events leading up to the stabbing. Even if it
           were assumed that the appellant–accused no. 1 acted in self-
           defense, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the
           force used was excessive and disproportionate. The act of
           stabbing the deceased multiple times in vital organs such as
           the chest and heart goes far beyond what is permissible under
           the right of private defense.
      26.6 As noted in the post-mortem report and corroborated by the
           testimony of PW-6 (the police surgeon), the injuries inflicted
           on the deceased were severe and intentional, including a fatal
           wound to the heart. The appellant’s actions cannot be justified
           as a defensive response to the minor injuries he sustained.
      26.7 In light of the above findings, the plea of exceeding the right
           of private defense under Exception 2 to Section 300, IPC, is
           not applicable to the appellant’s case. The courts below have
           rightly rejected this argument, holding that the appellant was not
           under any imminent peril and that his actions were deliberate
           and excessive.


10   [2005] 2 SCR 536 : (2005) 10 SCC 358
11   [1981] 3 SCR 352 : (1981) 2 SCC 531
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27. Parity with Other Accused Persons:
       27.1 The appellant has further contended that his sentence should
            be reduced on the grounds of parity with his co-accused. It is
            argued that since one co-accused had his sentence reduced,
            and another was acquitted by this Court, the appellant should
            be afforded similar leniency. The appellant is seeking similar
            leniency on the ground that the circumstances and involvement
            of all accused were substantially similar.
       27.2 The doctrine of parity ensures fairness in sentencing when
            co-accused persons are similarly situated and share the
            same level of culpability. However, parity is not an automatic
            entitlement; the role, intent, and actions of each accused
            must be individually assessed to determine their degree of
            involvement in the crime.
       27.3 The evidence presented during the trial clearly establishes that
            the appellant played a distinct and more culpable role in the
            incident. While the co-accused were armed with sticks and
            caused non-fatal injuries to the victims, the appellant alone
            was armed with a knife and used it to inflict fatal injuries on the
            deceased. The testimony of PW-1 reveals that the appellant
            stabbed the deceased after his stick was snatched during the
            altercation. This sequence of events demonstrates a deliberate
            escalation by the appellant, who resorted to using a deadly
            weapon with the intent to cause grievous harm.
       27.4 Nothing has been brought on record to show that the other
            accused persons had knowledge of appellant being in
            possession of the knife. Thus, there is no evidence to show that
            the other accused persons shared a common intention with the
            appellant to commit murder. The courts below have meticulously
            analyzed the evidence and concluded that the co-accused did
            not share a common intention to commit murder. While the group
            acted in concert to assault the victims, the fatal stabbing by the
            appellant was an independent and unilateral act. This finding
            is crucial in distinguishing the appellant’s culpability from that
            of his co-accused. The absence of common intention among
            the co-accused precludes the application of vicarious liability
            under Section 34, IPC, for the act of murder.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       415

         Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


     27.5 The sentence of Accused No. 2 was reduced from six years to
          three years on the grounds that he caused only grievous hurt
          with a stick and did not participate in the stabbing and was also
          unaware of the knife in possession of appellant. Accused no.3
          was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted due to lack
          of evidence linking him to the assault.
     27.6 The courts have carefully evaluated the evidence against
          each accused and tailored their sentences accordingly. The
          appellant’s argument for parity fails to recognize the qualitative
          differences in their roles and the gravity of their actions.
          The appellant’s actions were not only more severe but also
          demonstrated a clear intent to cause death. The fatal injuries
          inflicted on the deceased, as detailed in the post-mortem
          report, leave no room for doubt about the appellant – accused
          no. 1’s culpability. The courts below have correctly observed
          that the appellant’s role in the crime is incomparable to that
          of his co-accused.
     27.7 The principle of parity does not apply in the present case, as
          the appellant’s actions were materially different from those of
          his co-accused. The sentence imposed on the appellant reflects
          the gravity of his offense and his individual culpability.
28. Plea of old age and deteriorating health:
     28.1 Another ground taken by the appellant for reduction in sentence
          is that he is a senior citizen and has severe health concerns
          necessitating continuous treatment and physiotherapy. This
          Court had once previously granted interim bail to the appellant
          on medical grounds owing to the fact that he had suffered a
          stroke and partial paralysis as a result.
     28.2 The Court is cognizant of the appellant’s advanced age and
          deteriorating medical condition, considerations that warrant a
          humane and compassionate approach to justice. These factors,
          when presented in cases of serious offences, often invite the
          judiciary to weigh individual circumstances against the broader
          interest of justice. However, the Court is also tasked with
          balancing these personal hardships against the severity and
          nature of the offence, as well as its impact on the rule of law
          and societal harmony.
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       28.3 In the present case, the appellant has been convicted of murder,
            committed in the course of a group attack fueled by political
            rivalry. The act was not one of sudden provocation or impulse
            but arose from a premeditated and collective intent to harm
            the victim, even if the initial intention was to cause hurt. The
            evidence unequivocally establishes that the appellant actively
            participated in the attack, which culminated in the brutal stabbing
            of the victim in vital parts of the body, leading to his death.
            Such an act, carried out with the clear objective to eliminate the
            victim, underscores its heinous nature and deliberate execution.
       28.4 While this Court has carefully considered the appellant’s plea for
            leniency on account of old age and a medical condition, these
            factors alone cannot absolve or mitigate the responsibility for
            a crime of this magnitude. A murder committed with the intent
            to target vital organs, particularly in a group setting, reflects a
            level of intent and cruelty that demands an appropriate punitive
            response. To reduce the sentence in such a case would risk
            undermining the seriousness of the crime and the sanctity of life
            itself, principles that the judicial system is duty-bound to uphold.
       28.5 Furthermore, the offence occurred in a context of political
            rivalry, a factor that exacerbates its gravity. Crimes rooted in
            such motives often have far-reaching consequences beyond
            the immediate loss of life, contributing to social unrest and
            weakening public confidence in the rule of law. The Court
            must therefore ensure that its decisions reinforce the principle
            of accountability and deter the recurrence of such violent
            acts, particularly those that disrupt public order. The medical
            evidence, corroborated by eyewitness testimony and the
            recovery of the weapon, leaves no room for doubt. While the
            Court acknowledges the appellant’s advanced age and medical
            condition, these factors cannot outweigh the need for justice
            and the imperative to uphold the rule of law.
       28.6 In light of the above, while we empathize with the appellant’s
            personal circumstances, we find no compelling justification to
            interfere with the sentence imposed by the lower Court. The
            nature of the offence, its deliberate execution, and its societal
            implications necessitate that the punishment reflects the
            seriousness of the crime.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        417

            Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala


29. Lastly, once conviction under Section 302 of IPC is confirmed by
    all the Courts, then the minimum sentence is imprisonment for life,
    as provided under the provision itself. Thus, no ground or reason
    for granting a lesser sentence arises. When the minimum sentence
    itself is life imprisonment, then grounds like parity, leniency, old age,
    health concerns, etc. shall not be of any aid to the accused while
    seeking reduction of sentence. Therefore, the appellant herein has
    been granted the minimum sentence for committing the offence of
    murder.
30. After thoroughly examining the appellant’s submissions and the
    evidence presented in the case, the Court concludes that the appeal
    against conviction and the request for a reduction in sentence are
    without merit. The findings of both the Trial Court and the High Court
    are well-founded and supported by compelling evidence.
31. The courts below have rightly concluded that the appellant’s actions
    amount to murder under Section 300, IPC and thus punishable
    under Section 302, IPC. Accordingly, the appeal for reduction of the
    sentence is dismissed. The conviction and sentence are upheld.

     Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan