LALU YADAVversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

                 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 639 : 2024 INSC 782

                              Lalu Yadav
                                   v.
                   The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 4222 of 2024)
                                16 October 2024
              [C.T. Ravikumar* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent
       power under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for
       quashing the FIR against the appellant under Section 376, Penal
       Code, 1860.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code,
       1860 – ss.376, 313 – Respondent No.4-complainant alleged
       rape by the appellant on false promise of marriage – Whether
       the complainant gave her consent for the sexual relationship
       with the appellant under misconception of fact, as alleged:
       Held: No – As per the FIR, the offence was allegedly committed
       from 2013 to 2018 however, the FIR was registered only in
       2018 – There was a delay of more than 5 years in filing the FIR –
       Complainant and the appellant were living for long as husband
       and wife – There is a huge irregularity between the statements
       “established physical relationship with me without my consent”
       and “started living with me as the husband” – Present is a case of
       long consensual physical relationship during which the complainant
       addressed the appellant as her husband – Allegations in the FIR
       do not constitute a prima facie case of false promise to marry from
       the inception with a view to establish sexual relationship – On facts,
       subsequent refusal to marry the complainant not sufficient to prima
       facie establish that the complainant gave consent for the sexual
       relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact, so as
       to accuse the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the
       meaning of s.375, IPC – Further, since now the allegation of offence
       u/s.313, IPC is omitted by the State, there is no prima facie case
       for proceeding further against the appellant on the allegation of
       commission of offence punishable u/s.376, IPC – High Court ought

* Author
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       to have exercised its inherent power u/s.482, CrPC – Impugned
       order set aside – FIR and all further proceedings based thereon,
       quashed. [Paras 9, 14-16]
       Judicial Review – Criminal cases – Code of Criminal Procedure,
       1973 – s.482 – Constitution of India – Article 226 – Appellant
       sought quashing of FIR u/Article 226 – Nomenclature of
       petition not relevant, petition may be treated as one u/s.482,
       CrPC:
       Held: High Court can exercise its power either u/Article 226 of
       the Constitution of India or u/s.482, CrPC to prevent the abuse of
       process of the court or to secure the ends of justice – Nomenclature
       under which a petition is filed is irrelevant – If the court finds that
       the petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court u/
       Article 226, it may treat the petition u/s.482, CrPC. [Para 1]

                                 Case Law Cited
       Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [1997] Supp. 5
       SCR 12 : (1998) 5 SCC 749; Satya Pal v. State of U.P [1996]
       Supp. 9 SCR 203 : 2000 CrLJ 569 – referred to.
       Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (2019)
       18 SCC 204; “XXXX” v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [2024]
       3 SCR 309 : (2024) 3 SCC 496; Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of
       Delhi) [2023] 1 SCR 1061 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89; State of
       Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1990] Supp 3 SCR
       259 : AIR 1992 SC 604 – relied on.
       Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P., 2006 (56) ACC 433 –
       referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution
       of India.

                                List of Keywords
       Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Inherent power;
       Quashing; Rape on false promise of marriage; Parties living for
       long as husband and wife; Consent for sexual relationship under
       misconception of fact; Delay in registering the FIR; Long consensual
       physical relationship; Refusal to marry; Judicial Review in criminal
       matters; Nomenclature of petition.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       641

                Lalu Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


                                    Case Arising From

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 4222
      of 2024
      From the Judgment and Order dated 26.07.2018 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in CRMWP No. 16825 of 2018

                                Appearances for Parties

      Devvrat, Ms. Swati Setia, Ms. Harshita Sharma, Devesh Kumar
      Agnihotri, Subas Ray, Dr. Pabitra Pal Choudhary, Nitin Jain, Advs.
      for the Appellant.
      Ajay Kumar Misra, A.G./Sr. Adv., Garvesh Kabra, Ms. Harshita
      Raghuvanshi, Mrs. Pooja Kabra, Shantanu Kumar, Anurag Singh,
      Advs. for the Respondents.
                     Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                          Judgment
      C.T. Ravikumar, J.
      Leave granted.
1.    The captioned Appeal is directed against the order dated 26.07.2018
      of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous
      Writ Petition No. 16825 of 2018. The said Writ Petition was filed
      under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashment of
      FIR dated 21.02.2018 bearing Case Crime No. 28 of 2018 registered
      under Sections 376 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
      short the ‘IPC’) at Police Station Nandganj in Ghazipur District of
      the State of Uttar Pradesh. In view of the fact that quashment of
      FIR was sought under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is
      relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
      Special Judicial Magistrate.1 It was held therein that the High Court
      could exercise its power of judicial review in Criminal matters and it
      could exercise the power either under Article 226 of the Constitution
      of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
      1973 (for brevity ‘Cr.P.C’), to prevent the abuse of process of the


1    [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : (1998) 5 SCC 749
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       court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Nomenclature under
       which a petition is filed is not quite relevant. If the court finds that
       the petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under
       Article 226, it may treat the petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
2.     Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel
       for the State of Uttar Pradesh for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and also
       the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 (the complainant).
3.     The gravamen of her complaint, based on which the above-mentioned
       crime was registered on 21.02.2018, is revealed from the following
       allegations made thereunder: -
            “…My elder sister Meera Devi was married to Satendra
            Yadav Village Kukuda P.S. Nandganj, District – Ghazipur,
            Lalu Yadav S/o Seshnath Yadav R/o Atarsuya P.S.
            Nandganj District – Ghazipur used to come to my house
            along with the brother in law Ravindra Yadav of my elder
            sister, at that time about five years back I was a student of
            High School, then the said Lalu Yadav by way of deceiving
            myself promise that he will marry me and established
            physical relationship with me without my consent and
            started living with me as the husband. He used to say
            that he would marry me when he gets a job. My mother
            Rajvati Devi and my father Hari Singh Yadav was also of
            the knowledge of our relation. When my father and mother
            raised an objection about our relation then Lalu Yadav
            told her that he will marry Preeti. He told her that nobody
            should object and therefore my parents went silent and
            Lalu Yadav kept established with me the applicant without
            my consent due to which I became pregnant after the
            knowledge of which he give me a medicine of with which
            and abortion has occurred and when the said Lalu Yadav
            came to the house of the applicant on 28.09.2017 then
            he took the said applicant to Varanasi on 29.09.2017 and
            kept me in a hotel and again made physical relationship
            with me due to which I became pregnant in May 2017 and
            said Lalu Yadav did my abortion my pressuring me again,
            thereafter again 17.12.2017 the said Lalu Yadav took me
            to a hotel in Varanasi and made physical relationship with
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          643

            Lalu Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


          me their, thereafter Lalu Yadav got a job in army and after
          which he is refusing to marry the applicant…”
4.   In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to the details given
     under item No. 3 in Annexure- P2/FIR, which read thus: -
          “3 (a) occurrence of offence.
          1. Day Date from – 05.01.2013
          Date To – 05.01.2018
          (b) Information received at P.S:
          Date: 21.02.2018. Time: 21.34 hr.”
5.   Before delving into the rival contentions, it is relevant to note that
     though this Court stayed further proceedings in case Crime No.
     28/2018 on 13.11.2018, this Court virtually modified the same on
     18.08.2023 as under: -
          “It is made clear that the interim order passed by this
          Court staying further proceedings in Crime No. 28/2018
          registered at P.S. Nandganj, District Ghazipur, U.P. dated
          13.11.2018 will not stand in the way of investigation for
          investigating into the offence under Section 313 of IPC.
          List the matter after two months.”
6.   Earlier, on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 counter affidavit was filed
     fully justifying the impugned order. On behalf of the respondent No. 4
     also, a counter affidavit was filed, evidently, on the same line. Pursuant
     to the order dated 18.08.2023, virtually, permitting continuance of
     investigation in Crime No. 28/2018 in respect of the allegation of
     commission of offence under Section 313 IPC, investigation in that
     regard was continued and completed. Thereupon, an additional
     affidavit was filed on behalf of the first respondent - State with
     respect to the status of investigation and the same, insofar as it is
     relevant, reads thus: -
          “6. That pursuant to the direction, the investigating officer
          had conducted investigation with respect to offence
          u/s 313 IPC and after due investigation and material
          available on record, including her statement, medical
          reports etc. has concluded that there is no evidence/
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            material available with respect to offence u/s 313 IPC
            i.e. no material substantiating abortion of the victim in
            the present offence and hence as on 02.02.2024 omitted
            offence u/s 313, IPC.
            7. That the investigation u/s 376 is still pending as the
            same is stayed by this Hon’ble Court.”
7.     In view of the statement in the afore-extracted paragraph 6 and 7,
       the undisputed position obtained that the allegation of commission of
       offence under Section 313, IPC stands omitted against the appellant.
       What survives for consideration is only the question whether the
       impugned order invites interference and the subject FIR be quashed
       invoking the inherent jurisdiction?
8.     We have already taken note of the facts revealed from the subject
       FIR itself that the time of occurrence of offence is allegedly, from
       05.01.2013 to 05.01.2018 and that it was registered only at 21.34 hrs.
       on 21.02.2018. That apart, it is evident that even going by respondent
       No. 4, the complainant herself and the appellant were living as
       husband and wife. The complaint of respondent no. 4, as is revealed
       therefrom, is that the appellant had deceived her by promising to
       marry and then by establishing physical relationship. At the risk of
       repetition, we will have to refer to the FIR, carrying the following
       recitals from her complaint:
            “… Lalu Yadav S/o Seshnath Yadav R/o Atarsuya P.S.
            Nandganj District- Ghazipur, used to come to my house
            along with the brother-in-law Ravindra Yadav of my elder
            sister, at that time about five years back I was a student of
            High School, then the said Lalu Yadav by way of deceiving
            myself promise that he will marry me and established
            physical relationship with me without my consent and
            started living with me as the husband.”
                                                   (underline supplied)
9.     At the very outset, it is to be noted that there is a huge irregularity
       between the statements “established physical relationship with me
       without my consent” and “started living with me as the husband”. Be
       that as it may, bearing in mind the allegations raised by respondent
       No. 4 reflected in the subject FIR, we will refer to the relevant
       decisions of this Court.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        645

               Lalu Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


10. While dismissing the writ petition under the impugned order,
    presumably taking note of the contentions based on time lag of
    five years, the High Court relied on its Full Bench decisions in
    Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P.,2 and in Satya Pal v. State
    of U.P.3. as well as the decision of this Court in State of Haryana
    and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.4. It observed and held that there
    could be no interference with the investigation or order staying
    arrest unless cognizable offence is not ex-facie discernible from
    the allegations contained in the FIR or there exists any statutory
    restriction operating against the power of the Police to investigate
    a case. There can be no two views on the exposition of law thus
    made relying on the said decisions. In the same breath we will have
    to say that those decisions can be no bar for the exercise of power
    under Section 482, Cr.P.C., in various other situations dealt with,
    in detail, by this Court, including in the decision in Bhajan Lal’s
    case (supra).
11. To determine whether the case in hand deserves to be quashed at
    the present stage we will refer to some of the decisions. We have
    already taken note of the fact that though there was an allegation in
    the FIR regarding commission of offence under Section 313, IPC, on
    completion of the investigation, the investigating agency itself omitted
    the offence under Section 313, IPC against the appellant-accused.
    In paragraph 102 of the decision in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) this
    Court held thus: -
            “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
            relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
            the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
            of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
            power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
            Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
            reproduced above, we give the following categories of
            cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
            be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
            any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,



2   2006 (56) ACC 433
3   [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 203 : 2000 CrLJ 569
4   [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : AIR 1992 SC 604
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       though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
       clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
       guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
       of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
       exercised.
       (1)   Where the allegations made in the first information
             report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
             their face value and accepted in their entirety do
             not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
             a case against the accused.
       (2)   Where the allegations in the first information report
             and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
             do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
             investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
             of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
             within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
       (3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
             or complaint and the evidence collected in support
             of the same do not disclose the commission of any
             offence and make out a case against the accused.
       (4)   Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
             a cognizable offence but constitute only a
             non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
             by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate
             as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
       (5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
             are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
             basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
             a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
             proceeding against the accused.
       (6)   Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
             of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
             (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
             institution and continuance of the proceedings and/
             or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
             the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
             the grievance of the aggrieved party.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          647

               Lalu Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


            (7)     Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
                    with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
                    maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
                    wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
                    to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
12. In the decision in Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State of Karnataka
    and Anr.,5 this Court held thus: -
            “4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case,
            it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the
            appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise
            of marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to
            hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship
            which has continued for eight years, as “rape” especially
            in the face of the complainant’s own allegation that they
            lived together as man and wife.”
13. The decision in “XXXX” v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.,6
    also assumes relevance in the contextual situation. This court
    took into consideration an earlier decision of this Court in Naim
    Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi),7 where the allegation was one
    of alleged rape on false promise of marriage, made five years after
    the complainant and the accused started having relations and even
    got pregnant from the accused, of course when she was having
    a subsisting marriage, the Court found that there cannot be any
    stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent
    for sexual relationship under misconception. Having considered the
    said decision and finding identity in facts, this court in the decision
    reported in (2024) 3 SCC 496 reversed the order impugned therein
    dismissing the petition filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashment
    of FIR and allowed the appeal by setting aside the impugned order
    and quashing the subject FIR.
14. Now, having bestowed our anxious consideration to the decisions
    referred supra with reference to the factual situations obtained in
    the case at hand, we are of the considered view that the High Court



5   (2019) 18 SCC 204
6   [2024] 3 SCR 309 : (2024) 3 SCC 496
7   [2023] 1 SCR 1061 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89
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       has palpably gone wrong in not considering the question whether
       the allegations in the complaint reveals prima facie case that the
       complainant had given her consent for the sexual relationship with
       the appellant under misconception of fact, as alleged, or whether it
       reveals a case of consensual sex. Firstly, it is to be noted that the
       subject FIR itself would reveal that there occurred a delay of more
       than 5 years for registering the FIR; secondly, the very case of the
       complainant, as revealed from the FIR, would go to show that they
       lived for a long period as man and wife and thirdly, the facts and
       circumstances obtained from the subject FIR and other materials
       on record would reveal absence of a prima facie case that the
       complainant viz., respondent No. 4 had given her consent for sexual
       relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact. At any
       rate, the allegations in the FIR would not constitute a prima facie case
       of false promise to marry from the inception with a view to establish
       sexual relationship and instead they would reveal a prima facie case
       of long consensual physical relationship, during which the complainant
       addressed the appellant as her husband. Moreover, it is also the
       case of the complainant, revealed from the subject FIR and the other
       materials on record that she went along with the appellant to Varanasi
       with the knowledge of her family and stayed with him in hotels during
       such visits. The subsequent refusal to marry the complainant would
       not be sufficient, in view of the facts and circumstances obtained in
       the case at hand, by any stretch of imagination to draw existence of
       a prima facie case that the complainant had given consent for the
       sexual relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact,
       so as to accuse the appellant guilty of having committed rape within
       the meaning of Section 375, IPC.
15. The long and short of the above discussion is that the case at hand
    is a befitting case where the High Court should have exercised the
    power available under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of
    the process of the Court. Now that the allegation of offence under
    Section 313, IPC is omitted, there is absolutely no prima facie case
    for proceeding further against the appellant on the allegation of
    commission of offence punishable under Section 376, IPC. We are
    of the considered view that the High Court should have exercised
    its inherent power.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated 26.07.2018 of
    the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                      649

               Lalu Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


     Writ Petition No. 16825 of 2018 is set aside. FIR No. 28/2018 dated
     21.02.2018 registered at Police Station – Nandganj, Ghazipur District
     of Uttar Pradesh and all further proceedings on its basis are quashed.
     The appeal is accordingly allowed.

     Result of the Case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey