Holding

The Government may resume possession after termination of a licence only by following the procedure prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975; unilateral repossession without notice is not authorized.

Summary

The Anamalai Club held a licence for 28.70 acres of government land for sports and recreation. The State of Tamil Nadu terminated the licence under Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 and resumed possession with police assistance on the same day, without issuing a notice under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975. The Club obtained relief from a single High Court judge, but the Division Bench upheld the termination and held that the Eviction Act did not apply. On special leave, the Supreme Court held that even after a licence is terminated, the Government must follow the procedure prescribed in the Eviction Act—notice of show‑cause and a reasonable period to vacate—otherwise the repossession is unlawful. The Court, however, declined to order restitution because possession had already been taken, and it noted that a writ under Article 226 is not the proper remedy to determine title. The appeal was disposed of without costs.

Issues considered

Whether the Government can resume possession of land after termination of a licence under the Government Grants Act, 1895 without complying with the procedure of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975.
Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is an appropriate remedy to establish title in such a case.
Whether the Estate Officer may examine the legality of the licence termination while proceeding under the Eviction Act.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 32
Government Grants Act, 1895s. 3
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6

Subjects

licence terminationgovernment grants acteviction actdue processunilateral possessionnatural justicearticle 226public premisesspecific reliefsummary eviction

Judgment

A MIS ANAMALLAI CLUB
v.
THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS.

OCTOBER 23, 1996

B (K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.)

Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)
Act, 1975:

Sectio11s 3, 4 a11d 5--Grant of lice11ce u11der s.3 of Govemmmt Grants
C Act, 1895-Tennination of-Resumption of possession unilaterally by the
Government without notice to the licencee--Held : State cannot take
unilateral possession without recourse to the procedure provided under the
Act-Since possession already assumed, 110 direction could be given-
Govemment Grants Act, 1895-Section 3.
D
Constitution of India, 1950 :

An. 226-Wiit jurisdiction-Recourse to for establishing title-Not a
proper remedy.

E Bishan Das & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1962] 2 SCR 69; State
of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dhamiander Pd. Singh & Ors., [1989] 2 SCC
505; Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 203;
East In.dia Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank, [1992] Supp.(.2)29 and Midnapur
Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR (1924) PC 144,
relied on.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 14549-50
of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.4.96 of the Madras High
Court in W.A. No. 1055, W.M.P. No. 11237 of 1992.
G
Soli J. Sorabjee, V. Achuthan, Gopal Jain and Mukul Mudgal for the
Appellant.

V. Krishnamurthy for the Respondents.

H The following Order of the Court was delivered :
652
ANAMALLIAICLUBv. GOVT.OFT.N. 653

Leave granted. A
This appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench Judg-
ment of Madras High Court dated September 24, 1993 made in Writ
Appeal No. 1055 of 1992.

The undisputed facts are that the appellant was granted licence in B
respect of an extent of 28.70 acres of Government land in Anamalai,
Valparai Taluk of Coimbatore District for sports and recreation purposes.
Notice was issued on May 22, 1992 terminating the licence under Section
3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (for short, the 'Act') which was
served on its Secretary on May 23, 1992; the land was resumed and the C
possession thereof was taken with the assistance of the police personnel on
the even date. The appellant's writ petition was allowed by the learned
single Judge by his order dated August 17, 1992 in Writ Petition No.
7160/92 and giving directions therein. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent-
State filed the appeal and the Division Bench in the impugned Judgment
while upholding the termination of the licence under the Act, recorded a D
finding that "there is no legal impediment at all for resumption of posses-
sion of the lands by the Government, without seeking any aid of the
provisions of the PPE Act, after the determination of the grant in the
manner provided in the grant itself."
E
Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, contended that even
assuming that the termination of the grant was in accordance with the grant
itself, as found by the Division Bench of the High Court, resumption of the
possession without giving an opportunity to the appellant and following the
procedure prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises Act (Eviction
of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975 (for short, the 'Evktion Act') is F
unauthorised and unwarranted. The finding of the Division Bench is,
therefore, clearly unsustainable in law. Shri Krishnamurthy, learned coun-
sel for the State, contended that the right of the appellant flows from the
grant under which they came into possession. After determination of the
grant by issuance of the notice in terms of the grant itself, the appellants G
thereafter have no right to remain in possession. Therefore; the resumption
of the possession by the respondents in terms of the grant is valid in law.
In that situation, the need to take recourse to the provisions of the Eviction
Act bears no relevance and need not be followed.

The question is : whether the resumption of possession unilaterally, H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A after determination of the grant in the manner provided under the grant
itself, is valid in law as was held by the High Court? We think that the view
taken by the High Court is not correct in law. In Bishan Das & Ors. v. State "
of Punjab & Ors. (1962] 2 SCR 69, a Constitution Bench of this Court had
considered the question whether the Government would unilaterally take
B possession of the land after termination of the lease. One Ramjidas had
built a dharamasala, a temple and shops appurtenant thereto, after having
a licence of land from the State Government. The lease was terminated
and thereafter when the person in possession were sought to be dispos-
sessed, without taking any recourse to law, they filed writ petition under
Article 226 but remained unsuccessful. When writ petition under Article
C 32 was filed, this Court had considered the question whether the Govern-
ment is entitled to resume the land with a minimum use of force for
ejectment without recourse to law. It was contended therein that there was
no dispute as to the question of fact between the parties that the petitioners
therein had no right and title to the. subject matter in dispute. The writ
D petition under Article 226 was dismissed on the ground of the disputed
question of the fact which was upheld in appeal by the Division Bench. A
writ petition under Article 32 was filed. The right to possession of land was
a fundamental right at that time. It was contended that the Government
terminated the lease, as thereafter they were trespassers and so they had
E no right to resist the Government's power to resume the land. This Court
had repelled both the contentions as unsound and had held that the
Government violated the fundamental right to possession of land since the
petitioners therein were not trespassers. They remained in possession for
long time. Pursuant to the lease, they had constructed dharamshala, temple
and shops and managed them during the life time of the licencee. After
F his death, the petitioner and members of the family continued in possession
of and in management of the properties which was an admitted possession.
Therefore, they were not mere trespassers in respect of the said properties.
It was held that on the admitted facts of the case, the petitioners therein
could not be said to be trespassers in respect of the dharamsala, temple
G and shops nor could the State be said to be the owner of the property,
irrespective of whether it was a trust, public or private having taken the
possession unilaterally. It was open to the State to take appropriate legal
action for the purpose. It was also held that the State could not remove
them from possession except under the authority of law. The same view
H was reiterated by this Court in State of U.P. & Ors v. Maharaja Dhannander
ANAMALLIAI CLUB v. GOVT. OFT.N. 655

Pd. Singh & Ors. f1989) 2 SCC 505 at 516 thus : A

"A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession·
extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry
of earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The
use of the expression 're- entry' in the lease deed does not authorise
extra-judicial possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; B
a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of
law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does
not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is
under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that
all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should c
have a 'legal pedigree'. In Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, [1962) 2
SCR 69 this Court said :

"We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the con-
tention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be
removed by an executive order. The argument is not only D
specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications
and impact on law and order ... "

Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that
the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers E
is destructive of the basic principle.

Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the
Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial
right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only
F
in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume
possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is,
accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in
due course of law."

In Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors., (1968) 2 SCR G
203, a Bench of this Court had considered the same question after review-
ing the case law in that behalf and held that the Government cannot take
possession of the land except in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Act. In that case, the recourse to the provisions under Section
9 of the Specifi.c Relief Act (Section 6 of the present Specific Relief Act, H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A 1963) was upheld. The question W<!S also considered by this Court by one
of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.) in East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank, (1992)
Supp. (2) 29 at 44. It was held in paragraphs 29, 30 and 32 that :

"They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper
course. In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an
B unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in the manne~ provided
by law. The remedy under Section 6 is summary and its object is
to prevent self help and to discourage people to adopt any means
fair or foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was in due
course of law or with consent.
c
What is meant by due course of law? Due course of law in each
particular case means such an exercise of the powers by duly
constituted tribunal or court in accordance with the procedure
established by law under such safeguards of the protection of
D individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according to the
rules and principles which have been established in our system of
jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights.
To give such proceedings any validity, there must thus be a tribunal
competent by its constitution, that is by law of its creation, to pass
upon the subject matter of the suit or proceeding; and if that
E
involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the
defend<1.nt, it must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of
process \Vithin the State, or his voluntary appearance. _Due course
of law implies the right of the person affected thereby t<Y be present
before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question
F of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be
heard, by testimony or otherwise and to have the right determina-
tion of the controversy by proof, every material fact which bears
on the question of fact or liability be conclusively proved or
presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course of law
G in a comprehensive sense.

It is thus clear that the courts have viewed with askance any
process other than strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing
a person in occupation of immovable property against his consent.
H The reason is obvious that it aims to preserve the efficacy of law
ANAMALLIAI CLUB v. GOVf. OF T.N. 657
and peace and order in the society relegating the jurisprudential A
perspectives to a suit under Section 6 of the Act and restitute
possession to the person dispossessed, irrespective of the fact
whethe; he has any title to possession or not."

The reason is obvious that law attempts to preserve order in the B
society relegati~g that the jurisprudential perception stood under Section
6 of the Act irrespective 'of the possession of the person "dispossessed
irrespective of the fact whether he has any title to possession or not". In
paragraph 29, this Court approved the dictum cif the Privy Council in
Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR (1924)
PC 144 and held that persons are not permitted to take forcible posses- C
sion. They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper
course. In our jurisprudence governed by the rule of law even an
unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by
law. The remedy under Section 6 is of summary trial and its object is to
prevent self-help and to discourage people· to adopt any means fair or D
foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was in due course of law
or with consent.

Law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession
and rank trespasseres. Law respects possession even if there is no valid E
title to support it. Law does not permit any person to take law into his
hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having
recourse to a count. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of
the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful
possession removed from possession, accordingly to proper form and to
prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. Un-
F
doubtedly, the true owner is entitled to retain possession even though he
had obtained it by force or by other unlawful means but that would not
·.• be a ground to permit the owner to take law into his own hands and
eject the person in juridical possession or settled possession without
recourse to law. G

Thus, it could be. seen that even aft~r determination of the licence
under the Government' Grants Act, the Government is entitled to resume
possession but resumption of possession does not mean unilaterally taking
the possession without recourse to law. The Eviction Ad contemplates H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A such a procedure. "Premises" defined under Section 3(d) of the Act means
any land or any building or a part of a building or hut or any enclosure !..
appurtenant thereto. Section 4 prescribes procedure of issuance of a
notice of show cause before eviction giving an opportunity and thereafter
taking action under Section 5 of the Act. Unfortunately, on the facts of
B the case on hand, the respondent has not adopted the procedure
prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Eviction Act after determination
of the licence granted under the Government Grants Act. The High
Court, therefore, was not right in its conclusion that the procedure
prescribed under PPE Act is not applicable to the grants made under
the Government Grants Act since the appellants remained in settled
c possession since a long time pursuant to the grant. After determination
of the grant, though they have no right to remain in possession, the State
cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure
provided under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that it would have been
open to the respondent to have a notice issued to the appellant and give ,_
D time to vacate the premises within 10 days or 15 days and, therefore,
could leave resumed possession with minimal use of police force. We
cannot give any direction in this case since possession was already
resumed. We have directed not to create third party right in the property.
We are not inclined to interfere with the order.
E r
Shri Sorabjee contended that the appellant is entitled to notice
before the order of termination of grant made and so the action is bad
in law and so the appellant is entitled to restitution of the property. We
are not inclined to agree with him. The recourse to Article 226 of the
Constitution, to establish title would not be proper remedy. In this case,
F
we are not inclined to go into the question for the reason that the High
Court has held that the writ petition is not maintainable. After termination
of the licence by the Government under the Government Grants Act, f
the Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 cannot go into its correct-
ness and adjudicate in the proceedings under Section 3 thereof. In our )
I
G view, the Division Bench of the High Court is right in its finding. The ,I·
Government having determined the licence,the Estate Officer cannot go l
into the question of legality of the termination of the licence under the
Crown (Government) Grants Act to take further steps under Sections 4
and 5 of the Act. In that ·view of the situation in this case, we think that
,-'
H it is not necessary for the State Government to nomillate the Estate ,.
ANAMALUAI CLUB v. GOVT. OFT.N. 659
Officer and for the Estate Officer to give notice under Sections 4 and A
5. There is no need for the State to file a suit for eviction. But nptice
in compliance of principles of natural justice should have been given
giving reasonable time of 10 or 15 days to vacate the premises and to
deliver vacant and peaceful possession; thereafter, the Government would
be free to resume possession.. Since possession was already taken, though B
we are not approving of the m_anner in which the same was taken we
do not think that in this matter notice afresh needs to be given to the
appellant. It may be open to the appellant to avail of any remedy available
in law.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs. C
G.N. Appeal disposed of.