M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.versusSHRI RAJENDRA D. HARMALKAR

678            SUPREME COURT
                         [2022]REPORTS
                                5 S.C.R. 678                [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A                  M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.
                                        v.
                     SHRI RAJENDRA D. HARMALKAR
                         (Civil Appeal No. 2911 of 2022)
B                                APRIL 21, 2022
               [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
             Constitution of India: Art.226 – Writ Jurisdiction of High
      Court – Interference with the decision of disciplinary authority,
C     scope of – Respondent-original writ petitioner was appointed as
      casual employee in 1982 – He applied for the post of Refueling
      Helper and in qualification he mentioned Secondary School – Chief
      Vigilance Officer received a complaint that respondent had secured
      his job by submitting false and forged certificates – Similar complaint
      was also made to the police authorities – Despite repetitive requests
D     and follow up by the authorities, the respondent did not submit the
      original SSLC Certificate – The authorities of Secondary Board
      were requested to check up their records – Board informed that as
      per record, SSLC mark sheet did not belong to the respondent –
      Departmental Enquiry was initiated against the respondent – After
E     taking into consideration the gravity of the acts of misconduct,
      Disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from
      services – Respondent was also prosecuted by the Criminal Court,
      however, he was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt – Against the
      order of the Disciplinary Authority, the respondent filed writ petition
      before High Court – High Court held that punishment imposed on
F     the respondent was grossly disproportionate to the misconduct and
      directed to reinstate the respondent – Hence instant appeal – Held:
      Producing the false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct – The
      question is one of trust – Whether such a certificate was material or
      not and/or had any bearing on the employment or not is immaterial
G     – The question is not of having an intention or mens rea but is of
      producing the fake/forged certificate – Respondent’s case was that
      he pleaded guilty and admitted the submission of forged and fake
      certificate on the assurance that lesser punishment would be imposed,
      however, nothing on record to show who gave such assurance –
      The conduct on part of respondent showed his malafide intention –
H
                                       678
  M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                  679
                      HARMALKAR

He was acquitted by the Criminal Court by giving benefit of doubt      A
and there was no honourable acquittal – Once there was an
admission on the part of the respondent thereafter whether he has
been acquitted by the Criminal Court is immaterial – Unless and
until it is found that punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority was shockingly disproportionate and/or there was             B
procedural irregularity in conducting the inquiry, High Court would
not be justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposed
– When a conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authority
the same could not have been interfered with by the High Court
under Art.226 – High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering
with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority     C
– Service law.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. In the present case, the original writ petitioner
was dismissed from service by the Disciplinary Authority for           D
producing the fabricated/fake/forged SSLC. Producing the false/
fake certificate is a grave misconduct. The question is one of a
TRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake and
forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of
appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such a
certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the          E
employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having
an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/
forged certificate. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was
justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service.
[Para 7.1][689-A-B]                                                    F
      2. It was a case on behalf of the petitioner – original writ
petitioner before the High Court that he pleaded guilty and
admitted that he had submitted a forged and fake certificate on
the assurance that lesser punishment will be imposed. However,
except the bald statement, there is no further evidence on the         G
same. Nothing was mentioned on record as to who gave him such
an assurance. [Para 7.2][689-C-D]



                                                                       H
680            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A            3. So far as the submission on behalf of the original writ
      petitioner that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court for the
      offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in respect
      of the same certificate is concerned, the said contention is neither
      here nor there and is of no assistance to the original writ petitioner.
      Apart from the fact that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court
B
      by giving benefit of doubt and there was no honourable acquittal,
      in the present case before the Disciplinary Authority the original
      writ petitioner as such admitted that he produced the fake and
      forged certificate. Therefore, once there was an admission on
      the part of the respondent – original writ petitioner, thereafter
C     whether he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court is
      immaterial. [Para 7.4][689-H; 690-A-B]
            4. As per the settled position of law, unless and until it is
      found that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority
      is shockingly disproportionate and/or there is procedural
D     irregularity in conducting the inquiry, the High Court would not
      be justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposed
      by the Disciplinary Authority which as such is a prerogative of
      the Disciplinary Authority. [Para 7.5][690-D]
            5. In any case in the facts and circumstances of the case
E     and considering the charge and misconduct of producing the fake
      and false SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious decision
      was taken by the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss him from
      service, the same could not have been interfered with by the
      High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
      Constitution of India. The High Court has exceeded in its
F     jurisdiction in interfering with the order of punishment imposed
      by the Disciplinary Authority while exercising its powers under
      Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The order passed by the
      Disciplinary Authority dismissing the original writ petitioner from
      service on the misconduct proved is restored. [Paras 7.6 and
G     8][690-F-H; 691-B]
            Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : [2000]
            4 Suppl. SCR 693; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham,
            (1997) 7 SCC 463 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 549; Union
            of India v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388
H
   M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                         681
                       HARMALKAR

        : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 217; Union of India v. Diler                     A
        Singh, (2016) 13 SCC 71 : [2016] 4 SCR 473; B.C.
        Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749
        : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin
        Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) v.
        Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : [2013]
                                                                               B
        17 SCR 309 – relied on.
                         Case Law Reference
[2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693              relied on               Para 3.5
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 549              relied on               Para 3.5
                                                                               C
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 217              relied on               Para 3.5
[2016] 4 SCR 473                     relied on               Para 3.5
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644              relied on               Para 7(ii)
[2013] 17 SCR 309                    relied on               Para 7(iii)
                                                                               D
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2911 of
2022.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2015 of the High Court
of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013.
     Rajiv Shukla, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Ms. Shivani Kapoor, Pankaj             E
Sharma, Sanjay Kumar, Advs for the Appellant.
     Ms. Suruchi Suri, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Advs. for the
Respondent.
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             F
        M. R. SHAH, J.
       1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 29.06.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013 by which the High
Court has partly allowed the said writ petition preferred by the respondent    G
herein (hereinafter referred to as the “original writ petitioner”) directing
the petitioner herein to reinstate the original writ petitioner without any
back wages and other benefits by substituting the punishment of dismissal
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the employer – Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. has preferred the present appeal.
                                                                               H
682              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A              2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as
      under:
              That the respondent herein original writ petitioner was initially
      appointed in the year 1982 as a casual employee. He moved an application
      seeking the position of Refueling Helper, wherein under the heading of
B     qualifications, he mentioned that he has passed Secondary School Leaving
      Certificate (hereinafter referred to as “SSLC”) in April, 1986 from
      Karnataka Secondary Education Board. That he was thereafter appointed
      as Helper as per the regularization policy regularizing the casual
      employees, inter alia, subject to the contents prescribed in the application
      form for employment being correct. At that stage also the original writ
C     petitioner submitted SSLC of Karnataka Board bearing No.206271 dated
      19.05.1986.
            2.1 In the year 2003, the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Corporation
      received a complaint that the original writ petitioner had secured his job
      as Re-fueling Helper by submitting a false and forged SSLC. Similar
D     complaint was also made to the police authorities also.
            2.2 Despite repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities,
      original writ petitioner did not submit the original SSLC Certificate. On
      the contrary, the original writ petitioner sent a communication wherein it
      was mentioned that the original SSLC has been misplaced. Thereafter
E     the Manager, ER advised original writ petitioner to obtain a duplicate
      copy of the original SSLC and to submit the same to the Manager, ER.
      However, he continued evading submission of the original certificate or
      even the Duplicate SSLC from Karnataka Board.
            2.3 The Manager, ER thereafter requested the authorities of the
      Secondary Board to check up their records and confirm whether they
F
      had issued any marks certificate carrying details available on the
      photocopy of the SSLC marks sheet issued by them. In response to the
      same, the Board informed the authority that “as per the record, SSLC
      statement of marks for the year March, 1986 bearing Registration
      No.206271 relate to one Agrahar Jayant S/o Satyanarayana A.L. DOB
G     – 15.02.1968 and does not belong to Rajendra Dattaram Harmalkar S/o
      Datta Ram Harmalkar, DOB – 08.12.1962”.
             2.4 In the above circumstances, a departmental enquiry was
      initiated against the original writ petitioner. The original writ petitioner
      was served with the charge-sheet containing two charges which read
H     as under:
   M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                         683
                HARMALKAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      “1. Wilful insubordination or disobedience whether or not in             A
      combination with another, of any lawful and reasonable order of a
      superior.
      2. Giving false information regarding one’s age, father’s name,
      qualifications or previous service at the time of employment.”
       2.5 The original writ petitioner replied to the charge-sheet. The       B
Inquiry Officer held that both the aforesaid charges were proved and
proposed the punishment of dismissal. After giving an opportunity to the
original writ petitioner on having agreed with the findings of the Inquiry
Officer, and after taking into consideration the gravity of the acts of
misconduct proved, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment           C
of dismissal from services. The appeal preferred by the original writ
petitioner came to be dismissed.
       2.6 At this stage it is required to be noted that the original writ
petitioner was also prosecuted by the Criminal Court, however the learned
Trial Court acquitted him by giving benefit of doubt mainly on the ground      D
that the original SSLC was not brought on record.
       2.7 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of dismissal
passed by the Disciplinary Authority confirmed by the Appellate Authority,
the original writ petitioner preferred the writ petition before the High
Court. It was the case on behalf of the original writ petitioner that he
                                                                               E
admitted the alleged guilt of misconduct on the assurance of a lenient
view being taken by the authorities. It was also argued that there was no
minimum educational qualification and age limit (minimum or maximum)
prescribed to secure the job or even for the promotion. It was submitted
that therefore in such circumstances, it cannot be said that he had
submitted a false and forged certificate with an attempt to secure the         F
job or promotion. That the certificate was produced only for the purpose
of record and there was no dishonest intention to grab the job or promotion.
It was also urged that the Criminal Court had acquitted him and that he
had a good service record and that the first charge of insubordination is
not established. The High Court framed only one point for determination,
                                                                               G
namely, whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct committed by the petitioner. By the
impugned judgment and order the High Court observed and held that the
punishment imposed upon the original writ petitioner was grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct and interfered with the order of
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by observing that the         H
684                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     respondent was assured that on admission of his guilt a lenient view may
      be taken while imposing the punishment. The High Court also observed
      that the petitioner is out of service from the year 2006 and as the counsel
      for the petitioner had made a statement that he will forgive his back
      wages and promotion, by the impugned judgment and order the High
      Court allowed the said writ petitioner and the directed the appellant to
B
      reinstate the original writ petitioner from the date of dismissal from service
      in the post of Refueling Helper, however without any back wages or
      benefits.
             2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
      and order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petitioner and
C     interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
      Authority, the Indian Oil Corporation – employer – Disciplinary Authority
      has preferred the present appeal.
             3. Shri Rajiv Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
      appellant had vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
D     of the case the High Court has committed a grave error in interfering
      with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority
      pursuant to the charge of giving false information regarding his father’s
      name, his qualification by producing a fake and false SSLC was held to
      be proved. It is contended that the High Court materially erred in observing
E     that the punishment of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority
      on the proved misconduct was disproportionate to the misconduct
      established and proved.
            3.1 It is urged that when an employee has produced a false and
      forged SSLC of the Education Board the same can be said to be a grave
      misconduct and therefore the Disciplinary Authority was justified in
F     imposing the punishment of dismissal.
             3.2 It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant
      that the grounds on which the High Court interfered with the punishment
      imposed by the Disciplinary Authority namely that original writ petitioner:-
             (i)      has admitted the guilt on an assurance that a lenient view
G
                      shall be taken while imposing the punishment;
             (ii)     has been acquitted by the Criminal Court; and
             (iii)    that no minimum qualification or age limit was prescribed
                      for getting the job or promotion and that he had a good
H                     service record, are all irrelevant and/or not germane.
   M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                           685
                HARMALKAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       3.3 It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated      A
the fact that the Criminal Court acquitted the original writ petitioner by
giving him a benefit of doubt and there was no honorable acquittal.
       3.4 It is contended that it is immaterial, whether, there was a
minimum qualification or age limit prescribed for the job or promotion or
not and therefore there was no intention to secure the job by producing          B
the fake/forged certificate. It is submitted that it is a case of TRUST
and therefore when the Disciplinary Authority/employer loses the
Confidence and TRUST in such an employee who submitted a forged/
fake certificate, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the
order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
                                                                                 C
       3.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Om
Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad
Tiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388; and Union of India v. Diler Singh, (2016)
13 SCC 71, it is submitted that while interfering with the order of
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority the High Court has              D
exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising its powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that as per the settled position
of law unless there is a procedural irregularity in conducting the
disciplinary proceedings and/or the punishment imposed is shockingly
disproportionate to the proved misconduct, then and then only, the High          E
Court can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority.
      3.6 It is further submitted that even denying the back wages on
the concession given by the employee cannot be said to be a sufficient           F
punishment imposed. It is submitted that in the present case as such
during the interregnum period the respondent original writ petitioner was
working with the petroleum unit of Reliance Industries as a driver for
the period between 2006 to 2017. Therefore, denying the back wages
and promotion by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order
cannot be said to be any punishment at all.                                      G
      3.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
      4. The instant appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Suruchi Suri,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
                                                                                 H
686             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A            4.1 It is submitted by Ms. Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf
      of the respondent – original writ petitioner that in the present case the
      respondent – original writ petitioner did produce the fake/forged SSLC.
      However, the same had no relevance for securing the job as there was
      no minimum qualification or age limit prescribed for getting the job or
      promotion. It is submitted that the same was produced only for the purpose
B
      of record.
             4.2 Further, the original writ petitioner admitted his guilt of producing
      the fake/forge certificate on an assurance that a lenient view would be
      taken at the time of imposing the punishment.
C           4.3 It is submitted that even the respondent – original writ petitioner
      has been acquitted by the Criminal Court for the offences punishable
      under Sections 468 and 471 IPC regarding the said SSLC produced by
      him.
              4.4 It is further urged that even the respondent had an unblemished
D     and good service record. Therefore, considering the aforesaid overall
      facts and circumstances, when the High Court has interfered with the
      order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and has
      ordered reinstatement without any back wages and promotion, the same
      is not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers
      under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
E
            4.5 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the present
      appeal.
             5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
             6. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in exercise
F     of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has interfered
      with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and
      has ordered reinstatement without back wages and other benefits by
      observing that order of punishment of dismissal from the service imposed
      by the Disciplinary Authority is disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
G            Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration by
      this Court is, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case the
      High Court is justified in interfering with the conscious decision taken by
      the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the punishment of dismissal
      from service, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
      of India.
H
   M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                          687
                HARMALKAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       7. On the question of judicial review and interference of the courts     A
in matters of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, a
few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to:

       i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering
the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has
observed and held that the question of the quantum of punishment in             B
disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to order
and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the
applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as
‘Wednesbury principles’.                                                        C

       In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was said that
when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the
scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said
that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the
following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to           D
law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were
considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could
have taken.

     ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
                                                                                E
SCC 749, in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under:

      “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the
      disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being
      fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the
      evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested            F
      with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in
      view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/
      Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot
      normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some
      other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
      authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the         G
      High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either
      directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the
      penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in
      exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with
      cogent reasons in support thereof.”                                       H
688           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A           iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now
      Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) v. Rajendra Singh, (2013)
      12 SCC 372, in paragraph 19, it was observed and held as under:
           “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and
           summarised as follows:
B
           19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the
           quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is
           essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.
           19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/
C          departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment
           and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively
           within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
           19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the
           punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases
D          where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of
           the court.
           19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as
           shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against
           the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to
E          remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate
           authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The
           court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in
           such a case.
           19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above,
F          would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser
           punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges
           of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted
           with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of
           equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-
G          delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete
           parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge
           but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet
           in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges,
           indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to
           him would be justifiable.”
H
   M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                            689
                HARMALKAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       7.1 In the present case, the original writ petitioner was dismissed        A
from service by the Disciplinary Authority for producing the fabricated/
fake/forged SSLC. Producing the false/fake certificate is a grave
misconduct. The question is one of a TRUST. How can an employee
who has produced a fake and forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at
the initial stage of appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether
                                                                                  B
such a certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the
employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having an intention
or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate.
Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing
the punishment of dismissal from service.
       7.2 It was a case on behalf of the petitioner – original writ petitioner   C
before the High Court that he pleaded guilty and admitted that he had
submitted a forged and fake certificate on the assurance that lesser
punishment will be imposed. However, except the bald statement, there
is no further evidence on the same. Nothing has been mentioned on
record as to who gave him such an assurance.                                      D
       7.3 Even otherwise the conduct on the part of the original writ
petitioner is required to be considered.
        As observed hereinabove, prior to the issuance of the chargesheet
and after the complaint was received by the Vigilance Officer, there
were repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities requesting the          E
original writ petitioner to produce the original SSLC. Initially the original
writ petitioner did not even respond to the said requests. Thereafter, he
came up with a case that the original SSLC was misplaced. He was
then called upon to obtain a duplicate copy of the SSLC and to submit
the same to the Manager, ER. However, he continued to evade obtaining             F
the duplicate certificate from Karnataka Board. Only thereafter the
Manager, ER directly contacted the authorities of the Board and requested
the Education Board to check up from their records and only thereafter
it was revealed that the SSLC produced by the original petitioner was
forged and fake and belonged to or related to some another student and
it did not belong to the original writ petitioner. This shows the malafide        G
intention on the part of the original writ petitioner.
       7.4 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the original writ
petitioner that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court for the offences
punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in respect of the same
certificate is concerned, the said contention is neither here nor there and       H
690             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     is of no assistance to the original writ petitioner. Apart from the fact that
      he was acquitted by the Criminal Court by giving benefit of doubt and
      there was no honourable acquittal, in the present case before the
      Disciplinary Authority the original writ petitioner as such admitted that
      he produced the fake and forged certificate. Therefore, once there was
B     an admission on the part of the respondent – original writ petitioner,
      thereafter whether he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court is
      immaterial.
             7.5 Even from the impugned judgment and order passed by the
      High Court it does not appear that any specific reasoning was given by
C     the High Court on how the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
      Authority could be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct
      proved. As per the settled position of law, unless and until it is found that
      the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is shockingly
      disproportionate and/or there is procedural irregularity in conducting the
      inquiry, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the order
D     of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority which as such is a
      prerogative of the Disciplinary Authority as observed hereinabove.

             7.6 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
      Court, it appears that the High Court has denied the back wages and
      other benefits and has ordered reinstatement on a concession given by
E
      the learned counsel on behalf of the original writ petitioner. However, it
      is required to be noted that for the period between 2006 to 2017 i.e.
      during the pendency of the writ petition the respondent was working in
      the Petroleum Division of Reliance Industries. Therefore, he was aware
      that even otherwise he is not entitled to the back wages for the aforesaid
F     period. Therefore, the concession given on behalf of the original writ
      petitioner as such cannot be said to be a real concession. In any case in
      the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above
      and considering the charge and misconduct of producing the fake and
      false SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious decision was taken by
G     the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss him from service, the same could
      not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powers
      under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has
      exceeded in its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of punishment
      imposed by the Disciplinary Authority while exercising its powers under
      Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
H
   M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.                      691
                HARMALKAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the        A
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in interfering
with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority of
dismissing the original writ petitioner from service and ordering
reinstatement without back wages and other benefits is hereby quashed
and set aside. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing
                                                                            B
the original writ petitioner from service on the misconduct proved is
hereby restored.
      The present appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
                                                                            C
Devika Gujral                                             Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)




                                                                            D




                                                                            E




                                                                            F




                                                                            G




                                                                            H