Holding

The notification is valid, within the powers conferred by Section 25 of the Customs Act, does not violate Section 25(3) or Article 19(1)(g), and therefore the writ petition is dismissed.

Summary

M/s Pankaj Jain Agencies, an importer of ball bearing components, challenged Notification No. 142/86-Cus., issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, which reduced an earlier exemption and raised customs duty on its imports. The petitioners argued that the notification was not in force at the time of import, exceeded the statutory duty prohibited by Section 25(3), and unreasonably restricted their fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). The Supreme Court held that publication of the notification in the Official Gazette on 13 February 1986 was sufficient to bring it into operation, that the duty prescribed did not exceed the statutory duty, and that customs duties are not per se violative of Article 19(1)(g). Consequently, the petition was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether Notification No. 142/86-Cus., issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, is ultra vires the statutory power, particularly in view of the condition in Section 25(3) that duty not exceed the statutory duty.
Whether the notification was validly brought into force, i.e., whether publication in the Official Gazette suffices and whether it was effective at the time of the import.
Whether the increased customs duty constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to trade/import under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(g)
Customs Act, 1962s. 25(1), s. 25(3)
Customs Tariff Act, 1975

Subjects

Customs dutyNotificationSection 25Ultra viresFundamental rightsArticle 19(1)(g)Subordinate legislationOfficial GazetteImport exemption

Judgment

A M/S PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIES
v.
UNION OF INDIA

JULY 14, 1994

B [M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, CJ. AND DR. A.S. ANAND, J.]

Customs Act 1962: Section 25, sub-sections ( 1) and (3}-Notification
issued by Ceniral Government in exercise of Powers under section 25(1) of
the Customs Act-Constitutional Validity of, Notification No. 142186-Cus.
C dated 13-12-86, in so far as it reduces the exte11t of exemptio11 granted by
earlier notification No. 70/85-Cus., dated 17-3-85 and thereby ame11ds it-
Whether ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under section 25( 1)
of the Customs Act-l:Yhether violative of conditions laid down by sub-sec.
(3) of sec. 25 of the Customs Act.

D Constitution of India-An. 19(1)(gj--171e 'duty imposed'-'Excessive-
ness of t.u--Whether infringes the Fundamental Right guaranteed u11der Alt
19(1 )(g) of the Constitution.

Notification-Publication in Official Gazette-Whether acquires ele-
ments of operativeness and enforceability.
E
The Petitioner was carrying on the business of imports of com ..
ponents parts of Ball and Roller Bearings. In course of its business, the
Petitioner entered into agreements with M/s Business Birds, Singapore
for the supply of 'cups' of Chinese manufacture said to be component parts
F of Ball bearing. Accordingly, two consignment of 5000 and 13000 'cups'
respectively, under invoice dated 2-2-86 arrived at the Bombay Port on or
about 10-2·8'6. The Petitioner thereafter filed two Bills of Entry for home
consumption noted on 19·2 ..86. However, in the meantime, the Government
of India (Respondent herein), in exercise of its powers conferred under
sec. 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, issued, the impugned Notification No.
G 142/86-cus., dated 13-12-86. The said Notification which was duly published
in the Official Gazette on the very date i.e. 13-2-86, sought to reduce the
extent of the exemption granted by earlier Notification No. 70/85-cus.,
dated 17--3-85. The goods in question, in ordinary course would have fallen
under Tariff heading 84.62(2) and accordingly would have attracted
H statutory duty under chapter 84 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. It is the
602
PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIES v. U.0.1. 603

rigour of this statutory duty which was mitigated by the earlier exemption A
Notification No. 70/85-cus., dated 17·8-85. The impugned notification No.
146/86 however, amended the previous one In so far as it prescribed import
duty on 'parts of Ball Bearings'.

The enhancement of duty brought about by the impugned notifica·
lion, raised the Petitioner's liability from Rs. 1,84,341 to Rs. 6,42,065. The B
Petitioner, therefore challenged the validity of the said notification or in
the alternative Its applicability, before, this Court by way of Writ Petition
contending therein : -

(a) The import was complete even before the Impugned notification C
can be said to have come into force, as it was made available In Bombay
till the 19th of February, 1986. The notification therefore cannot be held
to have been duly promulgated or brought into force on the day the Import
had occurred and accordingly would have no application to the two con·
signment s in question. It is not sufficient that Subordinate Legislation is
promulgated. For Subordinate legislation to come into force, it is neces· D
. sary that they are made known or broadcast in a recognisable way, so
that all men may know what it is.

(b) The notification in so far as it prescribed import duty on parts
of Ball Bearings, in effect and substance purports to impose a fresh and E
nascent duty on spare parts or components of Ball Bearings and hence is
ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under the section 25(1)
of the Customs Act, as indeed no duty was really contemplated respecting
spare parts or components of Ball Bearings under the Customs Tariff Act,
1975. It is also violative of the specific condition in sub-section (3) of
section 25 which requires that the duty imposed shall in no case exceed the F
'statutory duty'.

(c) The duty imposed by the said notification constituted an un·
reasonable restriction on the Petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed
under Art 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. • G
Dismissing the Writ Petitions this Court

HELD : 1.1. Delegated or Subordinate Iegislati~n is all pervasive and
that there is hardly any field of activity, where governance by delegated or
Subordinate legislative powers is not as important, if not more important H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. l S.C.R.

A than governance by Parliamentary legislation. Unlike Parliamentary legis-
lation which is publicly made, delegated or Subordinate legislation is often
made unobtrusively in the chamber of a Minister, a Secretary to the
Government or other official dignitary. It is therefore necessary that
Subordinate legislation, to take effect must be published or promulgated
in a suitable manner, whether such publication or promulgation is
B prescribed by the parent statute or not. It will then take effect from the
date of such publication or promulgation. [612-G-H, 613-A]

If the Subordinate legislation does not prescrlhl! any mode of publi- .·
cation or it prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will
C take effect only when it is published through the customarily recognised
otncial channel namely the Official Gazette. [613-D]

1.2. The knowledge of the existence of content of a law by an in·
dividual would not always be relevant, save on the question of the sentence
to be imposed for its violation. [612·B]
D '
D.B. Raju v. H.J. Kantharaj, [1990] 4 SCC 178 para 14, referred to.

Johnson v. Sargant, (1918) 1 KB 101; Litn ChinAik v.Reginam, [1963]
1 All ER 223 and State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans Geoi'ge, AIR (1965)
SC 722, relied on.
E
B.K. Srinivasan & Another v. State of Kamataka & Others, AIR (1987)
SC 1059 at 1067, followed.

2. A tax, in particular, in the nature of duties. of customs is not per
se violative of Article 19(1)(g). Mere excessiveness of tax is not, by itself,
F violative of Art 19 (l)(g), and this question cannot be divorced from the
nature of the right to import. There is no absolute right, much less a
fundamental right to import. [615'B·C]

Deputy Assistant Iron & Steel Controller, Madras & Another v. L.
G ¥anickchand, Proprietor, Katra/la Metal Corporation, Madras, AIR (1972)
SC 935, Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports & Others, I '
AIR (1974) SC 1539 and/. Fernandes & Co. v. Deputy Chief Controller of
Imports & Exports & Others, AIR (1975) SC 1208, referred to.

3.1 In the facts of the present case, there is no substance in the
H contention that notwithstanding the publication in the Official Gazette,
PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIES v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH; J.) 605

there was a failure to make the law known and therefore the notification A
did not acquire element or operativeness and enforceability. (613-E)

3.2. The notes which are part or the Tariff provision read with the
Tariff, indicate that the 'part's and 'components' or Ball and Roller Bear-
ings are not excluded from duty. Also the rates prescribe in the impugned
notification do not exceed the rates or statutory duty. Hence, the conten- B
tion that the impugned notification is violative or the condition in sub-sec-
tion (3) section 25 or the Customs Act is devoid or force. (614-H, 615-A)

3.3. Right to import is not a Fundamental Right, that apart no factual
foundations are laid to demonstrate how this impost has had the effect or c
destroying the Petitioner's right to carry on trade or business. [615-D]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ petition No. 123 of 1987.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Ashok H. Desai, Harish N. Salve, S.K. Dholakia, Ravindra Narain, D
Ashok Sagar, Ms. Arnita Mitra, D.N. Mishra, Ms. Bina Gupta, P.H.
Parekh, A.K. Agarwal M.K.D. Namboodiry, Ms. Yasmin Tarapore,
Janendra Lal, Ms. Alpana Poddar, Kaiiash Vasdev, Ms. Monika Mohil, Ms.
Meenakshi, S. Ganesh, Rajiv Garg, N.D. Garg, U.A. Ranft, Anand Prasad,
Rajiv Tyagi, G.L. Rawal, Vimal Roy Jad, Anip Sachthey, Ms. Kamini E
Jaiswal, R.K. Mehta, K.R. Nambiar, A.N. Kirpal, K.K. Gupta, Kishan
Kumar and Ms. Poonam Madan for the petitioners.

D.N. Dwivedi, Additional Solicitor General, A.K. Ganguli, A. Subba
Rao, Ms. Sushma Suri, Dilip Tandon, P.Parmeswaran, C. V.S, Rao and Ms.
A. Subhashini for the respondents. F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATACHALIAH, CJ. By this petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, Mis. Pankaj Jain Agencies, the petitioner, assails the
vires of the Notification No. 142/86-Cus., dated 13.2.1986 of the Central G
Government issued in exercise of powers under Section 25(1) of the
Customs Act, 1962, amending the earlier Notification No. 70/85 dated
17.3.1985. These notifications relate to rates of customs duty on the imports
of parts, components and sub-assemblies of Ball Bearings and Roller
Bearings. The impugned notification specifically relates to 'parts' of Ball
and Roller Bearings. H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A 2. The petitioner carries on business of imports of component parts
of Ball and Roller Bearings and claims to be the beneficiary by assignment
and transfer of certain Replenishment licences initially issued in favour of
Mis Geo Millers & Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, against experts made by the
said licencee. The licences, were transferred to Mis. Ashoka Enterprises,
New Delhi, which in turn, further transferred the licences in favour of the
B petitioner.

Pursuant thereto, the petitioner claims to have entered into an agree-
ment with M/s. Business Birds, Singapore, for the supply of 'cups' of
chinese manufacture and said to be component parts O• Ball Bearings. The
C foreign supplier shipped the goods in three different lots from singapore
to Bombay Port. The first consignment of 8600 pieces was sent from
Singapore to Bombay on 5.1.1986 per Stearn Ship, HANLIM MARINER.
The Ship arrived in Bombay on or about 15th January, 1986 and the
consignment was cleared by the Revenue charging import duty at the then
D prevailing rates though, however, on the question of assessable values he
Revenue did not accept the invoice-value. The controversy in regard to that
particular consignment was as to valuation and not as to the rates of import
duty.

3. The two further consignments of 5000 and 13000 'CUPS' respec-
E tively under invoice dated 2.2.1986 are stated to have arrived at Bombay ·
Port on or about 10.2.1986. The petitioner filed two Bills of Entry for home
consumption which were noted on 19th February, 1986. The dispute in
regard to these two consignments concerned in this writ petition is whether
the higher rates indicated by the impugned Notification No, 142/86-Cus.,
F dated 13th February, 1986 were attracted. It is to be stated that the rates
of duty are statutorily provided under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and
these notifications under section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 seek to
exempt goods covered by the notification from such part of import duty as
may be in excess of what may be specified in the notifications. In that sense
G the impugned notification, strictly speaking, does not impose or prescribe
a rate of duty but has the effect of reducing the extent of the earlier
exemption. The petitioner's contention is that the higher rates of duty
indicated in the Notification No. 142/86-Cus., dated 13th February, 1986
could not be applied to the said two consignments as the impugned
notification could not be held to have been duly promulgated or brought
H into force on the day the import had occurred.
PANKAJJAINAGENCIESv. U.0.1.[VENKATACHALIAH,J.] 607

4. Sri Ganesh, learned counsel urged several contentio.is in support A
of the challenge to the validity - or in the alternative, of the applicability -
of the impugned notification No. 142/86-Cus., dated 13th February, 1986.
The contentions nrged at the hearing admit of being notified and formu-
lated thus : First, that the import was complete even before the impugned
Notification can be said to have come into force as the impugned notifica-
B
tion was nol made known to those who were likely to be affected byJt as
the notification was not available in Bombay till the 19th of February, 1986.
Secondly, it was urged, that the impugned notification in so far as it
prescribed import duty on parts of Ball Bearings, is ultra vires the powers
of the Central Government under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962
as inded no duty was really contemplated respecting spare-parts or com- c
ponents of Ball Bearings under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The im-
pugned notification, it is argued, in effect and substance purports to impose
a fresh and nascent duty on spare-parts or components of Ball Bearings
which were not originally brought to chargr; in the statute and that the
. impugned notification is not only beyond the powers of the Central D
Government under Section 25(1) but is also violative of the specific condi-
tion in sub-section (3) of Section 25 which requires that the duty shall in
no case exceed the "statutory duty". It is said that respecting 'part's of Ball
Bearings there was no "statutory duty" at all. Thirdly, it was urged that the
duty imposed constituted an unreasonable restriction on petitioner's fun-
damental rights under Article 19(1)(g), in that the enhancement brought E
about by the impugned Notification, so far as the present consignments
were concerned, was to raise the petitioner's liability from Rs. 1, 84.341 to
Rs. 6, 42,065.

5. Before assessing the merits of these contentions it is necessary to
F
advert to the relevant statutory provisions relating to the rates of duty on
imports of Ball Bearings and Roller Bearings and parts thereof under the
Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Chapter 84 deals, amongst other things, with Ball
or Roller Bearing. The relevant provisions say : -

84.62 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings : G
(1) Ball and roller bearings not 100% plus Rs.100
elsewhere specified. per bearing

(2) Ball bearings of all types, not exce- 200% plus Rs. 100
eding 60 millimetres bore diameter. per bearing H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. l S.C.R.

A (3) Roller bearings, including needle 200% plus Rs. 100
roller bearings but excluding adapter per bearing
roller bearings, not exceeding 85
millimeters bore diameter.

Apparently, the goods would, but for the impugned notification,
B otherwise attract 84.62(2) above.

The rigour of this statutory duty was mitigated by exemption notifica-
tion No. 70/85-Cus., dated 17.8.1985 exempting the imports from so much
of the duty as may be in excess of the rates specified in column No. 4 of
C the Table appended to the notification. This notification, however, was
further amendment by the impugned notification No. 142/86-Cus., dated
13th February 1986. The impugned notification provides :"NEW DELHI,
the 13th February, 1986. The impugned notification provides :

"NEW DELHI, the 13th February, 1986.
D 24th MEGHA, 1907 (SAKA)

NOTIFICATION

No. 142/86-CUSTOMS

E G.S.R. 199(E) : In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section
(1) of the section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), the Central
Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to
do, hereby makes the following further amendment in the notification of
the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Dept!. of Revenue)
F No. 78- 05-Cus., dated the 17th March, 1985 namely : -

In the Table annexed to the said notification for SI. No. 6 and the
entry relating thereto, the following SI. No. and entry shall be substituted,
11amely:-
(1) (2)
G
"6. Sub-head- l.(a) Parts including sub- 150 per cent ad-
ing No ..(3) of assemblies of bearings of valorem plus Rs. 15
description mentioned in per part or sub-
item 1(a) of SI. No. 5 assembly as the
above. case may be.
H
PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIESv. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH,J.] 609

1 2 3 A
(b) Parts including sub 150 per cent ad-
assemblies of bearings of valorem plus Rs. 26
description mentioned in per part or sub-
item l(b) of SI. No. 5 assembly as the
above. case maybe. B
(c) Parts including sub- 150 per cent ad-
assemblies of bearings of valorem plus Rs. 38
description mentioned in per part or sub-
item l(c) of SI. No. 5 assembly as the
above. ca•e maybe. c
(d) Parts including sub- 150 per cent ad-
assemblies of bearings of valorem plus Rs. 80
description mentioned in per part or sub-
item 1( d) of SI. No. 5 assembly as the
above. case maybe. D
2. All other goods 150 per cent ad-
valorem

Sd\-
(K.S. VENKATAGIRI) E
Under Secretary to the Govt. of India"

The impugned notification did not prescribe a rate higher than the
statutory duty.

6. The contention of Sri Ganesh that the relevant date with reference F
to which the rates of custom duty require to be ascertained had already
occurred by the time the impugned notification No. 142/86-Cus. came into
force is, on the facts of the present case, clearly untenable. Section 25(1)
of the Customs Act, 1962' provides :

'If the Central Government is satisfied that it is ne~essary in G
the public interest so to do, it may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, exempt generally either absolutely or subject to such
conditions (to be fu1filled before or after clearance), as may be
specified in the notification goods of any specified description from
the whole or any part of duty of customs leviable thereon." H
610 SU!'REME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A In BHARAT SURFACTANTS (PVT.) LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA,
in EXCISE LAW TIMES - (Vol. 43-1989, P.189, at p.194), this Court held:

"The provis;ons of Sec. 15 are clear in themselves. The date on
which a Bill of Entry is presented u/s 46 is, in the case of goods
cnlcrt.:d for home consumption, the date relevant for determining
B the rate of duty and tariff valuation. Where the Bill of Entry is
presented before the date of entry Inwards of the vessel, the Bill of
Entry is deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry
Inwards."

(Emphasis supplied)
c
In the present case the date with reference to which rates of duty
had to be ascertained was the 19th February, 1986. The impugned notifica-
tion dated 13th February, 1986 was published in the Gazette on the 13th
February, 1986. There is no infirmity in the impugned notification on this
D ~.;cnrc.

7. But. Sri Ganesh urged that it was not sufficient that a Law,
Rc:gulation, Statutory Instrument or subordinate legislation is promulgated;
and that for their coming into operation it is necessary that they are made
Lno\\·n or hr1.1adcast in so1ne recognizable way, so that all men may known
E "· '"" it Is Bui the law recognises the distinction between an Act of the
l .\!~islature which comes into force on the rlate it receives the assent of the
Prc~:ident or the Governor and subordinat:: legislation which require pub-
lication .in some recognised way.

It ls, however, urged, that is, until the notification was available in
F Bombay - and shown to be so available - the statutory rule or instrument
would not become operative.

This contention has the familiar ring of the dictum of Bailhache, J.
in Johnson v. Sargant, [1918] 1 KB 101, referred to with approval by Bose,
G J. in Har/a v. 17ie State of Rajasthan, AIR (1951) SC 467 who said :

"Natural Justice requires that before a lawcan become operative
it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some
. recognizable way so that all men may know what it is, or, at the
very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or cus-
H tomary channel by or through which such knowledge can be
PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIESv. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH,J.] 611

acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence'. A
(See also D.B. Raju v. HJ. Kantharaj, [1990] 4 SCC 178 Para 14.)

In Lim Cltin Aik v. Raginam, (1963) All England Law Reports, P.223
AT 226, the Privy Council also observed :
B
"It was said on the respondent's part that the order made by the
minister under the powers conferred by s.9 of the ordinance was
an instance of the exercise of delegated legislation and therefore
that the order, once made, became part of the law of Singapore
of which ignorance could provide no excuse on a charge of con-
travention of the section. Their Lordships are unable to accept this C
contention. In their Lordship's opinion, even if the' making of the
order by the minister be regarded as an exercise of the legislative
as distinct from the executive or administrative function (as they
do not concede), the maxim cannot apply to such a case as the
present where it appears that there is in the State of Singapore no D
provision, corresponding, for example, to that contained in S. 3 (2)
of the English Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, for the publication
in any form of an order of the kind made in the present case or
any other provision designed to enable a man by appropriate
inquiry to find out what "the law" is. "
E
8. But then in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR (1965)
SC 722 at 742, Rajagopala Ayyanagar, J. referred to the following comment
of Prof. C.K. Allen on Johnson v. Sargant :

"This was a bold example of judgment-made law. There was no
precedent for it, and indeed a decision, Jones v. Robson, (1901) 1 F
KB 673 which, though not on all fours, militated strongly against
the judge's conclusions, was not cited; nor did he judge attempt
to define how and when delegated legislation became known. Both
arguments and judgment are very brief. The decision has always
been regarded as very doubtful, but it never came under review by G
a higher court. 11 •

And observed :
11
We see great force in the learned author's comment on the
reasoning in Sargant's case, 1908-1 KB lOL Taking the present .f
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP.1 S.C.R ..

A case, the question would immediately arise is it to be made known
in India or throughout the world for the argument on behalf of the
respondent was that when the respondent left Geneva on Novem-
ber 27 he was not aware of the change in the content of the
exemption granted by the Reserve Bank. In a sense the knowledge
of the existence or content r.f a law by an individual would not
B always be relevant, save on the question of the sentence to be
imposed for its violation. It is obvious that for an Indian law to
operate and be effective in the territory where it operates viz., the
territory of India it is not necessary that it should either be
published or be made known outside the country. Even if, there-
c fore, the view enunciated by Bailhache, J. is taken to be .correct,
it would be apparent that the test to find out effective publication
would be publication in India, not outside India so as to bring it
to the notice of everyone who intends to pass through India. It was
"published" and made known in India by publication in the Gazette
on the 24th November and the ignorance of it by the respondent
D
viho is a foreigner is, in our opinion, wholly irrelevani."

Again in B.K Srinivasan & Anr. etc. v. State of Kamataka & Ors., AIR
(1987) SC 1059 at 1067 it was observed :

E "There can be no doubt about the proposition that where a law,
whether Parliamentary or Subordinate, demands compliance,
those that are Governed must be notified directly and reliably of
the law and all changes and additions made to it by various
· processes. Whether law is viewed from the standpoint of the
F 'Conscientious good man' seeking to abide by the law or from the
standpoint of Justice Holmes's 'Unconscientious badman' seeking
to avoid tho law, Law must be known, that is to say, it must be so
made that it can be known. We know that delegated or subordinate
legislation is all pervasive and that there is hardly any field of
activity where governance by delegated or subordinated legislative
G powers is not as important if not more important, then governance
by Parliamentary legislation. But unlike Parliamentary legislation
which is publicly made, delegated or subordinate legislation is
often made unobtrusively in the chambers of Minister, a Secretary
to the Government or other official dignitary. It is, therefore,
H necessary that subordinate legislation, in order to take effect, must
PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIES v. U.0.l. [VENKATACHALIAH. J.J 613

be published or promulgated in some suitable manner, whether A,
such publication or promulgation is prescribed by the parent
statute or not. It will then take effect from the date of such
publication or promulgation."

9. In the present case indisputably the mode of publication
prescribed by Section 25(1) was complied with. The notification was pub- B
lished in the Official Gazette on the 13th February, 1986. As to the effect
of the publication in the Official Gazette, this Court held (Srinivasan' Case
Supra at. p. 1067) :

"Where the present statute is silent, but the subordinate legis- C
lation itself prescribes the manner of publication, such a mode of
publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the subordinate
legislation does not prescribe the mode of publication or if the
subordinate legislation prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of
publication, it will take effect only when it is published through the
customarily recognised official channel, namely, the Official Gazette D
or some other reasonable mode of publication."

(Emphasis supplied)

We, therefore, see no substance in the contention that notwithstand-
E
ing the publication in the Official Gazette there was yet a failure to make
the law known and that, therefore, the notification did not acquire the
., elements of operativeness and enforecability. This contention of Sri Ganesh
is unacceptable.

10. The second contention is that the impugned notification is viola- F
tive of the condition in sub-section (3) subject to which above the power
to exempt under Section 25 could be exercised. Sub-section (3) of Section
25 of the Customs Act, 1962 says :

"An exemption under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) in respect
of any goods from any part of the duty of customs leviable thereon G
(the duty of customs leviable thereon being hereinafter referred to
as the statutory duty) may be granted by providing for the levy of
a duty on such goods at a rate expressed in a form or method
different from the form or method in which the statutory duty is
leviable and any exemption granted in relation to any goods in the H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A manner provided in this sub-section shall have effect subject to the
condition that the duty of customs chargeable on such goods shall
in no case exceed the statutory duty."

(Explanation - 'omitted')

B It i~ urged that there was no statutory-duty at all on spare parts and
components and that, therefore, the impugned notification is not an exer-
cise of the power to exempt but is in itself a source and an independent.
Substantive, fresh import spare parts on which no statutory duty obtained
earlier. As noticed earlier this contention is devoid of force.

c li.' Note under Section XVI provides :

"2. Subject to Note 1 to this Section, Note 1 to Chapter 84 and
Note 1 to Chapter 85, parts of machines not being parts of the
articles described in Heading No. 84.64 or parts of the following
articles falling within Heading No. 85.18/27, namely (i) insulators
D or insulated electric wire and the like, (ii) carbon articles used for
electrical purposes, or (iii) electrical conduit tubing and joints
therefore, are to be classified according to the following rules : -

(a) goods of a kind described in any of the Headings of Chapters
84 and 85 (other than Heading Nos. 84.65 and 85.28) are in all
E
cases to be classified in their respective Headings;

(b) other parts, if suitable for use solely or principally with a
particular kind of machine, or with a number of machines falling
within the same Heading (including a machine falling within head-
ing No. 84.59 or electrical goods and apparatus falling within
F
heading No. 85.18/27) are to be classified with the machines of that
kind. However, goods which are equally suitable for use principally
with the goods of Heading Nos. 85.13 and 85.15 are to be classified
in Heading No. 85.13;

G (c) all other parts are to be classified in Heading No. 84.65 or
85.28."

These notes which are part of the Tariff-provisions read with the
Tariff indicate that the 'parts' and components of Ball and Roller Bearings
are not excluded as contended. This contention has no substance. As
H indicated earlier the rates prescribed in the impugned notification do not
PANKAJ JAIN AGENCIES v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 615

also exceed the rates of statutory duty. The second contention of Sri A
Ganesh is not substantial either.

12. The third and the last submission is that the sudden and sharp
increase of duty steeply puts-up the petitioner's liability from Rs. 1,84,341
to Rs. 6,42,065 on these consignments constitutes an unreasonable restric-
tion on the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the B
Constitution. A tax, in particular, in the nature of duties of customs is not
per se violative of Article 19(1)(g). Mere excessiveness of a tax is not, by
itself, violative of Article 19(1)(g). This question cannot be divorced from
the nature of the right to import. There is no absolute right much less a
fundamental right to import. See: the Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel C
Controller, Madras & Anr. v. L. Manickchand, Proprietor, Katralla Metal
Corporation, Madras, AIR (1972) SC 935 and Andhra Industrial Works v.
Chief Controller of Imports & Ors., AIR (1974) SC 1539;!. Fernandes & Co.
v. The Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors., AiR (1975)
SC 1208. That apart, no factual foundations are laid to demonstrate how
this impost has had the effect of destroying the petitioner's right to carry D
on a trade or business. This Contention also has no merit.

13. Jn the result, none of the contentions so strenuously urged by Sri
Ganesh deserves to succeed. The Writ Petition is dismissed with costs.

Writ Petition No. 170 of 1987. E
WITH

Writ Petition Nos. 1498-99/1986, 1101/1986, 1768/1986, 1037/1986,
1661/1986, 1181/1986, 1522-23/1986 and 1729-30/1986.
F
ORDER

The contentions raised in these writ petitions are covered by the
pronouncement of this Court in 'Writ Petition No. 123/1987 Mis Pankaj
Jain Agencies v. Union of India & Others.
G
For the reasons set out in and following the said pronouncement,
these writ petitions are dismissed with costs.

T.W. Petitions dismissed.