M/S. SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

                          [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134


A        M/S. SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS.
                                    V.
                     STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
                 (Writ Petition (C) No. 537 of 2000)
                          JANUARY 20, 2011
B
        [J.M. PANCHAL, DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND GYAN
                    SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]

         Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948:
c
          s. 49 - Notification issued in exercise of powers conferred
    by s. 49 of the Act, granting Hill Development rebate to
    industries set up in hilly areas in respect of electricity charges
    to the extent of 33. 33%, for a period of five years -Meanwhile,
D   U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 came into force - By
    notification issued in exercise of powers conferred by s.24 of
    the 1999 Act, the benefit, which was granted to the industries
    set up in the hill areas regarding rebate in the electricity
    charges, was completely withdrawn - Writ petition filed
E   challenging the same - Petitioners raised the plea of
    promissory estoppel against the Government - Held: The
    petitioners were not entitled to raise plea of estoppel against
    the notification reducing Hill Development Rebate from 33%
    to 0% as there can be no estoppel against the statute - The
    rebate granted to the petitioners was a freedom from an
F   obligation which they otherwise were liable to discharge - The
    petitioners, as recipients of a concession, accepted to enjoy
    the benefits of the concession during the period of its grant -
    This right to enjoy was defeasible in the sense that it was
    liable to be taken away or withdrawn in exercise of the very
G   power under which the rebate/exemption was granted - Also,
    before starting their industrial units, the petitioners had
    entered into an agreement with the then U.P. State Electricity
    Board - The terms and conditions stipulated in the
    agreement make it clear that the petitioners were precluded
H                                    134                               .
    SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v.                   135
            STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
from challenging revision of tariff in exercise of statutory        A
powers conferred on respondent No. 2 in the larger public
interest - The petitioners being parties to the agreement now
cannot turn around and argue that the respondent No.2 was
bound to give 33.33% Hill Development Rebate and could
never change the tariff rates to the detriment of the petitioners   B
- U. P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999.

     s.49 - Notification uls.49 granting rebate/exemption in
respect of electricity charges - Power of the State
Government to curtail and/or withdraw the notification -
Applicability of ss. 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act -         C
Held: The Electricity (Supply) Act, being a Central Act, the
provisions of ss.14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act would
be applicable - The State Government, in view of s. 21 of the
General Clauses Act, could always withdraw, rescind, add to
or modify an exemption notification ..,.. General Clauses Act,      D
1897 - ss.14 and 21.

     Purpose of - Held: The Act was enacted to provide for
rationalization of production and supply of electricity ·and
generally for taking measures conducive to electrical -E
development.

      Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998 - s.29 -
Power of the licensee to amend and for modify the electricity
tariff - Scope - Held: The licensee has no power to amend
and/or modify the tariff determined by the Electricity              F
Regulatory Commission - UP. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999
- ss.24 and 29.

     General Clauses Act, 1897:
                                                                    G
     Purpose of - Held: The purpose of the General Clauses
Act is to place in one single statute different provisions as
regards interpretations of words and legal principles which
would otherwise have to be specified separately in many
different Acts and Regulations - Whatever the General               H
    136       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 3 S.C.R.


A Clauses Act says whether as regards the meaning of words
  or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute
    to which it applies.

        ss. 14 and 21 - Principles laid in ss. 14 and 21 -
    Discussed - Held: By virtue of ss. 14 and 21 of the Act, when
8
  a power is conferred on an a1,1thority to do a particular act,
  such power can be exercised from time to time and carries
  with it the power to withdraw, modify, amend or cancel the
  notifications earlier issued, to be exercised in the like manner
C and subject to like conditions, if any, attached with the exercise
  of the power.

          Administrative Law:

       Administrative decision - Difference from judicial
D decision - Held: Administrative decision is revocable while
  a judicial decision is not revocable except in special
  circumstances.

       Subordinate legislation - Exercise of power of
  subordinate legislation - Held: Is prospective and cannot be
E retrospective unless the statute authorizes such an exercise
  expressly or by necessary implication.

       Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of promissory estoppel
  - Object and applicability of - Held: The doctrine of
F promissory estoppel is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic
  one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties
  and to extend an equitable treatment to them - For application
  of doctrine of promissory estoppel, the promisee must
  establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position
G by reliance on the promise - Normally, the doctrine of
  promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government,
  and defence based on executive necessity would not be
  accepted by the Court - However, if it can be shown by the
  Government that having regard to the facts as they have
H subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD; AND ORS. v. STATE137
              OF U.P. AND ORS.
Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not         A
raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the
promise against the Government - Where public interest
warrants, the principles of promissory estoppe/ cannot be
invoked - Government can change the policy in public
interest - Also, doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be        B
invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law,
because none can be compelled to act against the statute.

     Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 - Policy decision
of the State Government - Fiscal decision - Judicial Review
- Held: The Supreme Court, while exercising powers under          C
Article 32, cannot substitute the opinion and/or view of the
Government - On facts, the policy of the State Government
in not granting rebate in respect of electricity charges to
industrial units situated in a particular area was basically a
fiscal decision and in absence of arbitrariness or                D
unreasonableness in the said policy, it cannot be a subject-
matter of judicial review of the Supreme Court under Article
32 - No right guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 14
of the Constitution was found to have been breached - Thus,
no case was made out to interfere with the policy of the State    E
Government.

     Pursuant to declaration of new industrial policy by
the State Government, Notification dated 28.06.1996 was
issued in exercise of pqwers conferred by Section 49 of           F
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, granting Hill Development
rebate to industries set up in hilly areas in respect of
electricity charges to the extent of 33.33%, for a period
of five years. The percentage of rebate was reduced to
17% by subsequent notifications dated 18.06.1998 and              G
25.01.1999, also i.ssued in exercise of the powers
conferred by Section 49 of the Act of 1948. Meanwhile,
the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 came into
force with effect from 14.01.2000. By notification dated
7.08.2000, issued in exercise of powers conferred by              H
    138       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act,
  1999, the benefit, which was granted to the industries set
  up in the hill areas regarding rebate in the electricity
  charges, was completely withdrawn.

       In the instant writ petition, the petitioners prayed for
8
  issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other
  appropriate writ or order declaring notification dated
  07.08.2000 issued by the UP Power Corporation Limitad
  (formerly known as U.P. State Electricity Board) as illegal,
  arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) and 21 of the
C Constitution insofar as it denied the petitioners, the Hill
  Development Rebate of 33.33% on the total amount of
  electricity bills issued by the respondents for the
  remaining unexpired period of five years from the date of
  commencement of supply of electricity to the industrial
D units of the petitioners. The petitioners also prayed for
  issuance of appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus
  or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
  commanding the respondents to restore/give Hill
   Development Rebate of 33.33% to the industrial units of
E the petitioners on the total amount of the electricity bills
  for the remaining unexpired period of five years.

          Dismissing the petition, the Court

F      HELD: 1.1. The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was
  enacted by the Parliament to provide for the
  rationalization of the production and supply of electricity
  and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical
  development. The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 being a
  Central Act, the provisions of Sections 14 and 21 of the
G General Clauses Act, 1897 would be applicable. By
  Section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, any power
  conferred by any central enactment may be exercised
  from time to time as occasion arises, unless a different
  intention appears in the Act. There is no different
H intention in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Therefore,
 SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 139
               OF U.P. AND ORS.
  the power to issue a notification under Section 49 of the A
  Act of 1948, can be exercised from time to time :t
  circumstances so require. Section 21 is based on the
  principle that power to create includes the power to
  destroy and also the power to alter what is created.
  Section 21, amongst other things, specifically deals with s
  power to add to, amend,-vary or rescind notifications. The
  power to rescind a notification is inherent in the power
  to issue the notification without any limitations or
  conditions. Section 21 embodies a rule of construction.
  The nature and extent of its application must be governed c
  by the relevant statue which confers the power to issue
  the notification, etc. However, there is no manner of doubt
  that the exercise of power to make subordinate legislation
  includes the power to rescind the same. This is made
  clear by Section 21. On that analogy an administrative
                                                              0
  decision is revocable while a judicial decision is not
  revocable except in special circumstances. Exercise of
  power of a subordinate legislation will be prospective and
  cannot be retrospective unless the statute authorizes
  such an exercise expressly or by necessary implication.
  The principle laid down in Section 21 is of general E
  application. The power to rescind mentioned in Section
  21 is without limitations or conditions. It is not a power
  so limited as to be exercised only once. The power can
  be exercised from time to time having regard to the
  exigency of time. When by a Central Act, power is given F
  to the State Government to give some relief by way of
. concession and/or rebate to newly established industrial
  units by a notification, the same can be curtailed and/or
  withdrawn by issuing another notification under the
  same provision and such exercise of power cannot be G
  faulted on the ground of promissory estoppel. The
  purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place In one
  single statute different provisions as regards
  interpretations of words and legal principles which would
  otherwise have to be specified separately in many H
        140     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011) 3 S.C.R.


    A different Acts and Regulations. Whatever the General
      Clauses Act says whether as regards the meaning of
      words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into
      every statute to which it applies. Further, power to curtail
      and/or withdraw the notification issued under Section 49
    B of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 giving rebate is
      implied under Section 49 itself on proper interpretation
      of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore,
      power to curtail and/or withdraw the notification issued
      under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948,
    c granting certain benefits, was available to the
      respondents. [Para 12) [162-H; 163-A, G-H; 169-A-H; 165-
        A]
             1.2. By virtue of Sections 14 and 21 of the General
        Clauses Act, when a power is conferred on an authority
    D   to do a particular act, such power can be exercised from
        time to time and carry with it power to withdraw, modify,
        amend or cancel the notifications earlier issued, to be
        exercised in the like manner and subject to like
        conditions, if any, attached with the exercise of the power.
    E   It would be too narrow a view to accept that chargeability
        once fixed cannot be altered. Since the charging
        provision in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 is subject
        to the State Government's power to issue notification
        under Section 49 of the Act granting rebate, the State
    F   Government, in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses
        Act, can always withdraw, rescind, add to or modify an
        exemption notification. No industry can claim as of right
        that the Government should exercise its power under
        Section 49 and offer rebate and it is for the Government
    G   to. decide whether the conditions are such that rebate
        should be granted or not. [Para 13) [165-C-E]

             1.3. There being nothing repugnant to raising of
        public revenue in exercise of sovereign power of State
        to impose and collect taxes including electricity duty, in
•   H
  SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 141
                OF U.P. AND ORS.
  any provision of the Act of 1948 or the policy statement        A
  made in the notification granting rebate, the raising of
  public revenue by withdrawing or reducing exemption,
  cannot be said to be against the provisions of any statute.
  Noticeably, the new industrial units, which were being
  established in the hill areas, could not have compelled the     B
  Government to exercise power under Section 49 of the
  Act of 1948 in their favour, for grant of rebate/concession
  in electricity tariff. Powers under Section 49 normally
  would be exercised by the State Government for
  industrial growth of an area and to generate employment         c
  opportunities for those who are residing in the area.
  However, on change in the circumstances, the
  Government can always reconsider the matter and can
  either curtail or withdraw the benefit granted earlier. The
  concept of the larger public interest introduced, before        D
  invocation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, in
  fact, amounts to amendment of the said provision, as
  notifications dated June 18, 1998 and January 25~ 1999,
  issued under Section 49 of the Act of 1948, as well as
  notification dated August 7, 2000, issued under Section         E
  24 of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1999, are
  in the nature of legislations and, therefore, the principle
  of promissory estoppel would not apply to them. [Para
  14] [165-F-H; 166-A-C]

       1.4. The rule of promissory estoppel being an              F
  equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular
  situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one,
  the objective of which is to do justice between the parties
  and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This
  doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice   G
  and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is
  neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of
  estoppel. For application of doctrine of promissory
  estoppels, the promisee must establish that he suffered
_ in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the         H
    142     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A promise. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel
  is being applied against the Government, and defence
  based on executive necessity would not be accepted by
  the Court. However, if it can be shown by the Government
  that having regard to tile facts as they have subsequently
B transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government
  to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an
  equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise
  against the Government. Where public interest warrants,
  the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked.
c Government can change the policy in public interest.
  However, it is well settled that taking cue from this
  doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do
  something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by
  law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled
D proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel
  cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made
  contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act
  against the statute. Thus, the Government -or public
  authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which
E is contrary to law. The petitioners are not entitled to claim
  promissory estoppel against the Government and cannot
  raise plea of estoppel against the notification dated
  August 7, 2000 reducing Hill Development Rebate to 0%
  as there can be no estoppel against the statute. [Paras
  11, 17, 18] [160-H; 161-A-E; 169-H; 170-A]
F
       1.5. The rebate which was granted to the petitioners,
  was, by definition, a freedom from an obligation which
  they otherwise were liable to discharge. The rebate was
  a privilege granting an advantage which was not made
G available to others. The rebate granted under Section 49
  of the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 was, therefore, a
  concession granted by the State Government so that the
  beneficiaries of such concessions were not required to
  pay the electricity tariff, they were otherwise liable to pay
H under the said Act during the period of its grant. The
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 143
              OF U.P. AND ORS.
petitioners, as recipients of a concession, accepted to         A
enjoy the benefits of the concession during the period of
ii:s grant. This right to enjoy was defeasible in the sense
that it was liable to be taken away or withdrawn in
exercise of the very power under which the exemption
was granted. [Para 16) [168-G-H; 169-A]                         B

     State of Rajasthan and Another vs. J.K. Udaipur Udyog
Ltd. and Another (2004) 7SCC 673; Arvind Industries and
others vs. State of Gujarat and others AIR1995 SC 2477 -
relied on.
                                                                c
    U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and another vs. Sant Steels
and Alloys (P) Ltd. and others (2008) 2 S.S.C. 777 - referred
to.

       2. Further, it is pertinent to notice that before starting D
  the industrial units, the petitioners had entered into an
  agreement with the then U.P. State Electricity Board.
  Clause 7 of this agreement provided that the rates/tariff
  fixed/ revised by the supplier, i.e., -the respondent No. 2
  from time to time, will be applicable to the petitioners. E
·Sub-clause (a) of Clause 7 of the agreement in most clear
  terms provided that the consumer, i.e., the present
  petitioner shall pay for the supply of electric energy at the
  rates enforced by the supplier, i.e., the respondent No. 2
  from time to time. Though the rate schedule applicable
  at the time of execution of the agreement between the
                                                                  F
  petitioners and the respondent No. 2 was annexed to the
  agreement, it was provided specifically again in sub-
  clause (c) of Clause 7 that the rate schedule mentioned
 ·may, at the discretion of the supplier, be revised by the
  supplier from tirrie to time and in case of revision the rates G
  schedule so revised shall be applicable to the consumer.
  It was also provided in the agreement that any levy such
  as sales tax, excise duty, electricity duty or any other
  charges by whatsoever name called by Central or State
                                                                  H
    144     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A Government or other competent authority on the
  electricity supplied to the consumer shall also be paid by
  the consumer. Therefore, in view of the terms and
  conditions stipulated in Clause 7 of the agreement, it is
  clear that the petitioners are precluded from challenging
B revision of the tariff in exercise of statutory powers
  conferred on respondent No. 2 in thf' larger public
  interest. There is no prohibition in the agreement by which
  respondent No. 2 was bound to give 33.33% rebate to the
  petitioners in all the circumstances or was precluded from
c changing the tariff rates. The petitioners being parties to
  the agreement now cannot turn around and argue that
  the respondent No. 2 is bound to give 33.33% Hill
  Development Rebate and can never change the tariff
  rates to the detriment of the petitioners. On the facts and
  in the circumstances of the case, therefore, respondent
0
  No. 2 is not bound to give 33.33% Hill Development
  Rebate to the petitioners for the period specified in the
  notification irrespective of change in the tariff rates. [Para
  20] [170-C-H; 171-A-G]

E      3. Whether to grant rebate to certain industrial units
  located in an area is basically and essentially a policy
  decision. The policy decision as reflected in the affidavit
  filed by Additional Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand,
  Department of Energy, is neither found to be
F unreasonable nor found to be arbitrary in any manner.
  Grant of power concession to new industrial units was
  not found by the State Government to be in larger public
  interest. This Court, while exercising powers under
  Article 32 of the Constitution, cannot substitute the
G opinion and/or view of the Government and come to the
  conclusion that power concession to new steel
  industries is in the larger public interest and, therefore,
  should be made available to the new steel industries.
  Such a course is not permissible at all. The policy having
H not been found either arbitrary, capricious or
      SH REE SI DH BALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v.              145
               STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
unreasonable, this Court cannot interfere with the policy            A
decision of the State Government. The policy of the State
Government in not granting rebate to industrial units
situated in a particular area is basically a fiscal decision
and in absence of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in
the said policy, it cannot be a subject-matter of judicial           B
review of this Court while exercising powers under
Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, no case is made
out by the petitioners to interfere with the said policy.
[Para 22] [173-F-H; 174-A-D]

     4. Also, in view of Section 29 of the Electricity
                                                                     c
Regulatory Commission Act, 1998, the licensee, i.e., the
respondent No. 2 has no authority to enforce any tariff
other than the approved by the Commission. In view of
Section 24 of the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 the
licensee, i.e., the respondent No. 2 lacks power/authority           D
to modify the tariff determined by the Commission and
in case of any violation, the licensee would be exposing
itself to the punishment prescribed under Section 28 of
the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1999. Grant of
reliefs claimed by the petitioners would amount to                   E
compelling them to act against the statute. Such a course
is not permissible while exercising powers under Article
32 of the Constitution. Thus the respondent No. 2
Corporation cannot be directed to amend or modify the
tariffs determined by the Commission nor the petitioners             F
would be entitled to seek any direction against the
licensee to amend or modify the tariff determined by the
Commission. [Para 23) [174-E-G; 175-A]
     Association of Industrial Electricity Users vs. State of U.P.   G
and others(2002) 3 SCC 711; West Bengal Electricity
Regulatory Commission v. CESC (2002) 8 SCC 715; BSES
vs. Tata Power Company Limited (2004) 1 SCC 195 - relied
on.
      5. If the power to reduce the rebate to 17% is                 H
    146       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (2011] 3 S.C.R.


A assumed to be available, then power to reduce the rebate
  to 0%, as is done by the notification dated August 7,
  2000, is also available. The petitioners have not
  challenged the previous judgment wherein this Court has
  held that the rebate would not be available/ cannot be
B given after coming into force of the U.P. Electricity
  Reforms Act, 1999. The petitioners have also not
  challenged the tariff rates made applicable from
  September 16, 2001 to March 31, 2002 vide order dated
  September 1, 2000 by the U.P. Electricity Regulatory
c Commission, wherein no rebate based on geographical
  area has been provided. This makes it very clear that the
  petitioners have not been differently treated nor the tariff
  is sought to be recovered in any illegal or arbitrary
  manner. Under the circumstances,. this Court does not
0 find breach of the salutary provisions of Article 14 of the
  Constitution. As no right guaranteed to the petitioners
  under Article 14 of the Constitution iS'found to have been
  breached, the present petition filed under Article 32 of the
  Constitution cannot be entertained and the petitioners
E are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the instant
  petition. Therefore, the petitioners are precluded from
  challenging notification dated August 7, 2000
  withdrawing the rebate in electricity rates. [Para 24] [175-
  B-F]

F                        Case Law Reference:
          (2008) 2 s.s.c. 777   referred to    Paras 6,9,10,11
          (2004) 7SCC 673       relied on            Para 16
          AIR1995 SC 2477       relied on            Para 17
G
          c2002) 3 sec 111      relied on            Para 23
          (2002) s sec 115      relied on            Para 23
          (2004) 1 sec 195      relied on            Para 23
H
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 147
              OF U.P. AND ORS.

    CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.          A
537 of 2000.

     Under Article 32 of Constitution of India.

    Shanti Bhushan, Sudhir Kumar Gupta, M.L. Lohaty, R.K.            B
Gupta, P.K. Shanna, Gargi for the Petitioners.

     Shail Kr. Dwivedi, MG, Pramod Swarup, Anuvrat Sharma,
Alka Sinha, Ameet Singh, R.K. Verma, A.P. Sahay, Rachana
Srivastava, Pradeep Misra, Suraj Singh for the Respondents.
                                                                     c
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. By filing this petition under Article
32 of the Constitution, the ten petitioners which are Private
Limited Companies have prayed to issue a writ in the nature
of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order declaring D
notification No. 1208/HC/UPPCL-V-1974/1204/2000 dated
07.08.2000 issued by the UP Power Corpor~tion Limited,
which was formerly known as U.P. State Electricity Board as
illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of
the Constitution in so far as it denies the petitioners, the Hill E
Development Rebate of 33.33% on the total amount of
electricity bills issued by the respondents for the remaining
~nexpired period of five years from the date of commencement
of supply of electricity to the industrial units of the petitioners.
The petitioners have also prayed to issue an appropriate writ F
in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order
or direction commanding the respondents to restore/give Hill
Development Rebate of 33.33% to the industrial units of the
petitioners on the total amount of the electricity bills for the
remaining unexpired period of five years.         ·                  G

    2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this petition are as
under:-

    The petitioners are industrial units carrying on business of
                                                                     H
    148       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2011] 3 S.C.R.


A manufacturing iron rods, ingots, strips in furnaces/re-rolling mills
  in hill area known as Kotdwar, State of Uttar Pradesh, now
  State of Uttarakhand. The industrial units of the petitioners were
  connected with power loads in the year 1996-97 by U.P. State
  Electricity Board which is now known as U.P. Power
B Corporation Limited. The claim made by the petitioners is that
  from the year 1986, the State Government, in order to develop
  hill areas and particularly Zero Industrial Zones of hill areas as
  well as for inducing, encouraging and alluring new
  entrepreneurs declared various exhaustive industrial policies
C with the consent of UP State Electricity Board, Sales Tax
  Department and Industrial Department granting various
  incentives including rebate of 33.33% on total amount of
  electricity bills to industrial units to be established in hill areas
  of UP. The petitioners have averred that a new industrial policy
D dated April 30, 1990 was declared by the State Government
  assuring grant of 33.33% rebate on total amount of electricity
  bills to new entrepreneurs for a period of five years. The case
  of the petitioners is that the Government of UP, pursuant to the
  aforesaid policy issued an order dated 16-10-1990 to UPSEB
  to implement all the instructions contained in the said industrial
E policy. The said policy, according to the petitioners was to
  remain in operation till March 31, 1995. The record shows that
  the UPSEB by Notification dated June 28, 1996 modified the
  earlier notifications and extended the Hill Development Rebate
  which was to expire on March 31, 1995 for a further period of
F r.ext five years to be made available to the new industrial units
  which would be set up till 31-3-1997. The petitioners have
  claimed that the five years period for which the petitioners were
  entitled to the Hill Development Rebate of 33.33% on the total
  amount of electricity bills was to be over in the year 2001-02.
G What is asserted by the petitioners is that in view of the
  promises, assurances and guarantees given by the Government
  of UP through various industrial policies declared from time to
  time and accepted, operated as well as implemented by
  UPSEB through different gazette notifications, the industrial
H units of the petitioners were established in Kotdwar, Distirct
 SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 149
      OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

  Pauri in the year 1996-97. According to the petitioners on            A
  January 3, 1997 the Respondent No. 2 Corporation, brought
  out its electricity tariff to be levied on the consumers and it was
  inter-alia stipulated that the promises made in the industrial
  policy declared by the UP Government on April 30, 1990 and
  gazette notification dated June 28, 1996 would continue to be         B
  available to the new entrepreneurs as before. The petitioners
  have mentioned that 33.33% rebate promised to industrial units
  established in the hill areas was accordingly granted to the
  petitioners who had established their industrial units in the year
  1996-97. Explaining as to why the respon<;lents had promised          c
  to grant rebate of 33.33%, it is stated that, the rebate was
  meant to meet out extra expenditure incurred by the industrial
  units set up in hill areas in comparison to the industrial units
  established on plain and developed areas on account of various
  factors such as labour charges, maintenance cost,
                                                                        0
  transportation of raw material, transportation of finished goods,
  availability of water, establishment charges etc. The petitioners
  have averred that vide Notification dated 18-06-1998 & 25-01-
  1999, issued by the respondent Corporation, uniform tariffs
  were introduced, which were seemingly innocuous but in fact           E
  had reduced the rebate ftom 33.33% to 17% and the result was
  that hill area units became less competitive and unviable in
  comparison to the units situated in developed areas. The
  petitioners have mentioned that the two Notifications dated June
  18, 1998/25-01-1999 levying the tariffs, were challenged by the
  petitioners before High Court of Allahabad by way of filing           F
  C.W.P. Nos. 15292 and 15293 of 1999. The High Court vide
  judgment dated 25-05-2000 had allowed the writ petitions and
  struck down clause 9(a) of the Notification dated 25-01-1999
  and clause 8(a) of the Notification dated 18-06-1998 holding
  that the petitioners were entitled to get H.D.R. of 33.33% on         G
  the total bill till the period of five years from the date of
, commencement of supply of electricity t9 them was to come to
  an end. The record shows that the final Judgm~nt dated
  25.05.2000 rendered by the High Court of Allahabad was
  challenged by U.P. Power Corporation Limited before this Court        H
    150      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A by way of filing SLP No. 10665-10666 of 2000 and this Court
  had initially passed an Interim Order dated July 28, 2000
  directing the present industrial units of the petitioners to make
  payments of electricity bills as per tariff notification dated
  25.01.1999. The claim made by the petitioners is that after
B passing of the above mentioned interim order dated
  28.07.2000 the respondent had issued a new tariff by
  notification dated 07.08.2000 and had increased exorbitantly
  the rate of charges and had completely withdrawn the Hill
  Development Rebate which was made admissible under the
c industrial policy dedared by the then Chief Minister in the year
  1996 and continuously allowed by the respondent No. 2 till 18-
  06-98/25.01.99. It is relevant to notice that the notifbation
  granting rebate was issued under Section 49 of the Electricity
  Supply Act, 1948, whereas the notification dated 07.08.2000
D whereby the rebate was completely withdrawn was issued
  under Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act,
  1999 which came into force with effect from 14.01.2000. The
  grievance made by the petitioners was that because of the
  interim order dated 28.07.2000 passed in S.L.P. Nos. 10665-
  10666 of 2000, the respondents were not entitled to issue and
E or introduce a new tariff by a notification dated 07.08.2000
  increasing the rate of charges and completely withdrawing the
  Hill Development Rebate but were entitled to levy tariff
  according to the notification dated 25.01.99. Therefore, they
  filed IA No. NIL of 2000 in SLP Nos. 10665-66 of 2000 seeking
F appropriate directions from the Court. The claim advanced by
  the petitioners is that the said IA was listed before the Court
  on 29.09.2000 and after hearing the parties, while adjourning
  the said IA for a period of two weeks the Bench hearing the
  I.A. had opined that the petitioners, if so advised, should file
G writ petition challenging the new tariff/revised rates of power
  made applicable with effect from 09.08.2000 by the notification
  dated 07.08.2000. The petitioners have claimed that taking hint
  from the opinion expressed by this Court on 29.09.2000, the
  instant petition was filed. The petitioners have mentioned that
H
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE, 151
     OF U.P. AND ORS .. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

by new tariff notification dated 07.08.2000, the respondents           A
have completely withdrawn the assured, promised and
guaranteed Hill Development Rebate which has made it
impossible for the petitioners to run their industrial units located
in the hill areas and therefore the notification dated 07.08.2000
should be regarded as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and           B
violative of provisions of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the
Constitution as well as contrary to the principles of promissory
estoppel. The assertion made by the petitioners is that the
respondents are bound to act as per their promise, solemnly
made to the petitioners while inviting them to establish the           c
industrial units in completely remote and underdeveloped areas
of U.P. The petitioners have further claimed that because of the
tariff introduced by notifications dated 18.06.98/25.01.99 out
of 28 industrial units which were established on assurances
given by the respondents, 15 industrial units were closed down         D
and now only 13 industrial units of the petitioners are operating
at present. It is mentioned that the new tariff introduced by
notification dated 07.08.2000 is contrary to the suggestions/
recommendations made by Uttar Pradesh Regulatory
Commission established under the provisions of Electricity             E
Regulatory Commission Act, 1998. Under the circumstances,
the petitioners have filed the instant petition and claimed the
reliefs to which reference is made earlier.

     3. On service of notice Mr. N.N.Srivastava, Deputy General
Manager (Com.), U.P. Power Corporation Limited, i.e., the              F
respondent No.2 herein, has filed affidavit in opposition on
behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 taking preliminary objections
that the petition is not maintainable as no fundamental right of
the petitioners, which are the companies, is violated. The
respondent No.2 has stated that since tariff was framed in             G
exercise of statutory powers by a statutory body, the petition is
not maintainable against exercise of this statutory power. In the
reply it is mentioned that there is a provision of filing review
before the Commission in case the petitioners feel aggrieved
but they are not justified in making grievance directly before this    H
    152      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A Court regarding introduction of new tariff rates and/or withdrawal
  of rebate by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the
  Constitution. After mentioning that the agreement entered into
  by the petitioners with the Respondent No. 2 Corporation
  contains a clause that the rates/tariff fixed/revised by the
B supplier i.e. the replying respondent, from time to time, would
  also be applicable to the petitioners. it is asserted that in view
  of the said clause. the petitioners are estopped from challenging
  the revision of the tariff made under statutory exercise of
  powers for greater public interest. In the reply, clause seven of
c the agreement has been reproduced and it is claimed that the
  petition which is mainly based on the principle of promissory
  estoppel being thoroughly misconceived, should be dismissed
  at once. So far as, merits of the matter is concerned, it is stated
  that the notification dated 07 .08.2000 is neither illegal nor
  arbitrary nor discriminatory nor hit by the principle of promissory
0
  estoppel and the reliance placed upon the decision dated
  25.05 2000 rendered by the High Court in Writ Petition No.
  15292 93 of 1999 is misconceived as the same is subject
  matter of challenge in tile pending SLP's. According to the
  reply, during the pendency of SLP filed by the respondent UP
E Power Corporation Limited, the UP Electricity Regulatory
  Commission framed a new tariff in exercise of statutory powers
  and directed the respondents to enforce the same and therefore
  the respondents who are bound to enforce the tariff, have
  enforced the same vide notification dated 07.08.2000. It is
F claimed that tariff revision made under the statutory powers has
  nothing to do with the interim order dated 28.07.2000 passed
  by this Court in the SLPs filed by the U.P. Power Corporation
  Limited and the High Court is wrong in allowing the Writ
  Petitions and directed that 33.33% rebate should be given to
G the petitioners, when the entire tariff is changed and total
  financial burden on the petitioners is less than 5% of tariff. After
  asserting that the Kotdwar is practically situated in plain area
  and very near to Najibabad, it is stated that the claim of high
  cost advanced by the petitioners is not genuine. In the reply it
H
 SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 153
      OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
  is emphasized that the tariff was revised to minimize the theft A
  of electricity which was prevalent amongst large and heavy
  consumers like petitioners and in fact rates enforced with effect
  from .18.06.1998 were more favourable to the petitioners but
  they were not satisfied with the said tariff and therefore had filed
  writ petition in the High Court from which the SLP No. 10665- B
  66 of 2000 have arisen. Another affidavit dated 26.12.2000 is
· also filed by Mr. N.N. Srivastava clarifying certain aspects of
  the matter. In the additional reply, different provisions of U.P.
  Electricity Regulatory Commission Act and U.P. Electricity
  Reforms Act, 1999 are adverted to and it is claimed that in view    c
  of Section 7(a) of the Act, the tariff as framed by the U.P. State
  Electricity Board is applicable to the petitioners and they having
  undertaken to pay the electricity charges as per the rules/tariff
  determined by UP State Electricity Board from time to time, the .
  petition is not maintainable. It is also asserted in the reply that D
  when the Regulatory Commission has held that no development
  rebate is to be given to a consumer, the Corporation has no
  authority at all to grant any development rebate and, therefore,
  the petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the
  petition.
                                                                       E
        4. The petitioners have filed rejoinder to the counter
  affidavits dated 03.11.2000 and 26.12.2000 filed on behalf of
  Respondents No. 2 and 3. In the rejoinder, they have reiterated
  their stand taken in the petition.
                                                                       F
        5. It may be mentioned that Civil Appeal Nos. 1215-1216
  of 2001 arising out of SLP Nos. 10665-10666 of 2000 with the
  instant Writ Petition No. 537 of 2000 were notified for final
  disposal before the Court on 20-09-2007. On the said date the
  appeals and the writ petition were called out for hearing and G
  after hearing the parties at length following order was passed
  by the Court on 20.09.2007:-

      "Heard the parties at length.

      Hearing concluded.                                              H
    154        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A         Judgment reserved.

                 Mr. A.M.Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing
          on behalf of the appellants shall file a detailed affidavit
          showing the consumption of the units in hill areas getting
          this incentive up to 1997 and after that when the new tariff
B
          was introduced in 1998. He may file the affidavit to this
          effect within two weeks from today. It will be open for the
          respondents to file their reply within two weeks thereafter.

          WRIT PETITION (C} NO. 537 OF 2000
c
              Let this matter be listed after the disposal of Civil
          Appeal No. 1215-1216 of 2001."

         Thus the instant writ petition was detagged and directed
    to be listed after the disposal of civil appeal Nos. 1215-1216
0
    of 2001.

         6. The decision in Civil Appeal No. 1215-1216 of 2001
    was pronounced on December 10, 2007 and it is reported in
    U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and another vs. Sant Steels and
E   Alloys (PJ Ltd. and others (2008) 2 S.S.C. 777. This Court by
    the said decision held that notifications dated 28.06.1996 and
    03.01.1997 wherein rebate was given were issued under
    Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and they were
    in the nature of delegated legislation. It was further held that on
F   the basis of principle of promissory estoppel, the respondent
    No. 2 Le. UP Power Corporation Limited was not entitled to
    take away benefit given to the industries. However, the Court
    made reference to Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1999
    wherein no such benefit of rebate is recognized and held that
G   the benefit of rebate cannot be extended after coming into force
    of Uttar Pradesh Regulatory Reforms Act, 1999, i.e., after
    14.01.2000 because estoppel cannot be claimed against the
    statute. The findings recorded by this Court while disposing of
    Civil Appeals No. 1215-1216 of 2001 made in Paragraph 34
H   and 36 of the decision, read as under:
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 155
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
    " 34. Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant      A
     Corporation submitted that now the Act of 1999 has come
    into force and that Act does not recognize the concessions
    given to the hill areas and that this is a primary legislation
    i.e. the Act passed by the State Legislature. Therefore, to
    this extent we can accept the submission of Dr. Singhvi          B
    that since the Act of 1999 does not recognize such Hill
    developmental benefits, therefore, from the date of passing
    of the Act of 1999 the said benefit cannot be accepted.
    We have stated above that there cannot be estoppel
    against the statute. Since such benefits have not been           C
    recognized by the Act of 1999. therefore, up to the date
    of coming into force of the Act of 1999, all the benefits
    which were being given to the respondent entrepreneurs
    shall be protected by invoking the principle of Promissory
    Estoppel but after coming into force of the Act of 1999,         D
    which is a primary legislation enacted by the Sate
    Legislature the benefits from the date the Act has come
    into force, cannot be made available to the respondents.

          )()()(                  )()()(            )()()(

                                                                     E
    36. Therefore, as a result of our above discussion, we hold
    that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court on
    revoking (sic invoking) the principle of Promissory
    Estoppel is correct and the respondent units will be entitled
    to such benefits till the UP Electricity Reforms Act, 1999       F
    came into force. Since after coming into .force of the Act
    of 1999 no such concession has been granted, therefore,
    the concession shall survive till the Act of 1999 came into
    force. The appeals are accordingly disposed of with no
    order as to cost."                                ·
                                                                     G
     7. On 20.01.2009 Division Bench of this Court heard W,P.
No. 537 of 2000, and referred the matter to larger Bench on
the question as to whether the rebate/ concession granted to
the petitioners from 1997 to 2002 should continue till 2002 or
                                                                     H
    156      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A will cease to have effect after 14.01.2000, as was directed by
  the Division Bench in C.A. No. 1215-1216 of 2001 decided on
  10.12.2007. Pursuant to the said direction the petition is placed
  before the present larger Bench.

        The proceedings of the case indicate that the writ petition
B was listed for hearing on 03.02.2010, when the Court directed
  the learned Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand to seek
  instructions from the Government whether the State
  Government was inclined to extend the benefit of Hill
  Development Rebate of 33.33% on total amount of electricity
C bills to the industrial units as was done by the erstwhile State
  Government of U.P. In response to the same, Mr. Nitish Kumar
  Jha, Additional Secretary to the Government of Uttarakhand,
  has filed affidavit dated April 19, 2010 mentioning that the
  concession/rebate by way of incentive was part of the policy
D framed by the then State Government of UP and the same was
  enforceable till the year 1997, but consequent upon
  enforcement of the UP Reorganization Act, 2000, the hill areas
  of the erstwhile State of UP were carved out which now form
  part of the new State known as State of Uttarakhand. According
E to the affidavit, to accelerate the pace of industrial development
  in remote and backward hill region and to remove economic
  backwardness of the hill region, by generating the employment
  opportunities with the possibility to check the brain drain from
  these areas and keeping in view the uneven geographic
F situation, environmental and social conditions, the Government
  of Uttarakhand has framed '"Special Integration Industrial
  Development Policy" for hills and remote areas of Uttarakhand.
  The affidavit proceeds to state that the policy formulated by the
  State '.)f Uttarakhand is an attempt to help and promote the
G establishment of industries based on the locally available
  resources with the coordinated and integrated industrial growth
  but so far as the power concession to new industrial units is
  concerned, the aforesaid policy does not provide for any
  concession to the steel industries established in the State as
H it is not considered necessary by the State to grant subsidy to
 SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 157
      OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

the steel industries in the larger public interest. Along with the    A
affidavit, the relevant extract of the aforesaid policy is produced
as Annexure R-1 and it is mentioned that in view of lack of
provision in the industrial development policy, the concession
of Hill Development Rebate of 33.33% granted earlier by UP
Government cannot be extended to the steel industries located         B
in the State of Uttarakhand.

       8. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties
  at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered
  the documents forming part of the petition and the authoritie~      C
  cited at the bar for the guidance of the Court. Though several
  authorities have been cited at the bar on both the sides, this
  Court proposes to refer to only those decisions which in fact
. helped the Court in resolving the dispute raised in the petition.

      The respondents have contended that the petitioners are         D
companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and
as companies do not have Fundamental Right under Article 19,
the petitions filed under Article 32 should not be entertained by
the Court. Therefore, the question which needs to be answered
is whether the instant petition filed under Article 32 of the         E
Constitution is maintainable. A company not being a citizen has
no Fundamental Right under Article 19. When a law infringes
the Fundamental Right of a company, a shareholder cannot
normally apply under Article 32 for enforcement of company's
Fundamental Right as in the eye of law two are distinct entities.     F
A corporation in law is equal to a natural person and has legal
entity of its own. The entity of a corporation is entirely separate
from that of its shareholder applying the doctrine of piercing or
lifting of veil and it cannot be said that the petition by
corporation is a petition by the shareholder. It is important to      G
mention that the petitioners are the companies registered
under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It is well
settled that a company cannot maintain a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution for enforcement of Fundamental Rights
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. A company,
                                                                      H
    158      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A being not a citizen, has no Fundamental Rights under Article
  19 of the Constitution. Nonetheless the companies would be
  entitled to claim right under Article 14 of the Constitution and,
  therefore, it would be relevant to examine whether the
  respondents have committed breach of Article 14 by
B withdrawing the concession in electricity rates given/granted
  earlier.

        9. The short question which now falls for decision of this
  Court is whether the Hill Development Rebate of 33.33% on
C total amount of electricity bills under industrial policy of the
  erstwhile State Government of U.P. granted to the writ
  petitioners will cease to have effect after 14.01.2000 when U.P.
  Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 came into force or should
  continue thereafter, as can be seen from the decision in U.P.
  Power Corporation Limited & Anr. vs. Sant Steels and Alloys
D (P) Ltd. & Ors. (Supra).

          10. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the writ
    petitioners submitted that the concessions in the bills for power
    supply were given to the industries set up in the hill areas in
E   view of the direction glven by the State Government in exercise
    of power under Section 78-A of the Act of 1948, pursuant to
    which necessary notifications granting concessions were
    issued and as acting upon the promises contained in those
    notifications, the private entrepreneurs had made huge
F   investments and acted to their detriment and, therefore, now
    the respondents cannot wriggle out from those promises and
    are estopped from withdrawing those concessions. Placing
    reliance on the observations made in para 30 of the reported
    decision in U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and another vs. Sant
G   Steel and Alloys (P) Ltd. (Supra) it was emphasized that
    therein the Court took the notice of the fact that in the UP
    Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 which came into force with effect
    from January 14, 2000 the benefit granted under the previous
    Act was neither specifically withdrawn nor it was stipulated that
H   the said benefit would not be available after coming into force
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 159
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
of the said Act with effect from 14.01.2000. Based on these              A
observations, it was argued that in such a situation the principle
of promissory estoppal which has been evolved by the Courts
which is based on public policy would not permit the State to
revoke/withdraw the benefits already granted to the petitioners.
As noticed earlier, the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP's filed         B
by UP State Power Corporation were notified for hearing with
the instant writ petition. It is difficult to fathom the reason, which
prompted de-tagging of the writ petition when Civil Appeals
were heard on merits. The petitioners could neither offer any
plausible explanation nor could they point out the relevant              C
circumstances which resulted into the de-tagging of the instant
writ petition from the civil appeals. There is no manner of doubt
that certain observations made in paragraphs 34 and 36
quoted above from the reported decision are against the
present petitioners but the Court also held that all the benefits
which were being given to entrepreneurs shall stand protected            D
before coming into force of the Act of 1999 on the principle of
promissory estoppal. Therefore, this Court will have to consider
the question whether the reasoning adopted by the Division
Bench for coming to the said conclusion is legal, though it was
made clear to all the learned counsel for the parties that the           E
instant Writ Petition cannot be treated as an appeal against the
decision dated December 10, 2007 rendered by the two
learned Judges of this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1215-1216
of 2001.
                                                                         F
     11. In view of the observations made by the Division Bench
of this Court in the reported decisions, the questions that fall
for consideration of this larger Bench are whether a benefit
given by a statutory notification can be withdrawn by the
Government by another statutory notification and whether the             G
principles of promissory estoppal would be applicable in a case
where concessions/rebates given by a statutory notification are
subsequently withdrawn by another statutory notification. It is an
admitted position that the notification dated June 28, 1996,
granting rebate to the industries set up in hill areas, was issued       H
    160       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A   in exercise of powers conferred by Section 49 of Electricity
    (Supply) Act, 1948. By the said notification rebate in electricity
    charges to the extent of 33.33% was given to the industries,
    which were set up in the hill areas during the specified period.
    It is also an admitted position that thereafter, by notifications
8   dated June 18, 1998 and January 25, 1999, issued in exercise
    of the powers conferred by Section 49 of the Act of 1948, the
    percentage of rebate granted by the earlier notification was
    reduced to 17%. However, by notification dated August 7, 2000
    the benefit, which was granted to the industries set up in the
C   hill areas regarding rebate in the electricity charges, was
    completely withdrawn. What is relevant to notice is that it is not
    in dispute that the notification dated August 7, 2000 withdrawing
    the benefits granted earlier. was issued in exercise of powers
    conferred by Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity
    Reforms Act, 1999. The above mentioned fact makes it evident
D   that the benefits, which were granted and/or curtailed in
    exercise of statutory powers, were subsequently withdrawn in
    exercise of another statutory power conferred by another statute,
    namely, Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1999. In the light
    of above mentioned facts, the question whether principle of
E   promissory estoppel would apply to exercise of statutory
    powers will have to be considered. The doctrine of promissory
    estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by catena
    of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a
    promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the
F   promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it,
    alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the
    promise and the promise would be enforceable against the
    Government at the instance of the promisee notwithstanding that
    there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is
G   not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by
    Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel
    being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the
    particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic
    one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties
H   and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 161
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
a principle evolveq by equity, to avoid injustice and though               A
commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm
of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of
doctrine of promissory estoppel the promisee must establish
that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance
on the promise. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel              B
is being applied against the Government and defence based
on executive necessity would not be accepted by the Court.
However, if it can be shown by the Government that having
regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it
would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise                 c
made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the
promisee and enforce the promise against the Government.
Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory
estoppal cannot be invoked. Government can change the policy
in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from       D
this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something
which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no
promissory estoppal against the settled proposition of law.
Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for
enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none                E
can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the
Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make
a provision which is contrary to law. Having noticed salient
features of the principle of promissory estoppel it would be
relevant to refer to certain observations made by the two Judge
Bench of this Court in U. P. Power Corporation Ltd. and another            F
vs. Sant Steel and Alloys (P) Ltd. (supra). In the said decision
the Court has observed in paragraph 33 of the reported
decision as under: -

     "33 ....................... But, after survey of all these cases on   G
     the subject, the judicial consensus that emerges is that
     whenever the State has made a representation to the
     public and the public has acted on that representation and
     suffered economically or otherwise, then in that case the
     State should be estopped from withdrawing such benefit                H
    162        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A         to the detriment of such people except in public interest
          or against the statute. So far as the public interest as
          involved in the present case is concerned, we have found
          that there was no overwhelming evidence to revoke the
          benefit granted to the industrial units in the hill areas. So
B         far as the statute is concerned, the notification was issued
          under Section 49 of the Act of 1948 and the same was
          revoked under Section 49 of the Act of 1948 though there
          was no such provision contained in Section 49 that it will
          be open to the Corporation to revoke the same but could
c         be possible by invoking the principle of General Clauses
          Act. But in (sic case of) such delegated legislation such
          withdrawal could only be permitted if larger public interest
          is invoked or if the Act is passed by the legislature."

         A critical analysis of the above quoted passage makes it
D   evident that the two Judge Bench was of the view that
    notification issued under Section 49 of the Act of 1948 can be
    revoked/modified only if express provision was made for the
    revocation/modification of the said notification under Section
    49 itself and the Court found that as there was no such provision
E   contained in Section 49, it was not open to the Corporation to
    revoke the same. Further, though the Court made reference to
    General Clauses Act, it added that the provisions of General
    Clauses Act would be applicable in case of delegated
    legislation if withdrawal/curtailment of benefit was in larger
F   public interest or if the legislation was enacted by the
    Legislature authorizing the Government to withdraw/curtail the
    benefit granted by a notification. Under the circumstances the
    two notifications curtailing the benefit to 17% were treated as
    contrary to Section 49 of the Act of 1948. On review of the law
G   on the subject and the relevant statutory provisions, this Court
    finds that, for the reasons mentioned hereinafter, the above
    statement of law is not an accurate proposition of law.

      12. It may be mentioned that the Electricity (Supply) Act,
H 1948 was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 163
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
rationalization of the production and supply of electricity and   A
generally for taking measures conducive to electrical
development. The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 being a Central
Act, the provisions of Sections 14 and 21 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 would be applicable. Section 14 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as under: -                       B

    "14. Powers conferred to be exercisable from time to
    time. - (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made
    after the commencement of this Act, any power is
    conferred, then unless a different intention appears that     C
    power may be exercised from time to time as occasion
    requires.

    (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and
    Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January,
    1887."                                                        D

    Whereas Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
    reads as under: -

    "21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend,
    vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. -   E
    Where, by any Central Act or Regulations a power to issue
    notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then
    the power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner
    and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to
    add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders,     F
    rules or bye-laws so issued."

Section 14 deals with the exercise of a power successively and
has no relevance to the question whether the power claimed
can at all be conferred. By Section 14 of the General Clauses     G
Act, 1897, any power conferred by any central enactment may
be exercised from time to time as occasion arises, unless a
different intention appears in the Act. There is no different
intention in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Therefore, the
power to issue a notification under Section 49 of thei Act of     H
    164      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A   1948, can be exercised from time to time if circumstances so
    require. Section 21 is based on the principle that power to
    create includes the power to destroy and also the power to niter
    what is created. Section 21, amongst other things, specifically
    deals with power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications.
B   The power to rescind a notification is inherent in the power to
    issue the notification without any limitations or conditions.
    Section 21 embodies a rule of construction. The nature and
    extent of its application must be governed by the relevant statue
    which confers the power to issue the notification, etc. However,
c   there is no manner of doubt that the exercise of power to make
    subordinate legislation includes the power to rescind the same.
    This is made clear by Section 21. On that analog~' an
    administrative decision is revocable while a judicial decision
    is not revocable except in special circumstances. Exercise of
    power of a subordinate legislation will be prospective and
0
    cannot be retrospective unless the statute authorizes such an
    exercise expressly or by necessary implication. The principle
    laid down in Section 21 is of general application. The power
    to rescind mentioned in Section 21 is without limitations or
E   conditions. It is not a power so limited as to be exercised only
    once. The power can be exercised from time to time having
    regard to the exigency of time. When by a Central Act power
    is given to the State Government to give some relief by way of
    concession and/or rebate to newly established industrial units
    by a notification, the same can be curtailed and/or withdrawn
F   by issuing another notification under the same provision and
    such exercise of power cannot be faulted on the ground of
    promissory estoppel. It would be profitable to remember that
    the purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place in one single
    statute different provisions as regards interpretations of words
G   and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified
    separately in many different Acts and Regulations. Whatever
    the General Clauses Act says whether as regards the meaning
    of words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into
    every statute to which it applies. Further, power to curtail and/
H   or withdraw the notification issued under Section 49 of the
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 165
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 giving rebate is implied under            A
Section 49 itself on proper interpretation of Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act. Therefore, this Court is of the firm opinion
that, power to curtail and/or withdraw the notification issued
under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, granting
certain benefits, was available to the respondents.                      B

      13. By virtue of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses
Act, when a power is conferred on an authority to do a particular
act, such power can be exercised from time to time and carry
with it power to withdraw, modify, amend or cancel the                   C
notifications earlier issued, to be exercised in the like manner
and subject to like conditions, if any, attached with the exercise
of the power. It would be too narrow a view to accept that
chargeability once fixed cannot be altered. Since the charging
provision in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 is subject to the
State Government's power to issue notification under Section             0
49 of the Act granting rebate, the State Government, in view of
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, can always withdraw,
rescind, add to or modify an exemption notification. No industry
can claim as of right that the Government should exercise its
power under Section 49 and offer rebate and it is for the                E
Government to decide whether the conditions are such that
rebate should be granted or not.

      14. There being nothing repugnant to raising of public
revenue in exercise of sovereign power of State to impose and            F
collect taxes including electricity duty, in any provision of the Act
of 1948 or the policy statement made in the notification granting
rebate, the raising of public revenue by withdrawing or reducing
exemption, cannot be said to be against the provisions of any
statute. It is relevant to notice that the new industrial units, which   G
were being established in the hill areas, could not have
compelled the Government to exercise power under Section 49
of the Act of 1948 in their favour, for grant of rebate/concession
                                                                         1
in electricity tariff. Powers under Section 49 normally would be
exercised by the State Government for industrial growth of an            H
    166      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 3 S.C.R.


A area and to generate employment opportunities for those who
  are residing in the area. However, on change in the
  circumstances, the Government can always reconsider the
  matter and can either curtail or withdraw the benefit granted
  earlier. This Court finds that the proposition of law laid down
B by the two Judge Bench in the decision mentioned above is
  too wide and has tendency to make Section 21 of the General
  Clauses Act, 1897, inoperative. The concept of the larger public
  interest introduced, before invocation of Section 21 of the
  General Clauses Act, in fact, amounts to amendment of the
c said provision, as notifications dated June 18, 1998 and
  January 25, 1999, issued under Section 49 of the Act of 1948,
  as well as notification dated August 7, 2000, issued under
  Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Reforms Act, 1999,
  are in the nature of legislations and, therefore, the principle of
  promissory estoppel would not apply to them.
0
        15. At this Stage, it would be relevant to notice certain
  principles which have emerged from the reported decisions of
  this Court.

E       16. In State of Rajasthan and Another vs. J.K. Udaipur
  Udyog Ltd. and Another (2004) 7SCC 673, pursuant to its
  Fourth New Industrial Policy, the State of Rajasthan had framed
  and notified the Rajasthan Sales Tax/Central Sales Tax
  Exemption Scheme for Industries, 1998 under Section 15,
F Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 and Section 8(5) of the Central
  Sales Tax Act. The Scheme was brought into force w.e.f.
  1.4.1998. The Scheme inter alia provided for grant of exemption
  to industrial units from payment of sales tax on intra-State and
  inter-State sale of goods and by-products manufactured within
G the State of Rajasthan. The cement plants and units were also
  entitled to exemption at the flat rate of 25% for eleven years.
  Sick units were also granted such benefits. The respondents
  before this Court were the Companies manufacturing cement
  in different units in Rajasthan and were sick industrial
H companies. They had applied for exemption under the Scheme
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 167
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
 claiming benefits. On 20-2-1999, the Director of Industries had      A
 certified that the application of the respondents was complete.
 During the pendency of the application of the respondents for
 sanction, a corrigendum dated 30.9.1999 was issued by the
 Government replacing the words "new units at SI. No.1" in
 respect of the units covered by SI. No. 4(a), with "new units at     B
 SI. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as the case may be". The result of the
 corrigendum was that sick cement units were placed under SI.
 No. 4(a) on a par with new cement units under SI. No. 3. The
 respondents submitted a representation to the Screening
 Committee that the corrigendum should not affect their case.         c
 The Screening Committee permitt~d the respondents to avail
 of the benefits available under the corrigendum. Consequently,
 no sanction and no eligibility certificate was ever issued to the
 respondents. Since the respondents had been availing of the
 higher rates of exemption against SI. No.1, provisional              D
 assessment orders and notices were issued to the respondents
 over the differential sales tax. The respondents then
 approached the Rajasthan High Court. Their grievance was that
 their rights under the Scheme had crystallized w.e.f. the date
 of certification of their applications and could not have been       E
 taken away by the corrigendum with retrospective effect. A
 learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the
 respondents were right in contending that the impugned
 corrigendum amounted to amendment but further held that the
 Government was competent to modify the Scheme. However,
 it '!Vas held that the corrigendum would be applicable from          F
 7.1.2000 i.e. the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.
.A Division Bench, while upholding the said decision, further
 held that the rights available to the respondents under the
 original Scheme were substantive rights and could not be
 affected adversely unless the subsequent notification clearly        G
 manifested an intention to do so. The Division Bench held that
 no such intention was manifested by the corrigendum and that
 the amendment was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 being
 discriminatory vis-a-vis other sick industries. It was also held
                                                                      H
    168       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A that the amendment could not discriminate against sick cement
  plants which had not availed of benefits of tax exemption earlier.
  It was concluded by the Division Bench that the benefits
  available to the respondents under the original Scheme were
  not affected by the corrigendum. This Court while allowing the
B appeal has held as under in paragraph 25 of the reported
  decision: -

          "An exemption is by definition a freedom from an obligation
          which the exemptee is otherwise liable to discharge. It is
          a privilege granting an advantage not available to others.
c         An exemption granted under a statutory provision in a fiscal
          statute has been held to be a concession granted by the
          State Government so that the beneficiaries of such
          concession are not required to pay the tax or duty they are
          otherwise liable to pay under such statete. The recipient
D         of a concession has no legally enforceable right against
          the Government to grant of a concession except to enjoy
          the benefits of the concession during the period of its grant.
          This right to enjoy is a defeasible one in the sense that it
          may be taken away in exercise of the very power under
E         which the exemption was granted. (See Shri Bakul Oil
          Industries v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 31, Kasinka
          Trading v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 274 and Shrijee
          Sales Corpn. V. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 398.)"

F From the principle enunciated in the above mentioned decision
  there is no manner of doubt that the rebate which was granted
  to the petitioners, was, by definition, a freedom from an
  obligation which the appellants otherwise were liable to
  discharge. The rebate was a privilege granting an advantage
  which was not made available to others. The rebate granted
G under Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 was,
  therefore, a concession granted by the State Government so
  that the beneficiaries of such concessions were not required
  to pay the electricity tariff, they were otherwise liable to pay
  under the said Act during the period of its grant. The petitioners,
H
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 169
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

as recipients of a concession, accepted to enjoy the benefits A
of the concession during the period of its grant. This right to
enjoy was a defeasible one in the sense that it was liable to
be taken away or withdrawn in exercise of the very power under .
which the exemption was granted.
                                                                     B
     17. Again in Arvind Industries and others vs. State of
Gujarat and others, AIR1995 SC 2477, Government had
withdrawn a concession given to a new industry. The claim of
the industry was that such a course was not open to the "
Government. It was claimed by the Government that notification C
giving concession did not contain any promise that the benefits
given to new industry would not be altered from time to time.
While rejecting the claim of the industry as not tenable, this
Court has held that Government is entitled to grant exemption
fo industries having regard to the industrial policy of the
Government, butit is equally free to modify its industrial policy D
and grant, modify or withdraw fiscal benefits from time to time.
What is important to notice is that this Court has held that in
such circumstances the principle of promissory estoppel would
not be attracted. What this Court finds is that several reported
decisions some of which are rendered by the larger Bench E
were not considered by Division Bench of this Court while
delivering judgment dated 10.12.2007 in Civil Appeal No. 1215
to 1216 of 2001. The legal effect would be that the finding
recorded by the Division Bench of this Court, in the above
mentioned case that the notification dated 18.6.1998 and F
25.1.1999 reducing the rate of rebate from 33.33% to 17%
were bad in law will have to be regarded as not laying down
correct proposition of law. Thus, the pe•.itioners in the present
writ petition are not entitled to claim promissory e·stoppel
against the Government and would not be entitled to any benefit G j
on the basis of two Judge Bench judgment of this Court referred
to earlier.

      18. From the above discussion, it is clear that the
petitioners cannot raise plea of estoppel against the notification
                                                                     H
    170       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 3 S.C.R.


A dated August 7, 2000 reducing Hill Development Rebate to 0%
  as there can be no estoppel against the statute.

         19. The next question, which falls for determination of this
    Court is whether the term stipulated in the contract entered into
    between the petitioners and the U.P. State Electricity Board
8
    (now the Corporation) stipulating that the respondent No. 2
    would give 33.33% rebate to the petitioners, is legally
    enforceable and whether in view of the said term the respondent
    No. 2 precluded from changing the tariff rates.

C      20. It is pertinent to notice that before starting the industrial
  urits, the petitioners had entered into agreement with the then
  U.P. State Electricity Board. Clause 7 of this agreement
  provided that the rates/tariff fixed/ revised by the supplier, i.e.,
  the respondent No. 2 from time to time, will be applicable to
D the petitioners. Clause 7 of the agreement reads as under: -

          "(7) a. The consumer shall pay for the supply of electric
          energy at the rates enforced by the supplier from time to
          time as may be applicable to the consumer.
E         b. The rate schedule applicable to the consumer at the
          time of execution of this agreement is annexed hereto as
          Annexure-2 H.V.-1.

          c. The Rate Schedule above mentioned may, at the
F         discretion of the supplier be revised by the supplier from
          time to time and in the case of revision the rate schedule
          so revised shall be applicable to the consumer.

          d. Any levy such as sales tax, excise duty, electricity duty
          or any other charges by whatsoever name called by
G         Central, State Government or other competent authority on
          the electricity, supplied to the consumer shall also be paid
          by the consumer."

    Sub-clause (a) of Clause 7 of the agreement in most clear
H
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 171
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
terms provided that the consumer, i.e., the present petitioner A
shall pay for the supply of electric energy at the rates enforced
by the S'Jpplier, i.e., the respondent No. 2 herein from time to
time. Though the rate schedule applicable at the time of
execution of the agreement between the petitioners and the
respondent No. 2 was annexed to the agreement, it was B
provided specifically again in sub-clause (c) of Clause 7 that
the rate schedule above mentioned may, at the discretion of
the supplier, be revised by the supplier from time to time and
in case of revision the rates schedule so revised shall be
applicable to the consumer. It was also provided in the c
agreement that any levy such as sales tax, excise duty,
electricity duty or any other charges by whatsoever name called
by Central or State Government or other competent authority
on the electricity supplied to the consumer shall also be paid
by the consumer. Therefore, in view of the terms and conditions
                                                                   0
stipulated in Clause 7 of the agreement, this Court is of the firm
opinion that the petitioners are precluded from challenging
revision of the tariff in exercise of statutory powers conferred
on the respondent No. 2 in the larger public interest. This Court
does not find any prohibition in the agreement by which the E
respondent No. 2 was bound to give 33.33% rebate to the
petitioners in all the circumstances or was precluded from
changing the tariff rates. The petitioners being parties to the
agreement now cannot turn around and argue that the
respondent No. 2 is bound to give 33.33% Hill Development
Rebate and can never change the tariff rates to th~ detriment F
of the petitioners. On the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, therefore, this Court holds that the respondent No. 2 is
not bound to give 33.33% Hill Development Rebate to the
petitioners for the period specified in the notification
irrespective of change in the tariff rates.                        G

     21. Another question, which needs to be answered, is
whether the Court of law would be justified in interfering with
the policy decision of the Government either to grant or not to
grant rebate to certain industrial units. From the record of the   H
    172      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 3 S.C.R.


A case, it is evident that before August 8, 2000, the U.P. State
  Electricity Board had power to frame/fix tariff under Section 49
  of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. However, thereafter tariff
  was determined and is being determined by U.P. Electricity
  Regulatory Commission under the provisions of U.P. Electricity
B Reforms Act, 1999. What is relevant to notice is that earlier the
  U.P. State Electricity Board had power to make/fix a tariff other
  than the uniform tariff contemplated under Section 49(3) of the
  Act of 1948 for the electricity to be supplied to its consumers
  having regard to the geographical position of any area.
C However, this power was not conferred on U.P. Electricity
  Regulatory Commission under the Act of U.P. Electricity
  Reforms Act, 1999. As the power to fix/prescribe the different
  rates of tariff in relation to geographical area is not provided
  and/or is not available under Section 24 of the Act of 1999, this
D Court is of the opinion that the Regulatory Commission could
  not have issued such differential tariff giving rebate to certain
  industries set up having particular geographical location.

         22. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners,
    argued that under Section 12 of the Act of 1999 the State
E Government was entitled to issue policy directions to the
    Regulatory Commission just as it had earlier power to issue
    policy directions to the U.P. State Electricity Board under
    Section 78 of the Act of 1948. It is true that the State
  . Government has power to issue policy directions to the
F Commission under the new Act. Therefore, the next question
   which arises for consideration is whether such a policy direction
    in fact was given by the State Government to the Regulatory
    Commission and the answer is obviously 'No'. There is no
    manner of doubt that the State Government could have issued
G direction regarding subsidy to be made available by the State
    Government to the licensee. However, on February 3, 2010,
    when the Special Leave Petition was listed for hearing before
    this Court, the Court had directed the learned counsel for the
    State of Uttarakhand to seek instructions from the Government
H whether the State Government was still willing to extend subsidy
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 173
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
  of development rebate of 33.33% to the industrial units set up            A
  in hill area, as was done by the erstwhile State Government of
  Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the State
 of Uttarakhand had taken appropriate instructions and as
 mentioned earlier, filed a short affidavit on April 19, 2010 for
 consideration of the Court. In the said affidavit it is specifically       B
 mentioned that with an objective to accelerate the pace of
 industrial development in remote and backward hill region and
 to remove economic backwardness of the hill region by
 generating the employment opportunities with the possibility to
 check the brain drain from this area and keeping in view the               c
 uneven geographical situation, the environmental and social
 conditions, the Government of Uttarakhand has framed "Special
 Integration Industrial Development Policy" for hills and remote
 areas of Uttarakhand, but as far as power concession to new
 industrial units is concerned, the aforesaid policy does not               D
 provide for any concession to the steel industries established
 in the State because it was not considered necessary in the
 larger public interest to grant such subsidy. In the said affidavit
 it is mentioned that in view of lack of provision in the industrial
 development policy, the concession of Hill Development                     E
 Rebate of 33.33% earlier granted by the Uttar Pradesh
 Government cannot be extended to the steel industries in the
State of Uttarakhand. Whether to grant rebate to certain
industrial units located in an area is basically and essentially a              1


policy decision. The policy decision as reflected in the affidavit              I
dated April 19, 2010 filed by Nitesh Kumar Jha, Addition.al                 F
Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand, Department of Energy,
is neither found to be unreasonable nor found to be arbitrary in
any manner. The Special.Integration Policy introduced by the
State of Uttarakhand for hills and remote areas of Uttarakhand
is not subject-matter of challenge by the petitioners in the                G
present writ petition. Grant of power concession to new
industrial units is not found by the State Government to be in
larger public interest. This Court; while exercising powers under
Article 32 of the Constitution, cannot substitute the opinion and/
                                                                            H .


                                                                        •
    174       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A or view of the Government and come to the conclusion that
  power concession to new steel industries is in the larger public
  interest and, therefore, should be made available to the new
  steel industries. Such a course is not permissible at all. The
  policy having not been found either arbitrary, capricious or
B unreasonable, this Court cannot interfere with the policy
  decision of the State Government. As observed earlier, there
  is nothing on record to show that any policy direction was given
  by the State of Uttarakhand to the Electricity Regulatory
  Commission to provide for rebate to industrial units situated in
c the hill area. The policy of the State Government in not granting
  rebate to industrial units situated in a particular area is basically
  a fiscal decision and in absence of arbitrariness or
  unreasonableness in the said policy, it cannot be a subject-
  matter of judicial review of this Court while exercising powers
  under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, this Court holds
0
  that no case is made out by the petitioners to interfere with the
  said policy.

        23. It will not be out of place to mention that in view of
  Section 29 of the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998,
E the licensee, i.e., the respondent No. 2 has no authority to
  enforce any tariff other than the approved by the Commission.
  In view of Section 24 of the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999
  the licensee, i.e., the respondent No. 2 lacks power/authority
  to modify the tariff determined by the Commission and in case
F of any violation, the licensee would be exposing itself to the
  punishment prescribed under Section 28 of the Act of 1999.
  This Court in Association of Industrial Electricity Users vs.
  State of U.P. and others (2002) 3 sec 711 as well as in West
  Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission vs. CESC (2002)
G 8 SCC 715, and in BSES vs. Tata Power Company Limited
  (2004) 1 sec 195, has held that the licensee has no power to
  amend and/or modify the tariff determined by the Regulatory
  Commission. Grant of reliefs claimed by the petitioners would
  amount to compelling them to act against the statute. Such a
H
SHREE SIDHBALI STEELS LTD. AND ORS. v. STATE 175
     OF U.P. AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
course is not permissible while exercising powers under Article A
32 of the Constitution. Thus the respondent No. 2 Corporation
cannot be directed to amend or modify the tariffs determined
by the Commission nor the petitioners would be entitled to seek
any direction against the licensee to amend or modify the tariff
determined by the Commission.                                    ·B

      24. What is relevant to notice is that if the power to reduce
the rebate to 17% is assumed to be available, then power to
reduce the rebate to 0%, as is done by the notification dated
August 7, 2000, is also available. The petitioners have not           C
challenged previous judgment of the High Court wherein this
Court has held that the rebate would not be available/ cannot
be given after coming into force of the U.P. Electricity Reforms
Act, 1999. The petitioners have also not challenged the tariff
rates made applicable from September 16, 2001 to March 31,
2002 vide order dated September 1, 2000 by the U.P.                   D
Electricity Regulatory Commission, wherein no rebate based
on geographical area has been provided. The discussion made
above makes it very clear that the petitioners have not been
differently treated nor the tariff is sought to be recovered in any
illegal or arbitrary manner. Under the circumstances, this Court      E
does not find breach of the salutary provisions of Article 14 of
the Constitution. As no right guaranteed to the petitioners under
Article 14 of the Constitution is found to have been breached,
the present petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution
cannot be entertained and the petitioners are not entitled to the     F
reliefs claimed in the instant petition. Therefore, the petitioners
are precluded from challenging notification dated August 7,
2000 withdrawing the rebate in electricity rates.

     25. For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is         G
hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order
as to costs.

B.B.B.                                  Writ Petition dismissed.