MADHUSHREE DATTAversusTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.

                  [2025] 2 S.C.R. 187 : 2025 INSC 105

                          Madhushree Datta
                                   v.
                     The State of Karnataka & Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 4884 of 2024)
                               24 January 2025
           [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as to whether, based on the materials on record, prima
       facie, ingredients of the offences u/ss.323, 504, 506, 509, and 511
       IPC are made out; whether the chargesheet and the related criminal
       proceedings against the appellants, liable to be quashed; and
       whether the mere assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by
       the appellants in scolding the complainant, sufficient to establish
       commission of offences u/s.504 and 509 IPC.

                                   Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 – Mere
       assertion of “filthy language” or harassment, if criminal
       intimidation or outraging modesty – FIR lodged by the
       complainant-female employee accusing the company and the
       appellants of having committed offence punishable u/ss.323,
       504, 506, 509, 511 – Filing of chargesheet arraigning the
       appellants as accused alleging that the appellants physically
       assaulted the complainant, confiscated the laptop provided by
       the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data, scolded
       the complainant in “filthy language”, forcibly terminated
       her employment, and was removed from the premises of
       the company by the security personnal who physically
       harassed and assaulted her – Petition seeking quashing of the
       chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the
       appellants – High Court dismissed the petition – Sustainability:
       Held: Not sustainable – On thorough examination the complaint,
       the FIR, and chargesheet, none of the ingredients of ss.323, 504,
       506, and 509 present, even if taken at face value and accepted in
       their entirety – Complaint bereft of even the basic facts, absolutely
       necessary for making out an offence – Nowhere alleged that the
       act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the
       appellants, provoked the complainant to commit breach of public
       peace or to commit any other offence – Term “filthy language,” when
* Author
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       examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or
       accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s
       modesty, does not fall within the purview of s.509 – In considering
       the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall conspectus of
       the case, the appellants’ actions do not demonstrate the requisite
       intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that
       their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to
       constitute an insult to woman’s modesty – In light of the employer-
       employee relationship between appellants and complainant;
       existing dispute between them relating to the employment; absence
       of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or
       accompanying gestures-whether preceding or succeeding the
       alleged words-failure to mention the use of any “filthy language”
       in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in
       the chargesheet, serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting
       modesty of the complainant by the appellants – Complaint also does
       not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the accused –
       Review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily
       alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather
       than criminal intimidation – Charge u/s.511 also cannot stand –
       Furthermore, after the complainant filed the complaint, NCR was
       registered – No cognizable offence was initially believed to have been
       committed against the complainant – Subsequently, FIR was lodged
       almost two months after the initial complaint was filed, u/ss.323, 504,
       506, 509, and 511 – Only s.509 constitutes a cognizable offence,
       whereas ss. 323, 504, and 506 are non-cognizable offences – FIR
       does not contain any allegations that would substantiate charge
       u/s.509 – Chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use
       of “filthy language” by appellants in scolding the complainant –
       Discrepancies and variations outlined suggest deliberate attempt
       to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable
       to cognizable or to transform civil dispute into a criminal matter,
       potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the
       dispute with the complainant – Allowing the criminal proceedings to
       proceed against the appellants would amount to abuse of the legal
       process and result in travesty of justice – Impugned order passed
       by the High Court set aside. [Paras 17-19, 24, 25, 27-32, 35, 37-45]

                                 Case Law Cited
       Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2013] 9 SCR
       240 : AIR 2014 SC 2013; Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh
       [2007] 4 SCR 125 : (2007) 11 SCC 265; Rupan Deol Bajaj v.
       Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 237 : (1995) 6 SCC
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                              189

              Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.


      194; Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka & Anr. [2015]
      1 SCR 156 : (2015) 7 SCC 423 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
      Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                                List of Keywords
      Mere assertion of “filthy language”; Criminal intimidation; Outraging
      modesty; Ongoing harassment; Confiscation of laptop containing
      proprietary intellectual data, codes; Non-Cognizable Report; “Filthy
      language”; Termination; Breach of public peace; Civil dispute;
      Criminal matter; Abuse of legal process; Travesty of justice.

                               Case Arising From
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
      4884 of 2024
      From the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2019 of the High Court
      of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP Nos. 3961 and 3962 of 2015
      With
      Criminal Appeal No. 4883 of 2024

                             Appearances for Parties
      Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Srijoy Das, Ms. Prerna Mehta, Anmol
      Kheta, Ritik Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
      D. L. Chidananda, Dr. J. P. Dhanda, Ms. Raj Rani Dhanda,
      Dr. Ashok Vasishtha, Advs. for the Respondents.

                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

      Dipankar Datta, J.

      The Appeal
1.    By a common impugned judgment and order dated 31 st July,
      20191, a learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka2 dismissed


1    impugned order
2    High Court
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       Criminal Petition No. 3961 of 2015 (Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs.
       State of Karnataka & Anr.) and Criminal Petition No. 3962 of 2015
       (Madhushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.), both filed under
       Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733, seeking
       quashing of the chargesheet filed under Section 173(2), Cr. PC and
       the entire proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file
       of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore4.
2.     The accused appellants5 - Madhushree Datta6 and Badrinarayana
       Jaganathan7 - have taken exception to the impugned order by
       presenting these appeals.

       Facts
3.     The proceedings before the ACMM have, as its genesis, an incident of
       25th October, 2013. The second respondent as complainant8 lodged a
       complaint dated 26th October, 2013 with the Sub-Inspector of Police,
       H.A.L. Police Station, Marathahalli, Bangalore, against M/s Juniper
       Networks India Private Limited9 and the appellants. The complainant
       asserted that she was employed as a Technical System Analyst at
       the Company, where she was subjected to ongoing harassment by
       the management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning
       under duress, with the threat of immediate termination if she did
       not comply. Specifically, the complainant alleged that on October
       25, 2013, between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the first accused, who
       held the position of Human Resources Manager at the Company,
       demanded that the complainant resign under threat of immediate
       dismissal. Furthermore, the first accused, allegedly instructed the
       complainant not to return to work and confiscated her personal
       belongings, including her laptop, bag, wallet, money, credit cards et
       cetera. The complainant further asserted that the laptop contained
       proprietary intellectual property, specifically codes and other work,
       that she had personally created. In addition, the complainant alleged



3    Cr. PC
4    ACMM
5    appellants
6    first accused
7    second accused
8    complainant
9    Company
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           Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.


      that the management ordered her removal from the premises, with
      security personnel escorting her out and reportedly engaging in
      behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and threatening
      with dire consequences.
4.    Following the above complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report10 was
      registered on 26th October, 2013. The NCR states that the employees
      of the Company, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant
      to both mental and physical harassment by confiscating her laptop,
      which contained her data. The complainant subsequently filed a
      formal complaint seeking an inquiry and investigation into the matter,
      following her forcible termination from employment on October 25,
      2013.
5.    More than 2 (two) months later, a First Information Report11 was
      lodged by the complainant accusing the Company and the appellants
      of having committed offences punishable under sections 323, 504,
      506, 509, 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 186012. The FIR states that
      the Company, along with the first accused, subjected the complainant
      to both physical and mental torture. They allegedly confiscated the
      laptop issued to the complainant and forcibly evicted her from the
      Company.
6.    Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted
      into the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511
      of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on 23rd April 2014, arraigning the
      appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleges that the appellants
      physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop
      provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data
      stored on it. Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding
      the complainant in “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her
      employment. Furthermore, with the assistance of security personnel,
      the appellants are said to have had the complainant removed from
      the premises of the Company.
7.    Aggrieved thereby, the appellants unsuccessfully approached the
      High Court as noted above.



10   NCR
11   FIR
12   IPC
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       Impugned Order
8.     A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court primarily
       considered the allegations set forth in the complainant’s complaint
       and concluded that, prima facie, they meet the necessary elements
       to constitute the offences attributed to the appellants. The High Court
       rejected the appellants’ objection regarding the procedure followed
       by the police in registering FIR No. 823/2013, and observed that
       the materials on record suggest that the offences alleged against
       the appellants involve both cognizable and non-cognizable offences.
       The High Court further held that a mere lapse in the process of
       investigation, by itself, would not constitute a valid ground for
       quashing the proceedings. Moreover, the records indicate that
       the investigating officer had obtained the requisite authorization
       under Section 155(2) of the Cr. PC prior to registration of the FIR.
       Additionally, the High Court noted that the alleged offences were
       committed by employees of the Company, that is, the appellants,
       and not by the Company itself, without the Company’s consent.
       Consequently, non-inclusion of the Company as an accused in the
       chargesheet did not entitle the appellants to seek quashing of the
       chargesheet.

       Contentions
9.     Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellants argued that
       the High Court erred in failing to exercise its inherent power under
       Section 482 of the Cr. PC, and to quash the chargesheet filed
       against the appellants. He contended that the following points warrant
       consideration by this Court:
       A.   Firstly, the FIR and the chargesheet filed by the first respondent
            fail to disclose a prima facie case against the appellants. The
            chargesheet, according to the appellants, does not disclose any
            of the essential elements of the offences under Sections 323,
            504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC even if accepted as true.
       B.   Secondly, the offences alleged in the complaint are of a general
            nature and do not specify the appellants’ involvement in the
            commission of the alleged offences. Categorical assertion is
            that the second accused was not present in the office on the
            date of the alleged incident and, therefore, no specific role has
            been attributed to him in relation to the alleged offences.
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           Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.


     C.    Thirdly, the issues pertaining to resignation and termination
           are civil in nature. Criminal proceedings have been initiated
           by the complainant solely to exert pressure on the Company
           and the appellants, with the intent of coercing them to settle
           the matter, and thereby enabling complainant to gain an undue
           monetary advantage.
     D.    Fourthly, the allegations levelled in the FIR are so absurd and
           inherently improbable that no reasonable person could, based
           on these allegations, conclude that there are sufficient grounds
           to proceed against the appellants.
     E.    Fifthly, the allegations made in the FIR and reiterated in the
           chargesheet are inconsistent.
     F.    Sixthly, initially, a NCR was registered against the appellants,
           and despite the investigation, no new material has been placed
           on record to substantiate the commission of a punishable offence
           under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC.
     G.    Seventhly, in criminal proceedings, the appellants cannot be
           held liable for the actions of a third party. The complainant
           has alleged that it was the security guard who harassed and
           assaulted her, threatening her with dire consequences.
     H.    Eighthly, no medical examination was conducted by the first
           respondent on the complainant to ascertain any injury resulting
           from an alleged assault by the appellants, thereby leading to a
           serious miscarriage of justice.
     I.    Finally, it was contended that no FIR based on the complaint
           dated 26th December, 2013 ought to have been registered on
           the face of the NCR.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for both sets of respondents supported
    the High Court’s order dismissing the appellants’ petitions under
    Section 482 of the Cr. PC. They vehemently refuted the submissions
    made by the learned counsel for the appellants and presented the
    following arguments:
     A.    Firstly, the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie,
           disclose the essential ingredients of criminal offences. A plain
           reading of the complaint, the FIR, and the chargesheet clearly
           establishes a case against the appellants under Sections 323,
           504, 506, and 511 of the IPC.
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       B.     Secondly, the Company and its employees, namely the
              appellants, subjected the complainant to harassment and
              humiliation. They issued life threats, engaged in criminal
              intimidation, committed physical assault, inflicted mental
              torture, insulted her, and unlawfully seized her intellectual
              property, including code, data, and other related materials.
              Furthermore, during the act of forcibly taking her laptop, she
              was inappropriately touched and handled, thereby subjecting
              her to physical harassment.
       C.     Thirdly, the complainant was coerced into tendering her
              resignation, and when she protested, force was used to
              compel her to return the laptop. Additionally, she was physically
              assaulted and threatened with severe consequences.

       Consideration
11. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for all the parties at
    length and examined the materials on record.
12. The points for determination that emerge for decision are:
       (i)    Whether, based on the materials on record, prima facie,
              ingredients of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509,
              and 511 of the IPC are made out, even if the allegations are
              taken at face value and accepted in their entirety?
       (ii)   Whether the chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings
              against the appellants, are liable to be quashed?
13. At the outset, we record that none of the two complaints lodged by
    the complainant - the first on 26th October, 2013 and the next on
    23rd December, 2013 - does with any degree of clarity and certainty
    suggest the presence of the second accused at the time of the
    alleged occurrence in the office premises of the Company. In fact,
    when this was pointed out to learned counsel for the complainant, he
    had no answer. Even though it is admitted that the second accused
    was not present, we are minded to proceed on the premise as if
    the second accused too was present. What would be the effect of
    arraigning him as an accused though not present shall, however,
    be dealt with at a later stage of this judgment.
14. While considering the first point, we need to examine in brief the
    relevant provisions of the IPC.
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           Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.


     Section 323, IPC
15. To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section
    323 of the IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323
    together.
16. What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions
    is that, for a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, there must be
    a voluntary act of causing hurt, i.e., bodily pain, disease, or infirmity,
    to another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused.
17. Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that
    the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by
    security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically
    harass, and threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the
    complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing
    hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused.
18. Furthermore, the chargesheet reiterates the similar version set forth
    in the complaint, stating that the complainant was forcibly thrown
    out of the office by the security personnel. While the actions of the
    security personnel could potentially constitute an offence of causing
    hurt, they are neither named in the complaint nor figure as accused
    in the chargesheet. Having said that, the appellants cannot be said
    to have foreseen or anticipated the actions of the security personnel
    in such a manner that would render them co-perpetrators of the
    offence. Hence, there is no basis for the prosecution to set forth
    the concept of liability of the employer or for the overt acts of its
    employees in this matter.
19. In the light of the abovementioned discussion, we are of the considered
    opinion that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC
    have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the
    chargesheet.

     Sections 504 And 509, IPC
20. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion
    of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the
    complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under
    Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC.
21. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions
    contained in Section 504 of the IPC.
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22. A perusal of Section 504 of the IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting
    someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a
    nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace
    or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients
    of Section 504 of the IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the
    available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or
    knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the
    public peace or the commission of any other offence.
23. We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court
    in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.,13 wherein
    Section 504 of the IPC came up for interpretation and it was held
    as under:
             “13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients,
             viz., (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to
             give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused
             must intend or know that such provocation would cause
             another to break the public peace or to commit any other
             offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree
             that should provoke a person to break the public peace or
             to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally
             insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give
             provocation to any other person and such provocation will
             cause to break the public peace or to commit any other
             offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504
             are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the
             offence is that there should have been an act or conduct
             amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the
             accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient
             by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.
             14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual
             words or language should figure in the complaint. One has
             to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the
             Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there
             has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person
             to break the public peace or to commit any other offence,
             that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit


13   [2013] 9 SCR 240 : AIR 2014 SC 2013
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              Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.


             of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant
             should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of
             provoking the other person to commit any other offence.
             The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the
             manner in which they are used, the person or persons to
             whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the
             person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant
             factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint
             lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

24. In the instant case, the chargesheet states that the appellants
    used “filthy language” while scolding the complainant; however, no
    such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint.
    Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language
    and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the
    complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other
    offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients
    of the offence under Section 504 of the IPC, as explained in the
    abovesaid decision, are not satisfied.
25. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section
    509 of the IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the
    meaning of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has
    been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC,
    this Court has addressed the essence of a woman’s modesty in the
    decision in Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh.14 Excerpts from
    the decision read as under:
             “12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty
             is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman’s
             modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused
             is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very
             relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in
             this Section is an attribute associated with female human
             beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female
             owing to her sex...”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)


14   [2007] 4 SCR 125 : (2007) 11 SCC 265
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26. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty
    of a woman under Section 509 of the IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v.
    Kanwar Pal Singh Gill,15 observed as under:
             “15. In State of Punjab vs. Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63)
             a question arose whether a female child of seven and a
             half months could be said to be possessed of ‘modesty’
             which could be outraged. In answering the above question
             Mudholkar J., who along with Bachawat J. spoke for the
             majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence
             of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to
             the common notions of mankind that must fall within the
             mischief of Section 354 IPC. Needless to say, the `common
             notions of mankind’ referred to by the learned Judge have to
             be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other
             learned Judge (Bachawat J.) observed that the essence
             of a woman’s modesty is her sex and from her very birth
             she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her
             sex. From the above dictionary meaning of ‘modesty’ and
             the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major
             Singh’s case (supra) it appears to us that the ultimate test
             for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is
             the action of the offender such as could be perceived as
             one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency
             of a woman...”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

27. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will
    be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented,
    in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish
    the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult
    the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act
    was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant
    being a woman.
28. The term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without
    any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent
    to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview
    of Section 509 of the IPC. Had there been references to specific


15   [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 237 : (1995) 6 SCC 194
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     words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding,
     succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate
     a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the
     prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants.
29. In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall
    conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants’
    actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that
    would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could
    provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult
    to a woman’s modesty.
30. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be
    assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances,
    not only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in
    the alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the
    appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials,
    respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by
    both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the
    employment in question.
31. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that
    the appellants used language towards the complainant that would
    warrant an offence under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the
    chargesheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using
    “filthy language.” Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR.
32. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants
    and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the
    employment; the absence of any references to specific words used,
    contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or
    succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any
    “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is
    only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding
    the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants.
    Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view
    that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the
    IPC have not been disclosed.

     Section 506, IPC
33. This brings us to the offence under Section 506 of the IPC, which
    the High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the
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       appellants. Section 506 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for
       the offence of criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the
       offence of criminal intimidation.
34. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections
    503 and 506 of the IPC in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of
    Karnataka & Anr.,16 where it was observed as follows:
             “11. xxxxxxxxxxxx A reading of the definition of ‘criminal
             intimidation’ would indicate that there must be an act of
             threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the
             person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or
             to the person in whom the threatened person is interested
             and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to
             the person threatened or it must be to do any act which
             he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which
             he is legally entitled to do.”
35. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any
    threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients
    of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not made out against
    him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest of
    the second accused is untenable, as Section 34 of the IPC, which
    imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied
    in this case.
36. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was
    threatened by the first accused, as detailed below:
             “Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 P.M. and 3-00 P.M. one
             MADHUSHIREE DUTTA (HR) asked me to forcefully resign
             or otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she
             abruptly asked me not to come for my work henceforth”.
37. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against
    the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention
    to cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat
    reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination,
    which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation.
    It is also the appellants’ case, which has not been disputed by the



16   [2015] 1 SCR 156 : (2015) 7 SCC 423
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                          201

           Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.


     complainant, that the complainant has filed a reference before the
     labour court challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement
     along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the materials
     on record, the ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie,
     are not disclosed against the first accused too.
38. After a thorough examination of the matter, including a review of the
    materials on record: viz., the complaint, the FIR, and chargesheet,
    we are of the view that none of the ingredients of Sections 323,
    504, 506, and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they are taken
    at face value and accepted in their entirety. The complaint is bereft
    of even the basic facts, which are absolutely necessary for making
    out an offence.
39. Since the ingredients of the offences under the aforementioned
    sections have not been made out, the charge under Section 511 of
    the IPC cannot stand.
40. To sum up, after the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was
    registered. It indicated that no cognizable offence was initially believed
    to have been committed against the complainant. Subsequently, an
    FIR was lodged on 23rd December, 2012, i.e., 58 (fifty-eight) days
    after the initial complaint was filed, under Sections 323, 504, 506,
    509, and 511 of the IPC. It is pertinent to note that only Section
    509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504,
    and 506 are non-cognizable offences. Furthermore, the FIR does
    not contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge under
    Section 509 of the IPC. Additionally, the chargesheet is the sole
    document that alleges the use of “filthy language” by the appellants
    in scolding the complainant. The discrepancies and variations outlined
    above, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the
    proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a
    civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing
    the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant.
41. Notwithstanding this, and as asserted by the appellants, there are
    certain facts that strongly suggest that the criminal proceedings were
    initiated by the complainant against the appellants with mala fide
    intentions, specifically to wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce
    a settlement. The presence of the second accused cannot by any
    stretch of imagination be visualised, if one were to barely read the
    complaints - initial and subsequent – and treat the contents as true;
202                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


       yet, the complainant alleged acts against him which, according to
       her, amounted to criminal offence. We are reminded of the maxim
       res ipsa loquitur and leave the discussion at that.
42. The legal principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under
    Section 482 of the Cr. PC for quashing complaints and criminal
    proceedings have been formulated by this Court in a plethora of
    decisions. We see no reason to burden this judgment of ours by
    referring to the same. However, we are fully convinced that allowing
    the criminal proceedings to proceed against the appellants would
    amount to an abuse of the legal process and result in a travesty of
    justice.
43. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are also of the view that the
    arguments advanced by Mr. Luthra on the permissibility of the police
    to register the FIR on 23rd December, 2013 need not be examined
    in this appeal.

       Conclusion
44. We, therefore, answer point (i), referred to in paragraph 12 (supra)
    in the negative while point (ii) of the same paragraph is answered
    in the affirmative.
45. Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court, dated
    31.07.2019, cannot be sustained and, consequently, stands set
    aside. The chargesheet and the entire proceedings in Case Crime
    No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the ACCM, Bangalore, against the
    appellants also stand quashed.
46. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.
47. We, however, make it clear that the findings/observations recorded/
    made herein shall have no bearing on the pending reference between
    the parties before the Labour Court.

       Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain