MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGHversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH

                          [2023] 4 S.C.R. 829                            829


     MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH                             A
                                  v.
                   STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 915 of 2016)
                          APRIL 24, 2023                                 B
           [B. R. GAVAI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860: ss. 302 , 201, 120-B – Circumstantial
Evidence – Criminal Conspiracy – Businessman-victim threatened
for money and shot dead by two motorcyclists – Appellant and several
                                                                         C
others chargesheeted – Trial court convicted and sentenced all the
accused persons except one – However, the High Court acquitted
all the accused except the appellant – On appeal, held: Prosecution
case rests solely on circumstantial evidence, as none was found
present at the scene of the incident – Neither of the independent
witness supported the prosecution case – Veracity of the                 D
Investigating Officer’s testimony does not inspire confidence on
account of various lapses – Nothing on record suggests that the
appellant had conspired to commit offence – Also all other accused
were acquitted by the courts below and a single person cannot hatch
a conspiracy – Thus, the High Court without appreciating the
                                                                         E
testimonies of the witnesses in their true import and meaning, and
without having any discussion concerning the complicity of the
appellant, in a perfunctory manner held the prosecution to have
established the case, which is entirely circumstantial in nature,
against the appellant – High Court erred in holding that the evidence
reveals that in all human probability the act must have been done        F
by the appellant – Principle of determining the guilt of the appellant
in a case involving circumstantial evidence is not that of probability
but certainty and that all the evidence present should conclusively
point towards only a singular hypothesis, which is the guilt of the
appellant – Thus, the order of the High Court is set aside – Arms
                                                                         G
Act, 1959 – s. 25(1)(1-b)(a) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1974 – Chapter XII.
      Penal Code, 1860:120-B – Charge of criminal conspiracy
under – Basic requirement of – Held: For the charge of criminal
conspiracy u/s. 120B, to be established, an agreement between the
                                                                         H
                                 829
830            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     parties to do an unlawful act must exist – In case of lack of direct
      evidence, it is not safe to hold a person guilty u/s. 120B – To prove
      the offence of criminal conspiracy, it is imperative to show a meeting
      of the minds between the conspirators for the intended common
      object – On facts, appellant cannot be convicted of criminal
      conspiracy solely for having concealed the location of the
B
      incriminating materials / articles and, in the absence of any evidence
      establishing meeting of the minds – Given that all the other co-
      accused have been acquitted by the courts below, meaning they
      were innocent of the crime, the fundamental requirement of a criminal
      conspiracy is not met.
C            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : Chapter XII – Duties
      and responsibilities of the Investigating Officer – Compliance of –
      Held: Investigating Officer is the person tasked with determining a
      direction, the pace, manner and method of the investigation – It is
      his statutory duty under the CrPC and is also a constitutional
D     obligation to ensure the maintenance of peace and the uphold of
      rule of law – On facts, Investigating Officer miserably failed to
      investigate as is expected and required of a police officer to
      investigate a crime of murder, especially when not even a single
      eyewitness exists, and the entire case rests entirely on circumstantial
      evidence – Investigating Officer did not meet the obligations he
E     was under – Numerous infirmities affected the conduct of the
      Investigation Officer calling into question, credibly, the investigation
      conducted by him or upon his directions.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court

F           HELD: 1.1 The prosecution’s case rests solely on
      circumstantial evidence, as none was found present at the scene
      of the incident. Further, it is also not the case of the prosecution
      that the present appellant had either used or shot the deceased
      with the gun allegedly recovered based on his statement, which
      was purportedly made before the police officer-PW-23 in the
G     presence of independent witnesses PW-6 and PW-7. [Paras 10
      and 11][837-G-H]
          1.2. Neither of the independent witness PW 6 and PW 7
      supported the prosecution case. Despite extensive cross
      examination conducted by the Public Prosecutor, nothing
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   MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                          831
            STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

substantial could be elicited from their testimonies indicating any    A
guilt of the accused. PW-1, nephew of the deceased, has not made
out any person to be responsible for the offence, nor has he
expressed any doubt or pointed fingers against any of the accused,
much less the present appellant. Close examination of the
testimony of the Investigating Officer-PW-23 reveals that the
                                                                       B
witness miserably failed to investigate as is expected and
required of a police officer to investigate a crime of murder,
especially when not even a single eyewitness exists, and the entire
case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. [Paras 14, 18 and
19][838-F; 839-C-D]
       1.3. The homicidal death of the victim is not in dispute. It    C
has come in the testimony of the Investigating Officer that on
27.9.2009, after registration of the complaint, he visited the spot;
carried out the preliminary investigation; sent the dead body for
post-mortem and collected several incriminating articles. His
testimony reveals that the prime accused was SP, who stands            D
acquitted on all charges by the Court below, and this Court is not
called upon examine the complicity of the other accused. It further
emanates from the testimony of PW 23 that the present appellant
was not present at the spot of the crime. In fact, not even one
person has disclosed his complicity in the crime. His testimony
further reads the complicity of the appellant in the crime, to be      E
suspected only based on the disclosure statements of co-accused
SP to the effect that the former could get recovered pistol/bullets/
live cartridges from the house of co-accused AS. The courts below
disbelieved this part of the version of the deponent qua the other
accused. Hence, the High Court’s reasoning in arriving at              F
appellant’s guilt is illogical if not self-contradictory. [Paras 20-
22][839-E-H; 840-A]
      1.4 Nothing on the record suggests that the instant
appellant had conspired to commit the offence. At best, as shown
from the testimony of this deponent, the present appellant has         G
only concealed the relevant incriminating evidence/articles. The
materials on record in no way establish that before the
commission of the offence, the accused had any common purpose,
object or intention of committing the crime, without the same
being borne out of the records, the charge of criminal conspiracy
                                                                       H
832            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     and of common intention which is to be read with Section 302 of
      the Penal Code, fails. For the charge of criminal conspiracy under
      Section 120B to be established, an agreement between the parties
      to do an unlawful act must exist. In some cases, direct evidence
      to establish conspiracy may be absent, but when the lack of
      evidence is apparent, it is not safe to hold a person guilty under
B
      this section. To prove the offence of criminal conspiracy, it is
      imperative to show a meeting of the minds between the
      conspirators for the intended common object. Thus, the present
      appellant cannot be convicted of criminal conspiracy under Section
      120B, solely for having concealed the location of the incriminating
C     materials/ articles and, in the absence of any evidence establishing
      meeting of the minds. Given that all the other co-accused have
      been acquitted by the courts below, meaning they were innocent
      of the crime, the fundamental requirement of a criminal conspiracy
      is not met. The charge of criminal conspiracy also fails on the
      ground that a single person cannot hatch a conspiracy. [Paras 30-
D
      33][841-E-H; 842-A,B-D]
            1.5 Even about the search, the veracity of the Investigating
      Officer’s testimony is not found to be inspiring in confidence on
      account of various lapses. For he did not examine the owner of
      the house; did not enter his movement in the case diary; did not
E     record that he took the accused for effecting the recovery; was
      not able to describe clearly the area from where the recovery
      was effected; admits both the independent witnesses, who do
      not belong to the area from where the recoveries were effected;
      does not associate any of the residents of the area for conducting
F     the search; does not examine any of the residents for carrying
      out any further investigation and most importantly admits that
      both the memo of arrest as also the recovery not to have been
      prepared by him or bearing his signature and the same too, have
      many corrections and over-writing, thus reducing the correctness
      and authenticity of this document. Furthermore, he is not clear
G     about the description of the articles recovered. [Paras 35 and
      36][843-A-C]
            1.6 The Investigating Officer is the person tasked with
      determining a direction, the pace, manner and method of the
      investigation. It is a statutory duty under the Cr.P.C. and is also
H
   MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                           833
            STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

a constitutional obligation ensuring the maintenance of peace and       A
the upholding of rule of law. The Magistrate concerned is not
empowered to interfere with the investigation being carried out
up until the submission of the report by the said officer. Needless
to state then that the role of the Investigating Officer is essential
and crucial. Chapter XII Cr.P.C. titled as “information to the
police and their powers to investigate”, lays down the procedure        B
and course of action to be taken by the police upon receipt of the
commission of an offence cognizable in nature. [Paras 38, 40][843-
F, H; 844-C-D]
      1.7 The Investigating Officer did not meet the obligations
he was under. Numerous infirmities affected the conduct of the          C
Investigation Officer calling into question, credibly, the
investigation conducted by him or upon his directions. [Para
44][846-D]
      1.8 The High Court, without appreciating the testimonies
of the witnesses in their true import and meaning, and without
                                                                        D
having any discussion concerning the complicity of the accused,
in a perfunctory manner held the prosecution to have established
the case, which is entirely circumstantial in nature, against the
instant appellant. Significantly, the High Court holds that the
evidence reveals that “in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused”. Inter alia, it is this finding which is      E
found to be erroneous, for the principle of determining the guilt
of the accused in a case involving circumstantial evidence is not
that of probability but certainty and that all the evidence present
should conclusively point towards only a singular hypothesis,
which is the guilt of the accused. The judgment passed by the
High Court is set aside.[Paras 45-46][846-E-H]                          F
      Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana (2015) 12 SCC 644
      : [2015] 9 SCR 977; D.K Basu v. State of WB (1997) 1
      SCC 416 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284; Parveen v. State
      of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1184; Geeta Devi
      Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine 57;
                                                                        G
      Amarnath Chaubey v. Union of India (2021) 11 SCC
      80; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India (2014) 2
      SCC 532 : [2013] 17 SCR 1099; Common Cause v.
      Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 332 : [2015] 6 SCR 731;
      Pooja Pal v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 135 : [2016]
      11 SCR 560; Bhagwant Singh v. Commission of Police                H
834              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A           (1983) 3 SCC 344 : [1983] 3 SCR 109; Mohd. Imran
            Khan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC
            192 : [2011] 15 SCR 1030 – referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
      [2015] 9 SCR 977                 referred to               Para 12
B
      [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284         referred to               Para 27
      (2021) 11 SCC 80                 referred to               Para 38
      [2013] 17 SCR 1099               referred to               Para 38
      [2015] 6 SCR 731                 referred to               Para 39
C
      [2016] 11 SCR 560                referred to               Para 41
      [1983] 3 SCR 109                 referred to               Para 42
      [2011] 15 SCR 1030               referred to               Para 43
D          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No.915 of 2016.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 14.01.2016 of the High Court
      of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No.468 of 2013.
             Shivaji M. Jadhav, Brij Kishor Sah, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Apurva,
E     Balraj Virha, Rehman Ali, Advs. for the Appellant.
            Ms. Ashmita Singh, Gautam Narayan, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            SANJAY KAROL, J.
F           1. The following three questions arise for consideration :
            1.     Whether the Investigating Officer in the present case had
                   complied with the duties and responsibilities cast upon him
                   by virtue of Chapter XII of Code of Criminal Procedure
                   Code, 1973?
G
            2.     Whether the court below, while acquitting all the other
                   co-accused in connection with the same crime, erred in not
                   returning a finding qua the instant appellant – a co-accused
                   - in respect of a charged framed under Section 120-B of
                   the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
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    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                              835
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

      3.     Whether the impugned judgments convicting the appellant        A
             are sustainable in law or not?
       2. Maghavendra Pratap Singh @ Pankaj Singh (referred to as
Pankaj Singh) has preferred the present appeal against the Judgment
dated 14.1.2016 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in
Criminal Appeal No.468 of 2013. He alone stands convicted for having        B
committed an offence punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code,
1860, with life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1000/- with further
imprisonment of 6 months in default; under Section 201 of the IPC,
punishable with 7 years RI with a fine of Rs.1000/- and 6 months RI for
default; under Section 25(1)(1-b)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959 3 years RI
with fine of Rs.1000/- and 6 months RI for default. The sentences were      C
awarded to run concurrently.
       3. The incident which led to the present case was that a
businessman by the name of Goverdhan Aggarwal (hereinafter, the
deceased) and certain others were threatened, and a demand of rupees
ten lakhs was made from each of them. On 26.9.2009 the deceased left        D
his office at about 7:00 PM for his home when two motorcyclists shot
him. He was taken to the District Hospital, Ambikapur, in the car of
PW-24, namely Prabodh Minz, where he died. That night, an FIR was
registered at the P.S. Gandhi Nagar (Ex.P-37). The body was sent for a
post-mortem vide Memo under Ex.P-39. After due investigation, a             E
chargesheet was filed, stating that all the accused persons, including
Sunil Paswan, Pankaj Singh, and Pappu Tiwari, came together and, in
agreement, committed or caused to be committed the murder of
Gowardhan Aggarwal. In pursuance of the said agreement, Pappu Tiwari
made available the motorcycle, Pankaj Singh conveyed the information
of the deceased having departed from his office, Abhishek Singh carried     F
Sunil Paswan and the weapons as pillion rider on the said motorcycle on
the evening of 26.9.2009 at about 7:00 PM, where Sunil Paswan then
shot the deceased.
       4. The Learned Additional District Judge, in Session Trial No. 76/
2010, seized of the trial against Sunil Paswan, Maghavendra Pratap Singh    G
@ Pankaj Singh, Akhileshwar Pratap Singh @ Lalit Singh, and Sidkant
Tiwari @ Pappu Tiwari; and in Sessions Case 166/2010, Mannu Singh
@ Gyanendra Singh @ Manvendra Singh @ Abhishek Singh, Satish
Tripathi, and Ganeshdutt Mishra.
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836              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A            A total of twenty- eight witnesses were examined, and the Trial
      Court framed eight issues for consideration. Issues A, B and C concern
      the instant appellant. They are; A) whether the accused persons have in
      agreement with each other and, in pursuance of criminal conspiracy,
      murdered the deceased; B) whether the accused have in agreement
      with each other and with the intention to screen each other from
B
      punishment concealed particular articles such as the motorcycle, pistol,
      cartridges, scarf, etc. and C) whether Pankaj Singh has been found in
      possession of two 9mm pistols, their magazines and thirty-three live
      cartridges without possessing the requisite licence thereof.
            5. The Learned Additional District Judge disposed of both the
C     cases with a common judgement dated 25.03.2013. by which out of the
      seven persons named above, one, namely, Akhileshwar Pratap Singh,
      was acquitted, and others were convicted and sentenced under various
      provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and in certain cases under
      provisions of the Arms Act, 1959.
D            6. A total of five appeals were filed before the High Court. The
      status of all accused persons is as under:
       Accused                 Charge            Trial Court      High Court




E




F




G
            7. The High Court, vide Impugned judgement dated 14.01.2016,
      acquitted all the accused save and except Maghavendra Pratap Singh
      @ Pankaj Singh, the present appellant.
            8. This Court has therefore been called upon to examine the
H     correctness of the conviction decision and sentence rendered by the
    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                                   837
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Sarguja,            A
Chhattisgarh, and as partly confirmed by the High Court.
       The Impugned Judgment
       9. In the appeal preferred by the convicts (five in number) in
terms of the impugned Judgment, the High Court, while acquitting all the
other convicts, namely, Satish Tripathi, Ganesh Datt Mishra, Mannu Singh,        B
and Sunil Paswan, has confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded
to Pankaj Singh as reproduced above. In doing so, the Court found the
testimonies of Ashish Agrawal (PW-1), Naresh Mandal (PW- 6), Avinash
Tirki (PW-7) and Inspector J.S. Saggu (PW-23), Investigation Officer
sufficient enough to prove the guilt of Pankaj Singh warranting conviction       C
and sentence. In paragraph 49 of its Judgment, the High Court observed
as under:
       “49. On due consideration, the prosecution has proved entire
       circumstantial evidence against the appellant Madvendra. The
       circumstances are fully established consistent only with the              D
       hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and that is not explainable
       by any other circumstances except that appellant Madhvendra is
       guilty and evidence collected by the prosecution is of the conclusive
       nature and tendency. The chain of evidence is complete, it shows
       in all human probability the act must have been done by the
       accused. The Prosecution has duly proved that appellant                   E
       Madhvendra had killed Gowardhan Agrawal and was also in
       possession of fire arm and cartridges in contravention of relevant
       provisions of Arms Act and had caused disappearance of evidence
       of offence committed by concealing the pistol, cartridges and other
       articles. The conviction awarded to accused Madhvendra does               F
       not call for any interference. The same is well founded.”
       Consideration of the Evidence on Record
       10. It is pertinent to note that the prosecution’s case rests solely
on circumstantial evidence, as none was found present at the scene of
the incident.                                                                    G
      11. Further, it is also not the case of the prosecution that the present
appellant had either used or shot the deceased with the gun allegedly
recovered based on his statement (Ex. P-15), which was purportedly
made before the police officer (PW-23) in the presence of independent
witnesses namely, Naresh Mandal (PW-6) and Avinash Tirki (PW-7).                 H
838             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A             12. It will be helpful to refer to the general principle of cases
      revolving around circumstantial evidence as encapsulated by Vijay
      Shankar v. State of Haryana (2015) 12 SCC 644. The relevant portion
      is as follows:
            “8. There is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the entire case
B           is based upon circumstantial evidence. The normal principle is
            that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the circumstances
            from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be
            cogently and firmly established; that these circumstances should
            be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of
            the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should
C           form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the
            conclusion that within all human probability the crime was
            committed by the accused and they should be incapable of
            explanation of any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
            accused and inconsistent with their innocence vide Sharad
D           Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [Sharad
            Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
            : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487]. The same view was reiterated in Bablu v.
            State of Rajasthan [Bablu v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 13 SCC
            116 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 590].”
E           13. In light of the fact that all the co-accused who had preferred
      appeals stand acquitted by the Court below, therefore, while fully
      appreciating the testimony of this witness, this Court confines the
      discussions only concerning the present appellant, namely Pankaj Singh.
             14. Interestingly, neither of the independent witness (PW 6 and
F     PW 7) supported the prosecution case. Despite extensive cross-
      examination conducted by the Public Prosecutor, nothing substantial could
      be elicited from their testimonies indicating any guilt of the accused.
      Noticeably, both the witnesses are rustic villagers working as daily wagers,
      have deposed to have signed blank papers, and are not residents of the
      area.
G
             15. A perusal of the testimony of PW-6 unrefutably reveals the
      witness to have signed documents which were blank, purportedly used
      by the police to strengthen this case for the commission of the offence.
            16. PW-6, while stating that he does not recognize the accused,
      admits that his signatures are on several documents. He further says
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    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                                  839
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

that he had signed blank papers under threat from police officials. Such        A
a statement is uncontroverted as the record does not reflect any
cross-examination on this issue or any other, for that matter.
       17. We also notice that PW-7, one of the persons on whom reliance
was placed by the courts below, states that he does not know the accused
persons and that he had come to know from having perused newspapers             B
that the deceased was murdered.
       18. We may also observe that PW-1, namely, Ashish Agrawal,
nephew of the deceased, has not made out any person to be responsible
for the offence, nor has he expressed any doubt or pointed fingers against
any of the accused, much less the present appellant. He states he has           C
“no information as to how many persons, how hit to uncle with bullet
coming with what mode.”
       19. The testimony of the Investigating Officer Inspector J.S. Saggu
(PW-23) runs into 97 pages. Close examination of the same reveals that
the witness miserably failed to investigate as is expected and required of      D
a police officer to investigate a crime of murder, especially when not
even a single eyewitness exists, and the entire case rests entirely on
circumstantial evidence.
       20. The homicidal death of Shri Goverdhan Aggarwal is not in
dispute. Be that as it may, it has come in the testimony of the Investigating   E
Officer that on 27.9.2009, after registration of the complaint, he visited
the spot; carried out the preliminary investigation; sent the dead body for
post-mortem and collected several incriminating articles.
      21. It is pertinent to note that his testimony reveals that the prime
accused was Sunil Paswan, who stands acquitted on all charges by the            F
Court below, and this Court is not called upon examine the complicity of
the other accused.
       22. It further emanates from the testimony of P.W. 23 that the
present appellant was not present at the spot of the crime. In fact, not
even one person has disclosed his complicity in the crime. His testimony
                                                                                G
further reads the complicity of Pankaj Singh in the crime, to be suspected
only based on the disclosure statements of co- accused Sunil Paswan
(Ex. P-13) to the effect that the former could get recovered pistol/bullets/
live cartridges from the house of co- accused Abhishek Singh. The courts
below have disbelieved this part of the version of the deponent qua the
                                                                                H
840             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     other accused. Hence, the High Court’s reasoning in arriving at Pankaj
      Singh’s guilt is illogical if not self-contradictory.
             23. Furthermore, we notice that on 12.10.2009, Pankaj Singh was
      called to the police station, where he recorded his statement, which
      corroborated what Sunil Paswan had said regarding him being able to
B     support the recovery of arms and ammunition from the house allegedly
      belonging to Abhishek Singh. Under the statement, the incriminating
      material, i.e., three guns (one with an empty cartridge); thirty- three live
      cartridges of 9mm; six empty 9 mm cartridges and four empty 9 mm
      cartridges, were recovered vide memo Ex. P-14. They were sent for
      analysis to the laboratory at Chandigarh. Further, his statement shows
C     that the accused, Pankaj Singh, was arrested on 22.10.2019 vide memo
      Ex. P-21/P-22.
              24. Now significantly, the witness (P.W. 23) admits that the
      statements of neither Sunil Paswan nor Pankaj Singh have been recorded
      by him, in his hand, or by any other named persons, under his instructions.
D     If that were so, it raises the question as to who prepared these memos,
      which still needs to be answered by the prosecution.
            25. Pertinent to note here is that no direct evidence is available
      which firmly proves the ballistic report, i.e., the expert’s report. Further,
      neither the expert who analysed and conducted the chemical analysis
E     nor the author of the report stand examined.
             26. Statement of the Investigating Officer that appellant Pankaj
      Singh was called to the police station itself is uninspiring in confidence,
      for there is no written communication on record which reflects the same.
      Further, it is also not his version that he was called by any other mode or
F     that the co-accused had brought him to the police station.
             27. We find PW-23 not to have placed on record any case diary
      indicating his movements to the spot of recovery. In light of the given
      facts and circumstances, this fact acquires significance. It is also observed
      that before arresting the accused, no information was ever supplied to
G     the family members of any of the accused persons. Moreover, some of
      the accused, residents of other States, for instance, Uttar Pradesh, were
      arrested without supplying any information to their relatives. This is in
      contravention to the directions issued in D.K Basu v. State of WB
      (1997) 1 SCC 416, the relevant portion thereof is as under:-
H
    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                                   841
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

      “(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held          A
      in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up,
      shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person
      known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as
      soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained
      at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo
                                                                                 B
      of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
      (4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee
      must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of
      the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal
      Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area
      concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after           C
      the arrest.”
     28. In pursuance of these directions, Section 79 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 was introduced, laying down the process for
“Warrant directed to police officer for execution outside jurisdiction”.
                                                                                 D
       29. The record does not reflect that the house from which the
recoveries were affected belonged to accused Abhishek Singh. Regarding
the conduct of the search, we may also observe that the owner of the
house was not examined. This begs the question that if both Abhishek
and Sunil were aware of the situs of incriminating articles, then why is it
that recoveries were not affected by their statements or through them?           E

       30. Nothing on the record suggests that the present appellant had
conspired to commit the offence. At best, as shown from the testimony
of this deponent, the present appellant has only concealed the relevant
incriminating evidence/articles. The materials on record in no way
establish that before the commission of the offence, the accused had             F
any common purpose, object or intention of committing the crime, without
the same being borne out of the records, the charge of criminal conspiracy
and of common intention which is to be read with Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, fails.
       31. For the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of           G
the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to be established, an agreement between
the parties to do an unlawful act must exist. In some cases, direct evidence
to establish conspiracy may be absent, but when the lack of evidence is
apparent, it is not safe to hold a person guilty under this section. To
prove the offence of criminal conspiracy, it is imperative to show a meeting
                                                                                 H
842            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A     of the minds between the conspirators for the intended common object.
      It was observed by a two-judge bench of this Court in Parveen v. State
      of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1184, that “A few bits here and a
      few bits there on which prosecution relies, cannot be held to be adequate
      for connecting the accused with the commission of crime of criminal
      conspiracy.”
B
             32. Keeping this abovesaid principle in view, we believe that the
      present appellant cannot be convicted of criminal conspiracy under
      Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860, solely for having concealed the
      location of the incriminating materials/ articles and, in the absence of
      any evidence establishing meeting of the minds. Given that all the other
C     co-accused have been acquitted by the courts below, meaning they were
      innocent of the crime, the fundamental requirement of a criminal
      conspiracy is not met.
            33. Needless to say, the charge of criminal conspiracy also fails
      on the ground that a single person cannot hatch a conspiracy.
D
              34. So far as the second question is concerned, we may refer to
      recent judgment of this Court in Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
      2022 SCC OnLine 57, wherein it was observed that the High Court,
      by virtue of being the First Appellate Court ought to reappreciated and
      discussed the evidence on record. Had that been done completely in the
E     present case, the High Court would have returned a finding on Section
      120-B of IPC. The charge of criminal conspiracy requires meeting of
      the minds prior to commission of offence, and with four of the five appeals
      being allowed and only the present appellant being convicted, the basic
      requirement of the section, that is of two or more persons agreeing to or
F     causing to be done an illegal act or an act which is not per se illegal but
      it is done by illegal means, is not met. The impugned judgment, however,
      only records that Section 10 and 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which
      deal with things having been said or done by a conspirator in reference
      to common design and a proved confession being considered as against
      another person; are not applicable and then observes that the sentence
G     handed down to Pankaj Singh does not call for any interference.
      Therefore, the Court implies that the conviction in its entirety including
      the sentence for criminal conspiracy is upheld. Such a view, in the
      considered view of this Court, cannot be sustained.
             35. Even about the search, we do not find the veracity of the
H     Investigating Officer’s testimony to be inspiring in confidence on account
    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                                   843
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

of various lapses. For he (a) did not examine the owner of the house; (b)        A
did not enter his movement in the case diary; (c) did not record that he
took the accused for effecting the recovery; (d) was not able to describe
clearly the area from where the recovery was effected; (e) admits both
the independent witnesses, who do not belong to the area from where
the recoveries were effected; (f) does not associate any of the residents
                                                                                 B
of the area for conducting the search; (g) does not examine any of the
residents for carrying out any further investigation and (h) Most
importantly he admits that both the memo of arrest as also the recovery
not to have been prepared by him or bearing his signature and the same
too, have many corrections and over-writing, thus reducing the
correctness and authenticity of this document.                                   C
       36. Furthermore, he is not clear about the description of the articles
recovered. Illustratively, in the memo, he records one black colour scarf
to have been recovered, but on a pointed query put by the Court, he
admitted that not to be so but only a black cloth which undoubtedly
cannot be equated to a scarf. Furthermore, there needs to be more clarity        D
in his mind about whether the tank from where the articles were recovered
was full of water.
      37. It has come on record that the recovered arms and ammunition
were first sent to the laboratory at Raipur and, after that, to the laboratory
at Chandigarh. However, none had come forward to prove the report                E
received from the said laboratories. Furthermore, there is nothing on the
record besides any other scientific evidence linking the accused to the
recovered articles.
        38. The Investigating Officer is the person tasked with determining
a direction, the pace, manner and method of the investigation. In                F
Amarnath Chaubey v. Union of India (2021) 11 SCC 80, it was
observed that the police has a primary duty to investigate upon receiving
the report of the commission of crime. In Manohar Lal Sharma v.
Union of India (2014) 2 SCC 532, this Court observed that one of the
responsibilities of the police is protection of life, liberty and property of
citizens. The investigation of offences to bring the offender to the book        G
and facilitate the ultimate search for truth is one of the important duties
the police has to perform. This is a statutory duty under the Cr.P.C. and
is also a constitutional obligation ensuring the maintenance of peace and
the upholding of rule of law.
                                                                                 H
844             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A           39. On the responsibility cast on an officer investigating a crime,
      this Court in Common Cause v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 332,
      observed as under :
            “31. There is a very high degree of responsibility placed on an
            investigating agency to ensure that an innocent person is not
B           subjected to a criminal trial. This responsibility is coupled with an
            equally high degree of ethical rectitude required of an investigating
            officer or an investigating agency to ensure that the investigations
            are carried out without any bias and are conducted in all fairness
            not only to the accused person but also to the victim of any crime,
            whether the victim is an individual or the State.”
C
             40. It is well recognised that the Magistrate concerned is not
      empowered to interfere with the investigation being carried out up until
      the submission of the report by the said officer. Needless to state then
      that the role of the Investigating Officer is essential and crucial. Chapter
      XII of Cr.P.C. titled as “information to the police and their powers to
D     investigate”, lays down the procedure and course of action to be taken
      by the police upon receipt of the commission of an offence cognizable in
      nature. Section 156 lays down the power of investigation; Section 157
      the procedure thereof; Section 160 the power to require attendance of a
      witness, Section 161 conduct examination of such witness, etc. Section
E     172 requires such police officer to maintain a case diary and Section 173
      lays down the format and the procedure for the report to be issued by
      such officer.
           41. This Court has in Pooja Pal v. Union of India (2016) 3
      SCC 135, expounded as under for criminal investigations and its success:
F           “96. The avowed purpose of a criminal investigation and its
            efficacious prospects with the advent of scientific and technical
            advancements have been candidly synopsised in the prefatory
            chapter dealing with the history of criminal investigation in the
            treatise on Criminal Investigation — Basic Perspectives by Paul
G           B. Weston and Renneth M. Wells:
            “Criminal investigation is a lawful search for people and things
            useful in reconstructing the circumstances of an illegal act or
            omission and the mental state accompanying it. It is probing
            from the known to the unknown, backward in time, and its
H
    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                                     845
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

       goal is to determine truth as far as it can be discovered in                A
       any post-factum inquiry.
       Successful investigations are based on fidelity, accuracy and
       sincerity in lawfully searching for the true facts of an event
       under investigation and on an equal faithfulness, exactness,
       and probity in reporting the results of an investigation. Modern            B
       investigators are persons who stick to the truth and are absolutely
       clear about the time and place of an event and the measurable
       aspects of evidence. They work throughout their investigation fully
       recognising that even a minor contradiction or error may destroy
       confidence in their investigation.
                                                                                   C
       The joining of science with traditional criminal investigation
       techniques offers new horizons of efficiency in criminal
       investigation. New perspectives in investigation bypass reliance
       upon informers and custodial interrogation and concentrate upon
       a skilled scanning of the crime scene for physical evidence and a
       search for as many witnesses as possible. Mute evidence tells               D
       its own story in court, either by its own demonstrativeness or
       through the testimony of an expert witness involved in its
       scientific testing. Such evidence may serve in lieu of, or as
       corroboration of, testimonial evidence of witnesses found and
       interviewed by police in an extension of their responsibility to seek       E
       out the truth of all the circumstances of crime happening. An
       increasing certainty in solving crimes is possible and will
       contribute to the major deterrent of crime—the certainty that
       a criminal will be discovered, arrested and convicted.”
                                                       (Emphasis in original)      F
        42. With reference to case diaries, it has been observed by this
Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commission of Police (1983) 3 SCC
344, a two-Judge Bench observed that entries into the police diary shall
be with (a) promptness; (b) in sufficient detail; (c) containing all significant
facts; (d) in chronological order; and (e) with complete objectivity.              G
       43. This Court in Mohd. Imran Khan v. State (Govt. of NCT
of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC 192, observed as under while noting the
effect of objectionable features and infirmities on criminal investigations:
       “31. The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from
       all objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead       H
846            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 4 S.C.R.


A           to a grievance to either of the parties that the investigation was
            unfair or had been carried out with an ulterior motive which had
            an adverse impact on the case of either of the parties. The
            investigating officer is supposed to investigate an offence avoiding
            any kind of mischief or harassment to either of the party. He has
            to be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility of bias or
B
            impartial conduct so that any kind of suspicion to his conduct may
            be dispelled and the ethical conduct is absolutely essential for
            investigative professionalism.
            The investigating officer
C               “is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with such
                evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction but to
                bring out the real unvarnished truth”.
             44. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles and applying them to
      the present set of facts, we may observe that the Investigating Officer
D     did not meet the obligations he was under. As we have noticed above,
      numerous infirmities affected the conduct of the Investigation Officer
      calling into question, credibly, the investigation conducted by him or upon
      his directions.
            Conclusion
E            45. In the considered opinion of the Court, the High Court, without
      appreciating the testimonies of the witnesses mentioned above in their
      true import and meaning, and without having any discussion concerning
      the complicity of the accused, in a perfunctory manner held the
      prosecution to have established the case, which is entirely circumstantial
F     in nature, against the present appellant. Significantly, the High Court
      holds that the evidence reveals that “in all human probability the act
      must have been done by the accused”. Inter alia, it is this finding which
      we find to be erroneous, for the principle of determining the guilt of the
      accused in a case involving circumstantial evidence is not that of
      probability but certainty and that all the evidence present should
G     conclusively point towards only a singular hypothesis, which is the guilt
      of the accused, Pankaj Singh.
            46. Given the above, the Judgment dated 14.1.2016 passed by the
      High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No.468 of
      2013 titled Maghavendra Pratap Singh @ Pankaj Singh v. State of
H     Chhattisgarh is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
    MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH v.                                  847
      STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.]

       47. The three questions noted above are answered accordingly.            A
       48. If not already released, the accused is directed to be set at
liberty forthwith.
       Interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of.
                                                                                B
Nidhi Jain                                                    Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA)




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