MAHAVEERversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1206
- Decided
- 8 October 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SANJAY KAROL
Holding
The presumption against the consumer under Section 39 applies only if artificial means are proved, and the prosecution failed to do so; likewise, the charge under Section 44 was not proved, so the appellant’s acquittal stands.
Summary
Mahaveer, a director of a steel company, was charged under Sections 39 and 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910 for alleged theft of electricity and tampering with a meter box that had three holes. The trial court acquitted him, finding the prosecution failed to prove the use of artificial means or any tampering. The High Court reversed the acquittal, relying on the presence of the holes and the reduction in consumption after they were sealed, and sentenced Mahaveer to imprisonment and fine. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the presumption against the consumer under Section 39 required proof of artificial means and whether the evidence established meter tampering under Section 44. It held that the prosecution’s witnesses gave only speculative testimony and did not prove artificial means or tampering, so the presumption could not be invoked. Consequently, neither Section 39 nor Section 44 was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court set aside the High Court judgment, reinstated the acquittal, discharged bail bonds, and allowed the appeals.
Issues considered
- Whether the prosecution proved the use of artificial means or unauthorised means required to invoke the presumption under Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910.
- Whether the evidence established interference with the meter or other works as required under Section 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910.
- Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court's acquittal on the basis of the evidence presented.
Legislation cited
- Electricity Act, 1910s. 39, s. 44
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the acquittal of the appellant-director of the company was correctly reversed by the High Court and whether his conviction u/ss.39 and 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910 for committing theft of energy and for interference with meters or licensee’s use of energy, sustainable. Headnotes† Electricity Act, 1910 – ss.39 and 44 – Theft of energy – Penalty for interference with meters or licensee’s works, and for improper use of energy – Conviction of the appellant-director of the company for the offence
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 381 : 2025 INSC 1206
Mahaveer
v.
State of Maharashtra and Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 2154-2155 of 2011)
08 October 2025
[Sanjay Karol* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the acquittal of the appellant-director of the
company was correctly reversed by the High Court and whether his
conviction u/ss.39 and 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910 for committing
theft of energy and for interference with meters or licensee’s works,
and for improper use of energy, sustainable.
Headnotes†
Electricity Act, 1910 – ss.39 and 44 – Theft of energy – Penalty
for interference with meters or licensee’s works, and for
improper use of energy – Conviction of the appellant-director
of the company for the offence punishable u/ss.39 and 44, for
committing theft of energy and for interference with meters
or licensee’s works, and for improper use of energy by the
High Court, reversing the findings of acquittal recorded by
the Magistrate – Sustainability:
Held: Under s.39, for the presumption against the consumer to
take effect, it must be proved that an artificial means or a means
not authorised by the licensee had been used in committing the
theft – Presumption is not of automatic application, and instead,
something is required to be established for it to apply, thus, on
facts, it must be established by the MSEB that an artificial means
had been employed – None of the five witnesses deposed with
complete confidence about the alleged theft of electricity and the
use of artificial means therein, by the appellant – Most of the
testimonies based on estimation, presumption, approximation or
possibilities, which cannot be deemed to be sufficient for proving the
theft – As a necessary follow-up of the inability of the prosecution
to prove the use of artificial means, the presumption against the
* Author
382 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
consumer, that is, the appellant, not set in motion – Charge u/s.44
is resting on shaky grounds as well – Nothing on record to show
that the meter had been injured or tampered with – None of the
investigators from the MSEB carried out a practical exercise of
checking the holes and the wires, and the possibility of it being
actually used for theft, as alleged to have taken place – None of
the witnesses or any other third person saw the accused, or, for
that matter, any other person connected to the Company, openly
tampering with the box – No categorical statement that at the time
of installation or any time prior to the inspection of the meter box
by officials of the MSEB, there were no holes in the box – There
are too many open possibilities for criminal liability to be affixed to
any person – s.44 also has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt – Thus, neither ss.39 nor 44 could be established against
the appellant – Judgment and order passed by the High Court set
aside. [Paras 13-17]
Case Law Cited
Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat [1996] Supp. 2 SCR
265 : (1996) 9 SCC 225; Satya Narain Prasad v. Bhagwan Ramdas
(1995) Supp. 4 SCC 629; Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian
[2021] 1 SCR 668 : (2021) 5 SCC 283; Vadivelu Thevar v. State of
Madras [1957] 1 SCR 981 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13 – referred to.
List of Acts
Electricity Act, 1910.
List of Keywords
Theft of energy; Interference with meters or licensee’s works;
Improper use of energy; Presumption; Use of artificial means;
Holes in the box; Criminal liability.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
2154-2155 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.10.2010 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA Nos. 270 and
346 of 1997
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 383
Mahaveer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Sunil J. Mathews, Deepak Kore, Ms. Jyoti Rani Chib, Ms. Yashika,
Rajeev Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ajit Bhasme, Sr. Adv., Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Rohan K Santoshi,
Parth Sarathi, Prashant Sharma, Gyanendra Vikram Singh,
Ms. Soumya Gulati.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
1. These appeals, at the instance of the appellant-convict, are directed
against the judgment and order dated 15th October, 2010, passed
in Criminal Appeal No.270/1997 and Criminal Revision Application
No.346/1997, whereby a learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay (Bench at Aurangabad) overturned the findings
of acquittal recorded by the IIIrd Jt. Judicial Magistrate (FC) at Jalan
in Reg. Criminal Case No.108/93 for the offence punishable under
Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 19101.
2. The facts as have been laid out by the Courts below are as follows:-
2.1 The appellant-convict was a Director of M/s. Rushi Steels
and Alloys Pvt. Ltd.2, situated at Plot No.52/7 of MIDC Area,
Jalan and was responsible for conducting the business of the
Company. The power supply to the Company was provided by
the Maharashtra State Electricity Board3.
2.2 The officials of the MSEB, in March 1993, noticed a mismatch
between the units supplied to these factories vis-à-vis the
readings taken from the meters at these factories. The alleged
disparity was to the extent of 36.6 per cent. Naturally, an
1 Hereinafter referred to as “The Act”
2 Hereinafter referred to as the “Company”
3 Hereinafter referred to as “MSEB”
384 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
investigation was followed in the months of April and May 1993.
During inspection of the meters placed at the factory of the
appellant-convict by senior officials of MSEB, in the presence
of independent witnesses, it was found that the meter had
been tampered with, and the box in which it was placed had
3 holes of 4 mm each.
2.3 According to the prosecution, the officials of the MSEB concluded
that the workers of the Company had been using additional
wires, interfering with the meter supply and thereby causing a
slowdown in the running of the meter. As such, the holes were
sealed. On a subsequent reading of the meter, the disparity
was now found to be around 10 per cent.
2.4 The approximate quantification of the alleged theft of electricity
was to the tune of Rs.30 lakhs.
2.5 The Executive Engineer, MSEB, lodged a First Information
Report with the Taluka Jalan Police Station, on 25th June 1993.
Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed
before the Court on 1st October 1993.
3. The prosecution examined five witnesses. Statement under
Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure4 of the two accused,
namely Radheshyam and Mahaveer, the present appellant-convict
(Mahaveer), was also recorded. It may be noted here itself that the
appeal qua Radheshyam stood dismissed as abated vide order dated
30th September 2019. The defence did not lead any other evidence
and furnished a whole and complete denial of the accusations levelled
by the prosecution.
4. The Trial Court, on consideration of the entire evidence, concluded that
the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. It could not prove abstraction, dishonest use or consumption
of electrical energy. The charges under Sections 39 and 44 of the
Act could not be established and as such, the following order was
passed:-
"1. Both the accused viz., (1) Radheshyam S/o Ratanlal
Agrawal, age 40 years and 2) Mahaveer S/o Ratanlal
4 Hereinafter referred to as “Cr.PC”
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 385
Mahaveer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
Agrawal, age 55 years, Directors of M/s. Rushi Steel
and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. Company are hereby acquitted
of the punishable offence under Section 39 of the
Indian Electricity Act, 1910.
2. Both the accused are further acquitted of punishable
offence U/sec. 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.
3. Both accused are acquitted under the provisions of
Section 248(1) of Cr. P.C.
4. Bail bonds of both accused stand cancelled.
5. Both the accused be set at liberty forthwith.
6. Muddemal viz., meter box in question be delivered to
prosecution vide Exh. 122, application of prosecution
claiming meter box in question U/sec. 452 Cr.P.C.
subject to condition that prosecution shall execute
a bond to restore it to the court if order made under
Sub Section (1) of Sec. 452 Cr.P.C. is modified or
set aside an appeal or revision.”
(S.D. Agrawal)
3 Jt. Judicial Magistrate
rd
(F.C.) Jalna
Date : 25.4.1997”
5. On appeal, the High Court framed the following points for
consideration:-
“i) Whether the prosecution proves that the respondents
committed theft of energy?
ii) Whether the prosecution proves that the respondents
interfered with the electric meter?
iii) Whether the complaint is made by competent person
as expected under Section 50 of the Electricity Act?
iv) What is the scope of appreciation of evidence when
the appeal against acquittal is filed?”
6. On consideration of evidence, the High Court held that once the
extra holes in the meter box were sealed, the consumption increased
significantly, and since the possibility of any other user stealing the
386 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
electricity had been foreclosed by the holes being plugged with a metal
plate having been placed there, it stood proved that the appellant-
convict(s) was responsible for the theft. Regarding Section 44 of the
Act, it was concluded that the case would fall squarely under clause
‘c’ of the said Section. Further, it was observed that the appellant-
convict(s) did not make any attempt to prove that the extra holes in
the meter box were not caused by them. Regarding the issue that
PW-3 Dinkar, being the competent authority to lodge the complaint, it
was held that he was given that he had been deputed by the MSEB
as the officer responsible for that area. Accordingly, a complaint at
his instance would be treated as a complaint made on behalf of
MSEB, and so, it would be in accordance with the law. On the next
point, it was held by the learned Single Judge that the Trial Court
had not appreciated the law as laid down by this Court in Ramesh
Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat5. Having recorded as above, the
appeal and the revision were allowed, and the appellant-convict(s)
was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
year and to pay a fine of Rs.2 lakhs each, in default whereof the
appellant-convict(s) was to undergo further rigorous imprisonment
for a period of 3 months.
7. Hence, these appeals. We have heard learned counsel appearing
for the parties.
8. The short question to be considered is whether the acquittal of the
appellant-convict(s) was correctly reversed by the High Court and
whether the conviction so handed down to him is sustainable in law.
9. The two provisions, of which infraction is alleged on the part of the
appellant-convict(s), are reproduced below for ready reference: –
Section 39
[39. Theft of energy.—Whoever dishonestly abstracts,
consumes or uses any energy shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine which shall not be less than one thousand
rupees, or with both; and if it is proved that any artificial
means or means not authorised by the licensee exist for
the abstraction, consumption or use of energy by the
5 (1996) 9 SCC 225
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 387
Mahaveer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
consumer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved,
that any abstraction, consumption or use of energy has
been dishonestly caused by such consumer.]
Section 44
44. Penalty for interference with meters or licensee’s
works, and for improper use of energy.—Whoever—
(a) connects any meter referred to in Section 26, sub-section
(1), or any meter, indicator or apparatus referred to in Section
26, sub-section (7), with any electric supply-line through
which energy is supplied by a licensee, or disconnects the
same from any such electric supply-line, 1 [* * *]; or
2
[(aa) unauthorisedly re-connects any meter referred to in
sub-section (1) of Section 26, or any meter, indicator or
apparatus referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 26, with
any electric supply-line or other works, being the property
of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied,
when the said electric supply line or other works has or
have been cut or disconnected under sub-section (1) of
Section 24; or]
(b) lays, or causes to be laid, or connects up any works
for the purpose of communicating with any other works
belonging to a licensee, 3 [* * *]; or
(c) maliciously injures any meter referred to in Section
26, sub-section (1), or any meter, indicator or apparatus
referred to in Section 26, sub-section (7), or wilfully or
fraudulently alters the index of any such meter, indicator
or apparatus, or prevents any such meter, indicator or
apparatus from duly registering; or
(d) improperly uses the energy of a licensee;
shall be punishable with 4 [imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend
to five thousand rupees, or with both], and, in the case
of continuing offence, with a daily fine which may extend
to 5 [fifty] rupees; and 6 [if it is proved that any artificial
means exist] for making such connection as is referred to
in clause (a), 7 [or such re-connection as is referred to in
388 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
clause (aa),] or such communication as is referred to in
clause (b), or for causing such alteration or prevention as
is referred to in clause (c), or for facilitating such improper
use as is referred to in clause (d), 8 [and that] the meter,
indicator or apparatus is under the custody or control of
the consumer, whether it is his property or not, 9 [it shall
be presumed, until the contrary is proved,] that such
connection, 10 [re-connection,] communication, alteration,
prevention or improper use, as the case may be, has been
knowingly and willfully caused by such consumer.
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In Satya Narain Prasad v. Bhagwan Ramdas6 it was observed
as follows:
“3. …It can be seen that Section 39 as such does not
prescribe any sentence but yet it creates an offence by
raising a fiction, namely, that whoever has dishonestly
used or abstracted any energy shall be deemed to have
committed the theft within the meaning of Penal Code,
1860. Therefore, dishonest abstraction of electricity is
deemed to be an offence under the Penal Code by virtue
of this fiction created under Section 39 of the Electricity
Act. Interpreting this section, this Court in Avtar Singh
case [(1965) 1 SCR 103 : AIR 1965 SC 666] held: (SCR
p. 107-A-B)
“To put it shortly, dishonest abstraction of
electricity mentioned in Section 39 cannot be
an offence under the Code for under it alone it
is not an offence, the dishonest abstraction is
by Section 39 made a theft within the meaning
of the Code, that is, an offence of the variety
described in the Code as theft. As the offence
is created by raising a fiction, the section which
raises the fiction, namely Section 39 of the Act,
must be said to create the offence. Since the
abstraction is by Section 39 to be deemed to be
an offence under the Code, the fiction must be
6 (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 629
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 389
Mahaveer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
followed to the end and the offence so created
would entail the punishment mentioned in the
Code for that offence. The punishment is not
under the Code itself for under it abstraction of
energy is not an offence at all.”
It looks as though the High Court has only referred to
the last sentence and overlooked the fact that Section
39 expressly made dishonest abstraction of electricity, as
offence punishable under the Code. Section 39, therefore,
makes something which was not a theft within the Penal
Code, a theft within it, and consequently that section also
makes theft punishable in the manner provided in the Code
because the illegal abstraction of electricity is deemed
to be a theft within the meaning of Code and it must be
deemed for all purposes a theft including the purpose of
imposing the punishment. Therefore, in deciding whether
an offence of theft as provided under Section 39 is made
out or not the Court has to read Section 39 along with
provision of IPC dealing with theft.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. It has to be noted that prior to proceeding with the merits of the
case, that reversal of acquittal by the High Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction in and of itself does not call upon this Court
to reappreciate the entire evidence when an appeal is preferred by
special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Reference
to Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian7 would suffice. A Bench of
three learned Judges records the position as under:
“11. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions, we do not find any valid ground to interfere
with the impugned judgment [P. Balasubramanian v.
Kalamani Tex, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 35499]. It is true
that the High Court would not reverse an order of acquittal
merely on formation of an opinion different than that of
the trial court. It is also trite in law that the High Court
ought to have compelling reasons to tinker with an order
7 (2021) 5 SCC 283
390 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of acquittal and no such interference would be warranted
when there were to be two possible conclusions. [C.K.
Dasegowda v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 13 SCC 119,
para 14 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 599] Nonetheless, there are
numerous decisions of this Court, justifying the invocation
of powers by the High Court under Section 378 CrPC,
if the trial court had, inter alia, committed a patent error
of law or grave miscarriage of justice or it arrived at a
perverse finding of fact. [State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4
SCC 271, para 27 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260; Ghurey Lal
v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450, para 70 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 60]
12. On a similar analogy, the powers of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution also do not encompass the
reappreciation of entirety of record merely on the premise
that the High Court has convicted the appellants for the first
time in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This Court in
Ram Jag v. State of U.P. [Ram Jag v. State of U.P., (1974)
4 SCC 201, para 14 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 370] , Rohtas v.
State of Haryana [Rohtas v. State of Haryana, (2019) 10
SCC 554, para 12 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 47] and Raveen
Kumar v. State of H.P. [Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P.,
(2021) 12 SCC 557 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869, para
14] , evolved its own limitations on the exercise of powers
under Article 136 of the Constitution and has reiterated
that while entertaining an appeal by way of special leave,
there shall not ordinarily be an attempt to reappreciate the
evidence on record unless the decision(s) under challenge
are shown to have committed a manifest error of law or
procedure or the conclusion reached is ex facie perverse.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. By way of an appeal, it is urged before us that the High Court has
committed a manifest error in overturning the findings of acquittal
entered by the Trial Court. A perusal of the record convinces us
that there may be some strength to this submission. As such, while
being conscious of the self-imposed limitations qua reappreciation
of evidence by this Court under the extant jurisdiction, we tread
further.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 391
Mahaveer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
13. A perusal of Section 39 of the Act reveals that any person who
dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy commits theft
of energy. The second part of the Section provides that if it is proved
that any artificial means or the means that have not been authorised
by the licensee, are used in such theft of energy till the contrary
is proved, it shall be assumed and presumed that such theft has
been committed by the consumer. What is obvious from the above
is that for the presumption against the consumer to take effect, it
must be proved that an artificial means or a means not authorised
by the licensee had been used in committing the theft. In other
words, the presumption is not of automatic application, and instead,
something is required to be established for it to apply. In the instant
case, therefore, it must be established by the MSEB that an artificial
means had been employed.
14. As we have already noted supra, the State examined five witnesses
to establish its case. Let us now examine how these five witnesses
are able to establish that artificial means had been employed in the
theft of electricity.
14.1 PW -1 was one Shankarrao, who was a witness to the
panchnama. He states that he was called there and shown a
meter box. He made a positive statement that he signed the
said document. When cross-examined, he stated that when
he signed the document, he had no knowledge of what had
taken place there, nor was the document written as per his
understanding. It was written independently, and he had only
affixed his signature on it. The meter he was shown was not
working. He was also shown some wires affixed to a wooden
board. It is admitted that he, having noticed whatever he was
shown, deduced, without confirmation, that there had been a
theft of electricity.
14.2 PW-2 was Balwant, Dy. Ex. Engineer, MSEB, Officer, Jalna. In
his detailed examination in chief, this witness detailed the entire
process of the cloud of suspicion being cast on the company
of the appellant-convict, as also the step-by-step actions taken
in regard of such suspicion. In his cross-examination, it comes
for that he had not checked the consumption of electricity by
the other companies. It was further stated:-
392 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“…It is true to suggest that all the statement made
by me by deposite and regarding less recording
of energy are based on guesswork and nothing
specific. It is true to nothing specific with regard
record with less electricity can be stated by me.…
I do not know as to whether previously there
were separate whole at the bottom of the metre is
question…. It is to do to suggest that I have been
pressurised by superior in deposed before the
Hon’ble Court”
14.3 PW-3 was the complainant. He testified that during the
inspection of the meter box, 3 holes were found. After plugging
the holes, it was stated that the discrepancy fell to 10 percent.
The numbers mentioned in the report, according to him, were
correct, and he has signed the same. In his cross-examination,
he admits that none of the officers of the MSEB verified the
possibility of –
“shortening the current by insulting wires in the holes
of the bottom of metre box. It is true to say that, all the
conclusions reached by us in the alleged occurrence
about theft of electricity in respect of metre box in
question entirely based upon the inference only.”
14.4 PW-4 testified that he had come to Jalan for the purpose of
conducting tests on the meters. At the time of testing, the
original seal of the meter box was found to be intact. He further
said that there was a direct correlation between the plugging of
the holes in the meter box and the number of discrepancies,
which were reduced significantly. In his cross-examination, it
comes forward that he had, on the basis of what he saw during
the inspection drew an inference that the energy consumed
was not in a proper manner because “there was possibility due
to existing the three holes in question.” The further relevant
portion is reproduced as under:
“I had given in my report send to S. E. the fact that, I
suspected have gone behalf of accused company. It
is true to suggest that, I have adopted the procedure
of elimination in between the 4 consumers after
making observations of all for consumers and gave
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 393
Mahaveer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
my conclusion that, the losses are due to 3 holes
of metre box in question.”
14.5 PW- 5 is a retired Chief Engineer, who at the relevant point
in time, was the Superintending Engineer, Aurangabad Circle.
He is the one who gave directions to the concerned officials
to commence the investigation. He details in his testimony,
the receipt of information of the discrepancy to the extent of
36.6% and the steps he took thereafter, including discussing
with higher officials. In his cross-examination, he admits as
follows:
“it is true to suggest that, the existence of 3 holes
at the bottom of the metre box of the accused is be
only because for charging the accused for pilferage
of energy.”
15. It is evident from the above discussion and extracts of the testimonies
put forward by the prosecution that none of them have deposed with
complete confidence about the alleged theft of electricity and the
use of artificial means therein, by the appellant-convict. Most of the
testimonies are based on estimation, presumption, approximation or
possibilities. Needless to state, the same cannot be deemed to be
sufficient for the purposes of proving the above. Reference may be
made to Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras8, wherein this Court
has explained the nature of witness testimony and its corresponding
effect on the overall case. The second of the three mentioned therein
is ‘wholly unreliable.’ The testimonies that make up this case appear
to fall squarely into this categorization. As a necessary follow-up of
the inability of the prosecution to prove the use of artificial means,
the presumption against the consumer, that is, the appellant-convict,
is not set in motion.
16. Insofar as the charge under Section 44 is concerned, we find that to
be resting on shaky grounds as well. Nothing has been brought on
record to show that the meter had been injured or tampered with.
None of the investigators from the MSEB carried out a practical
exercise of checking the holes and the wires, and the possibility of
it being actually used for theft, as is alleged to have taken place.
8 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13
394 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
None of the witnesses or any other third person saw the accused,
or, for that matter, any other person connected to the Company,
openly tampering with the box. There was no categorical statement
whatsoever that at the time of installation or any time prior to the
inspection of the meter box by officials of the MSEB, there were no
holes in the box. In other words, there are too many open possibilities
for criminal liability to be affixed to any person. In our considered
view, therefore, Section 44 of the Act also has not been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
17. Consequent to the above discussion, we hold that neither Sections 39
nor Section 44 could be established against the appellant-convict.
As such, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order dated
15th October 2010, passed in Criminal Appeal No.270 of 1997 and
Criminal Revision Application No. 346 of 1997, passed by the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana, is set aside. Mahaveer, the instant
Appellant, is acquitted of all charges. The bail bonds are discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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