MAHENDRA SINGH DHONIversusYERRAGUNTLA SHYAMSUNDAR AND ANR.

                         [2017] 3 S.C.R. 763


                   MAHENDRA SINGH DHONI                                      A
                                   v.
         YERRAGUNTLA SHYAMSUNDAR AND ANR.
             (Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 23 of2016)
                            APRIL 20, 2017                                   B
         [DIPAK MISRA, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
           MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 295A, 34 - Complaint - Quashing
of - Complainant was disappointed with the main page of monthly
business 111agazine which carried a painting paimed with photo of
                                                                             c
the petitioner with a caption "God ofBig Deals" - He filed complaint
petition constituting offence u/s.295A IPC before Magistrate at
Andhra Pradesh -;- Transfer petition filed by Petitioner before
Supreme Court to transfer complaint case to Karnataka - Meanwhile
the pendency of Transfer petition, petitioner sought quashment of            D
the complaint case itself- Held: s.295A does not stipulate everything
to be penalised - It penalises only those acts of insults to or those
varieties of atte111pts to insult the religion or religious belief of a
class of citizens which are perpetrated with deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class of
                                                                             E
citizens - Insults to religion .offered umvittingly or carelessly or
without any deliberate or malicious intention does not come within
the sec(ion -;- In the instant case, allegations re111otely do noi satisfy
the essential-ingredients of the offence and therefore, complaint
proceeding initiated against the petitioner quashed - Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.200.                                            F
      Penal Code, 1860- ss. 295A, 34 :__ Co111plaint petition quashed
by Supreme Court - Same benefit to flow in favour of the co-
accused - Held: In the instant case, as the comp(aint is quashed, it
shall squarely apply to the co-accused, who is the editor of the
magazine - Therefore, complaint is quashed even against co-                  G
accused.                                   ·
      Judicial Discipline - Responsibility - Held: Magistrates
conferred with the power of taking cognizance and issuing su111111ons
are required to carejitlly scrutinize whether the allegations made in
                                                                             H
                                   763
764             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A     the complaint proceeding meet the basic ingredients of the offence;
      whether the concept' of territorial jurisdiction is satisfied; and
      further whether the accused is really required to be summoned -
      This to be treated as the primary judicial responsibility of the court
      issuii1g process.
B           Disposing of the petition, the Court___ .

             HELD: 1.1 It is clear as crystal that Section 295A IPC does
      not stipulate everything to be penalised and any and every act
      would tantamount to insult or attempt to insult the religion or the
      religious beliefs of class of citizens. It penalises only those acts
c     of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion
      or religious belief of a class of citizens which are perpetrated
      with the deliber~te and malicious intention of outraging the
      religious feelings of that class of citizens. Insults to religion offered
      unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious
      intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not
D
      come within the Section. The said provision only punishes the
      aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with
      the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious
      feelings of that class. Emphasis has been laid on the calculated
      tendency of the said aggravated form of insuit and also to disrupt
E     the public order to invite the penalty. [Para 7][769-C-E]
            Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P. AIR (1957) SC 620 :
            (1957) SCR 860 - relied on
             1.2 In the instant case, after considering and scrutinizing
F
      the allegations made in the complaint petition, it is clear that the
      allegations remotely do not satisfy the essential ingredients of
      the offence and, therefore, applying the principle stated in State
      of Haryana & Ors. v. Bliajan Lal & others, the complaint
      proceedings initiated against the petitioner is hereby quashed.
      [Para 10][770-A-B)
G
            State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.(1992)
            Supp 1 SCC 335 : (1990) 3 Suppl. SCR 259 - relied
            on.
            2. In the case at hand, as the complaint is quashed, needless
H     to say, for the reasons for which th,e complaint is quashed, it shall
       MAHENDRA SINGH DHONI v. YERRAGUNTLA                             765
             SHYAMSUNDAR AND ANR.

squarely ap1>ly to the co-accused, who is the Editor of the            A
magazine. Therefore, applying the principle laid down in Harbhajan
Singh v. State of U.P. and Akhil ali Jehangir Ali Sayyed v. State of
Maharashtra, quash the complaint even against the co-accused.
Further, it is clarified that the order of quaslunent is passed
keeping in view the criminal miscellaneous petition filed in this
                                                                        8
case for quashing and also not to allow more space for abuse of
the process of the Court. [Para 13] [771-B-D)
      Harbhajan Singh v. State of U.P. (1982) 2 SCC 101 :
      (1982] 3 SCR 235; Akhil ali Jehangir Ali Sayyed v.
      State of Maharashtra (2003) 2 SCC 708 - referred to.
                                                                        c
                       Case Law Reference
[1957) SCR 860                          relied on       Para6
(1990) 3 Suppl. SCR 259                 relied on       Para 10
[1982] 3 SCR 235                        referred to     Para 12
                                                                        D
(2003) 2 sec 108                        referred to     Para 12
      CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Petition
(Criminal) No. 23of2016.
      Liz Mathew, M. S. Philip, Advs. for the Petitioner.
                                                                        E
      Sajad Sultan, Himanshu Shekhar, Jaideep Singh, Ms. Aishwarya
Bhati, T. Gopal, Ms. Tanuja Patra, Ms. Heena Khan, Advs. for the
Respondent.
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The present transfer petition was filed . F
seeking transfer of proceedings in Complaint Case No.1320 of2015
titled as Yerragunt/a Sllymsundar v. Mr. Clutita11y" K"/bag & Anr.
pending before the learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate,
Anantpur, Andhra Pradesh to the Court ofChiefMetropolitan Magistrate
at Bangalore in Karnataka. ·
                                                                        G
       2. When the matter was listed on 29.01.2016, this Court issued
notice and directed stay of further proceedings of the complaint case
pending before the learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate,
 Anantpur, Andhra Pradesh. Thereafter, the matter was called on ce11ain
 occasions and today when the matter was taken up, Ms. Liz Mathew,
                                                                        H
766             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A     learned counsel appearing for the petitioner filed a .Criminal Miscellaneous
      Petition No.7115 of2017 seeking quashment of the complaint case filed
      against the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have been loath to entertain
      such an application but, in view of the asseverations made to the effect
      that a complaint of same nature arising from a different trial court has
      been entertained and quashed, we have entertained the same.
B
              3. Learned counsel has drawn inspiration from order dated
       September 5, 2016 passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.843 and 847 of2016
      whereby this Court has quashed the criminal proceedings initiated in
      Complaint Case No.1978 of 2015 titled as Jayakumar Hirenwth v.
      Mahendra Singh Dlwni & others filed in the Court of IX Chief
c     Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore for the offence punishable under
      Section 295A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Be
      it noted, in the said case, though the High Court ofKarnataka was moved
      under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it declined to
      intervene and quash the proceedings. This Court, upon perusal of the
D     complaint and the allegations made in the complaint petition, opined that
      the allegations made in the complaint petition did not satisfy the ingredients
      t-0 constitute an offence under Section 295A read with Section 34 IPC
      and accordingly quashed the same.
              4. In the present case; as we find, the complaint petition is based
E      on the allegation that the complainant had purchased a monthly business
       magazine and was disappointed with the maih page of the magazine
       which carried a painting painted with the photo of the petitioner with a
       caption "God of Big Deals". There was description underneath which
       had the characters of some advertisement. As is discernible from the
       complaint petition, the complainant went to the town Police Station to
F      lodge an F.I.R. on 22.1.2013 but as the police declined to register the
       same, he was compelled to file a complaint petition under Section 200 of
      ·the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate entertained
       the same and issued summons.
             5. The seminal issue that arises for consideration is whether the
G     allegations made in the complaint constitute an offer1ce under Section
      295A of the IPC and whether this Court, in the obtaining factual matrix,
      relegate the trial at some other place or grant him liberty to file an
      application under Section 482 CrPC for quashing., At this juricture, we
      may refer to Section 295A of the IPC which reads as follows:-
H
          MAHENDRA SINGH DHONI v. YERRAGUNTLA                                      767
          SHYAMSUNDAR AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

         "295A. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage                 A
       . religious feelings of any class by insulting its re.ligion or
         religious beliefs.- Whoever, with deliberate and malicious
         intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of
         273 [citizens of India], 274 [by words, either spoken or
         written, or by signs or by visible representations or
                                                                                    B
         otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the
         religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with
         imprisonment of either description for a term which may
         extend to 4[three years], or with fine, or with both."
       6. Be it noted, the constitutional validity of Section 295A was
assailed before this Court in R"mji L"l Modi v. S/(lfe of U.P.1 which               c
was eventually decided by a Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench,
adverting to the multiple aspects and various facets of Section 295A
IPC held as follows :-
          "8. It is pointed out that s. 29SA has been included in chapter
          XV of the Indian Penal Code which deals with offences against D
          the publi'c tranquility and from this circumstance it is faintly sought
          to be urged, therefore, that offences relating to religion have no
          bearing on the maintenance of public order, or tranquillity and,
          consequently, a law creating an offence relating to religion and
          imposing restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and E
          expression cannot claim the protection of el. (2) of Art. 19. A
          reference to Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee
          the right to freedom of religion, will show that the argument is
          utterly untenable. The right to freedom of religion assured by
          those Articles is expressly made subject to pub Iic order, morality
           and health. Therefore, it cannot be predicated that freedom of F
           religion can have no bearing whatever on the maintenance of
           public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion
           cannot under any circumstances be said to have been enacted in
           the interests of public order. These two Articles in terms
           contemplate that restrictions may be imposed on the rights G
           guaranteed by them in the interests of public order.
           9. Learned counsel then shifted his ground and formulated his
           objection in a slightly different way. Insults to the religion or the
           religious beliefs ofaclass of citizens of India may, says learned
 1
     AIR 1957 SC 620                                                                H
768     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              (2017) 3 S.C.R.


A     counsel, lead to public disorders in some cases, but in many cases
      they may not do so and,, therefore, a law which imposes
      restrictions on the citizens' freedom of speech and expression
      by simply making insult to religion an offence will cover both
      varieties of insults, i.e., those which may lead to public disorders
      as well as.those which may not. The law in so far as it covers
B
      the first variety may be said to have been enacted in the interests
      of public order within the meaning of el. (2) of Art. 19, but in so
      far as it covers the remaining variety will not fall within that
      clause. The argument then concludes that so long as the possibility
      of the law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the
c     Constitution cannot be ruled out, the entire law should be held to
      be unconstitutional and void. We are unable, in view of the
      language used in the impugned section, to accede to this argument.
      In the first place el. (2) of Art. 19 protects a law imposing
      reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of
      speech and expression "in the interests of' public order, which is
D
      much wider than "for maintenance of' public order. If, therefore,
      certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder, a law
      penalising such activities as an offence cannot but be held to be
      a law imposing reasonable restriction "in the interests of public
      order" although in some cases those activities may not actually
E     lead to a breach of public order. In the next places. 295A does
      not penalise any and every act of insu It to or attempt to insult the
      religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalises
      only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to
      insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens,
      which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention
F
      of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to religion
      offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deli. berate or
      malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class
      do not come within the section. It only Punishes the aggravated
      form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate
G     and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that
      class. The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult
      is clearly to disrupt the public order and the section, which
      penalises such activities, is well within the protection of cl. (2) of
      Art. 19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the
      exercise of the right to freedom of speech and express ion
H
        MAHENDRA SINGH DHONI v. YERRAGUNTLA                                     769
        SHYAMSUNDAR AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

        guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(a). Having regard to the ingredients of A
        the offence created by the impugned section, there cannot, in
        ouropinion, be any possibility of this law being applied for purposes
        not sanctioned by the Constitution. In other words, the language
        employed in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions
        both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible B
        legislative action affecting the fundamental right guaranteed by ·
        Art. 19(1 )(s) and consequently, the question of severability does
        not arise and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the
        petitioner have no application to this case."
       7. On a perusal of the aforesaid passages, it is clear as crystal
that Section 295A does not stipulate everything to be penalised and any          c
and every act would tantamount to insult or attempt to insult the religion
or the religious beliefs of class of citizens. It penalise only those acts of
insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or religious
belief of a class of citizens which are perpetrated with the deliberate
and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class of     D
citizens. Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without
any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of
that class do not come within the Section. The Constitution Bench has
further clarified that the said provision only punishes the aggravated
form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the de! iberate and
                                                                                 E
 malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.
Emphasis has been laid on the calculated tendency of the said aggravated
form ofinsult and also to disrupt the public order to invite the penalty.
       8. Ms. Liz Mathews learned counsel for the appellant contends
that the allegations, if read in entirety, do not satisfy the essential
ingredients of the offence and, therefore, there is no justification that the    F
appellant should be compelled to face the trial. It is also her submission
that on the doctrine of parity, (as similar complaint has been quashed)
the original proceeding arising within a different territorial jurisdiction
deserves to be quashed.
      9. Mr. Jaideep Singh, learned counsel appearing for the                    G
complainant, respondent No. I, submitted that ifthe test, as provided by
the Constitution Bench, is applied, the complaint may not meet the
standards but there is some allegation which may be considered for the
purpose of offence.
                                                                                 H
770              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017)3 S.C.R.


A            10. To satisfy ourselves, we have bestowed our anxious
      consideration and scrutinized the allegations made in the complaint petition
      and we have no hesitation in holding that the allegations remotely do not
      satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence and, therefore, applying
      the principle stated in State ofHary·mut & Ors. v. Blwjan Lal & .f.Jthers1,
      we quash the complaint proceedings initiated against the petitioner.
B
             11. It is pertinent to state here that very monthly business magazine
      was the subject matter in Criminal Appeal No. 843 & 84 7 of2006, which
      were allowed, as mentioned hereinbefore. At this juncture, Mr. Sanchit
      Guru, learned counsel submitted that he is representing the co-accused
      before the trial Court in the complaint case. Once the complaint petition
c     is quashed in entirety because oflack of allegations against the accused
      persons, the same benefit has to flow in favour of the accused no. I.
      According to him, to keep the trial alive would not only be the abuse of
      the process of the court, but also tantamount to travesty of justice.
             12. In this regard, we may refer to a three-Judge Bench decision
D     in Harblutjmi Singh v. State of U.P. 3 wherein this Court granted benefit
      in appeal to one of the accused persons, and thought it appropriate that
      similar benefit should be extended to the co-accused also. It is interesting
      to note that the said benefit was extended despite the fact that the earlier
      appeals of that accused were dismissed by this Court on an antecedent
E     date. It is profitable to reproduce the passages from the said judgment:-
              "19. In the circumstances hereinabove stated, I am of the opinion
              that it will be manifestly unjust to allow the death sentence
              imposed on the petitioner to be executed. The question that,
              however, troubles me is weather this Court retains any power
F             and jurisdiction to entertain and pass any appropriate orders on
              the question of sentence imposed on the petitioner in view of the
              fact that not only his special leave petition and review petition
              have been dismissed by this Court but also the further fact that
              his petition for clemency has also been rejected by the President.

G             20. Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for
              due and proper administration of justice. Apart from the
              jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Arts. 32
              and 136 of the Constitution I am of the opinion that this Court
              retains and must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for
      2
         1992 Supp.( 1) sec 335
H     '(1982) 2 sec 101
             MAHENDRA SINGH DHONI v. YERRAGUNTLA                                   771
             SHYAMSUNDAR AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

          dealing with any extra-ordinary situation in the larger interests        A
          of administration ofjustice and for preventing manifest injustice
          being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly used only
          in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice.
          Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am
          of the opinion that this is a fit case where this Court should
                                                                                   B
        · entertain the present petition of Harbans Singh and this Com1
          should interfere."
     Be it noted, similar view has been taken in Akhil ali Jelumgir Ali
Sayyed v. State of Maharashtra'.
       13. In the case at hand, as the complaint is quashed, needless to           c
say, for the reasons for which the complaint is quashed shall squarely
apply to the co-accused, who is the Editor of the magazine. Therefore,
we apply the same principle and quash the complaint even against co-
accused. We may hasten to clarify that we have passed the order of
quashment keeping in view the criminal miscellaneous petition filed in
this case for quashing and also rot to allow more space for abuse of the           D
process of the Court.
       14. Before partingwith the case, we would like to sound a word
of caution that the Magistrates who have been conferred with the power
of taking cognizance and issuing summons are required to carefully
scrutinize whether the allegations made in the complaint proceeding meet           E
the basic ingredients of the offence; whether the concept of territorial
jurisdiction is satisfied; and further whether the accused is really required
to be summoned. This has to be treated as the primary judicial
responsibility of the court issuing process.
       15. The transfer petition and the criminal miscellaneous petition           F
stand disposed ofaccordingly.


Ankit Gyan                                                 Petition disposed of.




• (2003) 2 sec 10s