Supreme Court of India
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARANversusSTATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 401
- Decided
- 1 July 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The conviction cannot be sustained as the circumstantial evidence does not form a complete, unbroken chain that excludes reasonable doubt, and the appeal is allowed.
Summary
The appellant, a helmsman on the cargo ship "Lok Prem", was convicted under Section 302 IPC for allegedly murdering a fellow helmsman, L. Shivaraman, based primarily on circumstantial evidence and an alleged extra‑judicial confession to an engine officer. The prosecution relied on the appellant's fingerprints on a blood‑stained knife, the confession, and a motive stemming from a prior altercation, while the defence highlighted the absence of blood on the appellant's clothing, the non‑examination of two other helmsmen, and the existence of a second blood‑stained knife that was never forensic‑examined. The Supreme Court examined the chain of circumstantial evidence and held that it was incomplete, inconsistent and failed to exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence. It noted procedural lapses, such as the cleaning of the crime scene and failure to produce crucial forensic links, which undermined the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, ordered the appellant's release, and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC
- The admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra‑judicial confession
- Whether the forensic evidence (knives, fingerprints, bloodstains) conclusively links the appellant to the murder
- Whether procedural irregularities (non‑examination of witnesses, cleaning of the crime scene) vitiate the prosecution's case
- The requirement of a complete, unbroken chain of events to exclude reasonable doubt
Legislation cited
Subjects
murdercircumstantial evidenceextra‑judicial confessionforensic evidenceship jurisdictionIPC 302reasonable doubtchain of evidence
Judgment
[2013] 10 S.C.R. 907 907
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN A
v.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1300 of 2009)
JULY 1, 2013
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND M.Y. EQBAL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 - Murder - Incident occurred
on a ship while it was on the high seas - Allegation that
appellant-helmsman killed another helmsman with a knife - C
Conviction of appellant based on circumstantial evidence -
Justification - Held: On facts, not justified - There were many
inconsistencies and infirmities in the prosecution version - The
very fact that two blood-stained .knives were found by the
prosecution proves that the prosecution failed to give sufficient D
explanation as to who had assaulted the deceased by using
another knife - Two other helmsmen present when appellant
allegedly made confession before PW-6, not examined by the
prosecution - Though deceased was alleged to have been
assaulted as many as 14 times by a sharp-edged weapon E
and there was massive blood at the site of the offence, no
blood had spilled on the appellant or his clothes - Moreover,
nothing on record by way of explanation from the prosecution
side as to why the clothes of the appellant were not seized -
Vital piece of evidence regarding enmity of the appellant with F
his superiors and others was suppressed - Even the
Investigating Officer failed to inspect the cabin where the dead
body was found - No site plan was prepared by the
Investigating Officer - Before arrival of the Investigating
Agency officials, the place of occurrence including the cabin G
was completely washed and cleaned in such a way as if
nothing had happened in the cabin and the place around it -
Conclusion of the guilt of the appellant not fully established
beyond all shadow of doubt as the circumstances not
907 H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 10 S.C.R.
A conclusive in nature - Neither the chain of events was
complete nor the circumstances lead to the conclusion that
the offence was committed by the appellant and none else.
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -
8 Conviction based on circumstantial evidence - Permissibility
- Held: Conviction can be based solely on circumstantial
evidence - But while dealing with conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should in the first
C instance be fully established, and all the facts so established
should also be consistent with oniy one hypothesis i.e. the
guilt of the accused - Onus lies on the prosecution to prove
that the chain of event is complete and not to leave any doubt
in the mind of the Court - All circumstances must lead to the
conclusion that the accused is the only one who has
D committed the crime and none else.
The accused-appellant and the deceased 'L' were
helmsmen (crew members) on a ship sailing from South
Africa to Japan via Singapore. The prosecution case was
E that while the ship was on the high seas, the appellant
allegedly approached the llnd Officer (PW-6) with a blood-
stained knife in his hand and his hands smearing in blood
and allegedly confessed before him that he had killed 'L'.
The entire prosecution case was based on circumstantial
F evidence as no one saw the murder having been
committed by the appellant.
The trial court held the appellant guilty of committing
the murder of 'L' taking note of an earlier incident of
assault in which the appellant had sustained injuries at
G the hands of the deceased as motive on the part of the
appellant for commission of crime, the extra- judicial
confession made by him to PW-6 and presence of his
fingerprints on the knife that was allegedly used as the
weapon of offence. The appellant was convicted under
H Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life.
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 909
DELHI) & ANR.
The High Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and A
sentence, and therefore the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Conviction can be based solely on
circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the B
touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence.
While dealing with conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of the guilt is to be dra'!"n should in the first instance be
fully established, and all the facts so established should C
also be consistent with only one hypothesis i.e. the guilt
of the accused, which would mean that the onus lies on
the prosecution to prove that the chain of event is
complete and not to leave any doubt in the mind of the
Court. All circumstances must lead to the conclusion that D
the accused is the only one who has committed the crime
and none else. (Paras 11, 21] [926-C-D; 932-F-G]
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M. P. AIR
1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091; Padala Veera Reddy vs.
State of A.P. 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706; C. Chenga Reddy & E
Ors. vs. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193: 1996 (3) Suppl.
SCR 479; Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy vs. State of A.P.
(2006) 10 SCC 172: 2006 (3) SCR 348; Sattatiya vs. State
of Maharashtra (2008) 3 SCC 21 O; State of Goa vs.
Pandurang Mohite (2008) 16 SCC 714: 2008 (17) SCR 176; F
G. Parshwanath vs. State of Kamataka (2010j 8 SCC 593:
2010 (10) SCR 377; Rajendra Pra/hadrao Wasnik vs. State
of Maharashtra (2012) 4 SCC 37: 2012 (2) SCR 225 and
Brajendrasingh vs. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 289: 2012 (3)
SCR 599 - relied on. G
2.1. In the instant case, there are many
inconsistencies and infirmities in the prosecution version.
[Para 22] [933-A]
2.2. Both the accused and the deceased were good H
91 O SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A friends and both were staying in one cabin viz. Cabin
No.25. However, before the occurrence, the accused was
shifted to Cabin No.23 and therefore both the accused
and the deceased were staying in separate cabin on the
date of occurrence. [Para 23) [933-8-C]
B
2.3. The prosecution case is that the accused is
alleged to have confessed before PW-6 about the
commission of the offence and the blood-stained knife
was handed over to PW-6 which was subsequently seized
but no blood was noticeable on the clothes of the
C appellant which were found at the relevant time. The other
helmsmen, namely, 'B' and 'T' who were present when
the appellant is alleged to have made confession before
PW-6, were not examined by the prosecution. [Para 25]
[933-F-G]
D
2.4. The knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the doctor
concerned who had conducted post mortem
examination on the dead body of the deceased to find out
whether the injuries could have been caused by that
E weapon. Surprisingly, another knife (Ex.2b) alleged to
have been recovered from the boiler suit was also not
shown to the doctor to ascertain whether the said knife
was also used in the commission of the offence. [Para 26)
[933-H; 934-A-B]
F 2.5. The evidence reveals that after the said incident,
the appellant was tied up and kept on the bridge for at
least 2 to 3 days before being shifted. The contention of
the appellant's counsel was that the appellant was
susceptible of being forced to hold the knife (Ex.P-3) so
G as to get his fingerprints on the. knife which was never
kept inside the fish room along with the dead body. Apart
from the aforesaid, it appears from the post mortem
report that there were about 14 stab wounds on the neck
but there was no blood found on the dress of the
H appellant or on the scene of occurrence. Though the
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 911
DELHI) & ANR.
deceased was alleged to have been assaulted as many A
as 14 times by a sharp-edged weapon and there was
massive blood at the site of the offence, no blood had
spilled on the appellant or his clothes. Moreover, there is
nothing on record by way of explanation from the
prosecution side as to why the clothes of the appellant B
were not seized. Further, the alleged knife (Ex.P-3) was
not shown to the doctor who conducted the post mortem
of the deceased to take his opinion as to whether it was
Ex.P-3 alone which could have caused those injuries
especially when another knife was found from the boiler c
suit. [Paras 27, 28] [934-B-F]
2.6. A very relevant piece of evidence which has been
noticed by the High Court, but not given due
consideration, is that apart from the blood-stained knife
(Ex. P-3) and certain other items mentioned in the letter D
of Investigating Officer, one sealed cardboard parcel
containing blue soaked boiler suit worn by the deceased
at the time of incident was also sent to CFSL for
examination and opinion. In the said sealed cardboard
box, two Exhibits (2a and 2b) were found. Ex.2a was the E
dark blue coloured boiler suit and the Ex.2b was metallic
blade fitted in a wooden handle like a knife. The length
of the metallic blade is about 5.5 centimeter with one edge
sharp and another blunt having a round tip at one end.
None .of the prosecution witnesses including the F
Investigating Officer, stated anything as to how and
wherefrom the said knife (Ex.2b) was recovered and kept
with the boiler suit in the same cardboard box. This knife
(Ex.2b) also bore human blood-stained matching 'O'
group of the deceased. As per the post mortem report, G
stab wounds on the neck and chest of the deceased
might be by the use of the said weapon Ex.2b. The said
knife (Ex.2b) was not subjected to examination to t:nd out
the presence of fingerprints, if any, of the appellant. The
said knife (Ex.2b) was also not shown.to the doctor (PW- H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A 19) who conducted the post mortem examination on the
body of the deceased, to seek his opinion if the same
could have been possible weapon of offence. Even the
opinion of the expert witness (PW-22) was not sought as
to whether the cuts on the boiler suit could have been
B caused by that knife. [Para 29] [934-G-H; 935-A-D]
2.7. One more important aspect which has not been
taken note of by the trial court and the High Court is that
as per the prosecution case, the appellant was the
trouble maker and instigated other crew members not to
C steer the ship manually unless the officers give it in
writing about fulfillment of their demand of payment of
long overdue overtime. This vital piece of evidence
regarding the enmity of the appellant with the higher
officials and others has ·been suppressed: instead, the
D prosecution tried to show that there was no enmity
towards the appellant. [Para 30] [935-E-F]
2.8. Admittedly, after the alleged incident, the Master
of the ship got the scene of offence cleaned like a vision
E and nothing was kept intact in and around the cabin
where the offence was committed. Even the Investigating
Officer failed to inspect the cabin. No site plan was
prepared by the Investigating Officer. Before the arrival
of the Investigating Agency officials, the place of
F occurrence including cabin was completely washed and
cleaned in such a way as if nothing had happened in the
cabin and the place around it. [Para 31] [935-G-H; 936-A]
3. On consideration of all the relevant facts and vital
piece of evidence, it can safely be concluded that the
G offence committed by the appellant has not been fully
established beyond all reasonable doubts. The very. fact
that two blood-stained knives were found by the
prosecution proves that the prosecution failed to give
sufficient explanation as to who had assaulted the
H deceased by using another knife (Ex.2b). The High Court
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 913
DELHI) & ANR.
committed grave error in holding that in view of the A
findings arrived at by the trial court that offence was
committed by using the knife (Ex.P-3), the presence of
another knife (Ex.2b) with blood-stains will not demolish
the case of the prosecution. From the circumstances, the
conclusion of the guilt of the appellant has not been fully B
established beyond all shadow of doubt as the
circumstances are not conclusive in nature -- neither the
chain of events is complete nor the circumstances lead
to the conclusion that the offence was committed by the
appellant and none else. Hence, the impugned judgment c
of the High Court affirming the judgment of conviction
passed by the trial court cannot be sustained in law. [Para
32] [936-B-E]
Case Law Reference:
D
1952 SCR 1091 relied on Para 12
1989 Supp (2) sec 706 relied on Para 13
1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 479 relied on Para 14
2006 (3) SCR 348 relied on Para 15 E
(2008) 3 sec 210 relied on Para 16
2008 (17) SCR 176 relied on Para 17
2010 (10) SCR 377 relied on Para 18 F
2012 (2) SCR 225 relied on Para 19
2012 (3) SCR 599 relied on Para 20
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal G
No. 1300 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2008 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 820
of 2002.
H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A G. Tushar Rao, Promila, D.S.U. Krishna Jee, S.
Thananjayan for the Appellant.
Mukul Gupta, Attrey, Anjali Chauhan, B.V. Bairam Das,
Arvind Kumar Sharma for the Respondents.
B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment and order dated 25th July, 2008 passed
by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 820 of 2002
c whereby the judgment and order dated 9th August, 2002
passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in
Sessions Case No. 45 of 2001 convicting the accused-
appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short, "IPC") and sentencing him to imprisonment for life
0 and a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default of payment of fine, rigorous
imprisonment for one day was maintained and the said appeal
dismissed.
2. The prosecution version in a nutshell is that the Cargo
Ship Motor Vessel "Lok Prem" owned by the Shipping
E Corporation of India was chartered by a private company of
South Africa on 6th November, 1996 for carrying Chrome Alloy.
The accused-appellant and the deceased L. Shivaraman along
with other were helmsmen/seamen (crew members) on the said
ship. When the ship was sailing from South Africa to Japan via
F Singapore, the auto pilot went out of order which could not be
repaired for non-availability.of technicians on board and thus
requiring the crew on board to manually steer the ship. The
accused and one M.Y. Talgharkar showed reluctance to steer
the ship manually and insisted for repair of auto pilot and
G payment of their long overdue overtime. The ship was taken to
Singapore to make the auto pilot functional but the same could
not be got repaired. The accused and said Talgharkar are
alleged to have instigated other crew members to insist and
obtain it in writing from the Captain/Master of the ship (PW-5
H Radha Krishan Ambady) that the ship would be got repaired
,. MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 915
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
at Japan, otherwise they (crew members) shall not allow the A
moving of the ship from Singapore. When the Captain of the
ship reported the matter to the Shipping Corporation of India,
the General Secretary of the Union (NSUI) directed the crew
members to perform their duties in obedience to lawful
commands of the Captain. On 30th November, 1996, an B
altercation is stated to have taken place between the accused
and the deceased L. Shivaraman. As the accused had
sustained some cut injuries on his hands, he reported the matter
to the officials. On 1st December, 1996 when the ship was on
high seas, the appellant took off from his duty as helmsman on c
the ground of pain in his hands due to cut injuries and another
helmsman Baria was asked to do the duty as replacement. As
the accused and the deceased were staying in Cabin No. 25,
the accused was temporarily shifted from that cabin to Cabin
No. 23 due to the above incident of assault. At about 1510 D
hours, the accused allegedly approached llnd Officer Kalyan
Singh (PW-6) with a blood-stained knife in his hand and his
hands smearing in blood and is alleged to have confessed
before him that he had killed L. Shivaraman. On being asked
by Kalyan Singh (PW-6), the appellant handed over the blood-
stained knife to him which he placed in a cloth piece without
E
touching the same. Kalyan Singh (PW-6) then intimated the
Captain and other officers. The body of L. Shivaraman was
found lying in Cabin No. 23 in such a way that half of it was
inside the cabin and half of it outside. The officials of Shipping
Corporation of India were informed. On incident being reported, F
pursuant to an instruction from concerned quarter, the ship was
diverted to Hongkong. On being so directed by the Captain of
the ship (PW-5), Kalyan Singh (PW-6) got the body of the
deceased cleaned up for being preserved in the fish room with
the help of Manjeet Singh Bhupal (PW-4) and Chief Officer V.V. G
Muralidharan (PW-18) took photographs. The blood-stained
knife was kept in the safe custody of PW-5. The accused was
then apprehended, tied and disarmed before being shifted to
the hospital on board. Since the ship was having Indian Flag,
as per the International Treaty of which India was a signatory, H•
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A the act of the accused was subject to Indian laws. Accordingly,
a case bearing R.C. No. 10(S) of 1996 was registered by the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against the accused on
6th December, 1996. On reaching Hongkong, the body of
deceased was handed over to Hongkong Police for post
B mortem examination. Two CBI officers reached Hongkong on
7th December, 1996. The investigation of the case was
conducted by Anil Kumar Ohri, Dy. Superintendent of Police,
C.B.I. (PW-23). The Investigation Officer (1.0.) visited the ship
and recorded the statements of witnesses under Section 161
c of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, "Cr.P.C."). The
blood-stained knife (Ex. P-3) and deceased's boiler suit (Ex.
2a) as also relevant papers from the Hongkong police were
taken into his possession by the 1.0. The post mortem
examination on the dead body was conducted by Dr. Lal Sai
D Chak (PW-19). The accused was arrested and brought to Delhi
where he was medico legally examined by a doctor. The
specimen fingerprints and signature of the accused were
obtained. The knife and the specimen fingerprints were then
sent to Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) for
E comparison. The fingerprints of the accused had tallied with the
fingerprints appearing on the knife (Ex.P-3). The accused was
charged under Section 302 IPC. In support of its case, the
prosecution examined as many as 23 witnesses.
3. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 9th
F August, 2002 held the appellant guilty of committing the murder
of L. Shivaraman taking note of the incident of assault of 30th
November, 1996 in which the appellant had sustained injuries
at the hands of the deceased as motive on the part of the
appellant for commission of crime, the extra- judicial confession
G made by him to Kalyan Singh (PW-6) and presence of his
fingerprints on the knife that was allegedly used as the weapon
of offence.
4. Before the High Court while assailing the conviction and
H sentence by the trial court, it was _contended that there was
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 917
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
sufficient opportunity to force the appellant to hold the knife A
(Ex.P-3) to get his fingerprints thereon; that no blood was
noticeable on the clothes of the appellant; that the clothes of
the appellant which he was wearing at the relevant time were
not seized to establish that the same carried blood stains of
the deceased; two other helmsmen Baria and Talgharkar who B
were present when the appellant made confession before
Kalyan Singh (PW-6) were not examined by the prosecution;
that the weapon of offence i.e. knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to
the doctor concerned who had conducted post mortem
examination on the dead body of the deceased to find out c
whether the injuries could have been caused by that weapon;
that all the injuries could not have been caused by the said
weapon of offence which had one blunt edge and the other
sharp; that more than one weapon was used to cause injuries
on the person of the deceased by referring to existence of 0
another knife (Ex. 2b) in the parcel which contained deceased's
boiler suit (Ex. 2a) which had also been sent to CFSL; that no
fingerprints were lifted from the second knife nor the same was
referred to the expert for matching with the cuts on the boiler
suit; and that the second knife was also not shown to the doctor E
conducting post mortem on the body of the deceased to
ascertain if the same could have been used as a possible
weapon of offence. As regards alleged extra-judicial
confession, the depositions of Captain Radha Krishan Ambady
(PW-5) and Kalyan Singh (PW-6) were referred to and variance
in words allegedly used by the appellant while making the same F
was demonstrated; absence of any mention of such a
confession in the Official Log Book was also pleaded; and it
was contended that the 1.0. did not detect any blood in Cabin
No. 23 as the scene of crime had also been cleaned and on
account of such tampering the crime could not be connected G
with the appellant. It was contended that it was on account of
officers on board including Captain of the ship being unhappy
with and inimical towards the appellant that he was falsely
implicated. It was contended that the previous day incident of
assault could not be reckoned as motive for fatal assault on the H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A deceased on the following day and such motive alone in the
absence of necessary links in the circumstantial evidence would
not be suffice to record conviction against the appellant.
5. After appreciation of the evidence of prosecution
witnesses and the documents exhibited therein, the High Court
8
came to the conclusion that the prosecution has established the
guilt of the appellant in the commission of the offence and
accordingly dismissed the appeal affirming the judgment and
order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court.
Hence, this appeal by special leave.
c
6. Mr. G.Tushar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence as being illegal and contrary to facts
and evidence on record. Learned counsel submitted that the
D conviction is based on circumstantial evidence and a chain with
regard to the circumstances leading to the guilt of the appellant
has not at all been established. Counsel submitted that it is
settled law that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of
evidence and needs corroboration in a case dependent wholly
E on circumstantial evidence and in such cases the exact words
used by the accused have to be reproduced, but in this case
even PW-6 before whom the appellant is alleged to have made
confession has not been able to reproduce the exact words and
there are material contradictions in the statements of
F prosecution witnesses. It is contended by the counsel that the
manner in which the alleged weapon of offence i.e. knife Ex.P-
3 was seized and sealed is not proper and the probability of
tampering with the knife cannot be ruled out. Counsel submitted
that circumstances and the evidence on record indicate that the
appellant was susceptible to being forced to hold the knife so
G as to get his fingerprints on the knife. It is surprising, counsel
submitted, that there are about 14 stab wounds both minor and
major on the neck and torso as per post mortem report, but
there was no blood noticeable on the appellant nor did any of
the witnesses noticed blood either on the clothes of the
H
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 919
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
appellant or the bridge or the alleyway from the scene of A
occurrence to the bridge nor were the clothes of the appellant
were ever seized by the Captain/Master of the ship (PW-5), llnd
Officer (PW-6), the Chief Officer (PW-18), Senior Inspector
Hongkong Police (PW-20) or the Investigating Officer of CBI
(PW-23) and, therefore, the chain in the prosecution case of B
circumstantial evidence gets fatally broken due to this aspect.
It is submitted by the counsel that from the evidence it is clear
that at the time when the appellant is alleged to have confessed
to Kalyan Singh (PW-6), there were two helmsmen, namely,
Baria and Talgharkar and as per the evidence of the c
prosecution witnesses, they also could have heard the
appellant, but these two persons were not examined at all which
goes to show that the prosecution tried to hide something. It is
contended that the knife Ex. P-3 (weapon of offence) was not
shown to the doctor (PW-19) who conducted the postmortem D
of the deceased on 6th December, 1996 in Hongkong to take
his opinion as to whether it could be Ex.P-3 alone which could
have caused the injuries on the body of the deceased and in
the absence of such examination, the weapon remains
unconnected to the injuries on the deceased. Counsel E
contended that the injuries on the deceased were not consistent
with the weapon (Ex.P-3) and that too in the absence of the
opinion of the doctor who conducted post mortem and was not
shown the alleged weapon of offence. The counsel contended
that from the evidence on record it is clear that there was more
than one weapon containing the blood of the deceased as apart F
from Ex.P-3 knife, there was another knife about which there
is no mention nor any plausible reason as to wherefrom it came
and why no one bothered about it. The counsel submitted that
the doubt created by this circumstance has neither been looked
into, considered or removed by the prosecution at all and this G
being a case purely based on circumstantial evidence, the
benefit of doubt ought to be extended to the appellant. The
prosecution, counsel submitted, is expected and is duty bound
to eliminate every element of suspicion in every circumstance
relied upon by it so as to enable the courts to come to the H -
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A hypothesis consistent with the guilt of the accused and
simultaneously inconsistent with the innocence of the accused
person. It is contended that the Captain of the ship got the
scene of offence cleaned and no site plan of the scene of
occurrence prepared.
B
7. Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent-CBI, on the other hand, submitted that the trial
court and the High Court have dealt with the issue of extra-
judicial confession being legally maintainable. The prosecution
has also been able to prove that the same was without any
C inducement, threat or promise which factor the appellant has
not been able to discard from any of the witness. The
prosecution has been able to prove the motive to commit such
a crime. Similarly, the recovery of knife, CFSL report and post
mortem report clearly indicate that the injuries were from a
D single blade weapon. Even though there is no eye-witness to
the actual crime, yet the prosecution has been able to bring
home the guilt of the accused under Section 302 IPC by proving
the complete chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant neither in cross-examination of various witnesses
E nor in any explanation in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. has been able to make a dent in the entire evidence.
The counsel submitted that even in a case of circumstantial
evidence, the evidence has to be appreciated as a whole and
not in pieces, one bit here and one bit there.
F
8. We have considered the arguments advanced by the
counsel on either side and have also gone through the findings
recorded by the trial court as also by the High Court.
9. Admittedly, the entire case is based on the
G circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the murder having
been committed by the accused-appellant. Although the trial
court has not given much weightage to the confession alleged
to have been made by the accused-appellant before PW-5,
PW-6 and PW-20, but the High Court based the conviction on
H the basis of extra-judicial confession also. The trial court while
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 921
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
dealing with the confession alleged to have been made by the A
accused, observed as under:
"52. Now in the present case the prosecution is relying on
the confession of the accused before Kalyan Singh (PW-
6), the repetition confession before Sh. R.K. Ambady (PW- 8
5) and the confession allegedly made by the accused
before Inspector Wai (PW-20).
53. So far as the confession before R.K. Ambady (PW-5)
is concerned, I am not inclined to accept the same. PW-5
claims to have gone on the bridge. The accused had C
·confessed before him that he had killed Shiva Raman and
will kill the other persons whosoever comes before him
(Hum Shivaraman Ko Khalash Kiya Aur Koi Ayega To
Usko Bhi Khalash Karenga) However, this particular claim
of PW-5 is conspicuous by its absence from the official D
logbook entry Ex.PW5/D which had been made on
2.12.96. However, there is no reference of this particular
confession i.e. before PW-5.
54. So far as the confession before Inspector Wai (PW E
20) is concerned, the same cannot be looked into in view
of the law laid down in State vs. Ranjan Raja Ram 1991
(1) CCC 134. This particular judgment has been relied on
by counsel for the accused and it had been argued that
since the facts of the present case were identical,
therefore, the accused in the present case deserves F
acquittal. I have carefully gone through the judgment State
vs. Ranjan Raja Ram (supra). In that case the extra judicial
confession was made before a person who had just joined
the ship on 2.6. 78 and the occurrence had taken place on
9th/10th June 1978. He was a stranger to the accused. It G
was the prosecution case (in that case) the accused had
kept on telling his having committed the murder to every
one. It was not believed by the court. In para 26 of the
judgment it was mentioned that the name of PW in that
case had come for the first time on 15.7. 78. Therefore, that H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013} 10 S.C.R.
- A case is distinguishable so far as confession made by the
present accused before Sh. Kalyan Singh (PW6) is
concerned. What is a confession? What is the law on the
subject? Whether conviction can be based on extra judicial
confession?"
8
10. On the contentions of the accused-appellant, the High
Court while dismissing the appeal of the accused by the
impugned judgment held as under:
"13 ........ One cannot lose sight of the fact that according
c to Kalyan Singh (Pw-6), on reaching the bridge of the ship,
the appellant had first told him that he had killed Shivraman
and then repeated the same in Hindi also by uttering,
?KHALAS KAR DIYA?. The statement so made in Hindi
was only in continuation to the confession initially made by
D him wherein he had specifically named Shivraman. Thus,
the words ?KHALAS KAR DIYA? Uttered by the appellant
in Hindi are to be read in the context of his initial confession
naming Shivraman. No real variance in the content of
confession initially made and the one repeated in Hindi is
E thus brought out.
xxx xxx xxx
15..... The omission to mention the exact words in the log
book entry dated 2.12.1996 vide Ex. PW-5/D in the
F circumstances cannot make the testimony of Kalyan Singh
(PW-6) in regard to confession by the appellant
uncreditworthy. The log book entry (Ex.PW-5/D) does carry
a mention that the information regarding commission of the
murder of Shivraman by the appellant was given over
G phone by Shri Kalyan Singh (PW-6). from which it is evident
that Shri Kalyan Singh (PW-6) had, before passing on the
information to the said effect, come to know that it was the
appellant who had committed the crime ....... The
presence of the appellant at the bridge near Kalyan Singh
H (PW-6) before Shri Radha Krishan Ambady (PW-5) and
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 923
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
Murlidharan (PW-20) reached there and handing over of A
bloodstained knife collected from the appellant by Kalyan
Singh (PW-6) lend sufficient corroboration to the appellant
having approached Kalyan Singh (PW-6) at the bridge
and making confessional statement to him, as deposed
by Shri Kalyan Sijngh (PW-6). The stand of the appellant B
that Shri Kalyan Singh (PW-6) had joined hands with Shri
Radha Krishan Ambady (PW-5) and others on board
being inimical to him is difficult to accept, given the nature
of friendly relationship he enjoyed with Kalyan Singh (PW-
6). The learned trial court would, thus, appear to have c
committed no error in reaching the conclusion that the extra
judicial confession made by the appellant, as deposed in
the court, was voluntary and a truthful one and could, thus,
constitute an incriminating piece of evidence to find his
culpability in the commission of the crime. 0
16. Non-examination of two seamen, namely, Baria and
Thalgharkar, who were manually steering the ship at the
relevant time when the appellant made his confessional
statement before Kalyan Singh (PW-6) cannot be a ground
to discard an otherwise unimpeached testimony of Kalyan E
Singh (PW-6) in regard to confession made to him by the
appellant. Acceptance of testimony of a particular witness
in regard to an extra judicial confession is not dependent
on corroboration by other witnesses, if otherwise
creditworthy. . . . . . . The appellant and Talgharkar thus F
shared a comradely bond and in such a situation looking
for a support from Talgharkar to PW Kalyan Singh's
deposition on extra judicial confession by the appellant
would be expecting too much from him.
G
xxx xxx xxx
20 ...... Since the clothes which the appellant was wearing
at the relevant time were not taken into possession to
prove the existence of bloodstains, if any, thereon and as
none of the witnesses testifies about presence of H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A bloodstains on his clothes, the conclusion that follows is
that there were no bloodstains on his clothes when the
appellant approached Kalyan Singh (PW-6) at the bridge
to confess his guilty. This fact could have been of
considerable significance in adjudging the culpability of the
B appellant had the effect of the same been not offset by the
strong incriminating evidence which constitute the basis for
convicting the appellant. ... The clothes of the appellant,
as noticed earlier, were not soaked in deceased's blood
nor there is any evidence of his feet or footwear, if any,
c the appellant was wearing, having got smeared in
deceased's blood before his proceeding to the bridge and
in such circumstances, no blood could be expected to
have fallen down in the alleyway from the scene of the
crime to the bridge.
D xxx xxx xxx
23. Apart from the bloodstained knife Ex.P.3 and certain
other items, as mentioned in the letter (Ex. PW-21/2) of
the investigating officer, one sealed cardboard parcel
E 'containing a blue coloured soaked boiler suit' worn by
deceased at the time of incident marked as 'B' was also
sent to CFSL for examination and opinion. Such sealed
cardboard box was, on opening, found to contain two
Exhibits 2a and 2b vide CFSL report Ex.PW-22/1. Ex.2a
was the dark blue coloured boiler suit and Ex.2b was a
F
metallic blade fitted in a wooden handle like a knife. The
length of the metallic blade is about 5.5 centimeters with
one edge sharp and another blunt having a round tip at one
end. None of the prosecution witnesses, including the
investigating officer, stated anything as to how and
G
wherefrom the said knife Ex.2b was recovered and kept
with the boiler suit in the same cardboard box. This knife
Ex.2b, like knife Ex.P-3, also bore human bloodstains
matching 'O' group of the deceased. Existence of knife
Ex.2b was made a basis, by learned counsel for the
H
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 925
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
appellant, to argue that the same could have been used A
to cause stab wounds on the neck and chest of the
deceased, as noted in the postmortem report (Ex.PW-19/
A). Countering the argument related to nature of weapon
of offence used in commission of the crime, as raised by
the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for B
CBI contended that even though the prosecution witnesses
kept silent as to how the'knife Ex.2b came to be sealed
in the cardboard box containing the boiler suit (Ex.2a), in
view of sufficient evidence on record proving beyond doubt
commission of the crime by the appellant with the knife c
Ex.P-3, there is no real basis to support the contention that
knife Ex.2b could also be a possible weapon of offence.
)()()( xxx )()()(
25. The theory of more than one weapon being used in the D
commission of the crime, as propounded by learned
counsel for the appellant, as noticed earlier, emanates
from the nature of certain injuries on the body of the
deceased and existence of knife Ex.2b with bloodstains
thereon matching the blood group of the deceased. E
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that unlike
knife Ex.P-3 the knife Ex.2b was not subjected to
examination to find the presence of finger prints, if any, on
its handle. The same was also not shown to Dr. Lal Sai
Chak (PW-19), who conducted the postmortem F
examination on the body of the deceased to seek his
opinion if the same could have been the possible weapon
of offence, nor the opinion of the expert witness Shri C.K.
Jain (PW-22) was sought in respect thereto if the cuts on
the boiler suit could have been caused by that knife.
G
)()()( xxx )()()(
28. Keeping in view the incriminating evidence available
on record proving the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, we find no reason to arrive at a finding H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A different from the one recorded by the learned trial court
in regard to the complicity of the appellant in committing
the murder of L. Shivaraman on board. Hence, the
impugned conviction and sentence are maintained and the
appeal is dismissed being bereft of merit."
B
11. Now, we have to consider whether the judgment of
conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High
court can be sustained in law. As noticed above, the conviction
is based on circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the
accused committing murder of the deceased. While dealing
C with the said conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be
drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all
the facts so established should also be consistent with only one
hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the accused, which would mean that
D the onus lies on the prosecution to prove that the chain of event
is complete and not to leave any doubt in the mind of the Court.
12. In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State
of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343, this Court observed as under:
E
"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence
is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
F of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should
be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should
be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any
G reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been
.
done by the accused ..... "
H 13. In the case of Pada/a Veera Reddy vs. State of A.P.,
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 927
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, this Court opined as under: A
"10. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the
learned Counsel, we shall at the threshold point out that in
the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the
accused with the offence in question and the prosecution 8
rests its case solely on circumstantial evidence. This Court
in a series of decisions has consistently held that when a
case rests upon circumstantial evidence such evidence
must satisfy the following tests:
(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is C
sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly
established;
(2) those circumstances ,should be of a definite tendency
unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; D
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a
chain so complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability the crime was
committed by the accused and none else; and
E
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation
of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused
and such evidence should not only be consistent with the
guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his F
innocence. (See Gambhirv. State of Maharashtra, (1982}
2 sec 351)"
14. In the case of C. Chenga Reddy & -Ors. vs. State of
AP., (1996} 10 sec 193, this Court while considering a ca_se G
of conviction based on the circumstantial evidence, held -as
under:
"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled
law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 10 S.C.R.
A circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all
the circumstances should be complete and there should
be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his
B innocence. In the present case the courts below have
overlooked these settled principles and allowed suspicion
to take the place of proof besides relying upon some
inadmissible evidence."
15. In the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy vs.
C State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172, this Court again considered
the case of conviction based on circumstantial evidence and
held as under:
"26. It is now well settled that with a view to base a
D conviction on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must
establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by
reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so
proved must form such a chain of events as would permit
no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused. The
E circumstances cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also
well settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot
be a substitute for a proof and the courts· shall take utmost
precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis
of the circumstantial evidence. (See Anil Kumar Singh v.
F State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67 and Reddy Sampath
Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603)."
16. In the case of Sattatiya vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2008) 3 SCC 210, this Court held as under:
G "10. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. It
is settled law that an offence can be proved not only by
direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence where
there is no direct evidence. The court can draw an
inference of guilt when all the incriminating facts and
H circumstances are found to be totally incompatible with the
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 929
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
innocence of the accused. Of course, the circumstances A
from which an inference as to the guilt is drawn have to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be
shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought
to be inferred from those circumstances."
B
This. Court further observed in the aforesaid decision that:
"17. At this stage, we also deem it proper to observe that
in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution,
this Court will be extremely loath to upset the judgment of
conviction which is confirmed in appeal. However, if it is C
found that the appreciation of evidence in a case, which
is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by
serious errors and on that account miscarriage of justice
has been occasioned, then the Court will certainly interfere
even with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court D
and the High Court-Bharat v. State of M.P., (2003) 3
SCC 106. In the light of the above, we shall now consider
whether in the present case the prosecution succeeded in
establishing the chain of circumstances leading to an
inescapable conclusion that the appellant had committed E
the crime."
17. In the case of State of Goa vs. Pandurang Mohite,
(2008) 16 SCC 714, this Court reiterated the settled law that
where a conviction rests squarely on circumstantial evidence,
the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the F
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of
any person. The circumstances from which an inference as to
the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely G
connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those
circumstances.
18. It would be appropriate to consider some of the recent
decisions of this Court in cases where conviction was based H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
,fl. on the circumstantial evidence. In the case of G. Parshwanath
vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 8 SCC 593, this Court
elaborately dealt with the subject and held as under:
"23. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial nature,
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to
B
be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established.
Each fact sought to be relied upon must be proved
individually. However, in applying this principle a distinction
must be made between facts called primary or basic on
the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them
c on the other. In regard to proof of primary facts, the court
has to judge the evidence and decide whether that
evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved,
the question whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt
of the accused person should be considered. In dealing
D with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of
doubt applies. Although there should not be any missing
finks in the case, yet it is not essential that each of the finks
must appear on the surface of the evidence adduced and
some of these links may have to be inferred from the
E proved facts. In drawing these inferences, the court must
have regard to the common course of natural events and
to human conduct and their relations to the facts of the
particular case. The court thereafter has to consider the
effect of proved facts.
F
24. In deciding the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
for the purpose of conviction, the court has to consider the
total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of
which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the combined
effect of all these facts taken together is conclusive in
G establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would
be justified even though it may be that one or more of
these facts by itself or themselves is/are not decisive. The
facts established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should exclude
H
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 931
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
every hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. But A
this does not mean that before the prosecution can
succeed in a case resting upon circumstantial evidence
alone, it must exclud.e each and every hypothesis
suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant and
fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so B
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground.for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused
and must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused, where various links in
chain are in themselves complete, then the false plea or c
false defence may be called into aid. only to lend
assurance to the court."
19. In the case of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik vs. State
of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37, while dealing with the case
based on circumstantial evidence, this Court observed as under: D
"12. There is no doubt that it is not a case of direct
evidence but the conviction of the accused is founded on
circumstantial evidence. It is a settled principle of law that
the prosecution has to satisfy certain conditions before a E
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
sustained. The circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established and
should also be consistent with only one hypothesis i.e. the
guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be F
conclusive and proved by the prosecution. There must be
a chain of events so complete as not to leave any
substantial doubt in the mind of the court. Irresistibly, the
evidence should lead to the conclusion which is
inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the only G
possibility is that the accused has committed the crime.
13. To put it simply, the circumstances forming the chain
- of events should be proved and they should cumulatively
point towards the guilt of the accused alone. In such
circumstances, the inference of guilt can be justified only H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS '
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are
found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused
or the guilt of any other person."
20. Last but not least, in the case of Brajendrasingh vs.
B State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 289, this Court while reiterating
the above principles further added that:
"28. Furthermore, the rule which needs to be observed by
the court while dealing with the cases of circumstantial
evidence is that the best evidence must be adduced which
C the nature of the case admits. The circumstances have to
be examined cumulatively. The court has to examine the
complete chain of events and then see whether all the
material facts sought to be established by the prosecution
to bring .home the guilt of the accused, have been proved
D beyond reasonable doubt. It has to be kept in mind that
all these principles are based upon one basic cannon of
our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is innocent till
proven guilty and that the accused is entitled to a just and
fair trial. (Ref. Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of WB.,
E (1994) 2 SCC 220; Shivu v. High Court of Karnataka,
(2007) 4 SCC 713 and Shivaji v. State of Maharashtra,
c2008) 1s sec 269)"
21. As discussed hereinabove, there is no dispute with
regard to the legal proposition that conviction can be based
F solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the
touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence as laid
down by this Court. In such a case, all circumstances must lead
to the conclusion that the accused is the only one who has
committed the crime and none else.
G
22. From the prosecution side, a number of witnesses
have been examined to complete the chain of events and to
prove the version given in the FIR and subsequent thereto, We
have re-appreciated and analysed the evidence brought on
H record from the prosecution side. On the analysis of the
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 933
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
evidence, we have found many inconsistencies and infirmities A
in the prosecution version as mentioned hereinafter.
23. Admittedly, there is no eye witness in this case despite
the fact that the occurrence took place in the car.go ship and
obviously some of the crew members were living and/or on duty
B
around the ship. Both the accused and the deceased were
good friends and both were staying in one cabin viz. Cabin
No.25. Before the occurrence, the accused was shifted to Cabin
No.23. Admittedly, therefore both the accused and the
deceased were staying in separate cabin on the date of C
occurrence.
24. The accused-appellant and the deceased were
helmsmen on the ship which was sailing from South Africa to
Japan via Singapore. Since the auto-pilot went out of order and
could not be repaired, the crew members were directed to D
manually steer the ship. The accused and one Talghakar
showed reluctance to.steer the ship manually and insisted for
repair of the auto-pilot and payment of their long overdue
overtime. The prosecution case is that the accused and the said
Talghakar instigated other crew members to insist and obtain E
it in writing from the Captain (PW-5) that the ship would be got
repaired at Japan otherwise they (crew members) shall not
allow moving of the ship from Singapore.
25. The prosecution case is that the accused is alleged
to have confessed before PW-6 about the commission of the F
offence and the blood-stained knife was handed over to PW-6
which was subsequently seized but no blood wa$ noticeable
on the clothes of the appellant which were found at the relevant
time. The other helmsmen, namely, Baria and Talghakar who
were present when the appellant is alleged to have made G
confes.sion before PW-6, were not examined by the
prosecution.
26. The knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the doctor
concerned who had conducted post mortem examination on H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A the dead body of the deceased to find out whether the injuries
could have been caused by that weapon. Surprisingly, another
knife (Ex.2b) alleged to have been recovered from the boiler
suit was also not shown to the doctor to ascertain whether the
said knife was also used in the commission of the offence.
B
27. From the evidence, it reveals that after the said incident
the appellant was tied up and kept on the bridge for at least 2
to 3 days before being shifted. The contention of the appellant's
counsel was that the appellant was susceptible of being forced
to hold the knife (Ex.P-3) so as to get his. fingerprints on the
C knife which was never kept inside the fish room along with the
dead body.
28. Apart from the aforesaid, it appears from the post
mortem report that there were about 14 stab wounds on the
D neck but there was no blood found on the dress of the appellant
or on the scene of occurrence. Though the deceased was
alleged to have been assaulted as many as 14 times by a
sharp-edged weapon and there was massive blood at the site
of the offence, no blood had spilled on the appellant or his
E clothes. Moreover, there is nothing on record by way of
explanation from the prosecution side as to why the clothes of
the appellant were not seized. Further, the alleged knife (Ex.P-
3) was not shown to the doctor who conducted the post mortem .
of the deceased in Honkong to take his opinion as to whether
F it was Ex.P-3 alone which could have caused those injuries
especially when another knife was found from the boiler suit.
29. A very relevant piece of evidence which has been
noticed by the High Court, but not given due consideration, is
that apart from the blood-stained knife (Ex. P-3) and certain
G other items mentioned in the letter of Investigating Officer, one
sealed cardboard parcel containing blue soaked boiler suit worn
by the deceased at the time of incident was also sent to CFSL
for examination and opinion. In the said sealed cardboard box,
two Exhibits (2a and 2b) were found. Ex.2a was the dark blue
H coloured boiler suit and the Ex.2b was metallic blade fitted in
MAJENDRAN LANGESWARAN v. STATE (NCT OF 935
DELHI) & ANR. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
a wooden handle like a knife. The length of the metallic blade A
is about 5.5 centimeter with one edge sharp and another blunt
having a round tip at one end. None of the prosecution
witnesses including the Investigating Officer, stated anything as
to how and wherefrom the said knife (Ex.2b) was recovered
and kept with the boiler suit in the same cardboard box. This B
knife (Ex.2b) also bore human blood-stained matching 'O' group
of the deceased. As per the post mortem report, stab wounds
on the neck and chest of the deceased might be by the use of
the said weapon Ex.2b. The said knife (Ex.2b) was not
subjected to examination to find out the presence of· c
fingerprints, if any, of the appellant. The said knife (Ex.2b) was
also not shown to the doctor (PW-19) who conducted the post
mortem examination on the body of the deceased, to seek his
opinion if the same could have been possible weapon of
offence. Even the opinion of the expert witness (PW-22) was 0
not sought as to whether the cuts on the boiler suit could have
been caused by that knife.
30. One more important aspect which has not been taken
note of by the trial court and the High Court is that as per the
prosecution case, the appellant was the trouble maker and E
instigated other crew members not to steer the ship manually
unless the officers give it in writing about fulfillment of their
demand of payment of long overdue overtime. This vital piece
of evidence regarding the enmity of the appellant with the higher
officials and others has been suppressed: instead, the F
prosecution tried to show that there was no enmity towards the
. appellant.
31. Admittedly, after the alleged incident, the Master of the
ship got the scene of offence cleaned like a vision and nothing G
was kept intact in and around the cabin where the offence was
committed. Even the Investigating Officer failed to inspect the
cabin. No site plan was prepared by the Investigating Officer.
Before the arrival of the Investigating Agency officials, the place
of occurrence including cabin was completely washed and
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A cleaned in such a way as if nothing had happened in the cabin
and the place around it.
32. On cbnsideration of all these relevant facts and vital
piece of evidence, it can safely be concluded that the offence
committed by the appellant has not been fully established
8
beyond all reasonable doubts. The very fact that two blood-
stained knives were found by the prosecution proves that the
prosecution failed to give sufficient explanation as to who had
assaulted the deceased by using another knife (Ex.2b). The
C High Court has committed grave error in holding that in view
of the findings arrived at by the trial court that offence was
committed by using the knife (Ex.P-3), the presence of another
knife (Ex.2b) with blood-stains will not demolish the case of the
prosecution. In our view, from the circumstances the conclusion
of the guilt of the appellant herein has not been fully established
D beyond all shadow of doubt as the circumstances are not
conclusive in nature - neither the chain of events is complete
nor the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the offence
was committed by the appellant and none else. Hence, the
impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the judgment
E of conviction passed by the trial court cannot be sustained in
law.
33. For the reasons aforestated, this appeal deserves to
be allowed and the impugned judgment is liable to be set
F aside. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgments
of the High Court and the trial court are set aside. The appellant
is directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other
case.
B.B.B. Appeal allowed.
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