MAJOR R.S. BUDHWARversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

A                           MAJOR R.S. BUDHWAR
                                         v.
                           UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                                   MAY 8, 1996

B              [DR. A.S. ANAND AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

          Criminal law :

          Penal Code, 1860:
c         Sections 302 and 109 r/w S.34-Murda-Abetment to commh-Ac-
    complices supported charge levelled against accused-Evidence of ac-
    complices corroborated by circumstantial evidence-Value of accomplices'
    evidence-Properly explained by Judge-Advocate to General Court Ma1tial
    with reference to Ss 133 and 114 III. (b) of the Evidence Act, 1872---lnspite
D   of such explanation GCM found accused guilty-Held : finding of GCM not
    pervei~e-Case of 'sufficient evidence'-Conviction maintained-Evidence
    Act, 1872, Ss 133 and 114 III.(b)--Am1y Act, 1950, Ss 69 and 164(1) and
    (2).

E         Section 302---:IJeath sentence-Mitigating rircumstances-Murder of
    four Am1y officers-Accused committed murders under threat, command and
    influence of their superiors who instigated them to commit murders by
    exploiting their religious feelings-Superiors who master minded murders were
    awarded only life imprisonment-Post murder repentance of accused-Held:
    notwithstanding the fact that two of the murders were diabolically planned
F   and committed in cold blood; accused did not deserve extreme penalty of
    death-Hence commuted to life imprisonment.

          The appellants were convicted by General Court Martial under
    Section 69 of the Army Act, 1950 read with Sections 34, 109 and 302 of the
G   Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1194/1995
    was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and cashiering while the
    appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 625/1996 and 626/1996 were sentenced
    to death.

          Aggrieved by the order of the GCM the appellants presented two
H petitions under Section 164(1) and (2) of the Army Act, 1950 which were
                                         528
                         R.S.BUDHWAR V. U.0.1.                            529

rejected: The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court which were       A
dismissed.

      In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the accused persons it
was contended that this was a case of 'No evidence'; that the GCM onght
not to have relied upon the uncorroborated evidence of the accomplices
and that they were entitled for commutation of their death sentence.             B

      Disposing of the appeals, this Court

      HELD : 1. In respect of the appellants-accused sentenced to life
imprisonment the Judge-Advocate in his closing address to the General
Court Martial properly explained the value of the evidence of an ac-
                                                                                 c
complice with reference to Sections 133 and 114 (Illustration (b) of the
Evidence Act, 1872. If inspite of such explanation the GCM found the
appellant guilty it could not be said that its finding was perverse. When
the circumstantial evidence is considered along with the evidence of P.W.
10, the conclusion is irresistable that it is not a case of 'no evidence' but    D
one of 'sufticient evidence'. [534-G-H; 535-A; 536-A]

       2.1. In respect ofthe appellants-accused sentenced to death, they
committed four murders. Two of them were diabolically planned and
committed in cold blood. The appellants did not commit the two murders
on their own volition prompted by any motive or greed much less, evincing        E
total depravity and meanness. Indeed the main accused who was Major in
the Army alongwith others Ofticers of the Unit of the appellants instigated
and compelled them to commit the two murders by exploiting their
religious feelings. Initially the appellants declined to take any step towards
the commission of the offences but ultimately they succumbed to the              F
"threat, command and influence" of their superiors. [538-E-H]

      2.2. Another mitigating factor which calls for commutation of the
sentence ir that the said Major who alongwith another oliicer (since dead)
masterminded the two murders were awarded life imprisonment whereas
the appellants who carried out their orders have been sentenced to death.        G
In a case of the present nature which relates to a disciplined force as the
Army, the offence committed by the oliicers who conceived the plan, was
more heinous than that of the appellants who executed the plan as per
their orders and directions. It is of course true that those orders being not
la"ful the appellants, even as disciplined soldiers, were not bound to H
    530                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A comply with the same nor their carrying out such order minimised the
    offences but certainly this is a factor which cannot be ignored while deciding
    the question of sentence. Another fador which persuades this Court to
    commute the death sentence to life imprisonment is the post murder repen-
    tance of the appellants who not only surrendered before the authorities within
    two days but also spoke out the truth in their confessional statements. In fact,
B   but for their confessional statements the Officers, who were the mastermind,
    could not have been brought to book. [539-A-D)

          T1ive11iben & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Or.i., [1989) 1 SCR 509 and
    Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983) 2 SCC 344, referred to.
c         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
    1194 of 1995 Etc.

           From the Judgment and Order dated 27.5.94 of the Delhi High Court
    in Crl. W.P. No. 159 of 1993.
D
          N. Natrarajan, U.R. Lalit and N.N. Goswami, Naresh Kaushik, Mrs.
    Lalita Kaushik, Shyam Mudliar, Satish Agrawal, Pramod B. Aggarwala,
    T.V. Ratnam, Ashok K. Srivastava, S.N. Terdol, Ms. Anil Katiyar for the
    appearing Parties.
E
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. The above appeal and the two Special Leave
    Petitions were directed to be heard together as they relate to one and the
    same incident but having regard to the facts that over that incident two
F
    separate trials were held by General Court Martial ('GCM for short),
    assailing their verdicts two independent writ petitions were filed and the
    Delhi High Court dismissed them by two separate judgments, which are
    under challenge herein, we have heard them one after the other and
    proceed to dispose of them accordingly.
G
          CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Jl94 OF 1995

          While serving as a Major in the Indian Army the appellant R.S.
    Budhwar, along with two other officers, was tried by a G.C.M. in December
H   1988 for the following charge.
            R.S.BUDHWAR v. U.0.1.(M.K.MUKHERJEE,J.]                    531

        "Army Act        COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS                  A
        Section 69       TO SAY ABETMENT OF AN OFFENCE
                         SPECIFIED IN SECTION 302 OF INDIAN
                         PENAL CODE, IN CONSEQUENCE OF
                         WHICH ABETMENT SUCH OFFENCE
                         WITH COMMITTED, CONTRARY TO SEC-
                                                                              B
                         TION 109 READ WITH SECTION 34 OF IN-
                         DIAN PENAL CODE.

                         in that they together, at Field, on or before 14
                         June, 1987, abetted No. 3173368H Sep (L/NK)
                         Inder Pal Singh and No. 3174523 L. Sep Mahavir C
                         Singh, both of 8 .TAT to commit murders of IC
                         14807N Colonel SS Sahota and IC 28739H Major
                         Jaspal Singh of the same unit, which was com-
                         mitted in consequence of such abetment by the
                         said Sep (LINK) Inder Pal Singh and Sep. D
                         Mahavir Singh."

       The GCM found the appellant.and one of the other two (since dead)
guilty of the above charge and awarded them punishment of imprisonment
for life and cashiering. Aggrieved thereby the appellant presented a peti-
tiori under Section 164 (1) of the Army Act, 1930 ('Act' for short) wherein   E
he prayed that the findings and sentences recorded against him be not
confirmed. The GOC-in-C Eastern Command however rejected that peti-
tion and confirmed the findings and sentences of the GCM. He then filed
another petition in accordance with Section 164(2) of the Act which was
rejected by the Central government. The appellant then approached the         F
Delhi High Court with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India which was also dismissed. Hence this appeal.

      Mr. Lalit, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, first
contended that there being not an iota of evidence in the proceedings of
the G.C.M. to indicate that LINK Inder Pal Singh and Sep. Mahabir Singh G
(the petitioners in the two special leave petitions) committed .the murders
of the two officers mentioned in the charge the High Court ought to have
held that the findings of the G.C.M. as recorded against the appellant were
perverse. While on this point, Mr. Lalit however fairly conceded that
having regard to the limited scope of enquiry the High Court exercises H
    532                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A while sitting in its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction it was difficult for him to
    assail the finr'ing recorded by the G.C.M. that the appellant had instigated
    the above two persons to commit the murders on the ground that it was
    based on 'no evidence', but he strenuously urged that mere proof of the
    said fact could not in any way saddle the appellant with the offence of
    abctment of the commission of the murders, in absence of any evidence
B   whatsoever to prove that they actually committed the murders, and, that
    too on being instigated by the appellant. The other point that was raised
    by Mr. Lalit was that even if it was assumed that there was some evidence
    to connect the appellant with the offence alleged against him as furnished
    by lnder Pal Singh and Mahabir Singh, even then the GCM, which func-
C   tions as a judicial Tribunal, ought not to have relied upon the same, in
    absence of any independent corroboration thereof, as such evidence was
    adduced by the two assailants mentioned in the charge, who were undoub-
    tedly accomplices.

D         Mr. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the
    other hand contended that it could not be said that there was no evidence
    to connect the appellant \Vith the charge levelled against him and, there-
    fore, this Court would not be justified in interfering \vith the findings of
    the G.C.M. even if it, on its own appraisal, found the evidence to be
    insufficirr.: or unreliable. In responding to the other contention of Mr.
E   Lalit, Mr. Goswami first drew our attention to Section 133 of the Act which
    makes, subject to its provisions, Evidence Act, 1872 applicable to all
    proceedings before a Court Martial and contended that in view of Section
    133 thereof (Evidence Act), a conviction based on the uncorroborated
    testimony of an accomplice could not be held to be illegal. However, Mr.
F   Goswami submitted that in the instant case there was ample material to
    corroborate the evidence of the accomplices.


          In the context of the rival stands of the parties the crucial point that
   falls for our consideration is whether there is any evidence to prove that
G Inder Pal Singh and Mahavir Singh committed the murders of Col. S.S.
   Sahola, the Commanding Officer and Major Jaspal Singh, Second-in-Com-
   mand of B, JAT Unit (hereinafter referred to as 'CO' and '21C' respective-
   ly) on June 16, 1987 as alleged by the prosecution. If this question is to be
   answered in the negative, then the fact that there is evidence to prove that
   the appellant had instigated them to commit the murder - which is con-
H· ceded by Mr. Lalit also - would be redundant; and, resultantly, the im-
                R.S. BUDHWAR v. U.0.1. [M.K MUKHERJEE, J.]                 533

    pugned order of the G.C.M. would have to be quashed. To find an answer        A
•   to the above question we have carefully gone through the evidence ad-
    duced during the G.C.M. proceedings. On perusal of the evidence of
    Mahavir Singh (PW 10) and Inder Pal Singh (PW 16), the two accomplices,
    who, admittedly were the most important witnesses for the prosecution, we
    find that they first spoke of the orders they had earlier received from the
    appellant and others to commit the two murders. In narrating the incident     B
    of the fateful day, both of them stated that at or about 12 noon they went
    towards the office of CO and 2IC with arms and ammunitions. After
    moving some distance together, Mahavir Singh went towards the office of
    CO and Inder Pal Singh towards that of 2IC. According to Mahavir Singh,
    enroute he met LINK Ranbir Singh (PW 21) who asked him why he had             C
    come there. Mahavir Singh then fired one round towards him, who imme-
    diately caught hold of the muzzle of his (Mahavir's) rifle,. Mahavir Singh
    next stated that at that point of time, rapid fire came from the drill shed
    side towards the CO's jonga which was standing there. Simultaneously, he
    (Mahavir Singh) fired one round which injured Ranbir's hand and he fell
    down. The version of Inder Pal Singh (PW 16) as regards the firing is that    D
    when he reached the office of the 2IC he found that he was not there. He
    then went towards the office of the Adjutant. On the way he heard sounds
    of firing. When he reached the office of Adjutant he could not see clearly
    as to who were inside as the room was dark and \vindows were covered
    with curtains. Through the window he saw a Captain sitting inside and
    talking to some one, who might be 2IC. He then fired several rounds in the    E
    air. In the meantime Mahavir Singh came there and told him to run away.
    Then both of them ran towards the jungle.

            Drawing our attention to the above statements of the two ac-
    complices, Mr. Lalit argued that as neither of them admitted to have
                                                                                  F
    committed the murders it must be said that the finding of the G.C.M. that
    the appellant was guilty of the charge levelled against him was perverse -
    l:Jeing based on 'no evidence'. We are unable to accept the contention of
    Mr. Lalit for, later on in his evidence P.W. 10 fully supported the charge
    levelled against the appellant - though PW 16 did not - and there is other
    circumstantial evidence on record to substantiate the prosecution case.       G

         On being examined further during trial PW 10 testified :

            "It is correct that I alongwith LINK Inder Pal Singh had killed the
            CO and ZIC on the orders of accused No. 1 (the appellant)."         H
    534                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. Z S.C.R.

A         He further stated :
                                                                                      •
            "It is correct that accused No. 1 (the appellant) had asked me a
            question as to with what aim I was trying to implicate him in this
            case and (had replied that I was not trying to implicate him in
            any case and he had given a task which I had accomplished."
B
  Then again when asked about what he knew about the loss of grenades of
  the Unit he said the grenades were stolen to kill CO and ZIC. He also
  stated that he has already been sentenced to be hanged for committing the
  murders of CO and ZIC for obeying the orders of Major Sahib (the
C appellant). Again in cross-examination he testified that his job was to
  eliminate CO and ZIC. The ot~er piece of his evidence, which clearly
  indicates that he had committed the murders on the instigation of the
  appellant, reads as under :

            "On 18 June 87, after 1600 hrs. I and L/NK Inder Pal surrendered
D           to Hav Nav Rattan of my unit near Kambang Bridge. We have also
            surrendered our arms to him. We were made to sit in a 1 Ton
            Vehicle of our unit. After some time one Capt. of 16 Madras
            alongwith a guard of 3-4 OR came to the 1 Ton vehicle. Z or 3 OR
            sat with us in the vehicle. The guard Commander remained outside
            the vehicle. The first officer of my unit to come the site of surrender
E           was Haj Lamba. He had come in a RCL and it was parked ahead
            of 1 Ton vehicle. We wished him Ram Ram while his vehicle
            crossed 1 Ton vehicle. He replied by saluting but did not speak
            anything. After about half an hour of our surrender, accused No.
            1 came to us to the 1 Ton vehicle. He was looking as if he had
F            come running and he was perspiring. When he came close to us,
            we wished him Ram Ram. He came further close to us and patted
            me on my back and said "Shabash Kam Kar Diya, Chettri Sahib
             or Doctor Sahib Ko Kiyon Ragar Diya" meaning thereby, "well
             done, the job has been done, why Chettri Sahib and Doctor Sahib
             killed."
G
        In view of the above testimony of P.W. 10 it carmot at all be said that
  he did not support the charge levelled against the appellant. It is of course
  true that PW 10 is an accomplice but from the proceedings of the trial we
  find that the Judge-Advocate in his closing address properly explained to
H the GCM the value of the evidence of an accomplice with reference to
            R.S.BUDHWAR v. U.O.l.[M.K.MUKHERJEE,J.]                     535

Section 133 and Section 114 (Illustration b) of the Evidence Act. If inspire   A
of such explanation the GCM found the- appellant guilty it could not be
said that its finding was perverse. This apart, the following circumstances
proved thr'ough other witnesses amply corroborate the evidence of P .W.
10:

      (i) On 16 June, 1987 both Inder Pal Singh and Mahavir Singh were         B
found going towards the main office building with rifles and some rounds
of ammunitions. While Mahavir Singh went towards the office of the CO,
Inder Pal Singh went towards the office of the 21C;

      (ii) Near CO's office when NK Ranbir (PW 21) caught hold of the
muzzle of the rifle of Mahavir Singh he fired one round as a result of which
                                                                               c
Ranbir sustained an inj\l_ry on his hand and fell down unconscious. After
regaining his senses when he went to the office of the CO he found him
lying on the ground near his revolving chair gasping for breath;

      (iii) After the firing incident Mahavir Singh and Inder Pal Singh        D
together ran away towards the jungle along with their arms and ammuni-
tion;

     (iv) Both of them surrendered on June 18, 1987 with their rifles and
ammunitions which were seized and sent to Forensic Science Laboratory,
Calcutta for examination;                                                      E
      (v) On examination it was found that ten cartridges cases were fired
through one of those rifles bearing Regd. No. 9744 which was issued to
Inder Pal Singh and two cases were fired through the other rifle, bearing
Regd. No. 7343 which was issued to Mahavir Singh, in the morning of June
~~                                                                             F
       (vi) While sitting in the office of Adjutant, Major Chandal (CW 1)
sa.v through the \vindow Ranbir Singh holding the muzzle of a rifle. At that
moment he heard another bullet being fired from the said of his back. He
then ducked down on the table with face downward and saw, through the
window, inder Pal Singh firing about 10 to 15 rounds. After the firing had G
stopped when he came out of the office of the CO he found him lying in
a reclining position against the wall and he was badly injured and gasping
for breath; and (vii) Dr. Senewal, (PW 15) who held post mortem examina-
tion on the dead bodies of CO and 2IC found injuries on their persons
which, in his opinion, were caused by bullets and resulted in their deaths. H
    536                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A         When the above circumstantial evidence is considered along with the
    evidence of P.W. 10, the conclusion is irresistable that it is not a case of
    'no evidence' but one of 'sufficient evidence'. The findings of the GCM not
    having been assailed in any other court, the conviction and sentence of the
    appellant is well merited. We therefore, hold that there is no merit in this
    appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
B
    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO .............. OF 1996 (ARISING OUT OF SLP
    (CRL. NO. 2126 OF 1994) AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO ......... OF 1996
    (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL.) AND 2158 OF 1994).


c tence. Leave granted in both the petitions, limited to the question of sen-
         Sep Mahavir Singh and L/NK Jnder Pal Singh the appellants in these
  two appeals, were tried by the General Court martial ('OCH') for commit-
  ting the murders of four Army Officers, namely, Col. S.S. Sahota, Major
D Jaspal Singh, Captain B.K. Chottri and Captain A. Srivastava on June 16,
  1987. Of them Col. Sahota was the Commanding Officer, Major Jaspal
    Singh was the Second-in-Command and Captain Chottri was an officer
    attached to 8 JAT Unit while Captain Srivastava belonged to 302 Field
    Ambulance. The two appellants were also attached to the above unit. By
E   its order dated December 10, 1988 the GCM held them guilty of the above
    offences and sentenced each of them to death. Aggrieved thereby they
    presented petitions under Section 164 (1) of the Army Act ('Act' for short)
    wherem they prayed that the findings and sentence of the GCM be not
    confirmed. Those petitions were rejected and the fmdings and sentence
    recorded against them were confirmed. The appellants thereafter filed
F   another petition under Section 164 (2) of the Act which was also rejected.
    They then moved the Delhi High Court with a petition under Article 226
    of the Constitution of India wherein they confined their challenge to the
    sentence imposed upon them on the ground that the GCM did not take
    into consideration the mitigating circumstances while awarding the punish-
G   ment. In resisting the petition, the respondents contended that having
    regard to the fact that the appellants committed the murders of four senior
    officers in a planned manner they deserved the sentence of death. The
    High Court rejected the contention of the appellants and for that matter
    their writ petition with the following observations:

H           "The question of sentence has to be decided by taking into account
             R.S.BUDHWAR v. U.0.1.[M.KMUKHERJEE,J.]                        537

         the aggravating circun1stances as well as mitigating circumstances       A
         and then drawing a balance. The manner in which the crime was
         committed, the weapons used and brutality or lack of it are some
         of these relevant considerations to be borne in mind. Due regard
         is to be given both to the crime and the criminal. This was a case
         of killing of a Commanding Officer, an Officer Second in Com-
                                                                                  B
         mand and two other officers. The Commanding Officer in an Army
         Regiment is like a father of his subordinates. The contention that
         the petitioners had good service record and had no advantage in
         killing these officers and they had killed these officers on instiga-
         tion of Major Budhwar cannot be accepted in the present petition
         as without going into these aspects but assuming two views on            c
         question of sentence were possible, it is not for this court to
         substitute its view for that of the authority under the Act. It cannot
         be held that the view of authority in awarding death penalty was
         in manner perverse. We may notice that according to respondents
         life sentence was imposed on Major Budhwar as he was charged             D
         for abetment whereas petitioners were actual perpetrators of the
         crime. 11

      Hence these two appeals.

       Drawing inspiration from the judgment of this Court in T1ive11ibe11 &      E
Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., (1989] 1 SCR 509, wherein this Court has
held that undue and prolonged delays occurring at the instance of the
executive in dealing with the petitions of convicts filed in exercise of their
legitimate right is a material consideration for commuting the death penal-
ty, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants          F
were entitled to the commutation of their sentence as it took the respon-
dents more than three and half years to dispose of the petitions presented
hy the appellants under sub-sections {1) and (2) of Section 164 of the Act.
On going through the record we find much substance in the above
grievance of the appellants.
                                                                                  G
      Following the death sentence pronounced by'the GCM on December
10, 1988, the appellants filed their application under sub-section {1) of
Section 164 on December 31, 1988 whic!i was disposed of on February 13,
1991, that is, after a period of more than two years and one moa'th.
Thereafter the appellants moved their petition under sub-section (2) of H
    538                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   Section 164 on March 7, 1991 and this petition was disposed of after a delay
    of more than one year and six months. The total delay therefore, comes to
    more than three years and seven months; and needless to say during this
                                                                                       .'
    period the appellants were being haunted by the shadow of death over their
    heads. No explanation is forthcoming for these unduly long delays and
    therefore, the appellants can legitimately claim consideration of the above
B   factor in their favour, but, then it has also been observed in Tliveniben 's
    case (supra), relying upon the following passage from the earlier judgment
    of this Court in Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 2 SCC 344:

             "The nature of the offence, the diverse circumstances attendant
c            upon it, its impact upon the contemporary society and the question
             whether the motivation and pattern of the crime are such as are
             likely to lead to its repetition, if the death sentence is vacated, are
             matters which must enter into the verdict as lo whether the sen-
             tence should be vacated for the reason that its execution is
             delayed."
D
    that such consideration cannot be divorced from the dastardly and diabolic
    circumstance of the crime itself.

         Having given our anxious consideration to all aspects of this case in
E the light of the above principles we feel that the appellants do not deserve
  the extreme penalty of death, notwithstanding the fact that two of the
  murders, aamely that of the Commanding Officer and Second-in-Com-
  mand were diabolically planned and committed in cold blood. From the
  record, particularly the confessions made by the two appellants which
F formed the principal basis for their conviction we fmd that the appellants
  did not commit the above two murders on their own volition prompted by
  any motive or greed much less, evincing total depravity and meanness.
  Indeed, it was the case of the respondents themselves at the GCM - which
  has been accepted by us also in the earlier appeal, that Major R.S.
G Budhwar    alon="th
                  ,, ... other Officers of the Unit of the appellants instigated
  and compelled them to commit the above two murders by exploiting their
  religious feelings. The record further indicates that initially the appellants
  declined to take any step towards the commission of the offences but
  ultimately they succumbed to the "threat, command and int1uence" of their
  superiors. So far as the murders of the other two officers are concerned
H we find that they became the unfortunate victims of circumstances as they
                   R.S. BUDHWAR v. U.O.L [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.]               539

        happened to be presen\ at the time of the incident. Anothe~ mitigating A
  •     factor which in our opinion calls for commutation of the sentence is that
        Major Budhwar who alongwith another officer (since dead) masterminded
        the two murders were awarded life imprisonment whereas the appellants
'       who carried out their orders have been sentenced to death. Jn dealing with
        this aspect of the matter the High Court however observed, as noticed
        earlier, that the appellants committed the offences while the officers were
                                                                                    B
        only abettors. In our considered view in a case of the present nature which
        relates to a disciplined force as the Army, the offence committed by the
        officers who conceived the plan, was more heinous that of the appellants
        who executed the plan as per their orders and directions. It is of course
                                                                                  c
        true that those orders being not lawful the appellants, even as disciplined
      . soldiers, were nol bound to comply with the same nor their carrying out
        such order minimised the offences but certainly this is a factor which
        cannot be ignored while deciding the question of sentence. Another factor
        which persuades us to commute the sentence is the post murder repen-
        tance of the appellants who not only surrendered before the authorities D
        within two days but also spoke out the truth in their confessional state-
       ments. In fact, but for their confessional statements the Officers, who were
        the masterminds, could not have been brought to book. None of the
       mitigating circumstances, as noticed by us abOve, were taken into con-
•,J    sideration by the High Court. It was obliged to consider both the aggravat-
       ing and the mitigating circumstances and therefore by ignoring E
       consideration of the mitigating circumstances, the High Court apparently
       fell in error.

           · For the foregojng discussfon we allow these appeals and commute
      the sentence of-death imposed upon each of the ~ppellants to imprison-
      ment for life, for the conviction recorded against them.                    F

      v.s.s.                                                   Appeals allowed.