MANCHU MOHAN BABUversusSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 916
- Decided
- 31 July 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B V NAGARATHNA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the FIR and charge‑sheet failed to disclose any of the essential ingredients of the offences alleged, and therefore the criminal proceedings must be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
Summary
The appellants, Manchu Mohan Babu and his son, organized a rally and dharna on 22 March 2019 to protest the state government's refusal to reimburse student fees, despite a Model Code of Conduct prohibiting such gatherings without permission. The police registered FIR No.102 of 2019 alleging offences under IPC sections 290, 341, 171F read with section 34 and Police Act section 34, claiming obstruction of traffic and public nuisance. The High Court dismissed the petition to quash the proceedings, holding that specific allegations existed. On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the Bhajan Lal test and found that the FIR and charge‑sheet did not disclose any of the essential ingredients of the alleged offences. Consequently, the Court held that the criminal proceedings were an abuse of process and ordered the quashing of the case under Section 482 of the CrPC. The appeals were allowed and the application to quash the FIR was granted.
Issues considered
- Whether the criminal proceedings for alleged offences under IPC ss.290, 341, 171F r/w s.34 and Police Act s.34 should be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
- Whether the facts alleged in the FIR disclose any act constituting a cognizable offence within the ambit of the cited statutes.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 171F, s. 290, s. 34, s. 341
- Police Act, 1861s. 34
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to whether the criminal proceedings against the appellants for conducting rally and dharna against the State Government, allegedly causing obstruction to the free flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to passengers, punishable u/ss.290, 341 IPC and s.34 of the Police Act, 1861, ought to be quashed. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.290, 341, 171F r/w.34 – Police Act, 1861 – s.34 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Causing obstruction to free
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1969 : 2025 INSC 916
Manchu Mohan Babu
v.
State of Andhra Pradesh & Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 3298 of 2025)
31 July 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to whether the criminal proceedings against the
appellants for conducting rally and dharna against the State
Government, allegedly causing obstruction to the free flow of traffic,
inconvenience, annoyance and risk to passengers, punishable
u/ss.290, 341 and 171F r/w s.34 IPC and s.34 of the Police Act,
1861, ought to be quashed.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code,
1860 – ss.290, 341, 171F r/w.34 – Police Act, 1861 – s.34 –
Quashing of criminal proceedings – Causing obstruction to
free flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to
passengers – Appellants-chairman of educational institutions
and his son, along with others conducted rally and dharna
against the then State Government for not granting student
fee reimbursements, allegedly causing obstruction to the
free flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to
passengers – This was done after Model Code of Conduct
came into force restricting public meetings, dharnas, rallies
and road shows without prior permission – FIR registered
and chargesheet filed – Appellants sought quashing of the
criminal proceedings – High Court dismissed the petition –
Challenge to:
Held: Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet,
the crucial ingredients of the offences u/ss.290, 341, 171F r/w.34
IPC and s.34 of the Police Act entirely absent – Reading of the
FIR and the charge-sheet neither discloses any act committed or
* Author
1970 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
illegal commission that caused common injury, danger, annoyance
to the public or interference with their public rights, nor do they
disclose any voluntary obstruction to a person – Further no material
to suggest that there was any undue influence at elections,
impersonation at elections or any act committed with the intention
to interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights – Also do not
suggest that any act was committed on a road or in an open place
within the limits of a town that caused inconvenience, annoyance
or posed a risk of danger or damage to the public, and do not
disclose any of the specified actions u/s.34 of the Police Act –
Thus, cannot be concluded that the appellants, while conducting
the rally and dharna, engaged in any form of obstruction of the
road in a manner that led to the offences alleged – Appellants
exercised their right to freedom of speech and expression and
to assemble peacefully – Thus, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution – High Court erred in holding that
there were specific allegations against the appellants and there
were no tenable grounds to quash the proceedings – Impugned
judgment set aside. [Paras 18, 19]
Case Law Cited
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992)
Supp. 1 SCC 335; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate
[1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : (1998) 5 SCC 749; Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [1988] 2 SCR 930 :
(1988) 1 SCC 692 – held applicable.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Police
Act, 1861.
List of Keywords
Quashing of criminal proceedings; Raised slogans against
government; Rally; Dharna; Common injury, danger, annoyance
to public; Undue influence at election; Freedom of speech and
expression; Assemble peacefully; Causing obstruction to free flow
of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to passengers; Model
Code of Conduct; Restricting public meetings, dharnas, rallies and
road shows without prior permission.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1971
Manchu Mohan Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3298 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2025 of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati in CRLP No. 7446 of 2022
With
Criminal Appeal No. 3299 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Sr. Adv., Pai Amit, Abhiyudaya Vats,
Tathagata Dutta, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Prerna Singh, Guntur Pramod Kumar, Samarth Krishan Luthra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nagarathna, J.
Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgement dated 02.01.2025
passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati whereby
the High Court dismissed the application filed by the appellants herein
in Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022 under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) and refused to quash
C.C. No.1015 of 2021 on the file of the Court of the IV Additional
Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati for the offences punishable under Sections
290, 341 and 171F read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861, the
appellants are before this Court.
3. The appellant Manchu Mohan Babu in Criminal Appeal arising out
of SLP (Crl.) No.5247 of 2025 is the Chairman of Sri Vidyaniketan
Educational Institutions and the appellant Manchu Vishnu Vardhan
Babu in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8623 of 2025
is the son of Manchu Mohan Babu (hereinafter, “the appellants”).
1972 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.1 Briefly stated the facts of this case are that the General
Elections for the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly
in Andhra Pradesh were scheduled on 11.04.2019 and as a
consequence, the Model Code of Conduct came into force on
10.03.2019 restricting public meetings, dharnas, rallies and road
shows without prior permission from the Competent Authority
until the end of the electoral process. On 13.03.2019, the Sub
Divisional Police Officer, Tirupati West issued Prohibitory orders
under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 restricting such public
gatherings.
4. It is the case of the respondent-State that on 22.03.2019 at about
8:30 AM, the appellants and some others comprising of staff and
students congregated together to conduct a rally along the Tirupati-
Madanapalli Road, by raising slogans against the-then Government
of Andhra Pradesh for not granting student fee reimbursements.
They further are described to have raised slogans and conducted a
dharna on the same day from 8:30 AM to 12:30 PM.
5. The above acts are alleged to have caused obstruction to the free
flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to passengers.
6. On receipt of the said information about the rally and dharna, the
Mandal Parishad Development Officer and In-charge of the Model
Code of Conduct Team-IV, Chandragiri Assembly Constituency
arrived at the spot, videographed the rally and dharna and registered
a written complaint with the police. Consequently, an FIR bearing
No. 102 of 2019 came to be registered on 22.03.2019 against the
aforesaid appellants and other participants in the rally and dharna
at the Chandragiri Police Station, District – Tirupati Urban.
7. Statements of certain witnesses having been recorded, a chargesheet
came to be filed on 03.06.2020 against the appellants in C.C. No.
1015/2021.
8. Being aggrieved by the said criminal proceedings, the appellants
approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati by filing
Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022 seeking quashing of the criminal
proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021. Vide impugned order dated
02.01.2025, the High Court dismissed the said petition. The High
Court noted that there are specific allegations leveled against the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1973
Manchu Mohan Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another
appellants in the commission of the alleged offences and observed
that there were no tenable grounds to quash the proceedings. Hence
the instant appeal.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned
counsel for the respondent-State.
10. Sri Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, learned senior counsel for the appellants
submitted that the appellants were merely exercising their fundamental
rights of freedom of speech and expression and that the rally and
dharna in question did not cause any form of obstruction to the general
public. That the rally and dharna were both conducted peaceably and
without arms. It was further contended that the Model Code of Conduct
would not govern the appellants as they are private citizens. That the
criminal proceedings initiated are nothing but an abuse of the process
of law to scuttle the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights
of the appellants. That the High Court has not appropriately applied
the ‘Bhajan Lal test’ to determine if the criminal proceedings are to
be quashed. That no ingredients of the alleged offences have been
made out. Therefore, it was argued that this Court may set-aside the
impugned order dated 02.01.2025 and quash the criminal proceedings
pending against the appellants herein in C.C. No. 1015 of 2021.
10.1 Per contra, Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel for the
respondent-state contended that the dharna and rally were
conducted without prior permission of the concerned authorities,
blocked the traffic for several hours and caused public nuisance
and inconvenience. That reasonable restrictions may be applied
to the fundamental right to congregate peaceably.
11. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments advanced
at the bar and in light of the material on record.
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having
gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for
our consideration is, whether, the criminal proceedings in C.C. No.
1015 of 2021 against the appellants herein ought to be quashed.
13. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
(“Bhajan Lal”), this Court formulated the parameters in terms of
which the powers under Section 482 of CrPC may be exercised.
While it is not necessary to revisit all those parameters, a few that
1974 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held
that quashing may be appropriate in the following circumstances:
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2).
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.”
14. Further, this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial
Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, while affirming Bhajan Lal has
held that:
“22. It is settled that High Court can exercise its power
of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana
and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., this Court examined the
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution
and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down
certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction
under these provisions, it was also stated that these
guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae
to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1975
Manchu Mohan Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another
made in the first information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make
out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the
power of superintendence by the High Court is not only
of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This
article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent
the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and
to see that the stream of administration of justice remains
clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under
Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power
more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking
these powers. …”
(Underlining by us)
15. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, reasoned that the criminal
process cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and held that
while entertaining an application for quashing an FIR at the initial
stage, the test to be applied is whether the uncontroverted allegations
prima facie establish the offence. This Court also concluded that
the court should quash those criminal cases where the chances of
an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to
be served by continuation of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid
observations squarely apply to this case.
16. On perusal of the FIR of the instant case, it is noted that respondent
No.2-complainant has filed the FIR invoking Sections 290, 341, 171F
read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act. For
ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:
IPC:
“290. Punishment for public nuisance in cases not
otherwise provided for.— Whoever commits a public
nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this
Code, shall be punished with fine which may extend to
two hundred rupees.”
xxx
1976 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
341.Punishment for wrongful restraint.—Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both”
xxx
171F. Punishment for undue influence and personation
at an election: Whoever commits the offence of undue
influence or personation at an election shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year or with fine, or with both.
xxx
34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention: When a criminal act is done by several
persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each
of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner
as if it were done by him alone.”
xxx
Police Act, 1861
34. Punishment for certain offences on roads, etc:-
Powers of police officers -
Any person who, on any road or in any open place or
street or thoroughfare within the limits of any town to
which this section shall be specially extended by the State
Government, commits any of the following offences, to
the obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger of
damage of the residents or passengers shall, on conviction
before a Magistrate, be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty
rupees, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour
not exceeding eight days; and it shall be lawful for any
police officer to take into custody; without a warrant,
any person who, within his view, commits any of such
offences namely:-
First - Slaughtering cattle, Curious riding, etc.- Any
person who slaughters any cattle or cleans any carcass;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1977
Manchu Mohan Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another
any person who rides or drives any cattle recklessly or
furiously, or trains or breaks any horse or other cattle;
Second - Cruelty to animal - Any person who wantonly
or cruelly beats, abuses or tortures any animal;
Third - Obstructing passengers - Any person who keeps
any cattle or conveyance of any kind standing longer, than is
required, for loading or unloading or for taking up or setting
down passengers, or who leaves any conveyance in such a
manner as to cause inconvenience or danger to the public;
Fourth - Exposing goods for sale - Any person who
exposes any goods for sale;
Fifth - Throwing dirt into street - Any person who throws
or lays down any dirt, filth, rubbish or any stones or building
materials, or who constructs any cowshed, stable or the
like or who causes any offensive matter to run from any
house, factory, dung-heap or the like;
Sixth - Being found drunk or riotous - Any person who
is found drunk or riotous or who is incapable of taking
care of himself;
Seventh - Indecent exposure of person - Any person
who wilfully and indecently exposes his person, or any
offensive deformity or disease, or commits nuisance by
easing himself, or by bathing or washing in any tank or
reservoir, not being a place set apart for the purpose;
Eighth - Neglect to protect dangerous places - Any
person who neglects to fence in or duly to protect any
well, tank or other dangerous place or structure.”
17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the High
Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR and
chargesheet are correct as they stand, offences punishable under
the aforesaid sections were made out.
18. On a combined reading of the FIR and the charge-sheet, we fail
to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants
herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid
provisions. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet
1978 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offences under Sections
290, 341, 171F read with 34 IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act,
1861 are entirely absent. A reading of the FIR and the charge-
sheet neither discloses any act committed or illegal commission
that caused common injury, danger, annoyance to the public or any
section of the public or interference with their public rights, nor do
they disclose any voluntary obstruction to a person that prevents
them from proceeding in any direction that they have a right to
proceed in. Further they do not disclose any material to suggest
that there was any undue influence at elections, impersonation at
elections or any act committed with the intention to interfere with
the free exercise of electoral rights. Further they do not suggest
that any act was committed on a road or in an open place within
the limits of a town that caused inconvenience, annoyance or
posed a risk of danger or inquiry or damage to the public, and do
not disclose any of the eight specified actions under Section 34 of
the Police Act, 1861. Therefore, even if the case of the respondent-
State is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the
appellants, while conducting the rally and dharna, engaged in any
form of obstruction of the road in a manner that led to the offences
alleged. The appellants were exercising their right to freedom of
speech and expression and to assemble peacefully. Therefore, no
purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution.
19. As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand,
which are not in dispute, indicate that the ingredients of the offence
under Sections 290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the IPC and
Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 are not established. The High
Court erred in concluding that there were specific allegations against
the appellants and that there were no tenable grounds to quash the
proceedings, and therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application
under Section 482 CrPC on a completely misconceived basis. It
would have been appropriate for the High Court to have exercised
the power available under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of
the court’s process.
20. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned facts and judicial
dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellants
herein is made out, therefore, the judgments of this Court in the
case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs (1), (2) and (3)
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1979
Manchu Mohan Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another
of paragraph 102, extracted above and Pepsico, squarely apply to
the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of
justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.
21. In the result, we allow these appeals and set-aside the impugned
judgment. The application under Section 482 of CrPC on the file of the
High Court shall accordingly stand allowed. The FIR No.102 of 2019
dated 22.03.2019 registered at Police Station Chandragiri, District
Tirupati under Sections 290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the
IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 and the proceedings in
C.C. No.1015 of 2021 shall accordingly stand quashed.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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